Asanga - Mahayanasamgraha (Tr. Lamotte, English From French Ed.)
Asanga - Mahayanasamgraha (Tr. Lamotte, English From French Ed.)
Volume II
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRASTVAN [pg. 1]
Ten superiorities of the Mahyna ( 1-2)
Ten chapters of the Mahyna ( 3)
Authenticity of the Mahyna ( 4)
Order of the chapters ( 5)
I. Pravea in general ( 1)
II. Sabhravasth
1. Adhimukti ( 2)
2. Four stages of pravea ( 3)
3. Practices of sabhra ( 4)
4. Three cittottpana ( 5)
5. Catusthnapraha ( 6)
III. Prayoga- and prativedhvasth
1. Four paryeas and four yathbhtaparijnas ( 7)
2. Entry into the Vijaptimtra, process and comparisons ( 8)
3. Entry into the three svabhvas ( 9)
4. Domains of nman ( 10)
5. Daranamrga ( 11)
6. amatha and vipayan ( 12)
7. Four nirvedhabhgyas and four samdhis ( 13)
IV. Bhvanmrga ( 14)
V. Abhisamaya of the rvakas and the bodhisattvas, differences ( 15)
VI. Stanzas related to pravea
1. Strlakra, XIX, 47 ( 16)
2. Yogavibhagastra ( 17)
3. Strlakra, VI, 6-10 ( 18)
CHAPTER
FOUR:
Praveahetuphala
185]249
I. Mundane and supramundane pramits 1)
[pg.
II. uddhdhyaya ( 2)
III. Summarizing stanza ( 3)
IV. Number of the pramits ( 4)
V. Nature of the pramits ( 5)
VI. Order of the pramits ( 6)
VII. Etymology of the pramits ( 7)
VIII. Development of the pramits ( 8)
IX. Subdivision of the pramits ( 9)
X. Content of the pramits (v. 10)
XI. Vices opposed to the pramits ( 11)
XII. Benefits of the pramits ( 12)
XIII. Mutual inclusion of the pramits ( 13)
III. Stanzas on rayaparvtti and the identity of sasra and nirva (v. 3)
10
11
List of Abbreviations
Dh
Bh
bh
12
Foreword
Published in the north-west of India in the 4th century C.E., the Mahynasagraha
which constitutes the charter of Idealist Buddhism (vijnvda) professed by the
Mahyna school of the Yogcra, is the work of Asaga, the son of a brahmin of
Puruapura (Peshawar), who was a monk in the Sarvstivdin order before going over to
the Mahyna.
This work, of which Vasubandhu, Asaga's brother, obtained a copy, has not come down
to us in the original Indian, but has been transmitted in a number of Chinese and Tibetan
versions.11 I
2Published in Tokyo under the direction of Taizo Ishizaka and Shoson Miyamoto by the Foundation for
the Advancement of Buddhist Academic Studies and the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist
Studies
3 In the course of publication by the Pali Text Society.
13
Skityyana and deposited in the Jayaswal Research Institute in Patna4 has given us
access to many Vijnavda treatises, and some day we will read in their original
wording Maitreya's five stras claimed by the Yogcra:
1. Yogcrabhmi "Levels of the Practice of Yoga", just now in the course of
publication5
2. Ratnagotravibhga Mahynottaratantra "Highest Doctrine of the Great
Vehicle analyzing the precious spiritual lineages"6.
3. Mahynastrlamkra "Ornament of the Stras of the Great Vehicle", edited
and translated by Sylvain Lvi in the years 1907 to 1911.
4. Madhyntavibhga "Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes" which has just
been enriched by a new manuscript of the kriks and the bhya, the latter attributed to
Vasubandhu7.
5. Dharmadharmatvibhga "Analysis of the Nature of Phenomena", of which
the original Sanskrit has been found in Tibet and awaits publication8.
Asaga himself is held to be the author of the Abhidharmasamuccaya "Summary of
Scholasticism" and of the Mahynasagraha "General Survey of the Great Vehicle".
4 The list of these manuscripts will be found in R. Sktyyana, Palm-leaf Manuscripts in Tibet, JBORS,
XXI, 1935, p. 21-43; Second Search of Sanskrit Palm-leaf Manuscripts in Tibet, ibid., XXIV, 1938, p. 137
et seq.
5 For these later publications relative to this voluminous work, see Le Trait de la Grande Vertu de
Sagesse, vol. III, Louvain, 1970, p. LXVIII, and L. May, La Philosophie bouddhique idaliste, tudes
Asiatiques, XXV, 1971, p. 280 n.
6 E.H. Johnston's edition of the Sanskrit text, Patna, 1950; English translation, introduction and
commentary by Takasaki Jikido, Rome, 1966; a brilliant explanation of La Thorie du Tathagata et du
gotra, by D. S. Ruegg, in Publications of BEFEO, LXX, Paris 1969.
7 Edited and indexed by Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhynta-vibhga-bhya, Tokyo, 1964.
8 A work widely studied in Japan but still not well known in the West. The Tibetan translation, followed
by a short fragment of the original text, has been published by Nozawa Jsh in Recueil d'articles ddi au
professeur Yamaguchi, Kyoto, 1955, p. 11-49.
14
Lengthy fragments of the former work have been published9and the complete work has
had an excellent translation into French by Rev. Rhula10 The Mahynasagraha has
not been benefited in quite as favorable a way.
Finally for the record we will mention the Viatik and the Triik
Vijptimtratsiddhi where Vasubandhu "shows, in twenty and in thirty strophes
respectively, the nature of things is an activity -- (p. VII).", according to the translation
proposed by J. May. These two main works, remarkable for their conciseness and clarity,
were discovered in 1932 in Nepal by Sylvain Lvi who then edited and translated them in
the appropriate style11.
The study of these various documents raises the problem of authenticity and chronology
which Professor E. Frauwallner has brought up and discussed on the basis of an
abundance of documentation. His initiative has set in motion a whole series of research12.
Are the first Idealist stras, which tradition and legend assign to Asaga or
Maitreyantha, the work of an historical individual or are they the work of the
philosopher Asaga writing under the inspiration of the great Bodhisattva Maitreya
dwelling in the Tuita heaven? Or again, are they the work of several different authors
each claiming to have been inspired by the same bodhisattva? Actually it seems difficult
to attribute them as a group to one and the same author because these stras, Idealist
though they are, present important doctrinal divergences and different philosophical
concerns. Thus the Ratnagotravibhgha proposes as its main heading a doctrine of 'the
9 These fragments were published for the first time by V.V. Gokhale, Fragments from the
Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaga, Journal of the Bombay Branch R.A.S., n.s. XXIII, 1947, p. 13-38. They
have been continued by P. Pradhan in his Sanskrit restoration of the complete text of the work:
Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaga, Viva-Bharati Studies 12, Santiniketan, 1950.
10 W. Rhula, Le Compendium de la Super-doctrine d'Asaga, Publications of EFEO, LXXVIII, Paris,
1971.
11 S. Lvi, Vijptimtratsiddhi, Deux traits de Vasubandhu, Paris, 1925; Matriaux pour l'tude du
systeme Vijptimtra, Paris, 1932.
12 See E. Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin, 1956, p. 264-350; P. Demiville, La
Yogcrabhmi de Sagharaka, BEFEO, XLIV, 1954, p. 381, n. 4, p. 434, n. 4: L Schmithausen, Zur
Literaturgeschichte der Alteren Yogcra-Schule, Sonderdruck, ZDMG, Wiesbaden, 1969, p. 811-823.
15
Embryo of the Tathagata' in terms of which the Buddhanature is virtually inherent in all
living beings. Furthermore, the intervention of many hands has been detected in one of
these stras, the voluminous Yogcrabmi, so much so that, at least in certain sections,
it appears to be a conglomerate of heterogeneous material rather than a unitary work.
Whether supplied by the Indian, Chinese or Tibetan traditions, information concerning
the great scholars of the School is full of obscurities and incoherences, so much so that
one may wonder if the famous name of Vasubandhu does not apply to two distinct
individuals13: a Vasubandhu of the 4th century, the brother of Asaga and author of
numerous commentaries on the Idealist stras and stras, and a Vasubandhu of the 5th
century who, after having published the Abhidharmakoa where he explained the system
of the Sarvstivda-Vaibhaika, was converted to the Idealist Mahyna to which he
dedicated his well-known Viatik and Triik. These, as we know, were successful:
in India itself; the latter was commented upon no less than ten times and, in various
forms, was taught during the 6th century by eminent masters including Sthiramati at the
University of Valabhi at Kivr, Dharmapla and his pupil ilabhadra who made
famous the seat of Nland in the state of Bihar. It was at Nland when he arrived in the
year 633 that the Chinese master Hiuan-tsang found the information on the Vijnavda
that he was seeking, and on the basis of this, when he returned to China, he composed his
Ch'eng wei che louen14 which became, in the Far East and for centuries, the map par
excellence of Idealism. The detailed history of this movement of ideas has yet to be
written. Paul Demiville15 comments that the adherents of the school entitled "Idealist"
Vijnavda also bear the name Yogcra "Practitioners of (mental) effort". They are
regarded as successors to the refined Yoga taught in the meditation manuals compiled in
Kashmir in the second century of our era for the use of those specializing in dhyna.
These manuals, published under the name Yogcrabhmi16, had been developed in
13 On the problem of the two Vasubandhus, cf. E. Frauwallner, On the date of the Buddhist Master of the
Law Vasubandhu, Rome, 1951; Philosophie des Buddhismus, p. 76, 350; Landmarks in the history of
Indian Logic, WZKSO, V, p. 129-132. - P. S. Jaini, On the theory of the two Vasubandhus, BSOAS, XXI,
1958, p. 48-53.
14 Cf. L. de La Valle Poussin, La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite et annote, 3 vol., Paris, 1928-48.
15 In l'Inde Classique, II, Paris, 1953, p. 449.
16 One of these manuals is the Yogcrabmi of Sagharaka mentioned above, n. 12.
16
Sarvstivdin milieus, but some Mahyna practitioners did not delay in picking them up,
not without some retouching, and it is not unreasonable that the most monumental
production of the Idealist School bears, as well, the name Yogcrabhmistra.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Vijnavdin literature is very deeply rooted in
the old canonical stras of the Tripiika. The doctrine of a single mind and the
psychology of the fundamental or store-consciousness (layavijna) which explains it,
should be studied in the light of the canonical texts dealing with citta, manas and
vijna. Like the other four skandhas, vijna is produced and disappears in perpetual
alternation in both day and night17, but nevertheless, according to the dependent
production of phenomena (pratityasamutpda), it is the condition for name and form
(nmarpa), i.e. the psycho-physical phenomena of existence. In other respects, so the
old texts tell us, the world (of beings) is led by the mind, is manouevered by the mind:
everything obeys this single dharma, the mind18; the mind is luminous, but sometimes it
is defiled by the adventitious passions and sometimes it is free of the adventitious
passions19; by the defilement of the mind, beings are defiled; by the purification of the
mind they are purified20; just as the dyer or the painter paints human shapes by mixing
colors, so the mind makes future births21. Therefore, if there is "a great deal of
Mdhyamika philosophy in the Canon" (L. de La Valle Poussin), it is also true that in
the same Canon there is a large portion of Vijnavda.
The mind also plays a large rle in the Mahynastras, but for the earliest and notably
for the Prajpramit, it is a matter of "mind no-mind" (cittam acittam), and the true
nature of everything (dharma dharmat) is precisely the absence of mind (acittat)22.
Idealist Buddhism obviously cannot claim it. But there exists a second wave of
Mahynastras for which "the threefold world is nothing but mind" (cittmatram ida
vad yad ida traidhtkam)23 and which the Vijnavda will not fail to take into
17 Sayutta, II, p..95.
18 Sayutta, I, p. 39; Anguttara, II, p. 177; passage cited in the Mahynastrlakra, p. 151.
19 Anguttara, I, p. 10.
20 Sayutta, III, p. 151, 152.
21 Sayutta, II, p. 101-102; III, p. 152.
22 For this subject, see my Introduction to l'Enseignement de Vimalakirti, Louvain, 1962, p. 56-60.
23 Daabhmika, ed. Rahder, p.49.
17
account. These are, for example, the Daabhmka, the Sadhinirmocana, the
Lakvatra, the Ghanavyha, the Buddhabhmi, the Akayamatinirdea and the
rmldevisihanda.
In conclusion, I (E. L.) make the wish that the study of the Mahynasagraha will be
taken up and pursued in the light of the considerable progress marked by the
documentation and criticism in the course of these last thirty years. The assessment of
present knowledge on the Vijnavda has just been presented by Jacques May in his
article La philosophie bouddhique idaliste (Revue de la Socit Suisse d'Etudes
Asiatiques, XXV, 1971, p. 265-323). I refer the reader to this clear, precise and complete
study.
E. Lamotte
Louvain, June 10, 1973.
In Sanskrit: mahynasagraha; in Tibetan: theg pa chen po bsdus pa.
- Homage to the Royal Prince Majur.
18
PRASTVAN
(INTRODUCTION)
19
by
authorizing
(anujna)
innocent
pleasures
24 For the two extremes condemned by the Buddha, kmasukhalliknuyoga and tmaklamathnuyoga
(Pli: attakilamatha), cf. Vinaya, I, p.10: Dgha, III, p.113; Majjhima, III, p. 230: Sayutta, IV, p. 330; V,
p. 421: Nettipakaraa, p. 110; Visuddhimagga, p. 5, 32; Bodh. bhmi, p. 185(5), 187(11).
25 Cf. Atthaslin, p. 21 (= Sumagalavilsin): Tsu pi ca etesu tisso sikkh ti pahnni catubbhido
gambhrabhvo veditabbo. Tath hi Vinayapiaka visisena adhislasikkh vutt, Suttantapiake
adhicittasikkh, Abhidhammapiake adhipasikkh.
26 The manuscripts. of the Strlakra have 'vipratisrdinemaa: S. Lvi, in his edition, p. 54, corrects
this as 'vipratisrd avipratisrea, and in his translation, as 'vipratisrdikramea. But here, according to
gyod pa la rab tu das pas, it should be read as vipratisrtikramea.
20
iii. Finally, the Stra teaches the texts (dharma) and theses (artha)27. The Vinaya
accomplishes (nipatti) the texts and theses, because the person who has disciplined their
afflictions (kleavinayasayukta) penetrates (prativedha) the former and the latter. The
Abhidharma excels in cutting through arguments (sakathyavinicayakaualya) about
the texts and theses. For these nine reasons, they are enumerated as three baskets.
Furthermore, they have, as their purpose, liberation (vimocana) from sasra.
How then do they liberate? They liberate by predisposition (vsan), intellection
(bodhana), pacification (amana) and penetration (prativeda). By hearing (ruta), the
mind is predisposed; by reflection (cint), one understands; by cultivating tranquility
(amathabhvan), one becomes peaceful; by discernment (vipayana), one penetrates.
Furthermore, in brief (samsata), Stra, Vinaya and Abhidharma each has a fourfold
etymology (caturvidrtha) by the understanding of which the bodhisattva acquires
omniscience (sarvajt); as for the rvaka, by understanding the meaning of a simple
stanza, he acquires the destruction of his defilements (sravakaya). In what way does
each have a fourfold etymology?
1. The Stra is thus called because it tells us (scana) about the scene (raya), nature
(lakaa), thing (dharma) and purpose (artha). (i) The scene here means the place where
the Stra has been preached, by whom and to whom. (ii) The nature is the nature of
conventional
reality
(savtisatyalakaa)
and
the
nature
of
absolute
truth
(paramrthasatyalakaa). (iii) The entities are the aggregates (skandha), the bases
(yatana)
of
consciousness,
the
elements
(dhtu),
dependent
origination
27 The expression dharmrtha does not mean 'the meaning of the Ideal' (S. Lvi); it is a copulative
compound. By dharma is meant the stras; by artha, the theses taught in the stras. Cf. below, chap. III,
paragraph 1.
28 According to bh more complete than the Strlakra: chos ni phu po da/ skye mche da/ khams
da/ rten chi brel par byu ba da/ zas sa/ bsam gtan da/ tshad med pa da/ rnam par thar pa
brgyad da/ zil pai skye mched da/ zad par gyi skye mched da/ bya chub kyi phyogs da/ so so ya
dag rig pa la sogs pao. The detailed list of these various categories will be found in the Mahvyutpatti.
21
22
(rayaparvtti)33 resulting from change in the male or female sex organs of a monk or
nun (vyajanaparivartana); if there has been a wrong-doing not shared (asdhraa)
[by both sexes], it does not count34; (vi) reflection on reality (bhtapratyavek): this is a
special reflection having the aspect of summaries of the doctrine (dharmoddna)35; (vii)
penetration of the nature of phenomena (dharmatpratilambha): when, by seeing the
truths (satyadarana), one escapes (nisaraa) from the lesser and the least wrongdoings (kudrnukudrpatti)36. The Vinaya has four other meanings: (i) the individual
(pudgala): the person for whom the rule has been promulgated [by the Buddha]; (ii)
promulgation (prajapti): when, having learned of an individual fault (apardha), the
Buddha, having called the community together, promulgated the rule; (iii) analysis
(pravibhga), i.e., the analysis of the wording of the rule (uddea) after its promulgation;
(iv) discussion (vinicaya): this is establishing (nirdhraa) in each case whether or not
there is wrong-doing.
23
24
vii. Superior mind: the concentration of the mind or observance in the matter of mind is
called superior mind: these are the concentrations (samdhi).
viii. Superior wisdom: the practice of full understanding (abhisamaya) or observance in
the matter of wisdom is called superior wisdom: this is nonconceptual knowledge
(nirvikalpajna).
ix-x. bh comments as follows: spas pai khyad par es bya ba la/ khyad par du pags
paam/ rab tu dbye bas sam/ so so ra go rig pas on mos pa da/ es byai sgrib pa
spas pa ste/ de ya mi gnas pai mya an las das pao// ye es kyi khad par...ni sgrib
pa da bral bai ye es te/ de ya rnam par mi rtog pai ye es rjes su mthun pao// sas
rgyas kyi ye es ni sgrib pa thams cad kyi bag chags spas pa ste/ di ni rnam par mi
rtog pai ye es da/ ye es kyi khyad par ro/ : "Superiority of cessation: superiority
(viea), classification (prabheda) or intuition (pratytmagati) cut off the obstacle of the
afflictions (klevaraa) and the obstacle to knowledge (jeyvaraa): this is the
nonabiding nirva (apratihitanirva, cf. chap. IX). Superiority of knowledge:
knowledge without obstacle (vinvaraajna); this is consonant (nulomika) with
nonconceptual knowledge. The Buddha's knowledge is free of any trace (vsan) of
obstacle. It is a nonconceptual knowledge par excellence.
3. How is that shown? According to this passage, ten topics (sthna) of which
there is no mention in the Vehicle of the rvakas are treated in the Great
Vehicle. These are:
i) The store-consciousness (layavijna) is called support of the knowable
(jeyraya).
ii) The three natures (svabhva): dependent nature (paratantrasvabhva),
imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhva) and absolute nature
(parinipannasvabhva), are the natures of the knowable (jeyalakaa).
iii) Concept-Only (vijptimtrat) is the entry into the natures of the
knowable (jneyalakaapravea)
iv) The six virtues (a pramit) are the cause and the result of this entry
(praveahetuphala).
25
v) The ten stages of the bodhisattva (da bodhisattvabhmi) are the various
cultivations of the cause and result of this entry (hetuphala
bhvanprabheda).
vi) The discipline (savara) of the bodhisattvas is the superior discipline
(adhila) contained in these various cultivations.
vii) The concentrations (samdhi) called 'Hero's walk' (ragama), 'Matrix
of space' (gaganagarbha), etc., are the superior mind (adhicitta) contained in
these various cultivations.
viii) Nonceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajna) is the superior wisdom
(adhipraj) contained in these various disciplines.
ix) The nonabiding nirva (apratiitanirva) is the cessation which is the
result (phalapraha) of these three observances.
x) The three bodies of the Buddha (buddhakya), namely, essence body
(svbhvikakya), enjoyment body (sabhogakaya) and apparitional body
(nirmakaya), are the knowledge of the result (phalajna) of these three
trainings.
The ten topics (sthna) mentioned here show that the Great Vehicle is distinct
from the Vehicle of the rvakas. Furthermore, they show the superiority
(agrat) of the Great Vehicle. The Bhagavat reserves the preaching of it for
bodhisattvas. Therefore, relative to the Great Vehicle alone, the speech (vc) of
the Buddha Bhagavats is distinguished (viia) by ten superiorities (viea).
[133a18].
26
v) The ten stages of the Bodhisattva are the various cultivations of the cause and result of
this entry: the ten stages of the bodhisattva are the various cultivations of the two, i.e., of
the cause and of the result, which are the aforementioned virtues.
viii) Nonconceptual knowledge (literally, free of concept) is the higher wisdom: for the
rvaka, the absence of concept (nirvikalpa) consists of not conceiving of any of the four
errors (viparysa); for the bodhisattva, the absence of concept consists of not conceiving
of any dharma whatsoever; this is the difference between the two absences of concepts.
[For the four errors: taking what is impermanent to be permanent, (anitye nityam iti), etc.,
cf. Aguttara II, p. 52; Visuddhimagga, II, p. 683: Koa V, p. 21: Sadhinir., p. 101;
ikasam., p. 198].
ix) The nonabiding nirva is the fruit of cessation: this concerns the cessation which is
the fruition of the three trainings (ik), namely, the cessation (praha) of the obstacle
of the afflictions (klevaraa) and the obstacle to knowledge (jeyvaraa).
x) The three bodies is the knowledge of the result: this concerns the knowledge of the
result of the three trainings. If there were no essence-body (svbhvikakya), the Dharma
body (dharmakya) would not exist, as in the case of the eye (cakurindriya). If there
were no Dharma body, the body of enjoyment (sabhogakya) would not exist, as in the
case of the visual consciousness (cakurvijna). Here the 'supporter' (niraya) and the
'support' (nirita) should be thought of as equal. If the enjoyment body did not exist, after
having entered into the higher stages, the bodhisattvas would have no pleasure in
enjoying (sabhuj-) the Dharma. Without this pleasure, the accumulations (sabhra) of
enlightenment would not be complete (paripra), as in the case of color (rpa). If there
were no body of appearance (nirmakya), the bodhisattvas on the stage of application
of faith (adhimukticarybhmi) and the rvakas of lesser faith (hndhimuktika) would
fail in their undertaking (rambha). That is why it is necessary (avayam) that there be
three bodies. (Bh)
The ten subjects, etc.: This last line been translated according to H; the Tibetan is
obscure. The ten topics mentioned here show that the Great Vehicle is distinct from the
Vehicle of the rvakas, since they are not treated in the Vehicle of the rvakas. (Bh)
27
in the levels
(bhmi), they do not constitute a cause of disturbance (apakrahetu); in the path taught
by the Buddha, they do not bring the disturbances (apakra) of thievery (caura), etc.; or
again, they are not in variance with either sasra or nirva." (Bh)
28
5. Why are the ten tpics (sthna) treated in this sequence (krama)?
i) From the very start (prathaata eva), by their skill (kaualya niritya) in
the cause of dharmas (dharmahetu), bodhisattvas must acquire skill in
dependent origination (prattyasamutpda).
ii) Next, in order to succeed in suppressing (parihi) the extremes, which are
the faults (antadoa) of superimposition (samropa) and negation (apavda),
they must acquire skill in the natures (lakaa) of dependently produced
dharmas (prattyasamutpanna).
iii) Bodhisattvas trained in this way (evaprayukta) must penetrate
(pratividh-) the natures that they have understood (parighta); in that way,
they will liberate (vimuc-) their minds (citta) from obstacles (varaa).
iv) Next, after having understood the natures of the knowable (jeyalakaa),
and by depending on the six virtues (a pramit) previously practiced
(prvaprayoga), they must acquire purity of the highest intention
(adhyayaviuddhi).
v) Next, having spread (pratibhid-) the six virtues contained (parighta) in
the purity of highest intention over the ten levels (bhmi), they must practice
them for three incalculabl periods (kalpsakhyeya).
vi-viii) Next, they must fulfill the three trainings (ik) of the bodhisattva to
perfection (paripr-).
ix-x) Having fulfilled them, they must reach the nirva which is their result,
and attain (abhisabudh-) complete and perfect enlightenment (anuttar
samyaksabodhi). That is why these ten topics are treated in this order. In
this explanation, the entire Greater Vehicle is completed (paripra).
[133b10]
29
ii) They must acquire skill in the natures of dependently produced dharmas: to wrongly
(abhinivi-)
attribute
existence
(bhava)
to
the
imaginary
truly
nonexistent
NOTES
1-3. Superiority of the Mahyana over the Hnayna: Bodh. bhmi, p. 2976 ;
Strlakra, I, 10; XIX, 59-60; Madhyntavibhaga, chap. V, Ynnuttarya, p. 199262; N. Dutt, Aspects, p. 46-90.
Mahyana scripture, bodhisattvapiaka, dvdagadharmapravacana, dhra: Siddhi,
p. 614, which refers to Bodh. bhmi, p. 96 (6), 160 (16), 272 (12). Add Sadhinir.,
index, see under bodhisattvapiaka, dhra, dharaprajaptivyavasthpana;
Uttaratantra, p. 227. Bu-ston, I, p. 34-38, drawn from the explanation in Strlakra-
30
Sagraha; later, II, p. 101, he quotes some late stras and tantras on the compilation of
Mahyana scripture by Majur-Maitreya-Vajrapi. Another section of scriptures in 4,
9, and 29 categories of stra, 7 aspects of the Vinaya and 11 aspects of Mtk:
Sadhinir., X, v. 5-7.
4. Authenticity of the Mahyna: Strlakra, I 7; Hien yang cheng kiao louen song,
Taish 1603, p. 581b5-13; Bodhicaryvatra, IX, 42; Siddanta in Wassiliew, p. 289290; Siddhi, p. 176-178.
5. Compare the seven topics of the Madhyntavibhaga, p. 6-9 with the ten topics of
the Sagraha (Stcherbatsky, p. 10-15).
31
Chapter I
THE SUPPORT OF THE KNOWABLE
(jeyraya)
1. First of all, (atra tvat), at the very beginning (prathamata eva: cf. Prastvan,
3), it was said that the store-consciousness (layavijna) is the support of the
knowable (jeyraya). The Bhagavat has spoken of the store-consciousness.
Where did he speak of the store-consciousness? - In the Abhidharmastra (cf.
Triik, p. 37; Siddhi, p. 169) Bhagavat spoke this verse:
andikliko dhtu sarvadharmasamraya/
tasmin sati gatisarv nirvdhigamo 'pi ca//
It is the beginningless element; it is the common support of all dharmas. Given
this consciousness, there exists every destiny and entry into nirva. [133b16]
32
Given this consciousness: Since there is a basis common to all dharmas, there exists
every destiny: every destiny of sasra; destiny, i.e., fruit of retribution (vipakaphala) ...
There are no destinies that do not exist as its result; thanks to it, there is access to
nirva: it is necessary that there be defilements (sklea) in order that there be access
to nirva." (Bh) In fact, "the definitive destruction (nivtti) of the defilements of
existence and of birth (bhavdijtydisaklea) is called nirva). (U)
2. In the same stra (cf. Siddhi, p. 172), it is said: "The consciousness which,
supplied with all the seeds (sarvabjaka), underlies (lyate) every dharma, is
called root, fundamental, receptacle store-(laya). I have revealed it to the
virtuous ones." Such is the gama. [133b19]
33
34
lest they imagine that it is a self. Why would they imagine that? Because this
consciousness remains unchanged in its uniformity (ekkra) until the end of sasra
(sasrakote)." (U)
35
6. This consciousness is also called mind (citta). Thus the Bhagavat said: "Mind
(citta), manas and consciousness (vijna)." Among these three, manas is twofold
(dvividha):
i) Acting as immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) and
forming support (araybhta), the consciousness that has just disappeared
(anantaraniruddha vijna) is the support for the birth (utpattyraya) of the
mental consciousness (manovijna).
ii) The second is the afflicted manas (kliamanas), always associated
(saprayukta) with the four afflictions (klea), i.e., wrong view of the self
(satkyadi), pride of the self (asmimna), attachment to the self
(tmasneha) and ignorance (avidy). It is the support of the defilements
(sklea) of the consciousnesses (vijna).
The consciousnesses arise because of the first manas as support; the second one
is defilement.
Because it cognizes the object (viayavijapte), the manas is a consciousness; as
antecedent (samanantara), as thinking (manana), the manas is of two kinds.
[133c11]
Citta is the store-consciousness; manas is the twofold manas; vijna is the six active
consciousnesses (pravttivijna).
i) The first manas corresponds to the manas or, more precisely, to the manodhtu, manayatana , manaindriya of the Vaibhika; cf. Koa, I, p. 31-33: There is no manas
distinct from the consciousnesses. That one of the six consciousnesses which has just
disappeared is the manas (am anantartta vijna yad dhi tan manas) ... The
first five consciousnesses have the five material organs, eye, etc., as support; the sixth
consciousness, the mental consciousness, does not have a similar support. Consequently,
with the view of attributing a support to this consciousness, manas or manodhtu, or
again mana-yatana and manaindriya, is called that which serves as support, i.e., one or
another of the six consciousnesses. In relation to the mental consciousness which
immediately follows it, the consciousness that has just passed is the immediately
preceding condition and support of arising; it is called the first manas.
ii) The second is the afflicted manas, because it is afflicted (klita) by four passions ...
First, wrong view of the self is erroneous clinging to 'me and mine' (tmtmybhinivea).
Under its influence there comes pride of self; when one depends on 'me and mine', one
becomes proud (garvyate). When these two afflictions exist, self-love (tmarati) arises.,
i.e., attachemnt to the self. These three afflictions all have ignorance as cause. Ignorance
is not-knowing (ajna), the opposite of knowingness (vidyvipaka). (U) It is the
support of the defilement of the consciousnesses, because in the wholesome states, etc., of
concentration or non-concentration (samhitsamhitakualdyvasth), it is not
suppressed (viruddha) and is always present" (U); indeed, even in wholesome states of
mind (kualacitta), there is belief in a self (tmagrha). (Bh)
The consciousnesses arise because of the first manas as support ... , because the
consciousness that has just disappeared (anantaraniruddha vijna) and which is called
manas, gives up its place (avaka dadti) to the consciousness that is about to arise
(utpitsu vijna) and thus acts as support for its birth (utpattyraya)" (Bh) - The
second one is defilement; because it is a manas associated with the four afflictions; since
it believes in a self, etc., it defiles (saklea). (U)
Because it cognizes the object: in the sense that it grasps (ghti) the object and
appears like the object. This justifies its name of consciousness. As antecedent, as
37
thinking, the manas is of two types: this justifies its name of Manas. As it gives up its
place to the mental consciousness, it is called the first manas; as it brings defilement
through belief in a self (tmagrha), it is called the second manas. (Bh)
40
exists nowhere else than in the Manas. It is like the eighteen special attributes of the
Buddha (veikabuddhadharma), so called because they exist only among the Buddhas.
It is true that above I said that if it is associated with the other afflictions, the name
'unmixed' would not be justified, but there I had in view the thesis of my opponent the
faults of which I was pointing out.
ii) There would be no similarity with the five and this would be a fault: this comes back
to saying that the activity (pravtti) of the six consciousnesses (vijna) calls for six pairs
of conditions (pratyaya). The similarity (sdharmya) between the five consciousnesses,
visual consciousness, etc., and the mental consciousness, i.e., that they arise from two
conditions, would be contradicted (viruddha) if the afflicted manas did not exist, for the
mental consciousness would not have an empowering condition (adhipatipratyaya) as
simultaneous support (sahabh-raya) from its own side. The two conditions belonging
to each of the five] consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., constitute their nature of
consciousness. These consciousnesses each have the eye, etc., as coexisting and specific
support. These organs are their empowering condition (adhipatipratyaya) and not their
causal condition (hetupratyaya) ... It is the same for the mental consciousness: it must
have a support specific to its type. It is true that the store-consciousness is a simultaneous
support for the mental consciousness; but it cannot be said that it is its specific support.
Indeed, the store-consciousness is a support common to all the consciousnesses; it is a
causal condition and not an empowering condition.
According to a Sautrntika theory [cf. the root-theory], form (rpa) is the simultaneous
and particular support of the mental consciousness. This theory is false and unacceptable.
If that were so, the mental consciousness would always lack the two activities called
vikalpa, namely, investigation (nirpavilakpa) and memory (anusmaraavikalpa). [Cf.
Koa, I, p. 60: If the mental consciousness, like the first five consciousnesses, dependd
on a material organ, like the latter it would be without examination and memory.]
Thereby it is demonstrated that the theory proposed by other schools (cf. Notes),
according to which a material substance localized in the heart (hdayastharpavastu)
would be the special support of the mental consciousness, is also wrong. Indeed, it also
incurs the fault already pointed out above, and the mental consciousness resembles the
other five consciousnesses which depend upon the material organs (rpndriya). (U)
41
iii) Because of the etymology. What is there to be said? It is said: cogitat ergo vocatur
cogitans (manyata iti manas); if the manas did not exist, to what would this etymology
apply? Certainly not to the six consciousnesses. These six consciousnesses cannot be the
support for the consciousness that follows them immediately, because they have already
been destroyed (viruddha) when the former succeeds them. (Bh)
iv) There would be no differrence between the absorption of nonidentification and the
absorption of cessation, and this would be a fault: assuming acceptance of the existence
of the defiled Manas, this Manas resides in the mental continuum of fools (blasatna)
and does not reside in the mental continuum of saints (ryasatana), and the two
corresponding absorptions are different. In the opposing hypothesis, these two
absorptions, which both involve the destruction of awareness and sensation
(sajveditanirodha) and the cessation of the activity of the consciousnesses
(vijnasamudcra), would not be different.
It is not possible to say that these two concentrations are different, because the levels
(bhmi) on which they are practiced - the fourth Dhyna on the one hand, the Bhavgra
on the other hand - are different, or because the aims pursued (iha) - deliverance
(nisaran) on the one hand, tranquility (antavihra) on the other hand - are different
(cf. Koa, II, p. 210). Indeed, their self-natures (svalakaa) are identical since mind
(citta) and mental factors (caitta) have been destroyed (niruddha) in both. (U)
The Upanibandhana is attacked here, not by the Vaibhikas for whom the concentrations
are entities in themselves (dravyadharma), but by the Sautrntikas for whom, according
to Koa, II, p. 214, the absorptions are simply an entity by designation
(prajaptidharma), the simple nonexistence of the mind for a time. The present reasoning
(niraya) is addressed to the Sautrntikas, for both of us are quite close. This school, like
us, denies that the non-associated factors (viprayuktasaskra), of which the two
absorptions are a part, (cf. Koa, II, p. 178) are things in themselves (dravyasat). In this
case, how could the two absorptions be substantially different, at least that they differ
only by the presence or absence of the manas? (U)
v) Moreover among the gods having no conceptualizing (asmjideva), for the entire
duration of an existence there would be no belief in a self ... When one is born among the
gods having no concept, the mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta) are destroyed. At the
42
very first moment of their reincarnation (pratisadhi), there is the production of mind
and mental factors. At the end of the duration of their existence, the mental series
(satna) resumes (cf. Koa, II, p. 199-200). If these gods did not have afflicted manas,
they would be free of belief in a self during the course of their existence. But we have
never seen that beings, burdened as they are with all the afflictions (sakalakleayukta, cf.
Koa, II, p. 180), would be freed from belief in a self for the duration of a lifetime. This
is why the ryas are mistaken.
It is inadmissible to claim, with the Sarvstivdins, that the mental consciousness present
at the moment of the arising and support of belief in a self projects (kip-) the latter, and
that beings lacking awareneness thus possess this belief in a self because it has not been
cut off, is unacceptable ... Indeed, belief in a self perishes at the same time as its support,
and its projection has no other support than the mental consciousness that appears at the
moment of its arising. It is also impossible that - as the root-Sautrntikas have it - the
predispositions (vsan) of belief in a self reside in a bodily continuum (kyasatna).
Actually, material dharmas (rpadharma) cannot undergo perfuming (bhvan); they are
completely incapable of it. Moreover, the Sautrntikas deny that matter (rpa) is a mental
factor
(caitta)
because
it
has
no
immediately
preceding
condition
43
indeterminate." (U) H translates: present no matter what the nature of the state of mind
is.
The commentaries do not explain the last line. For explanation, we refer to Siddhi, p.
265. The four afflictions associated with the manas constitute an obstacle on the the path;
they are therefore defiled. On the other hand, they are indeterminate from the moral point
of view, neither wholesome nor unwholesome, because the manas which supports them is
subtle and their coming is spontaneous. They are comparable to the afflictions of the two
higher realms which, enveloped by tranquility, are indeterminate (cf. Koa, V, p. 40, 74,
93, 218).
consciousness did not exist through lack of a third category, the word citta could
designate only these two things, namely, the manas and the vijnas. But on the one
hand, there is no designation (abhidna) without something designated (abhidheya) and,
on the other hand, the words manas and vijna are not synonymous (paryya) because
the things that they designate (abhidheya) are distinct. By the word 'category' (lus,
Chinese t'i) we understand the thing designated. Thus it is proved that the storeconsciousness ... the store-consciousness is, of course, the thing designated by the word
citta. (U)
44
The
45
them ... although they are not taught the store-consciousness, they analyze
(pratyaveka) matter and other coaarse objects (rpdisthla), the nature of suffering
and its origin (dukasamudaydisvabhva), impermanence and other aspects
(anitydykra); by doing this, they cut off all the afflictions (klea). With this aim and
in the presence of the Bhagavat, they practice (caranti) the religious life (brahmacarya).
Coarse objects, because material dharmas (rpadharma) have a nature and
characteristics that are coarse; because feeling (vedan) and the other dharmas are easily
distinguished (paricchinna) in their object (lambana) and in their aspect (kra) and are
of coarse aspect. The store-consciousness is quite different (tadparta) and is rightly
called profound and subtle.
It is true that the Buddha said: 'I deny that it is possible to put an end to suffering if there
were even a single dharma not understood or not known completely' (nham
ehadharmam apy anabhijyparijya dukhasynatkriy vadmi, cf. Koavykhy,
p. 4, 16). But the Buddha means that if the afflictions are not cut one does not put an
end to suffering. In different words (viiaabda), the Buddha deals with the same
general subject: the afflictions are not cut each one separately. Or else the Buddha has in
mind the general characteristics (smnyalakaa), impermanence and other aspects
(anityatdykra). Therefore he does not mean to speak here about the storeconsciousness; there is no fault in that.
But the bodhisattvas are trained to understand all things: they have a capacity belonging
to their family (gotraprabhva). Endowed with this capacity, with the wish and the
ability, they are instructed to cognize everything. Otherwise they would be unable to
bring about the welfare of others (parrtha). Why? Not being omniscient, they would not
adequately understand the aspirations (aya) of others, their acquired inclinations
(anuaya, dhtu), the degree of their moral faculties (indriyavarvara), their possibilities
and their weaknesses, the different occasions: therefore they would not be able to bring
about the welfare of others. But all these things are sought by the bodhisattvas; this is
why they are taught the store-consciousness.
Without this knowledge ...: without the knowledge of the store-consciousness, they would
be unable to cut through mental constructions regarding the object (arthaparikalpa). If
these are not cut through, nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajna) would not be
produced since there would still be imaginary objects (parikalpitrtha). For this reason it
46
would not be easy for them to acquire omniscience (saravajajna). Why? They are
able to grasp (sktk-) the general characteristics (smnyalakaa) of objects; but the
imaginary objects of conceptual knowledge (savikalpajna), the self-natures
(svalakaa), concepts (vikalpa), are mutually different (anyonyavyvtta) and infinite in
number (ananta); it is absolutely impossible to know them all. But if they know that it is
only by the power of transformation (parimabala) of the predispositions of speech
(read: ming yen si k'i, abhilpavsan) characterizing the store-consciousness that
objects (artha), beings (sattva) and individuals (tman) manifest (avabhsante), then
they understand that there is neither the object that is known (grhya) nor the subject that
knows (grhaka), and thus they acquire nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpakajna).
Then, by subsequent wisdom (phalabdhajna), they penetrate (pratividh-) the nature
of things (dharmat) as studied (yathbhyastam). Since the true nature (tathat), which
consists (prabhvita) of the general characteristic (smnyalakhaa) of all dharmas, is
of one taste (ekarasa), they know all dharmas. In one instant they acquire universal
knowledge (sarvaviayajna), because the objects of this knowledge are not infinite
(ananta).
Nevertheless, in order for the bodhisattvas to succeed in that, they must spend three
incalculable periods (kalpsakhyeya, cf. chap. V, 6): they must accumulate (sabh-)
vast accumulations (sabhra) in order to acquire a vast perfection.
This universal knowledge (sarvkrajna), knowledge with marvellous fruits, is such as
we have said. The gathering of this marvelous wisdom assumes the clear seeing of the
nonexistence of dharmas (dharmanairtmya). Hence this stanza: 'If one does not cut
through the concept of object (grhyadharmavikalpa) for all objects, one does not
acquire omniscience. Therefore it is proper to proclaim the nonexistence of dharmas.' For those who do not understand this doctrine properly, this verse is added: 'Hence
continuity (satna) is powerful. They will know that, like fire that devours everything,
omniscience makes everything and cognizes everything.'.
Thus, according to whether one cognizes or does not cognize the store-consciousness, it
is easy or difficult to attain omniscience. In regard to this subject, it is asked whether the
knowledge relating to the nonexistence of dharmas (dharmanairtmya) constitutes
omniscience. Although it is omniscience (sarvajna), it is not universal knowledge
(sarvkrajna). (U)
47
odahati
acitta
upahpeti,
tathgatassa
bhikkhave
arahato
48
Creatures love the ultimate basis: This first member of the phrase (pada) designates
attachment (abhinivea) to the store-consciousness in a general way. They cherish the
ultimate basis: they cherish the store-consciousness of the present: they are fond of the
ultimate basis: they are fond of the store-consciousness of the past; they are pleased with
the ultimate basis: they will be pleased with the store-consciousness of the future.
Because, in their nature, creatures are deeply attached to the ultimate basis. because they
cherish it, are fond of it and are pleased with it, generally it is said that they love the
ultimate basis.
In order to destroy the ultimate basis ..., when they are taught the doctrine: the holy
doctrine (ryadean), they want to listen ... and lend an ear: this refers to wisdom
coming from hearing (rutamaya jna). They seek perfect wisdom: they want to reflect
on the doctrine which they have heard; this refers to wisdom coming from reflection
(cintmaya
jna).
They
are
in
possession
of
the
path
of
truth
to
Dharma.
Or
else,
Dharma
means
the
supramundane
path
(lokottaramrga) and anudharma means the mundane path (laukikamrga). They possess
it (pratipanna): they establish it (avasthpayanti) in their mental continuum
(cittasatna), they implant it and develop it to the point of manifesting the masteries
(vait); this refers to the wisdom coming from meditation (bhvanmaya jna). (U)
ii) Among the Mahsghikas, it is called root-consciousness. In the same way that the
tree depends on its root: the store-consciousness is the root cause (mlahetu) of all the
consciousnesses. In the same way, the tree's root is the cause of the leaves, etc., and
without the root, the leaves would not exist. (Bh)
iii) "In the gama of the Mahasakas ... : this school accepts three kinds of aggregates
(skandha): (1) momentary aggregates (kanikaskandha), i.e., the dharmas that arise and
cease from moment to moment; (2) aggregates that last for a lifetime (janmiskandha),
i.e., the dharmas that last up until death; (3) the aggregate that lasts for all of sasra
(sasrikaskandha), i.e., the dharma that lasts until the attainment of the diamond-like
concentration (vajropamasamdhi, cf. Koa, VI, p. 228). Other than the storeconsciousness, nothing else could be this aggregate. Therefore it is synonymous with
49
store-consciousness; actually, the other aggregates of which we are going to speak do not
last for all of sasra.
Why? Because in certain places and at certain times ...: in certain places, i.e., in a certain
world; at certain times, i.e., at certain moments. In the formless world (rpyadhtu), all
matter (rpa) is interrupted (samucchinna); among the gods without identification
(asajnideva) and in the two meditative attainments (sampatti), every mind is
interrupted. By contrast, the seeds (bja) of matter and of mind contained in the storeconsciousness can never be interrupted as long as the path that counteracts them
(pratipakamrga) does not arise. (U)
iv) For bhavga see the commentaries in the following . U: phags pa gnas brtan pa
rnams (rya sthavira) kyi lu las ni srid pai yan lag (bhavga) gi sgara gsus te / srid
pai rgyu yin pai phyir ro// rnam par phye ste smra ba (vibhajyavdin) i lu las kya
de skad du byu o // lta ba (darana) la sogs pa drug ni mig la sogs pai rnam par
hes pa (cakurdivijna) nas yid (mana) la sogs pai bar du ci rigs su (yathyogam)
sbyar ro// ga ig su dag kun gi rnam par es pa (layavijna); la e sda (dvea) ba
ni rnam par es pai cha bdun da ldan pai phre ba (vijnasptabhgyaml) lta
bar byedpa nas / dos po yos su gcod pai bar ro es smra ba dei la ni rigs pa thigs pa
(nyyabindu) i na du lta bar byao.
U: In the school (nikya) of the rya Sthaviras, this consciousness is also given the
name of 'bhavga' (factor of existence): indeed, the store-consciousness is the cause
(hetu) of existence (bhava). According to what they say, the six consciousnesses do not
cease nor do they arise. It is on account of either the bhavga or the retrospective mind
(fan yuan = parylambana) that they cease. [My (Lamotte) understanding of this is: when
the six consciousnesses cease, it is on account of the bhavga where they subside, or on
account of the retrospective mind which makes them subside there.] It is on account of
the mental retribution-consciousness (vipkamanovijnadhtu) that they arise. - They
say this because the projector (kepaka) is the mental consciousness alone
(manovijna). The first five consciousnesses, having nothing to cognize in the Dharma,
are merely projected (kipta). It is the same for the manas element (manodhtu) which is
merely the registering of the object (sapratcchana). Seeing (darana) - which precedes
registering - is a simple apprehension (tchao-tchou). Examining (satraa) ensures a
definite knowledge (vinicaya). Defining (avasthpana) is the creation of verbal concepts
50
(vgvikalpa). The six (??) consciousnesses are capable only of producing conduct
(deportment) (rypatha) as their result; they are incapable of accomplishing wholesome
or unwholesome actions (karmapatha); they are incapable of entering into or coming out
(vyutth-) of concentration (samdhi). Function (kriy ?) [Monier-Williams Dictionary
gives performance, activity] alone is capable of causing production. By virtue of the
projector, one is awakened from sleep; by virtue of function, one reviews what one has
dreamed, etc. The Vibhajyavdin school also calls this consciousness 'bhavga.
Here U gives an incomplete list of the nine cittas of the Sthavira school. The list cites,
among others, bhavga, -, darana, sapratcchana, satraa, avasthpana, kriy,
parylambana and bhavga. See below, Notes.
13. i) Some think that, [in the words of the Bhagavat cited in 6], the words 'citta'
(mind), 'manas' and 'vijna' (consciousness) are one and the same thing
(ekrtha), but that the syllables (vyajana) are different (bhinna). This opinion
does not hold (ayukta): we have noted (upalabhyate) that manas and vijna are
two different things; thus citta also is a separate thing.
ii) Regarding the words of the Bhagavat cited [in 11],: "Creatures love the
ultimate basis, etc., some say: "The ultimate basis (laya) is the five
elements of grasping (updnaskandha)"; others say: " The ultimate basis is
the pleasant feeling joined with lust (sukhvedan rgasaprayukt)"; others
51
again say: "The ultimate basis is wrong view of self (satkyadi). " They are
mistaken (mha) about the store-consciousness in their texts (gama) and
their conceptions (pratipatti); that is why they interpret it in that way.
According to the interpretations (vyavasthpana) current in the Vehicle of
the rvakas, these interpretations of the name of the laya do not hold.
Enlightened people (amha), however, believe (parigihanti) that the
ultimate basis is the store-consciousness. Why is this preferable?
(1) The five elements of grasping are impediments (pratikla) for those born
into very painful (pradukita) destinies (gati). It would be absurd that these
beings would take these extremely disagreeable (ania) elements as ultimate
basis (l-); on the contrary, they want to be liberated from them.
(2) Pleasant feeling joined with desire does not exist in and beyond the fourth
dhyna. It would be absurd that beings who experience it (tadupeta) would
take it to be ultimate basis, because it annoys them.
(3) Wrong view of self also is an impediment for Buddhists (chos di pa) who
believe in the non-existence of self (nairtmydhimukta). That is why it would
be absurd for them to take it as ultimate basis.
***
1. Considering the store-consciousness as their own substance (layavijnam
antartmabhvena abhyupagamya), beings born into very painful destinies
want to eliminate (vina) the painful elements. Nevertheless, bound (baddha)
to the store-consciousness by attachment to the self (tmasneha), they do not
by any means wish the destruction of the latter.
2. Beings born in the fourth dyna or beyond are opposed (pratikla) to
pleasant feeling joined with desire. Nevertheless, they remain bound
(anubaddha) to the store-consciousness by attachment to their own substance
(tmabhvasneha).
3. Similarly, Buddhists who believe in the nonexistence of self are opposed to
wrong view of self. Nevertheless, they remain bound (anubaddha) to the
store-consciousness by attachment to their own substance. Thus the
52
53
54
55
perishes at the same time as that which perfumes (vsaka, bhvaka). In accordance with
the perfuming, in harmony with that which perfumes, that which is perfumed has a
perfume capable of giving rise to a fruit of special type which, in turn, will be capable of
perfuming. Birth and destruction are simultaneous: this rules out births and destructions
which would take place at different moments and excludes eternal entities ... Thus,
sesame seeds perfumed by a flower: The author illustrates his explanation by examples
generally accepted (prasiddhadnta) by his adversaries. Actually, sesame seeds and
the flower are, both of them, modifications of the mind (cittaparima). The sesame
seeds arise and cease at the same time as the flower which perfumes them. Thereby they
are a cause capable of reproducing the scent belonging to the flower immediately
afterwards. It is the same here for successive moments of the sesame seeds. (U)
16. Do the seeds (bja) of afflictive dharmas (skleika) contained in the storeconsciousness constitute a category substantially different (pratibhinna) or nondifferent (abhinna) from this consciousness? Substantially, these seeds are
neither different nor non-different from the store-consciousness. However, the
store-consciousness arises in such a way that it has the power (prabhvaviia) of
giving rise to the afflictive dharmas; it is said to be provided with all the seeds
(sarvabjaka). [134c14]
56
and does not fall, at the same time the second one supports the first one so that it remains
upright and does not fall over.
This is the true definition of the causal condition: as we have said above ( 14), the cause
that contains the seeds is the causal condition to the exclusion of any other.
For another causal condition does not exist: for the other dharmas cannot contain the
seeds (bja). [The Vaibhikas, Koa, II, p. 244 seq.] who claim that five causes are
causal condition (hetupratyaya), equally (paryyea) name the store-consciousness. Actually, in regard to the three causes, co-arisen cause (sabhgahetu), omnipresent cause
(sarvatragahetu) and completely-ripening cause (vipkahetu), their nature of cause
(hetutva) is not justified (ayukta) if they do not carry the seeds (vsan). But the seeds
exist nowhere else than in the store-consciousness. - As for the associated causes
(saprayuktahetu), i.e., the interdependent mind-and-mental events (cittacaitta), like
wandering merchants, they exert themselves on objects (viaya) and possess a
potentiality of their own (svaakti); but, without the seeds that depend upon the storeconsciousness [according to bh: kun gi rnam par es pa la brten pai sa bon med par],
this potentiality is not explained. - By simultaneously-arising cause (sahabhetu) is
understood the store-consciousness and the active consciousnesses. Apart from the storeconsciousness, the mutual cause that contains the internal (dhytmika) and external
(bhya) seeds, no other causal condition exists " (U)
18. How can the non-different (abhinna) and non-variable (acitra) propensities
(vsan) be the cause of different and variable dharmas? Like cloth (vastra)
coated (pariata) by different ingredients: when it is coated, it does not show any
variation, but when it is dipped into the dye-bath (ragabhjana), then many
(aneka) different (bhinna) rainbow-hued (nnvidha) colors (ragaprabheda)
appear. Similarly, for the store-consciousness perfumed (bhvita) by diverse
propensities (nnvsan): at the moment of impregnation it is not varied; but
when it is dipped into the dye-bath, which is the arising of the fruit
(phalbhinirvtti), a crowd of various dharmas (apramanndharma)
manifests. [134c27]
58
59
Dependent origination signifies production as a result of a cause of that which has cause
(rgyu las rgyu da ldan pa bhu: heto sahetukotpda, cf. Koa, III, p. 78. When we
want to indicate the reason, we use the gerundive suffix (k-tva).
That apportions the self-natures: as it has the power (smarthya) of apportioning them,
or, as its activity (prayojana) is to apportion them, it is said that they apportion. The
store-consciousness apportions the self-natures, for it apportions the defiled nature
(skleikadharmasvabhva) of everything that arises (jtimat) by differentiating it.
That apportions the pleasant and the unpleasant: the twelve members [of the causal
chain] beginning with ignorance (avidy), by apportioning the different kinds of
existences (tmabhvaviea), pleasant and unpleassant (ramyramya), into wholesome
and unwholesome destinies, operates as principal condition (pradhnapratyaya) in
rebirth (abhinirvtti). Indeed, at the moment when the mental factors (saskra), etc.,
arise from the store-consciousness, merit (puya), demerit (apuya) and non-agitation
(nijya), etc. are differentiated (viia) by the power of ignorance, etc. (U)
20. Here, those who are mistaken (mha) about the first dependent origination,
i.e., store-consciousness, think that the origin of things (anvayatva) is to be
sought in self-nature (svabhva), or in previous actions (prvakta), or in a
transformation of the creator (ivaranirma), or in the Self (tman); or else they
think that there is neither cause (hetu) nor condition (pratyaya).
Those who are mistaken about the second dependent origination imagine a self
that is actor (kraka) and enjoyer (bhokt).
Let us suppose there is a group of people who are blind from birth
(jtyandhapurua), who have never seen an elephant (hastin) and who one day
are presented with an elephant. The first blind person touches (spati) the trunk
(tua) of the elephant, the second its tusks (danta), the third its ears (kara), the
fourth its feet (pda), the fifth its tail (lgla), the sixth its side (phavaa).
Someone asks them what is the elephant like, and the first answers that it is like
a plow (haladaa), the second, like a wooden leg (musala), the third, like a
winnowing basket (rpaka), the fourth, like a pillar (nidail), the fifth, like a
broom (samrjan) and the sixth, like a rock (upala). In the same way here,
60
those who are ignorant about these two dependent originations, blinded by
ignorance, are ignorant about the store-consciousness which here is comparable
to the elephant, are ignorant about its self-nature (svabhva), its nature as cause
and its nature as result. They think that the cause of things is the self-nature, or
previous actions, or a creator, or a Self, or else that there is production without
any cause. Finally, others believe in a Self which is active and enjoyer. [135a19]
khyab pai phyir thams cad dzin par byed pao: All the existences of the three-fold
world and all the destinies are the result of this consciousness: all the existences
belonging to the realm of desire, the realm of form and the formless realm
(kmarprpyvacara), and all the destinies in the continuum of the being
(sattvasatna), divine rebirth, etc., are the result of this consciousness: are inherent in it
(sabandhilakaa).
Whereas
matter
(rpa)
and
the
active
consciousnesses
(pravttivijna) are interrupted (samucchinna) at certain places and at certain times, the
store-consciousness is never interrupted as long as its obstruction (pratipaka) has not
arisen. Because it extends everywhere (vypya), it is 'all-inclusive' (sarvagrhaka).
