Pruneyard Shopping V Robbins
Pruneyard Shopping V Robbins
Robins
447 U.S. 74,100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741,1980 U.S.
The requirement that appellants permit the students to exercise their protected
rights of free expression and to petition on shopping center property clearly does not
amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants property rights under the
taking clause. It will not unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
shopping center. The shopping center may restrict expressive activity by adopting
time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its
commercial functions.
Appellants have failed to show that the right to exclude others is so essential to the
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it
amounted to a taking.
Concurrence.
(Justice Thurgood Marshall) Justice Marshall did not understand why the Court
suggested that rights of property are to be defined solely by state law, or that there is
no federal constitutional barrier to the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress
or a state government. Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a
legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some
general way.
(Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) The state may not compel a person to affirm a belief he
does not hold. A property owner may be faced with speakers who wish to use his
premises as a platform for views that he finds morally repugnant. The strong
emotions evoked by speech in such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to
respond.inst other not similarly protected.