Legtech Full Text (Maxey and Inchong)
Legtech Full Text (Maxey and Inchong)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45870 May 11, 1984
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The court stated that "when a man and a woman lived together as husband and
wife, justice demands that the woman should be entitled to the share of the
property. Certainly she cannot be considered mere adornment or only for
man's comfort and passion." The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage
in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. This article is
particularly relevant in this case where the "common-law" relationship was
legitimated through a valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold.
The provisions of the Civil Code are premised on the traditional and existing,
the normal and customary gender roles of Filipino men and women. No matter
how large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the
major, if not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the
woman. She is the administrator of the household. The fact that the two
involved in this case were not legally married at the time does not change the
nature of their respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally holds the
family purse even if she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds. As
pointed out by Dean Irene R. Cortes of the University of the Philippines, "in
the Filipino family, the wife holds the purse, husbands hand over their pay
checks and get an allowance in return and the wife manages the affairs of the
household. . . . And the famous statement attributed to Governor General
Leonard Wood is repeated: In the Philippines, the best man is the woman."
(Cortes, "Womens Rights Under the New Constitution". WOMAN AND THE
LAW, U.P. Law Center, p. 10.)
The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned in Yaptinchay
vs. Torres (28 SCRA 489) must include not only the earnings of a woman
from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the
family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children,
administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her
husband from household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties
of a housewife.
Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is
"Yes" because there is no showing that vested rights would be impaired or
prejudiced through its application.
A vested right is defined by this Court as property which has become fixed
and established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy; an
immediately fixed right of present or future enjoyment as distinguished from
an expectant or contingent right (Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs.
Pineda, 98 Phil. 711; Balbao vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498). This cannot be said of
the "exclusive" right of Melbourne Maxey over the properties in question
when the present Civil Code became effective for standing against it was the
concurrent right of Regina Morales or her heirs to a share thereof. The
properties were sold in 1953 when the new Civil Code was already in full
force and effect. Neither can this be said of the rights of the private
respondents as vendees insofar as one half of the questioned properties are
concerned as this was still open to controversy on account of the legitimate
claim of Regina Morales to a share under the applicable law.
The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the
estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. Technically
speaking, the petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase
price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of
rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. Equitable considerations,
however, lead us to rule out rentals on one hand and return of P650.00 on the
other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The
judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside insofar as one-half
of the disputed properties are concerned. The private respondents are ordered
to return one-half of said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates
for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for
respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in
significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and
equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is
whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the
alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates,
Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence
and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and
welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national
retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the
nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do
the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In
effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act
are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in
accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in
favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the
laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other
laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens
actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the
proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving,
among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and
their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to
continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic
Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act
is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other
persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from
enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws
and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the
subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the
Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the
retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8
of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend
that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the
State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of
national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly
related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing
is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of
legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of
law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone
is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is
reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be
a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of
the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature,
which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the
prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances
primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of
any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures
adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the
other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right,
have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the
legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear,
patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative
prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy,
and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly
into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as
its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate
scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of
residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as
society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents,
irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and
consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group
life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than
what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not
produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance
is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's
needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the
retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite
variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy
reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the
human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to
members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of
the community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its
increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home
and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or
corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He
has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the
clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a
supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait.
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the
bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was unknown in
provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and
villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He
even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life
appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their
agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many
communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this
trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Chinese ..........
12,087
93,155,459
29.38
Others ..........
422
10,514,675
3.32
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without
murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in
his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community
takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
Filipino ..........
113,659
213,451,602
60.89
Chinese ..........
16,248
125,223,336
35.72
Others ..........
486
12,056,365
3.39
Filipino .........
119,352
224,053,620
61.09
Chinese ..........
17,429
134,325,303
36.60
Others ..........
347
8,614,025
2.31
1949:
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to
fact, about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in
the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of
daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of
population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control over
distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles,
groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles.
And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco,
the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods and products
would easily become full and complete.
1951:
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail
trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is
imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of
radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an
element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business
make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an
issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion
within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative
to pass upon and decide.
