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The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way - Nagarjuna - Root Text and Commentaries
The Fundamental Wisdom of The Middle Way - Nagarjuna - Root Text and Commentaries
by Nagarjuna
Romanization and Literal English Translation of the Tibetan Text
by Stephen Batchelor, Sharpham College, April 2000
Preface
This document contains the romanized Tibetan text of Nagarjunas
Mulamadhyamakakarika together with a literal English translation. Two Tibetan texts
were consulted: the versions found in (1) The Asian Classics Input Project, Woodblock
to Laser Source CD, Release A,Produced under the direction of Khen Rinpoche Geshe
Lobsang Tharchin, Washington DC, 1993, and(2) Dbuma Rigs Tshogs Drug: The Six Yukt
Shastra of Madhyamika (pp. 1-37), edited by Prof. L.P. Lhalungpa. Delhi: 1970. The
version here relies on both sources as well as the text embedded in the prose of
Tsongkhapas An Ocean of Reason: A Great Exposition of the Root Text Verses from the
Center (rTsa she tik chen rigs pai rgya mtsho). Varanasi: mTho slob dge ldan spyi las
khang, 1973.
Each Tibetan verse is followed by a literal English translation. This translation served as
the first draft for the free poetic version published in Stephen Batchelor. Verses from the
Center: A Buddhist Vision of the Sublime. New York: Riverhead Books, 2000.
In making the English translation, the primary authority was Tsongkhapas fourteenth
century commentary: An Ocean of Reason: A Great Exposition of the Root Text Verses from
the Center.
The following translations from Sanskrit were also consulted:
Inada, Kenneth K. Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika with an
Introductory Essay. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1970.
Kalupahana, David J. Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany: SUNY, 1986.
Streng, Frederick. Emptiness -- A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville, New York:
Abingdon, 1967.
As was the following translation from the Tibetan:
Garfield, Jay L. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjunas
Mulamadhyamakakarika. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Abbreviations
In the comments that follow some of the verses, the abbreviations refer to the works
below. The number after the abbreviation refers to the page number of the editions
cited.
Lha. Dbuma Rigs Tshogs Drug: The Six Yukt Shastra of Madhyamika (pp. 1-37), edited by
Prof. L.P. Lhalungpa. Delhi: 1970.
Ts. Tsongkhapa. An Ocean of Reason: A Great Exposition of the Root Text Verses from the
Center (rTsa she tik chen rigs pai rgya mtsho). Varanasi: mTho slob dge ldan spyi las
khang, 1973.
K. Kalupahana, David J. Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany: SUNY,
1986.
The title given in brackets below the title at the head of each chapter is the name of the
poem found in Verses from the Center: A Buddhist Vision of the Sublime.
Contents
1. Investigation of Conditions (Conditions)
2. Investigation of Coming and Going (Walking)
3. Investigation of the Sense Organs (Seeing)
4. Investigation of the Aggregates(Body)
5. Investigation of the Elements (Space)
6. Investigation of Desire and the Desirous One (Addiction)
7. Investigation of Birth, Abiding and Perishing (Birth)
8. Investigation of Act and Actor (Actors)
9. Investigation of the Presence of Something Prior (Already)
10. Investigation of Fire and Firewood (Fire)
dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa Shes rab ces bya ba bzhugs so // //
rgya gar skad du // Pra dzny'a n'a ma m'u la ma dhy'a ma ka k'a ri ka
bod skad du //'jam dpal gzhon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo
Herein lie the Root Verses of the Center called Intelligence. In the language of
India: Prajnanamamulamadhyamakakarika. In the language of Tibet: dBu ma rtsa
ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba. I prostrate to the youthful Manjushri.
/gang gis rten cing brel par byung//gag pa med pa skye med pa//chad pa med pa rtag med
pa//ong pa med pa gro med pa//tha dad don min don gcig min//spros pa nyer zhi zhi bstan
pa//rdzogs pai sangs rgyas smra rnams kyi//dam pa de la phyag tsal lo/
I bow down to the most sublime of speakers, the completely awakened one who
taught contingency (no cessation, no birth, no annihilation, no permanence, no
coming, no going, no difference, no identity) to ease fixations.
1. Investigation of Conditions
(Conditions)
1. /bdag las ma yin gzhan las min//gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min//dngos po gang dag gang na
yang//skye ba nam yang yod ma yin/
1. No thing anywhere is ever born from itself, from something else, from both or
without a cause.
2. /rkyen rnams bzhi ste rgyu dang ni//dmigs pa dang ni de ma thag//bdag po yang ni de bzhin
te//rkyen lnga pa ni yod ma yin/
2. There are four conditions:Causes, objects, immediate and dominant. There is no
fifth.
3. /dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin ni//rkyen la sogs pa yod ma yin//bdag gi dngos po yod min
na//gzhan dngos yod pa ma yin no/
3. The essence of things does not exist in conditions and so on. If an own thing does
not exist, an other thing does not exist.
4. /bya ba rkyen dang ldan pa med//rkyen dang mi ldan bya ba med//bya ba mi ldan rkyen ma
yin//bya ba ldan yod on te na/
4. There is no activity which has conditions. There is no activity which does not have
conditions. There are no conditions which do not have activity, and none which do
have activity.
5. /di dag la brtan skye bas na//de phyir di dag rkyen ces grag//ci srid mi skye de srid du//di
dag rkyen min ci ltar min/
5. Since something is born in dependence upon them, then they are known as
conditions. As long as it is not born, why are they not non-conditions?
6. /med dam yod pai don la yang//rkyen ni rung ba ma yin te//med na gang gi rkyen du
gyur//yod na rkyen gyis ci zhig bya/
6. It is impossible for something that either exists or not to have conditions. If it were
non-existent, of what would they be the conditions? If it were existent, why would it
need conditions?
7. /gang tshe chos ni yod pa dang//med dang yod med mi grub pas//ci ltar sgrub byed rgyu zhes
bya//de ltar yin na mi rigs so/
7. When things cannot be established as either existent, non-existent or both, how can
one speak of an establishing cause. Such would be impossible.
8. /yod pai chos di dmigs pa ni//med pa kho na nye bar bstan//ci ste chos ni dmigs med
na//dmigs pa yod par ga la gyur/
8. An existent phenomenon is clearly said to have no object at all. If the phenomenon
has no object, where can the object exist?
9. /chos rnams skyes pa ma yin na//gag pa thad par mi gyur ro//de phyir de ma thag mi
rigs//gags na rkyen yang gang zhig yin/
9. If phenomena are not born, it is invalid for there to be cessation. Therefore, an
immediate [condition] is unreasonable. What, having ceased, can also be a condition?
10. /dngos po rang bzhin med rnams kyi//yod pa gang phyir yod min na//di yod pas na di
byung zhes//bya ba di ni thad ma yin/
10. Because the existence of essence-less things does not exist, it is incorrect to
say:When this exists, that arises.
11. /rkyen rnams so so dus pa la//bras bu de ni med pa nyid//rkyen rnams la ni gang med
pa//de ni rkyen las ci ltar skye/
11. There is no effect at all in the conditions individually or together. How can that
which is not in the conditions itself be born from conditions?
12. /ci ste bras bu de med kyang//rkyen de dag las skye gyur na//rkyen min las kyang bras bu
ni//ci yi phyir na skye mi gyur/
12. If, although the effect is not there, it is born from those conditions, why is an
effect not born from what are not its conditions?
13. /bras bu rkyen gyi rang bzhin ni//rkyen rnams bdag gi rang bzhin min//bdag dngos min las
bras bu gang//de ni ci ltar rkyen rang bzhin/
13. Effects [are of] the nature of conditions. Conditions do not have own nature. How
can those effects of what does not have own nature [be of] the nature of conditions?
14. /de phyir rkyen gyi rang bzhin min//rkyen min rang bzhin bras bu ni//yod min bras bu med
bas na//rkyen min rkyen du ga la gyur/
14. Therefore, [it does] not have the nature of conditions, nor is there an effect with
the nature of non-conditions. Since there is no effect, what could [be its] nonconditions or conditions?
4. /gang gi bgom pa la 'gro ba/ /de yi bgom la 'gro med par/ /thal bar 'gyur te gang gi phyir/
/bgom la 'gro ba yin phyir ro/
4. For whomever there is going within motion, for him it will follow that there [could
be] no going within motion, because there is going within motion.
Or, following the structure and wording of v. 10: To claim that there is going within
motion implies that there could be no going within motion, because it is asserted there
is going within motion.
5. /bgom la 'gro ba yod na ni/ /'gro ba gnyis su thal 'gyur te/ /gang gis de bgom gyur ba dang/
/de la 'gro ba gang yin pa'o/
5. If there were going within motion, it would follow that going would be twofold:
that by which one becomes someone in motion [in a place] and [that by which one]
goes in that [place].
6. /'gro ba gnyis su thal 'gyur na/ /'gro ba po yang gnyis su 'gyur/ /gang phyir 'gro po med par
ni/ /'gro ba 'thad par mi 'gyur phyir/
6. If going were twofold, the goer also would be twofold, because going is impossible
without a goer.
7. /gal te 'gro po med gyur na/ /'gro ba 'thad par mi 'gyur te/ /'gro ba med na 'gro ba po/ /yod pa
nyid du ga la 'gyur/
7. If there were no goer, going would be impossible. If there were no going, where
could a goer be existent?
8. /re zhig 'gro po mi 'gro ste/ /'gro ba po min 'gro ba min/ /'gro po 'gro po min las gzhan/
/gsum pa gang zhig 'gro bar 'gyur/
8. When a goer does not go, a non-goer cannot go; what third one other than a goer
and a non-goer could go? [cf. v. 15]
9. /gang tshe 'gro ba med par ni/ /'gro ba 'thad par mi 'gyur na/ /re zhig 'gro po 'gro'o zhes/ /ji
ltar 'thad pa nyid du 'gyur/
9. When a goer* is impossible without going, then how is it possible to say: a goer
goes?
* gro ba: Ts. 102 glosses this as gro ba po = goer which makes more sense and agrees
with K. 123. Could this be a textual corruption? l.2 would read better as: gro po thad par
mi gyur na.
10. /gang gi phyogs la 'gro ba po/ /'gro ba de la 'gro med pa'i/ /'gro po yin par thal 'gyur te/
/'gro po 'gro bar 'dod phyir ro/
10. To claim that a goer goes implies that there could be a goer who does not go,
because it is asserted that a goer goes. [cf. v. 4]
11. /gal te 'gro po 'gro gyur na/ /'gro ba gnyis su thal 'gyur te/ /gang gis 'gro por mngon pa
dang/ /'gro por gyur nas gang 'gro ba'o/
11. If the goer goes, it would follow that going would be twofold: that which reveals*
the goer and that which goes once [he] has become a goer.
*Ts. 103 understands mgon as brjod, i.e. that which allows someone to be designated as
a goer. This agrees with K. 124 (vyapadesa).
12. /song la 'gro ba'i rtsom med de/ /ma song ba la'ang 'gro rtsom med/ /bgom la rtsom pa yod
min na/ /gang du 'gro ba rtsom par byed/
12. If a beginning of going does not exist in what has gone, [if] a beginning of going
does not exist also in what has not [yet] gone [and if] there does not exist a beginning
within motion, wherein is a beginning of going made?
13. /'gro ba rtsom pa'i snga rol na/ /gang du 'gro ba rtsom 'gyur bai/ /bgom pa med cing song
ba med/ /ma song 'gro ba ga la yod/
13. Before a beginning of going, there is not any motion or anything which has gone
wherein going could begin. How can going exist in what has not [yet] gone?
14. /'gro rtsom rnam pa thams cad du/ /snang ba med pa nyid yin na/ /song ba ci zhig bgom pa
ci/ /ma song ci zhig rnam par brtag/
14. If a beginning of going is simply not apparent in any way, examine: what has
gone? what is motion? what has not [yet] gone?
15. /re zhig 'gro po mi sdod de/ /'gro ba po min sdod pa min/ /'gro po 'gro po min las gzhan/
/gsum pa gang zhig sdod par 'gyur/
15. When a goer does not stay, a non-goer cannot stay; what third one other than a
goer and a non-goer could stay? [cf. v. 8]
16. /gang tshe 'gro ba med par ni/ /'gro po 'thad par mi 'gyur na/ /re zhig 'gro po sdod do zhes/
/ji ltar 'thad pa nyid du 'gyur/
16. When a goer is not possible without going, how then is it possible [to say]: a goer
stays.
17. /bgom las ldog par mi 'gyur te/ /song dang ma song las kyang min/ /'gro ba dang ni 'jug pa
dang/ /ldog pa yang ni 'gro dang mtshungs/
17. There is no reversal of motion*, nor also of what has gone [and] what has not [yet]
gone. [Reversal of] going, engagement [to stay] and reversal [of staying] are similar to
going.
* Ts. 105 connects the reversal of motion with the starting to stay. Skt. seems
explicitly to mention staying. In the following line, Ts. explains that there is no
reversal of motion in either what has gone or not yet gone because both are devoid of
going. Reversal of motion seems to mean simply stopping. Tss comm. on l c-d is
difficult to trace, suggesting that he may be following a different version of the root text.
My rendition of c-d is tentative. K. 127 has: Movement, commencement and cessation
(of movement) are all comparable to motion.
18. /'gro ba de dang 'gro ba po/ /de nyid ces kyang byar mi rung/ /'gro ba dang ni 'gro ba po/
/gzhan nyid ces kyang byar mi rung/
18. It is inappropriate to say: going and a goer are the same. It is inappropriate to
say: going and a goer are different.
19. /gal te 'gro ba gang yin pa/ /de nyid 'gro po yin gyur na/ /byed pa po dang las nyid kyang/
/gcig pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur/
19. If whatever is going were a goer, it would follow that the actor and the act would
be the same too.
20. /gal te 'gro dang 'gro ba po/ /gzhan pa nyid du rnam brtag na/ /'gro po med pa'i 'gro ba
dang/ /'gro ba med pa'i 'gro por 'gyur/
20. If going and a goer were conceived as different, there could be going without a
goer and a goer without going.
21. /gang dag dngos po gcig pa dang/ /dngos po gzhan pa nyid du ni/ /grub par gyur pa yod min
na/ /de gnyis grub pa ji ltar yod/
21. If things are not established as the same and as different, how can they be
established?
22. /'gro ba gang gis 'gro por mngon/ /'gro ba de ni de 'gro min/ /gang phyir 'gro ba'i snga rol
med/ /gang zhig gang du 'gro bar 'gyur/
22. That very going by which a goer is made evident does not [enable a goer to] go.
Because there is no [goer] before going, who would be going where?
23. /'gro ba gang gis 'gro por mngon/ /de las gzhan pa de 'gro min/ /gang phyir 'gro po gcig pu
la/ /'gro ba gnyis su mi 'thad do/
23. [A going] which is other than the going by which a goer is made evident does not
[enable a goer to] go. Because it is impossible for going to be twofold within a single
goer.
24. /'gro po yin par gyur pa ni/ /'gro rnam gsum du 'gro mi byed/ /ma yin par ni gyur de yang/
/'gro rnam gsum du 'gro mi byed/
24. One who is a goer does not go in the three aspects of going. Also one who is not [a
goer] does not go in the three aspects of going.
25. /yin dang ma yin gyur pa yang/ /'gro rnam gsum du 'gro mi byed/ /de phyir 'gro dang 'gro
po dang/ /bgrod par bya ba'ang yod ma yin/
25. One who is and is not [a goer] also does not go in the three aspects of going.
Therefore, going and a goer and also that which is gone over do not exist.
'gro ba dang 'ong ba brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa gnyis pa'o/////
1. /lta dang nyan dang snom pa dang/ /myong bar byed dang reg byed yid/ /dbang po drug ste de
dag gi/ /spyod yul blta bar bya la sogs/
1. Seeing and hearing and smelling and tasting and touching, mind are the six sense
organs; their experienced objects are what-is-seen and so forth.
2. /lta de rang gi bdag nyid ni/ /de la lta ba ma yin nyid/ /gang zhig bdag la mi lta ba/ /de dag
gzhan* la ji ltar lta/
[Lha. *de bzhin bdag]
2. Seeing does not see itself. How can what does not see itself see anything else?
3. /lta ba rab tu bsgrub pa'i phyir/ /me yi dpes ni nus ma yin/ /song dang ma song bgom pa yis/
/de ni lta bcas lan btab bo/
3. The example of fire is not able to fully establish seeing. It, along with seeing, has
been refuted by gone, not gone and going.
4. /gang tshe cung zad mi lta bar/ /lta bar byed pa ma yin no/ /blta bas lta bar byed ces byar/ /de
ni ji ltar rigs par 'gyur/
4. When not seeing the slightest thing, there is no act of seeing. How can it [then] be
reasonable to say: seeing sees?
5. /lta ba lta nyid ma yin te/ /lta ba min pa mi lta nyid/ /lta ba nyid kyis lta ba po'ang/ /rnam par
bshad par shes par bya/
5. Seeing does not see; non-seeing does not see. It should be understood that seeing
explains the seer too.
6. /ma spang lta po yod min te/ /lta ba spangs par gyur kyang ngo/ /lta po med na blta bya dang/
/lta ba de dag ga la yod/
6. Without letting go of [seeing] a seer does not exist; in letting go of seeing, there is
also [no seer]. If there is no seer, where can there be what-is-seen and seeing?
7. /ci ltar pha dang ma dag las/ /brten nas bu ni byung bar bshad/ /de bzhin mig dang gzugs
brten nas/ /rnam par shes pa byung bar bshad/
7. Just as it is said that a child emerges in dependence on a father and a mother,
likewise it is said that consciousness emerges in dependence upon an eye and a
visual form.
8. /blta bya lta ba med pa'i phyir/ /rnam par shes la sogs pa bzhi/ /yod min nye bar len la sogs/ /ji
lta bur na yod par 'gyur/
[Ts. 129-30 explains rung min nyid as being an added emphasis. To not conceive of
the concept of form he regards as unworthy for the yogin who beholds reality. He cites
Buddhapalita, who explains how it is inappropriate, in contrast to how appropriate
it would be to reflect on non-abiding.]
6. /'bras bu rgyu dang 'dra ba zhes/ /bya ba 'thad pa ma yin te/ /'bras bu rgyu dang mi 'dra
zhes/ /bya ba'ang 'thad pa ma yin no/
6. It is untenable to say, the fruit is like the cause. It is also untenable to say, the
fruit is unlike the cause.
7. /tshor dang 'du shes 'du byed dang/ /sems dang dngos po thams cad kyang/ /rnam pa dag ni
thams cad du/ /gzugs nyid kyis ni rim pa mtshungs/
7. Feeling and perception, impulses and mind and all things are comparable in every
aspect, at every stage with form.
8. /stong pa nyid kyis brtsad byas tshe/ /gang zhig lan 'debs smra byed pa/ /de yi thams cad lan
btab min/ /bsgrub par bya dang mtshungs par 'gyur/
8. When having argued by means of emptiness, everything of that one who objects is
not an objection; it is similar to what is to be established .
9. /stong pa nyid kyis bshad byas tshe/ /gang zhig skyon 'dogs smra byed pa/ /de yi thams cad
skyon btags min/ /bsgrub par bya dang mtshungs par 'gyur/
9. When having explained by means of emptiness, everything of that one who finds
fault is not a fault; it is similar to what is to be established.
phung po brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bzhi pa'o////
3./mtshan nyid med la mtshan nyid ni/ /mi 'jug mtshan nyid bcas la min/ /mtshan bcas mtshan
nyid med pa las/ /gzhan la'ang 'jug par mi 'gyur ro/
3. Characteristics do not extend to that which has no characteristics; nor to what
possesses characteristics. They also cannot extend to something other than what
either possesses or does not have characteristics.
4./mtshan nyid 'jug pa ma yin na/ /mtshan gzhi 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/ /mtshan gzhi 'thad pa
ma yin na/ /mtshan nyid kyang ni yod ma yin/
4. If characteristics do not extend [to something] , something characterized would be
impossible. If something characterized is impossible, characteristics too would not
exist.
5./de phyir mtshan gzhi yod min te/ /mtshan nyid yod pa nyid ma yin/ /mtshan gzhi mtshan
nyid ma gtogs pa'i/ /dngos po yang ni yod ma yin/
5. Therefore, something characterized does not exist and characteristics do not exist.
There also does not exist a thing which is apart from being something characterized
or a characteristic.
6./dngos po yod pa ma yin na/ /dngos med gang gi yin par 'gyur/ /dngos dang dngos med mi
mthun chos/ /gang gis dngos dang dngos med shes/
6. If there is not a thing, of what can there be a non-thing? By whom are the opposites
thing and non-thing known [as] a thing and a non-thing?
[Ts. 140 understands a thing to refer to the obstructive matter of which space, as a
negation and hence a non-thing, is a negation of.]
7./de phyir nam mkha' dngos po min/ /dngos med ma yin mtshan gzhi min/ /mtshan nyid ma
yin khams lnga po/ /gzhan gang dag kyang nam mkha' mtshungs/
7. Therefore, space is not a thing; it is not a non-thing; it is not something
characterized; it is not a characteristic. The other five elements too are similar to
space.
8./blo chung gang dag dngos rnams la/ /yod pa nyid dang med nyid du/ /blta ba des ni blta bya
ba/ /nye bar zhi ba zhi mi mthong/
8. Those of small minds see things as existent and non-existent. They do not behold
the utter pacification of what is seen.
khams brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa lnga pa'o/ // /
(Addiction)
1. /gal te 'dod chags snga rol na//'dod chags med pa'i chags yod na//de la brten nas 'dod chags
yod//chags yod 'dod chags yod par 'gyur/
1. If a desirous one without desire exists before desire, desire would exist dependent
on that [desirous one]. [When] a desirous one exists, desire exists.
2. /chags pa yod par 'gyur na'ang*//'dod chags yod par ga la 'gyur//chags pa la yang 'dod chags
ni//yod dam med kyang rim pa mtshungs/
[*Ts. 146 chags pa yod par ma gyur na but acknowledges that Buddhapalita & Sherab
Dronme follow the reading above. Ts. 147-9 has a lengthy discussion about the
difference between the old and new translations of these verses.]
2. If there were no desirous one, how could there be desire? The same follows for the
desirous one too: [it depends on] whether desire exists or not.
3. /'dod chags dang ni chags pa dag//lhan cig nyid du skye mi rigs//'di ltar 'dod chags chags pa
dag //phan tshun ltos pa med par 'gyur/
3. It is not reasonable for desire and the desirous one to arise as co-existent. In this
way desire and the desirous one would not be mutually contingent.
4. /gcig nyid lhan cig nyid med de//de nyid de dang lhan cig min//ci ste tha dad nyid yin
na//lhan cig nyid du ji ltar 'gyur/
4. Identity has no co-existence: something cannot be co-existent with itself. If there
were difference, how could there be co-existence?
5. /gal te gcig pu lhan cig na//grogs med par yang der 'gyur ro//gal te tha dad lhan cig na//grogs
med par yang der 'gyur ro/
5. If the identical were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between the
unrelated; if the different were co-existent, [co-existence] would also occur between
the unrelated.
[grogs med par is translated by K, G [and Gnoli] as without association. The Tibetan
literally means without assistance. Grogs pa is the defining characteristic of rkyen
(condition), i.e. it implies a functional relationship, usually causal; it is what helps
something become what it is.]
6. /gal te tha dad lhan cig na//ci go 'dod chags chags pa dag //tha dad nyid du grub 'gyur
ram//des na de gnyis lhan cig 'gyur/
6. If the different were co-existent, how would desire and the desirous one be
established as different or, if that were so, [how would] those two be co-existent?
[this verse seems to say no more than v.7 below, but says it less neatly]
7. /gal te 'dod chags chags pa dag//tha dad nyid du grub gyur na//de dag lhan cig nyid du ni//ci
yi phyir na yongs su rtog/
7. If desire and the desirous were established as different, because of what could one
understand them as co-existent?
8. /tha dad grub par ma gyur pas//de phyir lhan cig 'dod byed na//lhan cig rab tu grub pa'i
phyir//tha dad nyid du yang 'dod dam/
8. If one asserts them to be co-existent because they are not established as different,
then because they would be very much established as co-existent, would one not also
have to assert them to be different?
9. /tha dad dngos po ma grub pas//lhan cig dngos po 'grub mi 'gyur//tha dad dngos po gang yod
na//lhan cig dngos por 'dod par byed/
9. Since different things are not established, co-existent things are not established. If
there existed any different things, one could assert them as co-existent things.
10. /de ltar 'dod chags chags pa dag//lhan cig lhan cig min mi 'grub//'dod chags bzhin du chos
rnams kun//lhan cig lhan cig min mi 'grub/
10. In that way, desire and the desirous one are not established as co-existent or not
co-existent. Like desire, all phenomena are not established as co-existent or not coexistent.
[Ts. 153 explains all phenomena to refer to hatred and the hater, stupidity and the
confused one, and proceeds to reconstruct v.1 substituting hatred for desire etc.]
'dod chags dang chags pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa drug pa'o //
(Birth)
1. /gal te skye ba 'dus byas na/ /de la mtshan nyid gsum ldan 'gyur/ /ci ste skye ba 'dus ma byas/
/ji ltar 'dus byas mtshan nyid yin/
1. If birth were compounded, it would possess the three characteristics [of a
compound]. If birth were uncompounded, how would it be a characteristic of a
compound?
2. /skye la sogs gsum so so yis/ /'dus byas mtshan nyid bya bar ni/ /nus min gcig la dus gcig tu/
/'dus pa yang ni ji ltar rung/
2. The three such as birth cannot individually be that which characterises
compounds. How is it possible for one at one time to be compounded [of all three]?
3. /skye dang gnas dang 'jig rnams la/ /'dus byas mtshan nyid gzhan zhig ni/ /gal te yod na thug
med 'gyur/ /med na de dag 'dus byas min/
3. If birth, abiding and perishing had an other characteristic of being compounded,
this would be endless. If not, they would not be compounded.
4. /skye ba'i skye bas rtsa ba yi/ /skye ba 'ba' zhig skyed par byed/ /rtsa ba'i skye bas skye ba yi/
/skye ba'ang skyed par byed pa yin/
4. The birth of birth gives birth to the root birth alone. The root birth also is that
which gives birth to the birth of birth.
5. /gal te khyod kyi skye ba'i skyes/ /rtsa ba'i skye ba skyed byed na/ /khyod kyi rtsa bas ma
bskyed des/ /de ni ji ltar skyed par byed/
5. If your birth of birth gives birth to the root birth, how does that which is not yet
born from your root give birth to that [root birth]?
6. /gal te khyod kyi rtsa ba yis/ /bskyed pa de yis rtsa skyed na/ /des ma bskyed pa'i rtsa ba des/
/de ni ji ltar skyed par byed/
6. If that which is born from your root birth gives birth to the root, how does that root
which is born from that give birth to that [from which it is born]?
7. /gal te ma skyes pa de yis/ /de skyed pa ni byed nus na/ /khyod kyi skye bzhin pa de yis/ /de
skyed par ni 'dod la rag/
7. If that which has not been born is able to give birth to that, that of yours which is
being born should be able to give birth to that.
[v. 4-7: This is a clear example of another hand interfering with the text. Not only is it
incapable of being reset as poetry, it is incompatible with the style of the verses that
precede and especially those that follow. Also cf. MMK 1: 7-9]
8. /ji ltar mar me rang dang gzhan/ /snang bar byed pa de bzhin du/ /skye ba'ang rang dang
gzhan gyi dngos/ /gnyis ka skyed par byed pa yin/
8. Just as lamplight illuminates itself and others, likewise birth too gives birth to
both itself and the thing of others.
[itself and the thing of others is the clumsy Tibetan form of svaparaatma, cf. svabhava /
parabhava.]
9. /mar me dang ni gang dag na/ /de 'dug pa na mun pa med/ /mar mes ci zhig snang bar byed/
/mun pa sel bas snang byed yin/
9. Wherever lamplight is present there is no darkness. What does lamplight
illuminate? It illuminates by dispelling darkness.
10. /gang tshe mar me skye bzhin pa/ /mun pa dang ni phrad med na/ /ji ltar mar me skye bzhin
pas/ /mun pa sel bar byed pa yin/
10. If, when lamplight is being generated, it does not encounter darkness, how does
the generation of lamplight dispel darkness?
11. /mar me phrad pa med par yang/ /gal te mun pa sel byed na/ /'jig rten kun na gnas pa'i mun/
/'di na gnas pa des sel 'gyur/
11. If darkness is dispelled even though it does not encounter lamplight, this
[lamplight] dwelling here would eliminate the darkness that dwells in all the worlds.
12. /mar me* rang dang gzhan gyi dngos/ /gal te snang bar byed 'gyur na/ /mun pa'ang rang
dang gzhan gyi dngos/ /sgrib par 'gyur bar the tshom med/
[Ts. *mes]
12. If lamplight illuminated itself and the thing of others, darkness too would
without doubt obscure itself and the thing of others.
13. /skye ba 'di ni ma skyes pas/ /rang gi bdag nyid ji ltar skyed/ /ci ste skyes pas skyed byed na/
/skyes na ci zhig bskyed du yod/
13. How can unborn birth give birth to itself? If the born gives birth, when it has
been born, what would be born?
14. /skyes dang ma skyes skye bzhin pa/ /ji lta bur yang mi skyed pa/ /de ni song dang ma song
dang/ /bgom pas rnam par bshad pa yin/
14. The born and the unborn, the being born do not in any way give birth. That has
been explained by the gone, not gone and going.
15. /gang tshe skye ba yod pa na/ /skye bzhin 'di 'byung med pa'i tshe
ji ltar skye la brten nas ni/ /skye bzhin zhes ni brjod par bya/
15. When being born does not arise in what is born, then how can one say [it is]
being born in dependence on the born?
16. /rten cing 'byung ba gang yin pa/ /de ni ngo bo nyid kyis zhi/ /de phyir skye bzhin nyid dang
ni/ /skye ba yang ni zhi ba nyid/
16. Whatever is dependently arising, that is by nature pacified. Therefore, being born
and what is born too are pacified.
[Ts. 174-6 gives a good summary of the identity of dependent arising and emptiness
with citations, including (174): Whoever sees dependent and relational arising sees the
Dharma; whoever sees the Dharma sees the Buddha. and (175) What is born from
conditions is unborn. By its very nature it has no birth. What is dependent on
conditions is said to be empty. He who knows emptiness is conscientious (bag yod)]
17. /gal te dngos po ma skyes pa/ /'ga' zhig gang na yod gyur na/ /de ni skye 'gyur dngos po de/
/med na ci zhig skye bar 'gyur/
17. If any unborn thing existed anywhere, on being born that [unborn] thing would
not exist. If so, what would be born?