62
dag ces don pa de dag gi ltar na rgyu da bras bu dag bad do // kun rdzob ces bya ni
phyi rol gyi nas la sogs pa ste/ kun gi rnam par es pa gyur pa yin pai phyir ro // dam
pai don ces bya ba la don dam pai sa bon ni kun gi rnam par es pa ste / sa bon
thams cad kyi rkyen yin pa da / dei bdag id yan lag yin pai phyir ro: The outer seed
is the wheat (yava), etc.; the inner seed is the store-consciousness. They are
undifferentiated, indeterminate from the moral point of view (avykta). These two seeds:
this is a matter of the outer seed and the inner seed or of the fruit (phala) and the cause
(hetu). With this two-fold object (nimitta), the store-consciousness is two-fold as well
because afflicted (skleika) dharmas and pure (vaiyavadnika) dharmas arise from the
store-consciousness, cause and primary subastance (mladravya). Those who read gis
dag [in place of gis ni] see this as an allusion to cause and fruit. The conventional seed
is the external seed, wheat, etc., because it is just a development (parima) of the storeconsciousness. The absolute seed is the store-consciousness, because it is the condition
(pratyaya) for all the seeds and the quintessence of the seed.
All the seeds have six characteristics: 1) They are momentary: the two kinds of seeds
perish as soon as they are born (janmnantara nirudhyante). Why? It is impossible that
an eternal (nitya) dharma could be seed because its nature remains unchanged from what
it was at the beginning. - 2) They are simultaneous with their fruit. A past (atta) dharma,
a future (angata) dharma or a dharma dissociated from its fruit (visayukta) cannot be
seed. Why? Because the fruit is born at the precise moment when the seed exists. - 3)
They proceed in continuity: The store-consciousness lasts up until its obstruction
(pratipaka) arises; the seeds of outer dharmas last until the formation of the root (mla)
or until maturity. - 4) They are determinate: they are individually determined
(pratiniyata). Everything is not born from everything; each substance is born from the
seed appropriate to it. Everything is not born at any time whatsoever; but a given
substance arises from the seed belonging to it. 5) They depend on conditions: these
seeds require their own conditions in order to produce their fruit. Anything does not give
rise to anything whatsoever but, at given times and given places, when the seeds
encounter their proper conditions, at these places and times, their fruit takes birth. - 6)
They are the authors of an appropriate fruit: a given seed produces only the fruit
appropriate to it. Thus, the store-consciousness produces only the store-consciousness,
63
and wheat seed produces only the wheat fruit. (Bh) This refutes the causality
(bjatva) of the Pradhna, etc., which does not have the qualities of seed. (u)
64
contary, the store-consciousness is stable in its nature; until the arising of its obstacle
(pratipaka), it forms a continous series that is never interrupted. It is essentially
indeterminate, being neither wholesome (kuala) nor unwholesome (akuala). Not being
an eternal entity, it is naturally perfumable or capable of concentrating perfumes. Finally,
it is in strict relationship with the perfumer, since it arises and ceases at the same time as
the latter. It shows the characteristics of propensity: because of these qualities, the
perfumed is the lakana, whereas the propensity is the lakya. (U)
***
The opposing theses concerning the nature of the perfumed are untenable:
1st thesis: The active consciousnesses mutually perfume one another. - No, because
there is no contact between these active consciousnesses: these consciousnesses have a
mobile activity (calapravtti).
Their respective three natures are in opposition: each of them functions with a special
support (araya), a special object (lambana) and a special act of attention (manasikara).
Or again, each of them appears in particular aspects (kra).
2nd thesis: The Drntikas claim that the earlier moment (prvakaa) perfumes the
later moment (uttarakaa). - To refute this thesis, the author says that two moments are
never simultaneous: there are no two moments that exist at the same time. It is the
simultaneous arising and cessation (sahotpdanirodha) that constitutes propensity. [U
adds: It is clear that these two moments which are not simultaneous are not in contact
(sabaddha). Not being in contact, they do not have the nature of perfumed-perfumer].
3rd thesis: But, it is said, these consciousnesses belong to the same type (samajtya).
Even though they are not in contact, they share the same type, the type consciousness
(vijnajti). Therefore they can perfume one another. - No, because it would be
applicable to other categories: it would be the same for other types. The organs (indriya),
eye, etc., being of the same type of rpaprasda (subtle material element), should also be
mutually perfumed, in the sense that the two organs, eye and ear, together having a subtle
characteristic (prasdadharma), should be mutually perfumed. Now you cannot accept
that because, despite the subtle element common to them, these organs have distinct
series and consequently cannot perfume one another. It is the same for the
65
24. The outer seed and the inner seed are, at the same time, generator (janaka)
and projector (kepaka, vhaka) because they project the offspring (anupta)
and the corpse respectively. It is like an arrow (iu) which does not fall in midflight. [Variant]: because they cease (vina-) spontaneously (svarasena) in
succession. [135b3]
66
These two kinds of seeds, outer and inner, are generating cause (janakahetu) and
projecting cause (kepakahetu) at the same time. The outer seed, on the one hand, is
generating cause relative to the shoot (akura) and, on the other hand, projecting cause
relative to the leaves (para), etc. The store-consciousness or inner seed is, on the one
hand, generating cause relative to name-and-form (nmarpa) and, on the other hand,
projecting cause relative to the six sense organs (ayatana) up to and including old age
and death (jarmaraa).
So be it; the seed is generating cause, but how is it projecting cause? In reply to this
question, the writer responds: they project the rotten wood and the corpse respectively. If
these two seeds were merely generating cause and not projecting cause, the seeds of grain
contained in warehouses and storehouses could not be kept as such for a long time. After
death, the corpse (mtaarra) could not exist (anupravt-) in the state of putrefaction,
etc. (vinlakdyavasth), but it would disappear (vina-) immediately after death.
What is the example for that? Because they spontaneouly perish subsequently, like the
arrow (iu). The momentum (saskravega) supplied by the stretched (kepakagua)
bowstring is the generating cause that makes the arrow released from the string not to
fall. The force (saskrabala) exerted by the bent bow is the projecting cause that makes
the arrow fly far to its target. It is not just the momentum furnished by the stretched cord,
for then the arrow would fall at once. Neither is it just the continuing thrust belonging to
the movement (raa), for then the arrow would not fall. But when these two forces are
joined together, the arrow, having left the string, travels far to its target. Thus it must be
agreed that here there is a twofold force operating (saskrabala), that which gives birth
and that which projects.
Those who read the variant: because they subsequently perish spontaneously'' establish
the existence of the projecting cause by means of reasoning without resorting to the
example of the arrow. How? When the oil wick (tailavarti) is used up, the flame of the
lamp subsequently is extinguished spontaneously (svarasena) independent of any
external cause (bhyapratyaynapeka); but that occurs little by little (kramea) and not
right from the start. For these reasons, there must necessarily be a projecting force. In all
compositional factors (saskra) that are undestroyed and actually present, there must
also be a germinating force which, by its development, projects them and causes them not
to be cut. (U)
67
25. Here are two stanzas that show the difference between the external and
internal seed:
i) The outer seed sometimes (am) is not planted (H: perfumed). It is not the
same for the inner seed. If the propensity for hearing, etc., (rutdivsan)
did not exist, the arising of its fruit would be impossible.
ii) Because this absurd consequence would follow (doaprasaga), that the
thing accomplished would perish (ktavipraaa) and that the thing not
accomplished would occur (aktbhygama). Therefore that is the support of
propensity. [135b8]
68
like rice, or grew without having been planted, like rye grass, there would be the absurd
consequence that the thing accomplished would perish and the thing not accomplished
would occur. Therefore the outer seed and the inner seed are in opposition (viruddha).
Objection. Saying that the outer seed is different in nature from the inner seed, is that not
contradictory to the thesis explained above ( 15, 17), that the store-consciousness is the
true seed of all dharmas? - In reply to this objection, the author says: the inner seed is the
condition for the outer seed, etc. Actually, the seeds of outer dharmas, rice, etc. appear in
the store-consciousness, considering the propensity-seeds (vsanbja) laid down in this
consciousness by the actions (karman) of living beings (prin) who are experiencing
these dharmas (cf. Tibetan verses). That is why the outer seed does not exist aside from
the inner seed. Cf. the stanza: The sky (vyoman), the earth (pithiv), the wind (vyu),
space (ka), the rivers (sarit), the directions (di) and the ocean (sgara) are simply
internal creations, mental constructions (vikalpa), and do not exist externally. There are
innumerable verses of this type. (U)
there that the mental events act as] enjoyer, discriminating and
stimulating." [135b12]
there is a store-consciousness that there can be a manas: with the manas as support, the
mental consciousness is actualized (manovijna). Just as the five groups of
consciousnesses are actualized by depending on the five organs, eye, etc., - and not
without these five organs - so the mental consciousness is not actualized without the
manas organ (manaindriya).
Conversely, relative to the store-consciousness, the active consciousnesses play the role
of twofold condition. Actually (dadharme), they nourish (paripoayanti) the seeds of
the store-cosnciousness; later (saparye), they envelop-plant (che-tche) their seeds so
that it may grow. In the moment, they nourish the seeds of the store-consciousness: by
relying
on
the
store-consciousness,
the
active
consciousnesses,
wholesome,
unwholesome, indeterminate, are actualized. At that moment, their arising (utpda) and
cessation (nirodha) coincide with that of their single and common support. Thus they
perfume the store-consciousness. As a result of this perfuming, causal condition
(hetupratyaya), the subsequent active consciousnesses, wholesome, unwholesome or
indeterminate, are actualized by developing, multiplying and becoming more and more
differentiated. Later, they envelop-plant their seeds so that it may be born: there is a
certain kind of perfuming capable of drawing-enveloping (yin-che) the storeconsciousness which is retributive (vipka) and indeterminate (avykta).
Thus, since on the one hand the store-consciousness is the seed and the support of the
active consciousnesses, and since on the other hand the active consciousnesses nourish
the seeds of the store-consciousness, envelop them and plant them, one is forced to admit
that store-consciousness and active consciousness are reciprocal conditions. (u)
71
consciousness, the eye (cakus) is the dominant condition, color (rpa) is the object
condition, the consciousness that has just disappeared (anantaraniruddha vijna) is the
antecedent condition. Just as the visual consciousness is the outcome of three conditions,
so each of the other active consciousnesses, the auditory consciousness, etc., is the
outcome of three particular conditions, just like the visual consciousness.
The different self-natures (svabhva) are the outcome of only the causal condition,
because the other three do not play a part here (na sabhavanti). Thus the three
dependent productions, that of sasra, etc., include four conditions. It does not follow
that each of them possesses all four; only mind-and-mental factors (cittacaitta) possess
all four. (U)
29. Here the store-consciousness is studied under its names (paryya) and
characteristics (lakhaa). How does one know that these names and
characteristics apply exclusively to the store-consciousness and not to the active
consciousnesses (pravttivijna)? - Without a store-consciousness defined in this
way, defilement (saklea) and purification (vyavadna) are impossible (ayukta):
passion-affliction (kleasaklea), action-affliction (karmasaklea) and birth-
72
73
believe that the retributive result arises from a past action; that is impossible. Why?
Because the past does not exist. From this example, the author shows that a citta of rga,
etc., cannot arise. Therefore he accepts that that the visual consciousness arising with the
lust, etc., may be perfumed by the lust. But he denies that another consciousness, a later
visual consciousness, arises with the passion. (U) This last phrase is clearer in u: di ni
re ig dod chags la sogs pa da lhan cig bhu bai mig gi rnam par es pa la dod
chags la sogs pai bag chags khas blas te/ de las gan byu ba ga yin pa de dod
chags la sogs pa da ldan par byu du mi ru bar bastan pa yin no /
ii) bh: re ig mig gi rnam par es pa dod chags la sogs pa da lhan cig byu ba de la
ya bag chags mi ru ste / mig gi rnam par es pa las lar skyes pa de la bag chags ji ltar
rigs: If there cannot be impregnation in the visual consciousness that arises with lust,
etc., how could there be impregnation in what arises later than this visual
consciousness"? This is an a fortiori argument (kaimutikanyya), clarified still further in
the Chinese by the expresssion chang .... ho houang.
Furthermore, the propensity does not reside in the lust: the propensity of the visual
consciousness cannot reside in the lust (Bh) - u continues: dod chags ni sems las
byu ba yin pas rnam par es pa la brten pao // gnas pas gnas la bsgo ba ni rigs pai
tshul tin gyi gnas pa id kyis gnas pa la bsgo bar ni mi ru ste: Being a mental event
(caitta), lust depends (rita) on the consciousness. But, whilst the perfuming of the
raya by the rita is possible, the perfuming of the rita by the raya is impossible.
In other words, the lust can perfume the consciousness on which it depends, but the
consciousness cannot perfume the lust which it supports. Thus the propensity does not
reside in the lust.
iii) Neither does the propensity reside in the other consciousnesses: the impregnation
cannot reside in the auditory consciousness, etc. (rotdivijna). Why? Because the
supports of these consciousnesses are distinct (bhinna). Since their supports are distinct,
none of them can arise and perish together. Indeed, the visual consciousness depends on
the eye, the auditory consciousness depends on the ear, and so on up to the mental
consciousness which depends on the manas. Since the supports are separate (viprakia),
it is impossible that the impregnation of one of them be found in the other. (Bh)
75
iv) Finally, the impregnation does not reside in the visual consciousness itself: the
visual consciousness likewise cannot perfume the visual consciousness because two
consciousnesses cannot arise at the same time. Since there are not two, simultaneous
birth and destruction (sahotpdanirodha) definitely does not occur. - The visual
consciousness does not return to perfume the visual consciousness because the perfumer
(vsaka) and the perfumed (vsya), the agent (kraka) and the action (kriy), would be
confused. (U)
31. Furthermore, amongst those who fall (cyu-) from a higher level, the ones
without identification (asajin), etc., and are reborn here in the realm of
desire, the first consciousness (vijna), which is afflicted (klia) by the
afflictions and sub-afflictions of the realm of desire and which appears at the
very beginning of the reincarnation: pratisadhi, will be reborn without seed.
Indeed, the propensity (vsan) of afflictions and sub-afflictions along with the
consciousness that supports it is past (atta) and no longer exists. [135c15]
76
77
But
the
visual
consciousness,
etc.,
perishing
instantaneously
(kaaniruddha) and destroyed a long time ago, cannot be the condition for name-andform.
If, in order to avoid this fault, a consciousness of rebirth (pratisadhivijna) is seen in
the vijna-factor, one is still mistaken. Indeed, (a) at the moment of rebirth
(pratisadhikle), the mental factors, meritorious (puya), unmeritorious (apunya) and
invariable (niijya), have long ago been destroyed, and the consciousness of rebirth
cannot arise from mental factors long since destroyed; (b) the rebirth consciousness
(pratisadhicitta) is not morally indeterminate (avykita), as it is eqipped with
attraction (anunaya) and repulsion (pratigha) [for sex; cf. Koa III, p. 50]. Since it is
indeterminate, it does not have the mental factors as condition.
If the vijna-factor is understood to be the store-consciousness conditioned by the active
consciousnesses associated with the mental factors and capable of containing the seeds,
the reasoning is correct. (U)
78
79
dependent on the coagulated vijna that is equipped with all the seeds, then
the 'support causal' consciousness (rayabhvena hetubhtam) would not be
equipped with all the seeds, whereas the 'supported (rita) fruitional
(phala)' consciousness would be equipped with all the seeds, which is
completely impossible.
Consequemtly, it is proved (siddha) that the coagulated vijna is not a mental
consciousness but a retributive consciousness equipped with all the seeds
(sarvabjaka vipkavijna). [136a12]
80
embryo' (sa ced nanda vijna mtu kuki nvakrameta, na tat kalala
kalalatvya savarteta). [For the vijnasamrcchana, see comments by P. Demiville,
in Notes, 34).
i) If it was the mental consciousness of the intermediary existence and not the storeconsciousness, that coagulates, that is born, there would be, dependent on the coagulated
mental consciousness: dependent on the retributive consciousness (vipkavijna), a
second mental consciousness: another active consciousness (pravttivijna). That is to
say, in subsequent states (uttarottarvasth) there would be a mental consciousness
associated (saprayukta) with faith (raddhdi) and with lust (rgdi) and equipped with
pleasant, unpleasant and conceptual feeling (sukhadukhavedan) and conceptual
(savikalpaka). Thus, two mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the
mother's womb, namely: (a) a mental consciousness retributive (vipktmaka) in essence,
the primary substance of the being (sattvamladravya), existing independently of the
effort of the moment (tatklaprayognapeka) and morally indeterminate (avykta); and
(b) a mental consciousness having an object (lambana) and an aspect (kra) quite
distinct (paricchinna), associated with pleasant, unpleasant, etc., feelings. These two
mental consciousnesses would exist simultaneously in the same body. But that is
impossible, being contradictory to the stra (stavirodht). A verse says: 'It is impossible
in the present, in the future, that two vijnas of the same kind arise together in the same
body without the one preceding and the other following' (asthnam anavako yad
aprvcarame dve vijne samabhge samakya utpaddeytm). And it cannot be
maintained that these two are only one, because their nature is different. Furthermore, the
retributive consciousness (vipkavijna) cannot be interrupted; for, in this hypthesis, the
rebirth (pratisadhi) having taken place, there would be a new taking of rebirth in
another place. Finally, the nature of the retributive consciousness is just a perpetual
series, and it does not have a new destiny (gati). (U)
ii) Furthermore, the coagulated vijna cannot be a mental consciousness. Why?
Because the mental consciousness always has a defiled support; because, if it were the
coagulated mental consciousness, it would never be interrupted. The mental
consciousness has the manas defiled by the afflictions (klea), lust (rga), etc., as support
(raya) (cf. 6), for it has birth (utpattibhava) as object. Since it has something that is
afflicted as support, we say that it has an afflicted support (klia rayo yasya sa
81
kliraya). But here the retributive (or coagulated) vijna does not have an afflicted
support because this vijna is indeterminate (avykta). Furthermore, the coagulated
vijna is never interrupted because it undergoes the mechanism of activity
(karmapravtti). Because then, if the mental consciousness were the coagulated vijna,
it would have an imperceptible object. The object of the mental consciousness is
perceptible (parihchinna), i.e., the dharmas. But the coagulated vijna does not have a
perceptible object of this kind. That is why the coagulated vijna cannot be a mental
consciousness. (Bh) - In other words, the coagulated vijna is morally indeterminate; it
is never interrupted; it has an imperceptible object. On the other hand, every mental
consciousness is afflicted, even if it is good; it is often interrupted and it has an easily
distinguishable object. Thus, the coagulated vijna cannot be a mental consciousness.
The clearest translation of this passge is from Paramrtha: Furthermore, the coagulated
vijna cannot be a mental consciousness because it depends on the afflicted, because it
takes its object for a long time , and because its object is imperceptible.
iii) Compare the Tibetan version with that of H, which is more explicit.
35. In those who are reborn, the grasping (grha; Chinese, updna) of the
material organs (rpndriya) is impossible without a retributive conscousness
(vipkavijna), for the consciousnesses other than this last one have their
specific support (raya = organ) and are not stable (dhruva). On the other hand,
there is no material organ without a consciousness. [136a15]
place.
Indeed,
the
other
consciousnesses,
the
active
consciousnesses
(pravttivijna), are unable to appropriate the material organs. Why? Because these
consciousnesses have their particular support: this shows that, lacking a storeconsciousness, the six organs, eye, etc., would not have a single dharma to appropriate all
at once. Indeed, the visual consciousness depends only on the eye; the auditory
82
consciousness depends only on the ear, and so on. Each of them can appropriate only its
own organ; it cannot appropriate a foreign organ. Thus a store-consciousness is necessary
to appropriate all the organs at once. (U) Moreover, these consciousnesses are not
stable: they are extremely mobile (cala) and disappear momentarily. Then, lacking a
store-consciousness, the eye and the other organs, deprived of an appropriator, would
perish. (Bh)
Some say (cf. Koa, II, p. 215): The organ of touch (kyendriya) appropriates the
organs because it naturally accompanies (vyp-) them. This is wrong because the organ
of touch also is appropriated. If it is assumed that the organ of touch is the appropriator,
there would be nothing else to appropriate it, which is inadmissible. Besides, the
Bhagavat would have said: When one abandons the organ of touch, there is death, and
would not have said what he did say (Majjhima, I, p. 296): When life, heat and
consciousness leave the body, the body lies abandoned like a piece of wood, without
feeling (yur umtha vijna yad kya jahaty am, apaviddha tad ete yath
kham acetana). That is why the organ of touch cannot be the appropriator. (U)
were to be cut in a boy or a girl, would name-and-form grow, would it develop?' - 'No,
Lord.' (vijna ced nanda daharasya kumrasya kumriky v ucchidyeta vinayen
na bhaved api tu tan nmarpa vddhi virdhi vipulatm padyeta. no bhadanta).
Similar texts would not be explained if there were not a store-consciousness. (U)
84
other consciousness, except the store-consciousness, that appropriates the body so that it
does not decompose? Abandoned by the store-consciousness, the body would perish.
(Bh) The mind and the mental factors (cittacaitta) present at the entry into absorption
do not merit the name of nutriment, for the stra does not speak of them, for, being
destroyed, they no longer exist. Neither is the destruction (nirodha) of this mind and
mental factors nutriment because the number of nutriments has been fixed as four. (U)
38. When, after having died here (ihatra cyutv), one is reborn in an absorbed
level (samhit bhmi), a non-absorbed (asamhita) and afflicted (klia) mental
consciousness (manovijna) forms the bond of rebirth (pratisadhibandha). But
in regard to the non-absorbed and afflicted mind (citta) of the higher levels,
nothing other than the retributive consciousness can constitute a seed (bja).
[136a23]
85
(ii) The mind at conception (upapatticitta) in the absorbed realm is not its seed because it
is impossible that one and the same mind can be seed (bja) and the possesser of seed
(bjin) at the same time.
(iii) The mind belonging to the material world, etc. (rpvacardicitta) which in the past
had been realized (prpta) in the course of earlier existences (jtaka) is not a seed
because there was no other consciousness to undergo the perfuming (bhvan).
(iv) The material series (rpasatna) is not a seed because it does not constitute a
causal condition (hetupratyaya).
A store-consciousness, therefore, must necessarily be accepted in which resides the
eternal propensity (andiklik vsan) of the mind returning from of the higher realms
(tadbhmisaghta). (U)
39. Among beings born in the formless realm (rpyadhtu), when there is an
afflicted-wholesome mind (kliakualacitta), without a retributive consciousness
furnished with all the seeds (sarvabjaka vipkavijna), it too would be born
without seed (bja) and without base (dhra). [136a25]
40. In this same realm, when the supramundane mind (lokottaracitta) appears
(sktkrakle), the other minds, the mundane minds (laukikacitta), disappear.
Thus the destiny in this realm (tadgati) would be annihilated (nivta). [136a27]
86
41. Some beings born in the sphere of neither-identification-nornonidentification (naivasajnsajyatana) produce a supramundane mind
(lokottaracitta) of the sphere of nothingness (kicanyyatana). But then, lacking
a store-consciousness, the two destinies (gati) that these two spheres constitute
would be annihilated (nivta). Indeed, this supramundane consciousness cannot
have as support (raya) either destiny in the naivasajnyatana or destiny in
the akicanyyatana or destiny in nirva. [136b2]
87
(ansravadharma) - i.e., the supramundane mind - is not within the scope (saghita) of
these destinies because it has no connection with them and counteracts (pratipaka) these
destinies. Finally, there is no nirva as destiny support: because the pure dharma
resides in the nirva-without-residue Element (sopadhieanirvadhtu): because
nirva, being the destruction aof all destinies, is called 'a destiny which is not a destiny'
(agatik gati) ..... (U) - The supramundane mind cannot have either the first sphere or
the second sphere as destiny-support because these two spheres are mundane.
Furthermore, produced as the mind of kicanyyatana by beings belonging to another
sphere [the sphere of naivasajnsajyatana], it cannot have two destiny-supports
simultaneously. Finally, this supramundane mind cannot have nirva as destiny-support
because it has another support, namely, sopadhieanirvadhtu. None of these three
things can be its destiny-support. If one does not believe in the existence of the storeconsciousness, what then is the destiny-support of this supramundane mind? (Bh)
42. At the moment of death (chuti), beings who have accomplished good actions
(suktakrin) and beings who have committed bad actions (duktakrin)
experience a gradual cold feeling (umanirgama) in the lower or the upper part
respectively of the body which, without a store-consciousness, would be
impossible. Consequently, the birth affliction (janmasaklea) also, lacking a
retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds (sarvabjaka vipkavijna)
would be impossible. [136b5]
88
mind of the desire realm, not being indeterminate (avykta), is not perfumable. As its
level of attachment is separate, it is not causal condition for the good mind.
ii) The good mind of the form realm, already obtained (prpta) in the course of other
existences in eternal sasra, is not the seed of the present good mind of the form realm
because it is past (atta) and, for many existences, has been replaced (antaryita) by
many minds belonging to the desire realm. For the Sautrntika masters, the past does not
exist. Since it does not actually exist, this past good mind cannot be the seed of of the
actual good mind of the form realm ..... (U)
iii) The store-consciousness contains the seed of this mind and the actual mind of the
form realm is born from its own seed contained in the store-consciousness. But the good
mind of effort (pryogikakualacitta) is not without efficacy (smarthya): it is only a
dominant condition and not a causal condition. It is from the power of its dominance that
the mind of the form realm is born ..... (Bh)
44. Similarly, lacking a retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds
(sarvabjaka vipkavijna), the supramundane purification
(lokottaravyavadna), is impossible (ayukta). Why would the supramundane
purification be impossible?
The Bhagavat said (Aguttara, I, p. 87): "The words of others (parataca
ghoa) and correct inner reflection (adhytma ca yoniomanasikra) are the
causes of correct seeing (samyagdi)". Words of others and correct reflection
perfume either the auditory consciousness (rotavijna) or the mental
consciousness (manovijna) or both together. However, at the time of correct
mental reflection on the texts (dharma), the auditory consciousness does not arise
and similarly, the mental consciousness is replaced (antaryita) by other
consciousnesses, distracted consciousnesses (vikipta vijna). At the moment
when the supramundane mind associated with correct reflection
(yoniomanasikrasaprayuktaka citta), i.e., correct seeing (samyagdi), arises,
the mental consciousness perfumed (bhvita) by the propensity of hearing
(rutavsana) together with the propensity of hearing, is destroyed (niruddha),
past (atta), finished long ago. Not existing any longer, how could it be the seed
90
(bja) able to give birth subsequently to the supramundane mind associated with
correct reflection?
The mundane mind (laukika citta) associated with correct reflection does not
arise, does not perish with the supramundane mind (lokottara citta) associated
with correct seeing; thus it is not perfumed by the latter; not being perfumed by
it, it cannot be the seed. Consequently, the supramundane purification also
would be impossible in he absence of a retributive consciousness furnished with
all the seeds. Indeed, the impregnation of hearing, which occurs in the mundane
mental consciousness, cannot contain (parigrah-) the seed of the supramundane
mind. [136b28]
45. How can the retributive consciousness furnished with all the seeds
(sarvabjaka vipkavijna), the cause of affliction (sakleahetu), be the seed
(bja) of the supramundane mind (lokottara citta) that counteracts this affliction
(tatpratipaka)? The supramundane mind is foreign (anucita); thus its propensity
(vsana) does not yet exist. Not having a propensity, from what seed (bja) could
it be said to arise?
Answer: It comes from the seed that is the propensity of hearing (rutavsana),
issuing from (niyananda) the very pure (ativiuddha) dharmadhtu. [136c4]
91
The supramundane mind is foreign ...: the pure mind has not yet been realized (prpta);
how could it arise without an appropriated cause? (U)
It comes from ... This phrase shows that the pure mind has a separate seed. It is certainly
not born from the store-consciousness as its seed. What then is its particular seed? It is
the propensity of hearing, issuing from the very pure dharmadhtu". (U) - " To show that
the dharmadhtu is unknown to the rvakas, etc., it is qualified as very pure: indeed, this
dharmadhtu, attested to by the Buddha Bhagavats, cuts through the attachment obstacle
(klevaraa)
and
the
obstacle
to
knowledge
(jeyvarana).
The
teachings
(deandharma), i.e., the stras, etc., which result from this very pure dharmadhtu, are
called the result of the very pure dharmadhtu. Since we 'understand' these stras without
error (aviparysa), we speak of hearing. The propensity coming from this hearing is
called propensity of hearing; or again the hearing itself constitutes propensity; hence the
expression propensity-hearing. [In Sanskrit: rutasya vsaneti rutavsana, or also
rutam eva vsaneti rutavsan. This propensity-series (vsansatna) residing as an
foreign principle in the store-consciousness is the cause capable of producing the
supramundane mind. That is why it is said that this mind comes from this seed which is
the hearing propensity
92
47. From the small propensity (mduvsana) is derived the medium propensity
(madhyavsana), from the medium propensity is derived the great propensity
(adhimatravsana); indeed, hearing (ruta), contemplating (cinta) and meditating
(bhvana) comprise a progression (bahulkaraa). [136c13]
93
94
95
49. As in the example of water (ambu) and milk (kra), the hearing propensity,
which is not the store-consciousness, and the store-consciousness itself exist
together in the same place. But how is it that the store-consciousness becomes
completely exhausted (sarvakrea), whereas the hearing propensity, which is
not the store-consciousness, develops completely?
It is like the milk drunk from water by a goose (hasa). In the same way, when
the mundane attachment (laukika rga) is eliminated, the propensity (vsana) of
the non-absorbed levels (asamhta bhmi) decresases little by little, whereas
the propensity of the absorbed levels (samhta bhmi) develops little by little,
and thus one arrives at the transformation of the basis (rayaparvtti). [137a1]
96
97
Except for the Buddhas, the pratyekbuddhas, the arhats and the avaivartika bodhisattvas,
those who dwell in nirodhasampatti are not dead (maraaviita): to show this, the
Bhagavat said that, amongst them, the vijna does not leave the body. This vijna is
none other than the store-consciousness. How does he know this (katha gamyate)?
Because the nirodhasampatti does not counteract this consciousness: the production of
nirodhasampatti does not counteract this consciousness, because the object (lambana)
and the aspect (kra) of the store-consciousness are not different (aparicchinna). Since
a vague (apatu) and indistinct consciousness (vijpti) does not hinder the
nirodhasampatti in its subsiding, the latter does not counteract the store-consciousness
because it does not destroy that which it does not hinder.
But the nirodhasampatti, having a distinct object and aspect, is produced by
counteracting
the
active
consciousnesses
(pravttivijna),
the
non-calmed
51. In those who emerge from (vyutth-) nirodhasampatti, the vijna is not
produced anew. Indeed, when the retributive consciousness (vipkavijna) has
been interrupted (samucchinna), it does not rearise (abhinirvt-), except in being
reborn (pratisadhi). [137a5]
98
But even from their point of view, such a mind (citta) is impossible [in nirodhasampatti]. Indeed,
i) Nirodhasampatti would be impossible.
ii) The object (lambana) and the aspect (kra) of the absorption vijna
are not perceived (upalabdha).
iii) Since the mental consciousness cannot be described here as an
unwholesome (akuala) or morally indeterminate (avykta) consciousness, it
would be associated (saprayukta) with the roots of good (kualamla).
iv) In the nirodhasampatti, there would be a contact (spara) whence the
presence (samudaya) of conceptualization (saj) and sensation (vedita).
v) Or rather, the nirodhasampatti would be reduced to a simple
interruption of
99
presupposes a perceptible object and aspect. But in the nirodhasampatti there is nothing
like that. Therefore there is no mental consciousness in it.
iii) The vijna of this absorption is definitely not a mental consciousness because this
mental consciousness would be associated with the roots of good. The mind of entry into
this absorption (sampatti) is definitely neither unwholesome nor morally indeterminate.
Since concentration is wholesome, it, i.e., the mind of entry, is only wholesome (kuala).
But without the roots of good, non-attachment (alobha), etc., this wholsome mind would
not exist. It is by association (saprayogata) that it is good. But if these roots of good
exist, how would the two mental factors, concept and senation, not be present?
iv) Non-covetousness and other roots of good are inseparable from contact. That is why
there would be contact in the nirodhasampatti. Now the contact coming from this
absorption has well-being (prarabdhi) as its nature: it is to-be-sensed pleasantly
(sukhavedaniya) or to-be-sensed indifferently (upekvedaniya), whence the presence of
a sensation (vedan) simultaneously (sahaja) with contact. But according to the
definition given by the Buddha, if there is concept and sensation, there is no
nirodhasampatti.
v) It is said: 'By suppressing (vidaa) concept and sensation in the manner that an
abscess (visphoa) or an arrow (iu) is removed, nirodhasampatti is produced. In this
absorption it is only concept and sensation that are destroyed, but mind remains'. In order
to refute this theory, the writer then says: Another absorption (samdhi) has this power:
this suppression of concept and sensation possible in samdhi is not characteristic of
nirodha alone. Why? Thus, in the nonconceptual absorption (asajisampatti), by
virtue of a preparatory practice (prvopya),
100
faith and the other roots of good would be present. On the other hand, if the latter had
been destroyed, the mind too would definitely be destroyed. This is why
nirodhasampatti is not simply the destruction of the factors supported (rita) by the
mind because, when there is a support (raya), to suppress the things supported (rita)
is not possible. (U)
53. The absorption of cessation does not contain a mind (citta) without mental
factors (caitta),
i) because it is impossible to separate the things supported (rita, i.e., the
mental factors) from their support (raya, i.e., the mind);
ii) because there are examples (dnta) where destruction of the things
supported necessarily leads to destructiom of the support;
iii) because the factors of the mind or mental factors are not like the nonomnipresent bodily factors (asarvaga). [137a12]
101
good. Therefore, in this absorption, the roots of good do not exist and the wholesome
mind (kualacitta) alone exists.
Answer - Such a dissociation has never been seen elsewhere. If, at the time of its cause,
the absorption is associated with these mental factors, it would remain associated with
them at the time of the fruition of result (niyandaphala). Therefore the objection does
not hold.
ii) Neither does it hold because there are examples. The Bhagavat has said (Majjhima, I,
p. 296): In those who dwell in the absorption of cessation, the factors (saskra) of the
body (kya), speech (vc) and mind (manas) are destroyed (niruddha).' Here the factors
of the body are the inbreath and the outbreath (npna); the factors of speech are
examination (vitarka) and judgment (vicra); the factors of mind are volition (cetan),
conceptualization (saj), etc. If examination and judgment were destroyed, speech
could not arise. It is the same for the mind: if the factors are destroyed, it does not arise.
Objection - But, you may say, if the factors of the body perish when one enters into
absorption, the body persists and does not perish. It is the same for the mind: the mental
factors are destroyed but the mind persists and does not perish.
Answer - This objection does not hold. Why?
iii) Because[the mental factors are not non-omnipresent like the body factors. The
Bhagavat has said: 'When the body factors are suppressed, there is still another cause for
the susbsistence (sthitihetu) of the body: food (hra), drink (pna), the vital organ
(jivitendriya), consciousness (vijna), etc. Thanks to these, although the inbreath and
outbreath may have disappeared, the body persists.' But it is not the same for the mind. If
the mental factors are suppressed, there is no further particular cause supporting the mind
so that it can subsist. Thus, since the absorption of cessation would not have a mental
consciousness,
it
would
be
necessary
to
call
it
absorption
without
mind
(acittakasampatti).
But since the retributive consciousness (vipkavijna) remains in this absorption, the
Bhagavat has stated that the vijna does not leave the body, and it is from this vijnna
supplied with all the seeds (sarvabjaka) that, coming out of absorption (sampattivyutthna), the active consciousnesses (pravttivijna) arise. This is why the storeconsciousness necessarily exists. (Bh)
102
(kualamla). How could the roots of good be separated from contact (spar)? How
could contact be separated from the univeral (sarvaga) mental factors, sensation, etc.?
(U)
b) Nor by reason of its original cause (samutthnata): a wholesome mind of
effort (prayogika kuhalacitta). That contradicts the stra for which every mind is
wolesome by virtue of an association with the roots of good. Moreover, who forces us to
believe that, if the mind of effort, the condition for absorption, is wholesome by
association with non-covetousness and the other roots of good, it is not the same for the
mind of absorption which is the result that that resembles the cause (niyandaphala)?
(U)
c) Nor by its nature (svabhvata): it would be included in the series of things
wholesome by nature, roots of good, etc. (U)
d) Nor absolutely (paramrthata): it would necessarily be liberated (vimukta).
(U)
ii) It could not be unwholesome, because the nirodhasampatti is in essence
wholesome. (Bh)
103
iii) Neither could it be morally indeterminate (avykita), for it is not the avykta
relating to conduct (rypatha) or to the arts (ilpasthna) or to magical creations
(nirma). But, you may say, it is the avykta arisen from retribution (vipkaja). In this
case, it comes down to a store-consciousness. Beyond these four avyktas there is no
fifth avykta. (Bh)
This is why the vijna residing in this absorption is the retributive consciousness and
not the mental consciousness. (Bh)
104
In order to refute this theory, the writer says: it is inadmissible as we have seen above
when he said, in 23, that two moments are never simultaneous. But this theory has yet
other defects.
When one falls from the formless realm (rpyadhtu) and is reborn into the form realm
(rpadhtu), it is impossible that the earlier form is the generating seed of the actual
form, because the earlier form has long since been destroyed. - When the mind falls from
the heaven of the non-identifying ones to be reborn into an identifying world, when the
mind reappears to leave the absorption of cessation, etc., it is impossible that the earlier
mind could be the generating seed of the later mind because the earlier mind has long
since been destroyed.
If the earlier mind could contain the seed of the later mind without having a birth and
cessation simultaneous with the later mind, if only the mind of the earlier moment could
be the seed that produces (vahati) the mind of the later immediately-following moment,
the last mind of the arhat could not be explained: he would be unable to enter into the
sphere of nirva-without-residue (nirupadhieanirvadhtu). Indeed, this ultimate
mind would be the seed which, as immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya), gives rise to another mind; the result would be that the sphere of nirvawithout-residue would never occur.
Consequently, the forms and minds that arise following one another in order of anterioity
and posteriority could only be immediately preceding conditions (samanatarapratyaya)
or dominant conditions (adhipratyaya) with respect to one another; they are not causal
conditions (hetuprataya). (U) 55.
105
With the help (yukti) of innumerable arguments explained above (29 to 55), the
author has proved that the store-consciousness exists necessarily. (Bh)
consciousness
associated
with
the
counteragent
of
the
afflictions
(pratipakasaprayukta) and supramundane (lokottara), separate from the five: the first
five consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., and distinct from the other: from the
unwholesome (akuala) impure (ssrava) and afflicted (saklia) mental conscousness;
the author, who has already spoken of a good mind, adds here that it is distinct from the
other with the aim of distinguishing it from the wholesome but impure (kualassrava).
106
How would this mind transform its support?: if you believe in the existence of the storeconsciousness, you could call 'transformation of the support' the phenomenon that causes
all the seeds of affliction (sakleabja) that it contains to lose the quality of seed. But if
you do not believe in it, what would this transformation consist of?
ii) You say that the arising of the counteragent is the transformation. But that is
impossible. Why? The counteragent is the transformation, you will say. No, because the
counteragent is not the cutting: it is the cutting of the afflictions that is called
transformation of the support. But the counteragent is not this cutting, because it is
merely the cause of the cutting (prahahetu). If it were the cutting itself, the cause and
the result would not be different. The result, i.e., nirva, is the cutting; the cause, i.e., the
noble path (ryamrga), is the counteragent. If the counteragent were the cutting, the
result and the cause would be one and the same thing and, on the arising of the
counteragent, there would be nirva. (Bh)
iii) You would perhaps admit that this mind loses its seeds or loses its nature of seed and
that that is the transformation: You would perhaps admit that the loss of the seeds or the
loss of its nature of seed applied to the active consciousness constitutes the
transformation of the support. (Bh) The mind (citta) in which the numerous seeds of
defilement (sakleabja) are accumulated (cita) would be without seeds, and you
would consider that to be the transformation of the support; or else its nature of seed
(bjasvabhva) would disappear, and you would consider that to be the transformation of
the support. (U)
But since this mind no longer exists, these two gates are nonexistent, and your claimed
transformation is impossible: If this mind still existed, one could say that it loses its
seeds when it loses its nature of seed. But if it no longer exists, it cannot be said that it
loses its seeds or its nature of seed. But at the moment when the supramundane mind
(lokottaracitta) manifests, this mind of which you speak no longer exists. How could it
be said that it loses its seeds when its nature is destroyed? (U) The afflicted active
consciousnesses (saklia pravttijna) no longer exist in the state of absorption
(sampattyavasth) with which we are concerned. Thus there are no longer any seeds
that could be destroyed. The two losses that you call transformation of the support are
impossible. But let us accept the existence of a store-consciousness: then, although the
afflicted active consciousnesses no longer exist in the state of absorption, their seeds
107
reside in the store-consciousness which can be deprived of seeds or of its nature of seeds
by transforming it. Since thus your claimed transformation of the support is not
explicable in the hypothesis of the existence of only the active consciousnesses, it is
necessary to believe in the existence of a store-consciousness. (Bh)
58. What are the types (prabheda) of store-consciousness? In short, the storeconciousness is threefold (trividha) or fourfold (caturvidha).
Firstly, it is threefold in regard to the three types (viea) of propensities
(vsana):
i) the propensity of speech (abhilpavsana),
ii) the propensity of the view of self (tmadivsana),
iii) the propensity of the factors of existence (bhavgavsana). [137b2]
109
ii) The dharmas destined to arise .... : the material organs (rpindriya), eye, etc., and
other entities of retribution would not be able to arise. (Bh) - If the root is suppressed,
there will be no leaves, etc. (U)
3. The store consciousness is the object (nimitta) of the view of self (tmadti) and the
belief in the self (tmagrha) that resides in the afflicted (klia) manas. If this special
store-consciousness which is object did not exist, belief in the self that has as its cause
the wrong view of self (satkyadi) contained in the afflicted manas would no longer
have an object (lambanaviaya). But it should be known that it is the result resembling
the cause (niyandaphala). (Bh)
iv) The fourth point is developed in the following paragraph.
111
112
ii) As exhausted, it is the good or bad seed which, once retributed, etc.: the good or bad
seed, once retributed, cannot be retributed again because it is exhausted. It is like the seed
(bja) which, after having produced a stem (akura), cannot produce another one. As nonexhausted, it is the seed of the speech impregnation: this seed which develops according
to conditions (anutpratyayam) is a cause capable of giving rise to the multiplicity of
discursiveness (vyavahraprapaca) .... Without a store-consciousness of exhaustion,
good or bad acts would not perish by exhaustion after having given their result: that is,
after having given their result, they would produce it again according to u: spyad zin pai
mtshan id med na dge ba da sdig pa es bya la sogs pa ni bras bu phyin pas spyad zin
pa jig pa de med pa gyur te / bras by byin nas ya bras bur gyur re es bya bai
tha tshig go].
Without a store-consciousness of non-exhaustion, the production of a new speech
impregnation would be impossible: without earler speech (prvbhilpa), no present
speech (pratyutpannbhilpa). (U)
iii) These magical entities, etc. are a cause capable of producing wrong views
(asamyagdi); it is the same for the store-consciousness. (U)
iv) This passage is easy to understand; there is no need to explain it.
114
and indeterminate, it opposes neither the good nor the bad with which it is in the
relationship of cause and result. (u) - If the retribution were not nonafflicted and
indeterminate, the disappearance of the afflictions would be impossible: since the good
arises from good and the bad from bad, the process of sasra would have no end. (Bh)
NOTES ON CHAPTER I
More or less com-lete accounts of the doctrine of the alayavijnana: Sadhir., chap. V;
Lakavatra, p. 46-54 and Suzuki, Studies, p. 248- 264; Strlakra, I, 18; XIX, 51;
Madyntavibhaga, p. 32-35 (Stcherbatsky, p. 54-57); Yogacarybhmi, Taisho 1579, p.
579 sq; lambanapark, JA, 1929, p. 41-46; Triik, p. 18-22; Karmasiddhi in MCB,
IV, 1935-36, 33-40;Siddhi, p. 94-220; Fan yi ming in S. Lvi, Matriaux.
Mdhyamika sources: Madhyamvatra, p. 125-160 (Muson, 1910, p. 317-344);
Bodhicaryvatra, IX, 15-35. Brhmanical sources: Bathmastra, II, 28-32 (Belvalkar,
II, p. 91-95); Sarvadaranasagraha in Muson, 1901, p. 191 sq.; adaranasagraha
Other references in Hobogirin, art. Araya, p. 35.
1. Jeyraya: Siddhi, p. 166; Fan yi ming, p. 127. The stanza andhikliko dhtu is
cited and commented in Triik, p. 37 and Siddhi, p. 169.
2-3. Etymology of the laya: Sadhinir., V, 3; Triik, p. 18 (23): tatra
sarvaskleikadharmabjasthnatvd laya. laya sthnam itipaeyau. atha
vlyante upanibdhyante smin sarvadharm kryabhvena. tad vlyate upanibadhyate
kraabhvena sarvadhamev ity laya; Karmasiddhi, 33; Siddhi, p. 96, 167; Fan yi
ming, p. 127.
4-5. The stanza of Sadhinir., V, v. 7, dnavijna gambhraskmo occurs in
Triik, p. 34; Karmasiddhi, 32, 37; Yogacarybhmi, Taish 1579, p. 379a12;
Madhyamakvatra, p. 196 (3) ; Siddhi, p. 173. Comparison with the river and the mirror:
Sadhinir., V, 5; Lakvatra, p. 48 (3), 37 (16), 127 (12), etc.; Triik, krik 4;
Siddhi, p. 156-157; H. Ui, Indo-tetsugaku-kenky, VI, 1930, p. 559.
Updna: Sadhinir., V, v. 2 (the laya appropriates sdhihnarpndriya and the
threefold vsan); Triik, p. 19 (upadnam updi sa punartmdivikalpavsan
rpdidharma-vikalpavsan ca); Siddhi, p. 124; the updhi is twofold: bija or threefold
vsan and sendriyakakya); Fan yi ming, p. 140-141.
The expression yogakema: Vinaya, II, p. 205; Dgha, III. p. 123, 124, 164; Majjhima, I,
p. 117, 349, 357; Sayutta, I, p. 173; II, p. 195, 226; III, p. 112; IV, p. 125; V, p. 130;
Aguttara, I, p. 50; II, p. 40, 53, 87, 247; III, p. 21, 294, 353; Divyvadna, p. 98, 123,
303, 408; Sadhinir., V, 3; Madhyntavibhaga, p. 33 (6); Triik, p. 19 (17);
Siddhi, p. 125. Cf. C. H. Jacobi, Triikvijapti des Vasubandhu, p. 54; R. B. A. Ray,
Yogakema, BSOS, VII, 1934, p. 133-136.
The coagulated (samrcchita) vijna: below, 34.
6. Citta-mano-vijna. These seem to be synonymous for the Lesser Vehicle: Dgha, I, p.
21 (Ya ca kho ida vuccati cittan ti vmano ti v viaan ti v ayam); Sayutta, II,
p. 95 - Visuddhimagga, II, p. 452 (Via, citta, mano ti atthato eka); Koa, II, p.
115
176. There are, however, slight differences: Mano represents intellectual functioning of
consciousness, while Viaa represents the field of sense and sense-reaction
(perception) and Citta the subjective aspect of consciousness (cf. Mrs. Rh. D., Buddhist
Psychology, p. 19). For Asaga, these are three different things (see below, 8). Lakvatar, p. 322 (16): citta vikalpo vijaptir mano vijanam eva ca, laya
tribhavace ete cittasya paryy); but, ibid., p. 46 (17): cittena cyate karma manas
ca vicyate, vijanena vijnti drya kalpeti pacabhi).
Asaga distinguished two manas: the manodhtu of the Lesser Vehicle, also called manayatana or mana-indriya (cf. Koa, I, p. 31-33) and the kliamanas. The latter is studied
in Triik, p. 22-23 and Siddhi, p. 225-274. It is always associated with the four
defilements. In these two texts, the four defilements are called tmadi, tmamna and
tmasneha (Triik, p. 23 (11); Siddhi, p. 255). In the Sagraha the former is the
satkyadi: cf. Majjhima, I,, p. 300; Sayutta, III, p. 16 seq.; J. Rahder, La sathyadi
daprs la Vibh, MCB, I, 1931-32, p. 227-239.
7. Demonstration of the existence of the kliamanas: Siddhi, p. 275-288.
i) On avidy veik, Koa, III, p. 84; V, p. 31. The word veika: Sayutta, IV, p. 239;
Aguttara, V, p. 74 seq.; Visuddhimagga, I, p. 268, Divydan, p. 2, 182, 268, 302; Koa,
VII, p. 66; Madhyntavibhaga, p. 56 (15); Siddhi, p. 277-279.
ii) There is a discussion on the support of the manovijna. This would be: a) The
consciousness which has just passed (yad anantartta vijnam) as immediately
preceding condition and antecedent (samanantarapratayaya); Sarvstivdin-Vaibhika
theory, cf. Koa, I, p. 31-32; Siddhi, p. 281. b) A substance (rpa) as co-arisen support
(sahabh-raya): root-Sautrntika theory mentioned here. More precisely, this material
would be the fleshly heart (hdayavastu): theory of the later Abhidhamma, cf. Milinda, p.
281; Atthaslin, p. 140, 257, 264, 342; Tikapahna,p. 17, 26, 53 seq. 62, 256;
Visuddhimagga, p. 447, 588; Paramatthajotik, II, p. 228; Abhidhammatthasagaha, p.
14; Vibhaga, p. 87-88. It is also the Traparya theory, cf. Koavykhy, p. 39 (26):
Trapariy api hdayavastu ,amovijanadhtor raya kalpayanti; and that of the
early Sautrntikas, cf. note of K'ouei ki in Siddhi, p. 221. c) A previous moment of the
organ as condition as the equal and immediate antecedent: another Sautrntika theory
mentioned in Siddhi, p. 282. d) The kliamanas as co-arisen support, specific and
dominant condition (adhipatipratyaya): Yogacra theory defended here and in Siddhi, p.
282.
iii) Etymology of manas: manuta iti manas (Koa, II, p. 177); manas manyate puna
(Lakvatar, p. 316 (2); mano manyanti vai sad (ibid., p. 323 (4); manyata iti manas
(Siddhi, p. 280).
iv) Difference between the two concentrations. There is a discussion on the nature of the
concentrations. a) They exist by themselves (dravyasat), both being the two destructions
of mind, but they differ from each other in the preparatory practice, the level where they
are practiced, the goal pursued, etc.: Sarvstivdin-Sautrntika theory, cf. Koa, II, p.
210-213; Siddhi. b) They have only nominal existence (prajaptisat), being the simple
nonexistence of the mind for a time: Sautrntika theory, cf. Koa, II, p. 214. c) They have
only nominal existence but they differ by the presence of the kliamanas in the
asajisampatti and its absence in the nirodhasampatti: Yogacara theory defended here
and in Siddhi, p. 283.
116
117
1) layrama. A phrase having three members: rma, rata, sammudita in Pli (Vinaya,
I. p. 4; Majjhima, I. p. 167; Sayutta, I., p. 136; Aguttara, II, p. 131) and in Sanskrit
(Mhvastu, III,p. 314; Tibetan Sagraha); the same phrase preceded by a fourth
member: ngai-laya in the Chinese versions and in Siddhi, III, fol. 23b. Related
expressions: Loka anlaya (Saundarandana song XII, v. 22), dharma anlaya
(Lalitavistara, XXV, p. 302). Same phrase in the Vinaya of the Dharmagupta (Sse fen liu,
chap. 31, Tok., XV, 5, 7a: "Beings are happy in the tch'ao k'ou", 75 and 11; 116 and 8)
and of the Mahisaka (Wou fen liu, chap. 15, Tok, XVI, 1, 90a: "Beings being happy,
become attached to k'ou tche", 116 and 8, 40 and 3). See S. Lvi, layrma, JA,
CCXV, 1929, p. 281-283; Hobogirin, art. Araya, p. 35, col. 2.
rutamaya jna, etc.: Dgha, III, p. 219; Vibhaga, p. 324; Visuddhimagga, II, p. 439:
Koha, II, p. 265; VI, p. 143; Sadhinir., VIII, v. 24; Madhyntavibhaga, p. 35 (19),
210 (12).
Dharmnudharmaptatipatti: Dgha, II, p. 224; III, p. 119; Sayutta, III, p. 40 seq.;
Aguttara, III, p. 176. Defined in Bodh. bhmi, p. 107 (22): yathparyeitnm
yathodgrhtan dharm kyena vac manas nuvartn samyakcintan bhvan
ca. Lengthy study in Madhyantavibhaga, p. 213-233.
2) Mlavijna of the Mahsghikas: The Sautrntika thesis 3 in Vasumitra's Yi tsong
louen louen (J. Masuda, Orogon and Doctrines of early Indian Buddhist schools, Asia
Major, II, 1925, p. 68) seems to be of Mahsghika inspiration: "There exist
mlantikaskandhas and ekarasaskandhas." The Mahsghika preceded the
Sautrntika whose thoughts have been influenced by the founders of the Yogcraschool.
It seems to me that the Sautrntika idea of the ekarasaskandha of the siubtle
consciousness which becomes the substance of trnasmigration and from which the
cu=rrent five skandha come into existnce was erived originally from the Mahsghika
thought. (J. Masuda, ibid.).
3) sasrikaskandha of the Mahsaka. Cf. thesis IXB, 9 of the Mahsaka: "The
skandhas, yatanas and dhtus are always present." According to the Shu-chi, the
constant existence of the bja or seeds nd not of the current (samudcra) skandha,
yatana and dhtu. This is undoubtedly an ingenuous interpretation because otherwise
the present proposition contradicts one of the other doctrines of the Maiska, namely te
doctrine of the perpetual destruction and recreation of the saskra (IXA, 23). This
interpretation is usbject, however, to a serious doubt. As it is well-known the bja theory,
i.e., the theory of the causation of the phenomena out ot the bja, plays an important role
in the later Yogcra literature, such as the Vijaptimatratsiddhi, et.c, I am unable, at
present, to ascertain if the Mahsaka bhidharmika had already the bja theory in
mind. (J. Masuda, ibid.).
4) Bhavga, in Pli bhavaga, 'subconscious life-continuum'. Many Pli and Sanskrit
references: Atthaslini, p. 72, 140, 269; Sammohavinodan, p. 81, 156 seq., 406;
Abhidhammatthasagraha, p. 12-13; Nettipakaraa, p. 91; Milinda, p. 299 seq.,
Visuddhimagga, p. 21, 164, 457 seq., 549, 617, 676; Jataka, VI, 82; Mrs. Rhys.-D.,
Buddhist Manual of Psych. Ethics, p. 3, 132, n.1, 134, n. 1; The Buddhist Philosophy of
Change, Quest review, Oct. 1917, p. 16; A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy, 1923, p. 104,
180, 194; L. de La Valle Poussin, Nirva, 1925, p. 65-66.
