G.R. No.

120880 June 5, 1997

FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D. DE GUZMAN, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again
assailed as precipitate and unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored
requisites of due process of law. Specifically, the petition assails the Decision
1
of
the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363, where
the said court held:
In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax
assessments and estate tax assessment, are already final and
(u)nappealable-and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax
remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213
and 218 of the National Internal Revenue Code. This summary tax
remedy is distinct and separate from the other tax remedies (such
as Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not affected or
precluded by the pendency of any other tax remedies instituted by
the government.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition forcertiorari with prayer for Restraining
Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the
former President of the Republic of the Philippines, the matter of the settlement
of his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are still unresolved,
the latter issue being now before this Court for resolution. Specifically, petitioner
Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the decedent, questions the actuations
of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue in assessing, and collecting
through the summary remedy of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax
delinquencies upon the estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency
of the proceedings on probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed
as Sp. Proc. No. 10279 in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 156.
Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with an application for writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993, seeking to
I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated
February 22, 1993 and May 20, 1993, issued by respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;
III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II
(Collection Service), from proceeding with the Auction of the real
properties covered by Notices of Sale.
After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision
2
on November 29, 1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for
estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and the estate of the deceased
President Marcos have already become final and unappealable, and may thus be
enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the properties of the late
President, as was done by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the petition forCertiorari with prayer for Restraining
Order and Injunction.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the appellate
court's decision, assigning the following as errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE SUMMARY TAX REMEDIES RESORTED TO BY THE
GOVERNMENT ARE NOT AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED BY
THE PENDENCY OF THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE
ALLOWANCE OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO
THE CONTRARY, THIS PROBATE PROCEEDING PRECISELY
PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE LATE
PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF THE PROBATE
COURT TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER COURTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
B. RESPONDENT COURT ARBITRARILY ERRED IN
SWEEPINGLY DECIDING THAT SINCE THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS OF PETITIONER AND HIS PARENTS HAD
ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE, THERE WAS
NO NEED TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF THE GROUNDS CITED
IN THE PETITION. INDEPENDENT OF WHETHER THE TAX
ASSESSMENTS HAD ALREADY BECOME FINAL, HOWEVER,
PETITIONER HAS THE RIGHT TO QUESTION THE UNLAWFUL
MANNER AND METHOD IN WHICH TAX COLLECTION IS
SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED BY RESPONDENTS
COMMISSIONER AND DE GUZMAN. THUS, RESPONDENT
COURT SHOULD HAVE FAVORABLY CONSIDERED THE
MERITS OF THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS IN THE PETITION:
(1) The Notices of Levy on Real Property were issued
beyond the period provided in the Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 38-68.
(2) [a] The numerous pending court cases questioning
the late President's ownership or interests in several
properties (both personal and real) make the total
value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax
due, incapable of exact pecuniary determination at
this time. Thus, respondents' assessment of the
estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy
and Sale are premature, confiscatory and oppressive.
[b] Petitioner, as one of the late President's
compulsory heirs, was never notified, much less
served with copies of the Notices of Levy, contrary to
the mandate of Section 213 of the NIRC. As such,
petitioner was never given an opportunity to contest
the Notices in violation of his right to due process of
law.
C. ON ACCOUNT OF THE CLEAR MERIT OF THE PETITION,
RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
IT HAD NO POWER TO GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO
PETITIONER. SECTION 219 OF THE NIRC
NOTWITHSTANDING, COURTS POSSESS THE POWER TO
ISSUE A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN
RESPONDENTS COMMISSIONER'S AND DE GUZMAN'S
ARBITRARY METHOD OF COLLECTING THE ALLEGED
DEFICIENCY ESTATE AND INCOME TAXES BY MEANS OF
LEVY.
The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby
adopted:
On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died
in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.
On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to
conduct investigations and examinations of the tax liabilities and
obligations of the late president, as well as that of his family,
associates and "cronies". Said audit team concluded its
investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The
investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written
notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax returns [sic], as
well as several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986,
all in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R.
Marcos before the Regional Trial of Quezon City for violations of
Sections 82, 83 and 84 (has penalized under Sections 253 and 254
in relation to Section 252 a & b) of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the
preparation and filing of the Estate Tax Return for the estate of the
late president, the Income Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for
the years 1985 to 1986, and the Income Tax Returns of petitioner
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II for the years 1982 to 1985.
On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency
estate tax assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-002464 (against the estate
of the late president Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of
P23,293,607,638.00 Pesos); (2) Deficiency income tax assessment
no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and Deficiency income tax assessment
no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the Spouses Ferdinand and
Imelda Marcos in the amounts of P149,551.70 and
P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the years
1985 and 1986); (3) Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-
1-82-91-002460 to FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against petitioner
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II in the amounts of P258.70 pesos;
P9,386.40 Pesos; P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60 Pesos
representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to
1985).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the
deficiency estate and income tax assessments were all personally
and constructively served on August 26, 1991 and September 12,
1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos (through her caretaker Mr.
Martinez) at her last known address at No. 204 Ortega St., San
Juan, M.M. (Annexes "D" and "E" of the Petition). Likewise, copies
of the deficiency tax assessments issued against petitioner
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II were also personally and
constructively served upon him (through his caretaker) on
September 12, 1991, at his last known address at Don Mariano
Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "J"
and "J-1" of the Petition). Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices
were served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs. Marcos c/o petitioner,
at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa,
Quezon City. Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos
(or her duly authorized representative or counsel), to a conference,
was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel
but to no avail.
The deficiency tax assessments were not protested
administratively, by Mrs. Marcos and the other heirs of the late
president, within 30 days from service of said assessments.
On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two
notices of levy on real property against certain parcels of land
owned by the Marcoses to satisfy the alleged estate tax and
deficiency income taxes of Spouses Marcos.
On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were
issued for the purpose of satisfying the deficiency income taxes.
On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real
property were again issued. The foregoing tax remedies were
resorted to pursuant to Sections 205 and 213 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto
Ata (counsel of herein petitioner) calling the attention of the BIR
and requesting that they be duly notified of any action taken by the
BIR affecting the interest of their client Ferdinand "Bongbong"
Marcos II, as well as the interest of the late president copies of
the aforesaid notices were, served on April 7, 1993 and on June 10,
1993, upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of
record, "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio
Law Office".
Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at
the lobby of the City Hall of Tacloban City. The public auction for
the sale of the eleven (11) parcels of land took place on July 5,
1993. There being no bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in
favor of the government.
On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II filed
the instant petition for certiorariand prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction.
It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement of
tax laws and the collection of taxes, is of paramount importance for the
sustenance of government. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and should
be collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such collection should be
made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting
interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation,
which is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved.
3

