Professional Documents
Culture Documents
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000 ONG CHIA, Petitioner, Republic of The Philippines and The Court of APPEALS, Respondents. Mendoza, J.
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000 ONG CHIA, Petitioner, Republic of The Philippines and The Court of APPEALS, Respondents. Mendoza, J.
2
objection which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition
for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M. Basa
St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the
Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to
state in his petition "his present and former places of
residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure
of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the
petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the
investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be
informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the
petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of
such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the
law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper
and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his
wife for several years, and sired four children out of
wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without
the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being
proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him
from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in
1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses, commissions
and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to
file an income tax return "because he is not liable for
income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is
not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be
shown that the employment gives one an income such
that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the
object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they
are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife
are living on the allowance given to them by their
children. The monthly pension given by the elder
children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses,
commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN NATURALIZATION
CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN
3
cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the
authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court
by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in
fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for
naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not
been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while
the case number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally
unreliable and should not be considered by the
Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is
trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical
error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the
correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of
the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also
docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner
offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents namely,
the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage
contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns are all public documents. As
such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing
of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough
to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we
shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include
the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance
with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms
part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7. 20 This
is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to
give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity
to check on the background of the applicant and prevent
suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior
on his part in any community where he may have lived at one
time or another.21 It is settled, however, that naturalization
laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor
of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the
State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly provides that the applicant for
naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and
4
Barbosa, SPO3 Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian, Inspector
Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C.
Bathan, Inspector Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3
Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren Chavez and
Pablo Calsis.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that
on March 10, 1997, at around seven-thirty in the evening,
while Mercy Beria, Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others
were leisurely walking along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone
1, Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding
anniversary, they heard several gunshots. Shortly after, they
met a certain Pablito Umali who told them that Ompong
Chavez had been shot. They ran to Chavez straight off and saw
him already lying on the ground, about 1 meters away from a
lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines which were
starting to come out. Beria shook Chavez and asked him what
had happened. Chavez replied tinambangan kami na Ador
(We were ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he be
brought to the hospital as he was dying. About eight (8)
meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya,
dead.[5]
Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio
communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2
Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to
conduct an investigation. SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1
Wilfredo Fernandez, among others, were already there.[6] SPO1
Barbosa collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures
and made some sketches.[7] SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand
interviewed one Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was
nearby, and when he heard people shout that Chavez was still
alive, he brought Chavez to the hospital but the latter expired
on the way.[8]
That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors
had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa
sought the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to
accompany him to the residence of the Adors. They arrived at
the Adors at around ten oclock that evening and spoke with
their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the
other male members of the Ador family but was told by
Diosdado Sr. that they were already asleep. Diosdado Sr.
nevertheless promised to present them the following day.[9]
The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain
Perez accompanied the Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado
III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa
at the PNP Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were
informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
choose their own counsel. They were then brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory at the Provincial Headquarters and subjected
to paraffin tests.[10] On the way to the crime laboratory,
Godofredo told his police escort that he had been entrusted
with a handgun which he kept in his residence.[11] The
information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then Deputy
Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto I.
Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun because
5
(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left
hand, negative;
(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;[21]
(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive. [22]
Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the
killing of his son was driven by the long-standing feud between
the Adors and his family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier
accused his other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for
allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado Jr.).[23] Then, Adelina, a
daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a case for abduction with
multiple rape against him, Absalon III, Rayne and Josephine, all
surnamed Cuya, after the romantic relationship between
Adelina and his deceased son Absalon III turned sour.[24] He
also presented official receipts of the funeral and burial
expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.[25]
Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke
of the animosity between the Chavez and the Ador
families. He produced a certification from the PNP Naga City
Police Station that on February 17, 1997, a blotter was entered
in the Daily Record of Events showing that deceased Chavez
reported a certain Ricardo Ador who while under the influence
of liquor caused him physical injury.[26] The witness likewise
presented an official receipt showing that the family
spent P3,500.00 for the funeral of the deceased
Chavez.[27] After presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its
case.