18. /gal te skye ba de yis ni/ /skye bzhin pa ni skyed byed na/ /skye ba de ni skye ba lta/ /gang
zhig gis ni skyed par byed/
18. If that which has been born gives birth to what is being born, what [other thing]
that has been born would be giving birth to that which has been born?
19. /gal te skye ba gzhan zhig gis/ /de skyed thug pa med par 'gyur/ /ci ste skye ba med skye na/
/thams cad de bzhin skye bar 'gyur/
19. If another [thing] that has been born gives birth [to it], this would be endless. If it
is born without [another] which has been born [OR if it is born without being born],
everything would be born like that [i.e. causelessly].
20. /re zhig yod dang med pa yang/ /skye bar rigs pa ma yin zhing/ /yod med nyid kyang ma yin
zhes/ /gong du bstan pa nyid yin no/
20. Thus it is not reasonable for what exists or does not exist to be born. It has been
shown above that there is no existent or non-existent.
21. /dngos po 'gag bzhin nyid la ni/ /skye ba 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/ /gang zhig 'gag bzhin ma
yin pa/ /de ni dngos por mi 'thad do/
21. It is not tenable for a thing that is perishing to be born. It is not tenable for that
which is not perishing to be a thing.
22. /dngos po gnas pa mi gnas te/ /dngos po mi gnas gnas pa min/ /gnas bzhin pa yang mi gnas
te/ /ma skyes gang zhig gnas par 'gyur/
22. A thing that has remained does not remain. A thing that has not [yet] remained
does not remain. That which is remaining also does not remain. What unborn [thing]
can remain?
23. /dngos po 'gag bzhin nyid la ni/ /gnas pa 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/ /gang zhig 'gag bzhin ma
yin pa/ /de ni dngos por mi 'thad do/
23. It is not possible for a thing that is perishing to remain. It is not possible for that
which is not perishing to be a thing.
24. /dngos po thams cad dus kun tu/ /rga dang 'chi ba'i chos yin na/ /gang dag rga dang 'chi
med par/ /gnas pa'i dngos po gang zhig yod/
24. If all things at all times are aging and dying phenomena, what things are there
which could remain without aging and dying?
25. /gnas pa gnas pa gzhan dang ni/ /de nyid kyis kyang gnas mi rigs/ /ji ltar skye ba rang dang
ni/ /gzhan gyis bskyed pa ma yin bzhin/
25. It is not reasonable for what remains to remain due to something else that
remains or due to itself. This is like how what has been born is not given birth to by
itself or another. [cf. v.18-19]
26. /'gags pa 'gag par mi 'gyur te/ /ma 'gags pa yang 'gag mi 'gyur/ /'gag bzhin pa yang de
bzhin min/ /ma skyes gang zhig 'gag par 'gyur/
26. What has ceased does not cease. What has not ceased also does not cease.
Likewise what is ceasing also does not. What unborn [thing] can cease? [cf. v. 22]
27. /re zhig dngos po gnas pa la/ /'gag pa 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/ /dngos po mi gnas pa la yang/
/'gag pa 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/
27. It is not possible for a thing which has remained to cease. It is also not possible
for a thing which has not remained to cease.
[past tense has remained follows Skt. (K .175). Tib. and Ts. 183 could read: It is not
possible for a thing which remains to cease. It is also not possible for a thing which does
not remain to cease.]
28. /gnas skabs de yis gnas skabs ni/ /de nyid 'gag pa nyid mi 'gyur/ /gnas skabs gzhan gyis
gnas skabs ni/ /gzhan yang 'gag pa nyid mi 'gyur/
28. A particular state [of something] does not cause that particular state itself to cease.
Moreover, another particular state does not cause that particular state to cease.
[Ts. 184 illustrates this with the example of milk and curds (butter), i.e.: milk does not
cause milk to cease, nor do curds cause milk to cease.]
29. /gang tshe chos rnams thams cad kyi/ /skye ba 'thad par mi 'gyur ba/ /de tshe chos rnams
thams cad kyi/ /'gag pa 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/
29. When the birth of all phenomena is not possible, then the cessation of all
phenomena is not possible.
30. /re zhig dngos po yod pa la/ /'gag pa 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/ /gcig nyid na ni dngos po dang/
/dngos po med pa 'thad pa med/
30. Cessation is not possible in an existent thing. Thingness and nothingness are not
possible in one.
31. /dngos po med par gyur pa la'ang/ /'gag pa 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/ /mgo gnyis pa la ji ltar ni/
/gcad du med pa de bzhin no/
31. Cessation is not possible also in what is not a thing. This is similar to how there is
no cutting off a second head. [i.e. a person cannot be beheaded twice]
32. /'gag pa rang gi bdag nyid kyis/ /yod min 'gag pa gzhan gyis min/ /ji ltar skye ba rang dang
ni/ /gzhan gyis skyed pa ma yin bzhin/
32. Cessation does not exist by its own self, nor does cessation [exist] by something
else. This is like how what has been born is not given birth to by itself or another [cf.
25]
33. /skye dang gnas dang 'jig pa dag/ /ma grub phyir na 'dus byas med/ /'dus byas rab tu ma
grub pas/ /'dus ma byas ni ji ltar 'grub/
33. Because birth and remaining and perishing are not established, there is no
conditioned. Because the conditioned is utterly unestablished, how can the
unconditioned be established?
34. /rmi lam ji bzhin sgyu ma bzhin/ /dri za'i grong khyer ji bzhin du/ /de bzhin skye dang de
bzhin gnas/ /de bzhin du ni 'jig pa gsungs/
34. Like a dream, like a magicians illusion, like a city of gandharvas, likewise birth
and likewise remaining, likewise perishing are taught.
skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bdun pa'o//// /
3. /gal te byed por* ma gyur pa/ /las su ma gyur byed na ni/ /las la rgyu ni med par 'gyur/ /byed
pa po yang rgyu med 'gyur/
[*Lha. po]
3. If one who does not exist as an actor did that which does not exist as an act, the act
would have no cause; the actor too would have no cause.
4. /rgyu med na ni 'bras bu dang/ /rgyu yang 'thad par mi 'gyur ro/ /de med na ni bya ba dang/
/byed pa po dang byed mi rigs/
4. If there were no cause, effect and cause would not be evident. If they were nonexistent, activity and agent and doing would not be evident.
5. /bya ba la sogs mi rigs na/ /chos dang chos min yod ma yin/ /chos dang chos min med na ni/
/de las byung ba'i 'bras bu med/
5. If activity etc. did not appear, dharma and adharma would not be evident. If
dharma and adharma did not exist, there would be no fruit that comes from them.
6. /'bras bu med na thar pa dang/ /mtho ris 'gyur pa'i lam mi 'thad/ /bya ba dag ni thams cad
kyang/ /don med nyid du thal bar 'gyur/
6. If there were no fruit, the path of liberation and higher states would not be
appropriate. Also it would follow that all activities are meaningless.
7. /byed pa por gyur ma gyur pa/ /gyur ma gyur de mi byed de/ /yin dang ma yin gyur cig* la/
/phan tshun 'gal bas** ga la yod/
[*Lha. gcig; **ba]
7. One who exists and does not exist as an actor does not do what exists and does not
exist [as an act]. Since existence and non-existence are mutually contradictory in one
[thing], where can they exist?
8. /byed pa por ni gyur pa yis/ /ma gyur las ni mi byed de/ /ma gyur pas kyang gyur mi byed/
/'dir yang skyon der thal bar 'gyur/
8. One who exists as an actor does not do an act which is not existent. One who does
not exist [as an actor] also does not do what exists [as an act]. Here too faults will
follow for one.
9. /byed pa por ni gyur pa dang/ /bcas pa las ni ma gyur dang/ /gyur ma gyur pa mi byed de/
/gtan tshigs gong du bstan phyir ro/
9. One who exists as an actor does not do what does not exist as an act and what
neither exists or not [as an act], because of what was demonstrated by the proof
above.
[Verses 9-11 are suspect. This degree of systematic nit-picking as well as the scholarly
reference to the proof above seem out of character.]
10. /byed pa por ni ma gyur pas*/ /las ni gyur dang bcas pa dang/ /gyur ma gyur pa mi byed de/
/gtan tshigs gong du bstan phyir ro/
[*Lha. pa]
10. One who does not exist as an actor does not do what exists as an act and what
neither exists or not [as an act], because of what was demonstrated by the proof
above.
11. /byed pa por gyur ma gyur ni/ /las su gyur dang ma gyur pa/ /mi byed 'di* yang gtan tshigs
ni/ /gong du bstan pas shes par bya/
[*Lha.Ts. dir]
11. One who neither exists nor does not exist as an actor does not do that which exists
and does not exist as an act. Here too this is to be known through the proof
demonstrated above.
12. /byed pa po las brten* byas shing/ /las kyang byed po de nyid la/ /brten nas 'byung ba ma
gtogs pa**/ /'grub pa'i rgyu ni ma mthong ngo/
[*Lha. byed po las la brten; **par]
12. An actor depends on acts and acts too occur in dependence on an actor. Apart
from this, one does not see a cause which is established.
13. /de bzhin nyer len shes par bya/ /las dang byed po bsal* phyir ro/ /byed pa po dang las dag
gis/ /dngos po lhag ma** shes par bya/
13. Likewise, one should understand clinging, because act and actor are dispelled.
Remaining things too should be understood by means of actor and act.
byed pa po dang las brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa brgyad pa'o/ // /
7. /lta la sogs pa thams cad kyi //snga rol gal te yod min na //lta la sogs pa re re yi //snga rol de
ni ji ltar yod /
7. If it is not evident prior to the totality of seeing etc., how can it be evident prior to
[each of them] seeing etc. individually?
8. /lta po de nyid nyan po de //gal te tshor po'ang de nyid na //re re'i snga rol yod gyur na //de ni
de ltar mi rigs so /
8. If the seer itself [were] the hearer and the feeler [were] it too, if it existed prior to
each, in that way it would not make sense.
9. /gal te lta po gzhan nyid la //nyan pa po gzhan tshor gzhan na //lta po yod tshe nyan por*
'gyur //bdag kyang mang po nyid du 'gyur /
[*Ts. po; Lha. por]
9. If the seer were different, the hearer different, the feeler different, at the time the
seer exists, there would be a hearer. Many selves would come about.
10. /lta dang nyan la sogs pa dang //tshor ba dag la sogs pa dang* //gang las 'gyur ba'i 'byung
de la'ang //de ni yod pa ma yin no /
[*Ts. & Lha. yang]
10. Also it is not evident in the elements from which seeing and hearing etc. and
feeling etc. occur.
11. /lta dang nyan la sogs pa dang //tshor ba dag la sogs pa yang //gang gi yin pa gal te med //de
dag kyang ni yod ma yin /
11. If that to which seeing and hearing etc. and feeling etc. belong is not evident, they
too could not be evident.
12. /gang zhig lta la sogs pa yi //snga rol da lta phyi na med //de la yod do med do zhes //rtog pa
dag ni ldog par 'gyur /
12. Reject the concepts it exists, it doesnt exist about that which is not evident
prior to, now or after seeing etc.
snga rol na gnas pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa dgu pa'o // //
1. /bud shing gang de me yin na //byed pa po dang las gcig 'gyur //gal te shing las me gzhan na
//shing med par yang 'byung bar 'gyur /
1. If firewood were fire, actor and act would be one. If fire were other than wood, it
would occur even without wood.
2. /rtag tu 'bar ba nyid du 'gyur //'bar byed rgyu las mi 'byung zhing //rtsom pa don med nyid
du 'gyur //de lta yin na las kyang med /
2. [Fire] would burn permanently and would not arise from causes for burning.
Starting [a fire] would be meaningless. If it were like that, there would also be no act.
3. /gzhan la ltos pa med pa'i phyir //'bar bar byed rgyu las mi 'byung //rtag tu 'bar ba yin na ni
//rtsom pa don med nyid du 'gyur /
3. Because [fire] does not depend on anything else, it would not arise from causes for
burning. If it burned permanently, starting it would be meaningless.
4. /de la gal te 'di snyam du //sreg bzhin bud shing yin sems na //gang tshe de tsam de yin na
//gang gis bud shing de sreg byed /
4. Concerning this, if one thinks that while burning it is firewood, if it is such only at
that time, by what could that firewood be ignited?
5. /gzhan phyir mi phrad phrad med na //sreg par mi 'gyur mi sreg na //'chi bar mi 'gyur mi
'chi na //rang rtags dang yang ldan par gnas /
5. Because [fire] is other, it would not connect; if it did not connect, it would not
ignite; if it did not ignite, it would not die; if it did not die, it would also remain in
possession of its own characteristic.
6. /ji ltar bud med skyes pa dang //skyes pa'ang bud med phrad pa bzhin //gal te shing las me
gzhan yang //shing dang phrad du** rung bar 'gyur /
6. Just as a woman connects with a man and a man too with a woman, although fire is
other than wood, it is fit to connect with wood.
7. /gal te me dang shing dag ni //gcig gis gcig ni bsal gyur na //shing las me gzhan nyid yin
yang //shing dang phrad par 'dod la rag /
7. If fire and wood eliminated each other, even though fire is something other than
wood, it would have to connect with wood.
8. /gal te shing ltos me yin la //gal te me ltos shing yin na //gang ltos me dang shing 'gyur ba
//dang por grub pa gang zhig yin /
8. If fire were dependent on wood and wood were dependent on fire, of what
becomes fire and wood dependently, which would be established first?
9. /gal te shing ltos me yin na //me grub pa la sgrub par 'gyur //bud par bya ba'i shing la yang
//me med par ni 'gyur pa yin /
9. If fire were dependent on wood, [already] established fire would be established
[again]. Firewood also would be [such] even without fire.
10. /gal te dngos po gang ltos 'grub //de nyid la yang ltos nas ni //ltos bya gang yin de 'grub na
//gang la ltos nas gang zhig 'grub /
10. If a thing (A) is established dependently (on B), [but] if what it depends upon (B)
is established also in dependence on that very thing (A), what would be established
in dependence on what?
11. /dngos po ltos grub gang yin pa //de ma grub na ji ltar ltos //ci ste grub pa ltos she na //de ni
ltos par mi rigs so /
11. How can a thing (A) which is established dependently (on B) be dependent (on B)
when it (A) is not established? If one asks, how can establishment be dependent? It
is not reasonable for it (A) to be dependent.
12. /shing la ltos pa'i me med de //shing la ma ltos me yang med //me la ltos pa'i shing med de
//me la ma ltos shing yang med /
12. There is no fire that is dependent on wood; there is also no fire that is not
dependent on wood. There is no wood that is dependent on fire; there is also no
wood that is not dependent on fire.
13. /me ni gzhan las mi 'ong ste //shing la'ang me ni yod ma yin //de bzhin shing gi lhag ma ni
//song dang ma song bgom pas bstan /
13. Fire does not come from something else; fire also does not exist in wood.
Likewise, the remainder of wood has been shown by gone, not-gone and going.
14. /shing nyid me ni ma yin te //shing las gzhan pa me yang med //me ni shing dang ldan ma
yin //me la shing med der de med /
14. Wood itself is not fire; fire is also not something other than wood. Fire does not
possess wood; wood does not exist in fire; that (fire) does not exist in it.
15. /me dang shing gis bdag dang ni //nye bar len pa'i rim pa kun //bum snam sogs dang lhan
cig tu //ma lus par ni rnam par bshad /
15. Through fire and wood is explained without exception all the stages of self and
the grasped and at the same time jugs, cloth and so on.
16. /gang dag bdag dang dngos po rnams //de bcas nyid dang tha dad par //ston pa de dag bstan
don la //mkhas so snyam du mi sems so /
16. I do not think those who teach the identity or difference of self and things are
wise in the meaning of the teaching.
me dang bud shing brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu pa'o //
7. /khor ba ba zhig sngon gyi mtha/ /yod ma yin par ma zad kyi/ /rgyu dang bras bu nyid
dang ni/ /mtshan nyid dang ni mtshan gzhi nyid/
7. It is not just samsara alone that has no before-extreme, cause and fruit themselves,
and characteristics and the basis for characteristics themselves,
8. /tshor dang tshor po nyid dang ni/ /don yod gang dag ci yang rung/ /dngos rnams thams cad
nyid la yang/ /sngon gyi mtha ni yod ma yin/
8. feeling and the feeler, whatever is suitable to bear meaning, also all things have no
before-extreme.
/sngon dang phyi mai mtha brtag pa zhes bya ste rab tu byed pa bcu gcig pao//
10 ambiguous) in the former sense. The crucial issue here, I feel, is the confusion around
what it means to say I cause myself pain.]
3. /gal te 'di las de gzhan zhing //gal te de las 'di gzhan na //sdug bsngal gzhan gyis byas 'gyur
zhing //gzhan de dag gis de byas 'gyur /
3. If that were other than this and if this were other than that, anguish would be
made by other and that would be made by those others.
[ Ts. 244 is happy with the reading of c-d by Buddhapalita and Sherab Dronme: /gzhan
de dag gis di byas pas//sdug bsngal gzhan gyis byas par gyur/ = ...anguish would be made
by others since those others made this.]
4. /gal te gang zag bdag gis ni //sdug bsngal byas na gang bdag gis //sdug bsngal byas pa'i gang
zag ni* //sdug bsngal ma gtogs gang zhig yin /
[*Lha. de]
4. If anguish were made by ones own person, who would that person be who has
made anguish by himself, but is not included in the anguish?
5. /gal te gang zag gzhan las ni //sdug bsngal 'byung na gzhan zhig gis //sdug bsngal de byas
gang sbyin de //sdug bsngal ma gtogs ji ltar rung /
5. If anguish arose from another person, how could it be suitable for there to be
[someone] not included in the anguish, who has been given it by another who made
the anguish?
6. /gal te gang zag gzhan sdug bsngal //'byung na gang gis de byas nas //gzhan la ster ba'i gang
zag gzhan //sdug bsngal ma gtogs gang zhig yin /
6. If anguish arose [from] another person, who would that other person be who,
having made it, gives it to someone else, but is not included in the anguish?
[Ts. 246 points out that this verse is not found in Buddhapalita or Sherab Dronme, but is
found in Chandrakirti.]
7. /bdag gis byas par ma grub pas //sdug bsngal gzhan gyis ga la byas //gzhan gyis sdug bsngal
gang byed pa //de ni de yi bdag byas 'gyur /
7. Since it is not established as made by self, how can anguish have been made by
other? [For] whatever anguish is made by other, that has been made by his self.
8. /re zhig sdug bsngal bdag byas min //de nyid kyis ni de ma byas //gal te gzhan bdag ma byas
na //sdug bsngal gzhan byas ga la 'gyur /
8. Anguish is not made [by] self; that is not made by that itself. If it is not made by an
other self, how can anguish be made by other?
9. /gal te re res byas gyur na //sdug bsngal gnyis kas byas par 'gyur //bdag gis ma byas gzhan
ma byas* //sdug bsngal rgyu med ga la 'gyur /
[*Lha. gzhan gyis ma byas bdag ma byas]
9. If it is made by each, anguish would be made by both. Not made by self, not made
by other, how can anguish have no cause?
10. /sdug bsngal 'ba' zhig rnam pa bzhi //yod ma yin par ma zad kyi //phyi rol dngos po dag la
yang //rnam pa bzhi po yod ma yin /
10. Not only does anguish alone not have the four aspects, external things too do not
have the four aspects.
bdag gis byas pa dang gzhan gyis byas pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu gnyis pa'o
// ///
2. /gal te bslu chos gang yin pa//de brdzun de la ci zhig bslu//bcom ldan das kyis de gsungs
pa//stong nyid yongs su bstan pa yin/
2. If whatever is a deceptive phenomenon is false, what is deceptive about it [in what
way is it deceptive]? That statement by the Bhagavan is a complete presentation of
emptiness.
3. /dngos rnams ngo bo nyid med de*//gzhan du gyur ba snang phyir ro//dngos bo ngo bo nyid
med med//gang phyir dngos rnams stong pa nyid/
[* Ts. na]
3. Things have no essential nature because they are seen to change into something
else. Things do not lack an essential nature because things are emptiness.
4. /gal te ngo bo nyid med na//gzhan du gyur ba gang gi yin//gal te ngo bo nyid yod na// gzhan
du 'gyur bar ji ltar rung */
[* Lha. ci ltar bur na gzhan du gyur]
4. If there were no essential nature, whose [nature] would it be to change into
something else? If there were an essential nature, how would it be possible to change
into something else?
5. /de nyid la ni gzhan gyur med//gzhan nyid la yang yod ma yin//gang phyir gzhon nu mi rga
ste//gang phyir rgas paang mi rga o/
5. This itself does not change into something else. The other itself too does not
[either]. Because youth does not age. Because age too does not age.
6. /gal te de nyid gzhan gyur na//o ma nyid ni zhor gyur ro//o ma las gzhan gang zhig ni//zho
yi dngos po yin par gyur/
6. If this itself changes into something else, milk itself would be curds. Something
other than milk would be the being of curds.
7. /gal te stong min cung zad yod//stong paang cung zad yod par gyur//mi stong cung zad yod
min na//stong pa* yod par ga la gyur/
[Lha. paang]
7. If a bit of the non-empty existed, a bit of the empty would also exist. If there did
not exist a bit of the non-empty, how could the empty exist?
8. /rgyal ba rnams kyis stong pa nyid//lta kun nges par byung bar gsungs//gang dag stong pa
nyid lta ba//de dag bsgrub tu med par gsungs//
8. The Conquerors taught emptiness as the forsaking of all views. Those who view
emptiness are taught to be without realisation [incurable/incorrigible].
[The source here is given by Candrakirti and Tsongkhapa as the Ratnakuta Sutra, i.e. a
Mahayana text. The earliest Mahayana sutras now extant appear to be some of those
collected in what came to be called the Ratnakuta. ... Some of these were translated into
Chinese as early as the latter part of the 2nd century AD. Warder. Indian Buddhism, 356.
The Kasyapaparivarta seems to be one of these early sections, in Warder it is sometimes
synonymous with the Ratnakuta (in contrast to the Great Ratnakuta). It also originates
from Andra in South India.
Tsongkhapa quotes a large chunk of the Kasyapaparivarta (od srungs kyis zhus pa), pp
260-1, which concludes with this passage: The Bhagavan said: Likewise, Kasyapa, if
emptiness is the emerging from (forsaking of) all views, then Kasyapa, he who views
emptiness alone cannot possibly be cured.]
'du byed brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu sum pa'o // //
4. /blta bya la sogs ba zhig la//gzhan nyid med par ma zad kyi//gang yang gang dang lhen cig
tu//gzhan par nyid du mi thad do/
4. Not only are the seen and so forth alone not existing as other,
it is invalid for anything simultaneous with something to be other [than it].
5. /gzhan ni gzhan la brtan te gzhan//gzhan med par gzhan gzhan mi gyur//gang la brten te
gang yin pa//de ni de las gzhan mi thad/
5. The other is other in dependence upon the other. Without the other, the other
would not be other. It is invalid for whatever is dependent on something to be other
than that.
6. /gal te gzhan ni gzhan las gzhan//de tshe gzhan med par gzhan gyur//gzhan med par ni
gzhan gyur ba//yod min de yi phyir na med/
6. If the other was other than the other, then, without the other, it would be other.
Without the other it would not be other. Therefore, it does not exist.
7. /gzhan nyid gzhan la yod ma yin//gzhan ma yin laang yod ma yin//gzhan nyid yod pa ma yin
na//gzhan nam de nyid yod ma yin//
7. Otherness does not exist in the other. Nor does it exist in what is not other. If
otherness does not exist, neither the other nor that itself exists.
8. /de ni de dang phrad pa med//gzhan dang gzhan yang phrad mi gyur//phrad bzhin pa dang
phrad pa dang//phrad pa po yang yod ma yin/
8. That does not connect with that. The other too does not connect with the other. The
connecting, the connection and the connector too do not exist.
phrad pa brtag pa zhes bya ste rab tu byed pa bcu bzhi pa'o // //
2. /rang bzhin byas pa can zhes byar//ci ltar bur na rung bar gyur//rang bzhin dag ni bcos min
dang//gzhan la ltos pa med pa yin/
2. How is it possible for there to be an essence which has been made?
Essences are not contrived and not dependent on anything else.
3. /rang bzhin yod pa ma yin na//gzhan gyi dngos po ga la yod//gzhan gyi dngos poi rang bzhin
no//gzhan gyi dngos po yin zhes brjod/
3. If an essence does not exist, how can the thingness of the other exist?
[For] the essence of the thingness of the other is said to be the thingness of the other.
[There is a problem here with the Tibetan translation from Sanskrit. Svabhava is
translated as rang bzhin, but parabhava rather clumsily as gzhan gyi dngos po [the term
first appears in I:3]. A Tibetan reader would thus lose the etymological connection
between own-thing (svabhava) and other-thing (parabhava), which then link up with
thing (bhava) and no-thing (abhava). Nagarjuna is playing on the word thing.]
4. /rang bzhin dang ni gzhan dngos dag//ma gtogs dngos po gang [Ts.=ga] la yod//rang bzhin
dag ni gzhan dngos dag//yod na dngos po grub par gyur/
4. Apart from an essence and the thingness of the other, what things are there? If
essences and thingnesses of others existed, things would be established.
5. /gal te dngos po ma grub na//dngos med grub par mi gyur ro//dngos po gzhan du gyur ba
ni//dngos med yin par skye bo smra/
5. If things were not established, non-things would not be established.
[When] a thing becomes something else, people say that it is a non-thing.
6. /gang dag rang bzhin gzhan dngos dang//dngos dang dngos med nyid lta ba//de dag sangs
rgyas bstan pa la//de nyid mthong ba ma yin no/
Those who view essence, thingness of the other, things and non-things do not see the
suchness in the teaching of the awakened.
7. /bcom ldan dngos dang dngos med pa//mkhyen pas ka tya ya na yi//gdams ngag las ni yod pa
dang//med pa gnyi gaang dgag par mdzad/
7. Through knowing things and non-things, the Buddha negated both existence and
non-existence in his Advice to Katyayana.
8. /gal te rang bzhin gyis yod na//de ni med nyid mi gyur ro//rang bzhin gzhan du gyur ba
ni//nam yang thad pa mi gyur ro/
8. If [things] existed essentially, they would not come to non-existence.
10. /yod ces bya ba rtag par dzin//med ces bya ba chad par lta//de phyir yod dang med pa
la//mkhas pas gnas par mi byao/
10. Existence is the grasping at permanence; non-existence is the view of
annihilation. Therefore, the wise do not dwell, in existence or non-existence.
11. /gang zhig rang bzhin gyis yod pa//de ni med pa min pas rtag//sngon byung da ltar med ces
pa//das na chad par thal bar gyur/
11. Since that which exists by its essence is not non-existent, is [the view of]
permanence. That which arose before is now non-existent,leads to [the view of]
annihilation.
rang bzhin brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bco lnga pa'o // //
3. If one moves around in having clung [to something] and then clinging [to
something else], there would be no becoming. If there were no clinging and no
becoming, who would move around?
4. /du byed mya ngan da bar ni//ci ltar bur yang mi thad do//sems can mya ngan da bar
yang//ci ltar bur yang thad mi gyur/
4. It is in no way feasible that impulses go beyond misery.
And it is in no way feasible that living beings go beyond misery.
5. /skye jig chos can du byed rnams//mi ching grol bar mi gyur te//snga ma bzhin du sems can
yang//mi ching grol bar mi gyur ro/
5. Impulses that have the properties of being born and dying are not bound and will
not be freed. In the same way as above living beings too are not bound and will not
be freed.
6. /gal te nye bar len ching na//nye bar len bcas ching mi gyur//nye bar len med mi ching
ste//gnas skabs gang zhig ching bar gyur/
6. If clinging binds, the one who has clinging would not be bound.
And there would be no bondage without clinging. In what situation would there be
bondage?
7. /gal te bcing byai snga rol na//ching ba yod na ching la rag//de yang med de lhag ma
ni//song dang ma song bgom pas bstan/
7. If binding existed prior to one who is bound, [that unbound person] would depend
on binding. That too cannot be. The rest has been explained by the gone, the notgone and the going.
8. /re zhig bcings pa mi grol te//ma bcings pa yang grol mi gyur//bcing pa grol bzhin yin gyur
na//bcing dang grol ba dus gcig gyur/
8. Those who are bound will not be free. And those who are not bound will not be
free. If those who are bound become free, bondage and freedom would be
simultaneous.
9. /bdag ni len med mya ngan da//myang das bdag gir gyur ro zhes//de ltar gang dag dzin de
yis//nyer len dzin pa chen po yin/
9. I, without clinging, am beyond misery. Nirvana is mine. Those who grasp in that
way have great grasping and clinging.
10. /gang la mya ngan das bskyed med//khor ba bsal baang yod min pa//de la khor ba ci zhig
yin//mya ngan das paang ci zhig brtag/
10. When nirvana is not born and samsara not eliminated, then what is samsara? And
what is considered as nirvana?
bcings pa dang thar pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu drug pa'o // //
1. /bdag nyid legs par sdom pa dang//gzhan la phan dogs byams sems gang//de chos de ni di
gzhan du//bras bu dag gi sa bon yin/
1. Restraining oneself well and loving thoughts that benefit others are the Dharma
which is the seed of fruits here and elsewhere.
2. /drang srong mchog gi las rnams ni//sems pa dang ni bsams par gsungs//las de dag gi bye
brag ni//rnam pa du mar yongs su bsgrags/
2. The great sage has taught all actions to be intention and what is intended. The
specifics of those actions are well known to be of many kinds.
3. /de la las gang sems pa zhes//gsungs pa de ni yid gyir dod//bsams pa zhes ni gang gsungs
pa//de ni lus dang ngag gir dod/
3. In this respect action spoken of as intention is regarded as being that of mind.
That spoken of as what is intended is regarded as being that of body and speech.
4. /ngag dang bskyod dang mi spong bai//rnam rig byed min zhes bya gang//spong bai rnam
rig byed min pa//gzhan dag kyang ni de bzhin dod/
4. Whatever (1) speech and (2) movements and (3) unconscious not-letting-go, (4)
other kinds of unconscious letting-go are also regarded like that.
5. /longs spyod las byung bsod nams dang//bsod nams ma yin tshul de bzhin//sems pa dang ni
chos de bdun//las su mngon par dod pa yin/
5. (5) Goodness that arises from enjoyment/use and in the same manner (6) what is
not goodness,[and] (7) intention. These seven dharmas are clearly regarded as action.
[This seven-fold division of acts is not traceable to any school of which I am aware. The
simpler division into restraint and love found in v. 1 serves a similar purpose to v. 4&5
and has the added advantage of leading into v. 6 through its mention of fruits.]