Whether or not the proper avenues of assessment and collection of the said tax
obligations were taken by the respondent Bureau is now the subject of the
Court's inquiry.
Petitioner posits that notices of levy, notices of sale, and subsequent sale of
properties of the late President Marcos effected by the BIR are null and void for
disregarding the established procedure for the enforcement of taxes due upon
the estate of the deceased. The case of Domingo vs. Garlitos
4
is specifically
cited to bolster the argument that "the ordinary procedure by which to settle
claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased, person, as in an
inheritance (estate) tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate
court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount therefor."
This remedy is allegedly, exclusive, and cannot be effected through any other
means.
Petitioner goes further, submitting that the probate court is not precluded from
denying a request by the government for the immediate payment of taxes, and
should order the payment of the same only within the period fixed by the probate
court for the payment of all the debts of the decedent. In this regard, petitioner
cites the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. The Administratrix of the
Estate of Echarri (67 Phil 502), where it was held that:
The case of Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas and
Collector of Internal Revenue (52 Phil 803), relied upon by the
petitioner-appellant is good authority on the proposition that the
court having control over the administration proceedings has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim presented by the government for
taxes due and to order the administrator to pay the tax should it find
that the assessment was proper, and that the tax was legal, due
and collectible. And the rule laid down in that case must be
understood in relation to the case of Collector of Customs
vs. Haygood, supra., as to the procedure to be followed in a given
case by the government to effectuate the collection of the tax.
Categorically stated, where during the pendency of judicial
administration over the estate of a deceased person a claim for
taxes is presented by the government, the court has the authority to
order payment by the administrator; but, in the same way that it has
authority to order payment or satisfaction, it also has the negative
authority to deny the same. While there are cases where courts are
required to perform certain duties mandatory and ministerial in
character, the function of the court in a case of the present
character is not one of them; and here, the court cannot be an
organism endowed with latitude of judgment in one direction, and
converted into a mere mechanical contrivance in another direction.
On the other hand, it is argued by the BIR, that the state's authority to collect
internal revenue taxes is paramount. Thus, the pendency of probate proceedings
over the estate of the deceased does not preclude the assessment and
collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over the same. According
to the respondent, claims for payment of estate and income taxes due and
assessed after the death of the decedent need not be presented in the form of a
claim against the estate. These can and should be paid immediately. The
probate court is not the government agency to decide whether an estate is liable
for payment of estate of income taxes. Well-settled is the rule that the probate
court is a court with special and limited jurisdiction.
Concededly, the authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited
jurisdiction, as a probate court over estate of deceased individual, is not a trifling
thing. The court's jurisdiction, once invoked, and made effective, cannot be
treated with indifference nor should it be ignored with impunity by the very parties
invoking its authority.
In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication;
5
to determine who are the heirs of the
decedent;
6
the recognition of a natural child;
7
the status of a woman claiming to
be the legal wife of the decedent;
8
the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
testator;
9
and to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.
10