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to
evidence for utter lack of evidence.[28] On May 13, 1998, the
trial court dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino
and Allan but denied the demurrer to evidence against
Godofredo
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be
justified for the accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and
Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted insofar as
these accused are concerned. Said accused therefore, namely:
Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are
ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816. The
bailbonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby
cancelled.
Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned
shall proceed.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.
For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the
killings of Cuya and Chavez. He said that on March 10, 1997, at
around seven oclock in the evening, he heard several gunshots
while he was having dinner with his wife and four (4) children
in their house in Pacol, Naga City. Since his wife advised him
not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner. The following
day, while he was gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend
Dominador Bautista arrived and asked him to go down from
the tree. Bautista wanted to borrow money and on his way to
see him, found a gun by the footpath. Bautista gave the gun to
him. It was his first time to hold a gun. He tried it out and fired
three (3) times. After firing the gun, he removed the empty
shells from its chambers and threw them away. He then
wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut
trunk. Bautista left when he told him that he had no
money. He then continued to gather pili nuts until Major Idian
and three (3) other policemen came.
Godofredos father told him that they were being
suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya the night before. Thus,
they went to the provincial headquarters, were subjected to
paraffin testing and made to sign a blank bond paper. After
that, they went back to the central police station. At the
central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia
that that morning, his friend Bautista found a gun along the
road and gave it to him. He hid the gun under a coconut
trunk. Calabia relayed the information to Major Idian who
directed PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the
gun. Godofredo led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the
gun, retrieved it and handed it to the latter. They then
returned to the police headquarters where he was jailed. He
asserted that the gun presented in court is different from the
gun he surrendered to the police.[30]
Bautista corroborated Godofredos story. He testified that
he found the gun which Godofredo yielded to PO3
Nepomuceno. He said that he was on his way to see
Godofredo to borrow money when he chanced upon the
handgun on the pathway. He gave the gun to Godofredo and
the latter tested it by pulling its trigger. After firing the gun,
Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw
them. Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it
under a fallen coconut trunk.[31]
Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998,
at Barangay Doa, Orani, Bataan, and committed to the Naga
City Jail on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered
to the court and was committed to the same city jail
on November 22, 1998. On November 23, 1998, both
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty. Hence, trial against them commenced and
proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining accused,
Godofredo.
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis[32] as a witness
against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III. Calsis testified that on
March 10, 1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by
the house of Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola
Kising at Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before going home
from work. After asking permission from her to go home and
while about to urinate outside her house, he heard several
gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower
plantation. As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr.,
Diosdado III, Godofredo and another unidentified man run
away. Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while Diosdado
Jr. had a long firearm.[33] He saw Chavez and Cuya lying on the
road. Chavez was about five (5) meters away from where he
stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away. The place was
6
illuminated by a bright light from an electric post. There were
no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear that he might
be identified by the assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but
shirked nevertheless.[34]
Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after
about one (1) year and nine (9) months. Fear struck him.[35] He
maintained that he knew the assailants because he and his wife
lived in the house of Lola Kising after they got
married.[36] Immense fear prevented him from attending to
Chavez, even while he heard him murmuring, and from
informing the families of the victims of the incident that very
same night. He was about to tell the Chavez family the
following morning but was counseled by his Lola Bading, the
sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the
case.[37] Calsis and his family left their residence in Pacol one (1)
month after the incident because he was afraid the assailants
might have identified him.[38] Even Lola Kising left her residence
two (2) months after the incident.[39] It was only after he
learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that the trial court dismissed the
cases for lack of evidence insofar as some of the original
accused were concerned that he took pity on the respective
families of the victims who have failed to get justice for the
death of their loved ones.[40]
In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997,
he was in Marikina City working as a warehouseman and
timekeeper of the Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was
there the whole time from February 15, 1997, until March 24,
1997.[41] Pablo Aspe, a co-worker of Diosdado Jr., corroborated
the latters testimony. He said that on February 15, 1997, he
and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga City, together to work in
Consuelo Construction in Marikina City. They were with each
other in Marikina City the whole time from February 15, 1997,
until he (Aspe) went home toNaga City on March 22,
1997. While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together
in their barracks at the construction site.[42]
Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On March 10,
1997, at around seven oclock in the evening, he was at their
house at Zone 1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his
parents and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard
gunshots. They ignored the gunshots, continued watching
television and slept at eight oclock. The following day, at
around six oclock in the morning, while he was fetching water,
four (4) policemen arrived at their house and talked to his
father. Thereafter, his father called him, his brother
Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and
Reynaldo. The policemen then requested all of them to go to
the PNP Central Police Headquarters for investigation
regarding the killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching the
police headquarters, they were interviewed by the media and
afterwards brought to the provincial headquarters where they
were subjected to paraffin tests. They were then brought back
to the Central Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back
home to Pacol.
