1

G.R. No. 127240

March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In
1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila
on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment and eventually
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had
four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a
verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A.
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law,
as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as
required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in
3 of the law, stated
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for
citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization,
Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the
February, 1986 revolution such that processing of
petitions for naturalization by administrative process
was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications
and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the
testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court
whether the State intended to present any witness present any
witness against him, he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the
petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the
sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major
portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our
part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that
petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of
the Philippines.And for this reason, we do not wish to
present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as
the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2)
failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of
C.A. No. 473, 7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines,
in violation of 2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or
misdeclared, also in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to

support his petition with the appropriate documentary

evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977
petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in
which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong
Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto
Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other
name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended
that his petition must fail.6The state also annexed income tax
returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to
show that his net income could hardly support himself and his
family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice,
once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977,
petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage
contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of
petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a JointAffidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These
documents show that when petitioner married Ramona
Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because
petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as
husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage.
This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he
started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa
Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the
petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and
denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that
due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not
precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower
court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The
appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name,
"LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No.
270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the
same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is
a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who
know (petitioner) by those other names to come
forward and inform the authorities of any legal

2
objection which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition
for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa
St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to
state in his petition "his present and former places of
residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure
of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the
petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the
investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be
informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the
petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of
such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the
law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his
wife for several years, and sired four children out of
wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without
the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being
proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him
from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in
1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions
and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to
file an income tax return "because he is not liable for
income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is
not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the
object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they
are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife
are living on the allowance given to them by their
children. The monthly pension given by the elder
children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses,
commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION
CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN

APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE

BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME
NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION
AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE
PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A
PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court
erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of
which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not
having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they
are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary
value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule
143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that
These rules shall not apply to land registration,
cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
(Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition
for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since
reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the
first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical
and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the
grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to
present and formally offer its documentary evidence before
the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right
to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed,
the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence
which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner

3
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court
by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in
fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for
naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not
been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while
the case number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally
unreliable and should not be considered by the
Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is
trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical
error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the
correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of
the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also
docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner
offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely,
the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage
contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As
such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing
of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough
to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we
shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include
the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance
with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms
part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. 20 This
is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to
give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity
to check on the background of the applicant and prevent
suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior
on his part in any community where he may have lived at one
time or another.21 It is settled, however, that naturalization
laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor
of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the
State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and

former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of

strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
denied.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. GODOFREDO B.
ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts
of gunfire, startling the otherwise tranquil but sanguine folks of
Pacol, Naga City. As the fusillade of shots ceased and the wisp
of smoke cleared, frolicking promenaders stumbled upon
Ompong Chavez who was gasping his last, clutching his
intestines which had spewed out from his bloodied
stomach. He did not in fact reach the hospital alive. A breath
away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement. He died on the
spot. For the twinned deaths, the Adors, six (6) of them, were
haled to court.
In
two
(2)
separate
informations,[1] Diosdado
Sr.,[2] Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan,
all surnamed Ador, were charged with the murder of Absalon
Abe S. Cuya III and Rodolfo Ompong S. Chavez. The
Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816
identically read:
That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and the aid of armed men, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ABSALON ABE
CUYA III (RODOLFO OMPO CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES[3] for Crim.
Case No. 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon him multiple
and mortal gunshot wounds which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.
With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
and nighttime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely,
Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, were taken into
custody. The two (2), Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained
at large. Trial thus proceeded only against Diosdado Sr.,
Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan who all pleaded not
guilty. Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III
and Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of Allan. Diosdado
Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.[4]
In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution presented a total of sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy
Beria, Larry Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr. Joel S.
Jurado, Police Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin

4
Barbosa, SPO3 Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian, Inspector
Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C.
Bathan, Inspector Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3
Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren Chavez and
Pablo Calsis.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that
on March 10, 1997, at around seven-thirty in the evening,
while Mercy Beria, Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others
were leisurely walking along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone
1, Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding
anniversary, they heard several gunshots. Shortly after, they
met a certain Pablito Umali who told them that Ompong
Chavez had been shot. They ran to Chavez straight off and saw
him already lying on the ground, about 1 meters away from a
lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines which were
starting to come out. Beria shook Chavez and asked him what
had happened. Chavez replied tinambangan kami na Ador
(We were ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he be
brought to the hospital as he was dying. About eight (8)
meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya,
dead.[5]
Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio
communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2
Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to
conduct an investigation. SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1
Wilfredo Fernandez, among others, were already there.[6] SPO1
Barbosa collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures
and made some sketches.[7] SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand
interviewed one Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was
nearby, and when he heard people shout that Chavez was still
alive, he brought Chavez to the hospital but the latter expired
on the way.[8]
That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors
had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa
sought the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to
accompany him to the residence of the Adors. They arrived at
the Adors at around ten oclock that evening and spoke with
their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the
other male members of the Ador family but was told by
Diosdado Sr. that they were already asleep. Diosdado Sr.
nevertheless promised to present them the following day.[9]
The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain
Perez accompanied the Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado
III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa
at the PNP Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
choose their own counsel. They were then brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at the Provincial Headquarters and subjected
to paraffin tests.[10] On the way to the crime laboratory,
Godofredo told his police escort that he had been entrusted
with a handgun which he kept in his residence.[11] The
information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then Deputy
Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto I.
Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun because

Godofredo said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3

Nepomuceno. Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and some
others accompanied Godofredo to the latters residence.
Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together
with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their backyard, retrieved the
gun from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the
latter. Godofredo allegedly told the police that he fired the said
gun outside their house on the night of March 10 after he
heard several gunshots.[12] PO3 Nepomuceno identified the
gun as a caliber .38 paltik handgun which had no serial
number.[13] PO3 Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun
to Major Idian[14] who likewise identified it as a .38 caliber
revolver. Major Idian returned the handgun to PO3
Nepomuceno
for
ballistic
and
paraffin
examination.[15] Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his
initials on the gun and put it in his private locker while
preparing the documents for the examinations and the
possible filing of a case for Illegal Possession of Firearm.[16]
Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado,
Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City, conducted an autopsy on
the bodies of Chavez and Cuya. Based on the autopsy reports,
Dr. Jurado testified that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds and died from cardio-pulmonary arrest, massive
intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the heart,
brain, lungs and digestive tract.[17] Chavez on the other hand
had three (3) gunshot wounds and died from traumatic shock
and massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage secondary to
multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney and the
internal abdominal organs.[18] Dr. Jurado further testified that
that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head three (3) days after
he conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives called his
attention to a protruding mass in Cuyas head. Thus, he had
Cuyas cadaver sent back to the funeral parlor, opened it and
was able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug which he
thereafter submitted to the City Prosecutors Office.[19]
Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola,
Legaspi City, testified that based on the ballistic examination he
conducted on the bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber
slug recovered from Cuyas head matched the three (3) .38
caliber test bullets which were test-fired from the suspected
firearm surrendered by Godofredo. He however averred that
the .38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a .357 Smith and
Wesson Magnum homemade revolver without serial number,
and not from a .38 caliber revolver.[20]
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also
transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Services for
examination and yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates,
thus
(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;
(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive; left
hand, negative;