The pivotal question the court is tasked to resolve refers to the authority of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to collect by the summary remedy of levying upon,
and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies, without the
cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the
deceased.
The nature of the process of estate tax collection has been described as follows:
Strictly speaking, the assessment of an inheritance tax does not
directly involve the administration of a decedent's estate, although it
may be viewed as an incident to the complete settlement of an
estate, and, under some statutes, it is made the duty of the probate
court to make the amount of the inheritance tax a part of the final
decree of distribution of the estate. It is not against the property of
decedent, nor is it a claim against the estate as such, but it is
against the interest or property right which the heir, legatee,
devisee, etc., has in the property formerly held by decedent.
Further, under some statutes, it has been held that it is not a suit or
controversy between the parties, nor is it an adversary proceeding
between the state and the person who owes the tax on the
inheritance. However, under other statutes it has been held that the
hearing and determination of the cash value of the assets and the
determination of the tax are adversary proceedings. The
proceeding has been held to be necessarily a proceeding in rem.
11

In the Philippine experience, the enforcement and collection of estate tax, is
executive in character, as the legislature has seen it fit to ascribe this task to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Section 3 of the National Internal Revenue Code
attests to this:
Sec. 3. Powers and duties of the Bureau. The powers and duties
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall comprehend the
assessment and collection of all national internal revenue taxes,
fees, and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties,
and fines connected therewith, including the execution of
judgments in all cases decided in its favor by the Court of Tax
Appeals and the ordinary courts. Said Bureau shall also give effect
to and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it
by this Code or other laws.
Thus, it was in Vera vs. Fernandez
12
that the court recognized the liberal
treatment of claims for taxes charged against the estate of the decedent. Such
taxes, we said, were exempted from the application of the statute of non-claims,
and this is justified by the necessity of government funding, immortalized in the
maxim that taxes are the lifeblood of the government. Vectigalia nervi sunt rei
publicae taxes are the sinews of the state.
Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after
administration is opened, need not be submitted to the committee
on claims in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of
its control over the administrator, the court may direct the payment
of such taxes upon motion showing that the taxes have been
assessed against the estate.
Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings
extends so far, even to allowing the enforcement of tax obligations against the
heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of the estate's properties.
Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the
deceased, can be collected from the heirs even after the
distribution of the properties of the decedent. They are exempted
from the application of the statute of non-claims. The heirs shall be
liable therefor, in proportion to their share in the inheritance.
13

Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in
question. One, by going after all the heirs and collecting from each
one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance
received. Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section
315 of the Tax Code upon all property and rights to property belong
to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property
of the estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the
payment of the tax due the estate. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in
probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory
requirement in the collection of estate taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that
the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale of the properties
allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required to seek
first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the
pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate
settlement court's approval of the state's claim for estate taxes, before the same
can be enforced and collected.
On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement
court which is bidden not to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the
decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any party interested in the
estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the
petitioner's contention that it is the probate court which approves the assessment
and collection of the estate tax.
If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the estate
taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper administrative and
judicial avenues provided for by law.
Section 229 of the NIRC tells us how:
Sec. 229. Protesting of assessment. When the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that
proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer
of his findings. Within a period to be prescribed by implementing
regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said
notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall
issue an assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a
request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and
manner as may be prescribed by implementing regulations within
(30) days from receipt of the assessment; otherwise, the
assessment shall become final and unappealable.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association
or corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest
may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from
receipt of said decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final,
executory and demandable. (As inserted by P.D. 1773)
Apart from failing to file the required estate tax return within the time required for
the filing of the same, petitioner, and the other heirs never questioned the
assessments served upon them, allowing the same to lapse into finality, and
prompting the BIR to collect the said taxes by levying upon the properties left by
President Marcos.
Petitioner submits, however, that "while the assessment of taxes may have been
validly undertaken by the Government, collection thereof may have been done in
violation of the law. Thus, the manner and method in which the latter is enforced
may be questioned separately, and irrespective of the finality of the former,
because the Government does not have the unbridled discretion to enforce
collection without regard to the clear provision of law."
14