7
Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and
Godofredo. They maintain that the trial court gravely erred in
convicting them of murder based on circumstantial
evidence. The testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis
that he saw them running away from the scene of the crime
was concocted. The handgun turned in by Godofredo was not
the same gun presented by the prosecution during the
trial. The unusual discovery of a slug from the head of the
deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy was conducted and
after the cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim was quite doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration of
the victim specifically pointed to neither Diosdado III nor
Godofredo. And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
those taken against them in violation of their constitutional
rights to counsel during custodial investigation.[50]
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.[51] It
may be the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of
all the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion
which suffices to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.[52] All the circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the theory that all the accused
are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are innocent and
with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.[53] The evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis
which may be consistent with their innocence.[54] Also, it should
be acted on and weighed with great caution.[55] Circumstantial
evidence which has not been adequately established, much
less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.[56]
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there
should be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[57] Like an ornate tapestry
created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked out
and assayed a strand at a time apart from the others, the
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.[58] The test to determine whether or not the
circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be
consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with
his innocence.[59] Accordingly, we have set guidelines in
appreciating circumstantial evidence: (1) it should be acted
upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent
with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every
theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a
certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who
committed the offense.[60]
8
Q. How far?
A. Around 100 meters.
Q. On the said date and time and place, you said you
saw them running, how far were you from
them?
A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)[63]
The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used
against Diosdado III whom he miserably failed to positively
identify during trial. In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the
trial court renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious
doubt. Calsis was presented to positively identify the assailants
who were supposedly personally known to him and were just
ten (10) meters away from him. It puzzles us no end why he
cannot even identify the Adors in open court.
Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of
the assailants, the trial court doubted him and gave credence
to the alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka,
Marikina, when the killings took place. The trial court favored
the unbiased testimony of Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr.
worked as a timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the
Consuelo Construction at Nangka, Marikina, from February 15,
1997, until March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only
on May 27, 1997. This ruling is strengthened by the fact that
on the morning following the killings, all the male members of
the Ador family were brought to the police headquarters for
paraffin examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among
them.[64] We thus respect the finding of the trial court that
indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent
any indication that the lower court overlooked some facts or
circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of
the case.[65]
While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or
reject an entire testimony, and may believe one part and
disbelieve another,[66] our Constitution and the law mandate
that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Calsis
committed an obvious blunder in identifying the supposed
assailants which this Court cannot simply let go. On the
contrary, it creates reasonable doubt in our minds if Calcis
really saw the persons he allegedly saw or if he was even
where he said he was that evening. For, it is elementary that
the positive identification of the accused is crucial in
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is wanting
in the instant case.
What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could
no longer be used against Godofredo since both the
prosecution and the defense have already rested and the case
against Godofredo was already submitted for decision when
Calsis was presented.[67] Neither can they still be used against
Diosdado Jr. who was already acquitted by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges
hurled against them. But, while it is true that alibi and denial
are the weakest of the defenses as they can easily be
fabricated,[68] absent such clear and positive identification, the
doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over positive
9
value as its source is now highly questionable. It has become
uncertain whether the deformed slug was fired from the .38
caliber revolver turned in by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber
handgun as attested to by the Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the
dying Chavez nor on the results of the paraffin tests to convict
either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute these, we
need not go far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial
court partially granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the
testimony of Mercy Beria, that she heard Rodolfo Ompong
Chavez say tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed
by the Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever
mentioned by the witness. Neither was she able to tell how
many (persons) Adors were involved. This testimony if it will
be given credence may inculpate any person with the family
name Ador as assailant. The prosecution therefore was not
able to establish with moral certainty as to who of the Adors
were perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin tests are not
conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.