5
(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left
hand, negative;
(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;[21]
(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive. [22]
Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the
killing of his son was driven by the long-standing feud between
the Adors and his family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier
accused his other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for
allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado Jr.).[23] Then, Adelina, a
daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a case for abduction with
multiple rape against him, Absalon III, Rayne and Josephine, all
surnamed Cuya, after the romantic relationship between
Adelina and his deceased son Absalon III turned sour.[24] He
also presented official receipts of the funeral and burial
expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.[25]
Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke
of the animosity between the Chavez and the Ador
families. He produced a certification from the PNP Naga City
Police Station that on February 17, 1997, a blotter was entered
in the Daily Record of Events showing that deceased Chavez
reported a certain Ricardo Ador who while under the influence
of liquor caused him physical injury.[26] The witness likewise
presented an official receipt showing that the family
spent P3,500.00 for the funeral of the deceased
Chavez.[27] After presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its
case.
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to
evidence for utter lack of evidence.[28] On May 13, 1998, the
trial court dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino
and Allan but denied the demurrer to evidence against
Godofredo
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be
justified for the accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and
Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted insofar as
these accused are concerned. Said accused therefore, namely:
Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are
ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816. The
bailbonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby
cancelled.
Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned
shall proceed.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.
For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the
killings of Cuya and Chavez. He said that on March 10, 1997, at
around seven oclock in the evening, he heard several gunshots
while he was having dinner with his wife and four (4) children
in their house in Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife advised him
not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner. The following
day, while he was gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend
Dominador Bautista arrived and asked him to go down from
the tree. Bautista wanted to borrow money and on his way to
see him, found a gun by the footpath. Bautista gave the gun to

him. It was his first time to hold a gun. He tried it out and fired
three (3) times. After firing the gun, he removed the empty
shells from its chambers and threw them away. He then
wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut
trunk. Bautista left when he told him that he had no
money. He then continued to gather pili nuts until Major Idian
and three (3) other policemen came.
Godofredos father told him that they were being
suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya the night before. Thus,
they went to the provincial headquarters, were subjected to
paraffin testing and made to sign a blank bond paper. After
that, they went back to the central police station. At the
central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia
that that morning, his friend Bautista found a gun along the
road and gave it to him. He hid the gun under a coconut
trunk. Calabia relayed the information to Major Idian who
directed PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the
gun. Godofredo led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the
gun, retrieved it and handed it to the latter. They then
returned to the police headquarters where he was jailed. He
asserted that the gun presented in court is different from the
gun he surrendered to the police.[30]
Bautista corroborated Godofredos story. He testified that
he found the gun which Godofredo yielded to PO3
Nepomuceno. He said that he was on his way to see
Godofredo to borrow money when he chanced upon the
handgun on the pathway. He gave the gun to Godofredo and
the latter tested it by pulling its trigger. After firing the gun,
Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw
them. Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it
under a fallen coconut trunk.[31]
Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998,
at Barangay Doa, Orani, Bataan, and committed to the Naga
City Jail on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered
to the court and was committed to the same city jail
on November 22, 1998. On November 23, 1998, both
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty. Hence, trial against them commenced and
proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining accused,
Godofredo.
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis[32] as a witness
against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III. Calsis testified that on
March 10, 1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by
the house of Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola
Kising at Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before going home
from work. After asking permission from her to go home and
while about to urinate outside her house, he heard several
gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower
plantation. As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr.,
Diosdado III, Godofredo and another unidentified man run
away. Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while Diosdado
Jr. had a long firearm.[33] He saw Chavez and Cuya lying on the
road. Chavez was about five (5) meters away from where he
stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away. The place was

6
illuminated by a bright light from an electric post. There were
no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear that he might
be identified by the assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but
shirked nevertheless.[34]
Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after
about one (1) year and nine (9) months. Fear struck him.[35] He
maintained that he knew the assailants because he and his wife
lived in the house of Lola Kising after they got
married.[36] Immense fear prevented him from attending to
Chavez, even while he heard him murmuring, and from
informing the families of the victims of the incident that very
same night. He was about to tell the Chavez family the
following morning but was counseled by his Lola Bading, the
sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the
case.[37] Calsis and his family left their residence in Pacol one (1)
month after the incident because he was afraid the assailants
might have identified him.[38] Even Lola Kising left her residence
two (2) months after the incident.[39] It was only after he
learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that the trial court dismissed the
cases for lack of evidence insofar as some of the original
accused were concerned that he took pity on the respective
families of the victims who have failed to get justice for the
death of their loved ones.[40]
In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997,
he was in Marikina City working as a warehouseman and
timekeeper of the Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was
there the whole time from February 15, 1997, until March 24,
1997.[41] Pablo Aspe, a co-worker of Diosdado Jr., corroborated
the latters testimony. He said that on February 15, 1997, he
and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga City, together to work in
Consuelo Construction in Marikina City. They were with each
other in Marikina City the whole time from February 15, 1997,
until he (Aspe) went home toNaga City on March 22,
1997. While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together
in their barracks at the construction site.[42]
Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On March 10,
1997, at around seven oclock in the evening, he was at their
house at Zone 1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his
parents and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard
gunshots. They ignored the gunshots, continued watching
television and slept at eight oclock. The following day, at
around six oclock in the morning, while he was fetching water,
four (4) policemen arrived at their house and talked to his
father. Thereafter, his father called him, his brother
Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and
Reynaldo. The policemen then requested all of them to go to
the PNP Central Police Headquarters for investigation
regarding the killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching the
police headquarters, they were interviewed by the media and
afterwards brought to the provincial headquarters where they
were subjected to paraffin tests. They were then brought back
to the Central Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back
home to Pacol.

Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested

by the police. Diosdado III was at their residence when his
father was picked up. Only his father was taken by the
police. He continued to reside in their house until April, 1998,
when he transferred to Sagurong, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay,
to work as a fisherman. On November 21, 1998, he received a
letter from his father telling him to come home. Thus, he went
home the following day. On November 23, 1998, he
surrendered to the court.[43]
The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez
and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and Disodado III, Jaime
Bobiles. Perez testified that he was the barangay captain of
Pacol from 1982 until May, 1997. In 1996, Cresenciana
Mendoza left their barangay permanently to live with her
children in Manila because she was sickly and alone in her
house. He said that Mendozanever came back. He does not
know any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not have talked
to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that
time, Mendoza was not there and her house was already
abandoned.[44] Similarly, Bobiles confirmed the testimony that
Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his
residence from May 1, 1998, until November 1998 when
Diosdado III received a letter from his father and had to go
home.[45]
In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez
asserted that he interviewed Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful
night of March 10, 1997.[46] After the rebuttal witness was
presented, the cases were finally submitted for decision.[47]
On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that a chain of
circumstances x x x lead to a sound and logical conclusion that
indeed the accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed
the offense charged[48] and as such rendered judgment
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and
penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby sentences the said accused
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 97-6815;
RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 97-6816, to pay the
heirs of Absalon Abe Cuya III P25,000 each by way of actual
damages and P50,000 in each criminal case by way of
indemnity. To pay the heirs of Rodolfo Ompong Chavez the
sum of P50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity, such
accessory penalties as provided for by law and to pay the
cost. For insufficiency of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt, he
is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.
The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered
to forthwith release from its custody the accused Diosdado B.
Ador, Jr., unless his further detention is warranted by any other
legal cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.[49]