Petitioner specifically points out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68,
implementing Sections 318 and 324 of the old tax code (Republic Act 5203), the
BIR's Notices of Levy on the Marcos properties, were issued beyond the allowed
period, and are therefore null and void:
. . . the Notices of Levy on Real Property (Annexes O to NN of
Annex C of this Petition) in satisfaction of said assessments were
still issued by respondents well beyond the period mandated in
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 38-68. These Notices of Levy
were issued only on 22 February 1993 and 20 May 1993 when at
least seventeen (17) months had already lapsed from the last
service of tax assessment on 12 September 1991. As no notices of
distraint of personal property were first issued by respondents, the
latter should have complied with Revenue Memorandum Circular
No. 38-68 and issued these Notices of Levy not earlier than three
(3) months nor later than six (6) months from 12 September 1991.
In accordance with the Circular, respondents only had until 12
March 1992 (the last day of the sixth month) within which to issue
these Notices of Levy. The Notices of Levy, having been issued
beyond the period allowed by law, are thus void and of no effect.
15

We hold otherwise. The Notices of Levy upon real property were issued within
the prescriptive period and in accordance with the provisions of the present Tax
Code. The deficiency tax assessment, having already become final, executory,
and demandable, the same can now be collected through the summary remedy
of distraint or levy pursuant to Section 205 of the NIRC.
The applicable provision in regard to the prescriptive period for the assessment
and collection of tax deficiency in this instance is Article 223 of the NIRC, which
pertinently provides:
Sec. 223. Exceptions as to a period of limitation of assessment and
collection of taxes. (a) In the case of a false or fraudulent return
with intent to evade tax or of a failure to file a return, the tax may be
assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax
may be begun without assessment, at any time within ten (10)
years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud, or omission:Provided,
That, in a fraud assessment which has become final and executory,
the fact of fraud shall be judicially taken cognizance of in the civil or
criminal action for the collection thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any internal revenue tax which has been assessed within the
period of limitation above prescribed, may be collected by distraint
or levy or by a proceeding in court within three years following the
assessment of the tax.
xxx xxx xxx
The omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent failure to contest or
appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's cause, as
under the above-cited provision, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be
assessed at any time within ten years after the omission, and any tax so
assessed may be collected by levy upon real property within three years
following the assessment of the tax. Since the estate tax assessment had
become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards protesting
the validity of the said assessment, there is now no reason why the BIR cannot
continue with the collection of the said tax. Any objection against the assessment
should have been pursued following the avenue paved in Section 229 of the
NIRC on protests on assessments of internal revenue taxes.
Petitioner further argues that "the numerous pending court cases questioning the
late president's ownership or interests in several properties (both real and
personal) make the total value of his estate, and the consequent estate tax due,
incapable of exact pecuniary determination at this time. Thus, respondents'
assessment of the estate tax and their issuance of the Notices of Levy and sale
are premature and oppressive." He points out the pendency of Sandiganbayan
Civil Case Nos. 0001-0034 and 0141, which were filed by the government to
question the ownership and interests of the late President in real and personal
properties located within and outside the Philippines. Petitioner, however, omits
to allege whether the properties levied upon by the BIR in the collection of estate
taxes upon the decedent's estate were among those involved in the said cases
pending in the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the court is at a loss as to how these
cases are relevant to the matter at issue. The mere fact that the decedent has
pending cases involving ill-gotten wealth does not affect the enforcement of tax
assessments over the properties indubitably included in his estate.
Petitioner also expresses his reservation as to the propriety of the BIR's total
assessment of P23,292,607,638.00, stating that this amount deviates from the
findings of the Department of Justice's Panel of Prosecutors as per its resolution
of 20 September 1991. Allegedly, this is clear evidence of the uncertainty on the
part of the Government as to the total value of the estate of the late President.
This is, to our mind, the petitioner's last ditch effort to assail the assessment of
estate tax which had already become final and unappealable.
It is not the Department of Justice which is the government agency tasked to
determine the amount of taxes due upon the subject estate, but the Bureau of
Internal Revenue,
16
whose determinations and assessments are presumed
correct and made in good faith.
17
The taxpayer has the duty of proving
otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of
official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an assessment based
on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does not appear to have
been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden of proof is upon the
complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is erroneous. Failure to
present proof of error in the assessment will justify the judicial affirmance of said
assessment.
18
In this instance, petitioner has not pointed out one single
provision in the Memorandum of the Special Audit Team which gave rise to the
questioned assessment, which bears a trace of falsity. Indeed, the petitioner's
attack on the assessment bears mainly on the alleged improbable and
unconscionable amount of the taxes charged. But mere rhetoric cannot supply
the basis for the charge of impropriety of the assessments made.
Moreover, these objections to the assessments should have been raised,
considering the ample remedies afforded the taxpayer by the Tax Code, with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals, as described earlier,
and cannot be raised now via Petition for Certiorari, under the pretext of grave
abuse of discretion. The course of action taken by the petitioner reflects his
disregard or even repugnance of the established institutions for governance in
the scheme of a well-ordered society. The subject tax assessments having
become final, executory and enforceable, the same can no longer be contested
by means of a disguised protest. In the main, Certiorari may not be used as a
substitute for a lost appeal or remedy.
19
This judicial policy becomes more
pronounced in view of the absence of sufficient attack against the actuations of
government.
On the matter of sufficiency of service of Notices of Assessment to the petitioner,
we find the respondent appellate court's pronouncements sound and resilient to
petitioner's attacks.
Anent grounds 3(b) and (B) both alleging/claiming lack of notice
We find, after considering the facts and circumstances, as well
as evidences, that there was sufficient, constructive and/or actual
notice of assessments, levy and sale, sent to herein petitioner
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos as well as to his mother Mrs. Imelda
Marcos.
Even if we are to rule out the notices of assessments personally
given to the caretaker of Mrs. Marcos at the latter's last known
address, on August 26, 1991 and September 12, 1991, as well as
the notices of assessment personally given to the caretaker of
petitioner also at his last known address on September 12, 1991
the subsequent notices given thereafter could no longer be ignored
as they were sent at a time when petitioner was already here in the
Philippines, and at a place where said notices would surely be
called to petitioner's attention, and received by responsible persons
of sufficient age and discretion.
Thus, on October 20, 1992, formal assessment notices were
served upon Mrs. Marcos c/o the petitioner, at his office, House of
Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Q.C. (Annexes "A", "A-1",
"A-2", "A-3"; pp. 207-210, Comment/Memorandum of OSG).
Moreover, a notice to taxpayer dated October 8, 1992 inviting Mrs.
Marcos to a conference relative to her tax liabilities, was furnished
the counsel of Mrs. Marcos Dean Antonio Coronel (Annex "B", p.
211, ibid). Thereafter, copies of Notices were also served upon
Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner and their counsel "De Borja,
Medialdea, Ata, Bello, Guevarra and Serapio Law Office", on April
7, 1993 and June 10, 1993. Despite all of these Notices, petitioner
never lifted a finger to protest the assessments, (upon which the
Levy and sale of properties were based), nor appealed the same to
the Court of Tax Appeals.
There being sufficient service of Notices to herein petitioner (and
his mother) and it appearing that petitioner continuously ignored
said Notices despite several opportunities given him to file a protest
and to thereafter appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the tax
assessments subject of this case, upon which the levy and sale of
properties were based, could no longer be contested (directly or
indirectly) via this instant petition for certiorari.
20