The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of
gunpowder nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired
the murder weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic
evidence should be taken only as an indication of possibility or
even of probability, but not of infallibility, since nitrates are
also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder.
(People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No. 121195, 27 November 1996;
People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha, 240
SCRA 283)[75]
Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in
evidence,
it
must
identify
with
certainty
the
assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. Also, while a
paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of
nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the source of the
nitrates was the discharge of firearms a person who tests
positive may have handled one or more substances with the
same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives,
fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous
plants.[76] In People v. Melchor,[77] this Court acquitted the
accused despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his
hands
[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a
paraffin test is not conclusive. While it can establish the
presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always
indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by
the discharge of firearm. The person tested may have handled
one or more of a number of substances which give the same
positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives,
fireworks, pharmaceuticals and leguminous plants such as
peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also
have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these
substances are present in the products of combustion of
10
All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court,
we cannot rest easy in convicting the two (2) accused based on
circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the said
circumstantial evidence presented do not inexorably lead to
the conclusion that they are guilty.[83] The prosecution witness
failed to identify the accused in court. A cloud of doubt
continues to hover over the gun used and the slug
recovered. The dying declaration and paraffin examination
remain unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled admissions
including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence. And,
the supposed motive of the accused is simply
insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the inference that
the
accused
committed
the
crime
were
not
proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot be
established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when evidence
is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more
obligated to rely on the strength of its own case and not on the
weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on
nothing less than moral certainty.[84]
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been
reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and speculations. It is
hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never
be the basis of conviction in a criminal case.[85] Courts must
ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly on
sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of
passion and prejudice.[86] If the alleged inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused,
and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence is not
adequate to support conviction.[87] The court must acquit the
accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction.[88] Conviction must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.[89] The overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of
the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt.[90] It is thus apropos to repeat the doctrine that an
accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt the prosecution must overthrow the
presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden. Accordingly, we have to acquit.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 976816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder and imposing on
them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and
their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are
being held for some other legal cause.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE
11
forthwith checked the same by making a small hole through
it. Convinced that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana,
SPO1 Dalusong handed the P500 bill to the appellant. He
thereupon scratched his head, a signal to the back-up men that
the transaction had been consummated.[6] Momentarily, the
back-up officers, who had earlier positioned themselves
separately in different strategic locations near the poseurbuyer, rushed to the scene and arrested the appellant. SPO1
Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag containing the
suspected marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the
appellant and recovered the buy-money from the latters
pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the
headquarters where he was booked, and the incident was
recorded in the police blotter.[7] The suspected marijuana was
brought to and initially examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an
accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), who
certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture of
marijuana leaves with seeds.[8]
On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the
Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service,
Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the
examination of samples of the suspected marijuana taken from
the appellant.[9] On September 6, 1998, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta,
evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the
orange plastic bag containing the suspected marijuana to the
PNP provincial crime laboratory service in Camp Juan, Laoag
City. The bag, together with SPO4 Venturas letter-request,
was received by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos.[10] On September 8,
1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and
the confiscated item, and were duly received by SPO4
Tampos.[11] The latter, in turn, handed the item to Police
Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the
Crime Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego Silang,
Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an
examination of representative samples extracted from the
suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant.[12] On the
basis of her examination, Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry
Report No. D-074-94 with the following findings:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED :
One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing
eight hundred grams (800) wrapped with newspaper pages
contained in an orange plastic bag.
...
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION :
To determine the presence of marijuana on the abovementioned specimen.
FINDI NGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned
specimen prove POSITIVE result to the test for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.[13]
The Case for the Appellant
The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and
alibi. He testified that sometime in the first week of August
1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to
12
Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The quantity of marijuana involved is more than 750
grams; hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided
for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay
the costs.
Hence, the present appeal.
The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:
1.
The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not
instigated in looking for marijuana and bringing it to Laoag.
2.
The lower Court erred in finding that the accused
received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO bill, despite his denial that
he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of the police officers who are presumed
to be regularly performing their official duties, there being no
improper motive attributed to them.
3.
The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.[16]
The appellant contends that contrary to the collective
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Oliver instigated him
to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence
and probative weight to his testimony and in considering the
testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.