118
bhavaga in
Pe Maung Tin trans. Visuddhimagga, p. 21, (Path of Purity, p. 25): But indeed, when a
visible object (rprammaa) enters the avenues of sight (cakkhussa ptham), on the
cessation of the subconsciousness (bhavaga) after arising teo or three times, the
imoperative mind-element (or the five-door adverting, kiriymanodhtu,
pacadvrvajjana), arises, accomplishing the function of adverting (vajjanakicca), and
then ceases. The arise and cease in order, the visul consciousness (cakkhuviaa)
accomplishing the function of seeing (dasssanakicca), the resultant mind-element
(vipkamanodhtu) accomplishing the function of receiving (sampaiccahanakicca), the
reiltant element of mond-cognition without root-conditions
(vipkhetukamanoviaadhtu : ahetuka maenas not depending on rga, desire, etc.)
accomplishing the function of scrutinizing (sam-traakicca), and the inoperative element
of mindcognition without rootcodition (kiriyhetukamanoviaadhtu) accomplishing
the function of determining (vohapanakicca). Immediately afterwards, apperception
takes place (javana javati).
b) The Sthaviras of K'ouei-ki have a list of nine cittas which may be superimposed on the
preceding. There are, however, some problems.
i) bhavgacitta: When, for example, at the beginning, one is born and since one is still
incapable of vikalpa (conceptualization), the citta can only take place concerning (lamb) objects automatically, this is called bhavgacitta.
ii) citta having the power of pulling-producing: If there are objects that present
themselves and the citta produces a 'watchful gaurd-duty' (king-kio, 149 and 13, 147 and
13 = varjana) [attracting, overcoming: Monier-Williams dictionary], this is called citta
having the power of pulling-producing.
119
iii) daranacitta: The citta with regard to this object having occurred, it sees (kien), it
looks at it (tchao-tchan, 86 and 9, 109 and 13).
iv) citta of 'equal investigation' (sapraticchanachitta): Having seen, it examines (tch'a,
40 and 11, mms, han) by means of equal examination of the good and the bad.
v) citta of 'equal penetration' (satraacitta): Having examined, it then cognizes
(vijnti) the good and the bad by means of 'equal penetration'.
vi) citta of establishment (vyavasthpanacitta): Then the mind of establishment
produces verbal concepts (vgvikalpa) and tells the good and the bad of the object.
vii) citta of functioning (che yong): Then, according to the good and the bad, there is
'movement-action' (tong tso, 19 and 9, 9 and 5; this phrase in Siddhi, X, 28a1;
corresponds to ceit ijita: may be the javana of the Pli sources, and the citta of
functioning arises.
viii) citta of fan-yuen (162 and 4, 120 and 9). This corresponds to tadrammaa in the
Pli sources: S. Z, Aung reanslates: The mind by which one says 'that object', just that
very one and no other. When the javana has taken place, at the moment when the
citta is about to enter into rest, it refers back to (fan-yuen) the thing previously
accomplished.
ix) The citta of fan-yuen having taken place, return to the bhavga which concerns
objects automatically.
13. This whole paragraph is taken up and developed in Siddhi, p.181-182.
14. On the lakaas of the laya, cf. Siddhi, p. 96-99. K'ouei-ki has a learned note on the
relationships between lakaa and the natures of being cause and effect. These two
natures will be studied in 17 and 27.
15. In this paragraph, vasan has the meaning of perfumed. The perfumed is studied in
23. On the theory of the bja-vasan in the Smkhya-Yoga, see L. de La Valle Poussin,
Le Bouddhisme et la Yoga de Patajali, MCB, V, 1936-37, p. 230-232.
The example of sesame seeds is well known. For the Koa, the smell of sesame perfumed
by the flower is different from the smell of the flower; cf. Koavykhy, p. 329 (19):
yath tileu puspagandhd gandhntraram utpadyate nyad eva na sa paupo gandha
ity ha.
16. The seeds are neither different nor non-different from the laya, "because they have
been made its own, appropriated (uptta) by the laya, embraced (parighta) within its
being, sharing its good or bad destiny (ekayogakema)." Siddhi, p. 124.
17. Two well-known examples of reciprocal causes:
120
i) The flame and the wick: Seyyathpi telaca paticca vai ca paticca telapdpo
jhayeyya. tasseva telassa ca vaiy ca pariydn anhro
nibbyeyya (Sayutta,
III, 126; V, p. 319). Expression repeated in Madhyamakavtti, p. 588 (2):
tailavartikayaniruddhapradpavat. Compare also Majjhima, I, p. 295: Seyyath pi vuso
telappadpassa jhyato acci paticca bh paayati. bha paicca acci payati.
ii) The bundles of reeds: Seyyathpi vuso dve nalajalpina aam aam nissya
tiheyyum Tsa ce vuso naakalpina ekam kadheyya ek papateyya aparace
kaheyya apar papaateyya (Sayutta, II, p. 114); tadathyuman riputra dve
naakalpyav ke ucchrite sytm. te nyonyanirite anyonya niritya tiheytm.
tatra kacid ekm apanayet. dvity nipatet. dvitym apanayet. ek nipatet
(Koavykhy, p. 668 (2), ad Koa, VIII, p. 138). Cf. also Madyamakavtti, p. 561 (11):
naakalpayogena.
The six hetus in the Vaibhika system: Koa, II, p. 244 seq.; Koavykhy, p. 188-189;
Vikhypana, Taish 1602, p. 170a12. Lengthy discussion on the ten and two hetus in
Siddhi, p. 453-463.
18. On the crafts of tailor and dyer, some information in Jtaka no. 38; trans. H.
Obermiller, Reden des Buddha, 1922, p. 428.
19. To be compared with 28. The Yogacrins distinguish three prattyasamutpdas:
i) Mutual causality of the laya and dharmas: cf. above, 17; Siddhi, p. 468-472. It is
mingled with the mutual causality of the laya and the pravttijnas, cf. 27.
ii) Causality in the twelve-membered causal chain: cf. Visuddhimagga, p. 517-586;
Sammohavinodan, p. 130-213; Compendium, p. 260 sq.; listambastra; Daabhmka,
p. 47-52; Madhyamavtti, XXVI, p. 542; Koa, III, p. 60 seq., Madhyntavibhaga, p. 3545; Siddhi, p. 481-501. Various works: L. de La Valle Poussin, Thorie ds douze
causes, 1913; P. Oltramare, La formule bouddhique des douze causes, 1909; P. MassonOursel, Essai donterpretation de la thorie bouddhique des douze conditions, 1915;
Oldenberg-Foucher, Le Bouddha (4), 1934, p. 250 sq. Recent works: V. Gokhale,
Prattyasamutpdastra des Ullagha (Nanjio 1227), 1930; Die buddhistishe Theorie
der Kasalkette, Sinica, V, 1939, p. 37-40; N Dutt, The Place of the ryasatyas and the
Prattyasamutpda in Hnayna and Mahyna, ABORI, XI, pt. II, p. 101-27; G. Tucci,
A Fragment from the Prattyasamutpda of Vasubandhu, JRAS, 1930, p. 611-623.
iii) Causality of the pravttivijnas, cf. below, 28.
The division of the saskras into puya, apuya, nijya: Dgha, III, p. 217; Vibhaga,
p. 135; Koa, III, p. 84; Madhyntavibhaga, p. 36 (11), 238 (8).
20. This paragraph appears to be a development of Aguttara, I, p. 173: Santi bhikkhave
eke samaabrhaman evavino evadihino ya kicya purisapuggalo
paisavedeti sulha v dukkha v adukkhamasukha v sabba ta pubbe
kataahet tita issaranimnahet ti ta ahetu-appaccay ti.
121
The theories of the trthikas on the origin of things (gua, padrtha, vara, Mahbrahma,
kla, di, prvakoi, svabhva, ka, tman, abda, paramu) are explained and refuted
in Siddhi, p. 23-27.
Parable of the blind and the elephant: Udna, VI, 4, p. 68-69; E. Chavannes, Cinq cents
contes et apologues, 1934, no. 86; Kisukopamajtaka, no. 238; G. A. Jacobs, A second
Handful of Popular Maxims, 1902, p. 53; JRAS, 1902,p. 174; T. W. Rhys-Davids, JRAS,
1911, p. 200 sq.; V. S. Ghate, Ind. Ant., 42, 1913, p. 251; M. Winternitz, Hist. Of Indian
Lit., II, 1933, p. 88.
On puruakra, cf. Dgha, I, p. 53; Milinda, P. 96; Koa, II, p. 289; Madhyantavibhaga,
p. 193 (20), 197 (17).
21. Sarvabjaka vipkavijna: Siddhi, p. 97-99.
22. Six characetristics of seed: Siddhi, p. 116-118.
23. Four characteristics of perfumed: Siddhi, p. 120.
The Sagraha mentions and refutes three theses on the nature of the perfumed:
i) that the pravttijnas are perfumable : root-thesis of the Sautrntika, cf. Siddhi, p. 183,
207.
ii) that the previous moment of a vijna perfumes the later moment : thesis of the
Drntika according to Sagrahabhya, p. 330a9; Sthavira thesis according to Siddhi,
p. 187 (here Sthavira probably means the Sautrntika rlbdha, cf. Siddhi, p. 222).
iii) that the vijnajti is perfumable: thesis of the divergent Sautrntika masters (yi che),
according to Siddhi, p. 185.
Other theses mentioned in Siddhi, p. 182-188.
24. Twofold causality of seed: Siddhi, p. 118-119.
Example of the bow and arrow: Viba, Taish 1545, k. 20, p. 103c; k. 21, p. 105a;
Koa, II, p. 200, 217; IV, p. 102.
25. Example of the flame and the wick: above, 17.
Expression aktbhygama, ktavipraa: Mahvyutpatti, 7529-7530;
Madhyamakavtti, p. 321 (1) Sarvadaranasagraha, ed. nand- rama, p. 21;
Sydvdamajar, 18, p. 151; Bodhicartvatraik in L. de La Valle Poussin,
Bouddhisme. Etudes et materiaux, 1898. [. 306 (18); Advaitabrahmas., p. 125.
26. laya and pravttivijna: Madhyntavibhaga, p. 32-35(Stcherbatsky, p. 54-57); L
de Lavalle Poussin, MCB, I, p. 403.
122
(Taish 1594, p. 135c29): In the mother's womb, the vijna and the kalala mutually
unite again. Physiological conception of the vijana, cf. S. Schayer, Ueber den
Somatismus der indischen Psychologie, Bull. Ac. Pol., 1936. - Paramrtha (Taish 1593,
p. 116b6): This vijna takes its support (t'ouo) upon the kalala and one is born by
transformation and union in the mother's womb. - Comm. of Vasubandhu translated by
Paramrtha (Taish 1595, p. 169b29-169c3): To take support upon the kalala means that
at one moment the vijna is associated (siang ying) with the kalala; it is 'transformed'
means that the retribution-vijna is different from the preceding sakliavijna; it is
'united' means that the blood and semen, coagulated by the wind which produces the
power of earlier actions, is identified with the vijna (ling yu che t'ong). - H. Ui,
Shodaijoron kenky, p. 303, cites, according to the commantary of the Sadhinirmocana
of Yuan-t'so, a passage by Paramrtha on the Sagraha, where Paramrtha says: The
union of the mlavijna (pen che) with the body coming from the father and mother (fou
mou yi t'i) is called upapattibhava (cheou cheng). Paramrtha says that kalala should be
translated as coagulated fat (hoa, 85 and 10). - The vijna undoubtedly becomes
coagulated by becoming identified with the kalala but, properly speaking, it is the kalala
that is a coagulant."
The phrase asthnam anavaka, in Aguttara, I. p. 27; Koa, III, p. 198; explained in
Koavykhy, p. 228 (17).
35. Appropriation of the material organs by the mind and mentals: Koa, I, p. 63;
Karmasidddhi, 34a; Madhyamakavtti, p. 576; Siddhi, p. 193.
The verse yur umth ... Majjhima, I, p. 296; Sayutta, III, p. 143; Koa, II, p. 215:
Koavykhy, p. 668 (16).
36. Theories on the vijnga. It is made up of:
i) the six pravttivijnas of the intermediate existence: Sarvstivdin theory, cf. Koa,
III, p. 85.
ii) the manovijna: another Sarvstivdin theory according to K'ouei ki, ad Siddhi, p.
200.
iii. the laya: Yogcra theory, cf. Siddhi, p. 199.
Continuation of the Buddha-nanda conversation: Via va hi nanda daharass
eva sato vocchijjissatha kumrassa v kumrikya v, api nu kho nmarpa vuddhi
virhi vepulla pajjissathti (Dgha, II, p. 63). - The Sanskrit phrase reproduced in
Lamotte's commentary is taken from Koavykhy, p. 669 (4).
37. Theory of hra: Majjhima, I, p. 261; Dgha, III, p. 228, 296; Dhammasagan, p. 58,
121, 358; Visuddhimagga, p. 3421; Koa, III, p. 119-128: Siddhi, p. 200-204. Here the
Sagraha refutes the Sarvstivdins. Other theories in Siddhi.
38-42. The question of the gatis and the yonis and, more specifically, that of the destiny
in rupyadhtu is studied in Koa, III, p. 12 seq.; Karmasiddhi, v. 34c; Siddhi, p. 191.
124
126
61. Dauhulya and prarabdhi: Sadhinir., p. 96, 116, 118, 120, 126, 127, 129, 146, 161,
127-129; Lakvatara, p. 94 (12), 109 (6); Strlakra, transl. p, 51; Bodh. bhmi, p. 9
(1), 14 (26), 20, (16); Triik, p. 22 (9), 27 (14), 43 (23), 44 (11); Siddhi, p. 608-612.
laya among the arhats: Siddhi, p. 162-166.
62. Moral nature of the laya: Triik, p. 21(11); Siddhi, p. 152.
127
Chapter II
128
(asat) and fictitious (bhrnta) thing (artha) is called the dependent nature. (Cf.
the Chinese versions) [138a11]
klavijapti:
This
is
non-interruption
of
the
stream
of
sasra
130
***
Concepts i) to ix) have speech propensity (abhilpavsan) as seed, because they are a
transformation of the consciousness (vijnaparima) and are not a separate substance.
Concept x) has the impregnation of the view of self as seed: it develops because of the
propensity of the view of self. Concept xi) has the propensity of the members of existence
as seed: it develops because of the propensity of the members of existence. (U) (Cf. I,
verses 58, 59).
131
(vikalpasvabhva);
(parinipannasvabhva),
the
also
absolute
called
the
character
is
fundamental
the
absolute
nature
of
nature
things
(dharmatsvabhva). These three chaeracters appear respectively as the dharma-to-beknown (parijeya), the dharma-to-be-cut (prahtavya) and the dharma-to-be-realized
(sktkartavya). Thus in the Mahprajpramitstra (Taish no. 220 = atashasrik),
the Buddha said to Maitreya: One imagines everything that is a conditioned substance
132
5. Among the concepts listed in 2, the concept of body, of the possessor of the
body and of the enjoyer (dehadehibhoktvijapti) is the six inner elements
(dhytmikadhtu), eye, etc. The concept cognized by the preceding ones
(tadupabhuktavijapti) is the six outer elements (bhyadhtu), color, etc. The
concept that cognizes the preceding one (tadupabhoktvijapti) is the six
elements, visual consciousness, etc., (cakurjndi-addhtu). The other
concepts, vi) - xi), are modes (prabheda) of the first five. [138a19]
133
The other concepts, vi) - xi), are modes of the first five: concepts i) - v), beginning with
dehavijapti and ending with tadupabhoktvijapti ..... Indeed, there are temporal
distinctions in the concept of saskra, namely, past, present or future saskra; hence
the concept of temporal appearance. There are numerical distinctions in this concept of
saskra: the number 1, etc.; hence the concept of numerical appearance. There are
distinctions of place in this same concept, namely, above, below, etc; hence the concept
of the aspect of space; and so on for the other concepts. (U)
6. You say: "These notions (vijapti) are none other than concept only
(vijaptimtra) since there is no object (arthbhvt)." What is the example
(dnta) for that? - The dream (svapna), etc., can be used as an example. Thus,
in a dream where there is no object (artha), nothing but a bare consciousness
(vijnamtra), various objects - colors (rpa), sounds (abda), smells (gandha),
tastes (rasa) and tangibles (spraavya), houses (ghara), forests (vana), lands
(bhmi) and mountains (parvata) - appear; however, there is no real object there.
By this comparison, it will be understood (avabudh-) how, not only in the dream
but everywhere else (sarvatrapi), there is nothing but concept (vijaptimtrat).
In the phrase 'the dream, etc., can be used as example', the word 'etc.' should be
understood as including other examples: magic (mya), mirage (mrici) and
optical illusion (timira). [Cf. I, 61, no. 3; II, 27].
Let us agree that in the awake state (prabodha) as in the dream state (svapna),
everything comes down to concept-only (vijaptimtra). But on emerging from
the dream, one has the feeling that the dream was just a concept. Why does the
same feeling not arise equally in the awake state? It appears in those who are
awakened (prabuddha) by means of the knowledge of reality (tattvajna). Just
as the feeling of the non-objectivity of the dream visions is lacking during the
dream but appears after waking up, in the same way the feeling of the nonobjectivity of the visions of the waking state is lacking in those who have not
been awakened by the knowledge of reality, but does appear in those whom this
knowledge has awakened. [138b1]
134
7. How can those who have not yet been awakened (prabuddha) by the
knowledge of reality (tattvajna) understand the existence of concept only
(vijaptimtra) by deduction (anum-)? - By scripture (gama) and by reasoning
(yukti).
i) Scripture, first. In the Daabhmika (p. 49), the Bhagavat said: "This
three-fold world is nothing but mind" (cittamtram ida yad ida
traidhtukam). And in the Sadhinirmocana (VIII, v. 7), Maitreya asked:
"Bhagavat, are the images (pratibimba) perceived during concentration
(samdhigohara) different (bhinna) or not different (abhinna) from the mind
(citta) that perceives them?" and the Bhagavat replied: Maitreya, they are
not different from the mind. Why? Because these images are concept only
(vijaptimtra). I have said that the object of consciousness
(vijnlamabana) is formed (prabhvita) by concept only, thus there is no
external object." - Maitreya asked: "Bhagavat, if the images perceived
during concentration are not different from the mind, how can the mind
grasp (gnti) the mind itself?" - "Maitreya, no dharma grasps another
dharma; nevertheless, the mind that arises thus (evam utpannam) from
causes and conditions appears thus (evam avabhsate) in the twofold aspect
of a mind that is seen and a mind that sees. Thus, for example, given a form
(rpa niritya) in the polished surface of a mirror (supariuddha
daramadala) in which it is reflected, one imagines that one sees the form
and the image (pratibimbam api paymti manyate). The form and the image
that one sees appear as two distinct things (bhinnrthenvabhsante),
whereas the image is non-existent [cf. Koa III, p. 34-35.] Similarly, the mind
that arises thus from causes and conditions and the images [erceived in
concentration seem to be different things, whereas they are two aspects, the
one passive, the other active, of one and the same mind.
ii) The reasoning is given as well by this gama. Thus, when the mind (citta)
is in concentration (samhita), whatever dharma image (jeyapratibimba),
135
blue (vinlaka), etc., is seen, it is the mind itself that is seen. There is no object
blue, etc., separate from the mind. By means of this reasoning, the
Bodhisattva is able to deduce (anuman) that, at the basis of all notions [and
not just at the basis of meditated concepts], there is concept only
(vijaptimatrta) and not objective reality. [138b18]
136
You are mistaken about the meaning of the word cittamtra. It is not only a question of
the nonexistence of form (rpa), but also of the nonexistence of the mind and mental
factors (rga, etc.) inasmuch as they take an object, of the nonexistence of objects taken
by the mind, including the knantya, etc., [objects of the mind in rpyadhtu
according to the Sarvstivdins.] On the other hand, the Sautrntikas think that ka, the
simple absence of form, has no reality: in fact, the ka is a manifestation of the mind; it
is cittamtra. Fearing lest the Sautrntikas would say: "The ka, being separate from
the citta-caitta, should be called a dharma that is not mind", or lest they say: "The mind
that bears upon ka, not having an object, does not exist", the text says the three worlds
are only mind ...." (U after Siddhi, p. 420)
Here is the passage of the Sadhinirmocana commented on by u: ti e dzin ni sems
rtse gcig tu byed pa sems las byu bai chos so /dei spyod ni yul lo // gzugs bran ni
gzugs dos ltar sna bao // dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu dbye ba can es
bya ba ni phyi rol gyi dmigs pa med pao // rnam par es pa dmigs pa yin par bad do //
es ba ni di ltar dmigs pa de rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba ni dei o bo id
ces bya bai tha tshig go // rnam par es pa ni dmigs par sna ba tsam gyis rab tu phye
ba yin par bad es bya bai tha tshig go // sems de id kyis es bya ba la sogs pa ni
bdag id la byed pa gal bar ston pao // byams pa chos ga ya es ba la sogs pa ni lan
debs pa ste / chos thams cad ni byed pa med pas byed pa da byed pa po mi thad pai
phyir ro // de ltar skyes pa es bya ba ni rten ci brel par byu bai che ba id kyis ni
gcig kho na rnam pa gis su sna bai tshul brjod pao // dper na gzugs kyi gi bo ra gi
bin id la brten nas me lo la sogs pai na du de id sna ya gzugs bran mtho o
sam du log par sems te / me lo la sogs pa rgyui mthus don gan du med kya sna
bai phyir ro // de bin du dran pa da kun tu rtog pa la sogs pai rkyen gyi mthus ga
tha dad pa ma yin ya tha dad par sna ba ti e dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs bran de
de bin du skyes so // lu de ni tshad ma da bcas par bcom ldan das id kyis gtan la
phab po /: Concentration is the one-pointed fixing of the mind (cittaikgrat): it is a
mental factor (caittasikadharma). The domain (gocara) perceived by it is its object
(viaya). The image (pratibimba) is a representation similar to the original. The object of
consciousness is formed (prabhvita) by a concept onlyt: there is no external object
(bhylambana). I have said that the object of consciousness is a concep only: that is to
say that this object formed by a mere concept has this simple concept as self-nature
137
(svabhva). This goes back to saying: I have said that consciousness is formed simply by
an appearing object. How can the mind grasp the mind itself? This shows the duality
between substance and its activity [between the emptiness that has been thought of and
the fact of the consciousness]. Maitreya, no dharma, etc.: this refutes the objection:
indeed, since all dharmas are without activity (cf. Koa, IX, p. 280), action (kriy) and
agent (kraka) are non-existent. Nevertheless, the mind that arises in this way, etc.: by
the vastness (mahattva) of dependent origination (prattyasamutpda), the mind, single
and simple, is caused to appear in a twofold aspect (kra) [of a mind that is seen and a
mind that sees]. Thus, when one places a screen (?) before one's face (svamukha), it is the
face itself which appears in the mirror (dara), etc.; however, one wrongly thinks that
one sees an image (pratibaimba) distinct from the face. By the causal power (hetubala)
of the mirror, etc., the image which is not something other than the face (cf. Koa, III, p.
34)] appears nevertheless as different from it. Similarly, by the conditioning power
(pratyayabala) of memory (smti), of imagination (parikalpa), etc., images seen in
concentration arise which, without being different from the mind, nevertheless appear as
differerent from it. This gama with its commentary (sapramam) was given by the
Bhagavat himself.
8. At the basis of the image blue, etc., there can be no consciousness of memory
because the object perceived in concentration is immediately present (puro
'vasthita). Arising from hearing (rutamaya) and pondering (cintmaya), the
consciousness of memory has the past (atta) as object; therefore what it sees is
concept only (vijaptimtra). By this deduction (anumna), even if he is not yet
awakened (prabuddha) by the knowledge of reality (tattvajna), the bodhisattva
can deduce the existence of concept only. [138b22]
reminder of the skeletons (kakla) once seen in a cemetery (mana), etc. To dispel
this theory, the author says: At the basis of the image blue, etc., there can be no
consciousness of memory because the object perceived in concentration is immediately
present. If the image perceived in concentration were the memory of some past day, one
ought to remember the particular place where the thing had been seen earlier as well as
the earlier perception. But this is not the case. The knowledge resulting from meditation
or concentration (bhvanmayajna) is a consciousness of the present; the object seen
by it is distinct (spaa) and immediately present (skt). The consciousness of memory
has no such object.
Objection - If the distinctive feature (mladravya) of memory is to be a consciousness
associated (saprayukta) with the wisdom stemming from hearing (rutamay praj)
and with the wisdom stemming from contemplation (cintmay praj), its twofold
object (gocara) is distinct from consciousness.
That is not so: stemming from hearing, etc., the twofold consciousness of memory has the
past (atta) as object. And since the past does not exist, the image which it perceives is
mere concept, for example, the memories of childhood. Therefore, what is remembered
by this consciousness is mere concept because the object of the mind (so nien) in empty
(nya). This is like the images of men and women - impure skeletons - perceived
directly by yogins. (U)
9. Among the eleven concepts (vijapti) (in 2, 5), - ideas that are like a dream (
6), - we understand that the concept of the visual consciousness, etc.
(cakurvijnavijapti) is mere concept (vijaptimtra), but how do we know that
material ideas (rpavijapti), eye, etc. (cakurdi), are mere concept? - By
scripture (gama) and by reasoning (yukti) as above ( 7).
If these [material concepts, eye, etc.,] are concept only, why do they have a
material appearance and form homogeneous and solid series (satna)? Because they are the basis (adhihna) or cause of error and other afflictions
(viparysadisaklea). Otherwise, if these concepts arose without material
appearance, the error that consists of taking as an object that which is not an
object (anarthe 'rtha iti vipaysa) would not occur. If the error would not occur,
139
the afflictions constituting the obstacle of desire (klevaraa) and the obstacle of
knowledge (jeyvaraa) would not occur. If the afflictions would not occur,
purification (vyavadna) also would not occur (see below, 25). That is why it is
necessary that these concepts arise in this way with a material appearance. Here
is a verse (cf. Strlakra, XI, 24):
bhrnter nimitta bhrnti ca rpavijaptir iyate /
arpi ca vijaptir abhvt syn na cetar //
The cause of illusion and the illusion itself are, respectively, material concept
and non-material concept. If the first were missing, the second would not exist.
[138c4]
10. i v. Why do concepts i) to v), namely, the concept of body, the possessor of
the body and the enjoyer (dehadehi-bhoktivijapti), the concept cognized by the
preceding ones (tadupabhuktavijapti) and the concept that cognizes the
preceding one (tadubhoktvijapti), arise simultaneously (sahabh) and together
(sahajta) during all of existence (kya = tmabhva)? - Because they are
destined to maintain (paripr-) birth (jti) and pleasure (upabhoga).
vi xi. Why do concepts vi) to xi), called concept of time (klavijapti), etc.,
exist? - Because:
vi) Beginningless sasra (andiklika) is never interrupted (samucchinna).
vii) The world of beings (sattvadhtu) is incalculable (aprameya).
viii) The receptacle-world (bhjanaloka) is immense (aprameya).
140
11. How are these concepts (vijapti) established (avasthita) as concept only
(vijaptimtra)? - Briefly (samsata), according to a threefold aspect (kra):
i) According to unicity (tanmtra), because they have no object (artha).
ii) According to duality (dvaya), because these concepts are supplied with
image (sanimitta) and vision (sadarana).
iii) According to arising as multiplicity (nntva), because they arise
simultaneously with different aspects (nnvidhkra).
***
i) Thus, all these concepts are uniquely concept since they have no object.
ii) They are twofold since they are supplied with image and vision. Thus, the
concept of the eye, etc. (cakurdi-vijapti) has, as image, (nimitta), the
concept of color, etc. (rpdivijapti), as vision (darzana), the concept of
visual consciousness (cakurjnavijapti), and so on up to the concept of
body consciousness (kyajnavijapti).
141
iii) The concept of manas (manovijapti) has, as image, all the concepts from
the concept of eye up to that of dharma; as vision, it has the concept of
mental consciousness (manovijnavijapti), because the mental
consciousness is concept (vikalpa) and arises similar to all the concepts. Here
is a verse:
Yogins wish to understand unicity (tanmtra), duality (dvaya) and multiplicity
(nnatva) because the one who has penetrated mind-only (cittamtra) is free
from mind. [138c23]
iii) The author establishes multiplicity. In one and the same concept, the first part
develops into various images which the second part grasps (ghti) in various ways as
the case may be (yathyogam). (Bh) Because of multiplicity: that is to say, the
concept arises under multiple aspects. In one and the same concept, the first part develops
(pariamati) in the aspect of an image, object of consciousness (grhyanimitta), and the
second part in the aspect of a vision, subject of consciousness (grhakadarana). These
two parts arise simultaneously in many different aspects. If one did not accept that one
and the same consciousness, at one given time, presents all kinds of aspects, this
consciousness would not be able to cognize several objects simultaneously. (U)
The concept of manas has, as image, all the concepts, from the concept of the eye up to
that of dharma; as vision, the concept of mental consciousness: This concept of manas
is able to grasp all objects simultaneously. As image, it has all the concepts from that of
the eye, which is the dominant power (adhipatibala), to that of of dharma; this is its
image part (nimitta bhga). The concept of mental consciousness, which cognizes the
object, is its vision part (daranabhga), because this mental consciousness is universal
concept (sarvavikalpa) and arises similar to all concepts. (U) In this third point,
relative to the mental consciousness only is there variety, because the object which it
grasps (grhyaviaya) is not determinate (pratiniyata). The other consciousnesses have a
determinate object and lack conceptualization (vikalpa). But the mental consciousness is
conceptual. Therefore one attributes the third point to it alone, namely, the multiplicity of
images and visions. This is why it is enough to show that this consciousness is concept
only. (Bh)
Verse: Yogins who understand concept only, duality and multiplicity, crush the external
object (bhyaviaya) and finally crush the mind that takes the object (grhakacitta).
Since the object (lambana) does not exist, the consciousness that takes it
(grhakavijna) does not exist either; since the object to be known (jeya) does not
exist, the knower (jt) does not exist either. Without jeya, there is no jt .... (U)
12. Some think (kecin manyante) that the first five consciousnesses do not exist
but that the mental consciousness (manovijna) takes such and such a name,
e.g., the name of visual consciousness, auditory consciousness, etc., according to
143
the support (raya) it takes, the eye, ear, etc., - in the same way that volition
(cetana) is called bodily action (kyakarman) or vocal action (vkkarman)
according to whether it depends on the body or speech.
Although arising on a material support, the mental consciousness is not,
however, without concept: arising on any support whatsoever, the mental
consciousness together with its various aspects (nnkrea) takes on a twofold
appearance, namely, the appearance of just an object (arthamtrabhsa) and the
appearance of a concept (vikalpbhsa).
In the two worlds endowed with form (rpidhtu), the mental consciousness
relies on the body (kya); consequently, as the material organs (rpndriya)
which are different from it (tadanya) and which rely on the body, it appears
everywhere (sthna) in the aspect of the tangible (sprathavya).
i) Here is a verse (cf Siddhi, p. 5; Dhammapada, stanza 37):
dragamam ekacaram aarra guhayam /
damayan durdama citta tam aha brmi brhmaam //
He who tames the stubborn mind that wanders afar, that wanders alone,
that has no body and that dwells in the cave, him I call brahman.
ii) In the same way, (cf. Majjhima, I, p. 295; Sayutta, V, p. 218): imesa
kho ....
mano cesa patisaraa: The manas senses the object perceived by the five
organs; the manas is their refuge.
iii) Similarly, it is said: Among the twelve yatanas in question, the six
groups of consciousnesses (avijnakya) are the mana-yatana. [139a6]
144
Beyond the mental consciousness there is no other consciousness of any other kind. How
is that? Just as volition: if it relies on the body and moves (pravartayati) the body, it is
called bodily action; if it relies on the voice and moves the voice, it is called vocal action;
if it is associated with the manas, is is called mental action. It is the same for the mental
consciousness.
Objection - If that were so, the mental consciousness would be without conceptualization
(vikalpa) like the visual consciousness, etc. (cf. I, 7; Koa I, p. 60), since it would have
a coarse (material) support (raya). The thing supported (rita) is always in accord
with its support (raya); thus, because the afflicted manas (kliamanas) is the support
of defilement (sakleraya), the mental consciousness that functions with it is defiled
(saklia). To reply to this objection, the bodhisattvas say: arising on no matter what
support, etc., that is to say, on the eye and the other support-organs, the mental
consciousness, together with its various aspects, takes on a twofold appearance, namely,
the appearance of a cognized object (grhya) and the appearance of a cognizing subject
(grhaka). Then to define these, these bodhisattvas say: the appearance of just an object,
etc. This means that there is one single mental consciousness of which one part (bhga)
manifests as the appearance of an imitation-object, while the other manifests as a concept
about this object (arthavikalpa). Thus it avoids the error of being without concepts.
Moreover, it appears everywhere in the aspect of the tangible: in concentration, it takes
in and imagines tangibles, heaviness and lightness, without, nevertheless, being distracted
(vikipta), because it accompanies these tangibles. This occurs in the two worlds with
form (rpidhtu) and not in the formless world (rpyadhtu). Why? Because in these
two worlds, this mental consciousness relies on the body a on the material organs
different from it which rely on the body. Just as the eye and the other material organs that
rely on the body can do good (hita) or evil (upadrava) to the body, so the mental
consciousness which, in the two worlds with form, relies on the body, is able to register
and imagine the body and do good or evil for it. (U)
By means of three scriptural texts, the bodhisattvas show that the mental consciousness
cognizes not only its own object but also those of the other five consciousness, and that,
consequently, these five consciousnesses are useless. To establish their system, the
bodhisattvas cite scriptural stanzas (gamagth) as proof: he who tames the mind which
wanders afar (because it has all the viayas as lambana), which goes alone (because
145
advitya), which has no body (= vigatakya) and which dwells in a cave (inhabits the
cave of the body) .... (Bh)
make
up
its
concept-image
because
they
are
its
object
14. How does one explain that, although it manifests, the object does not exist? As the Bhagavat has said: When bodhisattvas have four qualities (gua), i.e.,
four knowledges, they understand (avabudh-) the non-objectivity (anarthakatva)
of all concepts (vijapti). These four knowledges are:
146
147
(b) In the past, etc., in the dream and in double reflection, there is no object
of consciousness; nevertheless, they can be perceived.
(c) If the object were truly an object, the wisdom free of concept would not
arise; without this wisdom, buddhahood could not be attained.
(d) For bodhisattvas possessing mastery and also for yogins, earth, etc., are
transformed into whatever substance they wish by the power of their
aspiration.
(e) Finally, for the sage (dhmat) who assures for himself the possession of
tranquility, objects appear in this way together with the set of their
characteristics when he reflects on the dharmas.
(f) When nonconceptual wisdom is attained, no further objects appear. Thus
it is known that the object does not exist. Since it does not exist, concept is
not objective.
148
(cittaikgrat). They are called 'ecstatics' because they practice ecstasy. Who have
attained mastery of the mind: who have attained aptitude of mind (cittakarmayat). By
the power of their beliefs, they transform earth into water, etc. - (b) For the yogins who
have attained tranquility: who have attained concentration (samdhi). amatha and
samdhi are synonymous. Because it calms the distractions of the mind (cittavikepa),
amatha is tranquility.... And who practice examination of the dharmas: who, by a
practice subsequent to tranquility (phalabdha), practice vipayan (or praj) of the
dharmas, stras, etc. (u) - bh: don gcig la ya ji lta ji ltar yid la byas pa de lta de ltar
rnam pa ma po sna bao: "one and the same object, according to how it is considered,
appears to them with its set of characteristics, impermanence, suffering, etc. - (c) If the
object really existed, the acquisition of nonceptual knowledge would no longer be
explained because the object would be seen as it is from the start.(u)
150
152
17. Are these three natures (svabhvatraya) different (bhinna) or are they the
same (abhinna)? - They are neither different nor the same. The dependent
nature (paratantrasvabhva) is dependent (paratantra) in one sense (paryyena),
imaginary (parikalpita) in another, absolute (parinipanna) in a third sense.
In what sense is the dependent nature 'dependent'? - Insofar as it depends on
something else, i.e., the arising of the propensity seeds (vsanbja) (cf. 15).
In what sense is it 'imaginary'? - Insofar as it is the object of imagination
(parikalpa) and is imagined (parikalpita) by the latter (cf. 15, 16).
In what sense is it 'absolute'? - Insofar as it does not exist in the absolute sense in
the way it is imagined (cf. 4, 15). [139c2]
153
between one existent thing and another existent thing, but not between an existent thing
and a non-existent thing. Thus the horn of a rabbit (aavia), which does not exist, is
not different from that which it is. They are not the same because existence and nonexistence do not constitute one and the same thing. It is the same for the dependent nature
and the absolute nature which are impure (audda) and pure (uddha) by nature (prakti)
respectively. (U)
18. How many types (katividha) are there in the dependent nature
(paratantrasvabhva)? In brief (samsata), there are two (dvividha):
dependence in respect to the propensity seeds (vsanbja), and dependence
consisting of a fundamental non-differentiation (svabhvaparinipanna) in
regard to defilement (saklea) and purification (vyavadna).
It is dependent because of this twofold dependency.
The imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhva) also is twofold because it is
imagined by the imagination creating a self-nature (svabhvaparikalpa) and by
the imagination creating specifications (vieaparikalpa).
The absolute nature (parinipannasvabhva) also is twofold. It is absolute by
virtue of the absoluteness of self-nature (svabhvaparinipatti) and by virtue of
the absoluteness of purity (viuddhiparinipatti). [139c10]
The absoluteness of self-nature is the stained true nature (samal tathat); the
absoluteness of purity is the unstained true nature (vimal tathat). (U)
155
jusquau
invasions
musulmanes,
Paris,
1935,
p.
87.]
Artha
156
to
the
material
appearance.
Why?
Because
outer
and
inner
matter
(bhydhytmikarpa) is changed by old age. The word 'etc.' includes sickness (vydhi)
157
and death (maraa). Modification by pleasant sensation, etc.: because pleasant sensation
modifies the body. Thus it is said that in a happy man, his face (mukha) and eyes shine
(prasdyante). The word 'etc.' includes unpleasant sensation (dukhavedan) and neither
pleasant nor unpleasant sensation (adukhasukhavedan) also. Modification by lust, etc.:
because lust modifies the aspect of the body. The word 'etc.' includes hatred (dvea),
worry (moha), anger (krodha), etc. Thus it is said that an irritated (ruita) man has a bad
color (apriyavara). Modifications by agonies and changings of the seasons: murder
(vadha), iron fetters (bandhana) modify the body, etc.; the changing seasons also modify
the color of the outer and inner body, the color of the trees, etc. Thus it is said that the
body changes under the action of cold (takla). Modifications by the hells, etc.: the
word 'etc.' includes all the bad destinies (durgati). It is known that in these places, rpa,
etc., are changed. Modifications by the infernal destinies, etc. The word etc. includes all
the bad destinies. We know that in these places, the rpa, etc., is modified. Modifications
by the world of desire, etc.: the word 'etc.' includes the form realm (rpadhtu) because
in the formless realm (rpyadhtu) there are no concepts of material appearance. But
among the gods and in the four dhynas, beings (sattva) and cosmic matter
(bhjanarpa) are changed. By the power (prabhva) of pearls (mai), all kinds of lights
and colors alternate.
v) Nimittbhsaparimavikalpa. By virtue of their organ-support (rayendriya), eye,
etc., the concepts of visual consciousness, etc. (cakurjndivijapti), which take the
aspect of color, etc. (rpybhsa), undergo all kinds of modifications upon which the
vikalpas arise. They undergo, according to circumstances (yathyogam), the
modifications of old age, etc., mentioned above. Why? According to whether the eye is
healthy or dulled, the visual consciousness is clear or blurred. The consciousness is
changed to the degree that its support is changed. It is the same for the transformation by
way of pleasant sensation, etc., because in the happy person the mind is collected and in
the unhappy person it is scattered. It is the same for the modifications resulting from lust,
agony and the changes of the seasons. Similarly, among the damned and in the desire
realm, when the body (rayakya) changes, the consciousness changes likewise. In the
formless realm also there are transformations caused by feelings, etc.
vi) Parnvayavikalpa: this is a vikalpa which has as its cause the meeting with good or
bad friends, hearing the true or the bad Dharma.
158
vii-viii) The vikalpa of the heretics (trthika), such as Kapila, and that of the orthodox,
such as the Saugatas, are called ayonio- and yonio-vikalpa respectively. These two
vikalpas are associated, the first with wrong views (mithyadi) and the second with
right views (samyagdi), respectively
ix) The vikalpa associated with the 62 types of views (digata) which have as cause the
wrong view of self (satkyadi) is the vikalpa of the words 'earlier, later and middle'
which is treated by the Brahmajlastra: "Did I exist in the past?" These vikalpas are
called abhiniveavikalpa. In the term digata, gata has the meaning of 'type' (kra).
x) That which distracts is called distraction (vikipyate 'nenti vikepa): it is a vikalpa.
That is why one speaks of vikepavikalpa. This vikalpa distracts from nonconceptual
wisdom (nirvikalpakajna). Why? Because it distracts from the virtue of wisdom
(prajpramit). Nonconceptual wisdom is the virtue of wisdom. Those are the ten
vikalpas of the bodhisattvas. (U and u)
21. The ten distractions of the bodhisattvas are: i) abhvanimittavikepa, nonexistence; ii) bhvanimitta-vikepa, existence; iii) adhyropavikepa, imputation;
iv) apavdavikepa, negation; v) ekatvavikepa, identity; vi) nntvavikepa,
difference; vii) svabhvavikepa, self-nature; viii) vieavikepa, specifications; ix)
yathnm-bhiniveavikepa, interpreting the object according to the name; x)
yathrthanmbhiniveavikepa, interpreting the name according to the object.
[140a5]
159
160
bodhisattva does not, in the absolute sense, see all these words; not seeing
them in the absolute sense, he is not attached to them, meaning:
interpreting them according to the thing (tni bodhisattva sarvanmni na
samanupayaty asamanupayan nbhiniviate yathrthatayety abhiprya).
The logic applied here to form is to be applied to all the others up to
consciousness
To counteract all of these ten distractions (vikepa), nonconceptual wisdom
(nirvikalpakajna) is taught in all the Prajpramits. Thus the entire content
(sakalrtha) of the Prajpramits consists of an explanation about the
distractions that are counteracted (vipaka) and the nonconceptual wisdom that
counteracts them (pratipaka). [140a7]
161
ida yaduta nyat, nmamtram ida yaduta rpa, nmamtram ida yaduta
vedan, nmamtram ida yaduta saj, nmamtram ida yaduta saskr,
nmamtram ida yaduta vijnam, tathhi myopama rpa, myopam vedan,
myopam
saj,
myopam
saskr,
myopam
vijnam. my
ca
heto.
tathhi
ktrima
nma.
pratipattidharma te
kalpitgantukena
163
because it would have to be admitted that very different things (anekavidhrtha), cows,
etc., make up one and the same nature.
The first stanza repeats these ideas. It is proved, etc.: this shows that the dependent and
the imaginary are not the same thing.
The dharma does not exist but it is seen: this first part of the stanza is explained to
students (iya) by the example of magic. The students experience two difficulties here:
they ask anxiously: "If the dharma does not exist, how can it be seen; in the absence of
stain, how can there be purification?" Two examples answer these questions. It is like
magic, etc. The magical elephant (myhastin) does not exist as a true elephant,
nevertheless it is seen. It is the same for things (artha): they are seen and yet they do not
exist. It is like space. Space is not soiled (klia) by fog (nhra), etc., because it is pure
by nature (praktiviuddha); nevertheless, when the fog dissipates, we say that space is
purified. It is the same for dharmas. They are not stained because they are pure by nature;
nevertheless, when the obstacles (varaa) and adventitious (gantuka) stains (mala) are
destroyed, we say that the dharmas are purified. (Bh)
25. If it does not such exist as it appears, why is the dependent nature
(paratantrasvabhva) not completely (sarvea sarvam) non-existent? Without the
dependent nature, the absolute nature (parinipannasvabhva) does not exist. If
the former were missing, how come there would not be universal non-existence
(sarvanstitva)? If the dependent and absolute natures did not exist, defilement
(saklea) and purification (vyavadna) would be absent. But defilement and
purification do exist (upalabhyante). Thus it is wrong that everything would be
non-existent. Here is a stanza:
If the dependent and the absolute did not exist at all, defilement and purification
would not take place. [140a29]
164
26. In the Greater Vehicle, the Buddha Bhagavats taught the Vaipulyastras: in
this teaching (dean), it is said:
i) How should the imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhva) be conceived
(katha veditavya)? It should be conceived by proclaiming it as non-existent
(nstiprayyadeanay).
ii) How should the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhva) be conceived? It
should be conceived as a magic show (my), a mirage (marci), a dream
(svapna), a reflection (pratibhsa), an image (pratibimba), an echo
(pratirutk), the reflection of the moon in water (udakacandra), a magical
creation (nirma).
iii) How should the absolute nature (parinipanna) be conceived? It should be
conceived by proclaiming the fourfold pure dharma (caturvidha
vaiyavadnikadharma). The fourfold pure dharma is:
(a) The essential purity (praktivyavadna), i.e., the true nature (tathat),
emptiness (nyat), the utmost point of reality (bhtakoti), the signless
(animitta), the absolute (paramrtha), the fundamental element
(dharmadhtu).
(b) The stainless purity (vaimalyavyavadna), i.e., the same essential
purity as being free of all obstacles (sarvvaraahita).
(c) The purity of the path leading to the essential purity (tatprpaka
mrgavyavadnam), namely, all of the dharmas which are the limbs of
enlightenment (bodhipakyadharma), the virtues (pramit), etc.
(d) The purity of the object destined to give rise to the path
(tajjananrtham lambanavyavadnam), i.e., the teaching of the true
Dharma of the Greater Vehicle (mahynasaddharmadean). Because
this teaching is the cause for purity (vyavadnahetu), it is not imaginary;
because it is the outflow (niyanda) of the pure fundamental element
(viuddhadharmadhtu), it is not dependent.
165
All the pure dharmas (vaiyavadnika) result from (saghta) from this
fourfold purity. Here are some stanzas (cf. Abhidharmastra, in
Madhyntavibhaga, p. 112):
(i) myadidean bhte kalpitn nstidean /
caturvidhaviuddhes tu parinipannadean //
Concerning the product, we speak of magic; concerning the imaginary, we
speak of non-existence; but concerning the fourfold purity, we speak of the
absolute.
(ii) uddhi praktivaimalyam lambana ca mrgat /
viuddhn hi dharm caturvidhaghtatvam //
The purities are the essental purity, the stainless purity, the purity of the
path and the purity of the object. Indeed, the pure dharmas come from these
four natures. [140b16]
166
167
ii) They wonder: "How can the mind and mental factors (cittacaitta) which
have no object arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the stra compares the
dependent nature to a mirage (marci).
iii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object (asaty artha), how can one
experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings (inia upabhoga)?" To dispel
this hesitation, the stra compares the dependent nature to a dream (svapna)
iv) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can good or bad actions
(kualkualakarman) produce (abhinirvt-) a pleasant or unpleasant result
(itniaphala)?" To dispel this hesitation, the stra compares the dependent
nature to an image (pratibimba).
v) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the various rebirths
(nnvijna) arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the stra compares the
dependent nature to a reflection (pratibhsa).
vi) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the different kinds of
speech (nnvyavahra) arise?" To dispel this hesitation, the stra compares
the dependent nature to an echo (pratirutk).
vii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the images perceived
during correct concentration (samyag-grhakasamdhigocara) be
produced?" To dispel this hesitation, the stra compares the dependent
nature to the reflection of the moon in water (udakacandra).
viii) They wonder: "In the absence of an object, how can the bodhisattvas
whose mind is unerring (avipartacitta) be reborn at will (yathayam) for the
service of beings (sattvrthakriy)? To dispel this hesitation, the stra
compares the dependent nature to a magic show (parima). [140c1]
168
ii) Here, the mind and mental factors (cittacaitta) play the rle of mirage
(marcisthnya) and the object (artha) plays the role of the water (toyasthnya). While
the mirage does shimmer (pracarati), there is no real water (toyasthnya), and yet the
notion of real water (toyrthabuddhi) is produced. In the same way, when the mind and
mental factors shimmer, there is no real object (artha) and yet the notion of object
(arthabuddhi) is produced.
iii) In the dream, there is no real object; nevertheless, one knows that various pleasant
and unpleasant feelings are experienced. It is the same here in the awake state.
iv) The image is not a real object: it is relatively to the model that one has of the notion of
image (pratibimbabuddhi); nevertheless, there is no reality-'image' distinct from the
model. It is the same here. There is no reality 'pleasant or unpleasant result' and yet it is
perceived.
v) In a shadow-play (cykr), all kinds of reflections (pratibhsa) are seen. Although
these reflections are seen, the reality 'reflection' is non-existent. It is the same for the
consciousnesses: these are not different things (nnvidrtha) and yet they appear as
different things.
vi) The echo is not a real sound and yet it is heard. It is the same for superficial speech
(vyavahraprapaca): it is not ---- [one line missing in my (Migme Chodron) xerox
copy]
vii) The moon's reflection in water is not a real thing and yet, thanks to the clearness
(rdrat) and clarity (prasda) of the water, it is seen in the water. It is the same for the
concentrated mind (samhitacitta). The objects it perceives (lambanaviaya) are not
real things, yet they are perceived. Here, concentration (samdhi) plays the part of the
water (toyasthnya) because it is fresh and clear.
viii) The magical creation (nirma) is not a real object but, by the power of the magician
(nirmt), all kinds of things are created. A magically created object (nirmrtha) does
not fail to be perceived. It is the same here: the existence (kya = tmabhva) assumed
(uptta) by the bodhisattva is not real and yet the existence assumed by the bodhisattva
who is working for the benefit and happiness of all beings (sarvasattvahitasukha) is
perceived. (Extracted from Bh)
169
The Bhya gives another interpretation: There is yet another meaning to these eight
comparisons of the Bhagavat. The example of the magic show serves to reject the six
inner bases of consciousness (a dhytmikyatana) ... The example of the mirage
serves to reject the receptacle world (bhanaloka) ... The example of the dream serves to
reject the objects of enjoyment, color, etc. (rpdyubhuktaviaya) ... The example of the
image serves to reject the result of bodily action (kyakarmaphala) ... The example of the
echo serves to reject the result of vocal action (vkkarmaphala) ... Mental action
(manakarman) is threefold: non-concentrated stage (asamhit bhmi), concentrated
stage (samhit bhmi), and the coming from hearing (rutamaya). The example of the
reflection serves to reject the result of the mental action of non-concentrated stages ...
The example of the moon reflected in water serves to reject the result of mental action of
the concentrated stages ... The example of metamorphosis serves to reject the result of the
mental action resulting from hearing ... Cf. the commentary of Strlakra, XI, 30.
28. With what intention (ki sadhya) did the Bhagavat say, in the
Brahmaparipcch (cf. Viea-cintbrahmaparipcch, Taish no. 585, p. 4b23-24;
no. 586, p. 36c9; no. 587, p. 66c3-4), that the Tathgata does not see sasra and
does not see nirva? - Since the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhva) is
imaginary (parikalpita) on the one hand and absolute (parinipanna) on the other
hand (cf. v. 17), by expressing himself in this way the Bhagavat had in mind the
identity (nirviea) of sasra and nirva. Indeed, in its imaginary part
(bhga), this dependent nature is sasra; in its absolute part, it is nirva.
[140c6]
170
in nature between sasra and nirva. The meaning of 'dependent' is also explained,
because the latter, being based on the two natures, is not determinate (viniyata). (U)
29. In the Abhidharmastra, the Bhagavat said: There are three dharmas: that
which is part of defilement (sakleabhgapartita), that which is included in
purity (vyavadnabhgapatita) and that which is included in both
(tadubhayabhgapatita). What did he mean (ki sadhya) by speaking in this
way?
i) The imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhva) which occurs in the dependent
nature (paratantrasvabhva) falls into the defilement part.
ii) The absolute nature (parinipannasvabhva) which occurs in the
dependent nature falls into the purity part.
iii) As for the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhva), it falls into both parts.
It was with this intention that the Bhagavat spoke thus.
Is there an example (dnta) for this? The example of gold-bearing clay (sa
kho na gser yod pa = kcanagarbh mttik, Mahvyut. 7650). Thus, in goldbearing clay, three things are noticed (upalabhyate): the earth element
(pthivdhtu), the earth (pthiv) and the gold (kcana). In the earth
element, the earth, which is not there, is seen (upalabhyate), whereas the gold,
which is there, is not seen. When one has burned (dah-) the earth element by
means of fire (agni), the earth does not appear, whereas the gold appears.
The earth element, when it appears as earth, has a false appearance
(mithybhsa); when it appears as gold, it has a true appearance
(tattvabhsa). Consequently, the earth element falls into both parts [both the
earth and the gold]. Similarly, when one has not burned concept (vijapti) by
the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, the false imaginary nature
(abhtaparikalpitasvabhva) contained in this concept appears, whereas the
true absolute nature (bhtaparinipannasvabhva) does not appear. When
one has burned concept by the fire of nonconceptual wisdom
(nirvikalpakajna), the true absolute nature contained in this concept
171
appears, while the false imaginary nature does not appear. Consequently, the
dependent nature which consists as idea to wrong mental construction
(abhtaparikapavijapti) is included in both parts [participates in both
defilement and purity] and is similar to the earth element in the gold-bearing
clay. [140c23]
(yathkramam): ordinary matter (bhta) and derived matter (bhautika); the gold
(kacana) is the seed of gold (bja). (u)
30. In some places (e.g., in the Lakvatra, p. 115-116), the Bhagavat said that all
dharmas are eternal (nitya); elsewhere he said that they are transitory (anitya),
and yet elsewhere he said that they are neither eternal nor transitory. What was
his intention (ki sadhya) in proclaiming them to be eternal? - The dependent
nature (paratantrasvabhva) is eternal in its absolute part (parinipannabhga),
transitory in its imaginary part (parikalpitabhga), neither eternal nor transitory
in its two parts together. It was with this intention that the Bhagavat spoke in
this way.
All distinctions are exactly like this distinction between eternal, transitory and
their absence of both (advaya): happiness (sukha), sadness (dukha) and their
advaya; goodness (ubha), malice (aubha) and their advaya; emptiness (nya),
non-emptiness (anya) and their advaya; the self (tman), the non-self
(antman) and their advaya; tranquility (anta), non-tranquility (aanta) and
their advaya; the thing with self-nature (sasvabhva), the thing without selfnature (nisvabhva) and their advaya; that which arises (utpanna), the nonarisen (anutpanna) and their advaya; that which has been destroyed (niruddha),
the non-destroyed (aniruddha) and their advaya; primordial tranquility
(dianta), primordial non-tranquility (andianta) and their advaya; the
172
The fact results gradually from their absence of self-nature that they have
neither arising nor destruction, that they are primordially tranquil and
essentially nirvanized. [141a16]
173
In some places the Bhagavat said that all dharmas are eternal, etc.: The paratantra, in
its dharmat or tathat, is eternal: in its mentally constructed part, it is transitory because
it does not have eternity. That which is not eternal is called transitory and not that which
has birth and cessation (utpdanirodha). In its two parts together, the paratantra is neither
eternal nor transitory: this is the fact of being neither one nor the other (advayatva).
Happiness (sukha) is the absolute part of the paratantra; sadness (dukha) is the
imaginary part; their advaya is the paratantra itself, and so on. (U)
Explanation of the stanzas according to bh:
(a) Since the dharmas are non-existent, there is no dharma; since they appear in many
aspects, there is no adharma; it is in this sense that the dharmas exist (chos yin no es bya
ba tha tshig go). Consequently. since there is neither dharma nor adharma, non-duality is
asserted.
(b) On the one hand, i.e., from the one extreme (anta), it is asserted that they do not
exist: that they are without self-nature (nisvabhva); from the other extreme, it is
asserted that they do exist, that they do have self-nature. From both sides, it is asserted
that they are neither existent nor non-existent: by considering (parigrah-) the paratantra
that partakes of both natures at the same time (gi gai bdag id can), it is asserted that
they are neither existent nor non-existent.
