R V Woollin

R V WOOLLIN [1999] 1 AC 82
APPELLANT: Woollin
RESPONDANT: The Crown
CASE HISTORY
Appellant convicted of murder
TOPIC (S): Homicide, murder, mental element
Normally Ds actions are enough to illustrate the intent, but it becomes difficult
when they dont. The issue of intention is dealt with as it previously lacked
clarity.
MATERIAL FACTS:
Appellant lost temper, threw 3-month-old baby on to hard surface
Baby (Karl) sustained fractured skull and died
GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
1- By directing the jury in terms of substantial risk the judge unacceptably
enlarged the mental element of murder.
FOR
+L. Steyn: the Crown accepted that the
appellant did not want to cause the
child serious injuries.
The jury must consider 2 questions.
(a) How probable was the consequence
of serious injury which resulted from
his throw?
(b) Did he foresee the consequence in
the second before or at the time of
throwing? He could not have intended
serious harm if he did not foresee the
consequence and did not appreciate it
at the time that serious harm might
result from his throw if he thought, or
may have thought, that in throwing the
child he was exposing him to only the
AGAINST
-if the jury are satisfied that he was
aware of what he was doing and
must have realised and appreciated
that when he threw the child that
there was a substantial risk that he
would cause serious bodily harm to
him, then it would be open to you
to find that he intended to cause
injury to the child and you should
convict him of murder.
slight risk of being injured then you

would probably conclude that he did
not intend to cause serious injury as it
was outside his contemplation that the
child would be seriously injured. The
defence says that he did not think of
the consequence at all when he threw
the child, he didnt give it a moments
thought. If that is right then you
cannot infer that he intended to do
Karl really serious harm unless youre
sure that serious harm was a virtual
certainty from what he was doing and
he appreciated that such was the case.
+where a man realises that for all
practical purposes inevitable that his
actions will result in death/GBH , it
may be tempting to infer that he
intended the result, however little he
may have desired/wished it to happen.
The decision is one for the jury to be
reached upon a consideration of all the
evidence.
HELD
Appeal ALLOWED
Convicted of MANSLAUGHTER (instead of previous murder conviction)
RATIO
LEADING CASE(S)/STATUTE(S)
R v Smith [1960] -> the sole question is whether the unlawful and voluntary act
was of such a kind that GBH was the natural and probable result. The only test
for this is what the ordinary, responsible, man would, in all the circumstances of
the case, have contemplated as the natural and probable result.
If theres no evidence then the intention can be inferred by looking at

whether the result was natural or probably. However, determining whether
something is natural or probable is subjective.
The Criminal Justice Act (1967) the test for proving criminal intention was
trying to be clarified. Simply having a natural and probable result was not
enough to prove intention, material evidence needed to be taken into account.
What material evidence was there in Woollin which proved him not to have the
intention relevant to murder?
s(8) A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an
offence, (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a
result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable
consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or
foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences
from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances.
Nedrick -> used this guidance. Used find instead of infer. Debatable whether
this made a difference.
COMMENTARY/CRITICISMS
-The definition of intention should be the same throughout the criminal law
-The threshold for proving intention is too high, and this is dangerous because
the jury need to be sure beyond reasonable doubt before convicting. How the
jury are directed with regards to intention is a key issue, and although the issue
has been attempted to be clarified and explanation with regards to it has been
evolved, it still remains an issue.
A. NORRIE:
- Argues that the law of indirect intention is still unclear after HL decision in
Woollin.
-The HL rejected COAs conclusion that the foresight of a substantial risk of
death/GBH could in certain circumstances be an alternative mens rea.
- Prof. Sir John Smith: describes Woollin judgement to be important and most
welcome for drawing a form line between intention and recklessness.
- The judges are reluctant to recognise the Hyam case as wrong because it
would mean declaring their brethren or predecessors as having applied the
law incorrectly. If Hyam was materially correct with Nedrick then D should not
have been convicted of murder. L.Steyn falls short of overruling Hyam case
despite criticising it heavily. Coyness breeding lack of clarity in the law of