The appeal has no merit.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by
the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless
certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. The reason for
this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide
thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.[17] After a thorough and careful review of the records of
this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was sufficiently
established by the evidence, and the trial courts judgment is
well-supported by law and jurisprudence.
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.[18] In this case, the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of
marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the
entrapment operation.
q How has the case involving drug or marijuana
involving the accused brought to your attention
or to your office, for that matter?
a Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver
tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny
Domingcil at the Upholstery Shop along Ablan
Avenue and he also informed us that he ordered
P500.00 worth of marijuana.
q Who ordered from whom?
a Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
13
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
q
a
No, sir.
How did you know his face then?
Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that
the person is Manny Domingcil.
So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at
the scene where the transaction would take
place, Manny Domingcil was already there and
that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you?
Yes, sir.
After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?
We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.
And after or as soon as you were near him, what
happened next?
Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me
as the buyer, sir.
What did Oliver say?
Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen, (which when
translated into english[sic] means): Pare, this is
the buyer.
And so, what was the reaction of Manny
Domingcil?
Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the
stuff that was ordered.
And what did he say?
Manny Domingcil said: There is, Pare.
By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny
Domingcil?
Belrey Oliver, sir.
Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from
Manny Domingcil?
Yes, sir.
Where?
At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.
That was what Oliver told you when he ordered
the stuff?
Yes, sir.
When Manny Domingcil said: There is, pare,
what transpired next, if any?
I told him: Can I look at it and he brought out a
wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a
newspaper inside an orange plastic bag.
And after he had brought out the said thing, what
did you do with it?
I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.
You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper
and you said you checked its contents?
Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small
hole at the side.
And what was the result of your inspection?
I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.
And, so what did you do then?
After I found out that it was marijuana I handed
to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill, sir.
14
who organized and conducted the operation and was part of
the buy-bust team itself.[20] SPO4 Ventura remained steadfast
and unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling
by the defense counsel.[21]
Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic
Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory Center at San
Fernando, La Union, confirmed[22] Dr. Joseph Adayas initial
finding[23]that the substance seized from the appellant was
indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.
It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado
Mamotos[24] and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta[25] that the confiscated
marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic
chemist and later presented as evidence in court.
The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses
complement each other, giving a complete picture of how the
appellants illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and
how the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their
testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were
in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to
possess or sell the same. More importantly, all the persons
who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team
were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust
operation deserve full faith and credit.[26]
The appellants bare denial of the crime charged and his
barefaced claim that he was merely instigated by Oliver into
procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the
straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met
Belrey Oliver in the course of his canvass for the upholstery of
his brothers jeepney, would readily leave his errand behind
and allow a stranger to talk him into buying a prohibited drug,
a known criminal activity for which he could be prosecuted,
and if convicted, sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All this he
was willing to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of alleged
future favors from another who was also unknown to the
appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and spent
almost three days in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to
accommodate a newly found acquaintance, who handed the
appellant the meager sum of P700.00 for the intended
purpose. The Court cannot give credence to such a
preposterous stance as advanced by the appellant and
confirmed by his supposed corroborative witness, Ernesto
Gamiao.
It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed,
it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must also be credible in itself such that common
experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference
of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal
prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is
tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of
human experience and not by mere conjecture or
15
consideration.[34] Considering that the appellant was charged
with the sale and the delivery of prohibited drugs, the
consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be
sufficiently established even in the absence of the marked
money. The erasures and alterations in the Joint Affidavit of
the policemen involved in the buy-bust operation did not
debilitate the case of the prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit
of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any
party. Second. The investigator who prepared the Joint
Affidavit erroneously stated that the two P500.00 bills were
used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust operation
bearing Serial Numbers AA823675 and G242745. As shown by
the prosecutions evidence the policemen used only
the P500.00 bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of
the drug. Hence, the Joint Affidavit of the policemen had to
be corrected to reflect the truth.
All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by evidence to the
contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact
that the prosecutions evidence fully shows and confirms such
regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to
reverse or even modify the findings of the trial court giving
credence to the evidence of the prosecution.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case
No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO*, CAPT. ROMEO M.
BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L.
LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B.