(c) They are not such as they appear: they are not as they are perceived (upalabdha): this
is why they are asserted to be non-existent. But because, nevertheless, they do appear:
but because it is said that they exist insofar as they are simply appearance (sna ba tsam
du yod pai phyir yod pa es brjod pas), they are asserted to be existent for this reason.
(d) Now it will be shown in what sense (ki sadhya) it is asserted that all dharmas are
without self-nature (nisvabhva). (1) Because they do not exist in themselves: because
all dharmas do not arise by themselves (svata), independent of conditions (pratyaya):
that is the first meaning of the expression 'without self-nature'. (2) Because they do not
exist by way of their self-nature. Because once they are destroyed, since the dharmas do
not re-arise out of their own nature of self (niruddhn punas tentmannutpatte),
they are without self-nature: that is another meaning of the expression 'without selfnature'. (3) Because they do not persist in their self-nature. Because, once arisen, they do
not have the power to last for a single moment (kaa) afterwards, they are without self-
174
nature. These three absences of self-nature (nisvabhva) of dharmas are shared with the
rvakas (ravakasdhraa). (4) Because they are not such as they are thought to be,
their absence of self-nature is asserted: this fourth absence of self-nature is not shared
with the rvakas. The dharmas do not exist with the imaginary nature which foolish
people (bla) cling to (parighta). And it is in this sense (tatsadhya) that here in the
Greater Vehicle we say that all dharmas are without self-nature.
(e) From their absence of self-nature, there results the fact .... : from the fact that all
dharmas are without self-nature, it results that they are unborn, etc. indeed, that which is
without self-nature is unborn (yo hi nisvabhva so 'nutpanna); that which is unborn is
unceasing (yo 'nutpanna so 'niruddha); that which is unborn and unceasing is
primordially tranquil (yo 'nutpanno 'niruddha sa dianta); that which is primordially
tranquil is essentially nirvanized (ya dinta sa praktiparinirvta). This results
gradually: i.e., these various points are a chain of causes (uttarottatahetu). (bh)
175
sand in the Ganges, then one will understand the Greater Vehicle" (iyato
gagnadvluksamnabuddhn paryupsya mahyne 'vabodha utpadyate
(ibid. p. 83, l. 21).
iv) Pudgalaybhiprya: intention dealing with the individuals dispositions,
e.g., when he criticized in one person the gift which he had praised in another
person (yat tad eva dna kasyacit pudgalasya praasate kasyacid vigarhate
(cf. ibid. p. 83, l. 5 and 26). It is the same for discipline (la) and a certain
meditation (kacid bhvana) as for gift. These are the four intentions.
Furthermore, there are four motives:
1) Avatrabhisadhi: the motive of introduction, when, in the Vehicle of
the rvakas and in the Greater Vehicle, from the point of view of
conventional truth (savtisatya), he deals with the existence, respectively, of
the individual (pudgala), of the self-nature (svabhva) and of the
specifications (viea) of dharmas.
2) Lakabhisadhi: the motive of nature, when, in speaking of the nature
of dharmas, he explains their threefold self-nature (svabhvatraya).
3) Pratipakbhisadhi: the motive of antidote, when he sets forth the
practices (cary) that counteract the 84,000 obstacles.
4) Paimanbhisadhi: the motive of interpretation [or riddle], when he
wishes to say something other than what he says. On this subject, here is a
stanza (cf. Strlakra, p. 82, l. 20):
asre sramatayo viparyse ca susthit /
kleena ca susakli labhante bodhim uttamm //
Taking as solid that which is not solid, completely stuck in error, completely
stained by desire, they attain supreme enlightenment. [This riddle means:
Taking concentration as the main thing, thoroughly fixed in the inverse of error,
completely worn out by effort, they attain supreme enlightenment]. [141b5]
176
In the commentaries there are definitions of abhiprya and abhisadhi that are not at all
clear. Bh: There is a difference between abhiprya and abhisadhi. When the Buddha
first cognizes (yuan) the thing (che, 6 and 7) and then says it to someone else, that is
abhiprya. When, from this clarification (niyama), he succeeds in introducing it into the
holy doctrine (ryadean), that is abhisadhi. - bh: dgos pa da ldem por dgos pa la
tha dad du bya ba ci yod ce na / bcom ldan das kyis ga thugs la bag pa dton par
mdzad pa de ni dgos pa yin no // ga id kyis nes par bstan pa la jug par mdzad pa de
ni ldem por dgos pa yin no: What is the difference between abhiprya and
abhisadhi? When the Bhagavat is teaching (deayati), that which he has in his mind
(citta) is abhiprya. When, in this way, he introduces (avatrayati) it into the teaching
(nirdea), that is abhisadhi. - U: To see something from afar (yuan kouan) and wish
to capture (updna?) it, that is abhiprya. Seeing something nearby (kin kouan) and
wishing to introduce it, that is abhisadhi." - u: dgos pa ni yid la bag pa tsam yin gyi
pha rol la bltos par ni khas mi len no // ldem por dgos pa ni de id pha rol gzud pa la
bltos pao: Abhiprya being a simple fixation in the mind (mano'vasthpanamtra), it is
not an acceptance (abhyupagama) relative to something else (parpeka). Abhisadhi
has, as its purpose, the introduction of it to another (parvatrapeka).
i) Samatbhiprya. Because all the Buddhas are alike in their collections (sabhra),
etc., the Bhagavat said: "It is I who at that time was Vipavin". Similarly, when one
discovers a resemblance with someone else, one says: "That's me." But it is clear that the
Buddha Vipavin of the past is not the actual akyamuni Bhagavat. (U)
ii) Klntarbhiprya. Seeing that lazy (kuda) people are unable to practice the
Dharma zealously, the Bhagavat said: Merely by invoking the name of the Tathgata
Bahuratna, one is predestined, or: By means of a simple vow, one will be reborn in the
realm of Sukhvati. The Bhagavat had in view the increasing of the roots of previous
good (prvakualamla) in his listeners and thus to lead them later (klntara) to
enlightenment and to Sukhavati. (U) It is not enough to invoke a name to attain
supreme enlightenment definitively. Similarly, when we say that a paa (part of a rupee)
is worth a thousand paas, we mean that some day or at some other time, this paa will
be the cause of a thousand paas. (Bh)
iii) Arthntarbhiprya. - lu gi mtshan id kyi theg pa chen poi chos las rtogs pai
mtshan id kyi theg pa chen poi chos ni don gan te / de la dgos nas / sas rgyas ga
177
gi klu gi bye ma sed cig la bsen bkur byas na theg pa chen poi chos kyi don kho
du chud par gyur ro es bya ba gsus te / phags pa so so ra gis rig pai chos ni rtogs
par dka bai phyir ro // dis ni theg pa chen po la sgra ji bin par dzin pa bsal bar rig
par byao: The doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as understanding (abhisamayalakaa)
is something other than the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle as text (gamalakaa). This
is what the Bhagavat had in view when he said: When you have served as many
Buddhas as there are grains of sand in the Ganges, you will understand the Greater
Vehicle, because the holy Dharma (ryadean), knowable by one's own intuition
(pratytmavedya), is difficult to understand (durvighya). By these words, the Bhagavat
forbade the literal interpreting of the Greater Vehicle (yathrutagrha). (u)
iv) Pudgalaybhiprya. First the Bhagavat praises a gift made by the miser (matsara),
then he criticizes the same gift made by a generous man (dnaruci). First the Bhagavat
praises the discipline of the undisciplined person (dula), then he criticizes the same
displine of the honest person (lavat) in order to lead the latter to the cultivation of a
higher category of good. A certain meditation, i.e., worldly meditation (laukik
bhvan). (U)
1. Avatrabhisadhi. There are places where the Bhagavat talks about the pudgala,
about self-nature (svabhva) and the specifications (viea) of dharmas: this is in order to
serve as introduction into the Vehicles, and from the point of view of conventional truth
(savtisatya). In the same way, as introduction into the Vehicle of the rvakas, he
speaks about the existence of apparitional beings (upapduka), etc. As introduction into
the
Greater
Vehicle
and
as
reassurance
to
those
who
fear
annihilation
32. He who wishes to explain (nirdi-) the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle in brief
(samsata) must express himself in three points (trividh): i) he must give an
explanation of dependent production (prattyasamutpdanirdea), ii) an
explanation of the nature of dharmas resulting from dependence
(prattyasamutpannadharmalakaanirdea) and iii) an explanation of the
meaning of the discourses (uktrthanirdea).
i) First, an explanation of dependent production (cf. I, v. 17, 27), by saying
for example: "Dharmas result from speech-propensities (abhilpavsan)
and the latter from the former." Indeed, the retributive consciousness
(vipkavijna) and the active consciousnesses (pravttivijna), being
reciprocal conditions (anyonyapratyaya), arise from one another.
ii) The dharmas that are active consciousnesses (pravrtti-vijnalakaa
dharma) have concept equipped with image and vision (sanimittadaranavijapti) as nature (svabhva). (Cf. II, 11). As characteristics
(lakaa), they have the basis (raya, i.e., the dependent nature), the
imaginary nature (parikalpita) and the absolute nature (dharmat), the
nature of things): this is how the characteristics of the threefold self-nature
179
itself are explained, as, for example, when one says: "Resulting from concept
furnished with image and vision, these dharmas have three natures."
How should the natures of these dharmas be explained? - In the dependent
nature (paratantralakaa), the imaginary nature (parikalpitalakaa) does
not exist but the absolute nature (parinipannalakaa) is present. Thus, by
someone who does not see the truth (adatattva) and by someone who does
see it, these two natures, imaginary and absolute, are simultaneously
(ekakle) not perceived (anupalabdha) or perceived (upalabdha) as existent
(sat) and non-existent (asat) respectively. In the dependent nature, the
imaginary is absent but the absolute is present. That is why, when it arises, if
one perceives its imaginary nature, one does not perceive its absolute nature;
if one perceives its absolute nature, one does not perceive its imaginary
nature. Similarly, it is said: In the dependent, the imaginary is absent, but
the absolute is present there. That is why, in the dependent, these two
natures, imaginary and absolute, non-perceived and perceived, are the
same.
iii) What is the explanation of the meaning of the phrases (uktrthanirdea)? It consists of explaining (vibhaj-) a phrase (puvoktapada) spoken first by
means of the phrases that follow (eapada), when dealing with the qualities
of the Buddha (gudhikarat), or when dealing with the aims of the
bodhisattva (arthdhikarat). [141b24]
180
called these two natures. Of these two natures, the first is non-existent, the second is
existent. He who has not seen the truth (adatattva) sees the parikalpita but does not see
the parinipanna. He who has seen the truth (diatattva), sees, at one and the same
moment, the parinipanna and does not see the parikalpita. This idea has been explained
in the stanza. (Bh) At the moment when the one who has not seen the truth sees the
non-existence of the parinipanna and the existence of the parikalpita in the
paratantrasvabhva, at that same moment, the one who has seen the truth sees the nonexistence of the parikalpita and the existence of the parinipanna. (U)
iii) Up to now, the meaning has been explained independently of the intention of the
authors (vaktraynapekam). Now, the meaning of the uttered phrases (uktrtha) must
be explained according to the intention of the authors. The phrase gudhikarad
arthdhikarad v means guayd arthayc ca. The perfection (paripri) or the
benefit (upakra) already gained, already set up, is called quality (gua); the search
(paryeea) directed towards a benefit not yet acquired but settled ------ [Here a line is
missing from my [Migme Chodron] xeroxed text].
181
182
1st quality: moving in the absolute sense without obstacle in the knowable
(jeya tyantiknvaraa pravttigua).
2nd quality: penetrating into the highest purity of the Tathgata, the nature
of which is the non-duality of existence and non-existence
(bhvbhvdvayalakaatathatti-viuddhipraveagua).
3rd quality: uninterruptedly maintaining the spontaneous activity of the
Buddha (nirbhogabuddhakriyasamucchinna-sthitigua).
4th quality: possessing the identity of the supports, intentions and actions in
the dharmakya (dharmakya raybhipryakriybhedhagua).
5th quality: cultivating the antidote to all the obstacles
(sarvvaraapratipakabhvangua).
6th quality: escaping from the attacks of all the heretics
(sarvatrthikanirdharaagua).
7th quality: while dwelling in the world, not being confined by human
relationships (loke 'pi lokadharmsahryatva-gua).
8th quality: establishing the doctrine (vyavasthita-dharmagua).
9th quality: explaining the past and the future (vykaraagua).
10th quality: manifesting the sabhogakya and nirmakya in all the
universes (sarvalokadhtuu sabhoganirmakyapradaranagua).
11th quality: cutting through doubt (saayacchedana-gua).
12th quality: introducing into all kinds of practices
(nncarypraveagua).
13th quality: cognizing the arising of dharmas to come
(amutradharmotpdajanagua).
14th quality: appearing in accordance with the aspirations of beings
(yathdhimuktiprakanagua).
15th quality: engaging in disciplining beings by means of an immense troop
(aprameyakyena sattvavinaya-prayogagua).
183
184
2) Penetrating the highest purity of tathat, the nature of which is the nonduality of
existence and non-existence (bhvbhvdvayalakaa-tathattiviuddhipraveagua):
this 2nd quality explains the phrase: the Buddha penetrates the dharma without nature
(alakaadharmaparyaa).
This
tathat
possesses
an
absolute
nature
Uninterruptedly
maintaining
the
spontaneous
activity
of
the
Buddha
phrase:
the
Buddha
has
attained
identity
with
all
the
Buddhas
of
procuring
the
benefit
and
welfare
of
all
beings
185
every
obstacle
of
passion,
every
obstacle
to
knowledge
the
phrase:
the
doctrine
of
the
Buddha
is
without
decline
186
9) Explaining the past and future (vykaraagua): this 9th quality explains the phrase:
the Buddha penetrates the sameness of the three times (tryadhvasamatniryta). The
Buddha can move equally throughout the three times or through eternity because in the
equality of the three times, he is able to cognize past (atta) and (angata) future things
that have occurred or will occur. The Buddha explains them (vyk-) just like present
things (pratyutpanna).
10)
Manifesting
sambhogakya
and
nirmakya
in
all
the
universes
Manifesting
in
accordance
with
the
aspirations
of
beings
(yathdhimuktiprakanagua): this 14th quality explains the phrase: the bodies of the
Buddha are not imaginary (avikalpitaarra). Although he manifests his bodies in the
color of gold, etc., - in conformity with the diverse aspirations of beings - his bodies are
187
not imaginary; it is like the pearl (mai), the ferryboat (vdya), as is said in the
Tathgataguhyastra, Taish no. 312.
15) By means of an immense troop, he works to discipline beings (aprameyakyena
sattvavinayaprayogagua): this 15th quality explains the phrase: the Buddha's
knowledge
is
the
object
of
the
vows
of
all
the
bodhisattvas
Unlimited
extension
of
the
threefold
th
(buddhatrikyapradeparicchedagua): this 18
body
of
the
Buddha
Buddha has reached the identity of the buddhafields free from center and periphery
188
Being
dedicated
to
the
benefit
and
happiness
of
all
beings
189
***
Adorned with these qualities, the Buddha has a very pure intellect (suviuddhabuddhi);
thus the Bhagavat is distinguished from the rvakas, pratyakabuddhas and bodhisattvas
because of his pure intellect.
1) How does he obtain this very pure intellect? Next, it is said: he moves in nonduality
(advayasamudcara). On the other hand, the rvakas, etc., have a twofold samudcra
with regard to the objects to be cognized (jeyaviaya), namely, knowledge (jna) and
unafflicted ignorance. The Buddha, not having this twofold samudcra, possesses the
perfection of knowledge (jnasapad).
2) To explain the perfection of the cutting thyrough of the afflictions (prahasapad) in
the Tathgata, next it is said: he penetrates the dharma without nature
(alakaadharmaparyana). This is non-abiding nirva (apratihitanirva) the
nature of which is to be disgusted with sasra and nirva [cf. u: kor ba da mya an
las das pai mtshan id da mi mthun pai mtshan id mi gnas pai mya an las das
pai phyir ro].
3) By what means (upya) does he gain this nirva? Next the answer is: he resides in
the abodes of the Buddha (buddhavihrena viharan). Since the Bhagavat abides in
emptiness (nyat) and in great compassion (mahkaru), he resides neither in sasra
nor nirva.
4) Is this abode (vihra) of the Buddha shared with others (anyasdhraa) or is it
reserved (asdhraa) for the Buddha? Then the answer is: he has obtained equality with
all the Buddhas (sarvabuddhasamatprpta), because the Buddhas follow one another
and are united with one another in all points (sarvkreu). The preceding shows the
perfection of self-interest (svakrthasapad) in the Buddha.
5) Wishing to explain the perfection of altruism (parrthasapad) and to show that the
Buddha possesses the means to counteract (pratipaka) all the obstacles (varaa) that
fetter the beings to be disciplined (vineya), next it is said: he has attained the absence of
obstacles (anvaraagati gata).
190
6) There are beings, Mra, etc., capable of causing the doctrine to decline and causing the
interest of beings (sattvrtha) to decline; but here, there is nothing like that. That is why
it is said: his doctrine is without decline (apratyudvartyadharma).
7) There is no height or no depth that can hinder the Buddha from acting for the good and
happiness of beings (sattvahitasukha). That is why it is then said: his domain cannnot be
diminished (asahryagocara).
8) Concerning the means (upya) that allow the Buddha to procure the interest of beings,
next it is said: his system is inconceivable (acintyavyavasthna).
9) Are these efforts the same or different in all the Buddha Bhagavats? They are not
different.
Why?
Because
he
penetrates
the
identity
of
the
three
times
(tryadhvasamatniryta). All the Buddhas procure the interest of beings in the same
way throughout the three times.
10) Does the Buddha procure the interest of beings in this way gradually (anukramea)
in each universe one by one? No. Why? Because his bodies are extended in all the
universes (sarvalokadhtuprastaky) and manifest the perfect Buddha fully (yugapad)
in all the universes.
11) In order to show that the Buddha can cut through doubt that arises on any point, next
it is said: his knowledge pertains to everything so that there is no doubt
(sarvadharmanisaayajna).
12) Since the beings to be disciplined (vineyasattva) are of different lineages
(bhinnagotra), it is necessary to discipline them by appropriate means (upya). To
indicate this knowledge of skillful means (kualopayajna) of the Buddha, next it is
said: his intellect is endowed with all the practices (sarvacarysamanvgatabuddhi).
13) Basing himself on the abilities and inabilities of the beings to be disciplined
(vineyasattva), the Buddha distinguishes skillfully. That is why it is said next: his
knowledge of the dharmas is free of error (nikkadharmajna).
14) In the beings to be disciplined, whether they are of bad, correct or mixed practices
(pratipatti), the aspects in which the Buddha manifests are not imaginary. In order to
show this, next it is said: his bodies are not imaginary (avikalpitaarra).
191
15) In order to attract and give support to the rvakas and bodhisattvas of indeterminate
lineages (aniyatagotra), the Buddha praises the Greater Vehicle. To show this, next it is
said:
his
knowledge
is
the
obejct
of
the
vows
of
all
the
bodhisattvas
(sarvabodhisattvasapratcchitajna).
16) A certain category of beings to be disciplined wonders if the sti (or the Buddha) is
omniscient (sarvaja) or non-omniscient. To remove this doubt, it is then said: he has
reached
the
summit
of
the
nondual
Buddha
abodes
193
14a) (i) They have the same loving-kindness toward honest and dishonest
people (lavaddulev advayamaitrya); (ii) they listen to the doctrine
respectfully (satktyadharma-ravaa); (iii) they dwell in the forest
respectfully (satktyrayanivs); (iv) they disdain all the frivolities of the
world (lokavaicitrynabhirata); (v) they have no desire for the Lesser
Vehicle (hnaynnabhil); (vi) they see the advantages of the Greater
Vehicle (mahynnuasa-prek); (vii) they abandon bad friends
(ppamitra-parityakta); (viii) they are attached to good friends
(kalyamitrraya).
15a) (i) They practice the four limitless ones (caturbrahmavihraparicraka); (ii) they play with the five supernatural faculties
(pacbhijvikita); (iii) they take refuge in knowledge (jnapratisr).
16a) (i) They do not abandon beings given to good or bad practices
(pratipattimithypratipattinirita-sattvnikepaka); (ii) they have precise
language (ekavacanavd); (iii) they esteem the truth (satya-bahukara); (iv)
they are preceded by the mind of enlightenment (bodhicittaprvagama).
These sixteen phrases explain the first phrase: The bodhisattvas have as
their lofty predisposition the accomplishing of benefit and happiness for all
beings. [142a12]
II. The phrase They have as their lofty predisposition the accomplishing of
benefit and happiness for all beings is explained by sixteen actions
(karman), which are:
1b) The action of successive effort (paraparaprayoga-karma).
2b) Non-erroneous action (aviparysakarma).
3b) The action of personal effort independent of another's invitation
(parodyojannapeka svataprayogakarma).
4b) Immutable action (akobhyakarma).
5b) Disinterested action (nirmiakarma) defined by the three phrases of no.
5a. It consists of (i) absence of self-interested views (misasarga), (ii)
194
195
is
to
act
for
the
benefit
and
happiness
of
all
beings
196
effort
independent
of
others'
invitation
(parodyojannapeka
197
contrived (ktrima) and is conceived only temporarily. But if the action is not mixed with
biased views (misasa), the loving-kindness is not contrived and is never
abandoned. (ii) If loving-kindness is practiced while one is based on biased affection, one
experiences fondness (anunaya) for one's friends and revulsion (pratigha) for one's
enemies; the predispositions are not impartial. But if one is based on a disinterested
predisposition, one acts in the same way towards both. (iii) If loving-kindness is
practiced with a biased predisposition, the loving-kindness will last only until the end of
this life. But if one practices loving-kindness without biased predisposition, the kind
predisposition (maitricitta) will last forever throughout all rebirths. That is why the
bodhisattvas have profound love until the end of nirva.
6)
They
express
themselves
in
moderate
words
with
smiling
face
198
10) They are insatiable in listening and insatiable to the doctrine (rutrthtpta): this
is
explained
by
action
that
consists
of
providing
oneself
with
means
(upyaparigrhakakarma). Listening (ruta) is the doctrine, stras, etc. that one has
heard; this is not a question of hearing just anything at all. The doctrine (artha) is the
points of the teaching explained by these stras. Towards this listening and doctrine the
bodhisattvas are insatiable (asatua); these are the skillful means with which they
provide themselves in order to ripen (paripka) beings. That is why it is called action
consisting of providing oneself with means. Being insatiable in listening and the doctrine,
they discipline according to their ... [A few words are missing here from my (M.C.) xerox
copy].
11) They see the faults of their own errors (svaskhalitadoadar) and reprimand the
faults of others without anger (paraskhalita-nikrodhoddeaka): this is explained by
action tending to expel that which is to be counteracted (vipakanirkaraakarma). That
which is to be counteracted (vipaka) is desire (rga), hatred (dvea), etc. To expel them
is to distance oneself from them. Seeing the faults of their own errors, the bodhisattvas
quickly expel them and are able to criticize the faults of others. But it is with dignified
words that they make this reprimand and not otherwise. Thus the stra says: The person
who is given to misconduct (mithycra) incurs the blame of others; this person will
never have the right to criticize the wrong-doings of another. People also say: If one
commits faults oneself, after some time one does not notice them; one does not avoid
them as one should: prideful people will have no merit. To blame angrily the faults of
others is not doing good and is not practicing means. If your words lack dignity, others
will turn their back on you and will continue their bad conduct. Thus a stanza says: If
one reprimands the faults of others with the kindness (maitr) one feels for an only child,
one will certainly succeed in strengthening them so that they will no longer sin in the
future.
12) In all their postures, they cultivate the mind of enlightenment (sarverypatheu
bodhicittaparicraka): this is explained by the action consisting of ceaselessly
reflecting on this thought (samita tanmanasikrakarma), for they continually cultivate
the mind of enlightenment in all their activities. Thus it is said in the
Gocarapariuddhistra: Seeing a seated posture, they have this thought: 'I wish that
199
beings may sit on the throne of enlightenment (bodhimaa).' Cf. other stanzas of this
type.
13) They practice generosity without any wish for reward (vipkanirapekadna) and
the other phrases of 13a up to their means are drawn from the four elements of
conversion (catusagraha-vastughtopaya): this is explained by the action of going
towards the spiritual good (vieagamanakarma) defined by the seven phrases of 13b,
namely, the six virtues (pramit) and the four elements of conversion (sagrahavastu).
Having expelled the wrong-doings to be counteracted (vipakadoa) of 12, the
bodhisattvas
attain
the
fullness
of
going
towards
the
spiritual
good
5:
They
practice
dhyna
that
excludes
the
formless
realm
200
to
whom
the
bodhisattvas
attach
the
label
'good
friend'
(teu
201
sixteen practices. (iii) They dwell respectfully in the forest (satktyrayanivs). That
which is farther than one kroa from a town is called a forest; to live there is to dwell
there. By dwelling there appropriately without strolling about is to dwell there
respectfully. (iv) They disdain all the frivolities of the world (lokavaicitrynabhirata):
they distrust all worldly frivolities, singing, laughing, dancing, etc. To do that is to avoid
the evil preoccupations associated with desire (rga), etc.
reflection (manasikragua), because the bodhisattvas have rejected the Vehicle of the
rvakas and pratyekabuddhas and are filled with desire for the qualities of the Greater
Vehicle. (vii - viii) The quality of good comapanions (sahyagua), because the
bodhisattvas distance themselves from bad friends (ppamitra) and stay close to good
friends (kalyamitra).
15) They practice the four immeasurables (caturbrahmavihraparicraka), they play
with the five supernatural faculties (pacbhijvikrita), they take refuge in
knowledge (jna): this is explained by perfect action (nipannakarma). The action of
perfect nature (nipannalakaa) is called perfect action. Here the word 'action' is
synonymous with 'mark' (rtags = liga). The three phrases of 15b: purity in infinite
practices (apramaviuddhi), etc., explains the three phrases of 15a: they practice
the
four
immeasurables
(caturbrahmavihraparicraka),
etc.
(i)
The
four
202
16) They do not abandon beings who are given up to good or bad practices
(pratipattimithypratipatti-niritasattvnikepaka): like the other phrases of 16a, this
one is explained by stabilizing action (tatprasthnakarma) and the four phrases of 16b.
The stabilization of the lofty predisposition of acting for the welfare and happiness of
beings is an action; that is why one speaks of the stabilizing action. (i) The quality that
permits the directing of assemblies (saghapariayakagua). Sending away dishonest
(dula) people and gathering honest (lavat) people, bodhisattvas wish alike to cause
them to leave the bad states (akualt sthnd vyutthnam) and introduce them into the
good states (kuale sthne pratihpanam); this is not to abandon them. (ii) They have
precise speech (ekavacanavd): bodhisattvas teach (avavda) and exhort (anusana)
with precision and unhesitatingly because their speech (vacana) is dignified (deya). If
speech is not precise, it is not dignified. (iii) They esteem the truth (satyabahukara).
Material interests (mia) and the doctrine (dharma), which are dual, are united and form
a single kind of generosity. To accumulate wealth or to accumulate the doctrine is the
same thing. Bodhisattvas distribute them equally in conformity with their earlier promise.
This generosity exists only in the present. Thus a stanza says: The offering of material
goods causes beings to exhaust their life (yus), the offering of the doctrine causes them
to attain heavenly calm. (iv) They are preceded by the mind of enlightenment
(bodhicittaprvagama): this is explained by the phrase: the undefiled mind. Embraced
by the mind of enlightenment, bodhisattvas in all their activities are without desire and do
not seek the offerings of others, etc. They seek only the approach (adhigama) to supreme
enlightenment (anuttarabodhi).
NOTES to CHAPTER II
1. The three natures have been studied in Sadhimir., Chap. VI -VII; Lakvatra, p. 6768, p. 130-133; Bodh. bhmi, p. 37-38; Strlakra, XI, 13, 38; Madhyntavibhaga,
Chap. III: Tattvapariccheda, p. 110-165; Triik, p. 39 (4)- 42 (8); Siddhi, p. 514-561;
Treatise by Vasubandhu-Ngrjuna on the three natures, MCB, II, 1932-33, p.147-161.
Mdhyamika works: Madhyamakavtti, p. 274, 445, 553; Madhymakvatra, p. 166, 195.
- Preparation for the doctrine of the three natures in the Prajs and the Madhyamaka:
Sadhinir., Introduction, p. 14-16; Abhis. ala l. , p. 47; Madhyamakvatra, p. 101;
Bodhicaryvatarapajik, p. 361 (4).
203
nature, it arises in the mode of duality, as daranabhga and nimittabhga. These two
bhgas exist as point of view (ruci), they do not exist as proof (yukti). The Madhynta
states that these two characteristics are imaginary." The passage of the
Madhyntavibhaga cited here occurs in kr. I, 13 a-b, p. 46 (19): dvaybhvo hy
abhvasya bhva ca nyalakaam: "The non-existence of the two (grhya and
grhaka) and the existence (underlying) this non-existence, such is the essence of the
void (or the absolute)."
On the theory of the bhgas or aa, cf. Siddhi, p. 125-131, where there is a rich
bibliography.
12. On this theory of certain bodhisattvas, cf. Siddhi, p. 4-5, 396. Volition (cetan) is
called kya- vk-, mana-karman, according to whether it moves the body, the speech, or
is associated with the manas: this is the Sautrntika thesis (cf. Koa, IV, p. 12;
Karmasiddhi, v. 46-49) and the Vijnavdin thesis (cf. Siddhi, p. 51-52).
According to Koa, I, p. 59-61, the five vijnas involve vitarka and vicra ( =
svabhvavikalpa); the sixth involves the vikalpa of nirpa and anusmaraa as well.
The presence of the tangible in the dhynas: Koa, VIII, p. 154.
Mana cai pratisaraam: Sayutta, V, p. 218; Koavykhy, p. 703 (15). On the
other hand, the Drntikas say: "The manovijna has a distinct object: it does not
pertain to the object of the five vijnas, cakurvijna, etc." (Vibh, in Koa, VIII, p.
242).
13. On the development of the laya, cf. Lakvatra, p. 54 (10): dehabhogapratihnam
laya khyayate nm; p. 56 (7): layavijna
svacittadyadehapratihbhogaviaya yugapad vibvayati. For the
Madhyntavibhaga, p. 16-17, the vijna arises in a threefold appearance:
arthasattvapratibhva ( = layavijna asaprayogam), tmapratibhsa ( = klia
mana asaprayogam), vijaptipratibhsa ( = asaprayoga cakurjndiakam).
14. The stra of the four knowledges, probably taken from the Abhidharmastra is
reproduced in the Abhidharmasamuccayavykhy, Taish 1616, p. 715b19-715c1, and
Siddhi, p. 421-423. These four knowledges are:
i. Viruddhajnanimittatvajna. - The example of water seen by the pretas, etc., in
Madhyamakvatra, p. 164 (12); Viik, p. 4 (2-6); Nyyavrttika, p. 528 (12).
ii. Anlambanavijaptyupalabdhitvajna. Cf. below, 27.
iii. Aprayatnvipartatvajna. Cf. Sadhinir., III, 3; Strlakra, XI, 24;
Acintyastotra in Bodhicaryvatra, IX, 6: indriyair upalabdha yat tat tattvena bhaved
yadi, jt tattvavido bl tattvajanena ki tad.
iv. Trividhajnnuklatvajna involves a threefold knowledge designated by Siddhi
as:
a) Vaitjnnuvartakajna. This concerns the cetovait already mentioned in
chap. I, 60, dealing with the adhimuktibala of the yogins. The results of this vaita are
205
206
207
208
33. The twenty-one Buddha qualities (one general quality because of twenty special
qualities) are found in:
i. Sadhinir., Tib. 2 and Chin. of Bodhiruci, Taish 675, p 665c3-12, and of Hiuantsang, Taish 676, p. 688b17-25. Introduction of Paramrtha, Taisho 667, p. 711b27711c15.
ii. Buddhabhmistra, Taish 680, p. 720c7-16.
iii. All versions of Sagraha
iv. Mahvyutpatti where these qualities occur in the list of the 93
tathgatamhtmyanmnis.
In paragraph 33 II, a new series of qualities explaining the preceding ones. But the
versions differ as to number: the Tib. verse and Buddhaanta indicate 19 qualities and
cite 20 of them; Paramrtha and Dharmagupta indicate 21 and cite 20; Hiuan-tsang
indicate 21 qualities and cite 20 but end their enumeration by the word 'etc.' According to
the Chinese version of the Upanibandhana by Hiuan-tsang, this 'etc,' means 'the last
quality' (nihagua) explaining the epithet aparntakoiniha, the 22nd mhtmyanmn
in the list in the Mahvyutpatti.
The Buddha qualities are presented differently in Strlakra, XX-XXI, 43-61; Bodh.
bhmi, p. 375 to the end.
34. Lamotte says he has not found anywhere a similar explanation regarding the
bodhisattvas, but it may be gleaned from Strlakra, XIX, 63-80; Bodh. Bhmi,
anudharmayogasthnam, p. 301 seq.; Mahvyutpatti, 806-884. Bodh. bhmi gives details
on ayauddhi, p. 333 (5); samacitta, p. 286 (11); deyavacanat, p. 29 (3);
sagrahavastu, p. 217-230. the apramas or brahmavihras, p. 241 (15); the abhijs,
p. 58 (13); avavdnusana, p. 111-112.
Continuation of Chapter II
34. Kayapaparivarta, 23-25, p. 47-50 contains the original Sanskrit of chapter II, 34,
the reconstituted translation of which follows:
When the bodhisattva is endowed with 32 attributes, he is called 'bodhisattva'
(dvtriadbhir dharmai samanvgato bodhisattvo bodhisattvo ity ucyate). What are
these 32 (katame dvtriadbhi)? They are (yad uta):
0. Having the high intention of working for the benefit and happiness of all beings
(hitasukhdhyayatay sarvasatveu).
i. Introduction into omniscience (sarvajjnvatraatay).
ii. Knowing his own worth and consequntly not criticizing the skill of others (kim aham
argmti pare jnkunsanat) [Lamotte: akunsanat for akutsanat?]
iii. Suppressing pride (niradhimnatay).
iv. Having a steady high aspiration (dhdyayatay).
209
210
CHAPTER III
ENTRANCE INTO THE NATURES OF THE KNOWABLE
(jneyalakaapravea)
1. The natures of the knowable (jeyalakaa) have been presented in chapter II;
how should the entrance into the natures of the knowable (jeyalakaapravea)
be understood?
These are the mental states perfumed by great hearing
(bahurutabhvitvasth).
These states are not mingled with the store-consciousness
(layavijnensaghit).
Like the store-consciousness, they are seeds (layavijnavad bjbhta).
They are merged with right attention (yoniomanasikrea saghta).
They arise under the aspect of texts and theses (dharmrthbhsenotpann).
They are like cognizable substances (grhyadravya-sthnya).
They are mental discourse endowed with vision (sadarana-manojalp). [142b9]
211
would teach me full understanding', and the Bhagavat replied: 'Have you already
understood the basket of the holy texts (saddharmapiaka)?' Rhula replied: 'No,
Bhagavat.' Then the Bhagavat said to him: First you must understand the basket of texts.'
They are not mingled with the store-consciousness because these states follow from
(sravanti) the very pure fundamental element (ativiuddhadharmadhtu) and counteract
(pratipaka) the store-consciousness. They are not mixed since they oppose (viruddha)
one another (cf. chap. 1, 45).
2. Who is it who enters into the natures of the knowable (jeyalakaa)? - The
bodhisattva who has perfumed (bhvan) his mental series (cittasatna) by
means of the great hearing (bahuruta) of the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle,
who has served (rdhana) innumerable Buddha avatars
(apramaprdurbhva), who, with single faith (ekdhimukta), has fully
accumulated the roots of good (kualamla), and has thus fully accomplished the
accumulations of merit and wisdom (puyajnasabhra). [142b13]
212
3. Where does the bodhisattva enter? - Amidst this mental discourse (manojalpa)
furnished with vision (sadarana) that has the appearance of texts and theses
(dharmrthabhsa) and that comes from the doctrine of the Greater Vehicle
(mahynadharmnvaya), the bodhisattva enters into the stage where faith is
practiced (adhimukticarybhmi), into the path of seeing (daranamrga), into
the path of meditation (bhvanmrga) or the final path (nihmrga). He
enters into the adhimukticarybhmi because, being based on what has been
said to him (anukathitam), he adheres (adhimucyate) to the purely ideational
nature of all dharmas (sarvadharm vijaptimtram). - He enters into the
daranamrga because he penetrates mental discourse correctly
(yathbhtaprativedha). - He enters into the bhvanmrga because he trains in
counteracting all the obstacles (sarvvaraapratipakabhvan). - He enters into
the nihmrga because he has eliminated the obstacles. [142b17]
213
4. How (kena) does the bodhisattva enter into the natures of the knowable? - He
enters:
(i) by putting to work the roots of good (kualamlabaldhihna),
(ii) by rousing his courage in three ways (trividhacittottpana),
(iii) by eliminating four blockages (catusthapraha),
(iv) by being zealous (apramda) in a continuous and respectful
(statyasatkityaprayoga) effort applied to tranquility (amatha) and insight
(vipayan) concerning the texts ands theses (dharmrthlambana). [142b20]
ii) He thinks: "It is with these intentions (aya) that beings practice
(samuddcaranti) generosity and the other perfections (dndipramit). I too
am going to attain such intentions. By means of them I shall cultivate the
perfections (pramitbhvan) without too much trouble (alpakcchrea) and
I shall reach perfection (paripri)." This reflection consitututes the second
stimulant.
iii) He thinks: "Beings equipped with limited moral goodness
(sapratighakualadharmasamanvgata) are reborn after death with the
perfections of existence (kyaspad) of their choice (yathkmam). As for
myself, admirably endowed with limitless moral good (apratighakuaha), why
should I not obtain universal perfection (sarvasapad) at that moment?"
This is the third reflection. Here are some stanzas:
(i) (Cf. Strlakra, X, 11).
manuabht sabodhi prpnuvanti pratikaam /
apramey yata sattv laya nto 'dhivsayet //
Since throngs of beings in human condition reach enlightenment at each
instant, discouragement should not be permitted.
(ii) (Translated from H). It is with the intentions of a pure mind that
generosity, etc. is practiced. The Victorious Ones (jina) who have acquired
them can cultivate generosity, etc.
iii) (Translated from H). After death, good people obtain the
perfections of their choice (yathkmasapad). Why should not very good
people, who have cut through the obstacles, not obtain the most excellent
perfections? [142c6]
215
his courage sags (cittam avalyate). To counteract this discouragement, he practices the
stimulants. (Bh)
i) Innumerable human beings in innumerable universes, etc. This explains the first
stimulant. When he contemplates the series of other delivered beings, his courage
increases and he no longer feels discouraged. [He says to himself in fact: If, in the human
destinies, innumerable beings in innumerable universes at each moment come to supreme
perfect enlightenment, why should not I myself come to that point? Cf. Bh.]
ii) It is with these intentions, etc. This explains the second stimulant. I also have acquired
such intentions, i.e., his intentions are free of obstacles (vibandha) because they are
strangers to avarice (mtsarya), desire (kma), wickedness (vypda), laziness
(kausdya), languor-torpor (stynamiddha) and ignorance (avidy). By means of them,
without too much trouble, I will cultivate the virtues and come to perfection: having
obtained these higher intentions, I will spontaneously (svarasena) cultivate generosity,
etc. and quickly reach perfection (paripri).
iii) Beings endowed, etc. This explains the third stimulant. Equipped with a limited moral
goodness, i.e., equipped with moral goodness of worldly order (laukikakuala). Because
it has not suppressed the obstacles ranged against it (vipakvaraa),
it is limited
(sapratigha). As for myself, admirably endowed, etc.: I, who have cut through the
obstacles ranged against it, have acquired a moral goodness free of obstacles. Why
should I not later obtain full complete Buddhahood (pariprabuddhat)? To rouse
courage is to excite and raise it by reinforcing it and combatting discouragement.
Some stanzas summarize these ideas:
(i) Since beings in the human condition, etc. Timidity and weakness are called
discouragement (laya). The author exhorts (samdpayati) the bodhisattva not to become
discouraged. If he says: "I am incapable of reaching supreme perfect enlightenment", that
is timidity and weakness. The author exhorts him not to say that he is incapable and
consequently not to be discouraged. Thus a stanza says: Innumerable beings
(aprameyasattva) in the ten directions (daadi) at each moment (pratikaam) reach
Buddhahood (sugataphala). These people (purua) and myself are equal. It's not
necessary to be discouraged in the least.
216
(ii) It is with the intentions of a pure mind that generosity is practiced, etc.: Generosity is
not practiced with a bad (akuala) mind or a morally indeterminate (avykta) mind, etc.
Here it is a matter of pure mind only. Some people (loka) practice generosity with a bad
(akuala) mind, a morally indeterminate (avykta) mind or a distracted (vikipta) mind
because they are looking for certain forms of existence (bhva) or wealth (bhoga). This is
not the case for the bodhisattva: he seeks only supreme perfect enlightenment (anuttar
samyaksabodhi). These intentions (aya) are the cause permitting the development of
generosity, etc., without obstacle, as was said above (cf. Prastvan, 3, p. 7; chap. IV,
1). The Victorious Ones who have acquired them can develop generosity, etc. The
bodhisattvas are called victorious (jina) because they have already acquired these high
intentions. By means of them, the perfections of generosity, etc. operate spontaneously
(svarasena). ... By virtue of this determination (niyama), the bodhisattvas cut through
obstacles (pratipaka) to the virtues, and because they have cut through these obstacles,
the perfections of generosity operate spontaneously (svarasena) without effort
(anbhoga). By 'etc.' is meant the other five perfections, from discipline (la) to wisdom
(praj).
(iii) Good people, after their death, etc. This concerns those who are good from the
mundane level (laukikakuala). At the end of their life, they obtain the perfections of
their choice: as result, they obtain the personal perfections of the mundane order which
they wished for; thus they come to be reborn at the summit of existence (bhavgra). As
for those very good ones who have cut through the obstacles, i.e., who are good without
any obstacles, why should they not obtain the perfected perfections? Why should they not
obtain the perfect Buddhahood (saprabuddhat) that they wish for? (U)
6. [Catusthnaprahna]:
1. By abandoning reflection (manasikrapraht), the bodhisattva rejects
(parityajati) the customary reflections of the rvakas and the
pratyekabuddhas.
2. By abandoning perplexity and hesitation (vimatikkpraht), he
rejects any doubt (vicikits) regarding the Greater Vehicle.
217
present by itself,
218
(lambanaviaya). He even arrives at cutting all adherence to and all concepts about the
Buddhas, bodhisattvas, the pramits and other similar things. (U)
(akaranmaniritrtha) is only a mental word; he understands that the selfnature (svabhva) and the specifications (viea) attributed to this name or
this entity are mere designations (prajapti).
When he sees the name and phoneme as merely a simple mental word, he
sees that the self-nature and characteristics attributed to this name or this
entity are purely designations (prajapti): since the self-nature and the
characteristics are without objective nature (arthalakaa), they are also
nonexistent. It is by means of these four investigations and by means of these
four correct knowledges that, within these mental words of the appearance of
phonemes and theses, the bodhisattva enters into Concept-only
(vijaptimatrat). [142c26]
220
222
9. Thus, by entering into the mental speech (manojalpa) which is the apparent
object (nirbhsrthalakaa), the bodhisattva has entered into the imaginary
nature (parikalpitasvabhva); by entering into Concept-Only (vijaptimtra), he
has entered into the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhva); how does he enter
into the absolute nature (parinipannasvabhva)? - He enters by abandoning
(nirkaraa) even the notion of Concept-Only (vijaptimtrasaj). Then, for
the bodhisattva who has destroyed (vidhvas-) the notion of object
(arthasaj), the mental words (manojalpa) resulting from the propensity of
the dharmas that have been heard (rutadharma-vsannvaya) have no
possibility (avaka) of arising in the appearance of an object and consequently
no longer arise as an idea either. When the bodhisattva abides in name-withoutconcept in regard to all objects (sarvrtheu nirvikalpakanma), when he abides
in the fundamental element (dharmadhtu) by means of direct perception
(pratyakayogena), then he attains the nonconceptual knowledge
(nirvikalpakajna) in which the object (lambana) and the subject of
consciousness (lambaka) are completely identical (samasama). This is how the
bodhisattva enters into the absolute nature. [143a16]
223
without-concept in regard to all objects, etc. All objects, i.e., the stras etc. The domain
(gocara) where names are applied is here called all objects. There are ten kinds of names
(cf. the following paragraph): the first nine deal with concepts (savikalpaka), the tenth is
free of concept (nirvikalpaka) about all dharmas. The bodhisattva abides in namewithout-concept in regard to all dharmas. Thus it is said that everything is but a name and
that this name can produce everything. Here the ideas (vijapti) that appear as object are
metaphorically (upacra) called 'name' . He abides by direct perception in the
fundamental element: he adheres (adhimukti) to the dharmadhtu by means of
introspection (pratytmagati).
Object and subject of consciousness are completely identical for conconceptual
knowledge because, just as the object (lambana) does not exist, the subject (lambaka)
does not exist either. That is why object and subject are identical. Thus the bodhisattva
has entered into the absolute nature. (U)
Pudgalanman
(individuals):
names
occuring
in
the
Buddhist
teachings
(buddhadean), e.g. Devadatta, etc., Dharmnusrin (Dgha, III, p. 105, 254; etc.), etc.
224
3) Dharmanman (texts): stra, geya, etc. [These are the Buddhist scriptures in nine or
twelve divisions, cf. Majjhima, I, p. 133; Aguttara, II, p. 103, 178; III, p. 86 seq.; 177
seq.; Puggala, p. 43; Milinda, p. 344; Mahvyut., 1266-1278; Siddhi, p. 614.]
4) Arthanman (theses): that which is enunciated in these scriptures, e,g., (Dhammapada,
v. 294): Having killed his mother and father and two katriya kings, having destroyed the
kingdom and its subjects, the brahmin is innocent (mtara pitara hantv, rjno dve
ca khattiye, raha snucara hantv, angho yti brhmao). - See chap. VII, 11.
5) Sakepanman (generalities): e.g. (Vinaya, V, p. 86; Sayutta, III, p. 133: IV, p. 28,
401; Strlakra, XVIII, 101: Koa, IX, p. 252): All dharmas are not a self (sabbe
dhamm anatt; sarve dharm antmna iti).
6) Vistaranman (particularities): e.g. (Vinaya I, p.13): Form in particular is not a self
(rpa anatt).
7) Gotranma (phonemes): the vowels and consonants (akharavyajana) that are the
cause of language.
8) Auddhanman (impure beings), e.g. ordinary people (pthagjana) defiled by the
stains of the afflictions (kleamala).
9) uddhanman (pure beings), e.g., the ryas who have effaced the stains (vigatamala).
10) Antanman (climax): the mixed objects (saslambana), e.g. prajpramit, the
ten bhmis, etc., which have as object a mixture (sasrtha). (U)
225
12. Again, for what reason does he enter into Concept-Only (vijaptimtra)? By
means of a supramundane (lokottara) cognition of tranquility and discernment
(amata vipayanjna) concerning mixed dharmas (sasadharmlambaka),
by a subsequent cognition (phalabdhajna) of every type of concept
(nnvijapti), cutting (prahaya) all the seeds (bja) of the store-consciousness
with their images (sanimitta), the bodhisattva cultivates the seed of contact
(sparabja) with the dharmadhtu. Transforming his support (parvttraya),
securing all the attributes of the Buddha (buddhadharma), he attains
omniscience (sarvajjna): for this reason he enters into Concept-Only.
This subsequent cognition (palabdhajna), which considers every creation
(prabhava) coming from the store-consciousness and every object of concept
(vijaptinimitta) as a magic show (my), etc., is, in its essence, free of errors
(praktyaviparta). Thus, in the same way that the magician (mykra) is free of
doubt about the things produced by magic (myktadharma), so this
226
227
show, etc., is free of error by essence, because by considering, in accordance with the
truth, the dependent nature as a magical show, etc., one avoids error (cf. chap. II, 27).
In the same way that a magician is free of all error about magical things: the magician is
free of error about the plants (ta), trees (vka), etc., that are the causes of magic,
because he sees them correctly; the magician is free of error about the elephant (hastin),
the horse (ava), etc., because he sees them correctly. In the same way the bodhisattva
who has seen the truth (dasatya) correctly sees the non-existence of grhya and
grhaka. When he attains the truth, he produces this subsequent cognition (pralabdha),
generator of speech (vksamutthpaka), of conventional order (savti), but pure. At the
time when he knows cause and result and when he preaches the law, he is free of error.
His listeners (rvaka) are subject to error, but when the propensity of the teachings
(rutavsan) has perfumed their mental series (prabandha), they are freed of error
progressively (anukramea) and by degrees (anais) and thereby accomplish what they
had to do (ktynuhna). This subsequent cognition is likewise free of concepts
(nirvikalpa) and is unstained (aklia). (U)
229
14. Thus the bodhisattva has entered into the bhmis, has acquired the path of
seeing (daranamrga) and has entered into Concept-Only (vijaptimtrat).
How does he practice the path of meditation (bhvanmrga)?
In the ten bodhisattva bhmis as they are described (yathoktavyavasthna) and
that are
230
In the ten bodhisattva bhmis as they are described: in the ten bodhiattva bhmis
according to the decription given [in chap. V]. The cognition of tranquility and
discernment concerns mixed dharmas: it concerns the general characteristic
(smnyalakaa) and does not have concepts (vikalpa) as object. It is a supramundane
cognition, i.e., an nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpakajna). The subsequent cognition
is a descriptive cognition (vyavasthnajna). We cannot say that it is simply mundane
because it is not exercised in the world. Nor can we say that it is exclusively
supramundane because it manifests in conformity with the world. That is why it cannot
be defined with precision. (Bh)
In that way, the bodhisattva transforms his support: over the course of many periods
(kalpa), he cultivates nonconceptual wisdom and subsequent cognition and thus reaches
the transformation of the support (cf. chap. IX), i.e., the purification of his mental series
(cittacaittasatnapariuddhi). Then he exerts himself to attain the three bodies of the
Buddha: this will be explained at length below (chap. X). (U)
15. What is the difference (viea) between the two realizations (abhisamaya),
that of the rvakas and that of the bodhisattvas? - The abhisamaya of the
bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the rvakas by way of ten superiorities
(viea):
1) lambanaviea, by its object, because it concerns the Greater Vehicle.
2) Nirayaviea, by its basis, because it rests upon the great accumulations of
merit and wisdom (mahpuyajnasabhra).
3) Prativedhavieha, by its penetration, because it penetrates the nonexistence of self of the individual and of entities (pudgaladharmanairtmya).
4) Nirvaviea, by its nirva, because it takes possession of (parighti) of
the non-stable nirva (apratihita-nirva).
5) Bhmiviea, by its levels, because it brings deliverance (nisaraa,
niryna) by means of the ten levels.
231
232
(ansravadhtu), a buddha-land (buddhaviaya) (cf. chap. X, 30). This is not so for the
rvaka who is born in the womb of a mother (mtu kukau), etc.
233
234
235
18. Now, drawn from the Mahyanastrlakra (VI, 6-10), here are other
stanzas on clear understanding (realization) (abhisamaya):
236
237
238
iii) Now it is necessary to explain how the dharmadhtu is present before his eyes
(pratyakatm eti). By means of his intellect he understands that that nothing other than
his mind exists; that is why he recognized the non-existence of mind itself (nstti cittt
param etya buddhy cittasya nstitvam upaiti tasmt). He knows that nowhere is there
any perceived object (lambanaviaya) outside of the mind. Since this object does not
exist, the mind which perceives it (lambakacitta) does not exist either. The wise person
who has understood the non-existence of duality (dvayasya nstitvam upetya dhmn).
The wise person (dhmat) is the person endowed with great wisdom (praj). To know
with certainty (vinicaya) the non-existence of duality (dvayasya nstitvam) is to
penetrate (pratividh-) the imaginary nature (parikalpita). The non-existence of duality is
called the original non-existence of object and subject (lambanlambakayor
dinstitvam). He settles into the fundamental element that is beyond this duality
(satihate 'tadgatidharmadhtau). Satih- means to rest (sth) in equality (samat).
Completely free of grhya and grhaka, the dharmadhtu is beyond duality. The
dharmadhtu perceived in this way is not false; it is a true dharmadhtu.
iv) In the wise person, by the power of nonconceptual cognition (akalpanjnabalena
dhmata: by the power (anubhva) contained in this nonconceptual cognition
(nirvikalpakajna) of the bodhisattvas. This wisdom accompanies equality always and
everywhere (samnuytena samantata sad). It accompanies everywhere (samantata),
i.e., inwardly and outwardly (adhytmabahirdh). It accompanies equality (sama),
because if grhya does not exist, then grhaka does not exist either. Seeing an identity of
nature (svabhvasamat) like space (ka) in the dharmas, stras, etc., this knowkedge
accomapanies equality. It accompanies it always (sad), i.e., throughout all time. The
support, a heap of faults like a thicket, is expelled (tadrayo gahvaradoasacayo
nirasyate). By support (raya) is meant the cause (hetu) of defiled (sakleika)
dharmas. It is a heap of faults (doasacaya) because the propensities (vsan) of the
faults (doa), i.e., the defiled dharmas, are piled up there. It is like a thicket (gahvara)
because it is hard to penetrate (duranupravia). As poison is expelled by a powerful
antidote (mahgadeneva viam). This phrase is easy to understand. Since it drives away
faults (doa), this knowledge is like an antidote (agada). Stanza iv) deals with the
bhvanmrgavasth.
239
v)
Established
in
the
good
law
prescribed
by
the
Muni
modelled on the threefold training (ik): morality, concentration and wisdom. Chap. VI
deals with excellent morality (adhila), chap. VII with excellent mind (adhicitta) and
chap. VIII with excellent wisdom (adhipraj). This excellent wisdom is none other than
nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpakajna) acquired on the entry into the first bhmi and
perfected during the course of the following bhmis up to full blossoming. - Coming out
of the tenth bhmi, the bodhisattva has attained the fruit of his practices; he has cut all the
seeds of defilement. This is why chap. IX is called 'fruition-cutting' (phalaprahna), i.e.,
the cutting of the defilements which is the result of the three trainings. This chapter
briefly describes the state of Buddhahood: the old individuality of the bodhisattva is
changed (rayaparvtti); while remaining in sasra in order to save beings, he
himself is in nirva: this is what is called apratihitanirva. - An immaculate and
unhindered wisdom (vimalam apratihata ca jnam) which is expressed in the three
bodies (trikya) of the Buddha corresponds to the fruit of Buddhahood. Chap. X is
dedicated to it; it is entitled 'the wisdom of the fruit' (phalajna).