7
Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and
Godofredo. They maintain that the trial court gravely erred in
convicting them of murder based on circumstantial
evidence. The testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis
that he saw them running away from the scene of the crime
was concocted. The handgun turned in by Godofredo was not
the same gun presented by the prosecution during the
trial. The unusual discovery of a slug from the head of the
deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy was conducted and
after the cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim was quite doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration of
the victim specifically pointed to neither Diosdado III nor
Godofredo. And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
those taken against them in violation of their constitutional
rights to counsel during custodial investigation.[50]
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.[51] It
may be the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of
all the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion
which suffices to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.[52] All the circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the theory that all the accused
are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are innocent and
with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.[53] The evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis
which may be consistent with their innocence.[54] Also, it should
be acted on and weighed with great caution.[55] Circumstantial
evidence which has not been adequately established, much
less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.[56]
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there
should be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[57] Like an ornate tapestry
created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked out
and assayed a strand at a time apart from the others, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.[58] The test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be
consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with
his innocence.[59] Accordingly, we have set guidelines in
appreciating circumstantial evidence: (1) it should be acted
upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every
theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a
certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who
committed the offense.[60]

Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold

the conviction of the accused based on the circumstantial
evidence presented.
The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to
prove is that the accused were supposedly seen fleeing from
the locus criminis, armed with their respective weapons. Thus,
the trial court, gleaning from the evidence presented, found
that *w+hen about to stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador,
Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person
going to the direction of the house of the Adors which is about
500 meters away.[61] In fact, prosecution witness Calsis
allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying a long firearm but x x
x could not determine what kind of gun it was.[62] However,
the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr. But only rightly so. For,
Calsis had difficulty in identifying the Adors notwithstanding his
assertion that he knew and saw them personally. We defer to
his direct examination
ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. You said you recognized the persons running,
could you tell us their names?
PABLO CALSIS:
A. Yes sir.
Q. Name them?
A. Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.
Q. How about the others?
A. I could not tell his name but if I see him I could
identify him.
Q. The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they
are present in court, please point them out?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.?
A. (Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a
person inside the courtroom who answered by
the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.)
Q. How about this Sadang III?
A. (Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who
answered by the name of Diosdado Ador III.)
Q. Likewise, point to the third person?
A. (Witness pointed to a man)
COURT:
Delete that portion from the record, he is not on
trial.
ATTY TERBIO:
Q. You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one
inside the courtroom?
A. None sir.
Q. But if you saw that person, will you be able to
recognize him?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know these persons whom you just
tapped the shoulder?
xxx
xxx
xxx
A. I know these persons having lived in the house of
Lola Kising.

8
Q. How far?
A. Around 100 meters.
Q. On the said date and time and place, you said you
saw them running, how far were you from
them?
A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)[63]
The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used
against Diosdado III whom he miserably failed to positively
identify during trial. In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the
trial court renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious
doubt. Calsis was presented to positively identify the assailants
who were supposedly personally known to him and were just
ten (10) meters away from him. It puzzles us no end why he
cannot even identify the Adors in open court.
Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of
the assailants, the trial court doubted him and gave credence
to the alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka,
Marikina, when the killings took place. The trial court favored
the unbiased testimony of Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr.
worked as a timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the
Consuelo Construction at Nangka, Marikina, from February 15,
1997, until March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only
on May 27, 1997. This ruling is strengthened by the fact that
on the morning following the killings, all the male members of
the Ador family were brought to the police headquarters for
paraffin examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among
them.[64] We thus respect the finding of the trial court that
indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent
any indication that the lower court overlooked some facts or
circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of
the case.[65]
While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or
reject an entire testimony, and may believe one part and
disbelieve another,[66] our Constitution and the law mandate
that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Calsis
committed an obvious blunder in identifying the supposed
assailants which this Court cannot simply let go. On the
contrary, it creates reasonable doubt in our minds if Calcis
really saw the persons he allegedly saw or if he was even
where he said he was that evening. For, it is elementary that
the positive identification of the accused is crucial in
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is wanting
in the instant case.
What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could
no longer be used against Godofredo since both the
prosecution and the defense have already rested and the case
against Godofredo was already submitted for decision when
Calsis was presented.[67] Neither can they still be used against
Diosdado Jr. who was already acquitted by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges
hurled against them. But, while it is true that alibi and denial
are the weakest of the defenses as they can easily be
fabricated,[68] absent such clear and positive identification, the
doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over positive

identification of the accused must yield to the constitutional

presumption of innocence.[69] Hence, while denial is concededly
fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused cannot be
based thereon.[70] The rule in criminal law is firmly entrenched
that verdicts of conviction must be predicated on the strength
of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.[71]
The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by
Godofredo. But this was bungled by the prosecution. Major
Idian, Deputy Chief of Police of the Naga City Police Station, to
whom the handgun was turned over after Godofredo
surrendered it, identified it as a caliber .38 revolver, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What kind of firearm was it?
MAJOR IDIAN:
A. Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds
ammunition.
Q. What is the caliber?
A. .38 caliber.[72]
Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the
PNP for eight (8) years already and to whom Godofredo turned
in the handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38, thus
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
Q. What is the caliber of that gun?
PO3 NEPOMUCENO:
A. .38 caliber.[73]
However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification
Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that *t+he
indorsement coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x x
alleged that the .38 caliber live bullet was fired from a .38
caliber revolver. But our office found out that the firearm was
not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver.[74]
Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory? While the
prosecution traced the trail of police officers who at every
stage held the gun supposedly recovered from Godofredo, it
never clarified this discrepancy which is quite glaring to
ignore. It is difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief of Police
and a police officer of eight (8) years will both mistake a .357
caliber for a .38 caliber handgun. Likewise, a Chief of the
Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory
cannot be presumed not to know the difference between the
two (2) handguns. Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed
to clear up the variance and for this Court to suggest an
explanation would be to venture into the realm of pure
speculation, conjecture and guesswork. Thus, faced with the
obvious disparity in the suspected firearm used in the crime
and that which was turned over by Godofredo, his declaration
that the handgun presented in court was different from the
gun he gave to the police deserves serious, if not sole
consideration.
Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber
slug supposedly recovered from the head of the victim three
(3) days after the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary

9
value as its source is now highly questionable. It has become
uncertain whether the deformed slug was fired from the .38
caliber revolver turned in by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber
handgun as attested to by the Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the
dying Chavez nor on the results of the paraffin tests to convict
either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute these, we
need not go far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial
court partially granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the
testimony of Mercy Beria, that she heard Rodolfo Ompong
Chavez say tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed
by the Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever
mentioned by the witness. Neither was she able to tell how
many (persons) Adors were involved. This testimony if it will
be given credence may inculpate any person with the family
name Ador as assailant. The prosecution therefore was not
able to establish with moral certainty as to who of the Adors
were perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin tests are not
conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.
The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of
gunpowder nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired
the murder weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic
evidence should be taken only as an indication of possibility or
even of probability, but not of infallibility, since nitrates are
also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.
(People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No. 121195, 27 November 1996;
People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha, 240
SCRA 283)[75]
Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in
evidence,
it
must
identify
with
certainty
the
assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. Also, while a
paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of
nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the source of the
nitrates was the discharge of firearms a person who tests
positive may have handled one or more substances with the
same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous
plants.[76] In People v. Melchor,[77] this Court acquitted the
accused despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his
hands
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a
paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the
presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always
indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by
the discharge of firearm. The person tested may have handled
one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives,
fireworks, pharmaceuticals and leguminous plants such as
peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also
have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these
substances are present in the products of combustion of

