Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Macasaet V Macasaet
Macasaet V Macasaet
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 154391-92
The Facts
Petitioners Ismael and Teresita5 Macasaet and Respondents Vicente and Rosario
Macasaet are first-degree relatives. Ismael is the son of respondents, and Teresita is his
wife.6
On December 10, 1997, the parents filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Lipa City an ejectment suit against the children.7 Respondents alleged that they were the
owners of two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T78521 and T-103141, situated at Banay-banay, Lipa City; that by way of a verbal lease
agreement, Ismael and Teresita occupied these lots in March 1992 and used them as their
residence and the situs of their construction business; and that despite repeated demands,
petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental of P500 per week.8
Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement. They claimed that
respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots
in order that they could all live near one other, employ Marivic (the sister of Ismael), and
help in resolving the problems of the family.9 They added that it was the policy of
respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance grant of inheritance in favor of their
children. Thus, they contended that the lot covered by TCT No. T-103141 had been allotted
to Ismael as advance inheritance. On the other hand, the lot covered by TCT No. T-78521
was allegedly given to petitioners as payment for construction materials used in the
renovation of respondents house.10
The MTCC11 ruled in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises. It
opined that Ismael and Teresita had occupied the lots, not by virtue of a verbal lease
agreement, but by tolerance of Vicente and Rosario.12 As their stay was by mere tolerance,
petitioners were necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate the lots upon
demand.13 The MTCC dismissed their contention that one lot had been allotted as an
advance inheritance, on the ground that successional rights were inchoate. Moreover, it
disbelieved petitioners allegation that the other parcel had been given as payment for
construction materials.14
On appeal, the regional trial court15 (RTC) upheld the findings of the MTCC. However, the
RTC allowed respondents to appropriate the building and other improvements introduced by
petitioners, after payment of the indemnity provided for by Article 448 in relation to Articles
546 and 548 of the Civil Code.16 It added that respondents could oblige petitioners to
purchase the land, unless its value was considerably more than the building. In the latter
situation, petitioners should pay rent if respondents would not choose to appropriate the
building.17
Upon denial of their individual Motions for Reconsideration, the parties filed with the CA
separate Petitions for Review, which were later consolidated.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the finding of the two lower courts that Ismael and Teresita had been
occupying the subject lots only by the tolerance of Vicente and Rosario. 19 Thus, possession
of the subject lots by petitioners became illegal upon their receipt of respondents letter to
vacate it.20
Citing Calubayan v. Pascual,21 the CA further ruled that petitioners status was analogous to
that of a lessee or a tenant whose term of lease had expired, but whose occupancy
continued by tolerance of the owner.22 Consequently, in ascertaining the right of petitioners
to be reimbursed for the improvements they had introduced on respondents
properties,23 the appellate court applied the Civil Codes provisions on lease. The CA
modified the RTC Decision by declaring that Article 448 of the Civil Code was inapplicable.
The CA opined that under Article 1678 of the same Code, Ismael and Teresita had the right
to be reimbursed for one half of the value of the improvements made. 24
Not satisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioners brought this recourse to this Court.25
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. a) Whether or not Section 17[,] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court on Judgment should
apply in the rendition of the decision in this case;
b) Whether or not the Complaint should have been dismissed;
c) Whether or not damages including attorneys fees should have been
awarded to herein petitioners;
"2. a) Whether or not the rule on appearance of parties during the Pretrial should
apply on appearance of parties during Preliminary Conference in an unlawful
detainer suit;
b) Whether or not the case of Philippine Pryce Assurance Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals (230 SCRA 164) is applicable to appearance of parties in an
unlawful detainer suit;
"3. Whether or not Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply to the case on the
matters of improvements, or is it Article 447 of the Civil Code in relation to the Article
453 and 454 thereof that should apply, if ever to apply the Civil Code;
"4. Whether or not the [D]ecision of the Court of Appeals is supported by evidence,
appropriate laws, rules and jurisprudence;
"5. Whether or not Assisting Judge Norberto Mercado of the MTCC Lipa City should
be held accountable in rendering the MTCC [D]ecision;
"6. Whether or not Atty. Glenn Mendoza and Atty. Andrew Linatoc of the same [l]aw
office should be held accountable for pursuing the [e]jectment case[.]" 26
The Courts Ruling
inclined to believe the position of the [petitioners] that there was no such verbal
lease agreement between the parties herein that took place in 1992. x x x.
"From the allegations of the [petitioners], this Court is convinced that their stay and
occupancy of the subject premises was by mere tolerance of the [respondents], and
not by virtue of a verbal lease agreement between them."36
Having found a cause of action for unlawful detainer, the MTCC (as well as the RTC and
the CA) did not err in ordering the ejectment of petitioners as prayed for by respondents.
There was no violation of Section 17 of Rule 7037 of the Rules of Court. As earlier explained,
unlawful detainer was sufficiently alleged in the Complaint and duly proven during the trial.
Significantly, the issue of whether there was enough ground to eject petitioners was raised
during the preliminary conference.38
Not Merely Tolerated
Possession
Petitioners dispute the lower courts finding that they occupied the subject lots on the basis
of mere tolerance. They argue that their occupation was not under such condition, since
respondents had invited, offered and persuaded them to use those properties.39
This Court has consistently held that those who occupy the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an
implied promise that the occupants will vacate the property upon demand.40 A summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce this implied obligation. 41 The unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate.42
Toleration is defined as "the act or practice of permitting or enduring something not wholly
approved of."43 Sarona v. Villegas44 described what tolerated acts means, in this language:
"Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are those which by
reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or
another person to do on the property; they are generally those particular services or
benefits which ones property can give to another without material injury or prejudice
to the owner, who permits them out of friendship or courtesy. x x x. And, Tolentino
continues, even though this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
prescription." x x x. Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: There is
tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not
every case of knowledge and silence on the part of the possessor can be considered
mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance that is considered as an authorization,
permission or license, acts of possession are realized or performed. The question
reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission."45
We hold that the facts of the present case rule out the finding of possession by mere
tolerance. Petitioners were able to establish that respondents had invited them to occupy
the subject lots in order that they could all live near one other and help in resolving family
heed the demand, ejectment was the proper remedy against them. Their possession, which
was originally lawful, became unlawful when the reason therefor -- love and solidarity -ceased to exist between them.
No Right to Retain
Possession
Petitioners have not given this Court adequate reasons to reverse the lower courts
dismissal of their contention that Lots T-78521 and T-103141, respectively, were allegedly
allotted to them as part of their inheritance and given in consideration for past debts.
The right of petitioners to inherit from their parents is merely inchoate and is vested only
upon the latters demise. Indisputably, rights of succession are transmitted only from the
moment of death of the decedent.50 Assuming that there was an "allotment" of inheritance,
ownership nonetheless remained with respondents. Moreover, an intention to confer title to
certain persons in the future is not inconsistent with the owners taking back possession in
the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.51 Other than their self-serving testimonies
and their affidavits, petitioners offered no credible evidence to support their outlandish claim
of inheritance "allocation."
We also agree with the lower courts that petitioners failed to prove the allegation that,
through a dation in payment, Lot T-78521 had been transferred to the latter as payment for
respondents debts.52 The evidence presented by petitioners related only to the alleged
indebtedness of the parents arising from the latters purported purchases and
advances.53 There was no sufficient proof that respondents had entered into a contract of
dation to settle the alleged debt. Petitioners even stated that there was a disagreement in
the accounting of the purported debt,54 a fact that disproves a meeting of the minds with the
parents.
Petitioners also admitted that a portion of the alleged debt is the subject matter of a
collection case against respondents (Civil Case No. 0594-96).55 Thus, the formers
allegation that the indebtedness has been paid through a dation cannot be given credence,
inconsistent as it is with their action to recover the same debt.
Despite their protestations, petitioners recognized the right of the parents to recover the
premises when they admitted in their Position Paper filed with the MTCC that respondents
had a title to the lots.
"The [respondents] want to get their property because the title is theirs, the
[petitioners] do not object but what is due the [petitioners] including the reparation for
the tarnish of their dignity and honor must be given the [petitioners] for the benefits
of their children before the premises will be turned over."56
As a rule, the right of ownership carries with it the right of possession.
Second Issue:
"x x x. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latters
tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them. The status of defendant is
analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose
occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the
demand to vacate."63 (Emphasis in the original.)
As explained earlier, Ismael and Teresitas possession of the two lots was not by mere
tolerance, a circumstance that negates the applicability of Calubayan.
Article 448 Applicable
On the other hand, when a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable
provision is Article 448, which reads:64
"Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the
one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged
to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof."
This Court has ruled that this provision covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title
thereto.65 It does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere
tenant, agent or usufructuary.66 From these pronouncements, good faith is identified by the
belief that the land is owned; or that -- by some title -- one has the right to build, plant, or
sow thereon.67
However, in some special cases, this Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith
beyond this limited definition. Thus, in Del Campo v. Abesia,68 this provision was applied to
one whose house -- despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner -overlapped with the land of another.69 This article was also applied to cases wherein a
builder had constructed improvements with the consent of the owner. The Court ruled that
the law deemed the builder to be in good faith.70 In Sarmiento v. Agana,71 the builders were
found to be in good faith despite their reliance on the consent of another, whom they had
mistakenly believed to be the owner of the land.72
Based on the aforecited special cases, Article 448 applies to the present factual milieu. The
established facts of this case show that respondents fully consented to the improvements
introduced by petitioners. In fact, because the children occupied the lots upon their
invitation, the parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the improvements
introduced thereon.73 Thus, petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when
they built the structures on those lots.
The instant case is factually similar to Javier v. Javier.74 In that case, this Court deemed the
son to be in good faith for building the improvement (the house) with the knowledge and
consent of his father, to whom belonged the land upon which it was built. Thus, Article
44875 was applied.
Rule on Useful Expenses
The structures built by petitioners were "useful" improvements, because they augmented
the value or income of the bare lots.76 Thus, the indemnity to be paid by respondents under
Article 448 is provided for by Article 546, which we quote:
"Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
"Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the
same right of retention, the person who has defeated him in the possession having
the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value
which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof."
Consequently, respondents have the right to appropriate -- as their own -- the building and
other improvements on the subject lots, but only after (1) refunding the expenses of
petitioners or (2) paying the increase in value acquired by the properties by reason thereof.
They have the option to oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, unless its value is
considerably more than that of the structures -- in which case, petitioners shall pay
reasonable rent.
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,77 this case must be remanded to the trial court to
determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to Article
546. Such matters include the option that respondents would take and the amount of
indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the
lots. We disagree with the CAs computation of useful expenses, which were based only on
petitioners bare allegations in their Answer.78
Ruling on Improvement Justified
While, ordinarily, the jurisdiction of the MTCC on ejectment proceedings is limited to the
issue of physical or material possession of the property in question, this Court finds it
necessary to abbreviate the issue on the improvements in relation to Article 448. First, the
determination of the parties right to those improvements is intimately connected with the
MTCC proceedings in the light of the ejectment of petitioners. Second, there is no dispute
that while they constructed the improvements, respondents owned the land. Third, both
parties raised no objection when the RTC and the CA ruled accordingly on this matter.
Equitable considerations compel us to settle this point immediately, pro hoc vice, to avoid
needless delay. Both parties have already been heard on this issue; to dillydally or
equivocate would not serve the cause of substantial justice.
Other Issues Raised
Given the foregoing rulings, it is no longer necessary to address petitioners allegation that
the MTCC judge and respondents lawyers should be respectively held personally
accountable for the Decision and for filing the case.79 The insinuation of petitioners that the
lawyers manipulated the issuance of a false barangay certification is unavailing.80 Their
contention that respondents did not attend the barangay conciliation proceedings was
based solely on hearsay, which has little or no probative value. 81
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The portion requiring Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaet to reimburse one
half of the value of the useful improvements, amounting to P475,000, and the right of
Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to remove those improvements (if the former
refuses to reimburse) is DELETED.
2. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings to
determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the
Civil Code, specifically to the following matters:
a. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets option to appropriate -- as their
own -- the improvements on the lots, after paying the indemnity, as provided
under Article 546 in relation to Article 448 of the Civil Code; or in requiring
Spouses Ismael and Rosita Macasaet to pay for the value of the lots, unless it
is considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case petitioners
shall pay reasonable rent based upon the terms provided under the Civil
Code
b. The value of the useful expenses incurred by Spouses Ismael and Rosita
Macasaet in the construction of the improvements on the lots
c. The increase in value acquired by the lots by reason of the useful
improvements
d. Spouses Vicente and Rosario Macasaets choice of type of indemnity to be
paid (whether b or c)
e. Whether the value of the lots is considerably more than that of the
improvements built thereon
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Id., pp. 209-229. Ninth Division. Penned by Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, with the
concurrence of Justices Ruben T. Reyes (Division chairman) and Renato C.
Dacudao (member).
3
Assailed Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 210-211. Respondents Complaint, pp. 1-2;
rollo, pp. 85-86.
8
Id., pp. 3-4 & 211-212. Petitioners Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, p. 4;
rollo, p. 94.
9
10
Ibid.
11
12
Assailed Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo, pp. 213-214. MTCC Decision dated August 27,
1998, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 167-168.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
16
RTC Decision dated July 15, 1999, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 173-174.
17
Ibid.
18
19
20
21
22
Ibid.
23
24
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 13, 2003, upon this
Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum signed by Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza.
Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Ismael H. Macasaet, was filed on April 14,
2003.
26
27
Rivera v. Rivera, 405 SCRA 466, 471, July 8, 2003; Balanon-Anicete v. Balanon,
402 SCRA 514, 518, April 30, 2003; De Luna v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 276,
278, August 6, 1992.
28
29
30
Varona v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 124148, May 20, 2004; Sarmiento v. Court of
Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 153, November 16, 1995; Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,
232 SCRA 372, May 10, 1994.
31
32
Varona v. Court of Appeals, supra; Caiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107,
1115, February 24, 1997; Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 386.
33
Lopez v. David, GR No. 152145, March 30, 2004; Arcal v. Court of Appeals, 348
Phil. 813, 823, January 26, 1998; Hilario v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 202, 210,
August 7, 1996;Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, supra; Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,
supra, p. 385.
34
35
36
MTCC Decision dated August 27, 1998, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 167-168.
"Section 17. Judgment. If after the trial the court finds that the allegations of the
complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution
of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs.
If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant
to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment
for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires."
37
38
MTCC Order on the Preliminary Conference dated July 30, 1998; rollo, p. 108.
39
40
Rivera v. Rivera, 405 SCRA 466, 471, July 8, 2003; Pengson v. Ocampo Jr., 412
Phil. 860, 866, June 29, 2001; Arcal v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 825; Refugia v.
Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982, 1010, July 5, 1996; Dakudao v. Consolacion, 207
Phil. 750, 756, June 24, 1983.
41
Ibid.
42
Lopez v. David, supra; Arcal v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 825; Villaluz v. Court of
Appeals, 344 Phil. 77, 89, September 5, 1997.
43
44
45
46
MTCC Decision, dated August 27, 1998, p. 3 (rollo, p. 167); RTC Decision, dated
July 15, 1999, p. 2 (rollo, p. 171).
47
Id., p. 198. The term "may" in Article 1197 connotes discretion on the part of the
courts to exercise this power.
48
The records do not disclose the exact date when the conflict between petitioners
and respondents arose. It can be readily assumed to have transpired not later than
June 6, 1996, the date of petitioners demand letter, which became the subject of
Civil Case No. 0594-96 (Demand Letter; rollo, p. 145). At any rate, an animosity
between the parties was confirmed by respondents demand letter dated August 13,
1997, asking petitioners to vacate the subject lots (rollo, p. 89), and the subsequent
filing of this case.
50
51
53
Ibid.
54
In the Affidavits submitted with their Position Paper, petitioners alleged that the
execution of the Deed of Assignment did not occur, because their father had refused
to agree to the accounting of the materials supplied. Petitioners Memorandum, pp.
45-46; rollo, pp. 462-463.
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 44; rollo, p. 461. The recovery of P235,908, which
forms a significant part of respondents alleged P391,338 debt, is the subject matter
of Civil Case No. 0594-96.
55
56
58
59
61
62
Supra.
63
64
See Depra v. Dumlao, 136 SCRA 475, 481, May 16, 1985, in which this Court
explained the philosophy behind this provision.
65
Pada-Kilario v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 515, 530, January 19, 2000; Chua v.
Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 308, 318, January 21, 1999; Balucanag v. Francisco, 207
Phil. 433, 438;Floreza v. Evangelista, 96 SCRA 130, 136, February 21,
1980; Quemuel v. Olaes, 111 Phil. 797, April 29, 1961; Alburo v. Villanueva, 7 Phil.
277, 280, January 2, 1907.
66
69
Id., pp. 382-383. Article 448 does not apply where a co-owner builds, plants, or
sows on land owned in common, since such co-owner does not do so on land that
he or she does not own. See also Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines (1992), Vol. 2, p. 117.
70
De Guzman v. Fuente, 55 Phil. 501, 503, December 29, 1930; Aringo v. Arena, 14
Phil. 263, 268-269; Javier v. Javier, 7 Phil. 261, 267, January 2, 1907. [Cited in
Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (14th ed., 1999), Vol. 2, p.
211]; See also Boyer-Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 470, 488, July 15, 1992.
71
72
Id., p. 125.
73
The RTC observed that petitioners had merely been invited by the parents
(respondents) to transfer to the premises. Considering that the parties were living
near one other, it was readily assumed that respondents had known of the structures
built and had not opposed their construction. RTC Decision dated July 15, 1999, p.
4; rollo, p. 173.
74
75
76
77
Supra. Also cited in National Housing Authority v. Grace Baptist Church, GR No.
156437, March 1, 2004; and Technogas Philippines Manufacturing v. Court of
Appeals, 335 Phil. 471, 485, February 10, 1997.
78
Assailed Decision, p. 15; rollo, p. 223. This Court also notes that petitioners merely
submitted a list of expenses with their corresponding costs, without showing any
proof (e.g., actual receipts) that these costs had been incurred. Petitioners Position
Paper, p. 15, rollo, p. 123; Itemized List of Materials, rollo, p. 588.
81
79
80
This contention was based on information from an alleged barangay councilor of Banaybanay that no conciliation had transpired on October 14, 1997, the scheduled date.
Petitioner Teresita Macasaets Affidavit; rollo, p. 77. In a letter dated October 14, 1997,
addressed to the barangay captain, it appears that petitioners waived their presence at the
conciliation proceedings. Rollo, p. 103.