***
Chap. III, which could be improved by being better organized, deals with the path
(mrga) and its stages (avasth) which are enumerated in 3:
i) Sabhrvasth, stage of gathering. The bodhisattva cultivates conviction (adhimukti)
in the vijaptimtrat of all dharmas (cf. 2). He devotes himself to an infinity of
excellent practices (paramacary) of which some are described in 4-6. This period
extends from the first production of the mind of enlightenment (bodhicittotpda) up to
the production of umagata.
ii) Prayogvasth, the preparatory stage. The bodhisattva progressively tames the
concepts of object and subject (grhyagrhaka) and thus 'prepares' the seeing of reality
(tattvadarana). To this effect he cultivates the nirvedhabhgiyas of the Greater Vehicle
and the coreesponding samdhis (cf. 7 and 13) of which the following is a comparative
table:
Umagata
lokaladbdha
Mrdhan
lokavddhi
Satynulomik-
Tattvrthaika-
knti
parijana
deannupraviasamdhi
Laukikgra-
nantarya-
dharma
parijna
samdhi
241
This stage marks the end of the first asakhyeyakalpa (cf. chap. V, 6) and the end of
the adhimukticarybhmi.
iii) Prativedhvasth, stage of penetration. In one moment the bodhisattva reaches full
understanding (abhisamaya) of reality and produces nonconceptual wisdom
(nirvikalpakajna). See 9 and 11. This stage, which is instantaneous and constitutes
the path of seeing (daranamrga) of the bodhisattva, marks the entry into the first
bhmi.
iv) Bhvanvasth, the stage of meditation. The bodhisattva 'meditates' on what he has
'seen' in the third stage and perfects intuitive wisdom (cf. 14). This stage lasts from the
mind of residing in the first bhmi (sthiticitta) until vajropamasamdhi at the end of the
tenth bhmi, It lasts for two asakhyeyakalpas (cf. chap. V, 6).
v) Nihvasth, final stage. The bodhisattva leaves the obstacles (kleajeyvaraa) and
dwells in anuttar samyaksabodhi. Having become buddha, he converts beings and
causes them to enter into the vijaptimtrat.
Some more- or less-developed accounts of the Greater Vehicle in Abhisamaylakra,
chap. V, p. 27 seq.; Strlamkra, VI, 6-10 (= Sagraha, III, 18); XIV, 1-22
(sabhra), 23-27 (prayoga), 29-41 (darana), 42-51 (bhvan); Madhyntavibhaga,
tatrvasth, p. 188-192; Abhisamayasamuccaya, T 1605, k. V, p. 682b21 seq.; Triik,
p. 42 (12) seq.; Siddhi, p. 562-611; Bu-ston, I, p. 117.
On the path in the Lesser Vehicle, Koa, V, p. IV-XI (rsum); L. de La Valle Poussin,
Musla et Nrada, MCB, V, 1937, p. 192 sq.
Comparison of the rvaka, pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva paths. E. Obermiller,
Coctrine of P. P., AO, XI, 1932, p. 13-47.
***
1. Manojalpa, mental discourse, synonym of manovijna. - Cf. Uttaratantra, p. 133;
Strlakra, ad XI, 7 (manojalpair iti sakalpa); ad XIV, 23 (tathbhto bodhisattva
samhitacitto manojalpd vinirmuktm sarvadharmn na payati
svalakaasmnyalakakhyn manojalpamtram eva khyti); Triik, p. 32 (19)
(vitarka paryeako manojalpa); Siddhi, p. 385, 386, 586.
2. Sabhrvasth: Triik, kr. 26, p. 42 (12); Siddhi, p. 564-574. Sabhra in the
Lesser Vehicle: Jtaka, I, p. 1 (bodhi); Theragth comm. p. 214) (vimokhhkas-);
Mahvastu, I, p. 239 (5) kualamlas-); II, p. 286 (7) (sabhrato puynm); III, p. 250
(9) (dharmas-); Lalitavistara, p. 35 (12) (puyas-, jns-a, amathas-, vidarans-);
Saundarnanda, XVII, st. 15; Koa, VII, p. 80. - Sabhra in the Greater Vehicle:
Karupuarka, p. 104 (long list); Madh. vtti, p. 357 (1) (prajopyamahkarus-,
iksam., p. 191 (4) (dharmas-, jnas-); Strlakra, XVIII, 38-41 (types, essence,
etymology, result); Bodh. bhmi, p. 258 (25) (2 bodhis); Madhyntavibhaga, p. 213 (S.
of the rvaka and the bodhisattva); Siddhi, p. 564.
Adhimukti, adherence, forms the essential of this stage and the following one. Beyond
the references already given for chap. II, 13, for the Hnayna, see Dgha, I, p. 174;
Aguttara, V, p. 36; Paisambhid, I, p. 124; Milinda, p. 161, 169; Vibhaga, p. 340, 341;
Sumagalavilsin, I. p. 44, 103; Mahvastu, I, p. 159 (15), II, p. 309 (14); Lalitavistara,
p. 10 (11), 32 (20), 33 (6), 433 (11); Avadnaataka, I, p. 8 (11), 112 (8), 285 (5); Koa,
I. p. 40; II, p. 204; VII, p. 70. 85. - For the Mahyna, see Saddharmapuarka, p. 25,
242
31, 49, 53, 110, etc. (see also adhimucyate, p. 187, 232, 255, etc.); Bhadramya, p. 101
(ed. Rgamey); Samdhirja (ed. Rgamey), XIX, 2-4, XXII, st. 44; Lakvatra, P. 42
(12), 172 (2), 194 (16); Kyapa, 16, p. 35; Daabhmika, p. 7, 11, 14, 20, 29, 38, 40,
41, 56, 68, 70, 73, 75, 76, 78; Sadhinir., index; Madh. vtti, p. 159 n., 268 n., 337 (6),
338 (11), 358 n., 443 (1); iksam., p. 171 seq. (nayadh-); Strlakra, I. 13-18; X
as a whole; Bodh. bhmi, p. 95 (13), 195 (12); Uttaratantra, p. 158, 163, 164; Triik,
p. 25 (20); Madhyntavihaga, p. 190-192; Siddhi, p. 173, 563, 565, 572, 661, 731.
Adhimukticarybhmi, which is the subject of the following : Koa, IV, p. 224; Abhis.
al. l., p. 64 (6); Sadhinir. IX, v. 3; Daabhmika, introduction; Madh. avatra, p. 13;
Strlakra, IV, 2; XI, 75; XIV, 1; XVI, 76; XX, 24-27, 41; Madhyntavibhaga, p.
130 (5), 190 (5), 204 (14), 205 (7); Siddhi, p. 731.
3. See preliminary note.
4 - 6. Deal with the four practices in the Sabhravasth:
i) Accumulation by gathering the roots of good: see references to sabhra above and in
2.
ii) Struggle against discouragement: Strlakra, X, 11; Siddhi, p. 574.
iii) Elimination of the four stoppings: a) srvakapratyekabuddhamanasikraparivarjana, Strlakra, XIII, 14-15; b) vimativicikits-praha, definition
in Koa, V, p. 2, 31; Kyapa, v. 7, p. 16; Triik, p. 29 (27); Madhyntavibhaga, p.
73 (19); Siddhi, p. 347; Lakvatra, p. 117 (15), 118 (14-17); c)
dharmbhiniveaprana = suppression of tmtmyagrha, Sadhinir., p. 41, 161;
Siddhi, p. 250; d) vikalpapraha, Strlakra, XIX, 50 where the verse is commented
on in a slightly different way.
iv. Continuous effort applied to amatha and vipayan, see below, 12.
7. Deals with the prayogvasth and is to be complemented by 13.
Paryea: defined in Triik, p. 32 (19) (paryeako manojalpa kim etad iti
nirpaakrapravrtta vitarka), Siddhi, p. 385, 389, 390. - The four paryeas are
defined in Strlakra, XIX, 47; Bodh. bhmi, p. 53 (6-16);
Abhidharmasamuccayavykhy, T 1606, k. XI, p. 745b28 seq.; Siddhi, p. 576-577. - See
the definitions in Bodh. bhmi, p. 53: tatra nmaparyea yad bodhisattvo nmni
nmamtra payati. eva vastuni vastumtradarana vastuparyea.
svabhvaprajaptausvabhvaprajaptimtradarana svabhva-prajaptiparyean.
vieaprajaptau vieaprajaptimtradarana vieaprajaptiparyea. sa
nmavastuno bhinna ca lakaa payaty anulia ca.
nmavastvanuleasaniritm ca svabhvaprajapti pratividhyati.
Yathbhtaparijna: Strlakra, XIX, 48-55; Bodh. bhmi, p. 53 (17) -55 (3); 294
(14 - 20); Abhidharmasamuccayavykhy, T 1616, k. XI, p. 475c20 seq.; Siddhi, p. 577
(nmaiegata yathbhta-parijnam, etc.).
For singleness, duality and multiplicity, see notes to chap. II, 11.
The example of the rope mistaken for a snake has already been encountered in chap. II,
16. See also Koa, VI, p. 258; Lakvatra, p. 327 (10); Madgyntavibhaga, p. 14 (6),
28 (17); Madh. vtti, p. 220 (8), 523 (1); Cittaviuddhiprakaraa, st. 68-69. - Example
also used by akara in comm. to Mdukyop., nandrama, p. 8: yasya
dvaitaprapacasyopaame dvaitapratipatt rajjvm iva sarpdivikalpopaame
rajjutatvaparipatti; p. 40: sarpdivikalpa-pratiedhenaiva rajjusvarpapratipattivat
avasthasyevtmanas tuyatvena pratipipdayiitatvt; comm. on the Brahmastras, I, 1,
4, p. 60: syd etad eva yadi rajjusvarparavaa iva arpabhrnti nivarteta. See also
O. Lacombe, LAbsolu selon le vednta, 1937, p. 209.
he would proceed to the complete negation of all reality by being unaware of the
interdependence of subject and object. The bodhisattva who has uninterruptedly practiced
the path of preparation attains, at the end of a first incalculable period, the stage of
knowledge that transcends the distinction between object and subject. Thus, thanks to this
notion of Concept-only, a concentration called 'heat' along with its retinue is brought
about, a realization of the nonexistence of matter, etc., the first stage in the supramundane
path. After that comes the concentration called 'the highest state'. Then come the
concentrations called 'patience' which, by non-perception of any object whatsoever,
furthers the non-perception of the subject. Then follows, along with its associates and
accompanied by wisdom, the concentration called 'the highest of worldly dharmas', a
concentration which, being based on the non-perception of objects, produces the nonperception of Concept-only as well. Immediately after this is the path of seeing; this is
where the bodhisattva, attaining the omnipresent fundamental element, penetrates into the
first bhmi.
A similar explanation will be found in the Bodhicaryvatra, IX, 33-35: Pajik, p. 414
seq.
11. Describes the daranamrga. This marks the beginning of the practice of the
bhmis, the beginning of dharmadhtuprativedha (cf. Madhyntavibhaga, p. 101 (11);
252-253), birth into the buddhagotra (cf. Bodh. bhmi, p. 78 (23)); Madhyntavibhaga,
p. 56 (3), 195 (15), the beginning of the nirvikalpajna here called the 'mind of
sameness' (samacitta) and in chap. X, 5, no. 5, the 'knowledge of equality'
(samatcitta).
That equality is one of the main characteristics of nirvikalapaka-jna comes under chap.
VIII, 5, where it is said that tathat, the shared nature of all dharmas, is the object of
nirvikalpakajna. This is why Triik, p. 43 (18), defines this knowledge as samam
anlambylambaka nirvikalpa lokottara jnam.
On samat, equality, samatjna, knowledge of equality, samatcitta, the mind of
equality or unified state of mind that considers all beings as equal universally, without
mind of attachment or aversion, see Abhinikramaastra, T 190, k. XXXIII, p. 805c; T
261, k. IX, p. 905a-c; Lakvatra, p. 147 (3 - 4), 168 (144) - 169 (3); Strlakra, IX,
70-71; Siddhi, p. 743 seq.; four samats, (akara, vk, kya, dharma) in Lakvatra, p.
141-142; four samats (sattva, dharma, bodhi, praj) in Sadhinir., VIII, v. 21; five
samats in Bodh. bhmi, p. 286 (11) and Strlakra, XIV, 30-31; ten samats in
Avatasak, T 279, k. XXX, p. 164b; k. XXXVI, p. 191b; k. XXXVII, p. 193c; in
Buddhabhmistrahstra, T 1530, k. V, p. 313c1.
Here the mind of equality concerns all beings, 1) because they are equally antmna (cf.
Madyntavibhaga, p. 100 (8-11): svaparasamat pratilabhate. yo ham sa paro ya v
para so ham iti paratrtmani ca nyaty abhedadarant svapartmani ca
nyaty adhedadaran at svapartmanor abheda manyate), 2) because all beings are
the tathgatagarbha, cf. Tathgatagarbhastra, T 666, p. 457c8; Adhyardhaarik, T 241,
k. I, p. 780b26; T 242, p. 783a11; Strlakra, IX, 37; Lakvarra where the the
tathgatagarbha, which is praktiprabhsvara, nitya, dhruva, iva, avata, dwells in the
body of all beings (sarvasattvadehntargata, p. 77 (16) has the name laya
(layavijnasaabdita, p. 220 (14) and transmigrates (sasrati, p. 242 (2)); E.
245
Obermiller, Doctrine of the P. P., p. 331, 32, 45, 99; Uttaratantra, p. 82, 89, 104, 108,
114; Siddhi, p. 30, 110, 754-757; Mahparnirvastra, in Hoernle, Maniscript Remains,
p. 94. - Concerning the ayasamat of the bodhisattvas and the dharmadhtusamat of
the Buddhas, see Strlakra, XIV, 30.
12. amatha-vipayan. In the Hnayna, Majjhima, I, p. 494; III, p. 289, 297;
Sayutta, IV, p. 194-195, 295, 350, 352; V, p. 52; Aguttara, II, p. 157;
Dhammasagani, p. 60; Lalitavistara, p. 35 (14-15) (amatha-vidaran); Dvya, p. 95;
Koa, V, p. 99; VI, 280, 301; VII, p. 21; VIII, p. 131, 146, 157. - In the Mahyna,
Sadhinir. VIII, v. 1-18; Bodhicaryvatrapakik, p. 344 (1); Strlakra, XVIII, 6668; Bodh. bhmi, p. 209(2) (.-v. pakya dhynam); p. 260 (1) -261 (5) (four kinds of
amatha); Madhyntavibhga, p. 151 (20), 214 (2), 215 (8), 272 (19); Siddhi, p. 334, 370,
383, 596; E. Obermiller, Doctrine of the P. P., p. 16, 17, 20, 27, 68.
Knowledge of mixed object (sasadharmlambana jnam): below, chap. VII, 4;
chap. VIII, 19, no. 3; Sadhinir. VIII, 13-16.
The ideas have been summarized by L. de la Valle Poussin in Siddhi, p. 597: After
reflecting (cintan), which is the discursive understanding of the Buddha's teaching,
amatha, which is linking the mind with the ineffable reality, enters into contact with
the true nature of the dharmas, dharmat; amatha makes vipayan possible. The mind,
perfumed by amatha, discerns and cognizes the dharmas according to dharmat,
according the the preceding cintan.
Example of the magician is developed at length in Sadhinir., I, 4; Aashasrik, p.
21.
246
247
CHAPTER IV
CAUSE AND RESULT OF ENTRY
(praveahetuphala)
At the time of the preparatory practice (prayoga), the cause (hetu) of entry into
Concept-Only (vijaptimtra) is the six mundane virtues (laukikapramit) ... By means
of these six virtues, the bodhisattva enters into Concept-Only. Having entered, he
acquires an excellent result (because they are supramundane) contained in the high pure
aspiration (udddhyaya).
Thus, even without exerting himself in practicing the six virtues, the bodhisattva
cultivates the six virtues in a continuous and uninterrupted way and reaches perfection.
Objection: If the bodhisattva does not make an effort to practice the virtue of morality, is
he not immoral (dula)? - This objection is not valid because the bodhisattva neglects
only the coarse effort (stlaprayoga). If he neglected every effort at morality, the
objection would be valid. But since he neglects only coarse effort, the objection is
invalid.
By his adherence to the teaching: even though the relative teaching on the six virtues is
very profound (gambhra), the bodhisattva has faith in it.
Reflection of acceptance (svdanmanasikra): this is to think of the virtues as
qualities. [Cf. u: pha rol tu phyin pa rnams la yon tan blta ba].
Reflection of approbation (anumodanmansikra): this is to rejoice (pramud-) in the
virtues located in one's own mental series (svasatna) or in the mental series of the
other beings (parasatna) in all the universes (lokadhtu) of the ten directions
(daadi).
Reflection of rejoicing (abhinandanmanasikra): this is to say 'In the future, I hope that
I and others will never abandon these virtues and will bring them to perfection.' (U)
249
250
(3) In the profound and vast doctrine of their vehicle ... : the object (lambana) of the
high aspiration is the profound and vast doctrine (ryadeana) of the Greater Vehicle. It
is profound (gambhra) because its object (artha) is subtle (skma): this is the nonexistence of self of dharmas (dharmanairtmya). It is vast (vipula) because it is endowed
with power (anubhvasaprayukta): these are the concentrations called 'embryo of
space' (gaganagarbhdisamdhi). (Cf. chap. VII, 3). Such is the object of the high
aspiration.
(4) They see only a simple concept: they understand that all dharmas are nothing but
concept (vikalpamtra): this is the reflection (manasikra).
(5) They acquire nonconceptual wisdom: this is the counteragent (pratipaka).
(6) Their zeal and adherence being pure, their aspiration is pure: such is the self-nature
(svabhva) of the high aspiration that has faith (raddh) and zeal (chanda) as selfnature. (U)
(7) Previously and at present, in the unfolding of the law they see the Buddhas.
Previously, i.e., prior to the purity of aspiration (prg ayaviuddhyavasthya); now,
i.e., during this purity of aspiration. They see the Buddhas: this is the prediction (liga).
In the unfolding of the law: i.e., in the state of absorption (sampattyavasth).
(8) Finally, the quality (gua) of the aspiration: they understand that enlightenment is
close, for they attain it without difficulty. In this state, they see that enlightenment (bodhi)
will soon be acquired. Using superior means (upya), they attain it without difficulty.
(Bh)
251
4. [Number of pramits]: Why are there only six pramits? - There are six
because they were established (i) to counteract the opposing vices
(vipakapratipakavyavasthita), (ii) because they are the source of acquiring all
the Buddha attributes (sarvabuddhadharmasamudgamapadasthna) and (iii)
because they promote the ripening of all beings (sarvasattva-paripknulomika).
(i) The virtues of generosity (dna) and morality (hla) counteract
(pratipaka) the causes of not setting out on the journey (aprasthnahetu),
which are attachment to pleasures (bhogasaga) and attachment to one's
family (ghasaga).
The virtues of patience (knti) and zeal (vrya) counteract the causes of
drawing back (vivartanahetu) after having set out. The causes of withdrawing
are the pain resulting from the bad treatment imposed on transmigrating
beings (sasrasattvamithypratipattyutpannadukha) and the fatigue
resulting from the long practice of the good (ciraklauklapakaprayogaparikheda).
The virtues of meditation (dhyna) and wisdom (praj) counteract the
causes of destruction (vipraahetu) after setting out and withdrawing. The
causes of destruction are distraction (vikepa) and false wisdom (dupraj).
Thus the virtues are established as six in number in order to counteract the
opposing vices.
(ii) Non-distraction (avikepahetu) in the virtues or the virtue of meditation
is ensured by the first four virtues, the causes of non-distraction. As a result
of this non-distraction, one understands completely and perfectly
(yathbhta-samyagavabodha) the reality of dharmas (dharmatattva): this is
the virtue of wisdom; thus one acquires (samudgama) the attributes of
Buddha. Since these virtues are the source (padasthna) of acquiring
(samudgama) all the attributes of Buddha, therefore they are are fixed in
number as six.
(iii) The virtue of generosity helps beings (sattvopakra), the virtue of
morality keeps them from being tormented (sattvnupaghta), the virtue of
252
liberates the
253
virtue, etc. These four alternatives apply in turn (yathyogam) to the other
virtues in the same way as to generosity. [144b17]
254
255
vi) It suppresses all erroneous views (digata) and all wrong knowledge
(dupraj); it understands dharmas correctly and in all ways (samyak
sarvao dharmn prajnti):
256
(c) By helping beings by means of the six virtues, the bodhisattva is more
joyful than the beings whom he has helped. It is not the same for the latter.
Such is the bodhisattva's joyful disposition (muditatara ca bodhisattvo
bhavati abhi pramitbhi
258
iii) Finally, the bodhisattva rejoices in seeing all beings cultivate the six
virtues contained in these six dispositions (sarvasattvn
apramitbhvan aayaparightm abhinandati) and wishes that he
himself will never abandon the development of these six virtues as long as he
is not seated on the throne of enlightenment (cf. H). This is how the
bodhisattva cultivates the contemplation of rejoicing
(abhinandanmanasikra) incorporated in the six virtues.
All who hear about the development of contemplation (manasikrabhvan)
by the bodhisattva - a development incorporated in the six dispositions - and
who produce a mind of faith (raddhcitta), acquire infinite merit
(apramapuya) and destroy all the obstacles of their wrong-doings
(duktvaraa). What then could be said of the bodhisattvas themselves?
[145a11]
Cultivation
prepratory
to
practice:
This
is
the
non-erroneous
practice
259
9. [Subdivisions of the pramits]. What are the subdivisions of these virtues? Each is of three types:
i) (1) Generosity of the Dharma (dharmadan), (2) material generosity
(miadna) and (3) generosity of safety (abhayadna).
ii) (1) Morality of abstention (savarala), (2) morality of collecting the
wholesome dharmas (kualadharmasagrhakala) and (3) morality for the
service of others (sattvrthakriyla).
iii) (1) Patience to bear abuse (apakramaraaknti), (2) patience to accept
suffering (dukhdhivsanknti) and (3) patience to contemplate the
Dharma (dharmanidhyna-kti).
iv) (1) Zeal with which to arm oneself (sanhavrya), (2) zeal to exert oneself
(prayogavrya) and (3) zeal without timidity, stepping back or satiety (aknam
akobhyam asatui vryam).
v) (1) Meditation of abiding (vihradhyna), (2) meditation of production
(abhinirhradhyna) and (3) meditation for the service of others
(sattvrthakriyadhyna).
260
Material
generosity
(miadna):
to
offer
vital
provisions
261
(3) Morality for the service of others (sattvrthakriyla): supporting the activity of
beings in conformity with the Dharma, sharing irreproachable actions equally
(niravadyakarma), it ripens (vipcayati) beings.
iii) (1) Patience to bear abuses (apahramaraaknti): the cause for the maturation of
beings (sattvavipkapravttihetu).
(2) Patience to accept suffering (dukhadhivsanknti): the cause for the quality of
Buddha because, without withdrawing, it bears the various sufferings, e.g., cold (ta),
heat (ua), hunger (bubhisk) thirst (pips). (3) Patience to contemplate the Dharma (dharmanidhynaknti): the basis (raya)
for the two preceding patiences. It is the patience with regard to the profound (gambhra)
and vast (vipula) Dharma.
iv) (1) Zeal to arm oneself (sanhavrya): at the beginning, one encourages oneself by
saying: "I am going to do something." This explains the first word of the stra (Dgha,
III, p. 237, etc.; commentary to Strlakra, XVI, 68), 'Sthmavn', i.e., vigorous.
(2) Zeal to exert oneself (prayogavrya): at the time of acting (prayoga), to develop the
effort conforming to aspirations (yathayam). This explains the next word of the stra,
'Vryavn', i.e., energetic.
(3) Zeal without timidity, stepping back or satiety (alnam akibhyam asatui vryam,
cf. Strlamkra, XVI, 68b): not to abandon the action undertaken in conformity with
one's aspirations until one sits on the throne of enlightenment ( bodhimaaniadant).
It is without timidity (alna) because it does not step back in the face of fatigue; it is
without withdrawal because its courage does not yield before the insults of another
(parpakra); it is insatiable (asatua) because in the interval leading up to
enlightenment, it energetically develops the wholesome (kualapakha) without yielding
to laziness (kausdya). These three expressions, respectively, explain the words of the
stra: 'Utshi ddhaparkramo anikiptadhura kualehu dharmeu', i.e, courageous,
firm in its march, not rejecting the the yoke of accomplishing wholesome dharmas.
v) (1) Meditation of abiding (vihradhyna): it aims at attaining a present fortunate abode
(dadharmasukhavihra). Free of pride (mna), wrong views (di) and thirst (t),
it is pure (uddha).
262
10. [Content of the pramits]. What is the content of these virtues (tsa
sagraha katha draavya)? - These virtues contain (saghanti) all the
wholesome dharmas (kualadharma) insofar as they have virtue as their nature
(lakaa); they promote (nulomika) the virtues and are their outcome
(niyanda). [145a21]
263
11. [Vices opposing the pramits]. How do the vices opposing (vipaka) the
virtues include (saghanti) all the defilements (saklea)? Insofar as they
have these vices as their nature (lakaa), that they are their cause (hetu) and
their fruit (phala). [145a23]
12. [Benefits of the pramits]. What are the benefits (anuasa) of these
virtues? - In the course of transmigration (sasra), the bodhisattvas take
possession (parighanti) of the following benefits: mastery (aivarya), high birth
(mahjanma), great entourage of followers and servants (mahpakaparijana),
successful efforts in a great work (mahkarmnte), absence of torment
(anupaghta) and the weak afflictions (mduklea), skill in the arts, letters and
classical sciences (ilpastra-vidysthnakaualya): this happiness (abhyudaya) is
impeccable (niravadya), lasts until the attainment of the throne of enlightenment
( bodhimaaniadant), is devoted to the service of all beings
(sarvasattvrthakriyopasthita); it consitutes the benefits of the bodhisattvas.
{145b1]a
264
Skill
in
the
arts,
letters
and
classical
sciences
they
last
until
the
attainment
of
the
throne
of
enlightenment
by the name of zeal (vrya), sometimes by the name of meditation (dhyna) and
sometimes by the name of wisdom (praj). What was his intention (sadhi)? He wanted to say that, in the practice (prayoga) of each virtue, there is the
intervention of all the virtues. [145b8]
266
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
Preliminary Note.
References on the pramits:
In the Hnayna: dasa pramyo, Jtaka, I, p. 73 (32); Cariypiaka, collection of short
tales illustrating the seven pramit, trans. B. C. Law, Anthologies of the Pli Canon, III,
1938, p. 95 sq.; R. C. Childers, Dict of Pli, s.v. pram, p. 334 sq.; B. C. Law, Concepts
of Buddhism, 1938, p. 5; Mahvastu (with many examples from the Jtakas), III, p. 226
(2) seq.; Lalitavisatara, p. 2 (5), 8 (2), 34 (29) seq., 274 (21), 414 (19), 427 (17), 435
(10).; numerous examples of the virtues in Jtakaml, Avadnaataka,
Avadnakalpalat; Divya, p. 95, 127, 490; Koa, IV, p. 11, 231; VIII, p. 78, 82.
In the Mahyna: Mahvyut. 913-924; Dharmasagraha, XVII, XVIII;
Pacaviatisahasrik (ed. N. Dutt), p. 187-190; Saddharmapuarka, p. 17 seq., 142,
256, 259, 264, 332, etc.; Daabhmika, p. 63, 72, 81, 04; Bhadramykra, p. 80. 94,
103; Lakvatra, p. 236 seq.; Sadhinir. IX, v. 9-27 (lengthy developments of the first
six p., of the last four p., order, subdivisions, name, opposing vices, retribution, defiled
p., viuddhi shared and special to the p., permanence, vipkaphala, prabhva, hetu, phala
and artha, nisvabhva and p., pramit, upapramit and mahpramita); Madh.
avatra (treats one p. by means of bhmi); iksam. p. 187 et passim; Bodhicaryvatra
and Pajik entire; Strlakra, XVI (with the same subdivisions as the Sagraha),
Bodh. bhmi, p. 114-216; Abhidharmasamuccayavykhy, T 1606, k. XI and XII, p.
746c17 seq.; Madhyntavibhaga, p. 205-208; Siddhi, p. 620-638.
***
1. We must distinguish: the cause of entry, namely the improperly-called mundane
pramits, practiced prior to abhisamaya, before the bhmis; the fruit of entry, namely
the properly-called virtues of the supramundane (lokottara) state, purified by means of
nirvikalpakajna and cultivated in the bhmis. On this subject:
Bodhicaryvatrapajika, p. 345 (8-10): evam ete dndayasatktya sabht api
prajam antarea na saugatapapdhigamahetavo bhavanti n api pramitvyadea
labhante. prajakrtapariuddhobhja puar avyhatodrapravttitay tadankala,
anuvartamns taddhetubhvam adhigacchanti. pramitnmadhheya ca labhante.
Madhyntavibhaga, p. 204 (22): prathamy bhmau dharmadhto
sarvatragatvbodhl lokoyyat pramit pratilabhante. prvm tu
prathamabhuiprayogasaght laukik evety ata prathamy bhmau
pratilambhaparamatety ucyate.
Comm. on Nmasagti, cited in Siddhi, p. 627: ete dndaya sabodhicittaprvak
sarvasattveu maitrayapariamit pramitnma labhante. t punar laukik
lokottar ca. tatrnivrittmadyupalambh laukik. skandhdiv
antmdyadhimokapravtts tattvdhigama-paribhvit ca. - See also Madh. avatra,
p. 30-31. Also the distinction between upapramit and pramit in Sadhinir. IX, v. 27;
Lakvatra, p. 236-237; Siddhi, p. 637.
267
2. Each supramundane virtue is itself incorporated into the excellent pure proclivity:
uddhdhyaya. This proclivity is a quality of the bodhisattva in the first seven bhmis
(Strlakra, IV, 2). The bodhisattva who possesses it is madhyapka (Bodh. bhmi, p.
86 (5)). It is of five types (Strlakra, XX, 6) or of fifteen types (Bodh. bhmi, p. 313
(7) sq.). It constitutes the sixth paramat of the pramits (below, 5). It is essentially
altruistic (sarvasattvahitasukhdhyaya).
4. The number of the p. is fixed at six for many reasons: Sadhinir., IX, v. 9, no. 4 (two
reasons); Strlakra, XVI, 2-7 (six reasons: asakleam avipartaktyrambha
cdhiktya, parrtham tmrtham crabhya, sakalaparrthdhikrat,
samastamahyanasagrahdhikar at, sarvkramrgdhikrt, iktraya adhiktya);
Siddhi, p. 627 (four reasons).
5. Paragraph reproduced textually, with the indication of its author (ity rysaga), by
Haribadhadra in his Abhisamaylakrloka, ed. Wogihara, p. 245 (23). It is a question
of the six excellences (paramat) of the p.
The fourth paramat, upyakaualya, has the effect of making the p. triply pure
(trimaalapariuddhaka) by incorporarting them into the nirvikalpakajna. Thus the
generosity of the bodhisattva is triply pure because he makes no distinction between the
gift given (deya), the donor (dyaka) and the recipient (pratigrhaka). On
trimaalapariuddhi or trikoiuddhi, cf. Mahvyut., 2547: atashasrik P.P., p. 92 (5)
- 93 (1); Pacaviatishasrik, p. 264 (16-22); Bodhicaryvatra, IX, st. 168; Sapajik, p. 604 (5-6); Uttaratantra, p. 120, 254; Siddhi, p. 629 n.; Sagraha, below,
chap. VII, 9, no. 1. - Cf. Koa, IV, p. 234-238.
Siddhi, p. 626, has seven paramats instead of six: pratih-, raya-, adhyaya-,
vastu-, upyakaualya-, parima-, pariuddhi-. Cf. the seven paramats of the Param
bodhi, Bodh. bhmi, p. 89 (12).
Twelve paramats in Madhyntavibhaga, p. 202-209: audrya-, yatatva-, adhikra-,
nairantyarya-, akcchratva-, vittatva-, parigraha-, rambha-, pratilambha-, niyanda,
nipatti-.
6. Order of the p.: Sadhinir., IX, v. 11; Strlakra, XVI, 214;
Abhidharmasamuccayavykhy, T 1606, k. XI, p. 747b26; Siddhi, p. 628.
7. Etymology of the p.: Koa, IV, p. 231; Madh. avatra, p. 30; Sadhinir., IX, v. 13;
Strlakra, XVI, 15; Abhidharma-samuccayavykhy, T 1606, k. XI, p. 747c21 seq.;
Siddhi, p. 628. F. W. Thomas, JRAS, 1904, p. 547.
8. Cultivation of the p. Two theories presenting some differences: on the one hand, the
Sagraha, on the other hand the Strlakra, XVI, 16, the
Abhidharmasamuccayavykhy, T 1606, k. XII, p. 748b21 seq. and Siddhi, p. 629. The
Strlakra distinguishes:
268
269
Excluding any error, the Triatik P.P. cited here by the Bya, cannot be found either in
the original or in Chinese or Tibetan translation. It is mentioned in Mahvyut. no. 1374
and in the Nmasagiti, cf. P. Vaidya, tudes sur ryadeva et son Catuataka, 1923, p.
44.
270
CHAPTER V
THE VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTS OF CAUSE AND FRUIT
(hetuphalabhvanaprababheda)
1. A) In Chapter IV the cause and result of entry into the characteristics of the
knowable (jeyalakaapraveahetuphala) has been explained. How should the
diverse cultivations (bhvanprabrabheda) of this cause and fruit be understood?
- As the ten stages (bhmi) of the bodhisattva. What are they?
i) Pramudit bhmi, the joyous level.
ii) Vimal bhmi, the stainless level.
iii) Prabhkar bhmi, the shining level.
iv) Arcimat bhmi, the blazing-wisdom level.
v) Sudurjay bhmi, the difficult to conquer level.
vi) Abhimukh bhmi, the revealed level.
vii) Dragam bhmi, the far-gone level.
viii) Acal bhmi, the immovable level.
ix) Sdhumat bhmi, the excellent-intelligence level
x) Dharmamegh bhmi, the cloud of Dharma level.
B) Why is their number fixed as ten? - Because they counteract (pratipaka) the
ten opposing (vipaka) kinds of ignorance (avidy). In fact, ten kinds of ignorance
arise opposing the tenfold dharmadhtu that is to be known (daavidha
jeyadharmadhtu).
What is the tenfold dharmadhtu that is to be known?
i) In the fist bhmi, the dharmadhtu should be known as universal reality
(sarvatragrtha).
271
272
273
In Tibetan, these ten obstacle-ignorances are: (1) so soi skye bo id; (2) bden pa la lus
la sogs pas phyin ci log tu sgrub pa; (3) bul ba id; (4) ons mos pa phra ba kun tu rgyi
ba; (5) theg pa dman pas mya an las da ba; (6) mtshan ma rgya chen po la kun tu
spyod pa: (7) mtshan ma phra mo la kun tu spyod pa; (8) mtshan ma med par mon par
du byed pa; (9) sems can gyi don byed pa la mon par du byed pa med pa; (10) thob
par byad bai chos la gtso bor bya med pa].
(i) Sarvatragrtha: this dharmadhtu of the first bhmi is omnipresent because there is
no dharma that is non-substantial (antman). The person who knows this enters into the
first bhmi.
(ii) Agrrtha: this dharmadhtu of the second bhmi is excellent in all its qualities. The
person who knows this enters into the second bhmi.
(iii) Niyandrtha: The doctrine (dean) of the Greater Vehicle which follows from this
dharmadhtu of the third bhmi is excellent. The person who knows this enters into the
third bhmi.
(iv) Aparigrahrtha: this dharmadhtu of the fourth bhmi cannot be conceived of as
'mine' (tmiya) or taken as one's own; it is like an individual from Uttarakuru who cannot
be imprisoned. When one attains (adhigama) this dharmadhtu, one cannot say "It is
mine." The person who knows this enters into the fourth bhmi.
(v) Satnbhinnrtha: in this dharmadhtu of the fifth bhmi there is no difference in
nature; it is like the eye, etc., which, in the various series of beings (sattvasatnaviea)
separately, shows no differences. The person who knows this enters into the fifth bhmi.
(vi) Nisakleaviuddhyartha: in this dharmadhtu of the sixth bhmi there is no
defilement from the beginning because it is naturally nondefiled (aklia). Since it is not
at first defiled, it is not later purified. The person who knows this enters into the sixth
bhmi.
(vii) Anntvrtha: although the texts, stras, etc., (strdhidharma) may have given all
kinds of definitions (vyavasthna) for this dharmadhtu of the seventh bhmi,
nevertheless, it is without differences. The person who knows this enters into the seventh
bhmi.
274
(viii) Anapacayopacayrtha: this dharmadhtu of the eighth bhmi does not diminish
when the defilement (saklea) decreases and does not increase when the purity
(viuddhi) increases. Nimittavaitrayrtha: this dharmadhtu is the support of the
mastery over characteristics. The mastery over characteristics that is obtained is called
mastery of marks because the characteristics of gold, silver, etc., appear at will
(yathkmam). - Ketravaitrayrtha: this dharmadhtu is the support of mastery of the
buddhafields. The mastery which one obtains over the buddhafields is called mastery in
ketra: if one wishes that the ketra be transformed into jewels, etc., it occurs as one
wishes (cf. chapter I, v. 60; chapter II, 14). The person who knows this enters into the
eighth bhmi.
(ix) Jnavaitrayrtha: this dharmadhtu of the ninth bhmi is the support of the
mastery of analytical knowledge (pratisavid). [According to U: one realizes the virtue
of knowledge (jnapramit); with regard to all texts, one does not stick to them
literally (yathrutam) but one grasps the hidden meaning (abhisadhi); one ripens all
beings correctly and one experiences the supreme happiness of the Dharma.] The person
who knows this enters into the ninth bhmi.
(x) Karmavaitrayrtha: this dharmadhtu of the tenth bhmi is the support of the
mastery of action, physical activities, etc. (kyadikarman), and the support of the mastery
of dhrai- and samdhi-mukha. The person who knows this enters into the tenth bhmi.
These ignorances are undefiled in the rvakas, because they do not wish to enter into
the bhmis. (Bh)
2. i) Why is the first bhmi called Joyous (pramudit)? Because, thanks to it, for
the first
time (prathamata eva) one obtains for the first time the faculty
immorality (daulyamala).
iii) Why is the third bhmi called Shining (prabhkar)? Because, with the
immutable (acyuta) meditative stabilizations (samdhi) and absorptions
275
276
moment of full realization, obtain only the faculty of ensuring their own personal interest,
do not experience such joy; that is why there is no question of the Joyous bhmi for
them. If this joy is absent in the first bhmi, it will be absent also in the following
bhmis, because it is the first (prvagama).
ii) Vimal, Stainless, because it avoids the stains of immorality. In this bhmi, since
morality is present naturally (prakty), it avoids all the stains of immorality.
iii) Prabhkar, Shining, because with the meditative stabilizations and absorptions as
support ... In this bhmi extraordinary (adbhuta) meditative stabilizations are evidenced,
the brilliance of knowledge (jnaprabh) shines forth. Because it illumines the
dharmas, it is called blazing (prabhkar). That which does not perish after having been
obtained is called immutable (acyuta). The meditative stabilizations of the order of
concentration (dhyna) are called 'samdhi', the meditative stabilizations of the formless
realm (rupya) are called 'sampatti'. Or rather, samdhi is the one-ponted fixing of the
mind (cittaikgrat) and sampatti is the concentration (samdhna), the realization
(sktkra). This bhmi is the support of the great brilliance of the Dharma: on this
bhmi, the bodhisattvas are endowed with concentrations and, because they do not lose
them, they obtain the brilliance of knowledge (jnaprabh) of the dharmas of the
Greater Vehicle, stras, etc. Being the causal support (rayahetu), this bhmi is called
shining.
iv) Arcimat, Blazing Wisdom. Since the fire (arcis) of wisdom (mati = praj) occurs
on this bhmi, it is called the bhmi of blazing wisdom. In this expression, all the
auxiliary dharmas of enlightenment (bodhipakyadharma) are called 'fire' (arcis) because
they burn away the obstacles (varaa). When these auxiliaries of enlightenment are
abundant, the defilements (klea) are entirely consumed.
v) Sudurjay, Difficult to Conquer. The knowledge of the absolute truth
(paramrthasatyajna) is free of concepts (nirvikalpa); mundane knowledge
(laukikajna) which deals with writing (lipi), gestures (mudr), crafts (ilpa), sciences
(stra), etc., is conceptual (savikalpa). As the knowledge of absolute truth
(paramrthasatya) and the knowledge of contingent truth (savtisatya) are in
opposition (viruddha), it is difficult to produce them by bringing them together. This
277
bhmi, which joins them so that they do not contradict each other in any way, is very
difficult to overcome.
vi) Abhimukh, the Revealed bhmi, because the supreme virtue of wisdom
(prajpramit) is present here (abhimukh). In this bhmi, the absorption on dependent
origination (prattyasamutpdavihra) is attained (adhigama); the power of the
knowledge bearing on dependent origination (prattyasamutpdajna) makes the virtue
of wisdom, nonconceptual (nirvikalpa) and supreme (anuttar), manifest in its
sovereignty. One knows that all dharmas are neither defiled (saklia) nor purified
(viuddha).
vii) Dragam, the Far-Gone bhmi, because it reaches the limit of the exertion of
effort. In this bhmi the exertion of effort (prayogik cary)) is complete (paripr). But
even though all the marks (nimitta) of the dharmas are immobilized (acala, nijya),
there is still effort (bhoga) in the signless (animitta).
viii) Acal, the Immovable, because all the marks (nimitta) and all the practices of will
(abhisaskaraa) cease to disturb the mind. In this seventh bhmi, one is no longer
disturbed by any notion (nimitta) because all notions are no longer active (asamudcrt,
but that does not take place easily or spontaneously (svarasena) because one no longer
strives (prayoga). In the eighth bhumi, since there is no further striving, there is no more
bhoga. This is the difference between the seventh and the eighth bhmis.
ix) Sdhumati, Excellent Intelligence, because it attains the four liberated higher
knowledges (pratisavid) (cf. chap. X, 14). The knowledge of the pratisavids is the
best of all the knowledges. This knowledge is wisdom (mati = praj), hence the name
'sdhumat'. The four pratisavids are those of the Dharma, of meaning (artha), of
etymology (nirukti) and of prophecy (pratibhna). By means of dharmapratisavid, one
completely knows (abhijna) the phrases (pada) of all the texts (dharma); by
arthapratisavid, one completely penetrates (prativedha) the value (naya, vidhi) of every
meaning (artha); by niruktipratisavid, one completely discerns (pravicaya) all
languages (ghoa); by pratibhnapratisavid, one can preach the Dharma in all ten
directions as is needed (yathyogam). Because in this bhmi one acquires for the first
time the knowledge of the pratisavids not yet acquired, it is called the bhmi of
excellent intelligence.
278
279
the
fundamental element has been penetrated in the first bhmi: When one has completely
understood (samyagavabodha, pratipatti) the first bhmi, one quickly penetrates all the
following bhmis. A stanza says: When the first knot of bamboo is broken (veusadhi),
the other knots are quickly broken; in the same way, if one acquires correct knowledge of
the first bhmi, the others bhmis will be quickly gained. (U)
iv) By acquiring the achievement, by reaching the summit of development of these
bhmis: when one has cultivated the bhmis, one reaches the summit. (Bh)
The commentary to Strlakra XX-XXI, 41, is even more precise: caturvidho
bhmn lbdha / adhimuktilbho yathoktdhimuktito 'dhimukticarybhmau /
caritalbho
daau
dharmacariteu
vartant
tasym
eva
paramrthalbha
280
281
iii) Although there may be cultivation of the signless, there could be effort (bhoga). In
order to show that this cultivation does not require effort (bhoga) and functions
spontaneously (svarasena), the author then says: effortless cultivation, because it
functions spontaneously beyond any effort.
iv) Although the cultivation may occur without effort and spontaneously, it may
eventually be superior (vara) or inferior (avara). That is why the author adds: intensive
cultivation, intensive meaning 'strong' (adhimtra).
v) Although the cultivations may be intensive, one might feel satisfied after a minor
result (satui) and say to oneself: "I have practiced everything, why should I do
anything else?" - That is why the author adds finally: insatiable cultivation. Signless,
effortless and intensive cultivation are not enough. Why? Because in order to attain
buddhahood, it is necessary to practice zealously.
* * *
(1) At each moment the bodhisattva melts away the support of all the weaknesses. The
store-consciousness
(layavijna)
is
called
support
of
the
weaknesses
practices (cary), he is called the brilliance of the law. He is like the light derived from
the study (svadhyana) of a text (grantha).
(4) The signs, auxiliaries of purity, non-fabricated, manifest in him. The future
buddhahood (buddhat) is called purity. The marks that bring it along are called
auxiliaries of purity. These unfabricated marks manifest in him like the white parasol
(sitachattra), etc., of a Buddha or a cakravartin.
(5) For the fulfillment and the attainment of dharmadhtu, he makes use of the ever most
perfect cause. The tenth bhmi is called fulfillment (paripri) of the dharmadhtu;
abiding in the Buddha bhmi is called attainment (parinipatti) of the dharmadhtu. The
cause that produces this bhmi of the Buddha, being excellent (bahvantaraviia), is
called the perfect (uttara) cause. Being an accumulation (upacaya) of earlier causes, it is
called the ever most perfect (uttard uttaratara).
These five cultivations (bhvan) in the appropriate order (yathkramamam) produce
these five results (phala). (U)
5. As the main statement (pradhnata), ten virtues are cultivated in the ten
bhmis, one main virtue for each bhmi. In the first six bhmis the six virtues,
referred to in chapter IV, 1, are practiced; on the last four bhmis, the four
following virtues:
i) The virtue of skill in means (upyakaualyapramit). Sharing amongst all
beings the roots of good accumulated by the six virtues, they are applied to
supreme perfect enlightenment (atpramitopacitakualamlni
sarvasattvasdhrani ktv anuttary samyaksabodhau parimayati).
ii) The virtue of vow (praidhnapramit). By formulating various vows
(nnpraidhnny abhinirvtya), one unites (saghti) the causes
(pratyaya) of the virtues for a later time (amutra, yatym) .
iii) The virtue of power (balapramit). The six virtues are ceaselessly active
(satata samudcatanti) by the power of contemplation (pratisakhyna) and
of meditation (bhvan) (cf. Aguttara, I, p. 52).
283
284
(praj),
is
only
fundamental
nonconceptual
knowledge
(mlanirvikalpakajna); if six virtues are posited, the sixth (or wisdom) gives rise
285
6. How long a time (kiyatklam) does it take to reach the completion of the
development (bhvanparipri) of the ten bhmis? - Five individuals (pudgala)
reach the completion (paripri) after three incalculable periods
(kalpsakhyeya). (Cf. Strlakra), XIX, 63).
The person who adheres to the Dharma (dhimokika pudgala) reaches the
completion of his development after the first incalculable period. The person
who is
courses in the signs (nimittacrin) during the first six bhmis or whether he
courses in the signless (animittacrin) during the seventh, reaches the completion
of his development after the second incalculable period. Finally, the person who
courses in spontaneous activity (anabhisaskracrin) comes to the completion
of his development after the third incalculable period, going from the eighth to
the tenth bhmi.
Here is a stanza:
When he is endowed with pure strength (ubhabala) and with excellent
power (praihitabala), when he is of strong mind (dhacitta) and of
advancing progress (vieagamana), it is said that the bodhisattva
energetically cultivates the three incalculable periods. {146b4]
[Addition by Paramrtha]:
The bodhisattva career may require seven or thirty-seven incalculable
periods. What are the seven asakhyeyakalpas? Prior to the bhmis, there are
three; during the
to six based on equanimity (upek), the asakhyeya of bhmis seven and eight
based on pacification (vyupaama ?) and the asakhyeya of bhmis nine and ten
based on wisdom (praj).
What are the thirty-seven asakhyeyas? The three asakhyeyas of the
upyabhmi: the asakhyeya of the raddhcary, the asakhyeya of the
udyogacary (?) and the asakhyeya of ts'iu hiang hing (pratipdanachary ?).
Then three asakhyeyas for each of the ten bhmis, entrance, abiding and
emerging. These are the asakhyeyas necessary to arrive at completion (paripri)
of the development of the ten bhmis.
The
uddhdhyayika:
he
has
obtained
the
excellent
pure
proclivity
(uddhdhyaya) and zealously cultivates the practices. When he abides on the first six
bhmis, he is called nimittacrin; when he abides on the seventh bhmi, he is called
animittacrin. These two types of individuals reach the completion of their development
after the second incalculable period.
iii) The person who is above that, from the eighth to the tenth bhmi, is called
anabhisaskracrin. He reaches completion of his development after the third
287
NOTES TO CHAPTER V
Preliminary Note:
References to the bhmis or levels:
288
289
Milinda, p. 97; Visuddhimagga, p. 164, 325, 354; Mahvastu, II, p. 358 (7), 360 (9), 550
n.; Koa, II, p. 154; III, p. 200; VI, p. 154; VII, p. 88, 90; VIII, p. 148; Abhis. al. l., p.
102 (17), 125 (16); Daabhmika, p. 64, 67; Sadhinir., IX, v. 4. 5; Lakvatra
(anbhoga), p. 42 (8), 161 (1),
181 (1), 266 (8), 299 (2), 351 (5); Madh. vti, p. 335 n.; ikasam., p. 267, 271; Bodh.
bhmi, p. 88 (22), 346 (14), 350 (12); Madhyntavibhaga, p. 98 (7), etc.; Triik, p.
20 (12), 28 (5); Siddhi, p. 146, 335, 616-617.
290
Three asakhyeyas: Koa, III, p. 188; IV, p. 224; Strlakra, XIX, 64; Bodh, bhmi,
p. 255 (15)-356 (2).
Four asakhyeyas and one hundred kalpas: Pi sources, Cariypiaka, I, p. 1; Jtaka, I,
p. 2; Aguttara, II, p. 142; Milinda, p. 232, 289.
Seven asakhyeyas: Lalitavistara, p. 10 (4), Madh, vtti, p. 321(4).
Ten asakhyeyas: Nikyabheda of Vintadeva, Tg. Mdo XC. Thirty-three asakhyeyas:
Sagraha, Paramrtha version.
Three, seven or thirty-three asakhyeyas: Abhis. al. l., p. 988 (14) sq.
291
CHAPTER VI
THE OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT MORALITY
(adhila ik)
1. The various cultivations (bhvanprabheda) of the cause (hetu) and the result
(phala) have been explained. How should the superiority (viea) of excellent
morality (adhila) be conceived? - As it is said in the Bodisattvabhmi, in the
chapter on Acceptance of the Bodhisattva Discipline
(bodhisattvasavarasamdna). In brief (samsata), it is superior because of
four superiorities (viea):
i) superiority of types (prabhedaviea),
ii) superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules
(sdhrasdhraaikhviea),
iii) superiority of extent (vaipulyaviea),
iv) superiority of depth (gmbhryaviea). [146b10]
As it is said in the
292
293
i) The rule (ika) of the bodhisattvas is shared (sdhraa) with the rvakas
insofar as it is forbidden to the bodhisattvas to commit (samudcar-) natural
(praktisvadya) wrongdoings.
ii) The rule of the bodhisattvas differs (asdhraa) from that of the rvakas
insofar as the bodhisattvas can commit wrongdoings of disobedience
(pratikepaasvadya). According to this latter rule, there where the rvaka
commits a wrongdoing (patti), the bodhisattva does not; there where the
bodhisattva commits a wrongdoing, the rvaka does not.
iii) The morality (la) of the bodhisattva is on the physical (kyayika), vocal
(vcika) and mental (mnasa) levels; that of the rvakas extends only to the
physical and vocal levels. For this very reason, the bodhisattva commits
wrongdoings of mind (cittpatti) whereas the rvaka does not.
In summary (samsata), the bodhisattva can accomplish (samudcar-) and
observe (ik-) any physical, vocal or mental action (kyavgmanaskarma)
favorable to beings (sattvopakraka) provided that he is blameless (niravadya).
This is how the superiority consisting of shared and unshared rules is to be
conceived. [146b23]
294
wrongdoing. [According to bh: an thos kyi ltu bar gyur ba de la bya chub sems
dpai ltu ba med do es bya ba ni ji ltar dbyar gyi na du an thos rnams so bar gyur
na ltu ba yin no / sems can gyi don mtho la ma so na bya chub sems dpa rnams kyi
ltu ba yin la / so na ni ltu ba med do.]
iii) For this very reason, the bodhisattva commits wrondoings of mind whereas the
rvaka does not: they are guilty only of inwardly producing bad thoughts of desire
(kma),of killing (vypda), etc., even without arousing (samutth-) actions of body or
speech following these thoughts.
In summary, the bodhisattva can accomplish and observe any physical, vocal or mental
action favorable to beings, provided that he is blameless, i.e., any action that ensures the
welfare (hita) and happiness (sukha) of beings, without thereby arousing (samutth-) the
passions, lust, etc. (rgdiklea) in himself or in others. The bodhisattva is able to
accomplish all these acts. (U) It may happen that, while favoring beings, the action is
not blameless; for example, having illicit sex with a woman belonging to someone else.
To avoid this type of action, the author says: provided that he is blameless. (Bh)
295
ii) Scope consisting of increase of immense merits: the bodhisattvas gain an immense
accumulation of merit (puyasabhra). This is lacking in the rvakas.
iii) Scope consisting of increase of inclinations to work for the benefit and happiness of
all beiongs: encouraging beings to practice the wholesome is called 'inclination to work
for the benefit' (hitakriyaya); wishing that a certain person (pudgala), by means of this
benefit, will gain a higher fruit is called 'inclination to work for the happimness'
(sukhakriyaya).
iv) Scope consisting of establishing supreme complete enlightenment: by this morality the
bodhisattvas establish supreme perfect enlightenment. This is lacking in the rvakas.
(Bh)
296
prabhtn
rvakapratyekabuddhabodhisattvn
priatn
mahtman
vadhyodyatam
miakicitkaheto
the rle which the bodhisattva is playing, ceaselessly reproduces in his governing the
actions of Sudhanakumra (see Notes ).
iii) Manifesting all kinds of jtakas: e.g., the Vivantarajtaka where the Bodhisattva
gives his son and daughter to the brahmin (see Notes). This is a matter of a fabricated
action (nirma). He causes torment to some beings and grants his favors to others: in
the final analysis, bodhisattvas do not torment some and favor others [cf. chap. X, 36,
commentary]. This is what is called superiority in depth. (Bh)
we
have
spoken
of
the
four
kinds
of
superiorities.
But
in
the
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI
Preliminary Note:
Chapters VI to VIII are dedicated to the three iks, well-known in the Pi sources. Cf.
tisso sikkh, Sayutta, III, p. 83; Paisambhid, I, p. 46 seq.; Milinda, p. 133, 237;
Mahniddesa, p. 39; explained as adhisla-, adhicitta-, and adhipaa-sikkh, Aguttara,
I, p. 234 seq; Nettippakaraa, p. 126; with the synonyms samvara, samdhi and pa,
Visuddhimagga, p. 274; P. V. Bapat, Vimuyyimagga and Visuddhomagga, 1937, p. 70. Sanskrit sources in Koa, VI, p. 225, 230-231; VIII, p. 130.
***
For la, morality, in the Pli sources, see references in Davids-Stede, Pli Dictionary.
For la in the Mahyana, bodhisattvala, see ikasamuccaya with many stra
references; Bodhicaryvatra and Pajik, dikarmapradpa in L. de La Valle Poussin,
Bouddhisme, tudes et materiaux, 1898, p. 186 sq.; Bodh. bhmi, lapaala, p. 137-188;
298
299
300
CHAPTER VII
OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT MIND
(adhicitta ik)
301
doctrine
of
the
Greater
Vehicle,
i.e.,
the
profound
and
vast
302
is the chief one of all the samdhis. By means of its presence, the Buddha Bhagavats of
the present time (pratyutpannakla) and of the ten directions (daadi) are seen face to
face (abhimukha). - The ragama is the best (vara) of the samdhis; like a hero (ra),
the head of the army (akauhipati) in the midst of his soldiers (kaaka), he is able to cut
the troops of Mra to pieces (pramardana).
up
(prabhvita)
of
the
nature
common
to
all
dharmas
303
304
3) illuminating (spharaa),
4) making visible (vidarana),
5) transforming (anyathbhvakaraa),
6) going and coming (gaman),
7) concentrating and developing (sakepaprathana),
8) introducing all rpa into his body (sarvarpakyapraveana),
9) taking on the ways of those whom he meets (sabhgatopasakrnti),
10) appearing and disappearing (virbhvatirobhva),
11) subjugating to his will (vaitvakaraa),
12) subduing the magical power of others (paraddhyabhibhava),
13) giving the light of intellect (pratibhdna),
14) giving memory (smtidna),
15) giving bliss (sukhadna),
16) emitting light rays (ramipramoka). [146c26]
305
306
16) ramipramoka.- He emits rays of light that pacify (pratiprarabh-) the sufferings
of hell beings, summon the Buddhas and bodhisattvas ... in a word, realize the benefit
(artha) of creatures.