MORENO, C1C MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D.
MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT.
ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M.
DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO
S. MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO
ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO TARAN, petitioners, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of
Court filed by petitioners who were convicted and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011 for the double murder of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983.[1]
Petitioners were members of the military who acted as
Senator Aquinos security detail upon his arrival in Manila from
his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were
charged, together with several other members of the military,
before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino who
was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of
16
Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings
of the forensic group composed of Prof. Jerome B. Bailen, a
forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines,
Atty. Erwin P. Erfe, M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E.
Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant and Human Rights and
Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a
forensic dentistry consultant. Their report essentially
concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study
of the evidence in the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio
Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the service
stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was
shot while he was walking on the airport tarmac toward the
waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed to transport him
from the airport to Fort Bonifacio. This is contrary to the
finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C
Moreno, the security escort positioned behind Senator Aquino,
who shot the latter. The report also suggests that the physical
evidence in these cases may have been misinterpreted and
manipulated to mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert that
the September 28, 1990 decision of the Sandiganbayan should
be voided as it was based on false forensic
evidence. Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic
group of the physical evidence in the double murder case
constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle
them to a new trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In addition to the report of the forensic
group, petitioners seek to present the testimony of an alleged
eyewitness, the driver of the waiting AVSECOM van, SPO4
Ruben M. Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted to this
Court, SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he saw a man in blue
uniform similar to that of the Philippine Airlines maintenance
crew, suddenly fire at Senator Aquino as the latter was about
to board the van. The man in blue was later identified as
Rolando Galman.
Petitioners pray that the Court issue a resolution:
1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable
Courts Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and
September 10, 1991;
2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) dated September 28,
1990 in People vs. Custodio, et al., Case No.
10010-10011[;]
3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]
4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the
reception of additional defense evidence/re-trial
in the above entitled cases.[7]
The issue now is whether petitioners are entitled to
a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide:
Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. At any time before
a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on
17
exonerate them from the charges against them. We do not
find merit in their submission.
Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. Courts are generally reluctant in granting
motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence for it is presumed that the moving party has had
ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to secure
all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions
are treated with great caution due to the danger of perjury
and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that
which may be the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an
adverse judgment. Hence, the moving party is often required
to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that
there has been a lack of due diligence, and to establish other
facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence.[11] This Court has
repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1)
that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching;
and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly
discovered evidence could have been very well presented
during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the
same cannot be considered newly discovered.[12]
These standards, also known as the Berry rule, trace
their origin to the 1851 case of Berry vs. State of
Georgia[13] where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:
Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered
evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the
following points there seems to be a pretty general
concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party
who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come
to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to
the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That
it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the
new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only viz;
speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on
the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be
produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will
not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to
impeach the character or credit of a witness. (citations
omitted)
These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in
determining the propriety of motions for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial
has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to
present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding
of a new trial.
18
b.
COURT FINDINGS
As to the physical
evidence
Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the
single bullet that penetrated the head and caused the death of
Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory
ought to be the findings during the autopsy. The prosector in
the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer,
reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, that the
trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance having been
located at the mastoid region, left, below the external auditory
meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior
portion of the mandible, was forward, downward and
medially. (Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, Exhibit NNNN-2t-2)
A controversy as to this trajectory came about when, upon
being cross-examined by counsel for the defense, Dr.
Bienvenido Muoz made a significant turn-about by stating
that the correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was upward,
downward, and medially. The present position of Dr.
Muoz is premised upon the alleged fact that he found the
petrous bone fractured, obviously hit by the fatal bullet. He
concluded, in view of this finding, that the fatal bullet must
have gone upward from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal
bullet exited at the mandible, it is his belief that the petrous
bone deflected the trajectory of the bullet and, thus, the bullet
proceeded downwards from the petrous bone to the mandible.
This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz in this regard
notwithstanding, We hold that the trajectory of the fatal bullet
which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, forward,
downward and medially. For the reason that the wound of
entrance was at a higher elevation than the wound of exit,
there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory was
downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast rate of speed
takes a straight path from the wound of entrance to the wound
of exit. It is unthinkable that the bullet, while projected
upwards, would, instead of exiting to the roof of the head, go
down to the mandible because it was allegedly deflected by a
petrous bone which though hard is in fact a mere spongy
protuberance, akin to a cartilage.
Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of the fatal bullet;
First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and Dr. Ceferino Cunanan, the
immediate superiors of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, manifested
before the Court, that, since the wound of entrance appeared
ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion collar which
was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of
approach, a downward trajectory of the bullet is indicated. This
phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at
a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal bullet.
There was no showing as to whether a probe could have been
made from the wound of entrance to the petrous bone. Out of
curiosity, Dr. Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe from the
wound of exit into the petrous bone. He was unsuccessful
notwithstanding four or five attempts. If at all, this disproves
19
the theory of Dr. Muoz that the trajectory was upward,
downward and medially. On the other hand, Dr. Juanito Billote
and photographer Alexander Loinaz witnessed the fact that Dr.
Muoz*s+ understudy, Alejandrino Javier, had successfully
made a probe from the wound of entrance directly towards the
wound of exit. Alejandrino Javier shouted with excitement
upon his success and Alexander Loinaz promptly photographed
this event with Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end of
the probe at the mandible. (Exhibit XXXXX-39-A)
To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous bone, this
spongy mash of cartilage would have been decimated or
obliterated. The fact that the main bullet was of such force,
power and speed that it was able to bore a hole into the
mandible and crack it, is an indication that it could not have
been stopped or deflected by a mere petrous bone. By its
power and force, it must have been propelled by a powerful
gun. It would have been impossible for the main bullet to have
been deflected form an upward course by a mere spongy
protuberance. Granting that it was so deflected, however, it
could not have maintained the same power and force as when
it entered the skull at the mastoid region so as to crack the
mandible and make its exit there.
But what caused the fracture of the petrous bone? Was there
a cause of the fracture, other than that the bullet had hit
it? Dr. Pedro Solis, maintaining the conclusion that the
trajectory of the bullet was downward, gave the following
alternative explanations for the fracture of the petrous bone:
First, the petrous bone could have been hit by a splinter of the
main bullet, particularly, that which was found at the temporal
region; and,
Second, the fracture must have been caused by the kinetic
force applied to the point of entrance at the mastoid region
which had the tendency of being radiated towards the petrous
bone.
Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the temporal bone,
and of the parietal bone, Dr. Pedro Solis pointed out, had been
caused by the aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is applied
to the mastoid region of the head, Dr. Pedro Solis emphasized,
a radiation of forces is distributed all over the cranial back,
including, although not limited to, the parietal bone. The skull,
Dr. Solis explains, is a box-like structure. The moment you
apply pressure on the portion, a distortion, tension or some
other mechanical defect is caused. This radiation of forces
produces what is known as the spider web linear fracture
which goes to different parts of the body. The so-called
fracturing of the petrous portion of the left temporal bone is
one of the consequences of the kinetic force forcefully applied
to the mastoid region.
The fact that there was found a fracture of the petrous bone is
not necessarily indicative of the theory that the main bullet
passed through the petrous bone.
Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to whether the
metal fragments alleged by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz to have
been found by him inside the skull or at the wound of exit were
really parts of the main bullet which killed the Senator. When
Dr. Pedro Solis examined these fragments, he found that two
(2) of the fragments were larger in size, and were of such
shapes, that they could not have gone out of the wound of exit
considering the size and shape of the exit wound.
Finding of a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet fatal to the
credibility of defense witnesses.
The finding that the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno
Aquino, Jr. was directed downwards sustains the allegation of
prosecution eyewitnesses to the effect that Sen. Benigno
Aquino, Jr. was shot by a military soldier at the bridge stairs
while he was being brought down from the plane. Rebecca
Quijano saw that the senator was shot by the military man who
was directly behind the Senator while the Senator and he were
descending the stairs. Rebecca Quijanos testimony in this
regard is echoed by Jessie Barcelona, Ramon Balang, Olivia
Antimano, and Mario Laher, whose testimonies this Court finds
likewise as credible.