intention.
- Norrie doesnt think Woollin will be the last case on the issue of intention
because it might be impossible to achieve a conclusive position in the law of
indirect intention.
- Woollin leaves out essential issues unanswered: foresight of VC may be
regarded as morally under-inclusive OR over-inclusive.
> A Firm line?
- L. Steyns ->the HL in Hyam was wrong. The progression of cases from Maloney
to Nedrik reveals a consistent and principled development of the law based on
the need for foresight of VC and to establish the indirect intention for murder.
(Norrie feels that L.Steyn is defending the position he apparently rejects)
because he presented the development if the law in terms of a clear
progression of the cases from Maloney-Woollin subject to superficial
adjustment)
- L.Steyn -> The purpose of the reasoning in Maloney was to narrow down the
broad approach to MR in Hyam. H+S was not inconsistent with Maloney in the
test of foresight which is little short of overwhelming but did disapprove in
natural consequence model direction. H+S also consistent with Nedrick in its
guidance.
-foresight of natural consequence can be narrowed by reference to probability.
The higher the prob. The more likely D foresaw the consequence and therefore
intended it. Test for probability still problematic. How jury should deal with any
particular type of probability is unspecified.
> Should the Law be Broader?
- L.Goff committed to an alternative approach to L.Steyn
-L.Hope gives a parallel terrorist example in Maloney. The terrorists act would
not be considered murder on the law of indirect intent (based on Woollin). It
would be considered a murder if the circumstance was different. If he hides the
bomb in a plane, then it would mean he consciously intended on killing the
victim as this would be an example of indiscriminate malice which belongs to
the category of deliberate murder. He aimed to kill someone on the plane even
though the identity of the victim was not affixed. There is a direct intention
which is either straightforwardly covered by law or by the rules of transferred
malice.
Norrie says that L.Hopes example is still an example of indirect intention.
His reference to circumstance of the case suggests an approach based on
context and degree. If D had not nominated his V then that is different from
setting the bomb in the plane in order to destroy it AND setting it off in the
airport in order for a bomb disposal expert to be killed in the process of
diffusing it. Brings it back into the fold of VC.
- the judges are possibly holding reservations about Woollins clarification of law
on oblique intent because indiscriminate malice is a term which has a broad
moral flavour and is associated with the Scots law murder MR term wicked
recklessness.
-L.Bridge wanted to distinguish recklessness from indirect intention and
suggested intend and foresee connote two different states of mind. Norrie
says that for him to be consistent with his analysis of indirect intention, he
should have said theres a relevant distinction between the mental states of
foresight of moral certainty and foresight of a consequence within the range
of probability.
-There are cases where only purpose/direct intention will do Norrie says these
are cases where there is a moral threshold such that even D could foresee a
result as VC, it is at odds with his moral conception of what he was doing that it
could not be conceived as a result to what he intended.
#Steane -> Stean was broadcasting to assist the enemy but only doing so
in order to save his family.
There is a moral gap between what Steans AR and MR -> his act and his
purpose. The judges declined to find anything other than that he had an
intention to save his family; yet this is a case where it is VC that the offence of
assisting the enemy is VC. Indirect intention here could have been established
but was not found.
>The Laws language of Fault: normative or descriptive?
- Case central point: the restriction of indirect intent to cases of foresight of VC
and exclusion of probability or risk
- Theres a connection between the moral threshold (in cases like Steane) and
the problem of indiscriminate malice The problem lies in the nature of the
legal language of fault that is required to do essential moral work in the criminal
law.
- George Fletcher its propositions are descriptive and normative and that
one if the persistent tensions in legal terminology runs between the descriptive
and normative uses of the same terms
CASE POINTS/DICTA/IF THE FACTS WERE DIFFERENT...

If a consequence is virtually certain, then the probability/likelihood, of it being
foreseen is little short of overwhelming. This also ensures that the jury will not
use a finding of recklessness as evidence from which to infer the appropriate
intent for murder.
The use of the phrase virtual certainty may be necessary only where the
evidence of intent is limited to the admitted actions of the accused and the
consequences of those actions. Not necessary to use this phrase or similar
phrase where there are other evidence for the jury to consider.
Where D was charged with murder, the jury should be directed that they
werent entitled to find the necessary intention for a conviction of murder
unless they were sure that death/GBH was a virtual certain as a result of Ds
actions and that D appreciated such was the case. What if D didnt appreciate
such was the case?
Where theres no direct evidence that the purpose of D is to cause death/GBH,
the jury should be directed in considering Ds foresight to the consequences of
his actions, as evidence from which they may infer the necessary intent.
Murder is not to be extended to cases where the defendant has been reckless.
Direction should be clear and simple and expressed in a few words possible.
Essential if it is to be intelligible. Jury cannot be expected to absorb and apply a
direction which attempts to deal with every situation which may conceivably
arise.
A Norrie, After Woollin *1999+ Criminal Law Review 532-544
Indirect intention still unclear Woollin case did not end long-running saga
concerning indirect intention for murder.
Cognitivism of the law of intention doesnt reflect broader moral issues which
remain central to the judgement of criminal culpability.
HL rejected COA conclusion that foresight of substantial risk of death/GBH in
certain circumstances can be an alternative mens rea to intention. SJ Smith
believes that the judgement seems to draw a firm line between intention and
recklessness. This supported by orthodox subjectivists (e.g. G Williams).
Nedrick case preferred over Hyam case
LINKS
R v Matthews and Alleyne (2003) their appeals were dismissed and they were
convicted on the basis that law had not yet reached a definition of intent in
murder in terms of a virtual certainty. Whether they must or may find
intention. They may. Significant because it could conflict morally. Gives jury
flexibly moral elbow room (Ashworth) in cases where VC not sufficient.
Whether it is appropriate or not is debateable. Allows judges to import their
moral views, CL system will reflect morality of the public in step with public
morality. Disadvantage is that it would cause inconsistency, wont be able to
anticipate outcome, and would be subjective. Could become obsolete.

R V Woollin

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R V Woollin

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R V WOOLLIN [1999] 1 AC 82

RESPONDANT: The Crown

slight risk of being injured then you

If theres no evidence then the intention can be inferred by looking at

despite criticising it heavily. Coyness breeding lack of clarity in the law of

CASE POINTS/DICTA/IF THE FACTS WERE DIFFERENT...

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