Petitioner argues that all the questioned Notices of Levy, however, must be
nullified for having been issued without validly serving copies thereof to the
petitioner. As a mandatory heir of the decedent, petitioner avers that he has an
interest in the subject estate, and notices of levy upon its properties should have
been served upon him.
We do not agree. In the case of notices of levy issued to satisfy the delinquent
estate tax, the delinquent taxpayer is the Estate of the decedent, and not
necessarily, and exclusively, the petitioner as heir of the deceased. In the same
vein, in the matter of income tax delinquency of the late president and his
spouse, petitioner is not the taxpayer liable. Thus, it follows that service of
notices of levy in satisfaction of these tax delinquencies upon the petitioner is not
required by law, as under Section 213 of the NIRC, which pertinently states:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Levy shall be effected by writing upon said certificate a
description of the property upon which levy is made. At the same
time, written notice of the levy shall be mailed to or served upon the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the property is
located and upon the delinquent taxpayer, or if he be absent from
the Philippines, to his agent or the manager of the business in
respect to which the liability arose, or if there be none, to the
occupant of the property in question.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing notwithstanding, the record shows that notices of warrants of
distraint and levy of sale were furnished the counsel of petitioner on April 7,
1993, and June 10, 1993, and the petitioner himself on April 12, 1993 at his office
at the Batasang Pambansa.
21
We cannot therefore, countenance petitioner's
insistence that he was denied due process. Where there was an opportunity to
raise objections to government action, and such opportunity was disregarded, for
no justifiable reason, the party claiming oppression then becomes the oppressor
of the orderly functions of government. He who comes to court must come with
clean hands. Otherwise, he not only taints his name, but ridicules the very
structure of established authority.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVED to DENY the present petition. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED
in all respects.
SO ORDERED.