tobacco. The presence of nitrates or nitrites, therefore, should

be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of
infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun.
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian
and PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot be
considered in evidence against him without violating his
constitutional right to counsel. Godofredo was already under
custodial investigation when he made his admissions and
surrendered the gun to the police authorities. The police had
already begun to focus on the Adors and were carrying out a
process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting
incriminating statements and evidence: the police went to the
Ador residence that same evening upon being informed that
the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the
following day, all the male members of the Ador family were
told to go to the police station; the police was also informed of
the dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the Adors
as the assailants; the Adors were all subjected to paraffin
examination; and, there were no other suspects as the police
was not considering any other person or group of persons. The
investigation thus was no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime as the Adors were already being held as
suspects for the killings of Cuya and Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial
investigation, including the right to counsel, have already
attached to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and
(3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights should be in
writing and undertaken with the assistance of
counsel. Admissions under custodial investigation made
without the assistance of counsel are barred as
evidence.[78] The records are bare of any indication that the
accused have waived their right to counsel, hence, any of their
admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them. As we
have held, a suspects confession, whether verbal or nonverbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a
valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of
such coercion, or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is
inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were gospel
truth.[79] Thus, in Aballe v. People,[80] the death weapon, a fourinch kitchen knife, which was found after the accused brought
the police to his house and pointed to them the pot where he
had concealed it, was barred from admission as it was
discovered as a consequence of an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession.
With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution
likewise played up the feud between the Adors on one hand
and the Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and
suggested that the Adors had an axe to grind against the
Chavezes and the Cuyas. For sure, motive is not sufficient to
support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from
which it may reasonably be adduced that the accused was the
malefactor.[81] Motive alone cannot take the place of proof
beyond reasonable doubt sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of innocence.[82]

10
All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court,
we cannot rest easy in convicting the two (2) accused based on
circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the said
circumstantial evidence presented do not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that they are guilty.[83] The prosecution witness
failed to identify the accused in court. A cloud of doubt
continues to hover over the gun used and the slug
recovered. The dying declaration and paraffin examination
remain unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled admissions
including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence. And,
the supposed motive of the accused is simply
insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the inference that
the
accused
committed
the
crime
were
not
proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot be
established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when evidence
is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more
obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the
weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on
nothing less than moral certainty.[84]
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been
reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and speculations. It is
hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never
be the basis of conviction in a criminal case.[85] Courts must
ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly on
sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of
passion and prejudice.[86] If the alleged inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused,
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence is not
adequate to support conviction.[87] The court must acquit the
accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction.[88] Conviction must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.[89] The overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of
the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt.[90] It is thus apropos to repeat the doctrine that an
accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt the prosecution must overthrow the
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden. Accordingly, we have to acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 976816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder and imposing on
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and
their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are
being held for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MANNY A.

DOMINGCIL, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a
poseur-buyer, the appellant Manny Domingcil was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, for
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of
Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, not authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver mixed
dried marijuana leaves, tops and seeds in brick form, wrapped
with paper placed in a plastic bag, a prohibited drug, weighing
800 grams, to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation
conducted by Police Officers of Laoag City, in violation of the
aforesaid law.[1]
Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.[2] The case thereafter proceeded to trial.
The Case for the Prosecution
On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver,
an employee of Ferds Upholstery Shop located in Barangay 2,
Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police Station. He reported to
Chief Investigator SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura that the appellant
went to their shop looking for a buyer of marijuana. Oliver
recounted telling the appellant that he knew of someone who
was interested and ready to buy marijuana, and instructing him
to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store located in front
of the Divine Word College of Laoag at General Segundo
Avenue, Laoag City at around 1:30 p.m. of that same day.[3]
Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to
conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant. He
assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and
SPO2 Marlin Ramos, SPO2 Warlito Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel
Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie Agustin,
all assigned at the Investigation Section of the Laoag Police
Station as back-up. The marked buy-money consisting of
one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G-242745 was recorded in the
police blotter in accordance with standard operating
procedure.[4]
Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team
left the precinct on board two (2) owner-type jeeps and posted
themselves near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the
Divine Word College. Five minutes later, SPO1 Dalusong and
Oliver arrived at General Segundo Avenue.[5] Oliver
immediately approached the appellant, who was then standing
between the Macmac Store and a xerox center, and introduced
poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who was sporting casual clothes
and slippers: Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen (Friend, this is
the buyer). At this point, the appellant who was carrying an
orange plastic bag, brought out a brick-like item wrapped in
newspaper. He handed the item to SPO1 Dalusong, who

11
forthwith checked the same by making a small hole through
it. Convinced that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana,
SPO1 Dalusong handed the P500 bill to the appellant. He
thereupon scratched his head, a signal to the back-up men that
the transaction had been consummated.[6] Momentarily, the
back-up officers, who had earlier positioned themselves
separately in different strategic locations near the poseurbuyer, rushed to the scene and arrested the appellant. SPO1
Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag containing the
suspected marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the
appellant and recovered the buy-money from the latters
pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the
headquarters where he was booked, and the incident was
recorded in the police blotter.[7] The suspected marijuana was
brought to and initially examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an
accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), who
certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture of
marijuana leaves with seeds.[8]
On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the
Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service,
Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the
examination of samples of the suspected marijuana taken from
the appellant.[9] On September 6, 1998, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta,
evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the
orange plastic bag containing the suspected marijuana to the
PNP provincial crime laboratory service in Camp Juan, Laoag
City. The bag, together with SPO4 Venturas letter-request,
was received by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos.[10] On September 8,
1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and
the confiscated item, and were duly received by SPO4
Tampos.[11] The latter, in turn, handed the item to Police
Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the
Crime Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an
examination of representative samples extracted from the
suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant.[12] On the
basis of her examination, Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry
Report No. D-074-94 with the following findings:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED :
One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing
eight hundred grams (800) wrapped with newspaper pages
contained in an orange plastic bag.
...
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION :
To determine the presence of marijuana on the abovementioned specimen.
FINDI NGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned
specimen prove POSITIVE result to the test for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.[13]
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and
alibi. He testified that sometime in the first week of August
1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to

canvass the price for the repair of the upholstery of a

passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a
certain Belrey Oliver who was an employee of the Ferds
Upholstery Shop. In the course of their conversation, Oliver
asked the appellant where he came from and what his
occupation was. Upon being told that he helped in harvesting
mangoes in Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered refreshments
to Gamiao and the appellant. While taking their snacks, Oliver
inquired whether they wanted to back up the promotion of
certain policemen who, in the future, might be able to return
the favor to them. When the appellant asked in what way they
could extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for
somebody in Cagayan from whom they could buy one (1) kilo
of marijuana. He agreed to Olivers suggestion. The latter
handed to him the amount of P700.00 to cover the purchase of
the marijuana. The appellant immediately went to the
terminal bound for Cagayan to look for somebody from that
province who could be of help. When he could not find
anyone, he decided to personally take the trip. He then
instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his
mother that he was going to Cagayan.
The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After three (3) days, he was able to buy
one kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag
City on August 12, 1994, he went to Ferds Upholstery Shop at
11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured the
order. After seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him to
take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m. of the same day in
front of the Divine Word College where they would hand over
the marijuana to the policemen they intended to help.
At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmacs
Store and took his merienda. Momentarily, Oliver arrived
alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they walked
southward, away from the Macmacs Store, looking for the
policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They
walked back northward, at which point they encountered an
owner-type jeep which suddenly stopped. He was nonplussed
when Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his knapsack
containing the marijuana, and pushed him inside the jeep. He
was made to sit beside the driver with another policeman,
while Oliver seated himself at the back seat with another
policeman. The jeep they were riding was followed by a patrol
car. Still dazed at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver
four times, Why is it that this is now happening to me(?), but
Oliver did not respond. At the police station, he was
immediately locked up. That afternoon, SPO4 Ventura and
SPO2 Ramos, accompanied by Oliver, brought him to the City
Fiscals Office. He was later brought to the provincial hospital
where he was subjected to a physical check-up. That was the
last time he saw or heard of Oliver.[14]
On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered
judgment,[15] the dispositive portion of which reads :
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally
convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the accused Manny