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the
figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935),
when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled
the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the
enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the
alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
1941:
Assets
Year and Retailers
Nationality
No.Establishment Pesos
s
Item
Assets
(Pesos)
Per cent
Distribution
Filipino .............................................
1,878
Chinese ..............................................
7,707
Others ...............................................
24,415
Filipino .............................................
1,878
Chinese ...........................................
7,707
Others ..............................................
24,749
1947:
1941:
Filipino ..........
106,671
200,323,138
55.82
Chinese ...........
15,356
118,348,692
32.98
Others ............
1,646
40,187,090
11.20
Filipino ..........
111,107
208,658,946
65.05
Chinese ...........
13,774
106,156,218
33.56
Others ...........
354
8,761,260
.49
1947:
1948:
1948:
(Census)
Filipino ..........
113,631
213,342,264
67.30
(Census)
Filipino .............................................
1,878
Chinese .............................................
7,707
Others ..............................................
24,916
1949:
Filipino .............................................
Chinese ..............................................
Others ..............................................
1951:
Filipino .............................................
1,878
Chinese .............................................
Others ...............................................
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and
Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of
Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of
Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the
figures on Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors,
whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross
sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of
course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more
than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales
which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests
more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more.
The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign
elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely
engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native
investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in
matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional
convention.
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently
shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed
nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our
Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control
when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things,
that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was
twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant
or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of
Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the
fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation
of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under
their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country"
(Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the
members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens,
in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic
life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain,
political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength.
Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control
of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence,
largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the
government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic
freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for
7,707 But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not
seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such
predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital,
24,824 unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and
merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters
as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to
be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles
they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the
national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy and
of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and
consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily
illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the
aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits,
or because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction.
All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence,
the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the
article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article
suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free
enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious
influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise
of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of
justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and
justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and
intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our
purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential
commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and
enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential
foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so
that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn
Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and
tendencies; that they have violated price control laws, especially on foods and
essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9,
Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic
deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations
among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of
supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and
traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of
freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have
evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and
contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in
corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the
prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact
appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and
by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits
a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things
may come in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially
in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of
danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this
country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals;
what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the
Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly
defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided
as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not
take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but
admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and
avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and
therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis
does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3.
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not
rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for
classification has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as
well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co.
vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the
Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by
citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right
to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal
protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting
the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding
and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was
a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are in favor of its
constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines
does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses
of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with
approval the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs.
Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for
example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The
act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and
place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost
every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is
contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is
not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that
effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to
confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and
to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class
falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of
protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes
of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between
citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on
the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain
a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the
United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to
the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have regard
for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court
cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N.
E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them
aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of
race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was
based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our
institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this
particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid.
In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country
are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our
own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of
different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural
and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to
their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control
have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and
political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are
they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship,
are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have
said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence
that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the classification,
and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the
subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature
decisive.
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police
power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the
means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought
to be attained. . . . .
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment
introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to
promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege
to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the
Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various
provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is
the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and
utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is
provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of
the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the
Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and
spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable,
invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as
manifested in the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified.
It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people
would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and
refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public
interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet,
through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of
retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant,
how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and
recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation
to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the
right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is
denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations
of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege
should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in
the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial
review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the
Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of
its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the
Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not
annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.
Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due
process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other
arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the law does not
promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of
employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of
competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there
would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are
directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the
legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the
claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real
purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit
aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to
be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely
fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and
consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction,
Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of
the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term
"regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of
"nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main
purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either
prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within
the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the
Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of
Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed
by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within
the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects
its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of
the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the
wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said
to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act
of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of
intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an
act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of
getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of
regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree
of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing
to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of
prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning
when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or
only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also
been said that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was
followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also
contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title
changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been
many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have
made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord
with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or
general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other
provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and
scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which
have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In
the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised of
the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition
provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and
a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted
a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must
therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed
violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration
of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We
find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of
the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import
of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be
inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as
Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and
in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade
are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic
of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the
nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by
the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even
supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always
X. Conclusion
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the
law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is
stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation
of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty,
however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal
protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of
the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and
jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.