The downward trajectory of the bullet having been established,
it stands to reason that the gun used in shooting the Senator
was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound of
entrance at the back of the head of the Senator. This is
consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses to the
effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he stood at
the upper step of the stairs, the second or third behind Senator
Aquino, while Senator Aquino and the military soldiers bringing
him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise consistent with
the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that the shooting of
Senator Aquino occurred while the Senator was still on the
bridge stairs, a conclusion derived from the fact that the fatal
shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed
the service door and was led down the bridge stairs.
It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi Suzuki that, as was
gauged from the sounds of the footsteps of Senator Aquino, as
the Senator went down the bridge stairs, the shooting of the
Senator occurred while the Senator had stepped on the
11th step from the top.
At the ocular inspection conducted by this Court, with the
prosecution and the defense in attendance, it should be noted
that the following facts were established as regards the bridge
stairs:
Observations:
The length of one block covering
the
tarmac 196;
The width of one block covering
the
tarmac 10;
The distance from the base of the staircase
leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy
marker at the tarmac 126;
There are 20 steps in the staircase including the
landing;
The distance from the first rung of the stairway
up to the 20th rung which is the landing of stairs
208;
20
Distance from the first rung of the stairway up to
the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door
2311;
Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door
21;
Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door
1911;
Length of one rung including railpost 34;
Space between two rungs of stairway 9;
Width of each rung 11-1/2;
Length of each rung (end to end) 29:
Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing
25.
(underlining supplied)[20]
The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively analyzed and
discussed the forensic evidence in its resolution dated
November 15, 1990 denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by the convicted accused. The court held:
The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit NNNN-2-t-2
indicated a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet when it
stated that the fatal bullet was forward, downward, and
medially . . .
xxx
II
The wound of entrance having been at a higher elevation than
the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that
the trajectory was downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a
Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum revolver or a .45
caliber, must have traveled at a fast rate of speed and it stands
to reason that it took a straight path from the wound of
entrance to the wound of exit. A hole indicating this straight
path was proven to have existed. If, as contended on crossexamination by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, that the bullet was
projected upwards, it ought to have exited at the roof of the
head. The theory that the fatal bullet was deflected by a mere
petrous bone is inconceivable.
III
Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is
what is known as a contusion collar which was widest at the
superior portion, indicating an acute angle of approach, a
downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is conclusively
indicated. This phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the
fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of
the fatal bullet.
IV
There was no hole from the petrous bone to the mandible
where the fatal bullet had exited and, thus, there is no support
to the theory of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz that the fatal bullet had
hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory and had been
deflected by the petrous bone towards the mandible. Dr.
Juanito Billotes testimony in this regard had amplified the
matter with clarity.
xxx
21
the Senators head.[24] The Sandiganbayan, however, did not
give weight to their account as it found the testimonies of
prosecution eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie
Barcelona more credible. Quijano and Barcelona testified that
they saw the soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway
aim and fire a gun on the latters nape. As earlier quoted, the
Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more consistent
with the physical evidence. SPO4 Cantimbuhans testimony
will not in any way alter the courts decision in view of the
eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona, taken together
with the physical evidence presented during the
trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new
evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted.[25] Also, new trial will not be granted if
the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching.
As additional support to their motion for new trial,
petitioners also claim that they were denied due process
because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by
counsel. We are not persuaded. The records will bear out that
petitioners were ably represented by Atty. Rodolfo U. Jimenez
during the trial and when the case was elevated to this
Court. An experienced lawyer in criminal cases, Atty. Jimenez
vigorously defended the petitioners cause throughout the
entire proceedings. The records show that the defense
presented a substantial number of witnesses and exhibits
during the trial. After the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision,
Atty. Jimenez filed a petition for review with this Court,
invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit the
petitioners. When the Court denied the petition for review, he
again filed a motion for reconsideration exhausting his deep
reservoir of legal talent. We therefore find petitioners claim
to be unblushingly unsubstantiated. We note that they did not
allege any specific facts in their present motion to show that
Atty. Jimenez had been remiss in his duties as counsel.
Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of
their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The general
rule is that the client is bound by the action of his counsel in
the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that
the result of the litigation might have been different had his
counsel proceeded differently.[26] We held in People vs.
Umali:[27]
In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held
that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been made
in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result
of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel,
does not furnish a ground for a new trial.
If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening
cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new
counsel could be employed who could allege and show that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced,
or learned.
So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the
competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy,