Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Manchester Vs CA
Manchester Vs CA
Court of Appeals
149 SCRA 562
Principles:
1. Case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of actual date of filing in Court.
2. Basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of
damages in the original complaint and not in the amended
complaint.
3. All complaints, petition, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and that the
damages should be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees.
Gancayco, J.:
Facts:
The case is an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. The
prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants'
announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs
for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants
that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of
purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants'
illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly
and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during
the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of
the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of
payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of
damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of
the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as
damages
suffered
by
plaintiff.
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of
court filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for the
inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by
emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of
the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
After the Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee, on November 12, 1985 the trial court
directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the
amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs
specified the amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amounts of damages
were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the basis of assessment of the docket fees
should be the amount of damages in the amended complaint.
Ruling:
The motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.
The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount
only of P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for
specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the
complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint totalling
in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of
assessment
of
the
filing
fee.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court
ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee
covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not
consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for
recovery of ownership and possession of real property. An amended
complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount
of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said
amended complaint was also admitted. The action was considered
not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that
the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to
be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was
the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were
proper and regular." Hence, as the amended complaint superseded
the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended
complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee.
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the
prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
until the premises are restored to their former condition) was not yet
proper and warranted.
Moreover, if the case to be tried de novo, there is always the
possibility that the trial court may make different findings that will
support a judgment contrary to that of the inferior court. As such,
the right of the parties are changed. If the inferior courts decision
were to be executed after appeal therefrom, the Court of First
Instance would have to undo what it had previously ordered to be
done; hence, justice would hardly be served if it were mandatory for
the Court of First Instance to order the execution of the City Court's
decision. As it turned out, the original judgment was superseded by
that of the Court of First Instance in this case. The City Court's
decision upon the rendition of the Court of First Instance judgment
becomes a thing of the past, without life, purpose or effect. It is the
decision of the Court of First Instance that prevails. Finally the city
court decision having been superseded, the issue raised now has
become moot and academic and, therefore cannot be properly
raised.
reason which is not only reasonable and fair, the same being "due to
demands on the professional time of the (undersigned) counsel" but
also was satisfactory to the trial court that the said motion did not
affect the substantive rights of the adverse party and, therefore, the
Court may act on the same even without proof of service thereof on
the
adverse
party.
Accordingly, the Court agree with the contention of the
private respondent and the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated Nov. 25, 1975 which sustained the view that the
record on appeal filed by the private respondent within the period
prayed for in its motion ex parte for extension of time to file the
record on appeal, was submitted within the reglementary period and
that the trial court has the power and authority to act on the same
in accordance with the law, provided the ex parte motion was filed
within
the
original
period
prescribed
by
the
Rules.
same motion was "fatally defective, pro forma, and should not be
considered ... because it failed to comply with the mandatory and
elementary provisions of Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in relation to Secs. 4, 5,
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; consequently, the filing of
such motion for reconsideration ... did not and should not toll the
running of the period for appeal." Petitioners filed their opposition to
the motion for execution on the ground that they had complied with
Sec. 2 of Rule 37 in connection with Secs. 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent Judge denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner's motion was properly filed in
accordance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling:
The petition was dismissed.
No. Petitioner's motion was not properly filed in accordance with
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court.
Defective motion that does not comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6
of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper and does not toll the running of
period for appeal. Where a decision was rendered against
petitioners who filed a motion for reconsideration thereof with a
Notice of Hearing a) directed to the Clerk of Court , not to the
parties; and b) merely stating the same be submitted " for
resolution of the Hon. Court upon receipt hereof," copy of which
motion was duly furnished to and received by respondents' counsel:
said motion is fatally defective and did not toll the running of the
period to appeal, for it failed to indicate the place, time and date of
hearing of the motion as required by Section 2, Rule 37, in relation
to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15.