12
Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The quantity of marijuana involved is more than 750
grams; hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided
for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay
the costs.
Hence, the present appeal.
The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:
1.
The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not
instigated in looking for marijuana and bringing it to Laoag.
2.
The lower Court erred in finding that the accused
received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO bill, despite his denial that
he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of the police officers who are presumed
to be regularly performing their official duties, there being no
improper motive attributed to them.
3.
The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.[16]
The appellant contends that contrary to the collective
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Oliver instigated him
to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence
and probative weight to his testimony and in considering the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.
The appeal has no merit.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by
the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. The reason for
this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.[17] After a thorough and careful review of the records of
this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was sufficiently
established by the evidence, and the trial courts judgment is
well-supported by law and jurisprudence.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.[18] In this case, the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of
marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the
entrapment operation.
q How has the case involving drug or marijuana
involving the accused brought to your attention
or to your office, for that matter?
a Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver
tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny
Domingcil at the Upholstery Shop along Ablan
Avenue and he also informed us that he ordered
P500.00 worth of marijuana.
q Who ordered from whom?
a Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.

q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q

a
q
a

q
a

q
a

q
a
q
a
q

By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence

Section of Laoag City PNP, at that time?
SPO4 Ventura, sir.
Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver
tipped you of (sic) about this matter?
Yes, sir.
And because of that information from Belrey
Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4 Ventura do?
SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely
to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir.
Where will the operation take place?
In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of
the Divine Word College of Laoag, sir.
And did you have any participation in that
operation?
Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).
At what time was the operation scheduled to be
executed?
1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.
For the said operation, what preparations, if any,
did your group take?
Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.
What was the plan?
To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.
And you said that you were to act as poseur
buyer, anything was given to you in connection
with your specific participation?
I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of
P500.00, sir.
And what will you do with that P500.00?
The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed
me to reflect the serial number of the money in
the police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as
marked money.
And after the serial number was entered in the
police blotter, what next did you do?
Before we went out of the station, the team or
companions of SPO4 Ventura went ahead to the
place where the transaction will take place, sir.
And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura
who went ahead?
Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4
Balolong, sir, while Oliver and myself were the
ones who went together.
Who went ahead to the place where the sale will
take place?
The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.
And did you reach the place where the
transaction will take place?
Yes, sir.
Before you started to the place where the
transaction will take place in front of the Divine
Word College of Laoag, did you know then the
face of Manny Domingcil?

13
a
q
a
q

a
q
a
q
a
q
a

q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a

q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a

No, sir.
How did you know his face then?
Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that
the person is Manny Domingcil.
So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at
the scene where the transaction would take
place, Manny Domingcil was already there and
that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you?
Yes, sir.
After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?
We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.
And after or as soon as you were near him, what
happened next?
Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me
as the buyer, sir.
What did Oliver say?
Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen, (which when
translated into english[sic] means): Pare, this is
the buyer.
And so, what was the reaction of Manny
Domingcil?
Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the
stuff that was ordered.
And what did he say?
Manny Domingcil said: There is, Pare.
By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny
Domingcil?
Belrey Oliver, sir.
Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from
Manny Domingcil?
Yes, sir.
Where?
At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.
That was what Oliver told you when he ordered
the stuff?
Yes, sir.
When Manny Domingcil said: There is, pare,
what transpired next, if any?
I told him: Can I look at it and he brought out a
wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a
newspaper inside an orange plastic bag.
And after he had brought out the said thing, what
did you do with it?
I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.
You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper
and you said you checked its contents?
Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small
hole at the side.
And what was the result of your inspection?
I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.
And, so what did you do then?
After I found out that it was marijuana I handed
to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill, sir.

And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill,

what did you do next?
a I gave the signal to my companions, sir.
q And what did your companions do when you
gave the signal?
a They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
q What was your signal?
a I scratched my head, sir.
q And, what was your attire at that time you
bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny
Domingcil?
a Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.
q And all the time during your transaction with
Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey Oliver?
a At my side, sir.
q And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say
anything?
a None, sir.
q And after giving your signal to your companion
police officers who were nearby and they rushed
to your place where you were, what happened?
a They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
q And what about the marijuana which you said
Manny Domingcil sold to you?
a I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.
q And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know
what happened to it?
a SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill
from the pocket of Manny Domingcil.
q And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did
your group go?
a To the police station, sir.
q Do you know if any records were made to your
police station when you returned or arrived
there?
a Yes, sir.
q What for example?
a They made a request ... we reflected in the police
blotter the apprehension of Manny Domingcil,
the confiscation of the marijuana and the
recovery of the marked money in the amount of
P500.00.
q Was the serial number of the P500 bill you
recovered from the pocket of Manny Domingcil
recorded?
a Yes, sir.
q And do you know what happened to the stuff
later on after you returned to the police station?
a They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an
initial examination on the confiscated marijuana,
sir.[19]
The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was
corroborated on material points by SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura,
then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City

14
who organized and conducted the operation and was part of
the buy-bust team itself.[20] SPO4 Ventura remained steadfast
and unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling
by the defense counsel.[21]
Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic
Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory Center at San
Fernando, La Union, confirmed[22] Dr. Joseph Adayas initial
finding[23]that the substance seized from the appellant was
indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.
It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado
Mamotos[24] and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta[25] that the confiscated
marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic
chemist and later presented as evidence in court.
The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses
complement each other, giving a complete picture of how the
appellants illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and
how the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their
testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were
in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to
possess or sell the same. More importantly, all the persons
who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust
operation deserve full faith and credit.[26]
The appellants bare denial of the crime charged and his
barefaced claim that he was merely instigated by Oliver into
procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the
straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met
Belrey Oliver in the course of his canvass for the upholstery of
his brothers jeepney, would readily leave his errand behind
and allow a stranger to talk him into buying a prohibited drug,
a known criminal activity for which he could be prosecuted,
and if convicted, sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All this he
was willing to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of alleged
future favors from another who was also unknown to the
appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and spent
almost three days in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to
accommodate a newly found acquaintance, who handed the
appellant the meager sum of P700.00 for the intended
purpose. The Court cannot give credence to such a
preposterous stance as advanced by the appellant and
confirmed by his supposed corroborative witness, Ernesto
Gamiao.
It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed,
it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must also be credible in itself such that common
experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference
of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal
prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is
tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of
human experience and not by mere conjecture or

speculation. Testimonies that do not adhere to this standard

are necessarily accorded little weight or credence.[27]Besides,
instigation, or the appellants claim of a frame-up, is a defense
that has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor
because the same can easily be concocted and is a common
standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of
the
Dangerous
Drugs
Act.[28] Thus,
in People
vs.
Bongalon,[29] the Court held:
As we have earlier stated, the appellants denial cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We
are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances, law
enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract
information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi,
frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court with
disfavor as it can easily be, concocted, hence, commonly used
as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize the
disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order,
not to mention the well-being of society, if the courts, solely on
the basis of the policemens alleged rotten reputation, accept
in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily
fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
exists.
The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police
informant, does not enfeeble the case for the
prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in
court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service
to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed
with inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely
corroborative, especially so in this case, when the poseurbuyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.[30]
The appellants claim that the prosecution offered in
evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy money and did
not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original
copy thereof is not supported by the records. The records
show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the
marked money, was in fact offered in evidence by the
prosecution.[31] The appellant would surely have objected if the
prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the
bill. The appellant did not do so. The only ground for his
objection to the admission of the marked money was that it
was self-serving.
Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously
admitted in evidence by the trial court, the absence of the
original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked
money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable in
drug cases;[32] it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover,
the appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana
but also for the delivery thereof, which is committed by the
mere delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug. The
consideration for the transaction is of no moment.[33]
The law defines deliver as a persons act of knowingly
passing a dangerous drug to another with or without

