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PruneYard Shopping Center v.

Robins
447 U.S. 74,100 S. Ct. 2035, 64 L. Ed. 2d 741,1980 U.S.

TOPIC. Freedom of Expression


A state law which requires owners of large shopping enters to allow members
of the public to enter their property to distribute petitions does not constitute
a taking of property, even though the law limits the property owners right to
exclude others from its property.
FACTS:
PruneYard (Appellant) is a shopping center open to the public. It has a policy not to
permit any visitor or tenant to engage in any publicly expressive activity, including
the circulation of petitions, which is not directly related to its commercial purposes.
High school students (Appellees) set up a table in a corner of Appellants courtyard
and distributed pamphlets in support for their opposition to a United Nations
resolution against Zionism. A security guard told them to leave. Appellees seek to
enjoin Appellants from denying them access to the property to circulate their
petitions. Appellants content that their constitutionally established rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to exclude Appellees from adverse use of their private
property cannot be denied by invocation of a state constitutional provision or by
judicial reconstruction of a states laws.
ISSUE: When a large shopping center is required to allow free expression and petition on its
property, will that amount to a taking?
RESOLUTION: No.
ARGUMENTS & HOLDING

The determination of whether a state law unlawfully infringes a landowners


property in violation of the taking clause requires an examination of whether the
restriction on private property forces some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be born by the public as a whole. This includes
inquiring into such factors as the character of the governmental action, its economic
impact, and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.

The requirement that appellants permit the students to exercise their protected
rights of free expression and to petition on shopping center property clearly does not
amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants property rights under the
taking clause. It will not unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a
shopping center. The shopping center may restrict expressive activity by adopting
time, place, and manner regulations that will minimize any interference with its
commercial functions.

Appellants have failed to show that the right to exclude others is so essential to the
use or economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it
amounted to a taking.

Concurrence.
(Justice Thurgood Marshall) Justice Marshall did not understand why the Court
suggested that rights of property are to be defined solely by state law, or that there is
no federal constitutional barrier to the abrogation of common-law rights by Congress
or a state government. Quite serious constitutional questions might be raised if a
legislature attempted to abolish certain categories of common-law rights in some
general way.
(Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.) The state may not compel a person to affirm a belief he
does not hold. A property owner may be faced with speakers who wish to use his
premises as a platform for views that he finds morally repugnant. The strong

emotions evoked by speech in such situations may virtually compel the proprietor to
respond.inst other not similarly protected.

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