6. /gal te smin pai dus bar du//gnas na las de rtag par gyur//gal te gags na gag gyur pas//ci
ltar bras bu skyed par gyur/
6. If the action remained until the time of ripening, it would become permanent. If it
stopped, by having stopped, how could a fruit be born?
7. /myu gu la sogs rgyun gang ni//sa bon las ni mngon par byung//de las bras bu sa bon
ni//med na de yang byung mi gyur/
7. The continuum of sprouts and so on clearly emerges from seeds, and from that
fruits. If there were no seeds, they too would not emerge.
8. /gang phyir sa bon las rgyun dang//rgyun las bras bu byung gyur zhing//sa bon bras bui
sngon gro ba//de phyir chad min rtag ma yin/
8. Because continuums are from seedsand fruits emerge from continuums and seeds
precede fruits, therefore, there is no annihilation and no permanence.
9. /sems kyi rgyun ni gang yin pa//sems las mngon par byung bar gyur//de las bras bu sems
lta zhig//med na de yang byung mi gyur/
9. The continuum of mind clearly emerges from mind, and from that fruits. If there
were no mind, they too would not emerge.
10. /gang phyir sems las rgyun dang ni//rgyun las bras bu byung gyur zhing//las ni bras bui
sngon gro ba//de phyir chad min rtag ma yin/
10. Because continuums are from minds and fruits emerge from continuums and
actions precede fruits, therefore, there is no annihilation and no permanence.
11. /dkar poi las kyi lam bcu po//chos sgrub pa yi thabs yin te//chos kyi bras bu di gzhan
du//dod pai yon tan rnam lnga po/
11. The ten paths of white action are the means of practising Dharma. Here and
elsewhere, the fruits of Dharma are the five kinds of sensual qualities.
12. /gal te brtag pa der gyur na//nyes pa chen po mang por gyur//de lta bas na brtag pa de//dir
ni thad pa ma yin no/
12. If it were as that investigation, many great mistakes would occur. Therefore, that
investigation is not valid here.
13. /sangs rgyas rnams dang rang rgyal dang//nyan thos rnams kyis gang gsungs pai//brtag pa
gang zhig dir thad pa//de ni rab tu brjod par bya/
13. I will fully declare the investigation which is taught by the Buddhas,
Pratyekabuddhas and Sravakas, which is valid here.
[The explicit denunciation of v. 12 and the strident certainty of v. 13 are an
uncharacteristically heavy-handed and wordy way of telling us that the right view is
about to be given. Yet the text presents all voices with sympathy, suggesting a
developmental account of ethics in Buddhism rather than a were right - youre
wrong version.]
14. /dpang rgya ji ltar de bzhin chud//mi za las ni bu lon bzhin//de ni khams las rnam pa
bzhi//de yang rang bzhin lung ma bstan/
14. Just like a contract, irrevocable action is like a debt. In terms of realms, there are
four types. Moreover, its nature is unspecified.
15. /spong bas spang ba ma yin te//sgom pas spang ba nyid kyang yin//de phyir chud mi za ba
yis//las kyi bras bu skyed par gyur/
15. It is not let go of by letting go, but only let go of by cultivation. Therefore through
irrevocability are the fruits of acts produced.
16. /gal te spong bas spang ba dang//las pho ba yis jig gyur na//de la las jig la sogs pai//skyon
rnams su ni thal bar gyur/
16. If it perished through being let go of by letting go and the transcendence of the
action, then faults would follow such as the perishing of actions.
17. /khams mtshungs las ni cha mtshungs dang//cha mi mtshungs pa thams cad kyi//de ni nyid
mtshams sbyor bai tshe//gcig pu kho nar skye bar gyur/
17. The very [irrevocability] of all actions in similar or dissimilar realms, that one
alone is born when crossing the boundary [i.e. reborn].
18. /mthong bai chos la rnam gnyis so//thams cad* las dang las kyi de//tha dad par ni skye gyur
zhing//rnam par smin kyang gnas pa yin/
[*Ts. kun kyi]
18. In the visible world there are two kinds. Actions of all [types] and that
[irrevocability] of actions are produced as different things and remain [so?] even on
ripening.
19. /de ni bras bu pho ba dang//shi bar gyur na gag par gyur//de yi rnam dbye zag med
dang//zag dang bcas par shes par bya/
19. When the fruit is transcendent and when one dies, that ceases. One should know
its divisions to be without-corruption and with-corruption.
20. /stong pa nyid dang chad med dang//khor ba dang ni rtag pa min//las rnams chud mi za bai
chos//sangs rgyas kyis ni bstan pa yin/
20. Emptiness is not annihilation and samsara is not permanent. The dharma of the
irrevocability of actions is taught by the Buddha.
21. /gang phyir las ni skye ba med//di ltar rang bzhin med dei phyir//gang phyir de ni ma skyes
pa//de phyir chud zad mi gyur ro/
21. Because actions are not born, in this way they have no nature. Therefore, because
they are not born, therefore they are irrevocable.
22. /gal te las la rang bzhin yod//rtag par gyur par the tshom med//las ni byas pa ma yin
gyur//rtag la bya ba med phyir ro/
22. If actions existed [by] nature, without doubt they would be permanent. Actions
would not be done [by an agent] because what is permanent cannot be done.
23. /ci ste las ni ma byas na//ma byas pa dang phrad jigs gyur//tshangs spyod gnas pa ma yin
paang//de la skyon du thal bar gyur/
23. If actions were not done [by anyone], one would fear meeting what [one] has not
done. Also the fault would follow for that [person] of not dwelling in the pure life.
24. /tha snyad thams cad nyid dang yang//gal bar gyur bar the tshom med//bsod nams dang ni
sdig byed pai//rnam par dbye baang thad mi gyur/
24. All conventions also without doubt would be contradictory. Also the distinction
between doing good and evil would not be valid.
25. /de ni rnam smin smin gyur pa//yang dang yang du rnam smin gyur//gal te rang bzhin yod
na ni//gang phyir las gnas de yi phyir/
25. [When] the ripening of that [action] has ripened it would ripen again and again,
because if it existed [by] nature, it would [always] remain.
26. /las di nyon mongs bdag nyid la//nyon mongs de dag yang dag min//gal te nyon mongs
yang dag min//las ni yang dag ci ltar yin/
26. This action has the character of affliction and afflictions are not real. If affliction
is not real, how can action be real?
27. /las dang nyon mongs pa dag ni//lus rnams kyi ni rkyen du bstan//gal te las dang nyon
mongs pa//de stong lus la ci ltar brjod/
27. Actions and afflictions are taught to be the conditions for bodies. If actions and
afflictions are empty, how can one speak of bodies?
28. /ma rig bsgrib pai skye bo gang//sred ldan de ni za ba po//de yang byed las gzhan min
zhing//de nyid de yang ma yin no/
28. People who are obscured by ignorance, those with craving, are the consumers [of
the fruits of action]. They are not other than those who do the action and they are also
not those very ones.
29. /gang gi phyir na las di ni//rkyen las byung ba ma yin zhing//rkyen min las byung yod min
pa//de phyir byed pa po yang med/
29. Because the action does not emerge from conditions and does not emerge from
non-conditions, therefore, the agent too does not exist.
30. /gal te las dang byed med na//las skyes bras bu ga la yod//ci ste bras bu yod min na//za ba
po lta ga la yod/
30. If neither the action nor the agent exists, where can there be a fruit of the action?
If the fruit does not exist, where can the consumer exist?
31. /ci ltar ston pas sprul ba ni//rdzu phrul phun tshogs kyis sprul zhing//sprul pa de yang
sprul pa na//slar yang gzhan ni sprul pa ltar/
31. Just as a teacher creates a creation by a wealth of magical powers, and just as if
that creation too created, again another would be created,
32. /de bzhin byed po das las gang//byas paang sprul pai rnam pa bzhin//dper na sprul pas
sprul gzhan zhig//sprul pa mdzad pa de bzhin no/
32. Like this, whatever action too done by that agent [is ]also like the aspect of a
creation. It is just like, for example, a creation creating another creation.
33. /nyon mongs las dang lus rnams dang//byed pa po dang bras bu dag//dri zai grong khyer
lta bu dang//smig rgyu rmi lam dra ba yin/
33. Afflictions, actions and bodies and agents and fruits are like a city of gandharvas,
a mirage, a dream.
las brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu bdun pa'o // //
(Self)
1. /gal te phung po bdag yin na//skye dang jig pa can du gyur//gal te phung po rnams las
gzhan//phung poi mtshan nyid med par gyur/
1. If the aggregates were self, it would be possessed of arising and decaying. If it
were other than the aggregates, it would not have the characteristics of the
aggregates.
2. /bdag nyid yod pa ma yin na//bdag gi yod pa ga la gyur//bdag dang bdag gi zhi bai
phyir//ngar dzin nga yir dzin med gyur/
2. If the self did not exist, where could what is mine exist? In order to pacify self and
what is mine, grasping I and grasping mine can exist no more.
3. /ngar dzin nga yir dzin med gang//de yang yod pa ma yin te//ngar dzin nga yir dzin med
par//gang gis mthong bas mi mthong ngo/
3. The one who does not grasp at me and mine likewise does not exist.
Whoever sees the one who does not grasp at me and mine does not see.
[c-d are omitted on the grounds of their being a reiteration of a-b]
4. /nang dang phyi rol nyid dag la//bdag dang bdag gi snyam zad na//nye bar len pa gag gyur
zhing//de zad pas na skye ba zad/
4. When one ceases thinking of inner and outer things as self and mine, clinging will
come to a stop. Through that ceasing, birth will cease.
5. /las dang nyon mongs zad pas thar//las dang nyon mongs rnam rtog las//de dag spros las
spros pa ni//stong pa nyid kyis gag par gyur/
5. Through the ceasing of action and affliction, there is freedom. Action and affliction
[come] from thoughts and they from fixations. Fixations are stopped by emptiness.
6. /bdag go zhes kyang btags gyur cing//bdag med ces kyang bstan par gyur//sangs rgyas rnams
kyis bdag dang ni//bdag med ga med ces kyang bstan/
6. It is said that there is a self, but non-self too is taught. The buddhas also teach
there is nothing which is neither self nor non-self.
[Tsongkhapa (325) cites the Kasyapaparvrtti as a source here]
7. /brjod par bya ba ldog pa ste//sems kyi spyod yul ldog pas so//ma skyes pa dang ma gags
pa//chos nyid mya ngan das dang mtshungs/
7. That to which language refers is denied, because an object experienced by the
mind is denied. The unborn and unceasing nature of reality is comparable to nirvana.
[Tsongkhapa (326) explains that c-d are an answer to the question implied in 5c-d, i.e.
how does emptiness stop fixations?]
8. /thams cad yang dag yang dag min//yang dag yang dag ma yin nyid//yang dag min min yang
dag min//de ni sangs rgyas rjes bstan pao/
8. Everything is real, not real; both real and not real; neither not real nor real: this is
the teaching of the Buddha.
9. /gzhan las shes min zhi ba dang//spros pa rnams kyis ma spros pa//rnam rtog med don tha dad
min//de ni de nyid mtshan nyid do/
9. Not known through others, peaceful, not fixed by fixations,
without conceptual thought, without differentiation: these are the characteristics of
suchness.
10. /gang la brtan te gang byung ba//de ni re zhig de nyid min//de las gzhan paang ma yin
phyir//de phyir chad min rtag ma yin/
10. Whatever arises dependent on something else is at that time neither that very
thing nor other than it. Hence it is neither severed nor permanent.
11. /sangs rgyas jig rten mgon rnams kyi//bstan pa bdud rtsir gyur pa de//don gcig ma yin tha
dad min//chad pa ma yin rtag ma yin/
[Buddhapalita commentary gives: /don gcig min don tha dad min//chad pa ma yin rtag min
pa//de ni sangs rgyas jig rten gyi//mgon poi bstan pa bdud rtsi yin/]
11. That ambrosial teaching of the buddhas, those guardians of the world, is neither
the same nor different, neither severed nor permanent.
[Buddhapalita commentary: Not the same, not different, not severed, not permanent that is the ambrosial teaching of the buddha, the guardian of the world.]
12. /rdzogs sangs rgyas rnams ma byung zhing//nyan thos rnams kyang zad pa na//rang sangs
rgyas kyi ye shes ni//sten* pa med las rab tu skye/
[*Lha: rten. Buddhapalita: brten pa med. Ts. sten. Skt: asamsargat.]
12. When perfect buddhas do not appear, and when their disciples have died out, the
wisdom of the self-awakened ones will vividly arise without reliance.
bdag dang chos brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bco brgyad pa'o // //
6. If time depended on things, where would time which is a non-thing exist? If there
were no things at all, where would a view of time exist?
dus brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa bcu dgu pa'o // //
7. /gal te tshogs dang lhan cig tu//bras bu yang ni skye gyur na//skyed par byed dang bskyed
bya gang//dus gcig par ni thal bar gyur/
7. If the fruit were also born at the same time as the combination, it would follow that
the producer and the produced would be simultaneous.
8. /gal te tshogs pai snga rol du//bras bu skyes par gyur na ni//rgyu dang rkyen rnams med pa
yi//bras bu rgyu med byung bar gyur/
8. If the fruit were born prior to the combination, there would occur an uncaused
fruit which has no cause and conditions.
9. /gal te rgyu gags bras bu na//rgyu ni kun tu pho bar gyur//sngon skyes pa yi rgyu yang
ni//yang skye bar ni thal bar gyur/
9. If [when] a cause stops, it is forever transferred to the fruit, then it would follow
that the cause which was born before would be born again.
10. /gags pa nub par gyur pa yis//bras bu skyes pa ji ltar skyed//bras bu dang ni brel bai
rgyu//gnas pas kyang ni ji ltar skyed/
10. How can the production of fruit be produced by the stopping and disappearing
[of something]? Also how can fruit be produced by related causes which persist with
it?
11. /ci ste rgyu bras ma brel na//bras bu gang zhig skyed par byed//rgyus ni mthong dang ma
mthong bar//bras bu skyed par mi byed do/
11. If cause and fruit are not related, what fruit can be produced? Causes do not
produce fruits they either see or dont see.
12. /bras bu das pa rgyu das dang//ma skyes pa dang skyes pa dang//lhan cig phrad par gyur
pa ni//nam yang yod pa ma yin no/
12. The simultaneous connection of a past fruit with a past, a future and a present
cause never exists.
13. /bras bu skyes pa rgyu ma skyes//das pa dang ni skyes pa dang//lhan cig phrad par gyur pa
ni//nam yang yod pa ma yin no/
13. The simultaneous connection of a present fruit with a future, a past and a present
cause never exists.
14. /bras bu ma skyes rgyu skyes dang//ma skyes pa dang das pa dang//lhan cig phrad par
gyur ba ni//nam yang yod pa ma yin no/
14. The simultaneous connection of a future fruit with a present, a future and a past
cause never exists.
15. /phrad pa yod pa ma yin na//rgyus ni bras bu ji ltar skyed//phrad pa yod pa yin na
yang//rgyus ni bras bu ji ltar skyed/
15. When there is no connection, how can a cause produce fruit? Even when there is
connection, how can a cause produce fruit?
16. /gal te bras bus stong pai rgyus//ji ltar bras bu skyed par byed//gal te bras bus mi stong
rgyus//ji ltar bras bu skyed par byed/
16. If a cause is empty of fruit, how can it produce fruit? If a cause is not empty of
fruit, how can it produce fruit?
[Ts. 353 appears to read stong in this context as simply absent. This verse and 17-18
indicate Ns fluid, non-dogmatic use of the term empty.]
17. /bras bu mi stong skye mi gyur//mi stong gag par mi gyur ro//mi stong de ni ma gags
dang//ma skyes par yang gyur ba yin/
17. Unempty fruit would not be produced; the unempty would not stop. That
unempty is unstoppable and also unproducable.
18. /stong pa ji ltar skye gyur zhing//stong pa ji ltar gag par gyur//stong pa de yang ma gags
dang//ma skyes par yang thal bar gyur/
18. How would empty [fruit] be produced? And how would the empty stop? It
follows that that empty too is unstoppable and also unproducable.
[ Ts. 354 gets round this by saying: How would fruit which is empty of inherent
existence be intrinsically produced? And how would it stop by its own nature? This
adds something that is not there in Nagarjuna in order to conform to Tss insistence that
stong pa ALWAYS means rang bzhin gyis stong pa.]
19. /rgyu dang bras bu gcig nyid du//nam yang thad par mi gyur ro//rgyu dang bras bu
gzhan nyid du//nam yang thad par mi gyur ro/
19. It is never possible that cause and fruit are identical. It is never possible that
cause and fruit are other.
20. /rgyu dang bras bu gcig nyid na//bskyed bya skyed byed gcig tu gyur//rgyu dang bras bu
gzhan nyid na//rgyu dang rgyu min mtshungs par gyur/
20. If cause and fruit were identical, produce and producer would be identical. If
cause and fruit were other, cause and non-cause would be similar.
21. /bras bu ngo bo nyid yod na//rgyus ni ci zhig skyed par byed//bras bu ngo bo nyid med
na//rgyus ni ci zhig skyed par byed/
21. If fruit existed essentially, what would a cause produce? If fruit did not exist
essentially, what would a cause produce?
[Ts. 354-5 has the same difficulty as in 16-18 with l. c-d. He explains that a noninherently existing fruit would not be produced by a cause in the sense that noninherently existence things are also non-inherently existent. This is another example of
Ts. forcing Nagarjuna into his interpretative scheme. It also shows Ts. as somewhat
incurable. G. 266 also fudges this difficulty: from the ultimate standpoint it does not
arise.]
22. /skyed par byed pa ma yin na//rgyu nyid thad par mi gyur ro//rgyu nyid thad pa yod min
na//bras bu gang gi yin par gyur/
22. If it were not productive, the cause itself would be impossible. If the cause itself
were impossible, whose would the fruit be?
23. /rgyu rnams dang ni rkyen dag gi//tshogs pa gang yin de yis ni//bdag gis bdag nyid mi skyed
na//bras bu ji ltar skyed par byed/
23. If whatever is a combination of causes and conditions does not produce itself by
itself, how could it produce fruit?
24. /de phyir tshogs pas byas pa med//tshogs min byas pai bras bu med//bras bu yod pa ma yin
na//rkyen gyi tshogs pa ga la yod/
24. Therefore, there is no fruit which has been made by combination [or] made by
non-combination. If fruit does not exist, where can a combination of conditions exist?
tshogs pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu pao////
[The Sanskrit terms sambhava (byung ba/rising) and vibhava (jig pa/passing) are related to
bhava (dgnos po/thing); also cf. svabhava and parabhava. So appearance and
disappearance would capture the play on the two words. Not also that in verses 15-16
the Tib. byung/jig does not translate sambhava/vibhava, but udaya/vyaya]
2. /jig pa byung ba med par ni/ /ji lta bur na yod par gyur/ /skye ba med par chi bar gyur/
/jig pa byung ba med par med //
2. How can passing exist without rising? Is there death without birth? There is no
passing without rising.
3. /jig pa byung dang lhan cig tu/ /ji ltar yod pa nyid du gyur/ /chi ba skye dang dus gcig tu/
/yod pa nyid ni ma yin no //
3. How could passing exist together with rising? Death does not exist at the same
time as birth.
4. /byung ba jig pa med par ni/ /ji lta bur na yod par gyur*/ /dngos po rnams la mi rtag nyid/
/nam yang med pa ma yin no //
[Lha. *ji ltar yod pa nyid du gyur]
4. How could rising exist without passing? Things are never not impermanent.
5. /byung ba jig dang lhan cig tu/ /ji ltar yod pa nyid du gyur/ /skye ba chi dang dus gcig tu/
/yod pa nyid ni ma yin no //
5. How could rising exist together with passing? Birth does not exist at the same time
as death.
6. /gang dag phan tshun lhan cig gam/ /phan tshun lhan cig ma yin par/ /grub pa yod pa ma yin
pa/ /de dag grub pa ji ltar yod //
6. How can those that are not established either mutually together or not mutually
together be established?
7. /zad la byung ba yod ma yin/ /ma zad pa laang byung ba med/ /zad la jig pa yod ma yin/
/ma zad pa laang jig pa med //
7. The finished does not rise; the unfinished too does not rise; the finished does not
pass; the unfinished too does not pass.
8. /dngos po yod pa ma yin par/ /byung dang jig pa yod ma yin/ /byung dang jig pa med par
ni/ /dngos po yod pa ma yin no //
8. Rising and passing do not exist without the existence of things. Things do not exist
without the existence of rising and passing.
9. /stong la* byung dang jig pa dag/ /thad pa nyid ni ma yin no/ /mi stong pa laang byung
jig dag/ /thad pa nyid ni ma yin no //
9. Rising and passing are not possible for the empty; rising, passing are not possible
for the non-empty also.
10. /byung ba dang ni jig pa dag/ /gcig pa nyid du* mi thad do/ /byung ba dang ni jig pa dag/
/gzhan nyid du yang** mi thad do //
[Lha. *ni. **gzhan pa nyid duang]
10. Rising and passing cannot possibly be one; rising and passing also cannot
possibly be other.
11. /byung ba dang ni jig pa dag/ /mthong ngo snyam du khyod sems na/ /byung ba dang ni
jig pa dag/ /gti mug nyid kyis mthong ba yin //
11. If you think that you can see rising and passing, rising and passing are seen by
delusion.
12. /dngos po dngos las mi skye ste/ /dngos po dngos med las mi skye/ /dngos med dngos med mi
skye ste/ /dngos med dngos las mi skyeo //
12. Things are not created from things; things are not created from nothing; nothing
is not created from nothing; nothing is not created from things.
13. /dngos po bdag las mi skye ste/ /gzhan las skye ba nyid ma yin/ /bdag dang gzhan las skye ba
ni/ /yod min* ji ltar skye bar gyur //
[Lha. *na]
13. Things are not created from themselves, nor are they created from something else;
they are not created from [both] themselves and something else. How are they
created?
14. /dngos po yod par khas blangs na/ /rtag dang chad par lta bar ni/ /thal bar gyur te dngos de
ni/ /rtag dang mi rtag gyur phyir ro //
14. If you assert the existence of things, the views of eternalism and annihilationism
will follow, because things are permanent and impermanent.
15. /dngos po yod par khas blangs kyang/ /chad par mi gyur rtag mi gyur/ /bras bu rgyu yi
byung jig gi/ /rgyun de srid pa yin phyir ro //
15. If you assert the existence of things, eternalism and annihilationism will not be,
because the continuity of the rising and passing of cause -effect is becoming.
16. /bras bu rgyu yi* byung jig gi/ /rgyun de srid pa yin gyur na/ /jig la yang skye med pai
phyir/ /rgyu ni chad par thal bar gyur //
[Lha. *gal te bras rgyui]
16. If the continuity of the rising and passing of cause-effect is becoming, because
what has passed will not be created again, it will follow that the cause is annihilated.
17. /dngos po ngo bo nyid yod na/ /dngos med gyur bar mi rigs so/ /mya ngan das pai dus na
chad/ /srid rgyun rab tu zhi phyir ro //
17. If things exist essentially, it would be unreasonable [for them] to become nothing.
At the time of nirvana [they] would be annihilated, because the continuity of
becoming is totally pacified.
18. /tha ma gags par gyur pa na/ /srid pa dang po rigs mi gyur/ /tha ma gags par ma gyur
tshe/ /srid pa dang po rigs mi gyur //
18. If the end stops, it is unreasonable for there to be a beginning of becoming. When
the end does not stop, it is unreasonable for there to be a beginning of becoming.
19. /gal te tha ma gag bzhin na/ /dang po skye bar gyur na ni/ /gag bzhin pa ni gcig gyur
zhing/ /skye bzhin pa yang gzhan du gyur //
19. If the beginning is created while the end is stopping, the stopping would be one
and the creating would be another.
20. /gal te gag bzhin skye bzhin dag/ /lhan cig tu yang rigs min na/ /phung po gang la chi
gyur ba/ /de la skye ba* byung gyur ram //
[Lha. *baang]
20. If it is also unreasonable for stopping and creating to be together, arent the
aggregates that die also those that are created?
21. /de ltar dus gsum dag tu yang/ /srid pai rgyun ni mi rigs na/ /dus gsum dag tu gang med
pa/ /de ni ji ltar srid pai rgyun //
21. Likewise, if the continuity of becoming is not reasonable at any of the three times,
how can there be a continuity of becoming which isnon-existent in the three times?
byung ba dang jig pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu gcig pao // //
2. If the buddha depends on the aggregates, he does not exist from an own-nature.
How can that which does not exist from an own-nature exist from an other-nature?
3. /gang zhig gzhan gyi dngos brten nas/ /de bdag nyid du mi 'thad do/ /gang zhig bdag nyid
med pa de/ /ji ltar de bzhin gshegs par 'gyur /
3. It is not tenable for something dependent on other-nature to be self-existent. How
can that which has no self-existence be tathagata?
4. /gal te rang bzhin yod min na/ /gzhan dngos yod par ji ltar 'gyur/ /rang bzhin dang ni gzhan
dngos dag/ /ma gtogs de bzhin gshegs de gang /
[l. a-b cf. 2.c-d: /rang bzhin las ni gang med pa/ /de gzhan dngos las ga la yod]
4. If self-nature does not exist, how can there be the existence of other-nature? What
is a Tathagata apart from own-nature and other-nature?
5. /gal te phung po ma brten par/ /de bzhin gshegs pa 'ga' yod na/ /de ni da gdong* rten** 'gyur
zhing/ /brten nas de nas 'gyur la rag /
[Lha. *gdod **brten Ts. *gzod **brten]
5. If there exists a tathagata [who is] not depending on the aggregates, he exists in
depending [on them] now and will henceforth depend.
6. /phung po rnams la ma brten par/ /de bzhin gshegs pa 'ga' yang med/ /gang zhig ma brten
yod min na/ /des ni ji ltar nyer len 'gyur /
6. If there does not exist a tathagata [who is]not depending on the aggregates, how
does he grasp [depend on? them]?
[v. 5 & 6 mirror each other grammatically - (cf. Skt.) l.c of v. 6 is effectively redundant; it
serves as metric padding for the conditional na]
7. /nye bar blangs pa ma yin pa*/ /nye bar len par** cis mi 'gyur/ /nye bar len pa med pa yi/ /de
bzhin gshegs pa ci yang med /
[Ts. *pas; Lha. **pa]
9. That which is grasped/depended on does not exist from its own nature. It is
impossible for that which does not exist from its own nature to exist from another
nature.
10. /de ltar nyer blang nyer len po/ /rnam pa kun gyis stong pa yin/ /stong pas de bzhin gshegs
stong pa/ /ji lta bur na 'dogs par 'gyur /
[cf. v. 8; dogs = prajnapyate]
10. In that way, what is grasped/depended on and what grasps/depends are empty in
every aspect. How can an empty tathagata be [conventionally] understood by what is
empty?
11. /stong ngo zhes kyang mi brjod de/ /mi stong zhes kyang mi bya zhing/ /gnyis dang gnyis
min mi bya ste/ /gdags pa'i don du brjod par bya/
11. Do not say empty, or not empty, or both, or neither: these are mentioned
for the sake of [conventional] understanding.
12. /rtag dang mi rtag la sogs bzhi/ /zhi ba 'di la ga la yod/ /mtha' dang mtha' med la sogs bzhi/
/zhi ba 'di la ga la yod /
12. Where can the four such as permanence and impermanence exist in this peaceful
one? Where can the four such as end and no-end [of the world] exist in this peaceful
one?
13. /gang gis de bzhin gshegs yod ces/ /'dzin pa stug po* bzung gyur pa/ /de ni mya ngan 'das
pa la/ /med ces rnam rtog rtog par byed /
[Lha. *pos Ts. *po]
13. Those who hold the dense apprehension, the tathagata exists conceive the
thought, he does not exist in nirvana.
[Ts. 378-9 says that while this version is found in Chandrakirtis Prasannapada, he
prefers the version quoted by Buddhapalita: /gang gis dzin stug bzung gyur pa//de ni mya
ngan das pa la//de bzhin gshegs pa yod ceam//med ces rnam tog rtog par byed/. Those who
hold dense apprehensions conceive thoughts of the tathagatas existence or nonexistence in nirvana.]
14. /rang bzhin gyis ni stong de la/ /sangs rgyas mya ngan 'das nas ni/ /yod do zhe'am med do
zhes/ /bsam pa* 'thad pa nyid mi 'gyur /
[Lha. *paang]
14. For that one empty of own-nature, it is entirely inappropriate to think that once
the buddha has nirvana-ed he either exists or does not exist.
15. /gang dag sangs rgyas spros 'das shing/ /zad pa med la spros byed pa/ /spros pas nyams pa
de kun gyis/ /de bzhin gshegs pa mthong mi 'gyur /
[K. 310. zad pa med pa = avyaya = non-variable/steadfast]
15. Those who make fixations about Buddha who is beyond fixations and without
deterioration -- all those who are damaged by fixations do not see the tathagata.
16. /de bzhin gshegs pa'i rang bzhin gang/ /de ni 'gro 'di'i rang bzhin yin/ /de bzhin gshegs pa
rang bzhin med/ /'gro ba 'di yi rang bzhin med /
16. Whatever is the own-nature of the tathagata, that is the own-nature of this world.
The tathagata has no own-nature. This world has no own-nature.
de bzhin gshegs pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu gnyis pa'o // //
4. These afflictions are someones. But that [someone] is not established. Without
[someone], the afflictions are not anyones.
5. /rang lus lta bzhin nyon mongs rnams //nyon mongs can la rnam lngar med //rang lus lta
bzhin nyon mongs can //nyon mongs pa la rnam lngar med /
5. Like [the self apprehended in] the view of ones own body, the afflictions do not
exist in five ways in the afflicted. Like [the self apprehended in] the view of ones
own body, the afflicted does not exist in five ways in the afflictions.
6. /sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci log //rang bzhin las ni yod min na //sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci
log //brten nas nyon mongs gang dag yin /
6. If confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant does not exist from its own nature,
what afflictions can depend on confusion about the pleasant and unpleasant?
7. /gzugs sgra ro dang reg pa dang //dri dang chos dag rnam drug ni //gzhi ste 'dod chags zhe
sdang dang //gti mug gi ni yin par brtags /
7. Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these six are
conceived as the basis of desire, hatred and stupidity.
8. /gzugs sgra ro dang reg pa dang, //dri dang chos dag 'ba' zhig ste //dri za'i grong khyer lta bu
dang //smig rgyu rmi lam 'dra ba yin /
8. Colour/shape, sound, taste, tactile sensation, smell and dharmas: these are like
gandharva-cities and similar to mirages, dreams.
9. /sgyu ma'i skyes bu lta bu dang //gzugs brnyan 'dra ba de dag la //sdug pa dang ni mi sdug
pa //'byung bar yang ni ga la 'gyur /
9. How can the pleasant and unpleasant occur in those [things] which are like
phantoms and similar to reflections?
[K. 317 takes this to mean how can pleasure or displeasure arise in people who are like
illusions etc. This makes little sense in context, and the word people is not in the
original. G. hedges his bets and opts for ambiguity. Ts. 387 explains this as a question
about how the marks (mtshan ma) of pleasure and displeasure can occur in the six
sense objects. So: how can the features of likeability and unlikeability occur in the
objects themselves?]
10. /gang la brten nas sdug pa zhes //gdags par bya ba mi sdug pa //sdug la mi ltos yod min pas
//de phyir sdug pa 'thad ma yin /
10. Something is called pleasant in dependence on the unpleasant. Since that
would not exist without relation to the pleasant, therefore, the pleasant is not
tenable.
11. /gang la brten nas mi sdug par //gdags par bya ba sdug pa ni //mi sdug mi ltos yod min pas
//de phyir mi sdug 'thad ma yin /
18. /phyin ci log tu gyur bzhin la //phyin ci log dag mi srid de //gang la phyin ci log srid pa
//bdag nyid kyis ni rnam par dpyod /
18. confusions do not occur for those who are being confused. For whom do
confusions occur? Examine this by yourself!
19. /phyin ci log rnams ma skyes na //ji lta bur na yod par 'gyur //phyin ci log rnams skye med
na //phyin ci log can ga la yod /
19. If confusions are not born, how can they exist? If confusions are not born, where
can there be someone who has confusion?
20. /dngos po bdag las mi skye ste //gzhan las skye ba nyid ma yin //bdag dang gzhan las kyang
min na //phyin ci log can ga la yod /
20. Things are not born from themselves, not born from others. If they are also not
from self and others, where can there be someone who has confusion?
[K. points out that this verse is missing in Kumarajivas translation (I. also says its
missing from the Tibetan version) and is almost identical with XXI: 13. It seems
redundant here.]
21. /gal te bdag dang gtsang ba dang //rtag dang bde ba yod na ni //bdag dang gtsang dang rtag
pa dang //bde ba phyin ci log ma yin /
21. If self and purity and permanence and happiness were existent, self and purity
and permanence and happiness would not be confusions.
22. /gal te bdag dang gtsang ba dang //rtag dang bde ba med na ni //bdag med mi gtsang mi rtag
dang //sdug bsngal yod pa ma yin no /
22. If self and purity and permanence and happiness were non-existent, selflessness,
impurity, impermanence and anguish would not exist.
23. /de ltar phyin ci log 'gags pas //ma rig pa ni 'gag par 'gyur //ma rig 'gags par gyur na ni
//'du byed la sogs 'gag par 'gyur /
23. Thus by stopping confusion, ignorance will stop. If ignorance is stopped,
impulsive acts etc. will stop.
24. /gal te la la'i nyon mongs pa //gang dag rang bzhin gyis yod na //ji lta bur na spong bar
'gyur //yod pa su zhig spong bar byed /
24. If the afflictions of some existed by their own nature, how could they be let go of?
Who can let go of what exists by nature?
[Skt. gives svabhavam for yod pa in l.d]
25. /gal te la la'i nyon mongs pa //gang dag rang bzhin gyis med na //ji lta bur na spong bar
'gyur //med pa su zhig spong bar byed /
24. If the afflictions of some did not exist by their own nature, how could they be let
go of? Who can let go of what does not exist?
phyin ci log brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu gsum pa'o // //
2. /phags pai bden pa bzhi med pas//yongs su shes dang spang ba dang//bsgom dang mngon du
bya ba dang//thad par gyur ba ma yin no/
2. Since the four ennobling truths would not exist, understanding, letting go,
cultivating and realizing would no longer be valid.
3. /de dag yod pa ma yin pas//bras bu bzhi yang yod ma yin//bras bu med na bras gnas
med//zhugs pa dag kyang yod ma yin/
3. Since they would not exist, the four fruits would also not exist. If the fruits did
not exist, there could be no abiding in the fruits. Experiencing them would also not
exist.
4. /gal te skyes bu gang zag brgyad//de dag med na dge dun med//phags pai bden rnams med
pai phyir//dam pai chos kyang yod ma yin/
4. If those eight beings did not exist, the Community would not exist. Since there
would be no ennobling truths, the sublime Dharma could also not exist.
5. /chos dang dge dun yod min na//sangs rgyas ji ltar yod par gyur//de skad stong pa nyid smra
na//dkon mchog gsum la gnod pa ni/
5. If the Community and the Dharma did not exist, how could Buddha exist? When
you talk of emptiness, the three Jewels are maligned.
6. /byed cing bras bu yod pa dang//chos ma yin dang chos yin dang//jig rten pa yi tha snyad
ni//kun laang gnod pa byed pa yin/
6. The existence of actions and fruits, what is not Dharma and what is Dharma, the
conventions of the world: all these too are maligned.
7. /de la bshad pa khyod kyis ni//stong nyid dgos dang stong nyid dang//stong nyid don ni ma
rtogs pas//de phyir de ltar gnod pa yin/
7. An explanation for that: since you do not understand the need for emptiness,
emptiness, and the point of emptiness, therefore in that way you malign.
8. /sangs rgyas rnams kyis chos bstan pa//bden pa gnyis la yang dag rten//jig rten kun rdzob
bden pa dang//dam pai don gyi bden pao/
8. The Dharma taught by Buddhas perfectly relies on two truths: the ambiguous
truths of the world and the truths of the sublime meaning.
9. /gang dag bden pa de gnyis kyi//rnam dbye rnam par mi shes pa//de dag sangs rgyas bstan pa
ni//zab moi de nyid rnam mi shes/
9. Those who do not understand the division into two truths, cannot understand the
profound reality of the Buddhas teaching.
10. /tha snyad la ni ma brten par//dam pai don ni bstan mi nus//dam pai don ni ma rtogs
par//mya ngan das pa thob mi gyur/
10. Without relying on conventions, the sublime meaning cannot be taught. Without
understanding the sublime meaning, one will not attain nirvana.
11. /stong pa nyid la blta nyes na//shes rab chung rnams phung par byed//ci ltar sbrul la bzung
nyes dang//rigs sngags nyes par bsgrub pa bzhin/
11. If their view of emptiness is wrong, those of little intelligence will be hurt. Like
handling a snake in the wrong way, or casting a spell in the wrong way.
12. /de phyir zhan pas chos di yi//gting rtogs dka bar mkhyen gyur nas//thub pai thugs ni chos
bstan las//rab tu log par gyur pa yin/
12. Therefore, knowing how difficult it is for the weak to understand the depths of
this Dharma, the heart of the Muni strongly turned away from teaching the Dharma.
13. /skyon du thal bar gyur ba ni//stong la thad pa ma yin pas//khyod ni stong nyid spong byed
pa//gang de nga la mi thad do//
13. Since [those] erroneous consequences do not apply to emptiness, whatever
rejections you make of emptiness do not apply to me.
14. /gang la stong pa nyid rung ba//de la thams cad rung bar gyur//gang la stong nyid mi rung
ba//de la thams cad mi rung gyur/
14. Those for whom emptiness is possible, for them everything is possible. Those for
whom emptiness is not possible, for them everything is not possible.
15. /khyod ni rang gi skyon rnams ni//nga la yongs su sgyur byed pa//rta la mngon par zhon
bzhin du//rta nyid brjed par gyur pa bzhin/
15. You are transferring your own mistakes onto me. This is like mounting a horse
but forgetting about the horse itself.
16. /gal te dgnos rnams rang bzhin las//yod par rjes su lta byed na//de lta yin na dngos po
rnams//rgyu rkyen med par khyod ltao/
16. If you view all things as existing from their own nature, then you would view all
things as not having causes and conditions.
17. /bras bu dang ni rgyu nyid dang//byed pa po dang byed dang bya//kye ba dang ni gag pa
dang//bras bu la yang gnod pa byed/
17. Cause and effect itself, agents, tools and acts, production and cessation, the effects
too would be undermined.
18. /rten cing brel par byung ba gang//de ni stong pa nyid du bshad//de ni brten nas gdags pa
ste//de nyid dbu mai lam yin no/
18. Whatever is contingently related, that is explained as emptiness. That is
contingently configured; it is the central path.
19. /gang phyir rten byung ma yin pai//chos gang yod pa ma yin pa/ de phyir stong pa ma yin
pai// chos gang yod pa ma yin no/
19. Because there are no things at all, which are not contingently emergent, therefore,
there are no things at all, which are not empty.
20. /gal te di kun mi stong na//byung ba med cing jig pa med//phags pai bden pa bzhi po
rnams//khyod la med par thal bar gyur/
20. If all were not empty, nothing could come about or perish. It would follow for
you that the four ennobling truths could not exist.
21. /rten cing byung ba ma yin na//sdug bsngal yod par ga la gyur//mi rtag sdug bsngal
gsungs pa de//rang bzhin nyid la yod ma yin/
21. If things were not contingently emergent, how could anguish exist? Impermanent
things are taught to be anguish; in their very own nature they do not exist.
22. /rang bzhin las ni yod min* na//ci zhig kun tu byung bar gyur//de phyir stong nyid gnod
byed la//kun byung yod pa ma yin no/ [* error?]
22. If it did exist from its own nature, why would it have an origin? Therefore, for
those who undermine emptiness, it can have no origin.
23. /sdug bsngal rang bzhin gyis yod la//gog pa yod pa ma yin no//rang bzhin nyid ni yongs
gnas phyir//gag laang gnod pa byed pa yin/
23. If anguish existed by its own nature, there could be no cessation. Because its own
nature would be totally present, cessation too would be undermined.
24. /lam la rang bzhin yod na ni//bsgom pa thad par mi gyur te//ci ste lam de bsgom byas
na//khyod kyi rang bzhin yod ma yin/
24. If the path existed by its own nature, cultivation would not be appropriate. If the
path is to be cultivated, your own nature cannot exist.
25. /gang tshe sdug bsngal kun byung dang//gog pa yod pa ma yin na//lam gyis sdug bsngal
gog pa ni//gang zhig thob par gyur bar dod/
25. When anguish, origins and cessation cannot exist, what ceasing of anguish could
one seek to attain by the path?
26. /gal te rang bzhin nyid kyis ni//yongs su shes pa ma yin na//de ni ci ltar yongs shes
gyur//rang bzhin gnas pa ma yin nam/
26. If non-understanding existed by its very own nature, how could one ever
understand? Doesnt it abides by nature?
27. /de bzhin du ni khyod nyid kyi//spang dang mngon du bya ba dang//bsgom dang bras bu
bzhi dag kyang//yongs shes bzhin du mi rung ngo/
27. In the same way, your letting go, realizing, cultivating and the four fruits too are
as impossible as understanding.
28. /rang bzhin yongs su dzin pa yi//bras bu rang bzhin nyid kyis ni//thob pa min pa gang yin
de//ci ltar thob pa nyid du gyur/
28. How can any fruits, which totally hold their own nature and by their own nature
are unattained, be attained?
29./bras bu med na bras gnas med//zhugs pa dag kyang yod ma yin//gal te skyes bu gang zag
brgyad//de dag med na dge dun med/
29. If the fruits did not exist, there could be no abiding in the fruits. Experiencing
them would also not exist. If those eight beings did not exist, the Community would
not exist.
30. /phags pai bden rnams med pai phyir//dam pai chos kyang yod ma yin//chos dang dge
dun yod min na//sangs rgyas ci ltar yod par gyur/
30. Since there would be no ennobling truths, the sublime Dharma could also not
exist. If the Community and the Dharma did not exist, how could Buddha exist?
31. /khyod kyi* sangs rgyas byang chub la//ma brten par yang thal bar gyur//khyod kyi byang
chub sangs rgyas la//ma brten par yang thal bar gyur
31. It would also follow that your Buddha does not depend on awakening. It would
also follow that your awakening does not depend on Buddha.
32. /khyod kyi rang bzhin nyid kyis ni//sangs rgyas min pa gang yin des//byang chub spyod la
byang chub phyir//bstsal yang byang chub thob mi gyur/
32. For you, someone who by his very nature is not Buddha could not attain
awakening however much he strove in the practice of awakening for the sake of
awakening.
33. /ga yang chos dang chos min pa//nam yang byed par mi gyur te//mi stong ba la ci zhig
bya//rang bzhin la ni bya ba med/
33. No one would ever do what is Dharma and what is not Dharma. What can that
which is not empty do? Inherent nature is inactive.
34. /chos dang chos min med par yang//bras bu khyod la yod par gyur//chos dang chos min
rgyus byung bai//bras bu khyod la yod ma yin/
34. Even without Dharma and not-Dharma, you would have the fruits. You would not
have the fruits which have arisen from the causes of Dharma and not-Dharma.
35. /chos dang chos min rgyus byung bai/bras bu gal te khyod la yod//chos dang chos min las
byung bai//bras bu ci phyir stong ma yin/
35. If you have the fruits which have arisen from the causes of Dharma and notDharma, why are the fruits which have arisen from the Dharma and not-Dharma not
empty?
36. /rten cing brel par byung ba yi//stong pa nyid la gnod byed gang//jig rten pa yi tha snyad
ni//kun laang gnod pa byed pa yin/
36. Whoever undermines emptiness which is contingent emergence also undermines
all the conventions of the world.
37. /stong pa nyid la gnod byed na//bya ba ci yang med gyur zhing/rtsom pa med pai bya bar
gyur//mi byed pa yang byed por gyur/
37. If one undermines emptiness, there would be no actions at all and actions without
an author and agents who do not act.
38. /rang bzhin yod na gro ba rnams//ma skyes pa dang ma gags dang//ther zug tu ni gnas
gyur zhing//gnas skabs sna tshogs bral bar gyur/
38. If there were inherent nature, all beings would be unborn and unceasing, would
be fixed in place forever, separated from the variety of situations.
39. /gal te stong pa yod min na//ma thob thob par bya ba dang//sdug bsngal mthar byed las
dang ni//nyon mongs thams cad spong baang med/
39. If [things] were not empty, there could be no attainment of what had not been
attained, no ending of anguish and no letting go of all actions and afflictions.
40. /gang gis rten cing brel par byung//mthong ba des ni sdug bsngal dang//kun byung dang
ni gog pa dang//lam nyid de dag mthong ba yin/
40. He who sees contingent emergence sees anguish and origins and cessation and
the path itself.
'phags pa'i bden pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu bzhi pa'o // //
(Nirvana)
1. /gal te 'di dag kun stong na //'byung ba med cing 'jig pa med//gang zhig spong dang 'gags pa
las//mya ngan 'da' bar 'gyur bar 'dod/
1. If everything were empty, there would be no arising and perishing. From the
letting go of and ceasing of what could one assert nirvana(-ing)?
2. /gal te 'di kun mi stong na //'byung ba med cing 'jig pa med//gang zhig spong dang 'gags pa
las//mya ngan 'da' bar 'gyur bar 'dod/
2. If everything were not empty, there would be no arising and perishing. From the
letting go of and ceasing of what could one assert nirvana(-ing)?
3. /spangs pa med pa thob med pa //chad pa med pa rtag med pa //'gag pa med pa skye med pa
//de ni mya ngan 'das par brjod/
3. No letting go, no attainment, no annihilation, no permanence, no cessation, no
birth: that is spoken of as nirvana.
4. /re zhig mya ngan 'das dngos min//rga shi'i mtshan nyid thal bar 'gyur//rga dang 'chi ba med
pa yi //dngos po yod pa ma yin no/
4. Nirvana is not a thing. Then it would follow that it would have the characteristics
of aging and death. There does not exist any thing that is without aging and death.
5. /gal te mya ngan 'das dngos na //mya ngan 'das pa 'dus byas 'gyur/ /dngos po 'dus byas ma
yin pa//'ga' yang gang na yod ma yin/
5. If nirvana were a thing, nirvana would be a conditioned phenomenon. There does
not exist any thing anywhere that is not a conditioned phenomenon.
6. /gal te mya ngan 'das dngos na //ji ltar myang 'das de brten min//dngos po brten nas ma yin
pa//'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no/
6. If nirvana were a thing, how would nirvana not be dependent? There does not
exists any thing at all that is not dependent.
7. /gal te mya ngan 'das dngos min//dngos med ji ltar rung bar 'gyur//gang la mya ngan 'das
dngos min//de la dngos med yod ma yin/
7. If nirvana were not a thing, how could it possibly be nothing? The one for whom
nirvana is not a thing, for him it is not nothing.
8. /gal te mya ngan 'das dngos min//ji ltar myang 'das de brten min//gang zhig brten nas ma
yin pa'i//dngos med yod pa ma yin no/
8. If nirvana were nothing, how could nirvana possibly be not dependent? There
does not exist any nothing which is not dependent.
9. /'ong ba dang ni 'gro ba'i dngos//brten tam rgyur byas gang yin pa//de ni brten min rgyur
byas min//mya ngan 'das pa yin par bstan/
9. Whatever things come and go are dependent or caused. Not being dependent and
not being caused is taught to be Nirvana.
10. /'byung ba dang ni 'jig pa dag //spang bar ston pas bka' stsal to//de phyir mya ngan 'das par
ni//dngos min dngos med min par rigs/
10. The teacher taught [it] to be the letting go of arising and perishing. Therefore, it is
correct that nirvana is not a thing or nothing.
11. /gal te mya ngan 'das pa ni//dngos dang dngos med gnyis yin na//dngos dang dngos po med
pa dag//thar par 'gyur na de mi rigs/
11. If nirvana were both a thing and nothing, it would follow that it would be a thing
and nothing. That is incorrect.
12. /gal te mya ngan 'das pa ni //dngos dang dngos med gnyis yin na//mya ngan 'das pa ma
brten min//de gnyis brten nas yin phyir ro/
12. If nirvana were both a thing and nothing, nirvana would not be not-dependent,
because it would depend on those two.
13. /ji ltar mya ngan 'das pa ni//dngos dang dngos med gnyis yin te//mya ngan 'das pa 'dus ma
byas//dngos dang dngos med 'dus byas yin/
13. How could nirvana be both a thing and nothing? Nirvana is unconditioned;
things and nothings are conditioned.
14. /ji ltar mya ngan 'das pa la//dngos dang dngos med gnyis yod de//de gnyis gcig la yod min
te//snang ba dang ni mun pa bzhin/
14. How could nirvana exist as both a thing and nothing? Those two do not exist as
one. They are like light and dark.
15. /dngos min dngos po med min pa//mya ngan 'das par gang ston pa//dngos po med dang
dngos po dag//grub na de ni grub* par 'gyur/
15. The presentation of neither a thing nor nothing as nirvana will be established
[only] if things and nothings are established.
16. /gal te mya ngan 'das pa ni//dngos min dngos po med min na//dngos min dngos po med min
zhes//gang zhig gis ni de mngon byed/
16. If nirvana is neither a thing nor nothing, by who could neither a thing nor
nothing be perceived?
17. /bcom ldan mya ngan 'das gyur nas//yod par mi mngon de bzhin du//med do zhe'am gnyis
ka dang//gnyis min zhes kyang mi mngon no/
17. After the Bhagavan has entered nirvana, one cannot perceive [him? it?] as
existing, likewise as not existing, nor can one percieve [him? it?] as both or
neither.
18. /bcom ldan bzhugs par gyur na yang//yod par mi mngon de bzhin du/
/med do zhe'am gnyis ka dang//gnyis min zhes kyang mi mngon no/
18. Even when the Bhagavan is alive, one cannot perceive [him? it?] as existing,
likewise as not existing, nor can one percieve [him? it?] as both or neither.
19. /'khor ba mya ngan 'das pa las //khyad par cung zad yod ma yin//mya ngan 'das pa 'khor ba
las //khyad par cung zad yod ma yin/
19. Samsara does not have the slightest distinction from Nirvana. Nirvana does not
have the slightest distinction from Samsara.
20. /mya ngan 'das mtha' gang yin pa//de ni 'khor ba'i mtha' yin te//de gnyis khyad par cung
zad ni //shin tu phra ba'ang yod ma yin/
20. Whatever is the end of Nirvana, that is the end of Samsara. There is not even a
very subtle slight distinction between the two.
21. /gang 'das phan chad mtha' sogs dang//rtag la sogs par lta ba dag//mya ngan 'das dang phyi
mtha' dang//sngon gyi mtha' la brten* pa yin/
21. Views about who passes beyond, ends etc. and permanence etc. are contingent
upon nirvana and later ends and former ends.
22. /dngos po thams cad stong pa la//mtha' yod ci zhig mtha' med ci//mtha' dang mtha' med ci
zhig yin//mtha'dang mtha' med min pa* ci/
22. In the emptiness of all things what ends are there? What non-ends are there?
What ends and non-ends are there? What of neither are there?
23. /de nyid ci zhig gzhan ci yin//rtag pa ci zhig mi rtag ci//rtag dang mi rtag gnyis ka ci//gnyis
ka min pa ci zhig yin/
23. Is there this? Is there the other? Is there permanence? Is there impermanence? Is
there both permanence and impermanence? Is there neither?
24. /dmigs pa thams cad nyer zhi zhing//spros pa nyer zhi zhi ba ste//
sangs rgyas kyis ni gang du yang/su la'ang chos 'ga* ma bstan to/
24. Totally pacifying all referents and totally pacifying fixations is peace. The
Buddha nowhere taught any dharma to anyone.
mya ngan las 'das pa brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu lnga pa'o // //
4. Just as [it] only arises in dependence on the eye, [visual] form and attention, so
consciousness arises in dependence on name and form.
[Tsongkhapa has a rather tortured way of explaining this; he compares the arising of
visual consciousness from the dominant, object and immediate conditions (i.e. eye,
visual form and attention) with its arising from name (= attention) and form ( = eye and
visual form). But since he equates nama with the latter four skandhas, he is forced to
imply that vijnana arises from vijnana, i.e. A is the cause of A. No doubt Tibetans would
explain this away by arguing that A is the cause of A+1 etc., but this is not convincing in
context. Tsongkhapa seems unaware that nowhere in the early canon does the Buddha
include vijnana in nama. Nagarjuna, however, does seem to follow this early tradition
here.]
5. /mig dang gzugs dang rnam par shes/ /gsum po dus pa gang yin pa / /de ni reg pao reg de
las/ /tshor ba kun tu byung bar gyur/
5. The gathering of the three: eye and [visual] form and consciousness, that is
impact. From impact feeling totally arises.
6. /tshor bai rkyen gyis sred pa ste/ /tshor bai don du sred par gyur/ /sred par gyur na* nye bar
len/ /rnam pa bzhi po nyer len gyur/
[Lha. *nas]
6. Due to the condition of feeling, there is craving; one craves for what is felt. When
one craves, one clings to the four aspects of clinging [sense objects, views, morals and
rules, and views of self].
7. /nyer len yod na len pa poi/ /srid pa rab tu* byung bar gyur/ /gal te nye bar len med na/
/grol bar gyur te srid mi gyur/
[Lha. *kun tu]
7. When there is clinging, the becoming of the clinger fully arises. When there is no
clinging, one is freed; there is no [more] becoming.
8. /srid pa de yang phung po lnga/ /srid pa las ni skye bar gyur*/ /rga shi dang ni mya ngan
dang/ /smre sngags don bcas sdug bsngal dang/
[Lha. *byungs]
8. Becoming is the five aggregates; from becoming one is born. Aging, death, torment,
lamentation, pain,
9. /yid mi bde dang khrug pa rnams/ /de dag skye las rab tu byung/ /de ltar sdug bsngal phung
po ni/ /ba zhig pa* di byung bar gyur/
[Lha. *po]
9. mental unhappiness, anxiety: these vividly emerge from birth. Likewise, the entire
mass of anguish emerges.
10. /khor bai rtsa ba du byed de/ /de phyir mkhas* rnams du mi byed/ /de phyir mi mkhas byed
po yin/ /mkhas min** de nyid mthong phyir ro/
[Lha. *khams **pas]
10. The root of life is formative impulses. Therefore, the wise do not form impulses.
Therefore, the unwise are formers, but not the wise since they see reality.
[mi mkhas = Skt. avidvan = the ignorant]
11. /ma rig gags par gyur na ni/ /du byed rnams* kyang** byung mi gyur/ /ma rig gag par
gyur ba ni/ /shes pas de nyid bsgoms pas so/
[Lha. *rnam **kun]
11. When ignorance stops, formative impulses too do not occur. The stopping of
ignorance [comes] through practising that with understanding.
12. /de dang de ni gags gyur pas/ /de dang de ni mngon mi byung/ /sdug bsngal phung po ba
zhig pa*/ /de ni de ltar yang dag gag**/
[Lha. *po **dgab (corrupt)]
12. By the stopping of the former, the latter will clearly not occur. The entire mass of
anguish will likewise completely stop.
// srid pai yan lag bcu gnyis brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu drug pao // //
4. If you think that that became me, then that-which-is-clung-to would be something
else. What is your self apart from that-which-is-clung-to?
5. /nye bar len pa ma gtogs pai//bdag yod ma yin byas pai tshe//nye bar len nyid bdag yin
na//khyod kyi bdag ni med pa yin/
5. Were you [to say] that there exists no self apart from that-which-is-clung-to, if the
very that-which-is-clung-to were the self, your self would be non-existent.
6. /nye bar len nyid bdag ma yin//de byung ba dang jig pa yin//nye bar blang ba ji lta bur//nye
bar len po yin par gyur/
6. The very that-which-is-clung-to is not the self: it arises and passes away. How can
that-which-has-been-clung-to be the one that clings?
7. /bdag ni nye bar len pa las//gzhan du thad pa nyid ma yin//gal te gzhan na len med
par//gzung yod rigs na gzung du med/
7. It is not correct for the self to be other than that-which-is-clung-to. If it were other,
with nothing to cling to, then something [i.e. the self] fit to be apprehended would
not be apprehended.
8. /de ltar len las gzhan ma yin//de ni nyer len nyid kyang min//bdag ni nye bar len med
min//med pa nyid duang de ma nges/
8. In that way, it is not other than that-which-is-clung-to nor is it that-which-is-clungto. The self is not not that-which-is-clung-to, nor can it be ascertained as nothing.
9. /das pai dus na ma byung zhes//bya ba de yang mi thad do//sngon tshe rnams su gang
byung ba//de las di gzhan ma yin no/
9. It is incorrect to say: I did not occur at a time in the past. Whatever occurred
before, this is not other than that.
10. /gal te di ni gzhan gyur na//de med par yang byung bar gyur//de bzhin de ni gnas gyur
zhing//der ma shi bar skye bar gyur/
10. If this were other, it would arise even without that. Likewise, that could remain
and be born without dying in that [former life].
11. /chad dang las rnams chud za dang//gzhan gyis byas pai las rnams ni//gzhan gyis so sor
myong ba dang//de la sogs par thal bar gyur/
11. Cut off and actions wasted, acts committed by others would be experienced by
someone else. Such would be the consequences.
12. /ma byung ba las byung min te//di la skyon du thal bar gyur//bdag ni byas par gyur ba
dang//byung baam* rgyu med can du gyur/
[Lha. *baang]
12. There is no occurence from what has not occured. In that case faults would follow:
the self would be something made or even though it occured it would be uncaused.
13. /de ltar bdag byung bdag ma byung//gnyis ka gnyis ka ma yin par//das la lta ba gang yin
pa*//de dag* thad pa ma yin no/
[Lha. *par **ni]
13. Therefore, the self occured, did not occur, both or neither: all those views of the
past are invalid.
14. /ma ongs dus gzhan byung gyur dang//byung bar mi gyur zhes bya bar//lta ba gang yin
de dag ni//das pai dus dang mtshungs pa yin/
14. I will occur at another time in the future, I will not occur: all those views are
similar to [those of] the past.
15. /gal te lha de mi de na//de lta na ni rtag par gyur//lha ni ma skyes nyid gyur te//rtag la skye
ba med phyir ro/
15. If the divine were human, then there would be something permanent. The divine
is utterly unborn, because there is no birth in permanence.
16. /gal te lha las mi gzhan na//de lta na ni mi rtag gyur//gal te lha mi gzhan yin na//rgyud ni
thad par mi gyur ro/
16. If the human were other than the divine, then there would be no permanence. If
the divine and the human were different, there could be no continuity [between
them].
17. /gal te phyogs gcig lha yin la//phyogs gcig mi ni yin gyur na//rtag dang mi rtag gyur ba
yin//de yang rigs pa ma yin no/
17. If one part were divine and one part were human, there would be both
permanence and no permanence. But that is not reasonable.
18. /gal te rtag dang mi rtag pa//gnyis ka grub par gyur* na ni//rtag pa ma yin mi rtag
min//grub par gyur bar dod la rag/
[Lha. *gyur]
18. If both permanence and impermanence were established, you would have to
assert non-permanence and non-impermance as established.
19. /gal te gang zhig gang nas gar//ong zhing gang duang gro gyur na//de phyir khor ba thog
med par//gyur na de ni yod ma yin/
19. If something came from somewhere and went somewhere, then samsara would be
without beginning. That is not the case.
20. /gal te rtag pa ga med na//mi rtag gang zhig yin par gyur//rtag pa dang ni mi rtag
dang//de gnyis bsal bar gyur pao/
20. If there were nothing permanent at all, what thing could be impermanent,
permanent and impermanent, free of both?
21. /gal te jig rten mtha yod na//jig rten pha rol ji ltar gyur//gal te jig rten mtha med na//jig
rten pha rol ji ltar gyur/
21. If this world had an end, how would the next world come to be? If this world had
no end, how would the next world come to be?
22. /gang phyir phung po rnams kyi rgyun//di ni mar mei od dang mtshungs//de phyir mtha
yod nyid dang ni//mtha med nyid kyang mi rigs so/
22. Because the continuity of the aggregates is similar to the light of a lamp, therefore
the very existence or non-existence of an end is unreasonable.
23. /gal te snga ma jig gyur zhing//phung po di la brten byas nas//phung po de ni mi byung
na//des na jig rten mtha yod gyur/
23. If the former perished and that [future] aggregate did not arise in dependence
upon this aggregate, then this world would have an end.
24. /gal te snga ma mi jig cing//phung po di la brten byas nas//phung po de ni mi byung
na//des na jig rten mtha med gyur/
24. If the former did not perish and that [future] aggregate did not arise in
dependence upon this aggregate, then this world would not have an end.
25. /gal te phyogs gcig mtha yod la*//phyogs gcig mtha ni med gyur na//jig rten mtha yod
mtha med gyur//de yang rigs pa ma yin no/
[Lha. *pa]
25. If one part had an end and one part did not have an end, the world would be with
and without an end. That too is unreasonable.
26. /ji lta bur na nyer len poi//phyogs gcig rnam par jig gyur la//phyogs gcig rnam par jig mi
gyur//de ltar de ni mi rigs so/
26. How can one part of the one-who-clings perish while one part does not perish?
Likewise, that is unreasonable.
27. /ji lta bur na nyer blang ba*//phyogs gcig rnam par jig gyur la//phyogs gcig rnam par jig
mi gyur//de ltar de yang mi rigs so/
[Lha. *bai]
27. How can one part of that-which-is-clung-to perish while one part does not perish?
Likewise, that is unreasonable.
28. /gal te mtha yod mtha med pa//gnyis ka grub par gyur na ni//mtha yod ma yin mtha med
min//grub par gyur bar dod la rag/
28. If both the presence and absence of an end were established, you would have to
assert non-presence and non-absence as established.
29. /yang na dngos po thams cad dag//stong phyir rtag la sogs lta ba//gang dag gang du gang la
ni//ci las kun tu byung bar gyur/
29. And because all things are empty, about what and in whom do views such as that
of permanence spring forth?
30. /gang gis thugs rtse nyer bzung nas//lta ba thams cad spang bai phyir//dam pai chos ni
ston mdzad pa//gou tam de la phyag tshal/
30. I bow down to Gautama, whose kindness holds one close, who revealed the
sublime dharma in order to let go of all views.
[Ts. recognizes that this verse can be treated as separate from the body of the chapter.
He also cites the Sa lu ljang pai mdo (Shalistamba Sutra), an early Mahayana sutra, as a
source for this chapter.]
lta ba brtag pa zhes bya ba ste rab tu byed pa nyi shu bdun pao////
[Colophon]
dbu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba theg pa chen po'i chos mngon pa rnam
par gzhag pa / don dam pa'i de kho na yang dag par ston pa / shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i
tshul gsal bar byed pa / slob dpon bdag nyid chen po 'phags pa klu sgrub mi 'phrogs pa'i mkhyen
rab dang thugs rjer ldan pa / de bzhin gshegs pa'i theg pa bla na med pa'i tshul gsal bar byed pa
/ rab tu dga' ba'i sa bsgrubs nas / bde ba can gyi zhing du gshegs pa / 'jig rten gyi khams dang
ba'i 'od ces bya bar / de bzhin gshegs pa ye shes 'byung gnas 'od ces bya bar 'gyur bas mdzad pa
rdzogs so // //
dbang phyug dam pa'i mnga' bdag rgyal po chen po dpal lha btsan po'i bka' lung gis /rgya gar
gyi mkhan po chen po dbu ma pa / dzny'a na garbha dang / zhu chen gyi lo tstsha ba dge slong
cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan gyis bsgyur cing zhus te gtan la phab pa / 'di la rab tu byed pa nyi shu
rtsa bdun / shloo ka bzhi brgya bzhi bcu rtsa dgu yod / bam po ni phyed dang gnyis su byas so /
slad kyis kha che'i grong khyer dpe med kyi dbus / gtsug lag khang rin chen sbas pa'i dbus su /
kha che'i mkhan po ha su ma ti dang / bod kyi sgra bsgyur gyi lo tstsha ba pa tshab nyi ma grags
kyis mi'i bdag po 'phags pa lha'i sku ring la 'grel pa tshig gsal ba dang bstun nas bcos pa'o // //
slad kyis ra sa 'phrul snang gi gtsug lag khang du / rgya gar gyi mkhan po ka na ka dang / lo
tstsha ba de nyid kyis zhu chen bgyis pa'o // //
The
Fundamental
Wisdom
ofthe
Middle
Way
Nagarjuna's
Mulamadhyamakakarika
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY BY
JAY L. GARFIELD
New York
Oxford
OXFORD' UNIVERSITY PRESS
1995
9
Printed in the United States of America
Preface
This is a translation of the Tibetan text of Mlamadhyamakakarika. It is perhaps an odd idea to translate a Tibetan translation of
a Sanskrit text and to retranslate a text of which there are four
extant English versions. My reasons for doing so are these: First, 1
am not satisfied with any of the other English versions. Every
translation, this one included, of any text embodies an interpretation, and my interpretation differs in various respects from those of
my predecessors in this endeavor. This is to be expected. As Tuck
(1990) has correctly observed, Nagarjuna, like any philosopher
from a distant cultural context, is always read against an interpretive backdrop provided by the philosophical presuppositions of the
interpreter, and by previous readings of Nagarjuna. So 1 claim no
special privileged position vis a vis Streng (1967), loada (1970),
Sprung (1979), or Kalupahana (1986)-only a different position,
one that 1 hope will prove useful in bringing Mlamadhyamakakarika into contemporary philosophical discourse. 1, like any
translator/interpreter must acknowledge that there is simply no
fact of the matter about the correct rendering of any important and
genuinely interesting text. Interpretations, and with them, translations, will continue to evolve as our understanding of the text
evolves and as our interpretive horizon changes. Matters are even
more comple?t and indeterminate when the translation crosses centuries, traditions and languages, and sets of philosophical assumptions that are quite distant from one another, as is the case in the
present project. So each of the available versions of the text embodies a reading. Inada reads Nagarjuna from the standpoint of
viii
Preface
tbe Zen tradition, and bis translation reftects tbat reading; Kalupabana reads Nagarjuna as a Tberavada cornrnentator on tbe
Kacciiyiinagotta-stra, and bis translation reftects tbat reading, as
well as bis view about tbe affinities between Jarnes's pragrnatisrn
and Theravada Buddbisrn. Sprung adopts Murti's Kantian interpretation of Madbyarnika, and bis translation reftects tbat interpretation. Streng reads tbe text as primarily concerned witb religious
pbenornenology. Tbere is no translation of tbis text into Englisb,
and no cornrnentary on it, tbat specifically reftects an lndo-Tibetan
Prasagika-Madbyarnika interpretation. lnasrnucb as tbis is rny
own preferred way toread Nagarjuna, and tbe reading dorninant
in Tibetan and bigbly inftuential in Japanese and Cbinese discussions. of Mlamadhyamakakiirikii, 1 believe tbat it is irnportant to
fill tbis lacuna in tbe Englisb bibliograpby.
Having argued tbat all translation involves sorne interpretation
and, bence, tbat tbere is always sorne distance between an original
text and a translation, bowever good and canonical tbat translation
rnay be, it follows tbat Mlamadhyamakakiirikii and dBu-ma rtsaba shes-rab differ, bowever close tbey rnay be and bowever canonically tbe latter is treated. Since dBu-ma rtsa-ba shes-rab is tbe text
read by and cornrnented on by generations of Tibetan pbilosopbers, 1 tbink tbat it is irnportant tbat an Englisb translation of tbis
very text be available to tbe Western pbilosopbical public. This
text is bence wortby in its own rigbt of translation inasrnucb as it is
tbe proper subject of tbe Tibetan pbilosopbical literature 1 and
otbers find so deep and fascinating.
Tbis is not a critical scbolarly edition of tbe text. lt is not pbilological in intent; nor is it a discussion of tbe cornrnentarial literature on Nagarjuna's text. Tbere is indeed a need for sucb a book,
but tbat need will bave to be filled by sorneone else. Tbis is ratber
rneant to be a presentation of a pbilosopbical text to pbilosopbers,
and not an edition of tbe text for Buddbologists. If pbilosopbers
and students wbo read rny book tbereby gain an entrance into
Nagarjuna's pbilosopby and see Mlamadhyamakakiirikii, as interpreted berein, as a text wortby of study and discussion, tbis work
will bave served its purpose. Since rny intended audience is not
Buddbologists, per se, but Western pbilosopbers wbo are interested in Buddbist pbilosopby, 1 bave tried to balance standard
Preface
ix
renderings of Buddhist terminology with more perspicuous contemporary philosophical language. 1 am not sure that 1 have always
made the right decisions or that 1 have found the middle path
between the extremes of Buddhological orthodoxy and Western
revisionism. But that is the aim.
1 am also striving for that elusive middle path between two other
extremes in translation: 1 am trying on the one hand to avoid the
unreadable literalism of translations that strive to provide a verbatim reprt of the wotds used the original, regardless of whether
that results in a comprehensible English text. But there is on the
other hand the extreme represented by a translation written in
lucid English prose purporting to be what the original author
would have written had he been a twentieth-century philosopher
writing in English, or one that, in an attempt to convey what the
text real/y means on sorne particular interpretation, is in fact nota
translation of the original text, but a completely new book, bearing
only a distant relation to the original. This hopelessly mixes the
tasks of translation on the one hand and critical commentary on
the other. Of course, as 1 have noted above, these tasks are intertwined. But there is the fault of allowing the translation to become
so mixed with the commentary that one no longer has a grip on, for
example, what is Niigiirjuna and what is Garfield. After all, although the text is interpreted in being translated, this text should
still come out in translation as a t,ext which could be interpreted in
the ways that others have read it. Because the original does indeed
justify competing interpretations. That is one of the things that
makes it such an important philosophical work.
Amherst, Mass.
November 1994
J. L. G.
Acknowledgments
xii
Acknowledgments
Acknow/edgments
xiii
and friendship. Mr. Phillipe Goldin has also offered many helpful
suggestions on the translation and commentary. 1 also thank the
Ven. Khamtrul Rinpoche, the Ven. Geshe Yeshe Topden (Gen
Drup-Thop) and Gen Lam-Rim-pa for their teachings and Acarya
Nyima Tshering for his introduction and translation on those occasions. Special thanks to Nyima Penthog for improving my Tibetan.
1 thank His Holiness the Dalai Lama for his encouragement and
for valuable discussion of sorne difficult interpretative issues.
1 am also very grateful to friends and colleagues at Drepung
Loseling Monastic College. My visit there was extremely enjoyable
and also philosophically fruitful. Thanks to the Ven. Geshe Dak-pa
Toepgyal and the Ven. Thupten Dorjee for arranging everything
and for talking with me about this and other work. 1 am very
grateful to the Ven. Geshe Namgyal Wangchen for detailed comments and encouragement on this work and for useful discussions
about Madhyamika, translation, the task of presenting Buddhist
philosophical texts to the West, and other topics.
My acknowledgtnent of help in India would not b6 complete
without acknowledging the gracious hospitality and assistance in
living of Sri N. N. Ra, Sri Arun Kumar Ra, Sri A. R. Singh, and
their families in Sarnath; the hospitality of Kunzom Topden
Martam and his family in Sikkim-it was the Martam house in
which the writing actually got started; and Dr. L. S. Suri of the
American lnstitute of Indian Studies in New Delhi, whose administrative efficiency kept everything moving smoothly.
1 am deeply grateful to four friends who read a complete draft of
this work and provided honest, searching, sometimes scathing criticism. What more could one sk from colleagues and friends? Many
of their suggestions are incorporated in the book .as it now stands,
and much of whatever is good in it is dueto their enormous contributions. Sometimes 1 have disagreed with each of them. And whatever
errors remain are certainly m y own. So thanks especially tq the Ven.
Gareth Sparham, the Ven. Sherab Gyatso, Guy Newland, and Jane
Braaten for copious corrections and criticism and for extensive productive discussion. Thanks also to Prof. Alan Sponberg for useful
comments on an earlier draft and to Janet Gyatso, Graham Parkes,
and Georges Dreyfus for reading and commenting on the penultimate draft.
xiv
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
XV
Contents
Part One
The Text of MlamadhyamakakiJrik
Dedicatory Verses, 2
I Examination of Conditions, 3
II
III
IV
V
Examination
Examination
Examination
Examination
of Motion, 6
of the Senses, 10
of the Aggregates, 12
of Elements, 14
xviii
Contents
PartTwo
The Text and Commentary
Contents
XII
xix
PARTONE
The Text of
Mlamadhyamakakiirikii
Dedicatory Verses
Chapter 1
Examination of Conditions
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Without essence,
The phrase, "When this exists so this will be,"
Would not be acceptable.
11.
12.
Examination of Condition
13.
14.
Chapter 11
Examination of Motion
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Examination of Motion
One in virtue of which it is a mover,
And one in virtue of which it moves.
6.
7.
If without a mover
lt would not be correct to say that there is motion,
Then if there were no motion,
How could there be a mover?
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
If without motion
lt is not appropriate to posit a mover,
How could it be appropriate to say
That a moving thing is stationary?
17.
18.
19.
20.
Examination of Motion
21.
22.
23.
24.
. 25.
Chapter 111
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
11
6.
7.
8.
9.
'.
Chapter IV
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
7.
8.
9.
13
ChapterV
Examination of Elements
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Examination of Elements
6~
7.
8.
15
ChapterVI
l.
If prior to desire
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
17
ChapterVII
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
If this nonarisen
Could give rise to that,
Then, as you wish,
It will give rise to that which is arising.
8.
Just as a butterlamp
Illuminates itself as well as others,
So arising gives rise to itself
And to other arisen things.
9.
10.
11.
12.
19
20
13.
14l
15.
16.
17.
If a nonarisen entity
Anywhere exists,
That entity would have to arise.
But if it were nonexistent, what could arise?
18.
If this arising
Gave rise to that which is arising,
By means of what arising
Does that arising arise?
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
21
22
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
Chapter VIII
l.
2.
3.
lf a nonexistent agent
Were to perforrn a nonexistent action,
Then the action would be without a cause
And the agent would be without a cause.
4.
24
5.
8.
An actual agent
Does not perform a nonactual action.
Nor by a nonactual one is an actual one performed.
From this, all of those errors would follow.
9.
An existent agent
Does not perform an action that
Is unreal or both real and unreal
As we have already agreed.
10.
A nonexistent agent
Does not perform an action that
Is unreal or both real and unreal
As we have already agreed.
11.
12.
13.
25
Chapter IX
l.
2.
3.
4.
lf it can abide
Without the seen, etc.,
Then, without a doubt,
They can abide without it.
5.
27
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
ChapterX
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
29
30
13.
14.
15.
16.
Chapter XI
l.
2.
3.
4.
32
5.
6.
7.
8.
Chapter XII
Examination of Suffering
l.
2.
3.
4..
5.
34
6.
8.
No suffering is self-caused.
Nothing causes itself.
If another is not self-made,
How could suffering be caused by another?
9.
Chapter XIII
Examination of Compounded
Phenomena
l.
2.
3.
lf there is no entitihood,
What changes?
If there were entity,
How could it be correct that something changes?
36
5.
6.
7.
8.
.Chapter XIV
Examination of Connection
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
38
else
To be different from it.
6.
thing,
Without a different thing, a different thing could exist.
But without that different thing, that different thing
does not exist.
lt follows that it doesn't exist.
7.
8.
Chapte~XV
Examination of Essence
l.
2.
3.
lf there is no essence,
How can there be difference in entities?
The essence of difference in 1entities
Is what is called the entity of difference.
4.
5.
40
6.
7.
8.
9.
lf there is no essence,
What could become other?
lf there is essence,
What could become other?
10.
11.
ChapterXVI
Examination of Bondage
l.
2.
If someone transmigrates,
Then if, when sought in the fivefold way
In the aggregates and in the sense spheres and in the
elements,
He is not there, what transmigrates?
3.
4.
5.
42
7.
If prior to binding
There is a bound one,
There would be bondage, but there isn't.
The rest has been explained by the gone, the not-gone,
and the goer.
8.
9.
10.
Chapter XVII
l.
2.
3.
4.
44
S.
6.
7.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19 ..
45
46
21.
22.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Obstructed by ignorance,
And consumed by passion, the experiencer
Is neither different from the agent
Nor identical with it.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
47
Chapter XVIII
l.
2.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
49
ChapterXIX
Examination of Time
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Examination of Time
6.
51
ChapterXX
Examination of Combination
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Examination of Combination
There would be two kinds of cause:
With and without causal status.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
53
54
13.
14.
15.
Without connecting,
How can a cause produce an effect?
Where there is connection,
How can a cause produce an effect?
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Examination of Combination
21.
22.
23.
If the combination
Of causes and conditions
ls not self-produced,
How does it produce an effect?
24.
55
ChapterXXI
Examination of Becoming
and Destruction
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
There
There
There
There
8.
9.
10.
It is not tenable
That destruction and becoming are identical.
lt is not tenable
That destruction and becoming are different.
11.
12.
57
58
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
59
Chapter XXII
l.
2.
4.
If there is no essence,
5.
6.
7.
There is no appropriation.
There is no appropriator.
Without appropriation
How can there be a Tathagata?
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
61
62
14.
15.
16.
Chapter XXIII
Examination of Errors
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
64
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Examination of Errors
65
13.
14.
15.
16.
If there is no grasping,
Whether erroneous or otherwise,
Who will come to be in error?
Who will have no error?
17.
18.
19.
20.
66
23.
24.
If someone's defilements
If someone's defilements
Chapter XXIV
l.
2.
3.
4.
68
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
By a misperception of emptiness
A person of little intelligerice is destroyed.
Like a snake incorrectly seized
Or like a spell incorrectly cast.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
69
70
20.
21.
If nonunderstanding comes to be
Through its essence,
How will understanding arise?
lsn't essence stable?
27.
For an essentialist,
Since the fruits through their essence
Are already unrealized,
In what way could one attain them?
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
71
72
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
chapter XXV
Examination of Nirvana
.
l.
2.
3.
Unrelinquished, unattained,
Unannihilated, not permanent,
Unarisen, unceased:
This is how nirvaoa is described.
4.
5.
74
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Examination of NirviiT}a
75
14.
15.
NirvQa is said to be
Neither existent nor nonexistent.
If the existent and the nonexistent were established,
This would be established.
16.
If nirvQa is
Neither existent nor nonexistent,
Then by whom is it expounded
"Neither existent nor nonexistent"?
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
76
23.
24.
Chapter XXVI
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
That which is assembled from the threeEye and form and consciousness,
Is contact. From contact
Feeling comes to be.
78
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Chapter XXVII
Examination of Views
l.
2.
The view "in the future 1 will become other" or "1 will
not do so"
And that the world is limited, etc.,
All of these views
Depend on a finallimit.
3.
4.
5.
80
6.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Examination of Views
81
In the past
Are untenable.
14.
15.
18.
If nothing is permanent,
82
21.
23.
27.
28.
Examination of Views
30.
1 prostrate to Gautama
Who through compassion
Taught the true doctrine,
Which leads to the relinquishing of all views.
83
PARTTWO
88
89
90
91
92
93
In such cases, the next chapter will typically address that natural
rejoinder. So, for instance, the first chapter argues that conditions
and the relation between phenomena and that on which they depend are empty. But a natural rejoinder is that even conventional
but actual conditions can only be understood in the context of
change or impermanence. So Chapter 11 addresses change. The
text hence forms a single sustained argumnt with only a few digressions or changes of subject, generally marked by the section divisions 1 have suggested above.
The first chapter addresses dependent origination. While many
Western commentators assert that this chapter opens the text simply because it addresses a "fundamental doctrine of Buddhism, " 9
my analysis of the text suggests that Ngrjuna begins with causation for deeper, more systematic reasons. In Chapters 11 through
XXI, Ngrjuna addresses a wide range of phenomena, including
external perceptibles, psychological processes, relations, putative
substances, and attributes, arguing that all are empty. In the final
six chapters, Ngrjuna generalizes the particular analyses into a
broad theory concerning the nature of emptiness itself and the
nature of the ultimate, of liberation, and of the relation between
emptiness and dependent arising. At the close, he replies to objections. lt is generally, and in my view correctly, acknowledged that
Chapter XXIV, the examination of the Four Noble Truths, is the
central chapter of the text and the clmax of the argument, with
Chapter XXV on nirvQa and saQisra sharing that spotlight. One
verse of Chapter XXIV, verse 18, has received so much attention
that interpretations of it alone represent the foundations of major
Buddhist schools in East Asia:
18.
Here Ngrjuna asserts the fundamental identity of (1) emptiness, or the ultimate truth; (2) the dependently originated, that is,
9. Kalupahana (1986), p. 32.
94
95
96
97
texts, an "eminent text"--,-grows over time and merits reinterpretation and rereading as the tradition in which it participates develops
and provides an ever-expanding context for its reading. Moreover,
1 am reading Nagarjuna largely through the lens of the Tibetan
commentarial tradi~ion and through the Tibetan translation of bis
text-,-the text read and discussed by the scholars of this long,
deep, and intellectually diverse and rich tradition, few of whom
had access to Sanskrit. So the Nagarjuna whose views 1 am exploring is an evolving figure, rooted in the life and writing of a first or
second century lndian monk, of whom we know but little, but
whose literary life and identity extends through a complex, sophisticated, and contested textual and philosophical tradition in India
and Tibet and in the West.
As a consequence, in interpreting this text on the Middle Path
for a Western audience, 1 have sought insofar as possible to find a
middle path between these extremes. 1 have tried to explain
Nagarjuna's own arguments and their context as straightforwardly
as possible without burdening the Western philosophical reader
with extended discussion of the specifically ancient Indian Buddhist philosophical debates. 1 have indicated ways in which very
specific arguments can be generalized and have commented on
general structural features of arguments, chapters, and the text. 1
have throughout explained arguments in Western philosophical
terms, while situating those arguments in their Buddhist context.
There may be times when my desire to make arguments accessible
has led to sorne distortion in Nagarjuna's sense. There may also be
times at which, by leaving arguments set firmly within the soteriological context of Buddhism, 1 have left those arguments looking
like curios to my Western audience. Sorne of this may be unavoidable, but in any case 1 have sought specifically to minimize these
difficulties.
The interpretation 1 offer is situated squarely within a PrasangikaMadhyamika interpretation of Nagarjuna (the philosophical school
that reads Mlamadhyamakakiirikii through the commentaries of
Buddhapalita and Candrakirti). But more specifically, my reading is
heavily influenced by the Tibetan Geluk~pa tradition that takes as
central the commentaries of dGe-'dun-grub, mKhas-grub-rje, and
especially, Je Tsong Khapa. My interpretation of the text reflects not
98
99
Dedicatory Verses
Dedicatory Verses
101
made from the ultimate standpoint. That is, the assertions that are
being denied are assertions about the final nature of phenomena
that emerge from philosophical analysis. They are not meant to be
ordinary assertions dependent upon conventions. Nagarjuna will
deny that it is possible to assert anything from the ultimate standpoint. He will urge that all truth is relative and conventional. In
fact, as we shall see, these qualifications turn out to be mutually
entailing.
But each pair is significant in its own right. To say that "whatever
is dependently arisen is unceasing and unborn" is to emphasize
that dependent arising amounts to emptiness, and emptiness
amounts to nonexistence in the ultimate sense. While, as we shall
see, Nagarjuna defends the conventional existence of phenomena,
he will urge that none of them ultimately exist-that none of them
exist independently of convention with identities and natures that
they possess in themselves. Therefore, he will argue, nothing ultimately is boro, and from the ultimate standpoint there is nothing
to cease. This is a deep point, which only emerges completely
through a reading of the whole text. But we can say at this point
that this insight contains within it the seeds of the eventual equation of the phenomenal world with emptiness, of sarpsara with
nirvaQa, and of the conventional and the ultimate that are the
hallmarks of the PrasaQgika-Madhyamika view.
When Nagarjuna claims that "whatever is dependently arisen
is ... unanihilated and not permanent" he indicates that the dependently arisen world and all of its contents are, in virtue of being
dependently arisen and dependent upon conditions, impermanent.
Phenomena come into existence when the conditions upon which
they depend obtain, and they cease to exist when the conditions for
their continued existence no longer obtain. This impermanence, he
will argue, entails their nonexistence from the ultimate standpoint.
For there will be no principled way to assert criteria for identity for
phenomena that distinguish them in any principled way from their
conditions. Nor can we find any essence they themselves have that
determines their identity. The criteria for identity we posit will end
up being purely conventional. Hence the same is true for any
claims of substantial difference between things. But this impermanence and lack of intrinsic identity, while it amounts to the impossi-
102
Chapter 1
Examination of Conditions
104
Examination of Conditions
105
The fourfold classification of positions with regard to the relation between an active cause and its effect is meant to be exhaustive. But it is important to keep in mind that Nagarjuna was aware
of philosophical schools espousing each of these four positions.
And each of them has something to say for itself if we begn by
supposing a model of causation involving powers as essential properties of substantially real causes. The first view-held prominently by Samkhya philosophers 19-is that all causation is really
self-causation. A proponent of this view would argue that for a
cause to be genuinely the cause of an effect, that effect must exist
potentially in that cause. If it does not, then the cause might exist
without the effect, in which case the cause would fail to necessitate
the effect, in which case it would not be a genuine cause. This is
17. This account of the relevan! contrastive views derives from the oral commentary of the Ven. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas and the Ven. Gen Lobzang Gyatso.
18. The Ven. Lobzang Norbu Shastri has pointed out to me that this verse may
not in fact be original with Nagarjuna, but is a quotation from stra. It appears in
the Kamajika-prajaparamitastra as well as in the Madhyamika-Salistambastra.
But the chronological relation of these stras to Nagarjuna's text is not clear.
19. At least according to Tsong Khapa's commentary on this verse.
106
not to say that effects exist in full actuality in their causes, but that
they have a genuine potential .existence when their causes exist. In
this case, since the effect is present in the cause, it already has a
kind of existence prior to its appearance. And it is the fact of this
prior potential existence that accounts for the causal character of
the cause. So we can say, on this view, that a thing's prior potential
existence is what gives rise to its later actual existence. So effects
are in this sense self-caused. The typical kind of example appealed
to in order to defend this model of causation is the seed and sprout
relation. The sprout, although only actual after germination, is
potential in the seed. lts potentiality is what makes the seed a seed
of that sprout. Moreover, on this view, the seed and sprout cannot
be distinguished as substantially different. Intuitively it makes
sense to say that they are two stages of the same entity. But the
seed is the cause of the sprout. Hence, the proponent of this view
concludes, the sprout is self-caused.
Causation from another is a more familiar way of thinking of
causation and was the dominant doctrine of causation in the Buddhist philosophical milieu in which Nagarjuna was working. On
this view, causes and their effects are genuinely distinct phenomena. zo They can be characterized and can in principie exist independently of one another. But they are related by the fact that one has
the power to bring the other about. The relations between parents
and children is an example often appealed to in illustrating this
doctrine. Parents bring their children into existence. But they are
not identical entities.
The doctrine of causation by both self and other emerges
through a juxtaposition of the doctrine of causation-from-another
and the doctrine of self-causation. Let us return to the example of
the seed. A proponent of other-causation might point out that
seeds that are not planted, watered, and so forth, do not sprout. If
the sprout were present in the seed, these other conditions, which
are manifestly other than the sprout, would be otiose. On the
20. 1 will use the term "phenomena'' throughout in the commentary asan ontologically neutral expression to cover events, states, processes, objects, properties,
etc. Usually phenomena of severa) of these categories are at play at once. Sornetimes not. Where more precision is called for, 1 will be more specific, unless the
context makes it clear which category is relevant.
Examination of Conditions
107
108
the relation of conditions to the conditioned involves ascribing neither inherent existence nor causal power to the conditions.
Efficient conditions are those salient events that explain the
occurrence of subsequent events: Striking a match is the efficient
condition for its lighting. My fingers depressing the keys of this
computer is the efficient condition for the creation of this text.
The percept-object condition is in its primary sense the object in
the environment that is the condition for a mind's perception of it.
So when you see a tree, the physical tree in the environment is the
percept-object condition of your perceptual state. Now things get
vexed here in a number of ways. First, there is no unanimity in the
world, or even in Buddhist philosophy, regarding the analysis of
perception and, hence, no consensus on the view just adumbratedthat external objects are the percept-object conditions of perceptual
awareness. Idealists, for instance, argue that the percept-object
conditions are to be located in the subject. Second, many fans of
percept-object conditions, on both sides of the idealist/realist divide, argue that the substantial existence of such a condition, and
the appropriate exercise of its power to produce perception, is a
necessary condition of perception. Nagarjuna will be concerned to
reject any such analysis-whether idealist or realist-in virtue ofhis
attack on the notions of substantial existence, substantial difference, and causal power. Third, within the psychological domain, the
account generalizes beyond perception. Conceptual states, imaginings, reasoning-all can have percept-object conditions. To Western philosophical ears this seems odd. But from the standpoint of
Buddhist epistemology and psychology, intentionai2 1 activity gene rally is the natural kind comprised by "perception." So the point is
that the intentional existence of the golden mountain is a perceptobject condition of my being able to doubt that there is such a thing.
Finlly, the analysis bears generalization well beyond the psychological. For at the most abstract level, what is distinct about a perceptobject condition is its existence simultaneously with andas a support
for what it conditions. So Nagarjuna's attack on a substantialist
21. "lntentional" is here being used in the sense of Brentano and of recent
Western philosophy of mind-to mean contentful or directed upon an object. 1 do
not use the term to mean purposeful.
Examination of Conditions
109
understanding of this kind of explanans will apply, mutatis mutandis, to the case of a table supporting a book.
The dominant condition is the purpose or end for which an
action is undertaken. My hoped for understanding of Madhyamika
might be the dominant condition for my reading Nagarjuna's text,
its presence before my eyes the percept-object condition, and the
reftected light striking my eyes the efficient condition. The immediate conditions are the countless intermediary phenomena that
emerge upon the analysis of a causal chain, in this case, the photons striking my retina, the excitation of photoreceptor cells, and
so forth. 22
A nonpsychological example might be useful to illustrate the
difference between lhe four kinds of condition and the picture
Nagarjuna suggests of explanation in the most general sense: Suppose that you ask, "Why are the lights on?" 1 might reply as
follows: (1) "Because 1 fticked the switch." 1 have appealed toan
efficient condition. Or, (2) "Because the wires are in good working
order, the bulbs haven't burned out, and the el~ctricity is ftowing."
These are supporting conditions. Or, (3) "'f.he light is the emission
of photons each of which is emitted in response to the bombardment of an atom by an electron, and so forth." 1 have appealed toa
chain of immediate conditions. Or, (4) "So that we can see." This
is the dominant condition. Any of these would be a perfectly good
answer to the "Why?" question. But note that none of them makes
reference to any causal powers or necessitation. 23
22. Georges Dreyfus (personal communication) notes that the understanding of
the nature of percept-object conditions and dominant conditions in Miihiiyana
Buddhist philosophy undergoes a significan! transformation a few centuries later at
the hands of Dignaga and Dharmakirti and that Niigiirjuna is here making use of
older Sarvastiviidan understandings of these terms to demonstrate the emptiness of
conditions so understood.
23. Wood (1994) argues (see esp. pp. 48-53, pp. 63-64) that Niigiirjuna here
argues that nothing arises at all. He claims that the argument begins by providing an
exhaustive enumeration of the ways in which a thing could arise and then proceeds
to eliminate each of these. This analysis, however, is problematic on two counts:
First, it ignores the distinction between conventional, dependently arisen phenomena and inherently existent phenomena. To say that inherently existent phenomena
cannot arise in any way, or that there can be no inherently existent production, is
not thereby to say that there is no conventional dependency, or that there are no
dependently arisen phenomena. Second, Wood ignores the positive account of
110
The point being made in the first two lines of the verse is fairly
straightforward. When we examine the set of conditions that give
rise to an entity-for example, the set of conditions we detailed
above for the shining of a lamp, or the conditions for seeing a tree
we discussed previously-no analysis of those conditions yields the
consequent effect. Dissecting light switches, wires, brains, and so
forth, does not reveal any hidden light. Nor is there a tree perception to be found already in the existence of the tree, the eye, and
so forth. Rather these phenomena arise as consequences of the
collocation of those conditions. To borrow a Kantian turn of
phrase, phenomena are not analytically contained in their condi-
Examination of Conditions
111
\
112
Examination of Conditions
113
114
In the next two lines, as we will often see in the text, Nagarjuna
is speaking in two senses-first, from the conventional standpoint,
and second, from the ultimate. In the third line of the verse, he
notes that conditions can certainly, in a perfectly legitimate sense,
be appealed to as the things that bring about their effects; in that
sense, we can say that they are efficacious-that they have the
power to act. But in the fourth line he emphasizes that we cannot,
so to speak, quantify over this power, identifying it as a phenomenon or property possessed by the conditions. There are no powers
in that sense. Just as we can act for someone else's sake, despite
there being no sakes, we can appeal to the potency of conditions
despite their being no such potency. The trick is to make correct
26. There is, as Thck (1990) has noted, a current fashion of using Wittgenstein
to explcate Niigiirjuna and other Miidhyamika philosophers. Most (e.g. Huntington [1983a, 1983b, 1989], Gudmunson [1977], and Thurman [1984]) emphasize
connections to the.Philosophicallnvestigations, indeed with good reason. But (as
Waldo [1975, 1978] and Anderson [1985] as well as Garfield [1990, 1994, unpubIished] have noted) the Tractatus is also a useful fulcrum for exegesis, particularly of
Niigiirjuna's work. Tractarian ideas also inform my discussion of Niigiirjuna on
positionlessness, the limits of expressibility, and the relation between the two truths
below. None of this, however, should be taken either as implying that Niigiirjuna
would agree with everything in the Tractatus (assuredly he would not) or that the
parallels drawn between Miidhyamika philosophy and themes in the Philosophical
Investigations are spurious. They are in fact often quite illuminating.
Examination of Conditions
115
One might answer this question, Nagarjuna notes in the opponent's suggestion in the first two lines, by noting the presence of
sorne relation of "giving rise to," realized in a power. But, he
rejoins in the final two lines, this move is blocked: For having
shown the .absence and the theoretical impotence of such a link, it
would follow that there would be no conditions. Nagarjuna hence
suggests here that it is the regularities that count. Flickings give
27. This example was suggested to me in conversation by the Ven. Geshe
Lobzang Gyatso.
28. The verb here is "grag" (Skt: kila), which indicates that the embedded
content is not endorsed. That is, the first two lines of this verse are in the mouth of
the opponent.
116
He notes here that if entities are conceived as inherently existent, they exist independently and, hence, need no conditions for
their production. Indeed, they could not be produced if they exist
in this way. On the other hand, if things exist in no way whatsoever, it follows trivially that they have no conditions.30 The follow29. The Madhyamika position implies that we should seek to explain regularities by reference to their embeddedness in other regularities, and so on. To ask why
there are regularities at all, on such a view, would be to ask an incoherent question:
The fact of explanatorily useful regularities in nature is what makes explanation and
investigation possible in the first place and is not something itself that can be
explained. After all, there is only one universe, and truly singular phenomena, on
such a view, are inexplicable in principie. This may connect deeply to the Buddha's
insistence that questions concerning the beginning of the world are unanswerable.
30. See Bhattacharya (1979), esp. pp. 336-37, for a good discussiort of this
argument.
Examination of Conditions
117
ing three verses make this point with regard to each of the four
kinds of conditions:
7.
8.
9.
118
Examination of Conditions
119
Without essence,
The phrase, "When this exists so this will be,"
Would not be acceptable.
i
120
Here the realist argues that the conclusion Nagarjuna draws from
the unreality of causal power-the nonexistence of things (where
"existence" is read "inherent existence")-entails the falsity of the
claim that things dependently arise. For if there are no things,
surely nothing arises. This charge has a double edge: If the argument is successful it not only shows that Nagarjuna's own position
is vacuous, but that it contradicts one of the most fundamental
tenets of Buddhist philosophy-that all phenomena are dependently arisen. Moreover, the opponent charges, on Nagarjuna's
view that the explanandum is not to be found potentially in the
explanans, there is no explanation of how the former is to be
understood as depending upon the latter. As Nagarjuna will emphasize in 1: 14, however, the very structure of this charge contains
the seeds of its reply. The very emptiness of the effect, an effect
presupposed by the opponent to be nonempty, in fact follows from
the emptiness of the conditins and of the relationship between
conditions and effect. Nagarjuna will, hence, reply to the opponent's attempted refutation by embracing the conclusion of bis
reductio together with the premises it supposedly refutes.
12.
How, the opponent asks, are we to distinguish coincidental sequence from causal consequence, or even from conventional dependence? And why don't things simply arise randomly from
events that are nonconditions since no special connection is posited to link consequents to their proper causal antecedents?
Examination of Conditions
13.
121
122
Examination of Conditions
123
Chapter II
Examination of Motion
Examination of Motion
125
This verse is important not only because it announces the obvious reply that motion exists in presently moving things, but because it introduces the connection between change in general and
motion. Though this interpretative point is controversial, and several scholars have given widely different interpretations, 35 it is
34. The parallels to Zeno's paradoxes of motion, particularly that of the arrow,
should be evident.
35. The Ven. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas, for instance, argues that the chapter
should be interpreted as about change in general; the Ven. Gen Lobzang Gyatso,
126
on the other hand, argues that though the arguments could indeed be applied to
change in general, the chapter is specifically about motion through space. The
Ven. Lobzang Norbu Shastri argues that it is in fact specifically only about walking, and that any further generalization is illicit (all personal communication). 1
side with the Ven. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas on this point since Niigiirjuna offers
perfectly general arguments against change in properties. And it would seem
especially elegant for Niigiirjuna, who is attacking the tendency to reify, to begin
with the two properties most subject to reification in Buddhist philosophy, in
virtue of their universal applicability to phenomena and centrality to the Buddhist
metaphysical framework-dependent arising and change. While the canonical
commentaries 1 have consulted do not extend the argument in this direction, they
do not preclude such an extension.
Examination of Motion
127
In this verse Nagarjuna begins bis attack on the idea that motion
is a property with an existence ihdependent of movers. lf, he asserts, one were to posit motion as such a property that simply
happened to inhere in movers, it would follow from its independence that movers might not have it, but instead its contrary,
namely, nonmotion. But that is not tenable. So it follows that
motion can't be thought of asan independent property. This line of
argument is continued in the next two verses:
5.
6.
128
lf without a mover
lt would not be correct to say that there is motion,
Then if there were no motion,
How could there be a mover?
36. The commentaries 1 have consulted are silent on this issue, and there is no
consensus among the Tibetan. scholars with whom 1 have worked regarding this
issue.
Examination of Motion
129
10.
130
13.
These two verses are alternative formulations of the same argu. ment: If there is motion, it must begin sometime. But that moment
is inconceivable. For motion doesn't begin in a stationary thing.
And once a thing is in motion, it is too late. lt can't always have
begun in the pastor be yet to begin, and there simply isn't time to
go anywhere in the present.
14.
16.
If without motion
It is not appropriate to posit a mover,
Examination of Motion
131
Niigiirjuna now develops further problems with any view regarding motion as an entity; it must be either identical to or different
from the mover. Both options, he will argue, turn out to be incoherent:
18.
19.
The identity of agent and action is absurd on its face. For then
whenever an agent were to perform another act, s/he would become a distinct agent. There would be no basis for identifying
individuals over time.
20.
132
22.
Examination of Motion
133
24.
The three ways in question are past, present, and future. Something that is inherently a mover has been shown to be incapable of
motion in any of these periods. This is simply a way ofemphasizing
the moral of the entire chapter: Movers cannot be thought of as
being movers intrinsically. Moreover, nonexistent movers-movers
that are not even conventionally movers-certainly don't move. lt
must therefore be that neither do movers move intrinsically nor that
there is no motion. There must be a sense in which motion and
movers exist, but do not do so intrinsically. The final verse must
hence be read with "entity," "nonentity," and "existent" as asserted
in the ultimate sense:
25.
134
Examination of Motion
135
39. Again, the affinities to Hume are intriguing: The Humean analysis of external physical objects and of personal identity appears at first to deny the reality of
either. But what emerges from a more careful reading is that Hume shows that only
the reified substantialist versions of objects and selves are nonexistent. The objects
and selves with which we have actual perceptual and cognitive commerce, on his
view, are perfectly existent, but only in virtue of being dependent upon conventions
("custom") for their identity and existence. It is a clear analysis of their conventional character that allows us to coherently assert their existence.
Chapter 111
137
138
139
no point at which it could burn another. And if vision were intrinsically identifiable, there would be no moment at which it could see
another.
4.
When all there is to vision is visual perception, what is the motivation for positing an entity to undertake the process of perception?
All there is to vision is the perceptual process: We don't need to
posit an entity-the visual faculty over and above the set of interdependent phenomena that subserve vision. The desire todo sois of a
piece with the more general substantialist imperative to posit an
independent substratum to support every capacity or property.
5.
140
the other hand, if we pack vision into its definition, we thereby fail
to identify the subject nonrelationally. Vision and its subject are
thus relational, dependent phenomena and not substantial or inde~
pendent entities. So neither seeing nor seer nor the seen (conceived of as the object of sense perception) can be posited as
entities with inherent existence. The point is just that sense perception cannot be understood as an autonomous phenomenon, but
only as a dependent process.
7.
41. The authenticity of this verse is a matter of dispute. It is not present in all
editions of the text and may be a later interpolation.
42. And from the standpoint of a Buddhist analysis of human existence there is
more to it than this: In many presentations of the "twelve links of dependent
origination," consciousness conditions craving for existence, which gives rise to
existence in salfiSara.
141
43. The skandhas (literally "heaps" or "piles," but most often translated as
"aggregates") are the basic constituents of the personality. Five are typically identified: form (really matter-the physical body), sensation, perception, disposition
(behavioral and cognitive), and consciousness. But the term "skandha" indicates
two features of this decomposition that must be bom in mind to avoid confusion:
The division is practica! and empirical, and not philosophically principled, and the
skandhas themselves are decomposible into further heaps, etc. These are not,
hence, ontological fundamentals, but rather the first leve! of a psychology.
ChapteriV
143
144
3.
145
Any relationship between form and a putative cause is unintelligible, Nagarjuna argues, following closely the reasoning in Chapter l. If form exists, the cause has ceased to exist. If form does
not exist, the cause cannot have existed. This might seem at first
glance to be a wholesale rejection of the possibility of dependency of effects on causal conditions. But if we recall the moral of
Chapter 1 and keep the dialectical context of the current chapter
firmly in mind we will see that this is not so: The paradox of
causal contact arises-as Sextus also notes-only if we suppose
that the causes we appeal to in explanation must have sorne special force by means of which they bring about their effects. That,
as we have seen, is the view of the causal link as inherently
existent and, hence, of causes as inherently existent. The opponent Nagarjuna is attacking in this chapter is one who thinks that
form/matter is inherently existent, but who has granted that all
individual phenomena-all particular forms, such as human bodies, tables, and chairs-are dependently arisen. So the opponent
agrees that all phenomena must be explicable. But the opponent
wants to reify form, and that is to treat it as a phenomenonalbeit an inherently existent one. Therefore, it must, for the opponent, have an explanation of its existence, and since its existence
is inherent existence, it must be an explanation in terms of inherently existent causation. So all that Nagarjuna has to do is to
remind the opponent of the incoherence of that notion in order to
undermine the view that form as such is inherently existent. The
coherence of conventional dependent origination is not at issue.
5.
146
147
8.
9.
148
ChapterV
Examination of Elements
49. The others are earth, water, fire, air, and consciousness.
SO. The sense of "characteristic" (mtsan nyid) is that of a distinguishing characteristic, or a characteristic mark or signature of a thing. 1 therefore use the singular
here. (1 owe this suggestion to the Ven. Gareth Sparham.) But the points that
Nigitjuna makes are perfectly general and could as well be made using "characteristics," as loada (1970) and Kalupahana (1986) do.
150
But there is a problem. If a characteristic were inherently existent, it would have to become instantiated in either a characterized
or an uncharacterized object. But there are no uncharacterized
objects, and if the object already is characterized, there is no need
for the characteristic to become instantiated. So to think of individuals and properties as existing independently and then somehow coming together to constitute particulars makes no sense.
4.
Examination of Elements
151
In the first two lines of this verse, Nagarjuna draws the conclusion that there are no inherently existent characteristics and no
inherently existent characterized entities. Entities and their properties are mutually dependent and, hence, empty of inherent existence. But this does not mean, he emphasizes in the final two lines,
that there is sorne other ontology of inherently existent basic types
that could replace them. Indeed particulars can be thought of as
characterized entities, with characteristics; but this does not entail
the independent existence of entities of either of those types.
6.
152
This is the soteriological import of this discussion of fundamental ontology: If one reifies phenomena-including such things as
one's own self, characteristics (prominently including one's own),
or extemal objects-and if one thinks that things either fail to exist
or exist absolutely, one will be unable to attain any peace. For one
will thereby be subject to egoism, the overvaluing of oneself and
one's achievements and of material things. One will not appreciate
the possibility of change, of the impermanence and nonsubstantiality of oneself and one's possessions. These are the seeds of
grasping and craving and, hence, of suffering. The altemative,
Nagarjuna suggests, and the path to pacification, is to see oneself
and other entities as non-substantial, impermanent, and subject to
change and not as appropriate objects of such passionate craving.
Chapter VI
If prior to desire
And without desire there were a desirous one,
Desire would depend on him.
Desire would exist when there is a desirous one.
51. See, e.g., the Heart Stra, with its famous discussion of the emptiness
of the aggregates that begins with form and then moves to the psychological
aggregates.
154
155
In the first line of this verse, Ngrjuna points out the relational
character of simultaneity. If simultaneity is predicated, it must be
predicated of two distinct things that arise at the same time. We
!56
don't say that a thing arises simultaneously with itself. But if things
are completely distinct in nature, they cannot co-occur in the same
place, that is~ if desire and the desirous one had distinct essences,
they could not be in the same place at the same time.
5.
157
This last verse emphasizes and spells out the point scouted
above: We are left with a hard choice once we conceive of desire
and the desirous one as entities. If desire and the desirous one are
conceived as substantially different but simultaneous, we would
have to be able to establish the nature and existence of each independent of the other. That is no easy task. If we could accomplish
it, simultaneity would be a satisfactory solution to the dilemma.
But of course we cannot. Moreover, Nagarjuna argues in the next
verse, if they are completely different, we are left with the peculiar
task of explaining why they always go together. And asserting their
simultaneity forces this problem:
7.
158
Chapter VII
Having begun the text with an examination of the relation of dependency between phenomena, and having then conducted an analysis
of the fundamental ontological constituents of reality, Nagarjuna
now brings these two analyses together in a long chapter investigating the nature of the world of conditioned things as a whole. The
target position is the view that dependent arising itself, as well as
dependently arisen things, are either inherently existent or completely nonexistent. There are really two positions here with which
Nagarjuna must contend: First, the reificationist opponent charges
.that even if we grant Nagarjuna's earlier arguments for the conclusion that phenomena themselves are empty because they are dependently arisen, dependent arising itself must inherently exist.
For only if phenomena are truly dependently arisen, one might
argue, are they truly empty. Second, Nagarjuna must answer the
following objection: If dependent arising is empty, then arising,
stasis, and cessation are nonexistent. Hence there are, in fact, no
phenomena since phenomena are defined-particularly in a Buddhist context-as those things that arise, remain, and cease. But
clearly there are actual empirical phenomena; indeed, such phenomena must exist for Nagarjuna's claim that they are empty to
make any sense at all. How can this be reconciled with the emptiness of dependent arising?
160
l.
The three characteristics in question are arising, stasis, and cessation. On a standard Buddhist view, all phenomena come into being
in dependence upon conditions, remain in existence dependent
upon conditions, and cease to exist dependent upon conditions.
This is the core of the two central doctrines of dependent arising
and impermanence. Nagarjuna here poses a problem: lf dependent arising itself were produced by conditions, then it itself would
have these three characteristics and, apparently paradoxically, be
impermanent. This is prima facie paradoxical just because if dependent arising is impermanent, it would appear that sometimes things
don't arise dependently, which contradicts the thesis that all phenomena are dependently arisen. Moreover, as Nagarjuna will argue below, this assertion threatens a vicious re~ress-if arising
arises, there must already be arising in virtue of which it does so.
But, Nagarjuna asks in the third and fourth lines, if dependent
arising is not produced, where did it come from? lf one were to say
that dependent arising were not produced and, hence, that it does
not depend for its existence on anything else, this would appear to
contradict the thesis that everything arises dependently. Dependent arising itself would then be the counterexample to the thesis.
2.
161
162
3.
163
indeed have the very trio of characteristics that all ordinary phenomena have, namely, arising, abiding, and ceasing. lt is this alternative that occupies Ngrjuna for the remainder of the chapter.
This alternative is interesting dialectically in that, on the one hand,
it represents the most natural way to approach an analysis of dependent arising, namely, by consistently predicating it of everything,
hence suggesting that it is indeed a candidate for an essence of
things. On the other hand, as we shall see, that very move precludes treating it as a genuine essence since essences turn out to
lack precisely the properties that we must universalize here.
4.
This is the opponent speaking. He suggests that dependent arising arises from a more basic arising. This basic arising comes to be,
but not on the basis of anything else. The idea, defended by sorne
earlier Buddhist schools, is this: There are two levels of dependent
arising. The more superficial is the relationship of mutual dependence of all phenomena, issuing in their impermanence. But this
interdependence, on this view, is itself dependently arisen. lt depends on a basic arising-a mere fact of interdependent origination, which gives rise to the more specific empirical relations we
see. So in 'the first two lines of this verse, the opponent says that
when arising itself is considered in isolation, all that we have is the
basic arising. In the third and fourth lines, the opponent says that
when that arising has arisen, it gives rise to the more superficial
ordinary dependent arising. It is, then, that basic arising that is
posited as ontologically foundational.
5.
But Ngrjuna makes the obvious move in reply: Does the basic
arising arise from a more basic arising, or is it somehow unarisen
164
If this nonarisen
Could give rise to that,
Then, as you wish,
lt will give rise to that which is arising.
8.
165
Just as a butterlamp
Illuminates itself as well as others,
So arising gives rise to itself
And to other arisen things.
Nagarjuna now launches a lengthy critique of the example, arguing that the relation between the butterlamp and what it illuminates is not one that supports a notion of an inherently existent
basis on which things that are not inherently existent cn depend:
9.
Here Nagarjuna is emphasizing a disanalogy between the relation between the butterlamp and what it illuminates, and the putative relation between dependent arising and what it depends upon.
The opponent who wields the example does so in order to demonstrate a difference in status between dependent arising and the
dependently arisen. Dependent arising is meant not to be dependently arisen, despite the fact that all dependently arisen phenomena are. So the app~opriate analogy in the case of the lamp would
map this difference in status between b~ing dependently arisen and
being independent onto the difference between being illuminated
and not being illuminated. The problem, though, is that in the
example there is nothing that is not illuminated: Everything in the
neighborhood of the lamp is illuminated just as is the lamp.
lt was standard philosophical fare in the Buddhist tradition
within which Nagarjuna was working to see darkness as a positive
phenomenon. So to the extent that one adopted a reified ontology,
darkness would be reified as easily as light. The .attack on the
butterlamp analogy can thus effectively exploit the difficulties
Nagarjuna has a:lready developed for theories that require inherently existent things to be related to one another. But it is important to see that even if one is not disposed to reify darkness, and
regards it as the mere absence of light, to the extent that one reifies
light, Nagarjuna can argue that one will be compelled to reify
166
11.
12.
167
The point of all of this is not that we can't see lamps when they
are lit or that we can when they aren't. Rather it is that the mechanism by which we see what we see when a lamp is lit is the same
whether we are seeing the lamp or other things. To put it in contemporary terms, photons reach our eyes from the lamp or from its
ftame in the same way they do from the other physical objects in
the neighborhood. And just as the visibility of the things in the
neighborhood is dependent on a hostof conditions, sois the visibility of the lamp. So we do not have even an analogy to a case where
the status of dependent arising would be distinct from that of the
dependently arisen.
13.
168
Nagarjuna here suggests that the way the reificationist has gane
about posing the philosophical problem about the status of dependent arising itself is all wrong. The initial presumption at the basis
of this debate is that arisen entities arise from an independently
existing process of dependent arising. But this is wrongheaded in
at least two ways: First, phenome.na arise from other phenomena,
not from arising. So, for instance, if 1 strike a match, the tire
emerges from the friction, the sulphur, the oxygen, my desire for
light, and so forth, but not from dependent arising itself. That is a
fact at a different level of analysis, which itself comprises the network of relationshlps just indicated. Second, if the existence of the
process of arising antedates the existence of the arisen, it cannot be
a sufficient condition ora complete explanation of the arisen. For
if it were, the arisen would then exist. That being so, Niigarjuna
asks, "Why posit dependent arising itself as a phenomenon within
the framework of dependent arising?"
16.
169
them from the conventional point of view. This will be the conclusion of the extended argument that follows and is here merely
announced in advance. But it is important at this stage to be clear
about just what Nagarjuna is asserting for it is indeed a delicate
point: lt is true that ordiriarily and prereftectivey, and sometimes
as the result of bad philosophy, we tend to think of things as
permanent and as having fixed essential natures. But a careful
reftection on the nature of conventional phenomena shows them
on analysis to be impermanent and, hence, to be characterized by
the three properties of arising, stasis, and cessation.54
But while this takes us to a deeper understanding of the nature
of phenomena, it does not take us all the way. For phenomena,
having no essence, cannot have even these properties essentially.
One way of seeing that is this: If we take the import of the threefold nature of phenomena seriously, we see that the phenomena
are themselves literally momentary. And if they are momentary,
then there is literally no time for them to arise, to endure, or to
decay. So from an ultimate point of view, the point of view from
which they have no existence as extended phenomena at all, they
do not possess these three properties. Hence no single real entity is
in flux. In this sense they are peaceful. Nagarjuna points out the
other way of seeing phenomena in the next .verse: lt does not
follow from the fact that there are no inherently existent arisen
entities that there are non-arisen ones. All phenomena are arisen,
but they arise as empty, and as dependent. Coming to be just is
arising, and all arising is dependent arising.
Nagarjuna now turns bis attention to an analysis of the three
characteristics of arising, stasis, and cessation, showing of each in
turn that it cannot be understood as ontologically independent. He
begins with arising:
17.
If a nonarisen entity
Anywhere exists,
That entity would have to arise.
But if it were nonexistent, what could arise?
54. Such remarks also make it hard to sustain the nihilistic reading of the text
Wood (1994) offers. For here Nagarjuna is clearly committed to the claim that there
are dependently arisen phenomena.
170
If this arising
Gave rise to that which is arising,
By means of what arising
Does that arising arise?
The last two lines of this verse emphasize that the regress cannot
ever be cut off by positing sorne nonarisen arising. That would, as
Nagarjuna argued above, patently beg the question.
20.
171
172
This verse plays a central role in each of two interwoven arguments. In the cntext of VII: 21 and 26, it provides partof the
exhaustive analysis of the impossibility of arising, abiding and ceasing as instantiated in ceasing (hence in impermanent) phenomena.
In the context of VII: 22, 25, and 27, it provides part ofthe analysis
of the impossibility of locating endurance in any phenomenon,
hence emphasizing the impermanence of all phenomena. Since to
exist is to exist in time and things that are ceasing are by definition
not in a state of continued existence, ceasing phenomena do not
provide the kind of continuity with numerical identity that endurance demands. And all phenomena are, upon analysis, seen to be
constantly ceasing. So endurance has no possibility of instantiation, and ceasing phenomena cannot have this property asan essential attribute.
24.
173
Moreover, since all things decay, this analysis is perfectly general. Nothing exists in the way that it would have to in order to
have endurance as part of its essence.
25.
This verse recalls the discussion of VII: 13-19 and has an important echo in VII: 32. Nagarjuna argued earlier that we cannot
analyze arising either as sui generis or as dependent upon sorne
other arising. In the first case, we beg the question; in the second
we invite an infinite regress. He now points out that the same is
true of stasis. We can't, in order to demonstrate the inherent
existence of stasis, argue that it endures because of itself. If this
kind of reftexive explanation were possible, we would not need to
posit stasis in the first place as an explanation of the continued
existence of empirical phenomena. Each could count as selfexplanatory. aut if we say that stasis, like other static things, is
static because of its possessing a distinct stasis, we are off on a
vicious regress.
26.
Nagarjuna thus completes the tripartite argument for the impossibility of the instantiation of arising, abiding, and ceasing begun in
VII: 21 and 23. Cessation, conceived of asan inherently existent,
independent property, needs a substratum. We have seen in the
previous two verses in this argument that neither arising nor static
things can provide this substratum. The only alternative remaining
is the ceasing. But these phenomena, passing out of existence, are
by definition not inherently existent and so fail as candidates. And
again, since all phenomena are ceasing, this means that ceasing as
an independent property has no basis. The argument here is an
174
1\vo points are being made here: First, if there were intrinsically
real entities that could serve as ontological bases for cessation,
they would have to have either remained stable or not. If the
former, then in virtue of having the nature of stasis, they would be
incapable of cessation. If the latter, since they never really existed,
there is nothing to cease. But there is also a second point being
made that depends upon the conventional reality of cessation.
Since cessation is conventionally real and is incompatible both with
inherently existent stasis and with there being no stasis at all, both
of these alternatives with respect to stasis are eliminated. Cessation and stasis must be understood relatively and not absolutely.
This point is reiterated in the following verse:
28.
This verse also echoes VII: 25 and that discussion of the impossibility of arising being either self-explanatory or always explained
by reference to yet another arising. All things, having remained
momentarily in existence, change constantly. This, however, cannot be explained by reference to the nature of stasis, either reflexively or regres&ively.
29.
175
This verse and the next reinforce the point about the ultimate
nonexistence of cessation and, by implication, of arising and stasis.
In the preceding, Niigiirjuna emphasizes that for an inherently
existent entity to cease to exist would be for it to inherently exist
and not exist. In the subsequent verse, he points out that it makes
no sense for a nonexistent thing to cease to be, just as it makes no
sense to behead someone a second time:
31.
32.
176
That is, arising, abiding, and ceasing are not entities at all-they
are mere relations. Since tbese fundamental attributes of dependently arisen phenomena are empty of inherent existence, what
could have inherent existence?
34.
This chapter thus brings the first principal section of Mlamadhyamakakrik to a close, drawing together the threads spun in
the earlier chapters to produce a thorough demonstration of the
emptiness of the conventional phenomenal world. Having demonstrated the emptiness of conditions and their relations to their
effects, change and impermanence, the elements, the aggregates, 56
and characteristics and their bases-in short, of all the fundamental Buddhist categories of analysis and explanation-Nagarjuna
has now considered the totality they determine-dependent arising itself and the entire dependently arisen phenomenal world56. Sometimes translated as "heaps," or "collections." These are the groups of
more basic phenomena into which complex phenomena such as persons are decomposed in analysis. The decomposition is in principie bottomless-bundles of bundles of bundles .... See Chapters III and IV.
177
Chapter VIII
179
Nagarjuna here announces that, with respect to agency and action as well, he will steer a middle course between inherent existence and complete nonexistence. Neither action nor agent will
come out to be an inherently existing entity. Nor will either end up
being completely nonexistent.
2.
If the agent were inherently existent, then it would be unchanging. Activity is always a kind of change. So if there were action in
the context of an inherently existing agent, the action would be
agentless, which would be absurd. Moreover, the agent would be
inactive, which would also be absurd. This, of course, is just one
more case of Niigarjuna demonstrating the incoherence of a position that tries both to posit inherently existent, independent entities and then to get them to interact.
3.
If a nonexistent agent
Agent, the agent's activity, and the action all depend upon conditions. They are all, therefore, dependently arisen and empty. If, as the
opponent would have it, these are inherently existent, there would be
no action. But if we think of them as dependent, we can make perfectly good sense of agent, activity and action in interrelation.
180
5.
lf there were no action, then since entities arise from the action
of previous events, there would be no entities and no effects. In
short, without making sense of the possibility of actions and agency
as empty, we can't account for the existence of any phenomena.
6.
181
An actual agent
Does not perform a nonactual action.
Nor by a nonactual one is an actual one performed.
From this, all of those errors would follow.
An existent agent
Does not perform an action that
Is unreal or both real and unreal
As we have airead~ agreed.
e
10.
A nonexistent agent
Does not perform an action that
Is unreal or both real and unreal
As we have already agreed.
11.
Nagarjuna now moves to assert bis positive position on this matter: Agent and action are interdependent. Neither is logically or
ontologically prior to or independent of the other. What it is to be
an agent is to be performing an action. What it is to be an action is
to be the action of an agent:
12.
182
13.
Chapter IX
Now one can surely imagine an opponent responding to the argument of the previous chapter by granting that agency and its
corelative phenomena might be empty, yet still denying that awareness itself-the subjectivity that grounds perception-could be
empty. For, one might argue, the emptiness of all phenomena still
requires that there be a subject for whom they are phenomena.
Nagarjuna articulates this response in the opening verses of this
chapter:
l.
2.
That is, without a subject of experience, there can be no experience and no experienced objects. This argument has familiar instances in Descartes and Kant. But Nagarjuna, siding with Hume
on this issue, begins by asking how this entity could be an object of
knowledge:
184
3.
If it can abide
That is, independence is a two-way street. If the self is independent of its perceiving and perception, then its perceiving and perception are independent of it. Now there is one reading of this
claim on which it is straightforwardly and foolishly fallacious.
Nagarjuna is not arguing that all relations are symmetric. lt does
not follow from the fact that this book is on your table that your
table is on the book, and Nagarjuna is not foolish enough to think
that it does. The point is, rather, once again the Humean one that
whatever is indeed logically independent is separable. The opponent wants to argue that the self is logically independent of its
perceptions and their contents. But if so, then they are separable,
and we can imagine not only a nonperceiving subject, but also
unperceived perceptions. Justas we can imagine a clear table and a
book not on atable. But, Nagarjuna suggests, the idea of unperceived perceptions is both absurd on its face and contradictory to
the opponent's theoretical framework.