15
consideration.[34] Considering that the appellant was charged
with the sale and the delivery of prohibited drugs, the
consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be
sufficiently established even in the absence of the marked
money. The erasures and alterations in the Joint Affidavit of
the policemen involved in the buy-bust operation did not
debilitate the case of the prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit
of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any
party. Second. The investigator who prepared the Joint
Affidavit erroneously stated that the two P500.00 bills were
used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust operation
bearing Serial Numbers AA823675 and G242745. As shown by
the prosecutions evidence the policemen used only
the P500.00 bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of
the drug. Hence, the Joint Affidavit of the policemen had to
be corrected to reflect the truth.
All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by evidence to the
contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact
that the prosecutions evidence fully shows and confirms such
regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to
reverse or even modify the findings of the trial court giving
credence to the evidence of the prosecution.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case
No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO*, CAPT. ROMEO M.
BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L.
LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B.
MORENO, C1C MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D.
MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT.
ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M.
DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO
S. MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO
ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO TARAN, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of
Court filed by petitioners who were convicted and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011 for the double murder of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983.[1]
Petitioners were members of the military who acted as
Senator Aquinos security detail upon his arrival in Manila from
his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were
charged, together with several other members of the military,
before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino who
was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of

China Airlines at the Manila International Airport. Petitioners

were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was
also gunned down at the airport tarmac.
On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a
Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010-10011 acquitting all the
accused, which include the petitioners. However, the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by this
Court to be a sham trial. The Court thus nullified said
proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered
a re-trial of the cases.[2]
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.
In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the
Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found the
petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. It sentenced them
to reclusion perpetua in each case.[3] The judgment became
final after this Court denied petitioners petition for review of
the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show reversible error
in the questioned decision,[4] as well as their subsequent
motion for reconsideration.[5]
In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from
the Chief Public Attorney who, in turn, requested the
Independent Forensic Group of the University of the
Philippines to make a thorough review of the forensic evidence
in the double murder case. The petitioners, assisted by the
Public Attorneys Office, now want to present the findings of
the forensic group to this Court and ask the Court to allow the
re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to
determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.
Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the reopening of the case:
I
Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not
available during the second trial of the above-entitled cases
which could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan,
specifically:
A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false
forensic claims that led to the unjust conviction of the
petitioners-movants.
B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr.
II
There was a grave violation of due process by reason of:
A) Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;
B) Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;
C) Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress;
D) Willful suppression of evidence;
E) Use of false forensic evidence that led to the
unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants.
III
There was serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the
Sandiganbayan based on false forensic evidence, which entitles
petitioners-movants to a re-trial.[6]

16
Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings
of the forensic group composed of Prof. Jerome B. Bailen, a
forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines,
Atty. Erwin P. Erfe, M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E.
Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant and Human Rights and
Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a
forensic dentistry consultant. Their report essentially
concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study
of the evidence in the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio
Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the service
stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was
shot while he was walking on the airport tarmac toward the
waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed to transport him
from the airport to Fort Bonifacio. This is contrary to the
finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C
Moreno, the security escort positioned behind Senator Aquino,
who shot the latter. The report also suggests that the physical
evidence in these cases may have been misinterpreted and
manipulated to mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert that
the September 28, 1990 decision of the Sandiganbayan should
be voided as it was based on false forensic
evidence. Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic
group of the physical evidence in the double murder case
constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle
them to a new trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In addition to the report of the forensic
group, petitioners seek to present the testimony of an alleged
eyewitness, the driver of the waiting AVSECOM van, SPO4
Ruben M. Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted to this
Court, SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he saw a man in blue
uniform similar to that of the Philippine Airlines maintenance
crew, suddenly fire at Senator Aquino as the latter was about
to board the van. The man in blue was later identified as
Rolando Galman.
Petitioners pray that the Court issue a resolution:
1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable
Courts Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and
September 10, 1991;
2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) dated September 28,
1990 in People vs. Custodio, et al., Case No.
10010-10011[;]
3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]
4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the
reception of additional defense evidence/re-trial
in the above entitled cases.[7]
The issue now is whether petitioners are entitled to
a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide:
Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. At any time before
a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on

motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the

consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The court shall grant a new
trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have been committed during
the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered
which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have
discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the judgment.
xxx
Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration.
The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the
following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of
law or irregularities committed during the trial, all the
proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside
and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow
the introduction of additional evidence.
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand
and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be
taken and considered together with the evidence already in the
record.
(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or
reconsideration, the original judgment shall be set aside or
vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (emphasis
supplied)
In line with the objective of the Rules of Court to set
guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but without shackling
the hands that dispense it, the remedy of new trial has been
described as a new invention to temper the severity of a
judgment or prevent the failure of justice.[8] Thus, the Rules
allow the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of
law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly
discovered evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the
errors of law or irregularities are expunged from the record or
new evidence is introduced. Thereafter, the original judgment
is vacated and a new one is rendered.[9]
Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail
of the remedy of new trial before the judgment of conviction
becomes final. Petitioners admit that the decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
became final and executory upon denial of their petition for
review filed before this Court and their motion for
reconsideration. Entry of judgment has in fact been made on
September 30, 1991.[10] Nonetheless, they maintain that
equitable considerations exist in this case to justify the
relaxation of the Rules and re-open the case to accord
petitioners the opportunity to present evidence that will

17
exonerate them from the charges against them. We do not
find merit in their submission.
Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. Courts are generally reluctant in granting
motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence for it is presumed that the moving party has had
ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to secure
all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions
are treated with great caution due to the danger of perjury
and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that
which may be the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an
adverse judgment. Hence, the moving party is often required
to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that
there has been a lack of due diligence, and to establish other
facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.[11] This Court has
repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1)
that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching;
and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly
discovered evidence could have been very well presented
during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
same cannot be considered newly discovered.[12]
These standards, also known as the Berry rule, trace
their origin to the 1851 case of Berry vs. State of
Georgia[13] where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:
Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered
evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the
following points there seems to be a pretty general
concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party
who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come
to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to
the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That
it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the
new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only viz;
speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on
the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be
produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will
not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to
impeach the character or credit of a witness. (citations
omitted)
These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in
determining the propriety of motions for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial
has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to
present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding
of a new trial.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial

based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred
evidence is in fact a newly discovered evidence which could
not have been discovered by due diligence. The question of
whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence
discovered, and apredictive one, i.e., when should or could it
have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement
of due diligence has relevance.[14] We have held that in order
that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as
newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so
much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into
existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of
the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless
failed to secure it.[15]
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence,
and whether the movant has exercised due diligence depends
upon
the
particular
circumstances
of
each
[16]
case. Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is
often equated with reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice
to the defendant. In other words, the concept of due diligence
has both a time componentand a good faith component. The
movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in
gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act
reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence
contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good
faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the facts known to him.[17]
Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners
purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered
evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the
holding of a third trial.
The report of the forensic group may not be considered as
newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it
was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic
study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double
murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic
group used the same physical and testimonial evidence
proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and
interpretation of said evidence. They cited the materials and
methods that they used for their study, viz:
MATERIALS AND METHODS
MATERIALS:
a. Court records of the case, especially photographs
of: a) the stairway where the late Sen. Aquino and
his escorts descended; b) the part of the tarmac
where the lifeless bodies of the late Sen. Aquino and
Galman fell; and c) the autopsy conducted by the
NBI Medico-legal team headed by Dr. Mu[]oz; and
the autopsy report of the late Sen. Benigno
Aquino[,] Jr. signed by Dr. Mu[]oz and Dr. Solis;

18
b.