307
308
309
vi) When his mind for generosity is without solidity. The word asra has as its evident
meaning (hien mou), 'solidity', and as its hidden meaning (abhisadhi), 'distraction'
(vikepa). [For sra and asra, cf. chap. II, 31]. Taken in its hidden meaning, the
phrase means that the bodhisattva practices generosity with a mind free of distraction
(avikiptasaj), i.e., in samdhi or mind concentration (cittasamdhna).
vii) When he produces avarice. The word utpa- has as its obvious meaning 'to produce'
(samutpda) and as its hidden meaning 'to eradicate' (utpa- = unmlana). Taken in its
hidden meaning, the phrase means that the bodhisattva practices generosity by
suppressing (samudghta) avarice.
viii) When he does not quit at the end. Not like the rvakas who have tranquility as the
one vehicle (amathaikaynika, cf Sadhinir. VII, 15, p. 74), the bodhisattva does not
stop at the end, at nirva-without-residue (nirvikalpadhieanirva). [This point is
developed in chap. IX, 1].
ix) When he has no sovereignty over generosity, i.e., when avarice (mtsarya) and the
other vices opposing generosity (dnavipaka) do not dominate him.
x) When he is not fixed in the indestructible. Having arrived at perfection (sapad), at
indestructible sovereignty (akaydhipya), at definitive buddhahood (tyantikabuddhat),
the bodhisattva is not fixed there. How is that? Creating fabricated (nirma) bodies in
the interests of others (parrtha), he continues to practice generosity.
What has been said about generosity should be applied likewise to the other virtues from
morality to wisdom. That applies to the other five virtues. Thus a stra says: How does
the bodhisattva have morality (la)? When he observes no discipline. This means that the
bodhisattva sees the identity of himself and others. Also when the others observe pure
discipline, the bodhisattva is himself endowed with morality. (U)
10. [Here is another example of enigmatic language where the technical expressions
must be taken in their etymological sense. In order to find the term explained
etymologically, just join up the letters printed in roman letters, i.e. those not
italicized].
i) How is the bodhisattva the killer of living beings (pratiptin)? When he
takes beings out of transmigration (yadi prina sarato 'tiptayati).
311
ii) How is he the thief who takes what has not been given (adattdyin)?
When, without anyone having given him anything, he appropriates to himself
all beings (yady adattam apy tman sarvattvn dadti)
iii) How does he misbehave in love (kmamithycrin)? When he acts by
saying that all love is bad (yadi km mithy iti carati).
iv) How is he a teller of lies (mvadin)? When he calls a lie a lie (yadi ma
mam iti vadati).
v) How is he a slanderer (painyavdin)? When he always abides in the
supreme dwelling of emptiness (yadi parame nyavihre nitya viharati).
vi) How does he have harmful speech (pruyavdin)? When he is on the
other bank of knowledge (yadi jeyaprauita).
vii) How does he have thoughtless speech (sabhinna-pralpin)? When he
preaches the Dharma by analysing dharmas correctly (yadi sarvadharmn
sabhidya pralapati).
viii) How is he full of envy (sa-abhidhy)? When he attains supreme dhyna
many times (yady abhkam auttara dhyna pratilabhate).
ix) How is he full of wickedness (sa-vypda)? When he suppresses all the
defects of his mind (yadi sarvacittaklen vypdayati).
x) How is he full of wrong views (sa-mithydi)? When he shows clearly the
omnipresent falsehood (yadi sarvatraga mithytva yathbhta
darayati). [147b5]
312
ii) When, without anyone giving him something, he appropriates beings. Without
someone inviting him (udyuj-), he personally takes on (dadti) the interests of the other
person (parrtha).
iii) When he acts knowing that all love is bad. He knows full well (yathbhta
prajnati) that love of sensate objects (viayakma) and love of imaginary things
(parikalpakma ?) are depraved. A stanza says: The Buddha has said that desire (rga),
hatred (dvea) and ignorance (moha) come from the imagination (parikalpasamutpanna).
The pure (ubha) and the impure (aubha) also come from error (viparysa) which is
their condition (pratyaya). Pure and impure, both of which have this error as condition
for their arising, do not exist in themselves (svabhvata). Thus desire (kma) in regard
to them is futile (asabhava).
iv) When he calls a lie that which is a lie. It is because he calls a lie a lie that he is called
mvdin. A verse says: The Bhagavat has indeed defined all deceitful dharmas. Among
these, the saskras are the most deceitful.
v) When he always dwells in the supreme abode of emptiness. This answer to question v)
rests on a popular etymology (nirukti). Painya has 'slanderous words' (li kien yu =
painyavda according to Mahvyut. 8422) as its obvious meaning (hien mou). Its
hidden meaning is 'eternal supreme emptiness' (nityaparamanya); indeed, pai (Ch. pei,
classification 154) stands for parama, u (Ch. siu, 62 and 2) stands for nya and ni (Ch.
ni, 44 and 2) stands for nitya. If this hidden meaning is adopted, the answer is in
accordance (saprayukta), whereas if one keeps to the obvious meaning, it is not in
accordance.
vi) When he is on the other bank of the knowledge. Pruya is also taken in its
etymological sense. As its obvious meaning, pruya is 'harmful speech' (pruyavda);
as hidden meaning, 'to be on the other shore' (po ngan, 85 and 5; 46 and 5, = pra acc. to
Mahvyut. 2663). Adopting this hidden meaning, the author is saying: when he is on the
other shore of knowledge. The other shore of knowledge (jeyapra) is omniscience
(sarvajna). That is where the Buddha dwells in peace.
vii) When he preaches the Dharma by analyzing dharmas correctly. This explanation of
sabhinnapralpa is easy to understand.
313
viii) When he obtains supreme dhyna many times. As above, an explanation of the
etymological type. The dhyna that is in the Buddha's body (buddhakya) is supreme
(anuttara).
ix) When he suppresses all the defects of his mind. 'Destroy, cut' are synonyms of
suppress.
x) When he sees the omnipresent falseness very well, i.e., when he sees that everything
has deceit, imagination, falseness as nature. (U)
Buddha.
v) The dharmas connected with lust (sargadharma) are attributes of the
Buddha because the Buddha recognizes (abhyupagacchati) his fundamental
equality in respect to lustful beings (sargasattva).
vi - viii) For the same reason, the dharmas connected with hatred
(sadveadharma) are attributes of the Buddha, the dharmas connected with
ignorance (samohadharma) are attributes of the Buddha and the dharmas of
ordinary people (pthagjanadharma) are attributes of the Buddha.
314
ix) The dharmas free of stains (aliptadharma) are attributes of the Buddha
because the true nature (tathat) fully realized (nipanna) by the Buddha is
not stained by any obstacle (varaa).
x) The dharmas free of stains (anupaliptadharma) are attributes of the
Buddha because, while dwelling in the world, he is not soiled (upalipta) by
any human situation (lokadharma).
That is why the dharmas of the Buddha are profound. [147b17]
315
ix) The dharmas free of stainst are the attributes of the Buddha, because the pure tathat
is not stained by any obstacle (varaa). The rest is easily understood; there is no need to
explain it.
What are the results (phala) of these enigmatic words (sdhbhya) of the Buddha?
They easily allow the speaker (st) to explain (vyavasthp-); by condensing the
meaning (artha), he addresses himself easily to others. Thus they allow the listener
(rvaka) to understand easily, to complete (paripr-) his accumulations (sabhra)
easily by grasping the teaching (deana), by penetrating (pratividh-) the nature of things
(dharmat) by completing his accumulations. The listener acquires intelligent faith
(avetyaprasda) with respect to the Buddha whose magnanimity (mhtmya) he
understands. Similarly with respect to the Dharma and the Sagha, both of which are
superior. In this way, he acquires the truly fortunate abodes (dadharmasukhavihra)
by virtue of his awareness of the Three Jewels, Buddha, Dharma and Sagha. In the
company of wise ones, his information (upadea) is sharpened and he enters into the
category of the wise ones. Such are the ten advantages of the enigmatic words.
There are also enigmatic words in the Vehicle of the rvakas, such as the stanza: 'Having
killed his father and his mother,' etc. They also present these ten advantages. (U)
[This probably concerns stanza 294 of the Dhammapada, which has already been
mentioned in chap. III, 10, no. 4: mtara pitara hantv, rjano dve ca khattiye,
raha snucara hantv, angho yti brhmao. This stanza literally means: 'Having
killed his mother and father and two kings of the katriya class, having destroyed the
kingdom with its subjects, the brhmin is innocent,' But according to the commentary, it
should be understood thus: ' Having killed the thirst (tah) and the pride of self
(asmimna), and the false views of eternity and annihilation (sassatucchedadihi),
having destroyed the twelve sense-fields (dvdasyatana) with sensual desire
(nandirga), the khsava is without suffering (niddukkha).' See also the explanations of
the Dhammapadahakath, III, p. 454:
tattha snucaran ti yasdhakena yuttakena sahita, ettha hi "tah janeti purisan" ti
vacanato tsu bhavesu sattna jananato tah mt nma; "aha asukassa nma
rao v rjamahmattassa v putto" ti pitara nissya asmimnassa uppajjanato pit
nma; loko viya rjana yasm sabbadihigatni dve sassatucchedadihiyo bhajant,
316
317
730. This is the second of the three iks: adhicitta ik: Sadhinir., IX, 9;
Uttaratantra, p. 121; Siddhi, p. 313, 632.
2. Object of adhicitta: the law of the Mahyna contained in the Bodhisattvapiaka. The
latter is defined (Bodh, bhmi, p. 96(6)): tatra dvdahgd vacogatd yad vaipulya
tadbodhisattvapiakam. avaia rvakaapiaka veditavyam. See also Bodh. bhmi,
p. 160 (26), 173 (214), 274 (21). 330 (16), 336 (11); bodhisattvapiakadean, Bodh.
bhmi, p. 298 (4); -mtk, p. 157 (4), 180 (16), 332 (23); -vaipulya, p. 197 (10). See also
Sadhinir., IX, 9, 10, 18; Uttaratantra, p. 227; J. Przyluski, La lgende de lempereur
Aoka, 1923, p. 100; Le Concile de Rajgha, 1926, p. 114, 120, 124, 357-359, 361.
3. The four samdhis. These samdhis are of the domain of the fourth dhyna: they are
exclusively pure (ansrava): They cannot be attained before the bhmis. These samdhis
are infinite in number (cf. Saddharmapuarka, XXIII, p. 424 (7)). - There is a list of
118 s. in Mahvut., no. 506-623; atashasrik P.P., p. 825, 1412, 1531;
Karupuarka, p. 90. - Most frequently, as here, only the first four are cited:
mahynaloka, sarvapuyasamuccaya, samdhirjabhadrapla and ragama: Siddhi, p.
632 (to be corrected according to the terms below, restored according to the
Tibetan Upanibandhana). Another tetrad in Dharmasagraha, CXXXVI: gaganagaja,
vimalaprabha, sihavikrita, ragama. - The second s. of Sagraha,
sarvapuyasamuccaya, is cited in Saddharmapuarka, p. 424 (5). The
raagamasamdhi is explained in Buddhabhmistrastra, T 1530, k. 5, p. 316a8; it
has given its name to two stras: T 642, p. 629; T 945, p. 105. It exists as Sanskrit
fragments published by R. Hoernle, Manuscript Remains, 1916, p. 125, sq; T 945, p. 105,
partially trans. By S. Beal, A catena of Buddhist scriptures, 1871, p. 284-369.
4. On knowledge in regard to the combined object, see notes to chap. III, 12
On the weakness (dauhulya) of the store-consciousness, refer to chap. I, 61 and the
references connected with it.
The example of the nail driven out by another nail occurs in Sadhinir., VIII, v. 36, no.
3.
5. For birth at will (yathkmopapatti) of the bodhisattva, cf. chap. VI, 5. Otherwise,
these births are fabricated: see chap. X, 36, no. 1.
7. Primik ddhi in the Mahyana: Bodh. bhmi, p. 58-63; Siddhi, p. 792-793. We
know that ddhi is concentration (samdhi) according to Koa, VI, p. 285, VII, p. 98,
112; Paisabhidh, p. 205-206. The Hnayna counts ten types of iddhi: Dgha, I, p. 78,
212; II, p. 87, 213; III, p. 112, 281; Sayutta, II, p. 121; V, p. 264, 303; Aguttara, p.
180, 255, III, p. 17, 28, 82, 425; V, p. 199; Paisabhid, I, p. 111, II, p. 207;
Visuddhimagga, p. 378 seq.; Sumagalavilsin, I, p. 222; Atthaslin, p. 91; limits of
their power: Katthvatthu, p. 606 seq.
318
319
CHAPTER VIII
THE OBSERVANCE OF EXCELLENT WISDOM
(adhipraja ik)
(paritrakapraj),
fundamental
nonconceptual
knowledge
knowledge
(phalabdhanirvikalpakajna)
or
applied
wisdom
321
If cessation
of identification
and
sensation
(sajveditanirodha)
were
nonconceptual knowledge, the essential characteristic of this knowledge, i.e., its 'mental
factor' nature which makes it a knowledge, would be difficult to establish in the
unconscious state (asajin), etc. In fact, without a mind (citta) that supports them, there
are no mental factors (caitta). Now, in regard to the cessation of the mental
consciousness (manovijnanirodha), this state of unconsciousness, etc., is called a state
without mind (acittaka), as has been said above (cf. chap. I, 7).
322
323
nonconceptual (nirvikalpa) because whoever says 'mind' (citta) says 'the action of
thinking' (manan). If it depends on a non-mind, it would be like a material thing (rpa)
and not be a knowledge (jna). In order to cut through this twofold difficulty, the author
gives the half-stanza: Because it does not think and is not the result of a thought. The
support of nonconceptual knowledge is not a thought because this knowledge does not
think [same correction as above]; neither is it a non-thought because this knowledge is
the result of a mind (cittnvaya), has a mind for cause. The power of repeated practice
(abhysa) produces this state 'derived from mind'. This shows that the mind that serves as
support for this knowledge transcends (atikrmati) all action of thinking (manan) and
all concept (vikalpa). (U)
4. In the bodhisattva, the cause (gi) of nonconceptual knowledge is the hearingpropensity coming from speech (sbhilparutavsan) and correct thinking
(yoniomanasikra). [147c7]
324
325
knowledge. Thus, when the eye (cakus) grasps a color (rpa), it takes on a blue mark
(nldinimitta), and this blue mark is no different from the color grasped by the eye (see
Koa, IX, p. 280; Siddhi, p. 445). It is the same here: the nonconceptual knowledge does
not have an aspect distinct from tathat. (Bh) - The Dharma, furnished with object
(lambana), necessarily has an aspect (kra). Next follows a stanza on the aspect of
knowledge ... That which behaves like its object (lambanaadyena) is called the
aspect (kra). Nonconceptual knowledge behaves like tathat, its object. Its object is the
absence of marks inherent in its object of awaremenss: i.e., this knowledge has the aspect
inherent in tathat which is its object. This means that nonconceptual knowledge
concerns the tathat, its object (viaya), and has as aspect (kra) absence of attention
(amanasikra) of all concepts, or animitta. (U)
326
To establish his thesis, the author adds: When the phonemes are mutually joined, there is
a meaning of connection. When the separate phonemes (akara) are pronounced in series
(prabandha, satna), this gives a meaning (artha) that has a connection meaning
(sayogrtha). Thus, the two phonemes cha kus, when they are not separated
(avichchhinna), express the meaning 'eye'. This is the meaning of connection which is
conceptual (vikalpita). (Bh)
If the conceived object (vikalpitrtha) does not exist in reality, what is it that is
conceived (vikalpita)? The author answers: The meaning having the union of the
phonemes as self-nature is conceived, and nothing else, etc. Thus when the phonemes
(akara) are mutually joined (paraparasayoga), the expression forms a continuum
(asamuccheda), and the imagining mind (parikalpacitta), concerning this conventional
expression (saketa), makes up an imaginary object (parikalprtha) that is conceptual
(vikalpita); but beyond that, there is no real object (sadartha) that is conceived. This is
why the author says: and nothing else. If there were no serial expression formed by the
phonemes (akaraprabandhbhilpa), the concept (vikalpa) would not exist. (U)
b) Why are we sure that all dharmas are inexpressible (anabhilpya)? The author answers
by saying: Without a designation, knowledge on the thing designated does not operate. If
one does not know the designation (abhidna), the notion (buddhi) of the thing
designated (abhiddheya) is not produced. This is why all dharmas are inexpressible. But,
one might say, the notion of the thing designated (abhidheyabuddhi) is produced in
dependence (apekya) on the designation (abhidhna). In order to refute that, the author
adds: Since there is a difference between the two, there is no designation. Since the
designation (abhidhna) and the thing designated (abhidheya) are mutually different and
have a different nature (lakaa) (cf. chap. II, 24), the designation and the thing
designated are inexpressible (anabhilpya). For this reason, it is said that all dharmas are
inexprssible. (Bh)
Why are dharmas inexpressible? To clarify this thesis, the author says: Without a
designation, the knowledge of the thing designated does not operate. If truly there were
an object (artha) of which one could speak, it would be that a knowledge similar to
language would arise on this object independently of the name designating it
(abhidhnanm).
But
if
we
do
not
know
the
expression
designating
it
does not arise. This is why dharmas are inexpressible. But, one could say, even though
the outer object (bhyrtha) really exists, the knowledge of the thing designated
(abhidheyajna) is produced in dependence on the designation (abhidnam apekya).
To refute this, the author says: Since there is a difference between the two, there is no
designation. This means: by virtue of the difference in characteristics, there really is no
designation. Since the designation (abhidna) and the thing designated (abhidheya) are
of different natures (bhinnalakaa), their self-nature (svalakaa) differs. How could
there be a real designation based on the reality of an object? Everything is inexpressible:
the logical consequence is that every designation and everything is inexpressible. (U)
328
and
in
the
assembly
of
the
apparitional
body
329
retribution. In order to mark this idea, the author adds: in consideration of preparation
and acquisition. (Bh)
In the two assemblies, namely, in the two assemblies of the two bodies of the Buddha,
the apparitional body and the enjoyment body. In view of the preparation and
acquisition: this shows that nonconceptual knowledge can produce a fruit of retribution
(vipkaphala), but it is not the cause of retribution (vipkahetu) because it counteracts it
(prqtipaka). Here the dominant result (adhipatiphala) is metaphorically (upacra) called
fruit of retribution (vipkaphala) because it predisposes (tse-hiun); and as other actions,
impure actions (ssravakarman), produce a retribution, it is given this name. When one
practices nonconceptual knowledge (pryogika-nirvikalpakajna), one is born and
abides in the assembly of the apparitional body of the Buddha; but when one has acquired
(adhigama) fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, one is born in the assembly of the
enjoyment body of Buddha. (U)
330
13. For the bodhisattva, the outcome (nih) of nonconceptual knowledge is the
attainment of the three bodies in the pure state (uddhatrikya) and the
attaining of the excellent masteries (agravait). [147c27]
331
fundamental
and
subsequent
nonconceptual
nonconceptual
knowledge
knowledge
(phalabdhanirvikalpakajna).
a) First, the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (pryogika-nirvikalapakajna).
Initially, the bodhisattva listens to others talk about absence of concept (nirvikalpanaya).
Next, unable himself to see this absence of concept, he accords it his adherence
(adhimukti). Finally, with this adherence as support, he skillfully examines (nitraa)
absence of concept. This is what is called preparatory nonconceptual knowledge.
Because it gives rise to fundamental nonconceptual knowledge, it too is given the name
'nonconceptual'. This preparatory nonconceptual knowledge has the advantage of
immaculateness (nirupalepnuasa). Is there an example (dnta) for this? The stra
gives verse 14 a). In order to show that which does not stain it, the author says: by any
kind of heavy wrongdoing. In order to show the cause by means of which it is unstained,
he says: because of faith alone and adherence, because by delighting in faith in the
absence of concept, he accords it his adherence. That is why this knowledge can
counteract (pratipaka) any kind of bad destiny (durgati), and this explains that
wrongdoings (ppa) do not soil it.
332
15 a) The three knowledges (jna) are like a mute person (mka) trying to
understand an object (artha), a mute person who has understood the object,
a non-mute person who has understood the object.
b) The three knowledges are like an idiot (mha) trying to understand an
object, an idiot who has understood the object, an intelligent person
(amha) who has understood the object. c) The three knowledges are like
the first five consciousnesses trying to understand an object, the first five
333
to
speak
about
it,
so
the
subsequent
nonconceptual
knowledge
(phalabdhanirvikalpakajna), which has understood the tathat and has realized its
object (viaya), sets out to teach it: this is similar.
b) The stanza about the idiot is explained in the same way. [Bh: The idiot (mha) is a
person of incoherent language (avicchinna).]
c) Like the first five consciousnesses trying to understand an object. The first five
consciousnesses, visual consciousness, etc., try to understand an object; but despite the
attempt, they lack any concept (vikalpa). (Cf. chap. I, 7). It is the same for the
preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. - Like the first five consciousnesses that have
334
grasped the object. The first five consciousnesses that have grasped the object are
without concept. It is the same for the fundamental nonconceptual knowledge. - Like the
manas which has grasped the object. The mental consciousness (manovijna) which has
grasped the object is also able to imagine it (vikp-). It is the same for the subsequent
nonconceptual knowledge. (U)
d) The stanza on the treatise. Like a man who does not understand a treatise but who
seeks to understand it: such is the preparatory nonconceptual knowledge. - When he has
gone over it again, he grasps the letter (dharma) only: such is the fundamental
nonconceptual knowledge. Here by 'letter' (dharma) is meant the phonemes (akara). Like a man who has understood the treatise and has grasped the letters (dharma) and the
meaning (artha): such is the subsequent nonconceptual knowledge ... (Bh)
335
b) The fundamental nonconceptual knowledge is like space. The forms manifested there,
i.e., the forms that appear in space, are conceptualized. It is the same for the subsequent
nonconceptual knowledge: it is both conceptualized and conceptualizing. (Bh)
These two stanzas show the difference between the fundamental and the subsequent
knowledge. The examples of the eyes closed and the eyes open, of space and forms, show
that these two knowledges are, respectively, without concepts (nirvikalpa) and furnished
with concepts (savikalpa), identical (sama) and non-identical (asama). As for the
preparatory knowledge (pryogikajna) which is not represented here, it is not spoken
of. Moreover, the preparatory knowledge (pryogikajna) is the cause (hetu) of the
fundamental knowledge (mlajna); the subsequent knowledge (pihhalabdhajna)
is its result (phala). And this leads us to the rle fulfilled (ktynuhna) by
nonconceptual knowledge. (U)
17. Just as precious gems (mai) and celestial music (trya) accomplish their own
activity (svakarman) without thought, so it is always without thought that the
Buddhas accomplish their kinds of activity (nnkarman). [148a18]
336
all the wishes of its possesser], although without concepts (vikalpa), is able to fulfill the
rle desired by the beings who possess it. A celestial musical instrument (trya), even
without being struck (aghaita), can produce all kinds of sounds (abda) according to the
aspirations (aya) of those close by. In the same way, the nonconceptual knowledge of
the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, although without concepts, can accomplish all kinds of
rles. (Bh)
Nonconceptual knowledge realizes the state of Buddha (buddhat); but it is without
concepts (vikalpa); how can it procure the interest of beings (sattvrtha)? ... In the stanza,
the author brings in the examples of the precious gem and the celestial musical
instrument to prove that, although without concepts, the nonconceptual knowledge is able
to accomplish all kinds of rles effortlessly (anbhoga). Thus the cintmai and the
celestial musical instrument do not say: 'I am going to emit light, I am going to produce a
sound', because they are both without thought (acetana). But, by the power of the
meritorious actions (puyakarman) and aspirations (aya) of beings who have been born
where they occur, and independently of being struck (ghahana-nirapekan), they emit
all kinds of light (prabh) and produce all kinds of sounds (abda). It is the same for the
nonconceptual knowledge of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas: although without concepts, it
fulfills its role which is to render all kinds of services (nnrthakriy) in conformity with
the merits (puya) and aspirations (aya) of beings to be converted (vineyasattva) by it.
(U)
337
This
means
that
the
fundamental
nonconceptual
knowledge
This
shows
that
the
fundamental
nonconceptual
knowledge
(mlanirvikalakajnnna) is not really a knowledge (jna) because it does not arise like
preparatory conceptual knowledge (pryogikavikalpakajna). Neither is it a nonknowledge (ajna) because it derives its birth from this preparatory conceptual
knowledge.
There is yet another meaning to the phrase: Neither here nor elsewhere, without being a
knowledge, it is a knowledge. Because here, i.e., in itself, concepts do not exist, it is
called non-knowledge; but because it functions on the dharmat of concepts and not
elsewhere, it is a knowledge. In this explanation, the first and last members of the phrase
are connected to each other. [The first member fei yu ts'e (neither here) explains the first
member fei tshe (non-knowledge), and the second member fei yu (nor elsewhere)
explains the second member che tshe (knowledge)].
338
Not being different from its object, this knowledge is intuition. It is not like the
preparatory nonconceptual knowledge (pryogikanirvikalpakajna) which, although
functioning with objects and subjects of consciousness (grhyagrhaka), is called
nonconceptual (nirvikalpaka). On the contrary, it is because it is not distinguished from
its object (grhya) and is completely identified with it (samasama), that the fundamental
nonconceptual knowledge is called nonconceptual: this knowledge does not set up the
duality of object and subject (grhyagrhaka).
b) In another stra, the Bhagavat has said that all dharmas are without concept
(nirvikalp sarvadharm). To explain this absence of concept, the author follows with
stanza 18b ...
It should be known that all dharmas are originally free from concept, i.e., that all
dharmas, in their original nature (praktisvabhva), are without concept. Why? Because
the thing conceived does not exist. This shows that, the thing conceived being
nonexistent, all dharmas are originally without concept.
But if all dharmas are originally without concept because the thing conceived does not
exist, why do not beings (sattva) attain deliverance (vimoka) from the very beginning
(prakta)? - In order to anwer this question, the author says: Nonconceptual knowledge
is lacking, i.e., these beings do not have nonconceptual knowledge, and even though the
dharmas in their original nature are without concepts, these beings are not liberated from
the very beginning. But when the knowledge of the true nature (tathatjna) bearing on
the absence of concept of the dharmas arises in them, when they realize (sktkt-) the
absence of concepts of dharmas, then they will attain deliverance. But if this knowledge
does not arise, they will not attain delverance. Knowledge of the true nature
(tathatjna) is this same nonconceptual knowledge. (Bh)
340
knowledge free of the four errors (aviparysajna) that consists of taking the transitory
as eternal, etc. (Cf. Prastvan, 3, p. 8). The suppression of concepts (vikalpa)
comprising this fourfold error about the eternal, etc., is called the nonconceptual
knowledge of non-error.
(3) Nonconcept of non-proliferation (niprapacanirvikalpa). This belongs to the
bodhisattvas. Indeed, the bodhisattvas who have attained enlightenment (bodhi) of all
dharmas, avoid any vain proliferation. The true nature (tathat) attested by their
knowledge transcends the ways of discourse (abhilpapatha) and surpasses the objects of
worldly knowledge (laukikajnaviaya). As it cannot be expressed in words, no worldly
knowledge (laukikajna) can understand it. (Bh)
iii) Subsequent knowledge is of five types: (1) analysis of penetration, (2) analysis of
memory, (3) analysis of preaching, (4) analysis of synthesis, and (5) analysis of success.
(1) Analysis of penetration (prativedhavicra). At the time of penetration (prativedha),
one makes the following analysis: I am penetrating (I understand). Here penetration has
the sense of understanding (avabodha).
(2) Analysis of memory (anusmaraavicra). Emerging from (vyutthna) this penetration,
one remembers and says to oneself: I have penetrated absence of concepts (nirvikalpa).
(3) Analysis of preaching (vyavasthnavicra). This is to preach to others what one has
penetrated.
(4) Analysis of combination (sasargavicra). The knowledge of the combined object
(saslambanajna) sees that all dharmas have one and the same nature
(ekalakaa) and leads towards the transformation of support (rayaparvtti). When
this support has been transformed, this knowledge is reproduced.
(5) Analysis of success (samddhivicra). Everything suucceeds (samddhyate) according
to aspirations (yathayam). By means of this analysis, earth, etc., is transformed
(pariam-) into gold (cf. chap. I, 60; chap. II, 14). In order to obtain this success, this
analysis is made; that is why the analysis of success is spoken of. Some say that it is
because of this analysis that one obtains success. (Bh)
i) Hungry ghosts (preta), animals (tiryak), humans (manuya) and gods (deva)
have different notions of the same object according to their respective
capabilities. Therefore it is concluded that objects (artha) do not exist.
ii) Thus, in the past (atta), etc., in dream (svapna) and in the reflection in a
mirror (pratibimba), there is no object of consciousness (lambana) and yet
perception (upalabdhi) takes place [acc. to H: the characteristics of an object
(viayalakaa) are present].
iii) If the object were truly an object, there would be no nonconceptual
knowledge (nirvikalpakajna); if that were the case, the acquisition of
buddhahood (buddhatdhigama) would be impossible.
iv) For bodhisattvas possessing the masteries (vaita) and also for ecstatics
(dhyyin), earth, etc., is transformed into any substance they wish by the
power of convinced adhesion (adhimuktibala).
v) For the bodhisattvas versed in analysis (pravicaya), for sages (dhmat) in
possession of tranquility (anta), all dharmas appear as object (artha) to them
when they reflect on it (manasi kurvanti).
vi) When nonconceptual knowledge is functioning (carati), not a single object
appears. Thus we know that there is no object and, the object being absent,
there is no concept (vijapti). [148b12]
342
opposite (viruddha) things can be in the same place, we know that the imaginary object
does not exist.
Objection: If there is no real object (sadartha), how is a consciousness without object
(nirlambanavijna) produced (samudcar-)?
Answer: ii) For you, the Sautrntikas, there is no past (atta) or future (angata) object;
then how can there be a consciousness in regard to them? Furthermore, in dream
(svapna), the visions of the dream are non-existent; how then does one know them? The
bedroom of the dreamer cannot really contain the mountains (parvata), rivers (nad) and
elephants (hastin) that are perceived by the consciousness of the dreamer ... Finally, the
reflection (pratibimba) seen in a mirror (dara) or seen in concentration (samdhi) does
not exist in itself (dravyasat); how then does one know it?
Since all of that is a manifestation of the mind (cittbhsa), one perceives only the image
of the mind (cittapratibimba). Nevertheless the characteristics of an object are present
there: in brief, even though the objects (viaya) past (atta), future (angata), etc., do not
exist in themselves (dravyasat), the characteristics of an object (viayalakaa) do occur
in the mind that perceives them.
iii) If the perceived object (viayrtha) were truly an object, there would be no
nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpajna) because there would be concepts (vikalpa).
Intuitive knowledge being absent, the acquisition of Buddhahood would be impossible: if
the intuitive knowledge were truly lacking, it would be impossible to attain Buddhahood
and this would be a very serious error. Therefore we know that the imaginary object
(parikalpitrtha) has no reality.
iv) Furthermore, this object has no reality. Why? For the bodhisattvas in possession of
the masteries: for the bodhisattvas who have attained the great masteries; by the power of
convinced adhesion, i.e., by the power of aspiration (ayabala), earth is transformed
into whatever substance they wish: they change (pariam-) earth into gold (suvara), etc.
And also for the ecstatics: for persons other than the bodhisattvas, e.g., for the rvakas in
possession of dhyna.
v) For bodhisattvas versed in analysis: full of wisdom (praj); for the sages: endowed
with well-tried knowledge, the bodhisattvas are called sages; in possession of tranquility:
endowed with samdhi (samdhiprpta). When they reflect on the dharmas: when they
343
reflect on the dharmas, on stras, geya, etc. (cf. Mahvyut., 1267-1278), these appear to
them as object: when they reflect in such and such as way on these dharmas, stra, etc.,
in their various aspects (nnkra), non-substantiality, etc., (nairtmydi), these objects
appear to them in such and such a way. It should be known then that it is their mind in
right thinking (yoniomanasikracitta) which appears to them like subjects and objects of
consciousness (grhyagrhaka) and that no external object (bhyrtha) exists.
vi) When nonconceptual knowledge is operating, no object whatsoever appears. This is
in relation to the preceding discussion concerning the non-reality of the object. When
nonconceptual knowledge becomes active (samudcarati) in the bodhisattvas, no other
object manifests; it should be known then that all perceived objects (viayrtha) are nonexistent. Thus there is no object and consequently no concept: by way of conclusion
(nigamana), there is no perceived object (viayrtha) and hence no notion cognizes
(vijapti). We have already discussed this argument previously (in chap. II, 14) in the
detailed explanation on the characteristics of the knowable (jeyalakaa). (U)
344
iv) He avoids the abiding that consists of being content with just cutting the
obstacle of the afflictions (klevaraapraha-mtrasatutnaparityga).
v) He avoids abiding in the nirva-without-residue element with disregard
for the interest of beings (sattvrthanirapekanirupadhieanirvadhtusthnaparityga). [148b20]
345
iv) He avoids the abiding which consists of being content with cutting just the obstacle of
the afflictions. The rvakas believe that the power of meditation (bhvanbala) should
be aimed only at cutting the obstacle of the afflictions (klevaraapraha) and that
then they have done all there is to be done (sarvaktaktya). But the bodhisattva avoids
such an abiding because it sets up an obstacle (voti) to the benefit and well-being of
beings (sattvahitasukha). A stanza says: Dwelling in the unfortunate destinies (durgati)
does not set up as great an obstacle to attaining supreme bodhi as does dwelling in the
levels of the rvakas and the pratyekabuddhas. Since the bodhisattva avoids such a
dwelling, the method of nonabiding is spoken of.
v) He avoids abiding in the nirva-without-residue element with disregard for the
interest of beings. The rvakas, etc., who do not care about the interest of beings
(sattvrtha) dwell in the nirva-without-residue element (nirupadhieanirvadhtu):
complete
extinction,
like
wood
consumed
by
fire
(agniparidagdhakhavad
22. What is the difference (viea) between the two lnowledges, that of the
rvakas (rvakajna) and that of the bodhisattvas (bodhisattvajna)? The
knowledge of the bodhisattvas is distinguished by five aspects (kra):
i) It is distinguised by the absence of concepts (nirvikalpaviea) because it
does not conceptualize (vikalpayati) the dharmas, viz., aggregates (skandha),
etc.
ii) It is distinguished by its non-mediocrity (aparttaviea) because, by fully
understanding (prativedha) reality (tattva; H: tathta), by penetrating all the
aspects of the knowable (jeykra) and by referring (adhiktya) to all beings
(sattva), it is not mediocre.
iii) It is distinguished by its non-abidingness (apratihitatava-viea), because
it is fixed in nonabiding nirvna (apratihita-nirva).
346
Non-mediocrity
in
the
comprehension
of
the
true
nature
347
(sarvajeyaviayviparysajna) must arise in order that it may be said that they have
attained their goal (read sieou yi) and that they have done what had to be done.
c. Non-mediocrity with respect to beings (sattvn adhiktyaparittaviea). The rvakas,
etc., who seek only their own personal interest (svrtha), zealously cultivate the
knowledge of suppression of the afflictions and of non-production (kaynutpdajna,
cf. Koa, I, p. 82; IV, p. 180). On the other hand, the bodhisattva, by considering
(adhiktya) all beings, seeks perfect enlightenment (mahbodhi). It is by these three types
of non-mediocrity that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished from that of the
rvaka.
iii) Apratihitvaviea. The rvakas, etc., dwell solely in nirva. On the other hand, the
bodhisattvas, by the dominant power (adhipatibala) of compassion (karu) and wisdom
(praj)
with
which
they
are
endowed,
dwell
in
the
nonabiding-nirva
(apratihitanirva).
iv) tyantikaviea. This shows the great difference between the nirva of the rvakas
and that of the bodhisattvas. In the rvakas who abide in the nirva-without-residue
element (nirupadhieanirva), body (kya) and knowledge are extinguished (ka)
like the flame of a lamp (dpajvla) when it is put out. On the other hand, when the
bodhisattvas become buddha, the body of the Dharma (dharmakya) which they have
realized (sktkta) goes on until the end of sasra (sasrakoe) without being
destroyed. Moreover, in the formless realm (rpyadhtu), the mental series (satna)
does not cease. It is also by this difference that the knowledge of the bodhisattva is
distinguished.
v) Niruttaraviea. Above the vehicle of the rvaka (rvakayna) there is the vehicle of
the pratyekabuddha (pratyekabuddhayna) and above that is the Greater Vehicle
(mahyna). The vehicle of the bodhisattva is the vehicle of the Buddhas (buddhayna)
and there is none higher (niruttara).
These are the five points on which the knowledge of the bodhisattva is distinguished
from that of the rvaka.
Finally, the stanza reviews these ideas. Five superiorities: this is a matter of the five
types of differences already spoken of. Worldly and supraworldly perfections: the
dhynas and the formless (rpya) concentrations are called worldly perfections; the
348
nirva acquired by the rvaka, etc., is called supraworldly perfection. Since this
knowledge transcends them, it is put at the head of the list. (U)
23. If the bodhisattvas are thus endowed with the qualities (gua) and
perfections (sapad) of excellent morality (adhila), excellent mind (adhicitta),
and excellent wisdom (adhipraj), if they have attained sovereignty over all
riches (sarvadhana-vibhutva), why is it that there are beings (sattva) deprived of
resources (kadhana)? - This is because the bodhisattvas give nothing to some
beings because they see that these beings feel loathing (pratibaddhakarman) for
the riches; because they see some beings to whom riches (bhoga) have been
granted who are setting up obstacles (pratibandha) to the arising (utpda) of
wholesome dharmas (kualadharma); because they see some beings whose riches
are exhausted who are turning towards dislike (savegbhimukha); because they
see some beings to whom riches have been granted who are accumulating
unwholesome dharmas (akualadharma); because they see some beings to whom
riches have been granted who are causing suffering (pana, ghtana) to
innumerable other beings. That is why there are some beings deprived of riches.
Here is a stanza:
Seeing the disgust (karman = pratibaddhakarman), obstacle (pratibandha),
turning away (abhimukhatva), accumulation (caya) and wickedness (pana),
we understand why some beings do not obtain any of the riches of the
bodhisattvas. [148c11]
349
Thus a stanza says: The mother can suckle her child herself for months tirelessly; but if
the child closes its mouth, what good is the nourishment?
Because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted set up obstacles to the
arising of wholesome dharmas. The bodhisattvas see certain beings who experience no
disgust for the riches but who, once in possession of abundant riches, become careless
(pramda) and produce no wholesome dharmas. Then the bodhisattvas have this thought:
It would be better (varam) for these beings actually (dadharma) to be poor (daridra)
for a short time rather than to be poor for a long time in future existences (janmntara).
That is why the bodhisattvas do not give them the riches which they have at their
disposal.
Because they see some beings whose riches have been exhausted turn towards disgust.
The bodhisattvas see some beings whose riches are exhausted turn (abhimukha) towards
disgust (savega) for sasra and seek deliverance (nisaraa). But if they have fortune
(vibhava), they take to drunkenness (mada). That is why the bodhisattvas do not give
them the riches they have at their disposal, thinking: It would be better (varam) for them
to be poor (daridra) and turn their mind ceaselessly to disgust for sasra rather than to
be rich and give themselves up to pleasure (sukha), to carelessness (pramda), without
experiencing disgust for sasra and without producing wholesome dharmas.
Because they see some beings to whom riches have been granted accumulate
unwholesome dharmas. The bodhisattvas see that some beings to whom opulent wealth
has been given, give themselves up to carelessness (pramda) and accumulate (ci-) all
sorts of unwholesome dharmas. That is why they do not give the riches which they have
at their disposal. Thus a stanza says: It would be better (varam) to be poor (daridra) in
riches and avoid the bad destinies (durgati) and bad actions (ducarita) than to be rich
(vibhavant), disturbing the senses (indriya) and exposing oneself to becoming a
receptacle (bhjana) for future suffering.
Because they see some beings to whom wealth has been given make trouble for countless
other beings. The bodhisattvas see some beings, once in possession of fortune (vibhava),
who trouble countless beings (apramasattva). That is why they do not give them the
riches they have at their disposal. They think: It would be better (varam) that a person
350
undergoes the suffering of poverty (dridryadukha) rather than trouble many other
beings.
The stanza summarizes these ideas by saying: Seeing the repugnance, obstacle,
orientation, etc. The text is easy to understand; there is no need to explain it. (U)
citta
22. A more reasonable explanation of evil in the world is given in Sadhinir., IX, 265:
the evil in the world is due to the wrongdoings of beings and the bodhisattvas are unable
to oppose the law of the retribution of actions.
352
CHAPTER IX
CUTTING OFF, FRUITION OF THE THREE TRAININGS
(phalapraha)
353
involving
the
transformation
or
complete
suppression
(tyantikaparvtti) of the imaginary (parikalpita). [In chapter II, 29, we have seen that
the absolute nature forms the purity part of the dependent nature.]
iii) The support with two aspects is the dependent nature insofar as it is included in both
portions at the same time. The support with its two aspects is the dependent nature in all
its complexity.
iv) The transformation (parvtti) concerns the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhva);
the dependent nature of the mind and of the mental factors (cittacaitta) is the basis
(raya) of the transformation that destroys the defilements (saklea); it is also the
basis of all the buddha attributes (buddhadharma). Some actually say: The bhmis and
the virtues (pramit) are the support (raya) of the buddha attributes; the
354
transformation of the basis (rayaparvtti) is the fruit (phala), etc. [The Chinese text,
badly punctuated, should be corrected according to the Tibetan: sa da pha rol phyin pa
ni / sas rgyas chos kyi gnas yin no / gnas gyur pa ni bras bu ste]. - What is the
transformation of the basis? It concerns the dependent nature. When its antidote arises,
i.e., when the nonconceptual knowledge arises, the dependent nature expels its defiled
part: it destroys its disturbed part (skhalitabhga), which is formed by all the objects and
subjects of consciousness (grhyagrhaka), and is reduced to its purity part: rejecting
this imaginary nature which is formed by objects and subjects of consciousness
(grhyagrhaka), it is reduced to its very pure part (suviuddhabhga), completely free
of subjects and objects of consciousness (grhyagrhakavivarjita), cognizable by
introspection
(pratytmavedya)
and
avoiding
all
empty
prolifreration
(prapacocchedaka). (U)
355
356
of
adhimukticarybhmi),
when
the
afflictions
(klea)
are
active
(samudcaranti), one is completely ashamed, and then the afflictions are only slightly or
not at all active. (Bh)
By the power of adherence (adhimukti) and the hearing-propensity (rutavsan), one
breaks (samudghtayati) the propensities of the afflictions (kleavsan) contained in the
retribution consciousness (vipkavijna) and one increases (vardhayati) the power
(prabhva) of the pure dharmas (vaiyavadnikadharma). By the stability of the hearingpropensity (rutavsan) due to adherence (adhimukti) and by the presence of shame
(lajj), the afflictions are caused to act only slightly or not at all. (U)
ii) Prativedhaparvtti. This is the transformation of the support obtained by entering
into the bhmis. The appearance and disappearance of the real and the unreal
(tattvtattvakhynkhyna), etc.: this transformation extends up to the sixth bhmi.
Sometimes it is the cause for the appearance of the real (tattvakhyna); sometimes, when
emerging from (vyutthna) concentration, it is the cause for the appearance of the unreal
(attavakhyna). (Bh) When one has entered into the great bodhisattva bhmis, there
is appearance and disappearance of the real and the unreal: according to whether the
nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajna) functions mediately (sottaram) or
immediately (anantaram), there is sometimes the appearance of the real (tattvakhyna)
when one enters into concentration, and sometimes the appearance of the unreal
(atattvakhyna) when one emerges from (vyutthna) concentration. Thus the real and the
unreal, in these two moments, appear and disappear respectively. This appearance and
disappearance lasts until the sixth bhmi. (U)
iii) Bhvanaparvitti. It is that of the bodhisattvas fettered by obstacles, i.e., fettered by
the obstacle of knowledge (jeyvaraa). There is the disappearance of every concept,
357
etc.: this transformation of the basis lasts up until the tenth bhmi. All concepts (nimitta)
disappear; nonconcept (animiita), the true nature (tathat) alone, appears. (Bh)
iv) Phalaparipriparvtti. It is that of the bodhisattvas freed from the obstacles. They
are free of the obstacles (anvaraa) because they have no further obstacle. There is
appearance of the very pure reality (ativiuddhatattvakhyna) for the same reason. The
bodhisattvas obtain sovereignty over everything (sarvanimittavibhutva): with this
transformation as support (raya), they gain mastery over things (nimittavibhutva) and
according to their aspirations (yathayam), they procure the benefit and happiness of
beings (sattvahitasukha). (Bh)
v) Hnaparvtti. This is that of the rvakas, etc.: by etc., one should understand the
pratyekabuddhas. They penetrate (pratividhyanti) only one non-existence of self
(nairatmya), that of the pudgala. This transformation, not being able to procure the
interests of others (parrtha), is lower (hna). (Bh)
vi) Vilaparvtti. This is that of the bodhisattvas, etc. Since they penetrate
(pratividhyanti) both non-existences of self (nairatmya), that of the pudgala and that of
dharmas at the same time, they become established in a place where they can cut through
the defilements (saklea) without abandoning sasra. This transformation which
procures both the personal interest of the bodhisattva and that of others (svaparrtha) is
extensive (vila). (Bh) They cut through the defilements (saklea) but do not
abandon sasra. Penetrating (pratividh-) the two non-existences of a self (nairatmya),
they cut the defilements; but seeing peace (anta) in sasra, they do not abandon it.
(U)
What disadvantages do they incur in the lower transformation, etc.? This passage is
easy to understand.
What benefits do they derive from the extensive transformation, etc.? Since the
bodhisattvas have obtained mastery in all the destinies (gati) with the body appropriate
(sabhgakya) to these destinies and their inhabitants, [cf. Vimalakrtinirdea, in
iksamuccaya, p. 324 seq.; Hobogirin, art. Bosatsu, p. 139b]. By means of their skill in
various disciplinary means (vinayopyakaualya), they confirm those beings [who are
capable of entering the path (yeou kan =
discipline. They establish them (nikipanti) in happiness (abhyudaya) and in the three
358
vehicles
(ynatraya).
By
happiness,
the
fortunate
worldly
existences
(laukikasukhajanma) [or, acc. to Bh, the riches of the world (laukikavibava)] should be
understood. This is what constitutes the benefits of the Dharma.(U)
359
praktyaiva
nimittsamudcrt].
c. When the knowledge that knows the identity of sasra and nirva is produced, etc.:
The imaginary nature (parikalpitasvabhva) is called sasra. It is without self-nature
(nisvabhva). This absence of self-nature (nisvabhvat) is emptiness (nyat).
Emptiness is nirva, the absolute nature (parinipannasvabhva).
d. For this reason, one does not give up and one does not hold onto sara, etc. Since
sasra is nirva, one does not abandon it; but since the notion of sasra
(sasrasaj) no longer applies (pravi-) to sasra, one does not keep sasra.
Since nirva is not attained outside of sasra, one does not acquire nirva; but since
nirva is experienced (sktkta) within sasra, one does not lack nirva. (U)
360
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX
1. Apratisitanirva. - Difficult grammatical explanation: nirva yatra na
pratihyate (Note of J. Speyer in Muson, 1914, 9. 33; Syntax, 360); apratihito
nirve (Mahvyut., 406). - Aashasrik P.P., p. 23: api tu sthsyati sarvajatym
asthnayogena, comm. Abhis. al. l., p. 105 (9): tatra sthnam vastpalambha.
pratithna cetasa. tatpratiedhd asthnam; Aashastik, p. 37: apratihitamnso
hi thatgato rham damyaksabuddha. sa naiva saskte fhtau sthito npy asaskte
dh atau sthito na ca tato vyutthita, comm. Abhis. al. l, p. 151 (25): saskta iti
kmdike. asaskta iti tathatike. Tatra na sthas tattvato vastuvanupalambht. na ca
tato vyutthota iti naiva tatrsthitio nirviayasya nao prayogt. sav rty tv sthnam
asthna v prajaptam Bhagavateti mati; Vajracchedik, p. 27: apartihitahitta;
Bodhicaryvatrapajik, p. 421 (16): apratihitanirvatvena parammnti gate ...
bodhisattve; Dharmasagiti in iksam., p. 322b seq.: buddh bhagavanto ...
sarvasattvasamacitt niotyasamdhigocarh sa s arabirvavimukt yvat sattvn
mtpitrkalp samnamaitracitta; Strlakra, III, 3; IX, 14
(sasranirvpratihitatvt sasktsasktatvendvay vtti); IX, 45; IX, 70;
XVII, 32; XVII, 42 (tatrpi ca nisnehn rvakapratyekabuddhan
sarvadukhopaame nirve pratihia mana. Bodhisayyvn tu karunviatv
nirve pi mano na pratihitam); XVIII, 70; XIX, 62; Madhyntavibhaga, p. 4 (1),
108 (14-15), 160 (17) (dharmanairtmyaviayenpratishitanirvaprpakenvikalpena
janena svaya nirya mahynam ucyate), 187 (14) (kim tad apratihita
nirvam. bodhisattvvasthy tvat kmopapattivaitnirayea kruikatvt
sassropatti, prajabalena tatrsaklea); Siddhi, p. 628, 771, 677, 683, 777, 810;
Uttaratantra, p. 162, 173, 174. Consult J. Masuda, Der individualistische Idealismus,
1926, p. 49, sq.; T. Stcherbatsky, Conception of Buddhist Nirva, 1927, p. 185, 204; N.
Dutt, Aspects of Mahyna Buddhism, 1930, p. 200; H. von Glasenapp, Unsterblichhkeit
und Erlsung in den indischen Religionen, 1938, p. 62.
rayaparvtti: see Notes to chap. I, v. 57. Also Lakvatra, p. 202 (2): citta
dyavinirmukta svabhvadvayavarjitam rayasya parvttim anutpda vadmy
aham; Strlakra, XIX, 54 (= moka = tathatya khynat); XIV, 29 (in the first
bhmi); XIV, 45 (final or nihgata); Bodh. bhmi, p. 404 (27) (niruttar and sottars);
Siddhi, p. 219 (fruit of kleapraha); p. 600 (parvtti of rpaskandha and of
skandhacatuka); p. 667 (its twofold fruit).
Nirva: cf. the definition of Lakvatra, p. 200 (4): animittam iti vikalpasypravttir
anutpdo nirvam iti vadmi. ttra nirvam iti yathbhtryasthnadarana
vikalpacittacaittakalpasya parvttiprvaka
tathgatasvapratytmryajandhigama nirvam
iti vadmi. - See Siddhi, p. 668680.
2. Repeated and developed in Siddhi, p. 661-667.
3. The first two stanzas are taken from Strlakra, XIX, 53-54. The third deals with
the identity of sasra and nirva, cf. Madh. vtti, XXV, 19-20, p. 535: na sasrasya
nirvt kicid asti vie saam, na nirvasya saskart kicid asti vieaam.
nirvasya ca y koI sas arasya ca, na tayor antara kicit suskmam api vidyate
361
362
CHAPTER X
KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESULT
(phalajna)
1. The superiority of the cessation that is the result of the three iks
(tatphalaprahaviea) has been explained in Chapter IX; how should one
conceive (katha draavya) the superiority of the knowledge concerning this
result (tatphalajnaviea)? - The three bodies of the Buddha (buddhakya) the essential body (svbhvikakya), the body of enjoyment (sabhogakya) and
the apparitional body (nirmakya) - consitute the superiority of the knowledge
of this result.
i) First, the essential body (svbhvikakya) is the dharmakya (body of the
doctrine) of the Tathgata, because it is the basis of sovereignty over all the
dharmas (sarvadharmavibhutva).
ii) The body of enjoyment (sabhogakya) is based on the dharmakya and
is characterized (prabhvita) by all the types of assemblies (paranmadala)
of the Buddha because it experiences (anubhavati) the very pure
buddhafields (pariuddhaketra) and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the
Greater Vehicle (mahynadharmasabhoga).
iii) The apparitional body (nirmakya) also is based on the dharmakya
and manifests (pradarayati) the following activities: [cf. the twelve acts of the
Buddha in Lalitavistara analyzed by Bu-ston, II, p. 7-72; Daabhmika, p.
14]:
1-2: dwelling in the Tuita palace and then departing
(tuitabhavanvasam di ktv cyavanam);
3. entry into the womb (garbhvakrnti);
4. birth (janma);
363
pure buddhafields, they enjoy all sorts of jewels (ratna): gold (suvara), silver (rajata),
etc. The Buddhas and bodhisattvas mutually (parapara) enjoy their bodies of
wonderful colors, etc.; they enjoy texts (dharma), stras, etc. and many theses (artha) (cf.
Chap III, 1); they establish (vyavasthp-) the specific characteristics (svalakaa) and
the general characteristics (smnyalakaa). How is it the basis (raya) and of what is
it the basis? Of immaculate unhindered knowledge (vimalam aparatihata ca jnam).
By the dominant power (adhipatibala) of this wonderful knowledge, one is established in
inconceivable liberations (acintyavimoka). A knowledge arises in the great bodhisattvas
who have entered into the great bhmis which manifests the very pure buddhafields
(pariuddhabuddhaketra) and the enjoyment of the doctrine of the Great Vehicle
(mahynadharmasabhoga).
iii) The nirmakya depends on the dharmakya: see what was said above. By the
power of the knowledge of the result (phalajna-viea), he abandons the abode of the
Tusitas, etc., and finally enters into nirva. But that is all pure fiction. This is how
peculiar ideas having the aspect of a person (manuyasabhgavijapti), a person who is
accomplishing the stereotyped career of the Buddha kyamuni, arise in the mental series
(satna) of beings. (U)
365
obstacles; it secures (upasthp-) mastery of all the dharmas (sarvadharmavibhutva), and it is transformed into the purity portion of the dependent
nature (vyavadnabhgapatita paratantrasvabhva).
ii) Its nature is that of being constituted of white dharmas
(ukladharmasvabhvalakaa) because it has attained the ten masteries
(vaita) by means of the fulfillment of the six virtues (atpramit-paripri):
(a) Mastery of life (yurvait), mastery of mind (cittavait) and mastery
of provisions (parikravait) have been acquired by means of fulfillment
of the virtue of generosity (dnapramitparipri).
(b) Mastery of action (karmavaita) and mastery of birth (upapattivaita)
have been acquired by the fulfillment of the virtue of morality
(lapramitparipri).
(c) Mastery of aspiration (adhimuktivaita) has been acquired by
fulfillment of the virtue of patience (kntipramitparipri).
(d) Mastery of vow (praidhnavaita) has been acquired by fulfillment of
the virtue of zeal (vryapramitparipri).
(e) Mastery of miraculous powers (ddhivaita) pertaining to (saghta)
the five superknowledges (abhij) has been acquired by fulfillment of
the virtue of dhyna (dhynapramitparipri).
(f) Mastery of knowledge (jnavaita) and mastery of Dharma
(dharmavaita) have been acquired by fulfillment of the virtue of wisdom
(prajpramitparipri).
iii) It is nondual (advayalakaa).