5.
58. The Sanskrit strongly suggests that the "someone" is to be understood as the
appropriator (in the sense discussed in the previous chapter) and that the "something" is to be understood as the appropriated object. Later commentators (e.g.,
185
Nagarjuna here emphasizes the corelativity and interdependence of subject and object. 59 Subjectivity only emerges when
there is an object of awareness. Pure subjectivity is a contradiction
in adjecto. Moreover, the idea of an object with no subject is
contradictory. The very concept of being an object is that of being
the object of a subject. The affinities to Kant and Schopenhauer
here are quite strong, but should not be pushed too far. Nagarjuna
would clearly have no truck with the substantialist ftavor of their
analysis of the subject and object.
6.
Candrakirti and Tsong Khapa see esp. pp. 210-11) generally treat the verse this
way. This would be a reminder that perception is a special case of appropriation. (1
thank the Ven. Gareth Sparham for pointing this out.)
59. But not their identity. Though subject and object as well as internal and
external objects are, for Niigiirjuna, all ultimately empty and, in important senses,
interdependent, they are not identical. Physical objects are, as Kant would emphasize, empirically external to the mind in a way that pains are not; and the conventional perceiver is not one with the perceived. When 1 see an elephant, it is not,
thereby, the case that 1 have a trunk!
186
10.
However, one should not be tempted to try to ground perception, the perceived object, and the perceiver in sorne more funda-
187
Not only has this analysis refuted the inherent existence of the
self as a basis for experience, but in virtue of so doing, it has
refuted the inherent existence of perception and the perceptual
faculties.
12.
188
ties. Absent the bases, we can see these assertions merely as useful
analytical tools in various dialectical contexts to help us to see the
ultimately empty and conventionally real nature of phenomena;
And Nagarjuna concludes this chapter by asserting that once one
ceases hypostasizing the subjective self-that entity that might
seem to be, as Descartes notes, the most obviously existent and
most easily known entity of all-the temptation to hypostasize
other entities dissolves.
Chapter X
This chapter, the only one in this set of chapters ostensibly addressing an external phenomenon, is in fact concerned entirely with a
standard counterexample to the kind of arguments Niigiirjuna offered in the two previous chapters on subjectivity in action and in
perception. Recall that in those discussions Niigiirjuna argues that
subject and object cannot be intrinsically and distinctly identitied
as entities because of their mutual dependence. Buddhist schools
asserting substantial identity in the context of dependent coorigination, such as Vaibhasika and Sautriintika schools, used the
example of tire aild fuel to demonstrate the compossibility of substantial independent identity and dependent origination, as well as
the possibility of the one-way dependence relation that these
schools assert that actions and perception bear to the self. Just as
tire depends on fuel but not vice versa, they would argue, and just
as tire and fuel have distinct identities despite the fact that the
former depends for its existence on the latter, action and perception can depend on the subject but not vice versa. Despite this
dependence, proponents of this view would argue each relatum
can be individually established as an entity. 60 In this chapter,
Niigiirjuna undertakes the task of demonstrating that the example
190
l.
The second and third verses spell out the consequences of attributing inherent existence to tire: lt would be independent of all
conditions, including its fuel; it would burn causelessly, since there
would be no condition under which it would not burn. So all tire
would, in that case, be eternal. Moreover, it would not consume
anything, having no connection to the presence or absence of fuel.
Moreover, Nagarjuna asserts in the final two lines of X: 3, the
activity of starting a tire would be nonsensical:
3.
61. The intended sense of "fue!" here is material that is actually burning-not,
for instance, firewood neatly stacked outside.
4.
191
6.
Here the opponent suggests that just as males and females are
suited to connect in special ways in virtue of their particular anatomical structures, despite existing independently of one another,
fire and fuel may be similarly suited to sorne special'kind of connection. In that case, we would have the b~arre picture of fire being
independent of fuel, yet peculiarly suited to coming together with
192
it, and vice versa. 62 Moreover, since on this model tire and fuel are
distinct from one another in nature, yet interactive (they "preclude" each other in the sense that causes and effects preclude one
another-that is, in virtue of being connected yet incapable of
simultaneous copresence), there must still be sorne account of how
they connect, an account by no means easy to envisage:
7.
193
There are two arguments here. In the tirst two lines, Nagarjuna
argues that if tire were to depend upon fuel, tire would be doubly
established. The point is that in order for the fuel to count as fuel,
the existence of the tire must have already been established; indeed, the fuel depends upon the tire for its character as fuel. So to
say then that the tire is dependent upon the fuel would be to argue
that something whose existence is already presupposed if the fuel is
to exist depends for its existence on that fuel. Note that this is only
problematic for the opponent. That is, for one who accepts, as
Nagarjuna does, the mutual interdependence of phenomena, it is
in fact true that tire depends upon fuel and that fuel depends upon
tire. But the opponent at this stage in the argument argues that tire
exists only dependently, but dependently on independent fuel. So
Nagarjuna only needs to show that position to be untenable. And
the problem for the opponent is simply that the fuel he wants to
exist independently can only do so in the presence of tire, which
itself is merely dependent.
Second, Nagarjuna argues, this would entail the absurd independent establishment of fuel as fuel. For fuel to be established independently as fuel in the absence of tire would be for there to be
sorne characteristic of fuel that could be specitied irtdependently of
tire that makes it fuel. But there is none. What makes fuel fuel is
that it is combustible.
10.
194
195
15.
This colophon verse reminds us that when existence is understood in terms of emptiness and when entities are regarded as
purely relational in character, identity and difference can only be
understood conventionally. This applies not only with respect to
apparently distinct entities, but also to the relation between parts
and wholes, things and their attributes, events and their causes,
andas Niigarjuna emphasizes here, self and the objects of awareness. Strict identity and difference as determined by reference to
phenomena themselves are only conceivable from the incoherent
standpoint of inherent existence.
...
ChapterXI
But suppose that one could see that the self, considered as agent or
as subject, lacks inherent existence, and still one argued that nonetheless it must do so in virtue of its impermanence and being subject
to change. Then, one might argue, birth, aging, and death must be
real as the conditions of the self's unreality. This is the position with
which Nagarjuna concerns himself in this chapter. But he is also
concerned with the generalization of this question to the birth, aging, and death of all of cyclic existence. 63 And it is this more general
problem with which he actually opens the chapter, developing the
account of individual impermanence as a special case: 64
63. In Buddhist philosophy, the entire phenomenal world is referred toas cyclic
existence ( 'khor-ba, Skt: sattZSara). This term indicates not only the endless cycle of
birth and death posited by the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth, but also the universally
cyclic character of phenomena: Perception and action forma cycle; motivation and
action forro a cycle; the seasons are cyclic; chains of interdependence of phenomena
are cyclic; interpersonal relations are cyclic; craving and acquisition are cyclic. It is
this metaphor, suggesting that all of unenlightened existence amounts to going
around in circles despite the illusion of progress, that most poignantly captures the
sense in which all of human existence is suffering. See Sogyal Rinpoche 1992, pp.
18-22, fot an excellent discussion.
64. This is, as the Ven. Sherab Gyatso pointed out in conversation, not the only
possible reading of the import of this chapter. It could perfectly well be read simply as
197
The question about the existence and nature of the origin of the
world is one of the questions that Sakyamuni Buddha declared to be
unanswerable. Nagarjuna here interprets that to mean that there is
nothing coherent that can be said about the origin of the world.
Given the striking similarity between the questions that the Buddha
declared unanswerable and those that Kant argues to be unanswerable by reason in the Antinomies of Pure Reason, there is much to
be said for this diagnosis. 66 So Nagarjuna here claims that we cannot
198
make sense of the beginning or end of all of cyclic existencebeginnings and ends are beginnings and ends of actual, conventionally designated and delimited processes within cyclic existence.
2.
199
Birth, old age, and death here are to be understood in an absolute sense. Of course, conventionally, the birth of a particular
human being comes before her/his aging, which precedes her/his
death. But that should not lead us to think of that birth as the
origin of an entity, that aging as the midpoint ih the life of that
entity, or that death as the end of that entity. If one adopts a
doctrine of rebirth, as does Nagarjuna andas do all of bis interlocutors, the point can be made quite straightforwardly: For any sentient continuum, every birth is preceded by an aging and a death,
and so forth.
But even setting aside the particular doctrine of rebirth, we can
elucidate. this insight with equal force: To see particular entities as
having determinate, nonconventional beginnings of existence and
determinate, nonconventional termini and, hence, that there are
distinct times at which there is a clear fact of the matter about
whether or not they exist, independent of conventions for their
individuation, is to see those entities as having necessary and sufficient characteristics for their identity, that is, as having essences.
But the central thesis Nagarjuna is defending is that this very conception of what it is to exist is incoherent-that things are empty of
such essences and that the boundaries of objects are conventional
and indeterminate.' There is no fixed boundary between the existence of a seed, the tree to which it gives rise, a piece of wood from
that tree, anda table fashioned therefrom or between the existence
of an intact table, a broken table, wooden table parts, ashes, earth,
the nutrients for a seed, that seed, the sapling to which it gives rise,
and another tree.
Once we see the world from the standpoint of emptiness of
inherent existence, the history of any conventionally designated
entity is but an arbitrary stage carved out of a vast continuum of
interdependent phenomena. 67 The arising of any phenomenon, hu67. One must not, however, take this to mean that for Nagarjuna there is an
inherently existent continuum out of which we carve the merely conventional.
Rather just as any totality is dependent upon its parts, the totality of emprica!
200
man, nonhuman sentient being, or inanimate object is the consequence of the disintegration of others. That disintegration succeeds their arising and aging. Once we give up the intrinsic identity
of entities, the constant cycle of death, birth, aging, and rebirth of
entities is unavoidable.
4.
6.
The birth, aging, and death that the opponent has in mind can be
represented at two levels: At the most generallevel, it is the birth,
aging, and death of cyclic existence, the examination of which
frames this discussion. At that level, Nagarjuna is pointing out that
reality depends upon its empty components and, so, is itself empty. Ontology
presupposes conventional categories. Nor is this to say that the conventions we
adopt are from our perspective arbitrary. They reftect our needs, our biological,
psychological, perceptual, and social characteristics, as well as our languages and
customs. Given these constraints and conventions, there are indeed facts of the
matter regarding empirical claims and regarding the meanings of words. But there
is no transcendent standpoint, Niigiirjuna would insist, from which these conventions and constraints can be seen as justified.
201
ChapterXII
Examination of Suffering
The first of the Four Noble Truths is that "all this is suffering." So
one can imagine an interlocutor granting all that has gone before,
but in defense of Buddhist orthodoxy, insisting that suffering is
inherently existent. After all, the Four Noble Truths are, from a
Buddhist perspective, truths. Nagarjuna, of course, is a Buddhist
and accepts the Four Noble Truths. (In fact, the principal chapter
of this work, Chapter XXIV, is devoted to an exposition of the
Four Noble Truths from the standpoint of emptiness and to the
argument that only on Nagarjuna's analysis can these truths be
maintained at all.) So he must, without denying the reality of
suffering, explain its emptiness.
l.
Examination of Suffering
203
The next alternative-that suffering arises from anotherrequires that there be essential difference. For since suffering does
arise from previous conditions, if there is genuine otherness, that
would characterize the relation between suffering and its grounds.
4.
204
7.
Examination of Suffering
205
tory ground for suffering. The second alternative leads back to the
problem scouted in the opening verses: Self-caused suffering is
both inconceivable within a general Buddhist soteriological framework and runs afoul of the arguments against self-causation' generally. Finally, t is rather embarrassingly ad hoc. Niigarjuna sums
this up in the next verse:
8.
No suffering is self-caused.
Nothing causes itself.
lf another is not self-made,
How could suffering be caused by another?
10.
206
nent, and conventional, existing only as imputed and only in relation to its empty subjects, there is plenty of suffering to go around.
But moreover, not only is the existence of suffering rendered
comprehensible on this analysis, but so is the possibility of the
alleviation of suffering. For if the proponent of the inherent existence of suffering were correct, while it might seem that suffering
would then have a more salid status than that vouchsafed it by
Nagarjuna's analysis in terms of emptiness, that very substantial
existence and hence independence of other conditions would make
its alleviation impossible. For if it exists independently, then there
are no conditions in the absence of which it fails to exist. So
Nagarjuna's analysis not only makes good sense of the first truththat of suffering-and by implication of the second-that of the
cause of suffering-but also opens the door for an analysis of the
third and fourth truths-those of cessation and of the means to
cessation.
Chapter XIII
Examination of Compounded
Phenomena
69. Kalupahana (1986) translates this term (Skt: sartJSkra, Tib: 'du byed} as
"dispositions." That is often correct. But it can also refer to compounded phenom-
208
What deceives?
The Victorious Conqueror7 1 has said about this
That emptiness is completely true.
ena in general. Given the structure of the argument in this chapter, 1 (as do Tsong
Khapa and his followers) prefer this reading. Kalupahana (p. 48) argues that it
makes sense to follow 'a chapter on suffering with one on dispositions, inasmuch as
the latter plausibly give rise to the former. He is right. But it also makes sense to
follow a chapter on suffering with one on compounded phenomena since positing
them as self-existent is what gives rise to suffering. Dispositions and compounded
phenomena are-as the homonymy in question demonstrates-closely linked in
Buddhist metaphysics. Dispositions are themselves compounded phenomena; but
more importantly, they are what lead us to the conceptual compounding that gives
phenomena their status as conventional entities.
70. This, of course, is partially responsible for the kind of nihilistic misreading
of the text one sees, e.g., in Wood (1994).
71. An epithet of the Buddha. (The translation reflects the sense of the Tibetan.
The Sanskrit would read "Blessed One. ")
209
lt is emptiness that makes change possible. If things had essences, they would be incapable of real change. But since they are
seen to change, Nagarjuna argues, they must be empty of essence.
The opponent, though, rejoins: Since according to Nagarjuna all
things are empty and since this is their ultimate nature, all things in
fact do have a kind of entitihood, namely, existence as empty phenomena. Nagarjuna is here anticipating the charge that he has
rejected other essences only to posit emptiness asan essence, subject to all of the problems he has already adumbrated for essentialist metaphysics.
The opponent then asks (XIII: 4), "If everything lacks being, and
is therefore empty, what could change?" Change would seem to
have to be change of something, and the doctrine of emptiness
seems to rob us of those somethings. Nagarjuna, hence, presents
himself, in the voice of the opponent, with a dilemma: He seems to
have propounded, his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, a theory of the essence of all phenomena. That theory, according to this hypothetical objection, is that emptiness just is the es-
210
211
212
213
corresponding to these conventional assertions are real propositions that make them true or false--entities with or without the
ascribed properties. Again, as long as we remain and are aware
that we remain within the framework of conventional designation
and conventional assertion, this poses no problems.
But, when we start to do metaphysics, it is easy to slip into
nonsense: For now, when we want to characterize the essence of a
thing, we take ourselves to be positing a non-conventional thing
and ascribing to it an essential property. And there not only are no
such things, but there are not even possibly such things. There is
no ultimate way the world is that we are characterizing, truly or
falsely.
The danger to which Nagarjuna is here adverting with respect to
Madhyamika philosophy (of treating Madhyamika as a view) is
then connected to assertion in the following way: lf one were to
think that in asserting that things are empty that one is positing
entities and ascribing to those independent entities the property of
emptiness, one would be treating the language of Madhyamika as
making literal assertions. But from the standpoint from which
these would be true, there are no entities and no characteristics,
and a fortiori, there are no entities having the characteristic of
being empty. The language must hence be understood, from the
ultimate perspective, not as making assertions, but rather as
ostending-indicating that which cannot be literally asserted without falling into nonsense-as Wittgenstein puts it in the Tractatus,
showing that which cannot be said.
Nagarjuna makes this much more explicit in bis discussion of
positionlessness in Vigrahavytivartani XXI-XXVIII, where he explicitly denies that the Madhyamika assert any propositions, in
virtue of there being no entities or properties presupposed by their
use of language existing independently and corresponding to the
words used. Aryadev.a makes the same point at Catul}stitaka XVI:
21. Candrakirti in bis comments oll these verses compares one who
treats emptiness as an essential property-as opposed to the lack
of any essential property, thus treating Madhyamika language as
assertoric in the sense of asserting the view that all things have the
essential nature of emptiness-to one who, upon entei:ing a shop
214
and learning that there are no wares for sale, asks the shopkeeper
to sell him the "no wares. "74,75
To hold a view of emptiness-to reify it and then attribute it to
phenomena-would then involve simultaneously reifying those phenomena as having a fixed nature and denying their existence at all,
in virtue of djsparaging their conventional reality as unreality by contrast with the reality of emptiness. lt is this incoherence, so characteristic of essentialist philosophies, that leads Nagarjuna to assert
that one holding such a view is completely hopeless-incapable of
accomplishing anything, philosophically or soteriologically. 76,77
74. Murti ( 1985) puts this point nicely: "Criticism of theories is no theory.
Criticism is but the awareness of what a theory is, how it is made up, it is not the
proposing of a new theory. Negation of positions is not one more position" (p.
xxiii).
See also Siderits ( 1989) for an interesting discussion of the connection between
Niigiirjuna's claim to positionlessness and contemporary antirealism. Siderits puts
the point this way:
(Niigiirjuna) neither asserts nor intimates any claims about the ultimate nature of
reality, for he takes the very notion of a way that the world is independently of
our cognitive activity to be devoid of meaning .... The slogan 'The ultimate
truth is that there is no ultima te truth' is merely a striking way of putting the
point that an acceptable canon of rationality will have to reftect human needs,
interest, and institutions. (p. 6)
1 am neither completely comfortable with Siderits's construction of the contemporary realism-antirealism debate nor with his location of Niigiirjuna on the antirealist
side. (1 rather think that Niigiirjuna would reject the presupposition of that
debate-that the relevan! sense of "real" is coherent in the first place.) But the
connection he establishes between positionlessness and the rejection of a realist
ontology is instructive.
All of this will become much more explicit (if not much clearer) in the discussions in XXII, XXIV, XXV, and XXVII below. 1 discuss this at greater length in
Garfield (unpublished).
75. Ng (1993), however, argues that this verse should be read "all false views."
So he claims that, according to Niigiirjuna, to understand emptiness is to relinquish
all false views and that anyone who holds false views about emptiness is incurable.
But Niigiirjuna doesn't say this, and the interpretation seems unfounded. See pp.
18-25.
76. The Tibetan "bsgrub-tu-med-pa" (will accomplish nothing) translates the
Sanskrit term "asdhytm," which car al so be translated "incurable."
77. This does not entail, however, pace Sprung (1979, p. 9, 15-16), that nothing is
intelligible. Niigiirjuna spends a good deal of time developing quite lucid analyses of
conventional phenomena and their relation to emptiness. What fails to be intelligible
is, rather, the idea of inherent existence. But sin ce no phenomena exist that way. and
since emptiness is intelligible, the actual nature of phenomena is intelligible.
215
ChapterXIV
Examination of Connection
Examination of Connection
217
218
This problem emerges not only in the analysis of intuitively unitary phenomena like vision, but is perfectly general. Things that
are separate from one another cannot be coherently thought of as
inherently different entities either. For without any inherent identity, there is no basis for inherent difference. This recalls the argument of Chapter l.
5.
That is, the only way that difference or the identity of a different
thing as different could be shown to exist inherently would be for
that difference to be present independently of the existence of
another different thing. But that is not so. The only altemative
would be to argue that difference is present independently in single
things. But this ignores the relational character of difference.
7.
Examination of Connection
219
ChapterXV
Examination of Essence
Examination of Essence
2.
221
If there is no essence,
222
5.
By a nonentity, Nagarjuna means something inherently different from sorne existing entity. A nontable in this sense would be
inherently different from a table. But a nonexistent in general
would be a Meinongian subsistent which is available as a basis of
predication but is intrinsically different from what it is to be an
existent-a real thing possessed of the property of being nonexistent. Just as a table must be established as a determinate entity in
order to establish the nature of nontables, existence must be
established as an inherently existent property in order to establish
the parallel status of nonexistence. But neither tables nor existence can be so est~blished. By the same token, then, there are
no inherently established nontables, nor any inherently established nonexistents in their stead. So even though it might appear
that .an analysis through emptiness would lea ve us only with
nontables and nonexistent phenomena, it doesn't even leave us
with that (inherently), though it leaves us with plenty of tables,
nontables, existents, and nonexistents (conventionally).
6.
If the only way that one can think about phenomena is to think
of them as things with inherent natures and to think of things
without such natures as thereby nonexistent, none of the Buddhist
doctrines of impermanence, emptiness, or liberation will make any
sense.
7.
Examination of Essence
223
If there is no essence,
In the first half of this verse, the opponent replies that since the
argument in the previous verse presupposes the reality of change,
79. Kalupahana (1986) relies on this verse to argue that the entire Mlamadhyamakaktlriktl is a "grand commentary on the Discourse to Ktltyyana" (pp. 81,
232). While this sutta is clearly important for Niigiirjuna, nothing in thetext justifies
this global interpretation. The range of topics Niigiirjuna considers far exceeds the
scope of that sutta, and no other passage from that sutta is mentioned in the
Mlamadhyamakakrika.
224
Katyayana:
10.
11.
Chapter XVI
Examination of Bondage
>
226
Examination of Bondage
227
If compounded phenomena are permanent, grasping is permanent. And if grasping is permanent, sarpsara is permanent. And if
sarpsara is pernianent, then nirvaQa is impossible. But the philosopher who is positing inherently existent bondage is doing so in order
to defend a Buddhist perspective on cyclic existence and nirvaQa.
This is precisely the motivation for the reification-the worry that
sarpsara and nirvaQa are, if not inherently existent, nonexistent. So
this conclusion is inadmissible for such an opponent.
5.
228
lf prior to binding
There is a bound one,
There would be bondage, but there isn't.
The rest has been explained by the gone, the not-gone, and the
. goer.
Examination of Bondage
8.
229
230
Chapter XVII
232
2.
233
And resolve87
As well as ...
5.
234
uum until the consequence is produced. The interlocutor then offers an analogy popular in Buddhist philosophy:
7.
10.
In the next verse, another opponent offers an orthodox formulation from a substantialist Buddhist school, arguing that particular
kinds of action are described as the methods of attaining realization and that particular rewards for the practicioner are mentioned
235
89. Refraining from killing, stealing, adultery, lying, deception, slander, gossip,
avarice, hatred, and philosophical error.
90. Kalupahana (1986) misreads XVII: 12-19 as Nagarjuna's own view. This is
understandable, as Niigiirjuna is providing four rival accounts of the relation between action and its karmic consequences. Each on his view contains a kernel of
truth; each is indeed accurate in a sense, though misleading in the sense in which it
is intended. This final position is closest to Nagarjuna's position and can easily be
confused with it, but to read it this way misses the significance of the transition at
XVII: 20.
236
13.
14.
237
If one thought that one could just resolve to abandon attachment and delusion and succeed, that would be to treat attachment
and attached action as trivial entities-even as illusory in the full
sense. Justas when one sees a mirage, one can, knowing that it is a
mirage, stop seeing itas water. That is possible for illusory things,
but not so for empirically real ones. It takes effort to see an actual
puddle as empty-not of conventional water, but of nonconventional inherent existence-and it takes effort to stop reifying habits. Again, though this is articulated in defense of the opponent's
view, this is a sophisticated opponent, and Nagarjuna in fact agrees
with much of this.
17.
238
of rebirth (the one who arises). This comment is, of course, most
directly about rebirth and the mechanism of karma in transmigration. Here is a way to understand that explicit point: The mechanism by which karma operates in rebirth is not that each individual
action in a continuum designated as an individual remains permanently in place or leaves a substantial trace that lies dormant until
it produces its consequence. This is indeed how karma is often
conceived by substantialist Buddhist schools. Rather, each moment of such a continuum, including the moment of rebirth, is a
consequence, through the mechanism of dependent arising, of all
of the previous moments of that continuum (and, of course, of
much else besides). Those karmic consequences are, as it were,
"summed up" in the total state of the individual at birth.
But of course the implications of this are more general and
concern every moment of any life. They can hence be made independently of any discussion of transmigration, though of course
they help to demystify that Buddhist doctrine, at least s it is
conceived in Mahayna philosophy. The point is this: Every moment of our lives represents the causal consequences of, inter alia,
all of our prior actions. No action "lies dormant" waiting for its
consequences to emerge. Nor does any action somehow become
"canceled" when sorne salient consequence is noticed. There is no
accounting kept, and no debit and credit system, either from the
causal or the moral point of view in the continuum of human action
and experience. Rather, at each moment we are the total consequence of what we have done and of what we have experienced.
And the only sense in which sorne past action may determine sorne
future reward is one in which that past action, as well as other
conditions, have determined a state now that, together with other
future conditions, will determine that reward. Mutatis mutandis,
of course, for negative consequences. This sober empiricist account of these matters forms the basis for Mahayna moral theory
and its account of the nature of soteriological practice.
18.
239
But here the opponent slides over into the substantialism that
Nagarjuna will criticize. For although he has characterized actions
as impermanent, he has retained the seed-and-sprout metaphor
that has the actions identifiable over time and, hence, as having an
independent existence and identity. Moreover, he suggests, their
consequences are determinate in time, delimited by death or
nirvaQa:
19.
240
nent, but that entails both that they do not inherently cease and
that their effects are indefinite in scope.
21.
Nagarjuna here and in XVII: 24 draws sorne of the moral consequences of the nihilistic view of action that seems to follow from the
conditions set on its existence by the reificationist: Actions would
not come into being through agency and so would have no regular
relation to any agents. And so one might find oneself experiencing
the consequences of sorne action one had not performed, or find
that it was, in sorne sense, one's own action. One would not take
action seriously as one's own responsibility and would not worry
241
about moral infractions. Monks and nuns would break their vows.
Since morality depends on a distinction between morally positive
and morally negative acts, if there were no actions, or if actions
could not be thought of as initiated by their agents, there would be
no morality. From another perspective, the preservation of vows
would be an impossibility anyway since preserving the vows requires
taking action, which would be impossible if action were uncreated.
24.
26.
Moreover, Nagarjuna continues, afflicted action is, for the opponent, done essentially in affliction. But given that affliction has
already been shown to be empty in the chapter on suffering (XII),
242
Obstructed by ignorance,
And consumed by passion, the experiencer
Is neither different from the agent
Nor identical with it.
Since the action does not arise inherently, it lacks inherent existence. Since, as per the discussion of agent and action in Chapter
VIII, empty actions entail empty agents, there is no inherently
existing agent of the kind presupposed by the objector. But the
objector continues:
30.
243
That is, if we deny the reality of the action and the agent, we
seem to deny the reality of the consequences of the action and,
hence, the experiencer, whether "without understanding and consumed by passion" or not. But Nagarjuna's view is not that these
things are non-existent, as he emphasized in XVII: 20-only that
they are empty. So it does follow that the consequences are
empty-but that does not entail in any way that they are nonexistent. And it follows that the consequence and the karmic link are
empty. From this it follows that the reborn individual whose existence and characteristics are determined by this causal sequence is
also empty of inherent existence. And if so, there is no problem
about how his/her genesis is dependent upon an empty sequence.
Nagarjuna introduces an analogy to explain tpis situation:
31.
32.
That is, we can understand the entire sequence of agent, action, consequences of action, and arising of new agent, whether
within a single lifetime or-in the context of Buddhist ontology
and doctrine-across lifetimes, as an entirely empty sequence
with entirely empty stages. But that does not prevent its being
perceived, or its reality for those who participate therein.
33.
244
-Chapter XVIII
246
247
Nagarjuna replies that once one stops trying to posit an independent self, the problem posed simply vanishes. That is, the worry
about the possessor of the aggregates and properties of the self
occurs only given that one conceives of them as properties and
aggregates that ar essentially of something. The insight is a bit
abstract, but it is the same one that Hume was after in the Fig
argument in the Treatise.92 Much of the motivation for positing a
substantial self is the intuition that since its properties and components exist, they must exist somewhere-that there must be a substratum in which they inhere. But once we give up that conception
of what it is for a property ora component to exist (as Nagarjuna
has argued that we must in Chapters V, VI, and IX above), the
drive to posit a substratum vanishes. And when the drive to posit
the substratum vanishes, we simply, Nagarjuna urges, think of the
aggregates and properties as associated aggregates and properties,
not as my aggregates and properties.
3.
248
6.
249
There are many di,scussions of the way to think about the self in
the Buddhist canon. For those who are nihilistic about the self
(such as contemporary eliminative materialists or classical Indian
Carvakas), it is important to explain tht: conventional reality ofthe
self. For those who tend to reify the self, the doctrine of no-self is
taught, that is, the doctrine of the emptiness of the self. But,
Nagarjuna claims, as a preamble to the next verse, there is a
deeper view of the matter-a doctrine of neither self nor nonself.
That doctrine is closely tied to that of the emptiness of emptiness.
Both the terms "self" and "no-self" together with any conceptions
that can be associated with them, Nagarjuna claims, are conventional designations. They may each be soteriologically and analytically useful antidotes to extreme metaphysical views and to the
disturbances those views occasion. But to neither corresponds an
entity-neither a thing that we could ever find on analysis and
identify with the self, nora thing or state that we could identify with
no-self. The terms and the properties they designate are themselves
empty, despite the fact that they are used to designate emptiness. To
say neither self nor no-self is, from this perspective, not to shrug
one's shoulders in indecision but to recognize that while each of
these'is a useful characterization of the situation for sorne purposes,
neither can be understood as correctly ascribing a property to an
independently existent entity. And if they cannot be understood in
this way, what are we really saying?
7.
This insight is developed further in this verse. Here Nagarjuna begins to move towards bis famous and surprising identification of nirvaQa with saiTlsara, and of emptiness with conventional reality. This
250
251
That is, independent of conceptual imputation there are no objects, no identities, and so, no distinctions. But of course, as Kant
would agree, there is no way that we can think such a reality.
which Nagarjuna would agree, it seems out of place in this discussion. Wood, on
the other hand, takes this verse to indicate that straightforward contradictions
(existence and nonexistence) follow from the supposition that anything exists at
all, in any way, and, hence, to form part of a nihilistic analysis. While such a
reading would make sense if one only attended to this chapter, taken in the
context of the work as a whole, and especially Chapter XXIV, that nihilistic
reading is very hard to sustain.
94. That is, of course, everything that is conventionally real in the first place.
Santa Claus is not among the objects of analysis here.
95. It is interesting to note-and we will retum to this point in XXII belowthat Nagarjuna typically resorts to positive forms of the tetralemma when emphasizing claims about conventional phenomena and to negative forms when emphasizing
the impossibility of the literal assertion of ultimate truths. Ng (1993), pp. 99-105,
notices this point as well.