The gun and live ammunitions collected at the crime

scene;
c. A reference human skull photos and X-rays of the
same to demonstrate wound location and bullet
trajectory;
d. The reports of interviews and statements by the
convicted military escorts, and other witnesses;
e. Re-enactment of the killing of Aquino based on the
military escorts*+ version, by the military escorts
themselves in the Bilibid Prison and by volunteers at
the NAIA Tarmac;
f. Various books and articles on forensic and the
medico-legal field[;]
g. Results of Forensic experiments conducted in relation
to the case.
METHODS:
a. Review of the forensic exhibits presented in the
court;
b. Review of TSNs relevant to the forensic review;
c. Study of and research on the guns, slugs and
ammunitions allegedly involved in the crime;
d. Interviews/re-enactment of the crime based on the
militarys accounts, both in the Bilibid Prison where
the convicts are confined and the MIA (now NAIA)
stairway and tarmac;
e. Conduct of ocular inspection and measurements on
the actual crime scene (stairway and tarmac) at the
old Manila International Airport (now NAIA);
f. Retracing the slugs trajectory based on the autopsy
reports and experts testimonies using an actual
human skull;
g. X-rays of the skull with the retraced trajectory based
on the autopsy report and experts testimonies;
h. Evaluation of the presented facts and opinions of
local experts in relation to accepted forensic findings
in international publications on forensic science,
particularly on guns and [gunshot] wound injuries;
i. Forensic experiments and simulations of events in
relation to this case.[18]
These materials were available to the parties during the
trial and there was nothing that prevented the petitioners from
using them at the time to support their theory that it was not
the military, but Rolando Galman, who killed Senator Aquino.
Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present any new
forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the
defense at the time of the trial even with the exercise of due
diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer the opinion of
other forensic experts at the time regarding the physical
evidence gathered at the scene of the crime, there was ample
opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally
submitted and decided.[19]
A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision dated September
28, 1990 shows a thorough study by the court of the forensic
evidence presented during the trial, viz:

COURT FINDINGS
As to the physical
evidence
Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the
single bullet that penetrated the head and caused the death of
Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory
ought to be the findings during the autopsy. The prosector in
the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer,
reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, that the
trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance having been
located at the mastoid region, left, below the external auditory
meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior
portion of the mandible, was forward, downward and
medially. (Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, Exhibit NNNN-2t-2)
A controversy as to this trajectory came about when, upon
being cross-examined by counsel for the defense, Dr.
Bienvenido Muoz made a significant turn-about by stating
that the correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was upward,
downward, and medially. The present position of Dr.
Muoz is premised upon the alleged fact that he found the
petrous bone fractured, obviously hit by the fatal bullet. He
concluded, in view of this finding, that the fatal bullet must
have gone upward from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal
bullet exited at the mandible, it is his belief that the petrous
bone deflected the trajectory of the bullet and, thus, the bullet
proceeded downwards from the petrous bone to the mandible.
This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz in this regard
notwithstanding, We hold that the trajectory of the fatal bullet
which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, forward,
downward and medially. For the reason that the wound of
entrance was at a higher elevation than the wound of exit,
there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory was
downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast rate of speed
takes a straight path from the wound of entrance to the wound
of exit. It is unthinkable that the bullet, while projected
upwards, would, instead of exiting to the roof of the head, go
down to the mandible because it was allegedly deflected by a
petrous bone which though hard is in fact a mere spongy
protuberance, akin to a cartilage.
Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of the fatal bullet;
First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and Dr. Ceferino Cunanan, the
immediate superiors of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, manifested
before the Court, that, since the wound of entrance appeared
ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion collar which
was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of
approach, a downward trajectory of the bullet is indicated. This
phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at
a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal bullet.
There was no showing as to whether a probe could have been
made from the wound of entrance to the petrous bone. Out of
curiosity, Dr. Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe from the
wound of exit into the petrous bone. He was unsuccessful
notwithstanding four or five attempts. If at all, this disproves

19
the theory of Dr. Muoz that the trajectory was upward,
downward and medially. On the other hand, Dr. Juanito Billote
and photographer Alexander Loinaz witnessed the fact that Dr.
Muoz*s+ understudy, Alejandrino Javier, had successfully
made a probe from the wound of entrance directly towards the
wound of exit. Alejandrino Javier shouted with excitement
upon his success and Alexander Loinaz promptly photographed
this event with Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end of
the probe at the mandible. (Exhibit XXXXX-39-A)
To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous bone, this
spongy mash of cartilage would have been decimated or
obliterated. The fact that the main bullet was of such force,
power and speed that it was able to bore a hole into the
mandible and crack it, is an indication that it could not have
been stopped or deflected by a mere petrous bone. By its
power and force, it must have been propelled by a powerful
gun. It would have been impossible for the main bullet to have
been deflected form an upward course by a mere spongy
protuberance. Granting that it was so deflected, however, it
could not have maintained the same power and force as when
it entered the skull at the mastoid region so as to crack the
mandible and make its exit there.
But what caused the fracture of the petrous bone? Was there
a cause of the fracture, other than that the bullet had hit
it? Dr. Pedro Solis, maintaining the conclusion that the
trajectory of the bullet was downward, gave the following
alternative explanations for the fracture of the petrous bone:
First, the petrous bone could have been hit by a splinter of the
main bullet, particularly, that which was found at the temporal
region; and,
Second, the fracture must have been caused by the kinetic
force applied to the point of entrance at the mastoid region
which had the tendency of being radiated towards the petrous
bone.
Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the temporal bone,
and of the parietal bone, Dr. Pedro Solis pointed out, had been
caused by the aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is applied
to the mastoid region of the head, Dr. Pedro Solis emphasized,
a radiation of forces is distributed all over the cranial back,
including, although not limited to, the parietal bone. The skull,
Dr. Solis explains, is a box-like structure. The moment you
apply pressure on the portion, a distortion, tension or some
other mechanical defect is caused. This radiation of forces
produces what is known as the spider web linear fracture
which goes to different parts of the body. The so-called
fracturing of the petrous portion of the left temporal bone is
one of the consequences of the kinetic force forcefully applied
to the mastoid region.
The fact that there was found a fracture of the petrous bone is
not necessarily indicative of the theory that the main bullet
passed through the petrous bone.
Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to whether the
metal fragments alleged by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz to have
been found by him inside the skull or at the wound of exit were