(a) It has the nature of nonduality of existence and nonexistence
(bhvbhvdvayalakaa): in other words, it is neither existent nor
nonexistent as, on the one hand, all dharmas are nonexistent
(nisvabhva) and, on the other hand, emptiness (nyat) exists really.
(b) It has the nature of nonduality of being conditioned and
unconditioned (sasktsasktdvayalakaa): in other words, it is
366
367
transformed into the puure part dependent naturet. It has acquired the stainless true
nature
(amal
tathat)
by
means
of
transformation,
the
absolute
nature
368
369
previously having joyfully cultivated wisdom and having preached the good Dharma
(saddharma) according to its twelve classes that one now attains supreme wisdom. The
miraculous sounds (sughoa) are called the good Dharma (saddharma).
iii)
(bhvalakaa) because all dharmas are imaginary (parikalpita) and nonexistent; neither
does it have a nature of nonexistence (abhvalakaa), because the self-nature composed
of emptiness (nya) exists. (Cf. the second quality of the Buddha, chap. II, 33).
(b) Sasktsasktdvayalakaa. Because it is not conditioned (saskta) by
action (karman) and afflictions (klea), it does not have the nature of the conditioned
(sasktalakaa). Because it has acquired the mastery of appearing (vibhutva) as
conditioned dharmas and because, repeatedly at many times (abhkam), it appears as
conditioned, it does not have the nature of the unconditioned (asasktalakaa).
(c) Nntvaikatvdvayalakaa. Since the dharmakya of the Buddhas is
essentially one, it does not have the nature of plurality (nntvalakaa). Since
innumerable persons (apramraya) attain it (adhigam-) each in turn, it does not have
the nature of uniqueness (ekatvalakaa). This absence of plurality and of singleness is
called the nature of nonduality (advayalakaa). [See below, 8, 33].
Two stanzas follow which summarize these ideas so that they may be easily understood:
(i) Since the belief in a self does not apply to the basis, etc. Wherever there is the belief in
a self (tmagrha) that takes the inner (dhytmika) as self (tman) and the outer (bhya)
as other, such divisions as self and other, this and that, are also imagined (vikalpa). But
since belief in a self does not apply to the dharmakya of the Buddhas, it is free of such
divisions.
Objection. If that is so, why are there several Buddhas?
Reply. Because it refers to various entrances into the possession of this basis [= of this
dharmakya] that have occurred in the past, it is asserted that there are various bases [=
different Buddhas]. Since various entrances into the possession of this basis by the
bodhisattvas are referred to, it is asserted (vyavah-) that there are different Buddhas. In
conformity with mundane language (laukikavyavahra), one says: "This one is
kyamuni, that one is Vipavin", etc.
370
(ii) In view of the division of lineages (gotrabhedt): since the original cause has
divisions, there is but one single Buddha. There are two types of lineages (gotra): 1)
innate lineage (praktistha gotram) , i.e., a superiority having no beginning and
characterizing the six faculties (andiklika ayatanaviea), a natural gift that is
transmitted (parapargato dharmatpratilabdha); 2) acquired lineage (samudnta
gotra), i.e., that which is realized by an earlier effort (prvbhysa): consorting with a
spiritual friend (kalyamitra), etc. (Cf. Bodh. bhmi, p. 3). Since the innate lineage is
indivisible (wou yeou fen pie), it may be said that there is but one Buddha. But the
acquired lineage includes many kinds and, in view of the multiplicity of these lineages, it
cannot be said that there is but one single Buddha and that the other Buddhas do not
exist.
Because of needlessness (vaiyarthyt), there is but one single Buddha. Several Buddhas
depending on the first lineage (gotra) accumulate (sabh-), each separately, the
accumulations of enlightenment (bodhisabhra). If there were only one Buddha
reaching enlightenment while the others do not, the accumulations (sabhra)
accumulated by these others would be vain (nya) and sterile (niphala). But that is
impossible (ayukta).
In view of totality (skalyt), there is but one single Buddha. Embracing all beings to be
converted separately, the Tathgatas assure their welfare and happiness (hitasukha), i.e.,
they establish them in the three vehicles as appropriate. But if there were but one
Buddha, they could not assure these beings or introduce them into the buddha-vehicles
(buddhayna), for there is not a second Buddha. [In other words, if by rights there is only
one Buddha, what is the good of introducing beings into the vehicles destined to make
Buddhas out of them?] Thus, the buddha activity (buddhakriy) carried out by these
Tathgatas would never succeed. That is why it is necessary to admit that there are
several Buddhas.
In view of non-beginning (andita), there is not just one single Buddha. The
appearances of the Tathgatas on the earth (prdurbhva) have had no beginning
(andika), just like sasra. Since it is impossible to become Buddha spontaneously
(svata) without having accumulated the accumulations (sabhra), since it is
impossible to accumulate these accumulations without having been in the service
(upsana) of a Buddha, it is completely impossible that there be just one Buddha.
371
On the other hand, it cannot be asserted that there may be several Buddhas, given the
absence of divisions in the stainless basis (abhedd amalraya). Here the pure
fundamental element (ansravadharmadhtu) is called the stainless basis because the
excellence of knowedge (jnaviea) has definitively cut through the adventitious stains
(gantukamala). One cannot assert the presence of different Buddhas in this pure
fundamental element. That is why the author says: There is neither singleness nor
plurality of Buddha (naikabuddhatva bahutvam). - See below, 33.
iv) Nityalakaa. The dharmakya is immutable (avikra) and its series (satna) is
uninterrupted (asamucchinna); this is why it is stated that it has eternity as nature. This
characteristic is attributed to it for three reasons (hetupratyaya):
It has the purification of the true nature as nature: this shows that the true nature
(tathat) is eternal (nitya) and immutable (avikra). But the Buddha has acquired the
dharmakya as self-nature. If this dharmakya changed, it would not be the true nature.
That is why it is eternal.
It is the result of an earlier vow. Previously, the Tathgatas have uttered the following
vow: May I save (utt-) numberless beings (apramasattva) and thus lead them to
nirva. But various categories of beings do not reach nirva and thus the result
projected (kipta) by this vow is never interrupted (asamucchinna). That is why it is
eternal (cf. chap. II, 33: the Buddha aparntakoiniha). This projection of the vow
would be impossible without the eternity of the series.
Its activity is never exhausted. The activity derived from this previous great vow is never
exhausted because the categories of beings are infinite in number. As long as beings
continue to exist, the activity carried out by the Buddhas is never interrupted. That is why
the dharmakya is proclaimed to be eternal.
v) Acintyalakaa. It has inconceivability as nature. The faculty of conceiving (cintana)
is an imagining cognition (savikalpakajna), coming from reasoning (yukti), meditation
(nidhyna) and mental engagement (manasikra); it is the result (saghta) of
speculation (tarka) and may be illustrated by comparisons (dnta). The Buddhas are
not grasped (gocara) by it; that is why they are inconceivable. Since they transcend
(samatikram-) all stages of speculation (tarkabhmi), one can adhere to them only by
means of faith (raddhdhimukti); one cannot conceive of them (cintana). (U)
372
4. How is this dharmakya attained (adhigata) for the first time (prathama) by
contact (spara)?
i) By means of nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajna) and subsequent
knowledge (tatphalabdhajna) of the syncretic dharmas of the Greater
Vehicle (mahyna-saadharmlambaka), by means of the fivefold
cultivation (pacavidhabhvan).
ii) By means of fivefold development (pacavidhabhvan).
iii) By means of the gathering of the accumulations (sabhrasacaya) in all
the bhmis.
iv) By means of the diamond-like samdhi (vajropamasamdhi) which serves
to break (bhid-) the subtle obstacles (skmvaraa) that are so difficult to
break (durbheda). Immediately after (anantaram) this samdhi, one is freed
of all the obstacles (varaa).
By these means the transformation of the support (raya-parvtti) is obtained.
[149b28]
373
(1) the melting at each moment of the base of all the imperfections (pratikaa
sarvadauhulyraya drvayati);
(2) the suppression of numerous notions and thus pleasure in the garden of the Dharma
(nntvasajvigati ca dharmrmarati pratilabhate);
(3) the complete understanding of the Dharma's brilliance in its immense and unlimited
aspect (aparicchinnkra ca sarvato 'prama dharmvabhsa sajnite);
(4) the appearance of the marks, the auxiliaries of purity, non-imagined (avikalpitni
csya viuddhibhgyni nimittni samudcaranti);
(5) the taking possession of the ever most perfect cause for the perfecting and
achievement of the dharmakya (dharmakya-paripriparinipattaye ca uttard
uttarata hetusaparigraha karoti) (cf. chap. V, 4; Strlakra, XX-XXI, 31).
The diamond-like samdhi that serves to break subtle obstacles that are so difficult to
break: this gives the reason why this concentration is like a diamond. Just as the diamond
(vajra), hard (dha) by nature, is able to break things (bhid-) that are difficult to break
(durbheda), in the same way this concentration surpasses the lower categories and is able
to demarcate the supreme pure path of knowledge (anuttaraviuddhajnamrga); this is
why it is like a diamond. [Acc. to u: this concentration, which breaks the non-defiled
ignorance so difficult to break by the other knowledges, is the nantaryamrga (cf. Koa,
V, p. vii) of knowledge; this is why it is like a diamond.] Since immediately after this
concentration one is rid of all the obstacles, one acquires the transformation of the basis:
by means of nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajna) and subsequent knowledge
(phalabdhajna), one acquires the transformation of the basis and one attains the
dharmakya of the Buddhas. (U)
374
ii) By the transformation of the sensation aggregate (vedanskandhaparvtti), it acquires sovereignty over the blissful abodes
(sukhavihra), irreproachable (niravadya), immense (apramna) and vast
(vila).
iii) By the transformation of the perception aggregate
(sajskandhaparvtti), it acquires the sovereign power of explaining every
collection of words (nmkya), collection of phrases (padakya) and
collection of phonemes (vyajanakya).
iv) By the transformation of the formations aggregate
(saskraskandhaparvtti), it acquires sovereignty over creation (nirma),
transformation (parima), the reunion of assemblies (paratsagraha) and
accumulation of white dharmas (ukladharmasagraha).
v) By the transformation of the consciousness aggregate
(vijnaskandhaparvitti), it acquires sovereignty over the mirror-like
knowledge (darajna), the knowledge of sameness (samatajna), the
knowledge of contemplation (pratyavekaajna) and the knowledge of the
accomplishment of what had to be done (ktynuhna-jna). [149c7]
375
Sovereignty
over
accumulation
of
white
dharmas
From
that,
it
is
established
in
non-abiding
nirva
377
(pratyavekajna).
Endowed
with
all
the
samdhi-
and
assures
the
cognition
of
the
accomplishment
of
duty
6. Of how many things is the dharmakya the basis (raya)? - In brief, it is the
support of three things:
i) It is the support of the various abodes of Buddha (nnbuddhavihra).
Here are some stanzas:
(a) Since the Buddhas have attained (saprpya) their own element
(svadhtu), they have gained the fivefold satisfaction (tui). Those who
have not attained this element are deprived of satisfaction. That is why
those who desire this satisfaction must acquire this element.
(b) The power and accomplishment of duty (ktynuhna), the flavor of
the texts (dharmarasa), the perfection of theses (arthasapad) and the
perfection of the qualities (guasapad) are immense (aprameya). Seeing
these ever non-perishable benefits (nitykaya), the Buddhas gain
supreme (vara) irreproachable (niravadya) satisfaction.
ii) It is the support of the various bodies of enjoyment (nnsabhogakya),
for it assures the maturing (paripcana) of the bodhisattvas.
iii) It is the support of the various apparitional bodies (nnnirmakya),
for it assures the maturation mainly (pryena) of the rvakas. [149c15]
378
379
(b) And the accomplishment of duty (ktynuhna ca). Here the word and indicates an
enumeration (caabda samuccayrtha). Duty (ktya) means action (kriy), the activity
consisting of procuring the benefit of all beings (sarvasattvrthakriy) by establishing
them suitably (samyakprasthpana) and according to their capabilities (yathkalpam) in
the three vehicles (ynatraya). Accomplishment (anuhna) means realization
(sdhana). This accomplishment of what has to be done goes on without any obstacle
(apratigham) for an immense length of time. Seeing that their power and the
accomplishing of what has to be done are immense (aprameya), the Buddhas have great
satisfaction.
(c) The flavor of the texts (dharmarasa), i.e., the supreme flavor of the Dharma
(anuttaradharmarasa), such as the stras, etc. This concerns the flavor of the arguments
(yuktirasa) that are tasted in realizing the absolute truth (paramrthasatya).
(d) The perfecting of theses (arthasapad): the theses explained (abhidheyrtha) in the
texts, stras, etc., are all perfect, for they appear according to aspirations (yathayam
avabhsante).
(e) The perfecting of qualities (guasapad):, that is, the perfection of qualities such as
the superknowledges (abhij), etc. They gain great satisfaction in seeing the immensity
of the flavor of the texts, the immensity of the perfecting of the theses and of the
qualities.
Furthermore, some say that the word artha [translated here as thesis] means nirva and
that the guas are the faculties that arise at will. Their perfection also produces a great
satisfaction.
Seeing
these
ever-unperishing
advantages,
the
Buddhas
gain
supreme
and
irreproachable satisfaction: the Tathgatas see the unique flavor of the true nature
(tathataikarasa), the great satisfaction resulting from their immense power, etc., in
themselves. Even if they enter into nirva, all of this will never perish. This is why their
satisfaction is supreme (vara) and irreproachable (niravadya); supreme because the
obstacle of the defilements and the obstacle to knowledge (kleajeyvaraa) along with
their traces (savsana) have been completely cut off (praha).
ii) It is the basis of the various enjoyment bodies: the bodies of enjoyment (nirmakya,
sic: sabhogakya) exist with the dharmakya as ruling condition (adhipatipratyaya).
380
That is why the dharmakya is called basis, but not in the way that the sun (srya) is the
basis of the rays (rami). [In u, the negative is missing: de ni i ma da od zer gyi tshul
lta bu yin no = sryaramiyogena].
iii) Likewise, it is the basis of the apparitional bodies (nirmakya): it is the same thing.
It ensures the maturation of the rvakas mainly. The author says mainly (pryea) in
order to include the bodhisattvas of the level where convinced adherence is practiced
(adhimukticarybhmi). Being of weak aspiration (hndhimuktika), the rvakas do not
mature if they do not see (read li kien in place of souei kien) the Buddha's apparitional
body; it is the same for beginning bodhisattvas (dhikrmikabodhisattva). But the
bodhisattvas who have already entered onto the great bhmis have no need of seeing the
Buddha's apparitional body in order to be ripened, because they themselves penetrate
(pratividhyanti) the vast and profound Dharma (gambhravipuladharma). (U)
381
382
8. Should we say that the Buddha Bhagavats are different (bhinna), or should we
say that they are identical (abhinna)?
Since their bases (araya), their intentions (abhiprya) and their actions (karman)
are identical, it may be said that the dharmakyas are identical. But since
numberless individuals (apramakmaya) reach enlightenment
(abhisabudhyante), it may be said that the dharmakyas are different. What is
said about the darmakyas is equally true for the bodies of enjoyment
(sabhogakya). Since their intentions (abhiprya) and their actions (karman)
383
are identical, the sabhogakyas are identical. But since their bases (raya) are
different, the sabhogakyas are different for they exist in numberless supports.
It is the same for the apparitional bodies (nirmnakya) as for the bodies of
enjoyment. [150a2]
385
(1) The four apramas: loving kindness (maitr), compassion (karu), joy
(mudit) and equanimity (upek) which have as their object an infinite number
of beings (apramasattva) (cf. below, 10).
(2) The vimokas: the eight vimokas: rp rpi payati, etc. (cf. 11).
(3) The abhibhvyatanas: the eight abhibhvyatanas (cf. 11).
(4) The ktsnyatanas: the ten ktsnyatanas (cf. 11).
(5-6) The ara and the praidhijna are identical (!) (cf. 12 and 13).
(7)
The
four
pratisavids:
dharmapratisavid,
arthapratisavid,
386
vi. the power of the knowledge of the various dispositions acquired by beings
(nndhtujnabala);
vii. the power of the knowledge of the paths leading to the various destinies
(sarvatragminpratipajjnabala);
viii. the power of the knowledge of former abodes (prvanivsajnabala);
ix. the power of the knowledge of the death and rebirth of beings
(cyutyupapdajnabala);
x. the power of the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements
(sravakayajnabala).
(13) The four vairadyas:
i. The Buddha Bhagavat himself truly asserted (cf. Aguttara, II, p. 8-9;
Koavykhy, p. 645 30 seq.): "I am truly enlightened and if anyone objects that I
have not clarified such and such dharmas, I find no validity in this criticism." This
is the first fearlessness (samyaksabbuddhasya bata me sata dharm
anabhisabuddhity atra me kacic .... codayet, tatrha nimittam api na
samanupaymi. idam prathama vairadyam).
ii. He truly said: "I have truly destroyed the impurities, and if someone
objects that such and such impurities have not been destroyed by me, I find no
validity in this criticism." This is the second fearlessness (knsravasya bata me
sata ime srav aprah ity atra me kacih .... codayet, tatrha nimittam api
ma mananupaymi. idam dvitya vairradyam).
iii. He truly said: "I have preached to the rvakas the path of escape from
suffering, and if anyone objects that this path, the practice of which does not lead
to the final suppression of suffering, I find no validity in this criticism." This is
the third fearlessness (yo v punar may rvak mrga khyto ....
nairyika ...., tatkarasya samyakdukhaqkayya .... sa na nirysyatty atra
m kacic .... codayet, tatrha nimittam api na samanipaymi. ida ttya
vairadyam).
iv. He truly said: " To the rvakas I have revealed the dharmas that
present an obstacle to the path and if anyone objects that these dharmas, which
387
rotam
avadadhati,
jcittam
upasthpayanti,
pratipadyante
388
uranta iti vistara. tena tathgatasya na nad bhavati nghto bhavati. upekakas
tatra tathgato viharati smta saprajnan) (cf. 20.)
(16) Vsansamudghta. - This is to have completely destroyed the signs of
afflictions (kleadiace) that remain even when there are no more afflictions, e.g., the
habit of jumping about like a monkey, etc. (cf. 21, the example of Maudalyyana).
(17) Asamoat. - This is correct memory (smti) and knowledge (jna); not
wasting time in which one could be of service to beings (sattvrthakriyklnatikrama)
(cf. 22).
(18) Mahkaru. - This is to aspire for the welfare of all beings
(sakalajanahitayat) (cf. 23).
(19) The eighteen veika buddhadharmas. - veika, unique, has the meaning of
exclusiveness (asdhraa).
i. The Tathgata does not misstep (nsti tathgatasya skhalitam). On the
contrary, even though he has destroyed his impurities (ksrava), the arhat, when he
goes out to a town to beg his food (piapta), sometimes meets (samgacchati) a wild
elephant (hastin), a wild horse (ava), a wild bull (go) or a wild dog (kukkura);
sometimes he treads on sharp thorns (gahvarakaaka) underfoot and jumps with both
feet together onto a venomous snake; sometimes he enters a house (gha) and the
townswomen (mtgrma) speak to him in an inappropriate way; sometimes in the forest,
he loses the right path and takes a wrong path; sometimes he meets up with brigands
(amitracaura), madmen (vpada) or married women (parakalatra), etc. All these
missteps (skhalita) of this type which occur to the arhat do not occur for the Buddhas.
ii. The Tathgata does not shout (nsti ravitam). On the contrary, the
arhat who walks in the forest (araya) and loses his way, or who enters an empty house
(tyaktagha) raises his voice, calls out and utters loud cries (ravita). Or even, as a result
of deep-rooted (vsadoa) but non-defiled (aklia) habits, he opens his lips, uncovers
his teeth and bursts out into laughter (hsya). All these squallings (ravita) of this kind
that occur among the arhats do not occur among the Buddhas.
389
iii. The Tathgata has an infallible memory (nsti muit smti). On the
other hand, the arhat, even though he is stainless, forgets what he has done or what he has
said a long time ago.. The Buddhas forget nothing.
iv. The Tathgata has no notion of multiplicity (nsti nntvasaj). On
the other hand, the arhat produces exclusively (eknena) the notion of disgust
(pratiklasaj) with respect to nirva-with-residue (sopadhieanirva); with
respect to nirva-without-residue (nirupadhieanirva) he produces exclusively the
notion of calmness (ntasaj). With regard to both sopadhieanirva and
nirupadhieanirva the Tathgata produces the notion of identity (abhedasaj) and
is established in supreme equanimity (upek).
v. The Tathgata does not have an unconcentrated mind (nsty
asamhita cittam). On the the other hand, the arhat concentrates his mind in order to
enter into absorption and, when he emerges from it, (vyutthita) he is not longer
concentrated. In every state (avasth), the Tathgata does not have an unconcentrated
mind.
vi.
The
Tathgata
has
no
ill-considered
renunciation
(nsty
knowledge
and
are
in
accord
with
knowledge
(kyavgmanaskarma
jnaprvagama jnnuparivarti). On the other hand, the arhat sometimes has good
(kuala) bodily actions, sometimes morally indeterminate (avykta) bodily actions, and
it is the same for vocal and mental actions. Since these three actions are preceded by
knowledge and are in accord with knowledge in the Tathgata, they are never
indeterminate. That which is the outcome of knowledge (jnasamutthita) is called
390
unhindered
knowledge
and
vision
(tryadhvany
asagam
apratihara
jnadarana pravartate). As the arhat is unable to grasp the things of the three times
by means of a simple production of mind (cittotpdamtra), his knowledge (jna) and
vision (darana) are hindered (sakta); as he cannot know everything absolutely, his
knowledge and his vision are prevented (pratihata). On the contrary, with respect to the
things of the three times, the Tathgata knows absolutely every object in one simple
production of mind. This is why his knowledge and his vision are unattached and
unprevented. Consequently, these eighteen attributes individually are the attributes
unique to the Buddha (cf. 24).
(20) Sarvkravarajna, etc. This is to understand correctly all the aspects
(kra) of all the aggregates (skandha), elements (dhtu) and bases of consciousness
(yatana). The word etc. designates the innumerable qualities (apramagua)
associated (saprayukta) with the dharmakya. (U)
391
because he aspires that beings may be joined with happiness (sukhasayoga). - b) You
aspire to separate (vigamaya): explains the aprama of compassion (karu), because
he aspires that beings may be separated from suffering (dukhaviyoga). - c) You aspire
that they may not be divided (aviyogaya): explains the aprama of joy (mudit)
because he aspires that beings may not be separated from happiness (sukhviyoga). d)
You aspire for the welfare and happiness (saukhyahitaya): explains the aprama of
equanimity (upek) because he aspires that beings may attain welfare (hita) and
happiness (sukha). Equanimity (upek) is disgust (vaimukhya): he aspires that beings
may reject the agreeable feeling (sukhavedan), etc., and the traces of the defilements
(klenuaya), but he does not abandon beings. Furthermore, equanimity is called the fact
of staying in the very middle. In view of this quality (gua), homage is paid to the
dharmakya of the Buddhas and this is why it is said: Homage to you (namo 'stu te). (U)
11. [The eight vimokas (liberations), the eight abhibhvyatanas (dominating views
of the subject) and the ten ktsnyatanas (views of totality of the subject), cf.
Strlakra, XXXI, 44]:
sarvvaraanirmukta sarvalokdbhibh mune /
jnena jeya vypta te muktacitta namo 'stu te //
You are liberated from all obstacles, you dominate the entire world, O
Muni! Your knowledge peetrates the knowable; you are of freed mind!
Homage to you! [150a11]
392
ten ktsnyatanas. The vimokas precede the abhibhvyatanas and the abhibhvyatanas
precede the kisnyatanas (cf. Koa, VIII, p. 215). Thus, in his contemplations
(manasikra) and in his thinking (cintana), he is liberated from all obstacles, he
dominates the entire world and his knowledge penetrates all things (viaya); this is why
he is of liberated mind (muktacitta): endowed with these three qualities, his mind is
liberated from bonds (bandhana). (U)
12. [Ara (the power of preventing the arising of defilements in others), cf.
Strlakra, XXI, 45]:
aea sarvasattvn sarvakleavinaka /
kleaprahraka kliasnukroa namo 'stu te //
"You destroy all the afflictions of all beings completely; you crush the
afflictions; you have compassion for afflicted beings! Homage to you!"
[150a13]
393
13. [Praidhijna (the knowledge resulting from from vow), cf. Strlakra, XXI,
46]:
anbhoga nirsaga avyghta samhita /
sadaiva sarvaprann visarjaka namo 'stu te //
Your knowledge is spontaneous, detached, unfettered, always concentrated
and resolves all questions! Homage to you! [150a15]
knows
everything
(viaya).
b)
His
knowledge
is
detached
394
14. [The four pratisavids (infallible knowledges), cf. Strlakra, XXXI, 47]:
raye 'thrite deye vkye jne ca deike /
avyhatamate nitya sudeika namo 'stu te //
By virtue of the support and the supported which are the sermons, by virtue
of language and knowledge which are the preacher, your intellect is without
obstacle; you are always a kind preacher! Homage to you! [150a17]
b) Intellect without obstacle with respect to the supported (rita) is called unfailing
knowledge of meaning (arthapratisavid), because it knows the self-nature (svalakaa)
and the shared nature (smnyalakaa) of all dharmas, or because it knows without
obstacle the intentions dealing with something other (arthnatarbhi-prya, cf. chap. II,
v. 33) than what is found in the texts.
c) Intellect without obstacle in regard to language (vkya) is called unfailing knowledge
of etymology (niruktipratisavid): it can express the varied expressions referring to the
particular objects in all lands by conforming to the diverse notions arising in each of
these lands. Or also, it knows without obstacle the etymology of all the dharmas.
d) Intellect without obstacle in the categorizing knowledge of the dharmas
(dharmaprabhedanajna)
is
called
infallible
knowledge
of
preaching
396
16. [The thirty-two lakaas (marks) and the eighty anuvyajanas (minor marks), cf.
Strlakra, XXI, 49]:
satpuruya prapayante tv dv sarvadehina /
damtrt prasdasya vidhyaka namo 'stu te//
All beings, when they have seen you, recognize in you the Human Being par
excellence; just seeing you they have faith; you are the organizer! Homage to
you! [150a21]
397
17. [The four sarvkrapariuddhis (omniform purities), cf. Strlakra, XXI, 50]:
dnasthnasatyganirmaparimane/
samdhijnavaitm anuprpta namo 'stu te //
You have gained the mastery that consists of assuming, keeping and
abandoning, the mastery that consists of creating and transforming, the
mastery of concentration and the mastery of knowledge! Homage to you!
[149a23]
The
mastery
that
consists
of
assuming,
keeping,
abandoning
398
substances previously nonexistent (aprvajta rpa) is called creation (nirma); the act
of changing already existing substances in order to make gold (suvara), silver (rajata),
etc., is called transformation (parima). The Buddha has gained the mastery in all these
types of trasformation and creation.
c) The mastery of concentration (sampattivaita): this is purity of mind
(cittapariuddhi); according to his wish (yathkmam), he has at his disposal mastery
over the gates of concentration (smadhimukha); he can enter into concentration at each
moment (pratikaam), according to aspirations (yathayam).
d) The mastery of knowledge (jnavaita): this is the purity of knowledge
(jnapariuddhi); according to wishes (yathkmam), he has the mastery of the
dhramukhas at his disposal. Anugata means that he has indeed arrived at
(samudgata) the four mentioned purities. (U)
399
doctrine. He says: "That is not true, it is the contrary." He says that bad actions are the
means to going to a good destiny and that good actions are the means of going to a bad
destiny. Or, in fact, he says that everything is without cause (ahetuka), or that everything
has a creator (ivara) for its cause, a god, etc. The strength consisting of the knowledge
of what is possible and what is impossible (sthnsthnajnabala) crushes (bhanakti)
Mra's claims. Etymologically, sthna means that which can occur (sopya), that which
can take place (svaka). That which cannot occur (anupya), that which cannot take
place (anavaka) is called asthna. To subdue Mra's claims, the Buddha says: It is
impossible, it cannot happen (asthnam anavaka) that beings are arise without a
cause or from a bad cause. Why? Because if this is, that also is; if this arises, that arises
also... Effects (results) have ignorance as their cause (imasmim sati ida hoti imass'
uppd ida upajjati, yadida avijjpaccay sakhr, cf. Majjhima, i, p. 262-3; II, p.
32; III, p. 63; Sayutta, II, p. 65; Udna, I, p. 1, etc.). It is not a creator, a god, etc., who
produces them in succession.
b) By way of refuge (arae): these are actions (karman), for it is said: Beings are the
result of their own actions, are the inheritors of their actions... have each their own
actions for refuge (cf. u: hjog rten bdag git byas pa las gyi bgo skal la spyod pa,
fragmentary quotation from Majjhima, III, p. 203; Visuddhimagga, p. 301; Jtaha, IV, p.
128; Milinda, p. 65: kamasak, mnava, satt kammadyd kammayoni kammabandh
kammapaisara). When it is a question of actions, Mra attempts to cast confusion on
this doctrine, etc., as before. The second strength, which consists of the knowledge of
retribution of actions (karmavipkajnabala), subdues the claim of Mra, for it is
irresistible (apratigha). In order to subdue Mra's claim, the Buddha says (Majjhima, III,
p. 203): It is action that divides beings into lower and higher categories (kamma satte
vibhajati yadida hnappatatyti). That does not take place without cause, neither by
the act of a creator nor of a god, etc., as before.
c) By way of purity (uddhau), i.e., by way of mundane purity (laukikauddhi) and
supramundane purity (lokottarauddhi). Provisionally or definitively, it tames
(vidhamati) the afflictions and suppresses (samudghtayati) the propensities (anuaya) of
the afflictions by means of the dhynas, the meditative stabilizations (samdhi), the
absorptions (sampatti) and the noble path (ryamrga). When it is a matter of purity,
Mra attempts to cast confusion on this doctrine, etc., as before. The strength consisting
400
401
d) You proclaim that which creates obstacle (vighnakrakadeika): the Buddha proclaims
truly:
For
the
rvakas,
proclaim
the
dharmas
which
create
obstacles
(vighnakradharma), true obstacles. These two points refer to the fact that the Buddha
proclaims in the interest of others (parrtha). Without being attacked by others, by
heretics (anyatrthyn nirdhya): this shows that vairadya is synonymous with
absence of fear (nirbhaya). The Buddha cannot be attacked by others, by the heretics.
This is why he is fearless. (U)
20. [The three arakyas (things not requiring secrecy) and the three smtyupasthnas
(equanimities), cf. Strlakra, XXI, 53]:
vighyavakt paratsu dvayasakleavarjita /
nirraka asamoa gaakara namo 'stu te //
You speak independently in the assemblies; you are free of the twofold
defilement. Having nothing to hide, free of failure of mindfulness, you attract
the assemblies! Homage to you! [150a29]
402
hide (nirraka), free of failure of mindfulness (asamoa), the Buddha skilfully draws
(karati) the assemblies (gaa) of rvakas. (U)
omniscient one; you are always the omniscient one in the true
403
sarvaja). Here, according to a rule for stanzas, the words sarvaja and bhtrthika,
which form an indissoluble expression, are cited out of order. Or else, these two words
are to be separated; in this case, sarvaja means that the Buddha is omniscient, and
bhtrthika means that the Buddha possesses the real meaning (bhtrtha), as when one
says dika to designate a man who possesses a daa (club). (U)
404
Six times during the day and night, you think about the entire world; you
apply yourself to great compassion; you aspire for the good! Homage to
you! {150b6]
24. [The eighteen veika buddhadharmas (attributes unique to the Buddha), cf.
Strlakra, XXI, 57)]:
credhigamenpi jnenpi ca karma /
sarvarvakapratyekabuddhottama namo 'stu te //
In your deeds, your attainment, your knowledge, and your acts, you surpass
all the rvakas and pratyekabuddhas! Homage to you! [150b8]
405
You
surpass
all
the rvakas
and
406
in
essence
(praktiparinirvta)
and
of
imperceptible
nature
(anipalabdhalakaa) [Cf. chap. II, 30]. According to yet others, it is not a matter here
of various aspects to counteract (vipaka) by means of their antidote (pratipaka) [i.e., to
counteract by way of seeing the truths], but but rather a completely beneficent perfection
(sarvrthasapad) comparable to a cintmani of universal efficacy [a precious stone
assuaging all the desires of its possessor, cf. chap. VIII, 17]. As for myself [Asaga], I
see in this universal enlightenment (sarvkra) a special cutting of all the obstacles
(sarvvaraaprahaprakra). Why? Because it cuts off all kinds of obstacles
(sarvvaraaprakra); indeed, it cuts all the obstacles to knowledge (sarvajeyvaraa)
and it cuts off all the propensities (sarvavsan). Moreover, this great enlightenment is a
true knowledge (samyagjna) bearing on all objects (viaya). This is why the Buddha
cuts through (chinatti) all the doubts of others (parakk). Everywhere (sarvatra), i.e.,
in all the worlds (sarvaloka), he cuts off the doubts of others: all the doubts of men
(manuya) and gods (deva). He cuts off these doubts completely. Thus, this activity of
cutting off all the doubts of men and gods shows the superiority of this universal
knowledge (sarvkrajna). (U)
407
sakalaatpramitvipakanirmuktatay
atpramitpariprir
bhagavata
408
27. Such are the qualities (gua) with which the dharmakya of the Buddhas is
associated (saprayukta). Furthermore, it is associated with the following
qualities: self-nature (svabhva), cause (hetu), result (phala), action (karman),
associated qualities (yoga), function (vtti). The dharmakya of the Buddhas has
supreme (anuttara) qualities.
Here are some stanzas (cf. Strlakra, XXI, 60-61):
a.
i) You have completely achieved the Absolute; ii) you have emerged from all
the bhmis; iii) you have attained the first place among all beings; iv) you are
the liberator of all beings.
b.
v) You are endowed with inexhaustible and unequaled qualities; vi) you
show yourself equally in the universes and in the assemblies, but you are
completely invisible to gods and men. [150b17]
409
ii) You have left behind all the bhmis (sarvabhminista): you have emerged from the
ten bhmis, Pramudit, etc. This is the cause (hetu) of why the dharmakya has
completely achieved the Absolute.
iii) You have attained the foremost place among all beings (sarvasttvgrat prpta):
this concerns omniscience which ensures supremacy (viea) among all beings. This is
the fruit (phala) resulting from achievement of the Absolute.
iv) You are the liberator of all beings (sarvasattvavimocaka): this is the activity of the
dharmakya which has achieved the Absolute.
v) You are endowed with inexhaustible and unequalled qualities (akayair asamair yukto
gua): these are the qualities with which he is associated, for he is endowed with
infinite (ananta) and unique (asdhraa) qualities, powers (bala), fearlessnesses
(vairadya), etc., which are inexhaustible and unequalled.
vi) You show yourself in all the universes equally (lokeu dyase maaleu api): by
means of his apparitional body (nirmakya), he manifests in the universes (loka); by
means of his enjoyment body (sabhogakya), he manifests in the great assemblies
(maala): these two bodies are visible. On the other hand, he is completely invisible to
gods and men (adya ca sarvath devamnuai), for the dharmakya of the Buddhas
is not seen by men, gods, etc. This passage shows the difference (viea) between the
three bodies of Bhagavat by noting their function (vtti). The function (vtti) is a special
transformation (parimaviea) of the self-nature (svabhva). Among the three bodies,
two are visible (dya), the third is invisible (adya). (U)
410
changeable (adhruva) and unchangeable (dhruva) action, for the Buddhas are
endowed with three bodies (trikya).
iii) The Enlightened One (abhisabuddha) does not exist, but all the Buddhas
are not non-existent. At every moment (pratikaa), there are innumerable
Buddhas consisting (prabhvita) of existence (bhva) and non-existence
(abhva).
iv) The Buddha is not attached (rakta) and not unattached (arakta). It is by
means of attachment (rga) that he has attained certainty of release
(nisaraa). Knowing attachment (rga) and unattachment (virga), he has
penetrated the nature of attachment (rgadharmat).
v) The Buddha has transcended the aggregates (skandhti-krnta), but dwells
in the aggregates (skandhavihrin). The latter are neither identical to the first
ones nor different from them (naivyny nnanya). Although not
abandoning them, the Buddhas are completely pacified (upanta).
vi) The actions of the Buddhas are homogeneous (flow together) (sasta);
they are like the waters of the ocean (samudrajala). The Buddhas do not
worry themselves about serving beings (sattvrtha), saying: I have done
that, I am doing that or I will do that.
vii) It is the fault of beings (sattvadoa) if the Buddha does not appear, like
the moon
411
412
The dharmakya of the Buddhas is profound, i.e., the dharmakya of the Buddhas has a
self-nature (svabhva) difficult to understand (duravabodha) and the intellect of the
sages of this world (lokakuala) is unable to comprehend it. It is very profound, i.e., the
dharmakya is particularly difficult to understand and the intellect of the rvakas, etc.,
cannot grasp it. This depth is described in brief in twelve stanzas. (U)
i) This stanza explains the profundity (gmbhrya) of arising (utpda), establishment
(pratih), activity (karman) and subsistence (sthiti).
The Buddha has non-arising as arising: although they have no arising, the Buddhas seem
to have an arising. That is the profundity of arising (utpdagmbhrya).
He has non-establishment as establishment: his establishment consists of not being
established in either sasra or nirva; he is established in non-abiding nirva
(apratihitanirva, cf. chap. IX). That is the profundity of establishment
(pratihitgmbhrya).
All his actions are carried out effortlessly: he accomplishes all his actions (kriy)
effortlessly (prayatna), like a precious jewel (mai) or a celestial musical instrument
(triya). (Cf. chap. VIII, 17). That is the profundity of activity (karmagmbhrya).
He has the fourth nutriment as food. The nutriments are four in number:
a. the nutriments that sustain an impure person (auddhrayasthityhra); thus,
the person bound by all the bonds (sakalabandhana, cf. Koa, II, p. 180) sustains his
body by means of the four foods: food-by-the-mouthfuls, etc. (kavakrhra, cf. chap.
I, 37).
b. The nutriments that sustain a person who is both pure and impure
(uddhuddhrayasthityhra). Those who are born and dwell in the realm of form
(rpadhtu) or in the formless realm (rpyadhtu) sustain themsleves by contact-food
(sparhra), mentally-operating food (manasacetanhra) and consciousness-food
(vijnhra). Having no craving (vitarga), they do not have food-by-the-mouthfuls.
On the other hand, the srotapannas, in their quality as aikas, are also both pure and
impure (uddhuddhraya) but are sustained by the four nutriments.
c.
The
nutriments
that
sustain
person
who
is
exclusively
pure
(ekntauddhrayasthityhra); thus, the arhats, etc., are sustained by these four foods.
413
d.
The
nutriments
that
sustain
an
obviously
pure
person
This
stanza
explains
the
profundity
of
the
Enlightened
One
(abhisabuddhagmbhrya). The Enlightened One does not exist, for the pudgala and the
dharmas are non-existent; but, conventionally (savti) it is said that all the Buddhas are
enlighened. How do we know that the Buddhas are enlightened? At every moment, there
are innumerable Buddhas. This shows that at each instant, innumerable Buddhas reach
enlightenment. They are constituted of existence and non-existence: this shows that the
414
true nature (tathat) is existence (bhva) and non-existence (abhva) and that the
Buddhas are constituted (prabhvita) by this true nature. (Bh)
The Enlightened One does not exist, for there is no imaginary nature
(parikalpitasvabhva) in the dependent nature (paratantra); but all the Buddhas are not
non-existent, for the absolute nature (parinipannasvabhva) really does exist in the
dependent nature (cf. chap. II, 32). At each instant, there are innumerable Buddhas: in
universes (lokadhtu) surpassing in number the numberless grains of sand of the Ganges
(gagnadvluk); from moment to moment and simultaneously (samakla),
innumerable Buddhas reach enlightenment. They are consituted of existence and nonexistence: the Tathgatas have attained a place (pada) consisting (prabhvita) of the
emptiness of existence and of non-existence (bhvbhvanyat). (U)
iv) This stanza explains the profundity of detachment (vairgyagmbhrya). The Buddha
is not attached nor is he unattached. Since sensual attachment (kmarga) is absent in
him, it is said that he is not attached (rakta). Since he has no attachment, he is not
unattached (arakta) either. Why? Because sensual attachment is necessary for one to be
able to be detached from it. Since this attachment does not exist in him, he is not
unattached. It is by way of attachment that he has attained release, for it is by eliminating
the explosion of desire (rgaparyavasthna) but by keeping the traces of desire
(kmnuaya, cf. Koa, p. 3, 73) that he has attained definitive release
(tyantikanisaraa). If he had not kept the traces of desire, he would have entered into
parinirva like the rvakas, etc. Knowing attachment and unattachment, he has
penetrated the nature of detachment. Understanding that this imaginary sensual
attachment (parikalpitak-marga) has no nature of attachment, he has understood the
true nature of attachment (rgadharmat). (Bh)
v) This stanza explains the profundity of elimination of the aggregates
(skandhaprahagmbhrya). The Buddhas have gone beyond all the imaginary
aggregates (parikalpitaskandha), the aggregate of form, etc., (rpdiskandha), for they
understand (yathbhta parijnanti) completely that that which is imaginary does not
exist. But they reside in the aggregates: the Buddhas reside in the aggregates of the true
nature (dharmatskandha). These latter ones are not the same as the previous ones nor
are they different from them. It cannot be said that the aggregates of the true nature are
different from the imaginary aggregates, for the imaginary aggregates do not exist and,
415
consequently, are no different from what is. It cannot be said that they are identical, for
the imaginary aggregates are afflicted (saklita) and, consequently, are distinct from the
aggregates of true nature which have been purified. There is no identity nor difference
between dharma and dharmat. Not abandoning them, the Buddhas are completely
pacified: by not abandoning these aggregates of true nature, the Buddhas have attained
nirva par excellence. (U)
vi) This stanza explains the profundity of ripening action (paripcanagmbhrya). The
actions of the Buddhas are homogeneous (flow together): the activity of the Tathgatas
consists of actions dedicated to the welfare and happiness of beings (sattvahitasukha).
These actions, which are joined to one another and which together have a single taste
(ekarasa), are mixed with one another. It is asked what these actions resemble, and the
author replies that they are like the waters of the ocean: thus, the waters that flow into the
reservoir (vridhra) of the ocean (samudra) have one and the same flavor, are mixed
together and all maintain the well-being of the fish (matsya), etc. The Buddhas do not
worry about serving others, saying: I have done that, I am doing that or I will do that:
without forcing themselves (cittbhisaskaraa) or thinking (manasik-) about the
interests of others (parrtha), the Buddhas spontaneously (svarasena) accomplish the
service of others in the three times. In the same way, the precious jewel (mai) and the
celestial musical instrument of akra, etc., fulfill their rle without thinking about it. (U)
- Same examples in Strlkra, IX, 18-19.
vii) This stanza explains the profundity of appearance (vikaraagmbhrya). The
people of the world (loka) do not see the Buddha and yet it is said that the body of the
Buddha is eternal (nitya). If the body of the Buddha is eternal, why cannot it be seen? It
is the fault of beings if he does not appear, like the moon which does not appear in a
broken jar: water does not remain in a broken jar and, since the water does not remain in
the jar, the moon cannot be reflected there; the same among beings (sattvakya): the
water of tranquility (amathajala) being absent, the moon of Buddha (buddhacandra)
does not appear. Here, concentration (samdhi) is compared to the water, for it is clear
(rdra) by nature. He penetrates the whole world by means of his law, like the sun.
Actually, the Buddha does not show himself in the world, but he penetrates everywhere
(sarvavypin) by his buddha activity (buddhakriy), by preaching the doctrine, stra,
416
geya, etc. Like the light of the sun (sryaprabh) that penetrates the entire world, he
fulfills his buddha activity and ripens (vipcayati) beings. (Bh)
This seventh stanza is very close to Strlakra, IX, 16:
yathodabhjane bhinne candrabimba na diyate /
tath dueu buddhabimba na diyate //
viii) This stanza explains the profundity in the manifestation of enlightenment and
nirva (abhisabodhinirvasadaranagmbhrya). Sometimes the Buddha manifests
enlightenment, sometimes he is nirvanized: it is like fire. Fire in this world blazes
(prajvalati) at some moments and is extinguished (nirvpyate) at other moments. It is the
same for the Buddha: to those whose roots of good are not ripe (aparipakvakualamla),
he manifests enlightenment (abhisabodhi) in order to ripen these beings and lead them
quickly to deliverance (vimukti); to those whose roots of good are ripe
(paripakvakualamla) and who are already delivered (vimukta), the Buddha manifests
parinirva, for he has nothing further to do. He is never non-existent, etc.: the meaning
is easy to understand. (U)
This eighth stanza is very close to Strlakra IX, 17:
yathgnir jvalate 'nyatra punar anyatra yati /
buddheu api tath jeya sadaranam adarana //
ix) This stanza explains the profundity of abode (vihragbhrya). In regard to ordinary
dharmas, the Buddha has a superior essence and abode: in respect to bad dharmas
(akualadharma), the Buddha has a superior essence and a superior abode [cf. bh: de dag
la ya bdag id mchog da bugs pa mchog yin te]. His abode is superior, for it is by
abiding in the concentrations on emptiness (nyat), wishlessness (apraihita) and
signlessness (nimitta) that he is supported (lambate) on these bad dharmas and abides
there. - In respect to human destinies and bad destinies, he has superior essence and
abode: His abode is superior because it is by abiding in the dhynas and the
concentrations (sampatti) that he knows these destinies and abides there. - With respect
to the dharmas of non-religion, he has a superior essence and superior abode: His abode
is superior because it is by abiding in the brhmavihras called the infinite practices
417
(aprama, cf. above, chap. X, 10) that he knows these dharmas of non-religion and
abides there. (U)
x) This stanza explains the profundity of the very essence (tmabhvagmbhrya). The
very essence, because the eternal dharmadhtu of the Tathgatas and the qualities (gua)
derived therefrom are designated generally by the expression 'very essence'. The Buddhas
go everywhere: their subsequent nonconceptual knowledge (phalabdhajna, cf. chap.
VII) goes everywhere. Where do they go? To diverse objects (viaya), good (kuala), bad
(akuala), indeterminate (avykta), impure (ssrava), pure (ansrava), conditioned
(saskta), unconditioned (asaskita). etc. But they do not go everywhere: their
fundamental nonconceptual knowledge (nirvikalpakajna) which is without concept
(vikalpa) does not go out to the diverse objects. Although they appear everywhere:
although their apparitional bodies (nirmakya) take birth in all places, the Buddhas are
not perceived by the six senses, because from the absolute point of view
(paramrthata), the eternal dharmakya does not present the possibility of arising
(upapattyyatana) and is not grasped by the damned (nraka) or by similar beings
(sabhgasattva). (U).
xi)
This
stanza
explains
the
profundity
of
cutting
off
the
afflictions
(kleaprahnagmbhrya). In the Buddhas, the afflictions are corrected but not cut off: in
the state of bodhisattva, they have corrected the afflictions without cutting them off. In
the way that a poison is corrected by a spell: corrected by a magician's spell (mantra), a
poison (via) keeps its nature but is unable to harm. [Cf. Kyapaparivarta, 48, p. 78]. It
is the same for the afflictions: the power of mindfulness (smti) and knowledge (jna)
corrects their eruption, but the traces (anuaya) of the afflictions subsist. Why do the
traces of the afflictions persist? Because while suppressing them, the Buddhas fear
entering into parinirva immediately like the rvakas. Thus it is thanks to the afflictions
that they reach the destruction of the afflictions (klehakaya) and attain omniscience
(sarvajna). A stanza says: When the afflictions are rectified by the power of
mindfulness (smti) and knowledge (jna), bodhi is attained; similarly, when a poison
(via) is submitted to the action of a magical spell (mantra), its faults (doa) become
qualities (gua)." (U)
By retaining the defilements in the state of traces (anuaya), the Buddhas reach the
definitive destruction of the defilements (tyantikakleakaya) and attain the omniscience
418
of a Buddha, instead of entering into parinirva at once like the rvakas, because
omniscience is attained when the afflictions are destroyed. (Bh)
xii) This stanza explains the profundity of inconceivability (acintyagmbhrya). The
defilements become auxiliaries of enlightenment (bodhipakya), and the suffering of
sasra is the same as nirva. Results such as these coming from causes such as these
are inconceivable in the world. (U)
29. When the bodhisattvas recollect the dharmakya of the Buddhas, by how
many recollections (anusmti) do they recollect it? In brief (samsata), the
bodhisattvas practice (bhvayanti) seven methods (saptadh) of recollecting the
Buddhas (buddhnusmti):
i) They recollect them by saying: "The Buddhas enjoy sovereignty over all
dharmas (sarvadharmavibhutva), for in all the universes (lokadhtu) they
have acquired unhindered (apratigha) superknowledges (abhij). Here is a
stanza:
The Buddas do not have sovereignty over the entire world of beings
(sattvadhtu) who are prevented by obstacles (svaraa), deprived of the
cause (hetuvisayukta) and bound by the twofold fate
(niyamadvayasaprayukta).
ii) They recollect them by saying: " The body of the Tathgatas
(tathgatakya) is eternal (nitya)", for the Tathgatas [acc. to H: tathat] are
[is] always without stain (malavimukta).
iii) They recollect them by saying: The Tathgatas are absolutely (atyantam)
blameless (niravadya)", for they are free of any obstacle of affliction and any
obstacle to knowledge (sarvakleajeyvaraa).
iv) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathgatas have no effort to make
(anbhoga)", for, being free of effort, any activity of the Buddha
(sarvabuddhakriy) knows no interruption (asamucchinna).
419
v) They recollect them by saying: " The Tathgatas have great enjoyment
(mahbhoga)", for the pure Buddha fields (pariuddhabuddhaketra) are a
great enjoyment.
vi) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathgatas are free of stains
(anupalipta)", for they are not stained by any human situation (lokadharma)
while appearing in the world.
vii) They recollect them by saying: "The Tathgatas have great usefulness
(mahrtha)", for by manifesting (sadarana) enlightenment (abhisabodhi)
and nirva, they ripen beings who are not yet ripe (aparipakvasattvn
paripcayanti) and deliver beings who are already ripe (paripakvasattvn
vimocayanti). Here are some stanzas:
a. The Buddhas possess: (1) the perfection resulting from perfect
volition (svacittdhnasapad), (2) the perfection of eternity (nitya), (3) the
perfection of purity (uddha), (4) the perection of absence of effort
(anbhoga), (5) the perfection consisting of communicating the great
enjoyments of the Dharma (mahdharmasabhognupradna).
b. (6) The perfection of independent movement (anritapracra), (7)
the perfection consisting of wanting the welfare of beings
(bahujanrthakmat). Wise people (dhra) should practice the recollections
(anusmti) with regard to all these Buddhas. [151a10]
the
Tathgatas
have
attained
sovereignty
over
all
dharmas
not all beings reach parinirva? - Because these beings are prevented by the obstacles
(svaraa) and deprived of the cause of nirva. Having shown that the Buddha enjoys
sovereignty over all the dharmas (sarvadharmavibhutva) in a general way, then, the
author is going to explain in a more specific way why the Buddha does not have
sovereignty over beings (sattvavibhutva); this is why he says the stanza:
Over the entire world of beings hindered by the obstacles and deprived of the cause.
Beings are prevented by the obstacles: obstacles consisting of afflictions (klea), action
(karman) and retribution (vipka); for example, the violent emotions (tvraklea, cf.
Koa, IV, p. 202), the sins requiring immediate retribution (nantaryakarman, cf. Koa,
IV, p. 201), stupidity (jadat), deceit (kaitava), and so on. They are deprived of the
cause, because they do not have the cause for nirva, because they do not have the
family (gotra, cf. chap. X, 3, no. 3). They are bound by the twofold fate
(niyamadvayasaprayukta), namely, the fate of karmic action (gurukarmakraniyama)
and the the necessity of suffering the retribution (vipkanubhvaniyama). The fate of
karmic action: a repeated action (abhysa) brings about a result of similar cause
(sabhgahetu), necessarily associated with a result that accords with the cause
(niyandaphala). [Cf. u: ya da ya du goms pai phyir skal ba mam pai rgyu las mi
za rgyu mthun pai bras bu byu bai phyir te. For the explanation, see Koa, II, p.
294]. Thus Ajtaatru, who had killed his father, king Bimbisra (cf. Sumagalavilsin,
I, p. 135-137), was in turn killed by his son Udaya or Udyibhaddha, (cf. Mahvasa,
IV, 1). The necessity of suffering retribution, for action necessarily always requires
retribution; it is necessary to suffer the result of retribution (vipkaphala). Thus the
kyas
necessarily
had
Dhammapadahakath,
I,
to
p.
be
killed
346-349;
by
Virhaka
Kahahrijtaka,
(Pli,
no.
Viabha,
7,
I,
p.
cf.
133;
Bhaddaslajtaka, no. 465, IV, p. 146 seq., 151 seq.). The Buddha has no sovereignty
allowing him to introduce the beings in question into nirva; this is why, after having
shown in general that the Tathgata enjoys sovereignty over all dharmas, the author is
forced to say, more specifically, that he does not have sovereignty over beings.
ii) The Tathgatas body is eternal because he has the very pure tathat
(ativiuddhatathat) as self-nature because it is unalterable (ananyathvtti) and
immovable (avikra).
421
iii) The Tathgatas are absolutely without reproach, because they have cut all the
erroneous (svadya) obstacles, the obstacle of defilements and the obstacle to knowledge
(kleajeyvaraa).
iv) The Tathgatas do not have to make any effort: they are like a celestial musical
instrument (trya, cf. chap. VII, 17). The meaning is easy to understand.
v) The Tathgatas have great enjoyment, for they enjoy the blooming of the qualities
(guavyha) of the pure buddhafields (buddhaketra) which are the great enjoyment of
the Dharma (mahdharmabhoga). [Acc. to Bh: The pure buddhaketras of the Tathgatas
are called great enjoyment].
vi) The Tathgatas are free of stains: they are like the blue lotus (nlotpala) which is
unstained by the water. (Cf. Kyapaparivarta, v. 38, p. 67). The meaning is easy to
understand.
vii) The Tathgatas are of great use. By manifesting enlightenment and nirva, they
render the greatest service to beings: according to needs (yathkalpam), they ripen them
or deliver them.
These are the seven recollections of the Buddhas.
Two stanzas summarize these ideas. The word perfection (sapad) applies to each
member of the stanza:
(1) The perfection resulting from right volition (svacittdhinasapad) summarizes the
first recollection: sovereignty over all dharmas (sarvadharmavibhutvalakaa).
(2) The perfection of eternity (nityasapad) summarizes the second recollection: the
eternity of the body (kyanityalakaa).
(3) The perfection of purity (uddhasapad) summarizes the third recollection:
irreproachability (niravadyalakaa).
(4) The perfection of absence of effort (anbhogasapad) summarizes the fourth
recollection: absence of effort (anbhogalakaa).
(5) the perfecion of communicating the great enjoyments of the Dharma
(mahdharmasabhognupradnasapad) summarizes the fifth recollection: the great
enjoyment of the Dharma (mahdharmasabhogalakaa).