really parts of the main bullet which killed the Senator. When
Dr. Pedro Solis examined these fragments, he found that two
(2) of the fragments were larger in size, and were of such
shapes, that they could not have gone out of the wound of exit
considering the size and shape of the exit wound.
Finding of a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet fatal to the
credibility of defense witnesses.
The finding that the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno
Aquino, Jr. was directed downwards sustains the allegation of
prosecution eyewitnesses to the effect that Sen. Benigno
Aquino, Jr. was shot by a military soldier at the bridge stairs
while he was being brought down from the plane. Rebecca
Quijano saw that the senator was shot by the military man who
was directly behind the Senator while the Senator and he were
descending the stairs. Rebecca Quijanos testimony in this
regard is echoed by Jessie Barcelona, Ramon Balang, Olivia
Antimano, and Mario Laher, whose testimonies this Court finds
likewise as credible.
The downward trajectory of the bullet having been established,
it stands to reason that the gun used in shooting the Senator
was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound of
entrance at the back of the head of the Senator. This is
consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses to the
effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he stood at
the upper step of the stairs, the second or third behind Senator
Aquino, while Senator Aquino and the military soldiers bringing
him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise consistent with
the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that the shooting of
Senator Aquino occurred while the Senator was still on the
bridge stairs, a conclusion derived from the fact that the fatal
shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed
the service door and was led down the bridge stairs.
It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi Suzuki that, as was
gauged from the sounds of the footsteps of Senator Aquino, as
the Senator went down the bridge stairs, the shooting of the
Senator occurred while the Senator had stepped on the
11th step from the top.
At the ocular inspection conducted by this Court, with the
prosecution and the defense in attendance, it should be noted
that the following facts were established as regards the bridge
stairs:
Observations:
The length of one block covering
the
tarmac 196;
The width of one block covering
the
tarmac 10;
The distance from the base of the staircase
leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy
marker at the tarmac 126;
There are 20 steps in the staircase including the
landing;
The distance from the first rung of the stairway
up to the 20th rung which is the landing of stairs
208;

20
Distance from the first rung of the stairway up to
the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door
2311;
Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door
21;
Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door
1911;
Length of one rung including railpost 34;
Space between two rungs of stairway 9;
Width of each rung 11-1/2;
Length of each rung (end to end) 29:
Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing
25.
(underlining supplied)[20]
The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively analyzed and
discussed the forensic evidence in its resolution dated
November 15, 1990 denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by the convicted accused. The court held:
The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit NNNN-2-t-2
indicated a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet when it
stated that the fatal bullet was forward, downward, and
medially . . .
xxx
II
The wound of entrance having been at a higher elevation than
the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that
the trajectory was downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a
Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum revolver or a .45
caliber, must have traveled at a fast rate of speed and it stands
to reason that it took a straight path from the wound of
entrance to the wound of exit. A hole indicating this straight
path was proven to have existed. If, as contended on crossexamination by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, that the bullet was
projected upwards, it ought to have exited at the roof of the
head. The theory that the fatal bullet was deflected by a mere
petrous bone is inconceivable.
III
Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is
what is known as a contusion collar which was widest at the
superior portion, indicating an acute angle of approach, a
downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is conclusively
indicated. This phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the
fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of
the fatal bullet.
IV
There was no hole from the petrous bone to the mandible
where the fatal bullet had exited and, thus, there is no support
to the theory of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz that the fatal bullet had
hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory and had been
deflected by the petrous bone towards the mandible. Dr.
Juanito Billotes testimony in this regard had amplified the
matter with clarity.
xxx

These physical facts, notwithstanding the arguments and

protestations of counsel for the defense as now and heretofore
avowed, compel the Court to maintain the holding: (1) that the
trajectory of the fatal bullet which hit and killed Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. was forward, downward and
medially; (2) that the Senator was shot by a person who
stood at a higher elevation than he; and (3) that the Senator
was shot and killed by CIC Rogelio Moreno on the bridge stairs
and not on the tarmac, in conspiracy with the rest of the
accused convicted herein.[21]
This Court affirmed said findings of the Sandiganbayan
when it denied the petition for review in its resolution of July
25, 1991. The Court ruled:
The Court has carefully considered and deliberated upon all the
contentions of the petitioners but finds no basis for the
allegation that the respondent Sandiganbayan has gravely
erred in resolving the factual issues.
The attempt to place a constitutional dimension in the petition
is a labor in vain. Basically, only questions of fact are
raised. Not only is it axiomatic that the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are final unless they fall within specifically
recognized exceptions to the rule but from the petition and its
annexes alone, it is readily apparent that the respondent Court
correctly resolved the factual issues.
xxx
The trajectory of the fatal bullet, whether or not the victim was
descending the stairway or was on the tarmac when shot, the
circumstances showing conspiracy, the participants in the
conspiracy, the individual roles of the accused and their
respective parts in the conspiracy, the absence of evidence
against thirteen accused and their co-accused Col. Vicente B.
Tigas, Jr., the lack of credibility of the witnesses against former
Minister Jose D. Aspiras, Director Jesus Z. Singson, Col. Arturo
A. Custodio, Hermilo Gosuico, Major General Prospero Olivas,
and the shooting of Rolando Galman are all factual matters
w[h]ich the respondent court discussed with fairness and at
length. The petitioners insistence that a few witnesses in their
favor should be believed while that of some witnesses against
them should be discredited goes into the question of credibility
of witnesses, a matter which under the records of this petition
is best left to the judgment of the Sandiganbayan.[22]
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the
theory presented by the defense during the trial of the double
murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but
rather recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.[23] If
at all, it only serves to discredit the version of the prosecution
which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter
upheld by the Sandiganbayan.
The same is true with the statement of the alleged
eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His narration merely
corroborates the testimonies of other defense witnesses
during the trial that they saw Senator Aquino already walking
on the airport tarmac toward the AVSECOM van when a man in
blue-gray uniform darted from behind and fired at the back of

21
the Senators head.[24] The Sandiganbayan, however, did not
give weight to their account as it found the testimonies of
prosecution eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie
Barcelona more credible. Quijano and Barcelona testified that
they saw the soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway
aim and fire a gun on the latters nape. As earlier quoted, the
Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more consistent
with the physical evidence. SPO4 Cantimbuhans testimony
will not in any way alter the courts decision in view of the
eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona, taken together
with the physical evidence presented during the
trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new
evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted.[25] Also, new trial will not be granted if
the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching.
As additional support to their motion for new trial,
petitioners also claim that they were denied due process
because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by
counsel. We are not persuaded. The records will bear out that
petitioners were ably represented by Atty. Rodolfo U. Jimenez
during the trial and when the case was elevated to this
Court. An experienced lawyer in criminal cases, Atty. Jimenez
vigorously defended the petitioners cause throughout the
entire proceedings. The records show that the defense
presented a substantial number of witnesses and exhibits
during the trial. After the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision,
Atty. Jimenez filed a petition for review with this Court,
invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit the
petitioners. When the Court denied the petition for review, he
again filed a motion for reconsideration exhausting his deep
reservoir of legal talent. We therefore find petitioners claim
to be unblushingly unsubstantiated. We note that they did not
allege any specific facts in their present motion to show that
Atty. Jimenez had been remiss in his duties as counsel.
Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of
their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The general
rule is that the client is bound by the action of his counsel in
the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result of the litigation might have been different had his
counsel proceeded differently.[26] We held in People vs.
Umali:[27]
In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held
that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made
in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result
of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel,
does not furnish a ground for a new trial.
If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening
cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new
counsel could be employed who could allege and show that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced,
or learned.
So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the
competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy,

materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper

defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a
new trial; and in general the client is bound by the action of his
counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not be heard to
complain that the result of the litigation might have been
different had counsel proceeded differently. (citations omitted)
Finally, we are not moved by petitioners assertion that
the forensic evidence may have been manipulated and
misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners
did not allege concrete facts to support their crass
claim. Hence, we find the same to be unfounded and purely
speculative.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.