422
The
perfection
consisting
of
wanting
the
welfare
of
many
beings
423
amanuyas.
x) It is supported by the great joy and great bliss of the taste of the Dharma
(mahdharmarasaprtisukhdhiita).
xi) It is used in the service of all beings (sarvasattvrtha-kriyopasthita).
xii) It excludes all the suffering of the afflictions (apagatasarvakleopadrava).
xiii) It drives out all the mras (sarvamraparityakta).
xiv) It surpasses all other manifestations (sarvavyhtirikta), for it is adorned
with the miraculous activity of the Tathgata (tathgatdhihnaracita).
xv) It has great mindfulness, great intellect and great practice
(mahsmtimatipratipattinirya) for paths.
xvi) It has great tranquility and great insight (mahamathavipayanyna)
as vehicles.
xvii) It has the great gates of deliverance: emptiness, signlessness, and
wishlessness (nyat-nimittpraihitamahvimokamukhapravea) as entryways.
xviii) It has one of the priceless king-lotuses adorned with innumerable
collections of qualities (apramaguasacaylaktamahratnapadmarjanirita) as base.
In the same way, the following perfections are attributed to the pure
buddhafield: (1) perfection of color (varasapad), (2) perfection of shape
(sasthnasapad), (3) perfection of size (pramasapad), (4) perfection of
territory (deasapad), (5) perfection of cause (hetusapad), (6) perfection of
result (phalasapad), (7) perfection of ruler (adhipatisapad), (8) perfection
of assistance (pakasapad), (9) perfection of retinue (parivrasapad), (10)
424
iii) Its surface is limitless and its dimensions immeasurable. The dimensions (prama)
and the surface (maala) of the pure buddhaketra are limitless (aparicchinna) and
immeasurable (duravagha). Or else, its surface is immeasurable because its dimensions
are limitless. This phrase explains the perfection of dimension (pramasapad) of the
buddhaketra.
iv) Its domain surpasses the threefold world. Its territory (dea) surpasses the domain
(gocara) of the threefold world (traidhtuka) because it is not the object (gocara) of the
craving belonging to the threefold world (traidhtukat) and because it is not a result
of retribution of action (karmavipkaphala). This phrase explains the perfection of
territory (deasapad) belonging to the buddhaketra.
v) It is the outcome of supramundane and supreme roots of good. The pure buddhaketra
arises having the supramundane roots of good (lokottarakualamla) and the supreme
roots of good previously acquired (phalabdhottarakualamla) as cause (hetu). It does
not have a creator (Iavara, etc.) as cause. This phrase explains the perfection of cause
(hetusapad) of the buddhaketra. [Bh: What is its cause? It is supramundane
nonconceptual knowledge (lokottaranirvikalpakajna) and subsequent knowledge
(phalabdhajna); this subsequent knowledge is called supreme (uttara) because it is
acquired subsequent to the preceding one.]
vi) For nature it has the very efficacious and very pure mind. The pure buddhaketra has
the very efficacious (ativibhu) and very pure (ativiuddha) mind (vijapti) as nature
(lakaa) for it is nothing but mind (vijaptimtra) and there is no external object
(bhya) such as jewels (ratna), etc., outside of this mind. But it is this pure mind that is
transformed (pariam-) in this way into jewels, etc. This phrase explains the perfection
of result (phalasapad) of the buddhaketra.
vii) It is the residence of the Tathgata. It has the Buddha and none other as ruler
(adhipati). This phrase explains the perfection of ruler (adhipatisapad) of the
buddhaketra.
viii) It is the refuge of the great bodhisattvas. Only the bodhisattvas already entered into
the great bhmis (mahbhmipravia) live there and assist the Tathgata. There are no
rvakas, etc., there. This phrase explains the perfection of assistance (pakasapad) of
the buddhaketra.
426
ix) It is the immense promenade of the devas, ngas, yakas, etc. The devas, etc. who live
there serve him as retinue (parivra). These are magical creations (nirma) without
reality. Mahoraga means the great boa constrictors. This phrase explains the perfection of
retinue (parivrasapad) of the buddhaketra.
x) It is maintained by the great joy and great bliss of the taste of the Dharma. In this pure
buddhaketra, joy (priti) and bliss (sukha), the taste of the Dharma of the great vehicle
(mahynadharmarasa) serve as food (hra). This phrase explains the perfection of
maintenance (adhihnasapad) of the buddhaketra, for food (hra) maintains
(adhitihti) the life of the body.
xi) It is used to procure the interest of all beings. After eating this food, it procures the
interest of all beings (sarvasattvrtha). This phrase explains the perfection of activity
(karmasapad) of the buddhaketra.
xii) It excludes the torments of the afflictions. In this pure buddhafield there are no
torments (upadrava) caused by the afflictions (klea). This phrase explains the
benefaction (upakrasapad) of the buddhaketra.
xiii) It drives away the mras. It expels the four enemies (caturamitra), namely,
kleamra (the afflictions), skandhamra (the aggregates), mtyumra (death) and
devaptramra (the Evil One) (cf. ikhsamuccaya, p. 198; Mahvastu, III, p. 273, 281;
Madh. vtti, p. 49; etc.). This phrase explains the perfection of absence of fear
(nirbhayasapad) of the buddhaketra.
xiv) It surpasses all the other manifestations and is adorned with the miraculous activity
of the Tathgata. It surpasses the manifestations (vyha) of all the bodhisattvas for it is
the seat (spada) of the manifestation of a Tathgata. This phrase explains the perfection
of seat (spadasapad) of the buddhaketra, for it is far superior (bahvantaraviia) to
all other seats.
xv) For roads it has great mindfulness, great intellect and great practice. Great
mindfulness (mahsmti) is the wisdom that comes from hearing (read wen so tch'eng
houei = rutamaypraj). Great intellect (mahmati) is the wisdom that comes from
reflecting (read: sseu so tch'eng houei = cintamaypraj). Great practice
(mahpratipatti) is the wisdom that comes from meditation (bhvanmaypraj). This
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phrase explains the perfection of path (mrgasapad) of the buddhaketra. Here road
(nirya) is synonymous (paryya) with path (mrga).
xvi) As vehicles, it has the great tranquility and great insight. Mounted (rdha) on
tranquility (hamatha) and insight (vipayan), it travels on the three paths of wisdom
(prajmrga) and goes toward the pleasure-garden of destinies (gatyrma). This
tranquility and insight, which surpass the tranquility and insight of the rvakas and
pratyekabuddhas, is called great. This phrase explains the perfection of vehicle
(ynasapad) of the buddhaketra.
xvii) For entry-ways, it has the great gates of deliverance: emptiness, signlessness and
wishlessness. It has three gates of deliverance (vimokamukha, cf. Koa, VIII, p. 184) as
entries. Entry (pravea) is synonymous with door (dvra). These doors are called great
for the same reason as above. This phrase explains the perfection of entry
(mukhasapad) of the buddhaketra.
xviii) As base it has a priceless king-lotus adorned with innumerable collections of
qualities. Just as worldly people (loka) are ornamentd with jewels (ratna), collections of
jewels ornament this pure buddhafield. It has as support a priceless king-lotus (hong lien
hoa translates atapattra, padma and utpala in Mahvyut, 6143-6145) (mahratna)
adorned with innumerable collections of qualities. Just as the circle of earth rests on the
ciircle of wind (vyumaala, cf. Koa, III, p. 138), so this pure buddhafield is supported
by a priceless king-lotus adorned with innumerable collections of qualities. This lotus
(padma), being far superior (bahvantaraviia) to other flowers, is called the priceless
king-lotus (mahratnapadmarja). - Or else, it is the Tathgata who is called great king
(mahrja) because he is the great Dharma king (mahdharmarja) and this lotus is the
seat (dhra) of the Buddha and takes its name from its master. It is the basis of the
buddhaketra: the pure buddhaketra which rests on this king-lotus lasts for a long time
without interruption. This phrase explains the perfection of the basis (dhrasapad) of
the buddhaketra.
The enjoyment of this pure buddhaketra is absolutely pure: this ketra is without dirt
(auci) because it is free of dung (mha). It is absolutely blissful, for in it there is no sad
feeling (dukhavedan) or intermediate feeling (madhyavedan). It is absolutely
irreproachable, for in it there is no bad element (akuala) or ethically indeterminate
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pratihpayati).
429
430
v) It protects from the lower vehicles. It causes the bodhisattvas and the rvakas of
indeterminate family (aniyatagotra) to reach great enlightenment (mahbodhi) and it
establishes them in the complete practice (samyakcarita) of the Greater Vehicle.
From the point of view of these five activities, the Buddhas are all the same (sama). In
order to explain this idea, the author adds a stanza.
In the world (loka), when the causes (hetu) differ, differences of activity
(karmaprabheda) are assumed: thus, the divine cause is a peculiar cause; the human
cause, the demonic cause, etc. are peculiar causes. This is why the activities are different.
Among the Buddhas, this is not the case. The cause being identical (abhinna), their
activities are not different.
In the world, when the supports (raya) are different, differences in activity are
assumed. By supports is meant the individuals. Because they differ, the activities differ.
Thus, Devadatta and Yajadatta, who are different individuals, have different activities.
This is not the case for the Buddhas. Since the dharmakya of all the Buddhas is
identical, their activities have no difference. By functions here is meant the diverse
occupations (prayojana) practiced. Because the functions differ, the activities are
different. Thus the farmer (kbala) has a perculiar function, the merchant (vaij) has a
peculiar function, and so on. Since their function, i.e., the service to beings, is identical
among all of them, their activities are not different.
In the world, when intentions (aya) differ, differences in activity are assumed.
Intention means the pursued aim (abhiprya). Thus in the world, the intention directed
towards the good (hitaya) and the intention directed towards happiness (sukhaya)
have different objects (viaya) and the activities corresponding to them are different. This
is not the case with the Buddhas. Since their intentions of working for the benefit and
happiness of all beings (sarvasattvahitasukhakriyaya) are identical, their activities are
not different.
In the world, when the modes of operation (saskra) differ, different activities are
assumed. Mode of operation means effort (vyyma). Thus a mediocre effort produces a
mediocre activity, a great effort produces a great activity. Because the efforts differ, the
activities are different. This is not the case for the Buddhas. Since all their activity (kriy)
is carried out without effort (anbhoga), their activities are not different.
431
Since these diversifying forces do not exist among them, the masters of the world do not
have different activities: since these five diversifying forces, cause (hetu), etc., do not
exist among them, there are no differences in the fivefold activities among the masters of
the world (lokanyaka or Buddha). (U)
32. If this dharmakya of the Buddhas, associated with such qualities (gua) and
such perfections (sapad), does not occur (asdhrana) among the rvakas and
the pratyekabuddhas, with what intention (kisadhya) did the Buddha
proclaim a single vehicle (ekayna)? - Here are some stanzas:
a. [Cf. Strlakra, XI, 54]:
karartham ekem anyasadhraya ca /
deitniyatn hi sabuddhair ekaynat //
In order to attract some and to maintain others, the single vehicle has been
preached by the Buddhas to people of indeterminate family.
b. [Cf Strlakra, XI, 53]:
dharmanairtmyamuktn tulyatvt gotrabhedata /
dvyaypte ca nirmt paryantd ekaynat //
By virtue of the identity of dharmas, the non-existence of self and
deliverance, by virtue of the difference in families, acquisition of two
convictions, transformations and preeminence, there is but one single
vehicle. [151b20]
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bodhisattvas of indeterminate family and arranges it so that they remain in the Greater
Vehicle. Why? Because he wants the bodhisattvas of indeterminate family not to leave
the Greater Vehicle and not to use the vehicle of the rvakas to reach parinirva. The
Buddha proclaims a single vehicle for these reasons. (Bh)
b. By virtue of identity of the Dharma (dharmatulyatvt). By Dharma is meant the true
nature (tathat). The vehicles - the vehicle of the rvakas, etc., - although they are
different, lead alike to tathat, and as this tathat towards which they go is the same
(nirviita), the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.
By virtue of the identity of the non-existence of self (nairtmyatulyatvt). In these
vehicles, the non-existence of self of the individual (pudgalanairtmya) is the same. If
there really were different pudgalas, there could be different vehicles, e.g., that of the
rvakas and that of the bodhisattvas. But as there really are no different pudgalas, the
Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.
By virtue of the identity of deliverance (muktitulyatvt). Insofar as they deliver from the
obstacle of the afflictions (klevaraavimukti), the three vehicles are identical. As the
Buddha said: There is no difference between deliverance and deliverance. It is in this
sense (sadh) that the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle.
By virtue of the difference of families (gotrabhedata). rvakas of indeterminate family
(aniyatagotra) are of different kinds. In the crowds of rvakas moving towards
enlightenment (bodhipariata) there are both the family of the rvakas (hrvakagotra)
and the family of the Buddhas (buddhagotra). For this reason, the Buddha proclaims the
single vehicle.
By virtue of the acquisition of two convictions (dvyaypte): because a twofold
conviction (haya) has been acquired: 1) The Buddhas acquire the conviction of being
the same as all beings (sarvasattveu tmya prpnuvanti); they say: "They are me,
and I am them. Since this one (myself) has become Buddha (abhisabuddha), those will
become Buddha also." That is the first conviction. 2) In the assembly of
Saddharmapuarka, the Bhagavat made a prediction (vykaraa) to the rvakas, such
as ariputra, predicting that they would become Buddha; cf. Saddharmapuarika, p. 65:
bhaviyasi tva Sariputrngate 'dhvani... samyaksabuddha. In this way, these
rvakas acquired the following conviction: "We and the Buddha are the same (sama)
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without any difference (advitya)." Moreover, in this assembly there are some
bodhisattvas who have the same names as these rvakas who receive the same
prediction. Thus, one and the same word of the Buddha bears a twofold advantage: the
rvakas acquire the conviction of being the same as the Buddha and the bodhisattvas
receive the revelation of it. This is why the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle (see
Notes).
By virtue of metamorphoses (nirmt). In fact, the Buddha said: "O monks, I remember
that at one time, at many hundreds of times, I attained parinirva by means of the
vehicle of the rvakas" (anekaataktvo 'ha rvakaynena parinirvta, cf.
Strlakra, p. 68). Having already become Buddha, how could he again attain
parinirva by the rvaka vehicle? There is a hidden meaning (sadhi) in this phrase. It
is in order to convert beings of the rvaka category who are to be converted
(vineyasattva) that the Buddha created (nirm-) bodies and manifested a parinirva in
accord with the rvaka vehicle. Thus, since the rvaka vehicle and the pratyekabuddha
vehicle are mixed with the Greater Vehicle, there is only one single vehicle.
By virtue of preeminence (prayantt). Based on the argument of preeminence, the
Buddha proclaims the single vehicle. Other vehicles are not absent, but there is no other
vehicle superior to it. Alone, this single vehicle is far superior (bahuvantaraviita). That
is why the Buddha proclaims the single vehicle. (U)
33. If the Buddhas have one and the same dharmakya, how do we know that
there are many Buddhas? - Here is a stanza:
Since there are not two Buddhas in one and the same world (dhtu), we
know that there is one single Buddha. But since innumerable (aprameya)
beings complete their accumulations (sabhra) at the same time and since
births (kramopapatti) of Buddhas in succession is impossible, the plurality of
Buddhas is affirmed. [151b24]
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Now the author will explain why it must be assumed that the Buddhas are one (eka) and
many (sabahula) at the same time, while having all the same dharmakya.
They are one because their dharmakya is the same (cf. chap X, 3, no. 3). The Buddhas
have the same dharmakya for self-nature (svabhva); and as this dharmakya is unique,
there is but one Buddha. Moreover, there is but one Buddha because there are never two
Buddhas appearing simultaneously in one and the same universe (cf. below, chap. X,
36, no. 8). Therefore there is but one Buddha.
In the stanza, it is shown that the Buddhas are one and many at the same time. In the
same world, there are not two Buddhas: this phrase shows that there is one single
Buddha. In the same universe (lokadhtu), two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously.
This is why it is said that there is but one single Buddha.
The other phrases in the stanza show that the Buddhas are many. Innumerable beings
complete their accumulations at the same time: innumerable bodhisattvas complete their
accumulations (sabhra) at the same time. If these bodhisattvas, who have completed
their accumulations of merit and wisdom (puyajnasabhra) at the same time, did
not become Buddha at the same time, these accumulations would be vain and sterile
(niphala). But as numerous bodhisattvas finish the accumulations at the same time, it
must be acknowledged that there are many Buddhas at the same time (cf. chap. X, 3,
no. 3). The arising of the Buddhas in succession is impossible: it is not possible {there is
a line missing here at the bottom of the xerox page} we know that there is but a single
Buddha. But since innumerable (aprameya) beings end their accumulations (sabhra)
at the same time, and since the arising in succession (kramopapatti) of the Buddhas is
impossible, the plurality of the Buddhas is asserted. (Bh)
34. How do we know that in the dharmakya the Buddhas are neither absolutely
parinirvanized (atyantaparinirvta) nor absolutely non-parinirvanized
(atyantparinirvta)? - Here is a stanza:
Because they are free of all obstacles (sarvvaraavinirmukta), because their
activity (kriy) has not ended (pra), the Buddhas are absolutely nirvanized
(atyantanirvta) and absolutely non-nirvanized (atyantnirvta) at one and the
same time. [151b28]
435
they
are
referring
to
the
nirva-without-residue
element
35. Why is not the body of enjoyment (sabhogakya) the essential body
(svbhvikya)? - For six reasons:
i) Because it appears (avabhsate) as a material body (rpakya).
ii) Because it appears differently in numberless Buddha assemblies
(apramabuddhaparanmaala).
iii) Because by manifesting according to the aspirations (adhimukti) of
beings, it appears with an indeterminate nature (aniyatasvabhva).
iv) Because by manifesting in different ways, it appears with a changing
nature (calasvabhva).
v) Because it appears mixed (sasa) with all kinds of assemblies (parat) of
bodhisattvas, of rvakas, of devas, etc.
vi) Because the two transformations of support (raya-parvtti), that of the
store-consciousness (layavijna) and that of the active consciousnesses
(pravttivijna), not being in accord (viama), therefore the enjoyment body
is not the essential body.
[151c5]
436
36. [Translated according to H]. Why is the apparitional body (nirmakya) not
the essential body (svabhvika-kya)? - For eight reasons:
437
i) It is impossible (ayukta) that the Bodhisattva, who, a long time ago (cirt),
acquired imperishable concentrations (acyutasamdhi), should take birth
among the Tuitas and among humans.
ii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who, for a long time, has had the
memory of his former abodes (prvanivsnusmti), should not know writing
(lipi), oral arithmetic (gaan). calculation (sakhy), carving (mudr), the
arts (ilpa), the sciences (stra), as well as the enjoyment (sabhoga) of
desirable objects (kmagua) perfectly.
iii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who for a long time has known the
doctrine, badly (durbhita) proclaimed or well (subhita) proclaimed,
should go to find the heretics (trthika).
iv) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, who for a long time has known the
right way of the three vehicles (ynatraya), should take up the wrong practice
of asceticism (dukaracary).
v) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, neglecting hundreds of thousands
(koi) of Jambudvipas, should be content with one single place to reach
enlightenment (abhisabudh-) and turn the wheel of Dharma (dharmacakra).
vi) If, without manifesting enlightenment (abhisabodhi), the Bodhisattva
used only apparitional bodies (nirmkya) to accomplish the deeds of a
Buddha (buddhakriy) everywhere else but in Tuita, it must be that he
would have attained enlightenment only among the Tuita gods.
vii) Why not accept that the Buddhas are born simultaneously in all the
Jambudvipas? There is no scriptural text (gama) or argument (yukti) that
prevents that assumption.
viii) Even if there are many simultaneous appearances (nirma) of
Buddhas, that does not contradict the stra (Aguttara, I, p. 27) which
affirms that there are not two Buddhas appearing at the same time in one
and the same world, because, in speaking of one and the same world
(lokadhtu), the stra means (saghnti) one and the same universe-of-four-
438
439
vi) Someone may object: The Buddha avoids (li) manifesting enlightenment
(abhisabodhi) in the other Jambudvipas: only in our Jambudvipa does he really attain
enlightenment; it is by means of the apparitional bodies (nirmakya) that he
accomplishes the deeds of a Buddha (buddhakriy) everywhere else. - Why not assume
that he truly attains enlightenment among the Tuita gods and that his apparitional bodies
(nirmakya) descend into all the universes-of-four-continents (cturdvpaka, each
containing a Jambudvpa, acc. to Koa, III, p. 145) in order to accomplish the deeds of a
Buddha?
vii) If you think that attaining enlightenment in one single Jambudvpa and manifesting
an apparitional body elsewhere is not impossible, why was the Buddha unable to attain
enlightenment only when he dwelt among the Tuita gods and to manifest his
apparitional body in all the Jambudvpas of the universes-of-four-continents
(cturdvpaka)? If reaching enlightenment in all the cturdvpakas indiscriminately can
be denied, there is no scriptural text (gama) or argument (yukti) allowing the affirmation
that there are Jambudvpas where the Buddha does not appear.
viii) Objection. Is that is not contradictory to the stra (stravirodha)? The stra actually
says (Aguttara, I, p. 27): It is impossible in the present or in the future that two
Tathgatas appear in one and the same world without the one preceding and the other
following (ahna eta bhikkhave anavakso ya ekiss lokadhtuy dve tathgat
arahanto samm sambuddh apubba acarima uppajjeyum, cf. the Sanskrit in Koa,
III, p. 198; commentary in Koavykhy, p. 338). If you agree that many Buddhas appear
simultaneously in all the Jambudvpas, you are in contradiction to the stra.
Answer. To refute this objection (codyaparihra), we say that the simultaneous existence
of many apparitional (nirma) Buddhas does not contradict the stra according to which
two Buddhas do not appear simultaneously in one and the same world. For this stra,
speaking of one and the same world (ekissa lokadhtuy), means the same unique
universe-of-four continents (cturdvpa), and not a universe-of-a-thousand-continents
(shasradvpaka, or chiliocosm, containing a thousand cturdvpas, cf. Koa, III, p. 170).
Indeed, this same stra adds (Aguttara, I, p. 28) that, likewise, two cakravartin kings are
not born simultaneously. If you deny that many Buddhas appear simultaneously in
different cturdvpas, you must also deny that many cakravartins appear simultaneously
in different cturdvpas. But you accept that the impossibility for two cakravartins to
440
appear simultaneously concerns only one single cturdvpaka and does not concern the
shasradvpaka. Therefore you must also accept that the impossibility of two Buddhas
being born simultaneously concerns only one single cturdvpaka and does not concern
the shasradvpakas. [See Notes]. Furthermore, the stanza mentions many Buddhas and
illustrates omnigeneric enlightenment: subtle apparitional Buddha bodies, etc. Just as the
apparitional body (nirmakya) of the Buddha descends into the womb of his mother
(garbhvakrnti) and accomplishes the other deeds of the Buddha, in the same way many
fictitious (nirmita) rvakas, such as riputra, etc., with their distinctive characteristics,
descend into the wombs of their mothers simultaneously at the same time. It is in order to
illustrate the superiority of this omnigeneric enlightenment (sarvkrbhisabodha) that
the Buddha created these fictions (nirma).
In order to show that the complete annihilation (tyantikaparinirva) of the Tathgata is
impossible, the author says: It is in the service of all beings that the Buddha made his
vows, dedicated his efforts and attained great enlightenment. These vows (praidhna)
and these efforts (prayoga) have in view only the service of all beings (sarvasattvrtha).
As long as this work is not completed, it is impossible that the Buddha is parinirvanized
in complete annihilation (tyantikaparinirva), for his vows and his efforts would both
be sterile (niphala). Therefore the parinirvanized Buddha is the apparitional body
(nirmakmaya) and not the essential body (svbhvikakya). (U)
iii) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, a long time ago, has learned to
distinguish the wrong doctrine (asaddharma-dean) from the good doctrine
(saddharmadean), should go in search of heretics (trthika) and make them
his teachers.
iv) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva who, long ago, has penetrated
(prativedha) the value of the the noble path of the three vehicles
(ynatrayryamrganaya), should still search for his path and give himself up
to wrong asceticism (dukaracary).
v) It is impossible that the Bodhisattva, paying no attention one hundred
kois of Jambudvpas, should reach supreme enlightenment (anuttar
bodhi) and turn the wheel of Dharma (dharmacakra) in one single place.
vi) If, abstaining from manifesting upya and supreme enlightenment
(anuttar bodhi), the Bodhisattva used only one apparitional body
(nirmakya) to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha (buddhakriy) elsewhere
than in our Jambudvpa, then he would have attained enlightenment among
the Tuita gods.
vii) If that were not so, if it was not in Tuita that he attained enlightenment,
why would the Buddha not appear likewise in all the Jambudvpas? That the
Buddha does not appear elsewhere than in our Jambudvpa is a teaching
showing neither scripture (gama) nor reasoning (yukti).
viii) Someone may object: In your hypothesis, two Tathgatas appear
simultaneously in the same world (lokadhtu). This is not contradictory, if
one accepts that there are many apparitional bodies (nirmakya), that they
make up a plurality.
When we speak of the same world, this concerns one and the same universeof-four-continents (cturdvpa). This is why two cakravartin kings cannot be
born, either one or the other, simultaneously in the same world. It is the
same for the Buddhas.
Here is a stanza:
442
Subtle apparitional Buddha bodies penetrate many wombs in the same way.
In order to manifest omnigeneric enlightenment (sarvkrbhisabodha),
they manifest in the world.
443
innumerable periods (kalpa), the Bodhisattva remembers all the arts that he had
cultivated in his previous abodes; his memory is unfailing. It is impossible that he should
not know or not remember all these arts that he once practiced. In order to convert
beings, he declares that people of inferior category can change and become people of
higher category; he shows himself as not having these arts and as having to develop
them. That is why his body is an apparitional body (nirmakya) and not an essential
body (svbhvikakya) or a body of enjoyment (sabhogakya).
iii) For thirty-three incalculable great periods (kalpsakhyeya), the Bodhisattva
cultivated the good practices zealously; his merits (puya) and his knowledge (jna) are
complete (paripra). It is impossible that, in his subsequent existences, he should not
know how to tell the difference between bad and good preaching. If he were lacking this
knowledge, what dharma would he know once he became Buddha? It is in order to
convert the heretics that he manifests such hesitations in choice of doctrine. This is why
his body is an apparitional body and not one or other of the two other types.
iv) For thirty-three incalculable periods, the Bodhisattva sojourned in the ten liberations
(vimoka) and the ten good practices (cary). From the first bhmi, he has penetrated
(pratividh-) the value of the noble path of the three vehicles (ynatrayryamrganaya).
Having cut through belief in nihilism and eternalism (ucchedaavatgrha), he does not
give himself up to bad painful and pleasureable practices: that is the value of the noble
path of the first two vehicles. Rejecting belief in the existence of the conditioned
(saskragrha), he cultivates the good practice of knowledge free of concept
(nirvikalpakajna): that is the value of the noble path of the bodhisattvas. The
asceticism (dukaracary) of the heretics (trthika) can destroy the dharmas already
obtained (prpta), it cannot acquire dharmas not yet obtained (aprpta). In the two
worlds (?), it can only destroy and not increase anything; that is why it is futile. It is
impossible that the Bodhisattva should practice it. It is in order to convert beings that he
stated the cultivation of asceticism; it is not for retribution that he appears to practice it.
That is why his body is an apparitional body and not either of the other two bodies.
v) When the Bodhisattva is cultivating the path throughout 10,000 kois of Jambudvpas,
he ripens beings of 10.000 kois of Jambudvpas. When he attains enlightenment, it must
be that he assumes bodies everywhere. But he receives only one single body, a body of
retribution (vipkakya) and cannot have many of them. If that were so, why would he
444
not assume a retribution body separately in a higher place, in all places accomplishing his
work of conversion by means of apparitional bodies (nirmakmaya)? It is impossible
that he would give up 10,000 kois of Jambudvpas and accomplish enlightenment
(sabodhi) and the turning of the wheel of Dharma (dharmacakrapravartana) only
partially in one single Jambudvpa. It is in order to convert beings and bring them the
knowlege that a Buddha has appeared in the world that he manifests all these activities,
such as bodhi under the banyan tree, preaching in India, etc. This is why this body of the
'historical' Buddha is an apparitional body (nirmakya) and not one or other of the two
other bodies.
vi) If you maintain that he attains supreme enlightenment (anuttar bodhi) in only one
single Jambudvpa and that elsewhere he abstains from such upyas as entering the womb
(garbhvakrnti), etc., and only manifests apparitional bodies (nirmakya) in order to
accomplish the deeds of a Buddha (buddhakriy), why do you not maintain that a
Bodhisattva, as you represent him here, attains supreme enlightenment in Tuita and not
under the banyan tree, in one single Jambudvpa, and that everywhere else, he is content
with manifesting apparitional bodies in order to accomplish the deeds of a Buddha? This
body, that of kyamuni of our Jambudvpa, would then not be an apparaitional body
according to you.
Cf. Taish 1596, p. 320b5: If you say that he attains enlightenment in only one single
place [in our Jambudvpa], and that everywhere else he is content to manifest apparitional
bodies with their entourage (parivra), why would it not have been among the Tuitas
that he would have attained enlightnment, being content with manifesting apparitional
bodies in all the universes-of-four-continents?
[P. Demiville: Evidently here the author is addressing himself to the school that does
accept the doctrine of the nirma body but does not accept that the 'historical'
kyamuni was one. And the author seeks to win them over by saying: Then it should be
easy for you to accept that he was already Buddha in Tuita, i.e., outside the dvpas and
that in India there was but one nirma.]
vii) If it was not in the Tuita heaven that he attained enlightenment, then he must attain
it everywhere ... There is neither scripture (gama) nor reasoning that can demonstrate
the doctrine that he attained it in one single place, i.e., in one single Jambudvpa.
445
Therefore this body, i.e., the kyamuni of our Jambudvpa, is an apparitional body and
not one or the other of the two other bodies.
[P. Demiville: It is a fact that the Buddhas are many, as we will establish in the eighth
reason. Thus, if you do not accept that these multiple Buddhas are all nirmas of a
transcendent Buddha who has 'really' attained bodhi, then there is only one possibility: it
is that the attaining of bodhi is itself only nirma and is produced everywhere by
nirma: which is what we maintain from our side. - We are going to show that it is
inadmissible that the Buddha is realized in one single Jambudvpa, which is in no way
established even by tradition; then one of two things: either the Buddha of our single
Jambudvpa was already Buddha in heaven - then he is just one kind of nirma of his
antecedent in Tuita - and it is from him all the other Buddhas emanate by nirma; or
else this Buddha of our Jambudvpa, like all the others, is quite simply emanated by his
other two bodies.]
Dh, Taish 1596, p. 320a16: Why not accept that the Buddhas appear likewise [acc. to
Huian-tsang: simultaneously] in all the Jambudvpas? Neither scripture nor reasoning can
demonstrate that this is not so. - Comm., p. 320b8: If you say that he did not attain
enlightenment in all the universes-of-four-continents (cturdvpa), that is impossible, for
there is neither scripture nor reasoning that are opposed to it.
viii) In one single sahaloka, two Tathgatas appear simultaneously. This scriptural text
is not contradictory to our doctrine. Why? Because it is acknowledged that the
apparitional bodies (nirmakya) consist of a plurality. That these apparitional bodies
are many, that there are apparitional bodies everywhere, there is nothing impossible
there. That is why this body is an apparitional body and not one or other of the two other
bodies. - Thus we are able to prove that you are in contradiction with the stra if you say
that the Buddha is not seen in a single one of hundreds of kois of universes. There are
some who say that two Buddhas cannot be born simultaneously in one single great
trichiliocosm (mahtrishasralokadhtu) and that it is the same for the cakravartin kings.
But you must interpret this stra in the light of the case of the cakravartin kings. Two
cakravartin kings cannot be born simultaneously in one and the same universe, but there
is nothing preventing them being born in different universes. It is the same for the
Tathgatas.
446
Explanation of the stanza: The Buddha descends from the Tuita heaven in Jambudvpa
in order to be conceived there. At this moment, he creates all his disciples by nirma,
riputra, etc., who are conceived. Thanks to this creation, supreme enlightenment
(anuttar bodhi) with its signs (skr) can be manifested: if there were only the two
lower vehicles, it would be impossible to show that the Buddha is superior. If there were
only the superficial and narrow knowledge of these two vehicles, it would be impossible
to show that the wisdom of the Buddha is endowed with all the signs (skr). The
fictive bodies of riputra, etc., appear in the world in order to show that.
37. Since the enjoyment body (sabhogakmaya) and the apparitional body
(nirmakya) are both transitory (anitya), how can the stra say the the body of
the Tathgata (tathgatakya) is eternal (nitya)? - Because the resultant body
(niyandakya = sabhogakya) and the apparitional body both depend on the
eternal dharmakya. Since the enjoyment (sabhoga) is never interrupted
(samucchinna) and appearances (nirma) are always re-occuring, we know that
the body of the Tathgata is eternal. Compare the phrase: it always experiences
happiness (sad sukham anubhavati), and the phrase: it always nourishes (sad
pia prayacchati). [151c29]
448
vi) in order that beings ripen (paripac-) quickly (gram) by not giving up the
yoke (dhura) of their personal energy (svvrya).
Here are two stanzas:
a. Because his activity (kriy) is complete (paripra), in order to prevent
rejection of nirva, in order to prevent disdain (avaj) for the Buddhas, in
order to stimulate interest (autsukya) in regard to the Buddha,
b. in order to stimulate the personal energy (pratytmavrya) of beings and in
order to ripen them (paripac-) quickly (gram), the apparitional body of the
Buddha is not present definitively (tyantikam). [152a11]
449
error (viparysa)?" This is why they exert themselves to understand the Dharma that the
Buddha proclaims to them before he enters into nirva.
iv) In order to arouse interest with regard to the Buddha. This reason is not explained;
see 38-2.
v) In order to stimulate personal energy in beings. In this way they know that the
Dharma is hard to find. When they know that the Bhagavat is going to enter into nirva,
they personally (pratytmam) exert their energy (vrya). The Buddha is the master who
teaches the Dharma in the world; when he is no longer there, the world is without
support. Knowing that, they exert their energy.
vi) In order that beings ripen quickly by not rejecting the yoke of personal exertion. In
order that they exert their energy and avoid rejecting (nikip-) the good yoke
(kualadhura) by saying: "Our roots of good (kualamla) will ripen inevitably as long as
the Bhagavat has not been annihilated (niruddha)."
For these six reasons, the apparitional body of the Buddha does not last eternally. In
order to summarize the ideas explained above, the author says the stanzas: Because his
activity, etc. (U)
450
the subhitakya. These two bodies are called dharmakya. This Dharma is very
profound (atigambhra) and hard to penetrate (pratividh-); it is not graspable by people
of lower category. But those who have penetrated it conceive profound respect for the
Tathgata. The false body (savtikya) is the nirmakya. In order to show that this
body is imaginary (parikalpita) and without true reality (asadbhta), the nirmakya
does not last eternally.
iv) If the Buddha remained always in one single nirmakya, the beings who would see
him for the first time would feel interest (autsukya), but then, after a while, they would
experience satiety. But if the nirmakya undergoes all kinds of wondrous
transformations (adbhutaparima) in its color and shape (rpasasthna), the beings
who see him continually feel ever a new interest and ignore their satiety. This is why the
nirmakya does not last eternally.
v) If the Buddha always remained as nirmakya, beings would not bother themselves
with him. Also the Tathgata abandons his mirmakya in order that, knowing that the
Buddha will not be in the world for a long time, beings will make an effort and train
rhemselves without depending on someone else ... This is why the nirmakya does not
last eternally.
vi) We have just shown how beings who have not developed effort are led to develop it.
Now it will be shown how those who already have developed effort do not abandon it. By
developing the wisdom of concentration (samdhipraj), perfection is soon reached
(sapad). This is why the nirmakya does not last eternally. (P)
452
453
NOTES
The bibliography on the three bodies of the Buddha is immense; a mass of information
(sources and works) may be found in Hbgirin, under Busshin, p. 174-185; Siddhi,
Appendix III, p. 762-813.
There are many similarities between the present chapter and the
Abhisamaylakraloka, chap. XXIX.
On the buddhology of the Vijaptimtra school (Sramati, Asaga, Vasubandhu,
Bandhuprabha) see especially: Uttaratantra, p. 240-288; Strlakra, IX, 60-66;
Sagraha, chap. X; Prajpramit-strastra, T 1510, k. III, p. 792;
Saddharmapuarkopadea, T 1520, p. 18c3 (three bodhis); Daabhmikastrastra, T
1522, k. II, p. 130c seq.; Buddhabhmistraastra,T 1530, k. VII, p. 325c;
Mdhyantavibhaga, p. 191, Siddhi, p. 693-716.
454
The twelve acts of the Buddha: Lalitavistara, analyzed in Bu-ston, II, p. 7-72;
Daabhmika, p. 14 (20); Uttaratantra, p. 254.
3. The natures of the dharmakya: Uttaratantra, p. 251-253; Triik, st. 29-39, p. 43-45;
Siddhi, p. 693, 703-704; 710, 789.
i. rayaparvtti: see notes to chap. I, 57; IX, v. 1; Triik, p. 44-45.
ii. ukladharma: Strlakra, IX, 4. - The ten vaits: definitions in Madh. avatra, p.
347(11) - 348 (3); Bodh. bhmi, p. 70 (7).
iii. Advaya: a. Bhvbhvvdvaya, second quality of the Buddha. above chap. II, 33;
Strlakra, IX, 24-25. - b. Saskt-sasktdvaya, Strlakra, IX, 14. - c.
Nnttvaikatvdvaya, below, 33; Strlakra, IX, 26, 77, 82-85; Madhyntavibhaga,
p. 103 (19) (dharmakyasybhinnatvam); Avatasaka, T 278, k. V, p. 324 (9), 429b20;
Mahprajpramitstra, T 220, k XXV, p. 972a22.
iv. Nitya: Uttaratantra, p. 255; Strlakra, IX, 66 (praktynityat svbhvikasya
svabhvena nityatvt); Madhyntavibhaga, p. 187 (21) (dharmakyasynuccheda).
v. Acintya: Uttaratantra, p. 256; Triik, p. 44 (21): acintyas tarkgocaratvt
pratytmavedayatvt dntbhvc ca; Siddhi, p. 699.
455
bhmi, p. 405; Strlakra, XIV, 45; Madhyntavibhaga, p. 157 (1); Siddhi, p. 3, 162,
667, 685.
5. Vibhutva of the Buddha resulting from various parvttis: Strlakra, IX, 38-48;
Siddhi, p. 600 (rpaskandha- and skandhacatukaparvtti).
Adamrdhalakaa, in Tibetan spyi gtsug bltar mi mtho ba, in Chinese wou kien ting
siang. The dictionary of Mochizuki restores it, without reference, as
anavalokitamrdhatas. This is the ua as it is invisible to the sattvas of the
traidhtuka, or to the devas and manuyas, or to the bodhisattvas of the two ynas as
well. Sometimes it is counted amongst the 32 lakaas, sometimes among the 80
anuvyajanas. For example, in the Mahprajpramitstra, T 220, k. 381, p. 968c18,
ting siang wou neng kien is the 65th anuvyajana, whereas the ua is the 32nd
lakaa. In the Pacavimatishasrik P. P., T 223, k. 24, p. 395e28, the wou kien ting is
the first anuvyajana, while the ua is the 32 nd lakaa. The Yogacrabhmistra, T
1579, k. 49, p. 566 seq, counts it as one of the lakaas with the ua. The biography
and details are in Hbgirin, under Chs. (P. Demiville)
The four jnas, the knowledge of the mirror, etc., and the revolution of the vijnas:
Mahvyut., 111-114; Dharmasagraha, XCIV; Strlakra, IX, 67-76;
Buddhabhmistra, T 680, p. 721 seq.; Buddhabhmistrastra, T 1530, k III, p. 301a;
k. IV, p. 306c; k. V, p. 312a; k. VI, p. 316c; Siddhi, p. 681-692.
Dhra and samdhimukha: Bodh. bhmi, p. 272 (12); Strlakra, XII, 23; XVIII, 26;
Uttaratantra, p. 219; Siddhi, p. 613, 618, 633, 659.
456
7. Cf. chap. X, 5
9. The guas of the Buddha. - The present list, drawn from Strlakra, XX-XXI, 4359, is repeated almost word for word in Abhidharmasamuccaya, T 1605, k. XIII, p.
690c11; Abhidharmasamuccayavykhy, T 1606, k. XIII, p. 757c18;
Abhisamaykrloka, XXIX, p. 914 (24) - 916 (8). The Uttaratantra, p. 264, lists 64
properties of the Buddha. Bodh. bhmi, p. 89 (3) enumerates 140 buddhadharmas which
it describes in the lakavyajanapaala, p. 375-383 and the pratihpaala, p. 384410. Here is this list: tatreda catvriadauttara buddhadharmaatam.
dvtriamahpurualakani atir anuvyajanni catasra sarvkr pariuddhayo
daa balni catvri vairadyni trI smtyupasthnni try. arakyno mahkaru
asapramoadharmat vsansamudghtat
10. The four apramas (= brahmavihras).- Defined in Abhis. al l., p. 914 (25):
apramni maitrydicaturbrahmavihra. - Cf. Dgha, II, p. 196, III, p. 220;
Theragth, I, st. 649; Jtaka, I, p. 139; II, p. 61; mett, etc.: Visuddhimagga, I., p. 111,
295; Atthaslin, p. 192; Divya, p. 224 (28); Koa, p. 196-203; Vibh, T 1545, k. CXLI,
457
11. The eight vimokas.- Defined in Abhis. al l, p. 914 (25): adhytma rpyarp
bahirdh rpI payatti dvau, ubha vimoka kyena skatk rtvopasapadya
viharatty eka, kavijan-kicanyananaivasajayatannti catvra
sajaveditanirodha ity eka ity aau vimok. - Cf. Dgha, III, p. 262; Aguttara, I, p.
40; IV, p. 306; Vibhaga, p. 342; Paisabhid, II, p. 38-40; Atthaslin, p. 190;
Dhammasagai, p. 53; Mahvyut., 1511-1518; Dharmasagraha, LXI; Koa, VIII, p.
203-211; Koavykhy, p. 597 (8), 643 (18); Vibh, T 1545, k. CXLI, p. 727a1;
Avadnaataka, II, p. 69 (2), 154 (14); Saddharmapuarka, p. 29 seq. et passim.
The eight abhibhvyatanas. - Defined in Abhis. al l., p. 915 (3):
adhytmarprpasajnau pratyeka parttdhimtrkrbhy bahirdh rpI
patatas tny abhibhya jnta iti catuayam. adhytmrpasajy eva
nlaptalohitvadtn abhibhya patari catuayam ity aavidham abhibhvyatanam. Cf. Dgha, II, p. 110; III, p. 260, 287; Majjhima, II, p. 13; Aguttara, I, p. 40; IV, p. 305,
348; V, p. 61; Dhammasagai, p. 52; Atthaslin, p. 387; Visuddhimagga, p. 175 seq.;
Koa, VIII, p. 211-213; Vibh, T 1545, k. CXLI, p. 727a11; Mahvyut., 1520-1527;
Strlakra, VII, 9; XXI, 44; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691a12; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIII,
p. 758c5.
The ten kitsnyatanas.- Definitons in Abhis. al. l, p. 915 (2):
pthivyaptejovyunlaptalohtvadtavijnkam iti ktsna daavidham. - Cf. Dgha,
III, p. 268, 290; Majjhima, II, p. 14; Aguttara, V, p. 46 seq., 60; Nettippakaraa, p. 89.
112; Paisabhid, I, p. 28; Visuddhimagga, I, p. 110; Koa, VIII, p. 213-215;
Koavykhy, p. 692 97); Vibh, T 1545, k. CXLI, p. 727a19; Mahvyut.. 1529-1540;
Strlakra, VII, 9; XXI, 44; A.S., T1605, K. VII, p. 691a18; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIII,
p. 759a21.
55; Vibhaga, p. 19 seq; Avadnaataka, II, p. 131 (5); Divya, p. 401 (4); Mahvastu, I,
p. 164 (15), 165 (5); 509; II, p. 292 (17); Lalitavistara, p. 358 (2), 361 (20), 423 (22), 437
(21) (raajaha); Koa, I, p. 13; IV, p. 121; VII, p. 86-87; Koavykhy, p. 22 (30);
Abhis. al., VIII, st. 7; Abhis. al. l, p. 21 (25), 28 (17), 40 (19), 83 (17), 917 (1);
Strlakra, XXI, 45; Bodh. bhmi, p. 89 (1); A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691a23; A.S.V.,
T 1606, k. XIV, p. 759b9.
The Abhis. al. l., p. 917 (2), shows the difference between the ara of the rvaka and
that of the Buddha: m 'smaddarant kasyacit kleopatti syd iti
mauyakleopapattiparihrit rvakdyara -samdhi. thatgatn tu
sakalajanakleaprabandhonmlana syd grmdiu. ity asarsamdhiviea.
13. Praidhijna. - Defined in Abhis. al., VIII, st. 8: anbhogam ansagam avtghta
sad sthitam, sarvapranpanud bauddha praidhijanam iyate; Abhis. al. l, p. 915
(7): samyagapagata sarvanimittasan
p. 172; VII, p. 88-89; Strlakra, XVIII, 54; XXI, 46; Bodh. bhmi, p. 89 (1); A.S., T
1605, K. VII, p. 691a24-26; A.S. V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 759b17.
The Abhis. al. l., p. 917 (9) shows the difference between the pranidhijna of the
rvaka and that of the bodhisattva: nirmittatvenasvarasapravtta svasarasapravtta
vastvanabhinivead rpdisagavigata savsanakleajeyvaraapraht
sarvajeyvyghtam sasram avasthnt sad sthita samyakpratisavillbht
pranavisarjanakri tathgata praidhijanam iti rvakdipraidhijand viiam
iam.
14. The four pratisavids. - Defined in Bodh. bhmi, p. 258 (5): yat sarvadharm
sarvaparyeu yvadbhvikatay yathvadbhvikatay ca bhvnmaya asaktam
avivartya janam iyam e dharmapratisavit. yat puna sarvadharmm eva
sarvalakaeu yvadbhvikatay yathvad bhvikatasay ca bhvanmayam asktam
avivartya janam iyameam arthapratisavit. yat puna sarvadharmm eva
sarvanirvacaeu yvadbhvikatay yathvadbhvikatay ca bhvanmayam asaktam
avivartya janam e niruktipratisavit.yat puna sarvadharmm eva
sarvaprakrapadaprabhdeu yvadbhvikataya yathvadbhvikatay ca bhvanmayam
459
15. The five and the six abhijs.- Infinite bibliography: Vibh, T 1545, k. CXLI, p.
726b22; Koa, VII, p. 97-126; Mahvyut., 202-209; Dharmasagraha, XX;
Daabhmika, p. 34-37; Madh, avatra, p. 56; iksam., p. 243; Bodhicarv. paj., p.
428 (4); Strlakra, VII, 1; XXI, 48; Bodh. bhmi, p. 58; Uttaratantra, p. 148, 180,
190; A. S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691b6 seq.; A.S.V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 759c17 seq.
460
Marks of the cakravartin and the Buddha, Koa, III, p. 203; marks of the beginning
bodhisattva, Koa, IV, p. 220; Siddhi, p. 737. Following is the list of lakaas and
anuvyajanas according to Lalitavistara.
The thirty-two lakaas:
1. uara, his head is crowned by a cranial protuberance;
2. bhinnjanamayrakalpbhinlavallitapradakivartakea, his hairs, curling to
the right, are deep black, brilliant like the tail of the peacock or collyrium with moving
reflections;
3. samavipulalalta, his forehead is broad and smooth;
4. r bhruvor madhye jt jimarajatapraka, between his eyebrows he has a circle of
hair white like snow or silver;
5. gopakmanetra, his eyelashes are like those of a heifer;
6. abhinlanetra, his eyes are dark black;
7. samacatvriaddanta, he has forty even teeth;
8. aviraladanta, his teeth are close together without any gap;
9. ukladanta, his teeth are white;
10. brahmasvara, his voice has the sound of Brahma (or according to others, he has the
voice of a passerine bird);
11. rasarasgravn, his sense of taste is excellent;
12. prabhtatanujihva, his tongue is broad and thin;
13. sihahanu, he has the jaw of a lion;
14. susataskanda, his shoulders are perfectly rounded;
15. saptosada, the seven parts of his body are well-developed;
16. citntarsa, the space between his shoulders is covered;
17. skmasuvaravaracchavi, his skin is fine and golden in color;
18. sthito 'navanatapralambabhu, standing upright, his arms come down to his knees;
19. sihapvsdhakya, the front part of his body is like a lion;
461
20. nyagrodhaparimaala, his waist is like the trunk of a nyagrodha tree, the Indian fig
tree;
21. ekaikarom, his hairs arise one by one;
22. rdhgrbhipradakivartarom, their upper ends curl to the right;
23. koopagatavastiguhya, his penis is sheathed;
24. suvivartitoru, his thighs are pefectly rounded;
25. aieyamgarjajagha, his leg is like that of the king of the gazelles;
26. drghguli, the toes of his feet are long;
27. yatapripda, his heel is broad;
28. utsagapda, his instep is high;
29. mdutaruahastapmada, his feet and hands are soft and delicate;
30. jlgulihastapda, his toes and fingers are marked with a network of lines;
31. adha karmatalayoh cakre jle cotre arcimat prabhsvare 'site sahasrre sanemike
sanbhike, the soles of his feet are marked with beautiful wheels luminous, brilliant,
white, having a thousand rays held by a felly within a hub;
32. supratihitasamapda, his feet are close together and well set.
The eighty anuvyajanas:
1. tuganakha, his nails are rounded,
2. tmranakha, verging on the color of copper,
3. snigdhanakha, smooth;
4. vttguli, his fingers are rounded,
5. citrguli, beautiful,
6. anuprvacitrguli, tapering;
7. ghaira, his veins are hidden,
8. ghagulpha, his ankles are covered,
9. ghanasadhi, his joints are solid,
462
463
465
18. The ten balas: Aguttara, V, p. 32 seq.; Majjhima, I, p. 69; Cullaniddesa, p. 466;
Milinda, p. 105, 285; Vibhaga, p. 335-344; Kathvatthu, p. 228; Mahvastu, I, p. 38
(125), 39 (13), 159 (12), 502; Lalitavistara, p. 433 seq.; Koa, VII,p. 67-72;
Koavykhy, p. 641 (10) seq., Dhraivaraparippicch in Madh. avatra, p. 369-395;
Abhis. al. l., p. 455 (15); Strlakra, XXI, 51; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691b28 seq.;
A.S.V., T 1606, K XIV, p. 760b11 seq;, Mahvyut., 120-129; Dharmasagraha, LXXV;
Sagraha, above, v. 9, no. 12.
19. The four vairadyas: Majjhima I, p. 71 seq., 380; Dgha, I, p. 110; Aguttara, II, p.
13; III, p. 297 seq.; IV, p. 83, 210, 213; Paisambhid, II, p. 194; Dhammapadahakath,
I, p. 71; Sumagalavilsin, I, p. 278; Mahvastu, I, p. 38 (15), 39 (13 seq.; II, p. 545; III,
p. 386 (14); Divya, p. 126 (13), 264 (30), 627 (15); Lalitavistara, p. 5, 403 (1); Koa, III,
p. 196; IV, p. 221; VII, p. 75; Koavykhy, p. 645 (30); Mahvyut., 131-134;
Dharmasagraha, LXXVII; Saddharmapuarka, p. 29 seq., 77 seq., 239; Abhis. al. l.,
p. 455 (21); Madh. avatra, p. 320; Strlakra, III, 3; XXI, 53: Bodh. bhmi, p. 403
(3); Madhyntavibhaga, p. 56 (15), 200 (27); Uttaratantra, p. 118, 360; A.S., T 1605, k.
VII, p. 691c4 seq.; A.S V., T 1606, k. XIV, p. 760c13 seq.; Sagraha chap. X, 9, no.
13.
20. The three arakyas (these are rakya, rakaa, arakya, arakaa, arakanya).
466
Koavykhy, p. 646 (34); Strlakra, XVIII, 42-44; XXI, 53; Bodh. bhmi, p. 403;
Madhyntavibhaga, p. 166; A.S., T 1605, K. VII, p. 691c15 seq.; A.S.V., T 1606, k.
XIV, p. 761a19; Sagraha, above, chap. X, v. 9, no. 15.
467
For the claims of Praa Kassapa to be omniscient, cf. Aguttara, IV, p. 428: Pao
Kassapo sabbau sabbadassv aparisesaaadassaa paijnati carato ca me
tihato ca suttassa ca jgarassa ca satata samita aadassana paccupahitan ti.
ikam., p.
286 seq.; Divya, p. 96, 125 (st. on compassion), 359 (5); Koa, VII, p. 77-79;
Saddharmapuarka, p. 259; Bodh. bhmi, p. 247(10); Strlakra, XVII, 43; XXI, 56;
Uttaratantra, p. 179; Siddhi, p. 328; A.S., T 1605, k. VII, p. 691c23; A.S.V., T 1606, k.
XIV, p. 761c1.
468
28. The profundity of the dharmakya has been studied at length by the Strlakra;
lakaagmhrya, IX, 22-25; sthnagmbhrya, IX, 26; karmagmbhrya, IX, 27-36.
29. Anusmti in general: applied to six objects, Digha, III, p. 250, 280; Aguttara, III, p.
284, 312 seq, 452; V, 329 seq.; Paisambhid, I, p. 28; extended to ten objects, Aguttara,
I, p. 30, 42; Lalitavistara, p. 34; Saddharmapuarka, p. 225, 231, 232. - Bodh. bhmi, p.
91 (4) seq. has a section on the tenfold guanusmaraat of the Tathgatas.
469
in the Bodhisattvapitaka there is a stra (or stras) containing 100,000 gths - for this
reason called the Stra of the One Hundred Thousand - the introduction of which
elaborates on the lakaas of the pure lands. The Sadhinirmocana may well be classed
in the Bodhisattvapiaka; perhaps Asaga may have wished to designate this stra by this
name.
***
For the seven jewels, cf. Milinda, p. 267 (23); Mahvyut., no. 5943 seq.; Divya, p. 297
(24); Saddharmapuarka, p. 151 (1).
For the King-lotus/es, see, e.g., Lakvatra, p. 70 (1), where it is said that the
bodhisattva settled in the tenth bhmi is seated on a great lotus throne ornamented with
many jewels and pearls, in a palace of great price in the form of a lotus (sa tastym
pratihito nekaratnamuktopaobhite mahpadmarje padmaktau mahratnavimane
... niaa).
31. Cf. the ten tathgataktya, tathgatakaraya, in Bodh. bhmi, p. 407 (5) seq. We
have already mentioned the identity of all the Buddhas from the point of view of their
activity in chap. X, 3, no. 3.
32. The single vehicle: Aashasrka, p. 3. - Pacaviatishasrik, p. 3 (5). Bodhicaryvatrapajik,p. 430 (3): buddhaipratyekabuddhaih ca rvakai ca
nievit, mrgas tvam ek mokasya nsty anya iti nicaya; Abhis. al. l., p. 133 (12) 134 (11); Sadhinir., IX, v. 32-33; Lakvatra, p. 65, 133; Kyapaparivarta, v. 80, p.
116; Saddharmapuarka, p. 41 (15), 46 (11), 143 (4); ibid. for the relationships among
the three vehicles, p. 79-82; Madh. vtti, XV, 7, p. 269. - Madh. avatra, p. 22 (8);
ikasa., p. 95 915); Strlakra, XI, 53-59; XII, 23; Uttaratantra, p. 169, 205;
Buddhabhmistrastra, T 1530, k. V, p. 312b seq,; Mahratnakua, T 310, k. CXIX, p.
676b6-12; Siddhi, p. 673, 724, 725.
For the bodhisattva niyatas and aniyatas, cf. Siddhi, p. 733 seq.
The predictions of the Saddharmapuarka are the object of three chapters, VI-VIII, p.
144 seq. - The same argument is used in Abhis. al. l., p. 133 (23): eva
470
471