96. Here 1 take issue with philosophers such as Sprung (1979), who argue that
the tetralemma is insignificant for Madhyamika thought. Indeed, as 1 indicate in
severa! places in this commentary, it is, both in its positive and negative moods,
often an indispensable analytic too!. lt is indeed "used as a means of investigation"
(p. 7) here and elsewhere in the text. Andas 1 argue here and below it is often quite
useful. Sprung may be led to this conclusion by the fact that he overlooks the
contrast between positive and negative tetralemmas, focusing exclusively on the
latter. Moreover, he confuses its logical structure. See Ruegg (1977) and Matilal
(1977) for divergent but each interesting and helpful investigations into the structure of the tetralemma, as well as Wood (1994) for what 1 regard as a serious
misunderstanding of the tetralemma and of its deployment in Madhyamika philosophy (see esp. pp. 64-77).
252
253
98. Kalupahana (1986) r~ads these final verses very differently, as having nothing to do with the ultimate truth, but rather as suggesting that freedom from
suffering "d?Cls not necessarily mean the absence of a subject-object discrimination.
It means the absence of any discrimination based upon one's likes and disllkes,
one's obsessions" (p. 59). It is, however, very hard to square this reading of XVIII:
10, 11 with any defensible reading of XVIII: 8, 9.
ChapterXIX
Examination of Time
Another response to the attack on the reality of action and its consequences might to be argue that, nonetheless, the time in which
action and its consequences are realized must be real. Nagarjuna in
this chapter argues that time cannot be conceived of as an entity
existing independently of temporal phenomena, but must itself be
regarded as a set of relationsamong them. His arguments are closely
akin to those of Zeno, Sextus, and McTaggart.
l.
Examination of Time
255
That is, if we den y that the present and the future existed potentially in the past and were somehow coexistent with it, there is no
way to understand the mechanics of the dependency relation. By
the time the present comes around, the past isn't around to give
rise to it. And when the past was around, the present didn't occur.
3.
If, on the other hand, one argued that the parts of time are
independent, there would be no sense in which they would be
256
Examination of Time
257
99. This insight is foundational for Dogen's later analysis of Uji, or being-time.
Chapter:XX
Examination of Combination
2.
In the opening verses, Nagarjuna sets up the destructive dilemma that frames the first part of this chapter: Either the effect is
Examination of Combination
259
First, suppose that the effect already exists somehow in the co.mbination of phenomena on which it depends. Then in grspingthat is, in conceiving or perceiving-that collection, we should,
ipso facto, grasp the effect. But we do not. Consider the set of
conditions of a match lighting. There is the presence of sulphur,
friction, oxygen, and so forth. But neither in virtue of conceiving
of these things nor in virtue of seeing them do we see fire.
4.
On the other hand, Nagarjuna argues, if the proponent of inherently .existent dependence argues that the effect is not present in
the combination, he would have to say that there is no difference
between actual conditions of an effect and an arbitrary collection
of phenomena with no relation at all to it. Because the very point
of this analysis is to explain how a particular set of conditions
determines an effect. For Nagarjuna, as we should be able to see
by recalling bis treatment of dependent origination and the relation between conditions and their effects in Chapter 1, this is no
problem: There is simply no general metaphysical answer to such a
question for a Madhyamika philosopher. A collection of conditions
determines its effect simply because when those conditions are
260
Examination of Combination
261
time the effect emerges, the cause will have vanished, and the
effect will then have emerged without a cause and so will be a
causeless effect.
7.
But neither, of course, can the effect arise before the conditions
are met since the effect would then arise spontaneously, and this
possibility has been refuted earlier.
9.
262
Examination of Combination
11.
263
13.
14.
15.
Without connecting,
How can a cause produce an effect?
Where there is connection,
How can a cause produce an effect?
264
18.
Examination of Combination
265
This attack on the inherent status of the relation between conditions and effects focuses on arising itself. The effect must either
101: See the discussion of XXVII: 30 for more on this point.
266
have entitihood or not. If it does, its being caused to arise is selfcontradictory. If not, though, from the ultimate standpoint it does
not arise. lt would follow from either that there is no inherently
existent arising and, so, no inherent production from a collection
of conditions. The next verse makes this same point from the side
of the collection. If the effect produced is not inherently produced,
the collection does not inherently produce it. If not, it is not an
inherently productive collection:
22.
23.
If the combination
Of causes and conditions
Is not self-produced,
How does it produce an effect?
Chapter:XXI
Examination of Becoming
and Destruction
In this chapter, Nagarjuna examines the phenomenon of momentary impermanence. At this point in the dialectic, one might
suggest that since the emptiness of phenomena derives directly
from their decomposition into momentary time-slices and from
the fact that they are constantly coming into existence and being
destroyed, that process of momentary arising and destruction itself ought to be real in the strong sense. Nagarjuna, by way of
completing the discussion of the nature of conventional phenomena, demonstrates the emptiness of even arising and destruction
themselves as a prelude to the final section .of the text, that
discussing the nature of the ultimate and its relation to conventional reality.
l.
268
will then follow that if they are inherently existent, they have
contradictory properties.
2.
But they cannot exist simultaneously. For then the same entity
would have contradictory properties.
4.
6.
269
This verse offers an epigrammatic summary of the previous argument: All phenomena, when analyzed closely, resolve into ephemeral moments, constantly disappearing to be succeeded by later
stages of what are conventionally identified as the same objects. So
everything that has ever existed has disappeared. Such a thing
cannot be coming into existence. But no nondisappeared thing
ever comes into existence. For as soon as it exists, it disappears.,
Similarly such things cannot be in the process of destruction. But
nothing that is not ephemeral is destroyed either. Given this
ephemeral nature of phenomena, establishing becoming and destruction as distinct, independent processes is impossible. This
claim is made directly in XXI: 8:
8.
270
lt is not tenable
That destruction and becoming are identical.
lt is not tenable
That destruction and becoming are different.
They cannot be identical because they are contradictory predicates. But every destruction is a coming to be and vice versa.
Hence when conceived of inherently, they can be neither identical
nor different; when conceived of inherently, they cannot exist:
11.
271
If one thinks that any existent entity must exist inherently, then
one is forced simultaneously to embrace the extremes of nihilism
and reification. One must reify because any existent must be
treated as inherently existent and hence permanent. But upon
observing the impermanence of phenomena, one will be driven to
nihilism since their impermanence would entail their lack of inherent existence and hence their complete nonexistence. An opponent, however, can be imagined to reply as follows:
15.
272
273
274
Chapter XXII
This is the first of the final set of chapters in the text, all of which
deal directly with topics concerning the ultimate truth and its relation to the conventional. The doctrine of the two truths, central to
all Mahayiina Buddhist philosophy, is most explicitly enunciated in
Chapter XXIV. But it is present as a pervasive theme in the text.
There is a conventional world of dependently arisen objects with
properties, of selves and their properties and relations. And in that
world there is conventional truth: Snow is white. Grass is green.
Individual humans are distinct from one another and from their
material possessions. But there is also an ultimate truth about this
world: It is empty (of inherent existence ). None of these objects or
persons exists from its own side (independently of convention).
From the ultimate point of view there are no individual objects or
relations between them. Just how these two truths are connected,
and how we are to understand them simultaneously, is the central
problem of Miidhyamika epistemology and metaphysics, and from
the standpoint of Miidhyamika, a satisfactory solution is essential
for Buddhist soteriological practice and ethics as well.
But discourse about the ultima te is perilous in a number of ways.
First, and most obviously, there is the ever-present danger of talking sheer nonsense. For the ultimate truth is, in sorne sense, ineffable in that all words and their referents .are by definition conventional. The dualities generated by the use of terms that denote
276
individuals or classes as distinct from others or from their complements are unavoidable in discourse and nonexistent in the ultimate. So one must be very careful to kick away all ladders
promptly. At the same time, there are things that one can say
without lapsing into nonsense, by way of ostention, even from the
bottom rungs .
. . But the other g~:ave danger is this: By distinguishing the conventional from the ultimate, it is tempting to disparage the former in
contrast to the latter, developing a sort of theory of one truth and
one falsehood. This is done if one reifies the entities associated
with the ultimate, such as emptiness or impermanence, or the Four
Noble Truths, or the Buddha. Then one treats these as real, intrinsically existent phenomena. The conventional then becomes the
world of illusion. It is to combat this tendency to treat the conventional world as illusory through treating such apparently transcendent entities as inherently existent that Nagarjuna develops these
final chapters. Perhaps the most obvious candidate for reification
in a Buddhist context is the Buddha himself, and that is where
Nagarjuna begins:
l.
'277
gates for two reasons: First, the self posited is meant to be unitary,
and the aggregates are plural. Scond, the aggregates are constantly undergoing change, while the self that is posited is meant to
endure as a single entity.
But the self can't be differet from the aggregates either. For
anything that happens to the aggregates happens to the self, and
vice versa. lf 1 hurt m y body, 1 hurt myself. lf you lose your vision,
you become blind. And in the present case, buddhahood is presumably attained by a purification of the aggregates through practice.
lf the aggregates were entirely different from the self. it is not clear
how purifying them would lead the practicioner to buddhahood.
The self cannot stand outside the aggregates as a basis for them,
for if we strip away all of the aggregates, there is nothing left as an
independent support. But nor is the self somehow contained in the
aggregates as a hidden core, and for the same reason. When we
strip away all of the aggregates in thought, nothing remains of the
self.
2.
The fifth possibility is that the self, in this case the Buddha's self,
is distinct from but dependent upon the aggregates. But from the
standpoint of positing an inherently existent Buddha this is unsatisfactory. For if the Buddha were dependent, he would lack an
essence and would be empty. And th~ situation can't be saved by
suggesting that he has an essence through a relation to another
since that presupposes essential difference, which presupposes that
both the Buddha and the aggregates on which he is supposed to
depend have individual essences: This is reinforced in the first two
lines of the next verse:
3.
276
individuals or classes as distinct from others or from their complements are unavoidable in discourse and nonexistent in the ultimate. So one must be very careful to kick away all ladders
promptly. At the same time, there are things that one can say
without lapsing into nonsense, by way of ostention, even from the
bottom rungs.
But the other gr:ave danger is this: By distinguishing the conventional from the ultimate, it is tempting to disparagethe former in
contrast to the latter, developing a sort of theory of one truth and
one falsehood. This is done if one reifies the entities associated
with the ultimate, such as emptiness or impermanence, or the Four
Noble Truths, or the Buddha. Then one treats these as real, intrinsically existent phenomena. The conventional then becomes the
world of illusion. lt is to combat this tendency to treat the conventional world as illusory through treating such apparently transcendent entities as inherently existent that Niigiirjuna develops these
final chapters. Perhaps the most obvious candidate for reification
in a Buddhist context is the Buddha himself, and that is where
Niigiirjuna begins:
l.
277
gates for two reasons: First, the self posited is meant to be unitary,
and the aggregates are plural. Scond, the aggregates are constantly undergoing change, while the self that is posited is meant to
endure as a single entity.
But the self can't be differerit from the aggregates either. For
anything that happens to the aggregates happens to the self, and
vice versa. lf 1 hurt my body, 1 hurt myself. lf you lose your vision,
you become blind. And in the present case, buddhahood is presumably attained by a purification of the aggregates through practice.
lf the aggregates were entirely different from the self. it is not clear
how purifying them would lead the practicioner to buddhahood.
The self cannot stand outside the aggregates as a basis for them,
for if we strip away all of the aggregates, there is nothing left as an
independent support. But nor is the self somehow contained in the
aggregates as a hidden core, and for the same reason. When we
strip away all of the aggregates in thought, nothing remains of the
self.
2.
The fifth possibility is that the self, in this case the Buddha's self,
is distinct from but dependent upon the aggregates. But from the
standpoint of positing an inherently existent Buddha this is unsatisfactory. For if the Buddha were dependent, he would lack an
essence and would be empty. And the situation can't be saved by
suggesting that he has an essence through a relation to another
since that presupposes essential difference, which presupposes that
both the Buddha and the aggregates on which he is supposed to
depend have individual essences: This is reinforced in the first two
lines of the next verse:
3.
278
The reifier in the last two lines of this verse and in the next asks
how it is possible that a real Buddha could lack a self. What then
would be the thing that practiced, that became enlightened and
that preached the Dharma?
4.
If there is no essence,
How could there be otherness-essence?
Without possessing essence or otherness-essence,
What is the Tathagata?
5.
7.
279
There is no appropriation.
There is no appropriator.
Without appropriation
How can there be a Tathiigata?
But, as we have seen in the first two verses of this chapter, there
is no way that the Buddha can be thought of as inherently existent
in relation to those aggregates. So we can't divorce the Buddha
from the aggregates. Nor can we understand the Buddha as inherently existing given that he must have aggregates.
9.
280
281
12.
13.
282
This crucial final verse emphasizes again the lack of any fundamental nature of entities. Emptiness is the final nature of all
things, from rocks to dogs to human beings to buddhas.l05 This fact
entails, for Mahayana philosophers, the possibility of any sentient
being to be fundamentally transformed-to attain enlightenment.
104. Nagao (1991) puts this point nicely: " ... [F]or one whose point or departure is snyatti, even the claim that all is snyatti is absurd, for non-assertion or nonmaintenance of a position is the real meaning of snyatti" (p. 42).
105. See also Kalupahana (1986), pp. 310-11, and Ng (1993), pp. 26-28, for a
similar reading.
283
But this is so, paradoxically, because ultimately there is no fundamental transformation, because there is nothing to transform. In
Chapters XXIV and XXV below, we will see the dramatic consequences of this line of reasoning.
Chapter XXIII
Examination of Errors
Examination of Errors
285
samsara at all and why we are not already in nirvaQa. And if they
are merely illusions, why isn't the distinction between samsara and
nirvaQa merely an illusion; why isn't suffering merely an illusion?
In short, why isn't illusion merely an illusion? This chapter is devoted to answering these fundamental questions in Buddhist
soteriological theory.
l.
But it follows from this that the defilements, in virtue of depending on these attributions and upon our relation to pleasant and
unpleasant things, all of which are themselves empty, are empty of
inherent existence. Indeed, they are not only dependently arisen,
but depend upon things or features of those things already shown
to be empty.
3.
286
In the first line, an interlocutor points out that if there are defilements at all there must be somebody whose defilements they are.
Niigiirjuna replies that we have already shown that there is no
subject for personal attributes in the many discussions of the relation between the self and its states previous to this (Chapters III,
IV, VIII, IX, XII, XIII, XVI, XVII, and XVIII). So whatever
analysis of defilement we develop, it will have to be one according
to which they presuppose no defiled individual.
5.
This verse recalls and applies the fivefold analysis of the self
developed in the previous chapter to the analysis of the defilements and the defiled. They are not identical to the aggregates,
completely different from the aggregates, present as a basis of the
aggregates, contained in the aggregates as a core, or separate from
or dependent upon the aggregates. The arguments concerning the
relation of the self to the aggregates can simply be applied directly
either to the defilements or to the defiled.
6.
Examination of Errors
287
8.
11.
288
absolute but rather comparative terms and, hence, essentially interdefined. lf this is so, then since their referents depend upon
each other for their satisfaction of these descriptions, neither prop~
erty can exist inherently.
12.
And since these are the bases for desire and anger, desire and
anger, arising from empty phenomena, must themselves be seen as
empty.
13.
Examination of Errors
15.
289
The argument above addresses the first and fourth of the principal errors directly. This verse hints at the generalization of this
argument to the other two. If there is no permanent self, there is
nothing to do the grasping that generates the view that there is
happiness in sarpsra or to grasp onto the body. Since all of these
errors are rooted in grasping and since any inherently existent
grasping would depend on an inherently existent grasper, these
errors cannot be inherently existent. The next two verses emphasize the nonexistence of both the error and the one in error from
the ultimate standpoint:
16.
If there is no grasping
Whether erroneous or otherwise,
Who will come to be in error?
Who will have no error?
17.
290
The next two verses mobilize a by now familiar general argument against inherent exi~tence specifically against the inherent
existence of error: Either error has arisen or it hasn't. lf it has, it
depends on something and so is not inherently existent. If it has
not, it has not come to be and so is either nonexistent or unexplained. Moreover, if error is to be conceived as inherently existent, it must arise from one of the four possible sources: self, other,
both, or neither. And all four possibilities have been refuted for
inherently existent entities in the general case in Chapter 1:
19.
20.
But why is the opponent forced to think of the objects of inherently existent error as inherently existent? That is, of course, an
obviously incoherent position. But the view characterized as an
error must have sorne ontological basis. And the self that is putatively in error has already been ruled out. So the only remaining
possibility is that the error is the perception of an inherently real
but at the same time deceptive object: a real but nonexistent object. lt is this that Nagarjuna claims is incoherent. Error then can
Examination of Errors
291
neither be an objctless but inherently existent mental phenomenon,106. nor can it be a subjectless perception of an inherently real
but nonexistent object. So in no way can error be grounded in
anything substantial.
22.
When all error is abandoned and we see the world aright, we are
no longer ignorant of the true nature of things. But this is not
because we then apprehend things and their true nature. Rather
we apprehend that there are no things, per se, and that those
posited from our side have no nature to understand.
106. For one thing, Nagarjuna has argued that there is no inherently existent
mind in which it could be located. For another, the idea of error, per se, though not
error about anything, is patently incoherent.
292
24.
If someone's defilements
Existed tbrougb bis essence,
How could tbey be relinquisbed?
Wbo could relinquisb tbe existent?
Nagarjuna reminds the s.ubstantialist at the end that if the defilements or errors were inherent in the person and, hence, were part
of his/her essence, they would be permanent and, hence, could not
be relinquished. This would constitute a direct rejection of one of
the most fundamental tenets of the Buddhist outlook-the possibility of liberation.
25.
If someone's defilements
Did not exist tbrougb bis essence,
How could tbey be relinquisbed?
Wbo could relinquish tbe nonexistent?
Chapter XXIV
294
295
4.
296
ing the Four Noble Truths, denies the existence of the three refuges and makes Buddhism itself impossible.
6.
The implicit dilemma with which Nagarjuna here confronts himself is elegant. For as we have seen, the distinction between the two
truths or two vantage points-the ultimate and the conventionalis fundamental to bis own method. So when the opponent charges
that the assertion of the nonexistence of such things as the Four
Noble Truths and of the arising, abiding, and ceasing of entities is
contradictory both to conventional wisd()m and to the ultima te truth
(viz., that aH phenomena are dependent, impermanent, merely arising, abiding momentarily and ceasing, and only existing conventionally, empty of inherent existence), Nagrjuna is forced to defend
himself on both fronts and to comment on the connection between
these standpoints.
Nagarjuna launches the reply by charging the opponent with foisting the opponent's own understanding of emptinesson Nagarjuna.
Though this is not made as explicit in the text as one might like, it is
important to note that the understanding Nagarjuna has in mind is
one that, in the terms of Mdhyamika, reifies emptiness itself. This
wi~l be made more explicit in XXIV: 16:
7.
8.
297
As
we shall see, this analysis of the distinction between the two truths as an
appearance/reality distinction is explicitly rejected by Nagarjuna in XXIV: 18, 19. 1
agree with Kalupahana ( 1986), who notes that "artha as well as paramartha are truths
(satya). Th former is not presented asan un-truth (a-satya) in relation to the latter,
as it would be in an absolutistic tradition. Neither is the former sublated by the latter." But Kalupahana goes a bit too far when he continues, "There is no indication
whatsoever that these are two truths with different standing as higher and Iower" (p.
69). For there is clearly an importan! sense in which, despite their ontic unity, the
ultimate truth is epistemologically and soteriologically more significan! than the conventional. Kalupahana also errs in my view when he characterizes the two truths as
"two fruits" and, hence, as different bu(complementary moral ideals (p. 332). In bis
zeal to see Ngarjuna as a non-Mahayana philosopher andas a Jamesian pragmatist,
1fear that he distorts the central epistemological and metaphysical themes ofthe text.
109. lt should be noted that both Sanskrit and Tibetan offer two terms, each of
which in turn is often translated "conventional truth." Sanskrit presents "saftlv;tisatya" and "vyavahtira-satya." The former is delightfully ambiguous. "Saftlv;ti" can
mean conventional in all of its normal senses-everyday, by agreement, ordinary,
etc. But it can also mean concealing, or occ/uding. This ambiguity is exploited by
Madhyamika philosophers, who emphasize that the conventional, in occluding its
conventional character, covers up its own emptiness.
Candrakirti's commentary to this verse distinguishes three readings, reftecting
three distinct etymologies: "Saftlv;ti" can mean concealing; it can mean mutually
dependen!; it can mean transactional, or dependen! on Iinguistic convention. The
Iatter is captured exactly by the second term "vyavahtira," which simply means
298
10.
299
By a misperception of emptiness
A person of little intelligence is destroyed.
Like a snake incorrectly seized
Or like a spell incorrectly cast.
110. See Streng (1973), pp. 92-98, and Huntington (1989), pp. 48-50, for a similar analysis. (But Huntington places a bit too much emphasis on specifically social
convention in bis analysis of the conventional truth, neglecting the role of what the
Mdhyamikas call "primal ignorance;" or the "innate disposition to reify," embodied
in our ordinary cognitive tendencies, which may, in fact, be ontogenetically more fundamental than the specifically social conventions to which they give rise and that then
reinforce them. See esp. pp. 52-54.) This analysis contrasts sharply with Murti's
(1973) assertion that "the Absolute [ultimate truth] is transcendent to thought ...
phenomena in theiressential form" (p. 9). This view ofthe ultimate truth asan absolute standing behind, or in opposition to, a relative truth of the conventional, as a
Kantian noumenal world stands to a phenomenl world, is quite contrary to
Ngrjuna's doctrine ofthe emptiness of emptiness. See also Murti (1955) for an extended defense of this reading and Sprung (1973), esp. pp. 43-46, for another argument for a radical discontinuity between the two truths. Thla and Dragonetti (1981)
agree with this view of Mdhyamika as nihilistic with regard to the conventional
truth: "As a consequence of their argumentation and analysis, the Mdhyamikas
deny the existence of the empirial reality, of all of its manifestations ....
As a result ... there remains (we are obliged to say) 'something' completely
different .... That 'something' is the true reality" (p. 276). Crittenden (1981) is in
substantial agreement with this view.
Curiously, even Nagao seems to succumb to this temptation to absolutize emptiness when he turns to bis analysis of the ultimate truth, despite bis emphasis on the
identity of the two truths when he is elucidating the conventional. See Nagao
(1989), pp. 71-72, 75-76.
300
12.
13.
301
Nagarjuna here simply denies that bis view sustains the nihilistic
reading, while granting that if one treats emptiness as nonexistence, all of the absurd conclusions that the opponent enumerates
inded follow. But, Nagarjuna continues in XXIV: 14, the interpretation of the entire Madhyamika system depends directly on how
one understands the concept of emptiness. If that is understood
correctly, everything else falls into place. lf it is misunderstood,
nothing in the system makes any sense:
14.
15.
302
303
304
kind of dependence, impermanence, or action. But more importantly, if Ngrjuna's analysis of these things as empty meant that
they were nonexistent and that only emptiness exists, then Ngarjuna himself would be denying the empirical reality of these phenomena. That is, not only would an inherently existent phenomenal world be devoid of change, dependency,. and so forth, but
inherently existent emptiness would render the phenomenal world
completely nonexistent.
This defines the straits between which the middle path must be
found, as well as the presupposition that generates both extremes:
The extreme of reification of the phenomenal world depends upon
viewing emptiness nihilistically; the extreme of reification of emptiness requires us to be nihilistic about the phenomenal world. A
middle path must reify neither and hence must regard emptiness,
as well as all empty phenomena, as empty. Both extremes presuppose that to exist is to exist inherently. They only disagree about
whether this inherent existence is properly ascribed to conventional phenomena or to their ultimate nature. Nagrjuna will deny
exactly that presupposition, arguing that to exist is to exist conventionally and that both conventional phenomena and their ultimate
natures exist in exactly that way. The next verse is the clmax of the
entire text and can truly be said to contain the entire Madhyamika
system in embryo. lt is perhaps the most often quoted and extensively commented on verse in all of Mabayana philosophy:
18.
19.
These two verses demand careful scrutiny and are best discussed
together. In XXIV: 18, Nagrjuna establishes a critical three-way
relation between emptiness, dependent origination and verbal convention, and asserts that this relation itself is the Middle Way
toward which bis entire philosophical system is aimed. As we shall
305
"a
Relativity or mutual dependence is a mark of the unreal. . , . For the Miidhyamika, reciprocity, dependence, is the lack of inner essence. Tattva, or the Real,
is something in itself, self-evident, and self-existent. Reason, which understands
things through distinction and relation is a principie of falsity, as t distorts and
thereby hides the Real. Only the Absolute as the unconditioned is real. ... (p. 16)
306
This represents as clear a statement as one would like of the position that the
conventionallultimate distinction is a version of an appearance/reality or phenomenonlnoumenon distinction, a position 1 read Nagiirjuna as at pains to refute. As
Murti says later in this essay (p. 22), "1 have interpreted iunyattl and the doctrine of
the 1\vo Truths as a kind of Absolutism, not Nihilism. Niigarjuna's 'no views about
reality' should .not be taken as advocating a 'no-reality view.' "
Nagao (1991) concurs with Murti on this point: "The 1\vofold Truth is composed
of paramartha (superworldly or absolute) and saQlvrti (worldly or conventional).
These two lie sharply contrasted, the former as the real truth, and the latter as the
truth concealed by the veil of falsehood and ignorance" (p. 46). Now while Nagao,
to be sure, is less disparaging of the conventional truth than is Murti, noting the
altemative etymologies of "sa'flvrti-satya" and allowing that " ... the 1\vofold
Truth opens a channel by which language recovers itself in spite of its falsehood and
ignorance," he emphasizes that "the 'silence' of paramrtha is true 'Wisdom' " (p.
46) Hence in the end, he agrees with Murti on the critica! interpretive claim that the
two truths are radically distinct from one another and that the conventional truth is
not in fact a truth in any straightforward sense. See also Napper [1993] and Hopkins
[1983] for a similar interpretation.
There are two things to say about this interpretation: First, as Nagarjuna would
be quick to point out, absolutism is not the only altemative to nihilism. Madhyamika is an attempt to forge a middle path between precisely those two extremes.
And second, to say that a rejection of absolutism is a rejection of the reality of the
world tout court is to presuppose exactly the equation of existence with inherent
existence that is the target of Nagarjuna's critique. To the extent that "reality" is
interpreted to be absolute reality, Nagarjuna indeed advocates a "no-reality view."
But to the extent that we accept the Madhyamika reinterpretation of "reality" as
conventional reality, no such consequence follows.
Streng (1973) agrees:
Because Nagarjuna's ultimate affirmation is pratityasamutpda, any conventional affirmation that might suggest an absolute, in the form of a dogma or
doctrine, is avoided. Even iunya, asvabhva, Tathgata or pratyaya cannot be
transformed into absolutes ....
. . . The highest awareness, which is needed for release from svabhva, is not
the result of moving from the finite to the infinite, but the release from ignorance
about the dependent co-origination of anything at all. Paramrthasatya, then, is
living in full awareness of dependent co-origination .... (p. 36)
120. Nagao (1989) puts this point nicely:
When the birth-death cycle itself is empty, when there is nothing that exists
permanently as its own essence; when, without self-identity all the functions of
beings depend upon others, then dependimt co-arising is emptiness and empti. ness is dependent co-arising ....
307
308
dependently arisen. So everything-including emptiness-lacks inherent existence. So nothing lacks the three coextensive properties
of emptiness, dependent-origination, and conventional identity.
With this in hand, Nagarjuna can reply to the critic: He points
out (XXIV: 20-35) that, in virtue of the 'dentity of dependent
origination and emp~iness on the one hand and of ontological independence and intrinsic reality on the other, such phenomena as
arising, ceasing, suffering, change, enlightenment, and so on-the
very phenomena the opponent charges Nagarjuna with denyingare possible only if they are empty. The tables are thus turned: lt
appeared that Nagarjuna, in virtue of arguing for the emptiness of
these phenomena, was arguing that in reality th~y do not exist
precisely because for the reifier of emptiness, existence and emptiness are opposites. But, in fact, because of the identity of emptiness and conventional existence, it is the reifier who, in virtue of
denying the emptiness of these phenomena, denies their existence.
And it is hence the reifier of emptiness who is impaled on both
boros of the dilemma he presented to Nagarjuna: Contradicting
the ultimate truth, the opponent denies that these phenomena are
empty; contradicting the conventional, he is forced to deny that
they even exist! And so Nagarjuna can conclude:
20.
The argument for this surprising turnabout reductio is straightforwardly presented in the subsequent verses:
21.
309
denies its emptiness, he denies that suffering is dependently originated. But he agrees that all phenomena are dependently originated. He thus is forced to deny the existence of suffering. But
for Nagarjuna, since existence amounts to emptiness, the assertion of the emptiness of suffering affirms, rather than denies, its
existence.
22.
The second n~ble truth is that suffering has a cause. But, again,
if the opponent asserts the nonemptiness of suffering, he asserts
that it does not arise from causes and conditions. Yet Nagarjuna's
analysis shows that it must, in virtue of its emptiness, be so arisen
and thus accords with the second truth.
23.
Similarly, the third noble truth is the truth of cessation. But inherently existent things cannot cease. Empty ones can. Nagarjuna's
analysis thus explains the third truth; the reifier contradicts it.
24.
25.
The fourth truth is the truth of the path. Again, the path only
makes sense, and cultivation of the path is only possible, if suffer-
310
If nonunderstanding comes to be
Through its essence,
How will understanding arise?
Isn't essence stable?
27.
28.
For an essentialist,
Since the fruits through their essence
Are already unrealized,
In what way could one attain them?
29.
311
But it would also follow that there is no Dharma-no true Buddhist doctrine since that is grot!nded on the existence of the Four
Noble Truths. And finally, as Nagarjuna emphasizes in XXIV: 31,
32, since the attainment of buddhahood depends upon the study
and practice of the Dharma within the context of the spiritual
community, the opponent's view, unlike Nagarjuna's, has the consequence that no buddha can arise. Moreover, if the Buddha and
enlightenment were each inherently existent, they would be independent and could hence arise independently, which is absurd. To
be a buddha is to be enlightened, and vice versa:
31.
32.
312
35.
313
314
The standpoint of emptiness is hence not at odds with the conventional standpoint, only with a particular philosophical understanding of it-that which takes the conventional to be more than
merely conventional. What is curious-and, from the Buddhist
standpoint, sad-about the human condition, on this view, is the
naturalness and seductiveness of that philosophical perspective. 122
This, of course, is the key to the soteriological character of the
text: Reification is the root of grasping and craving and hence of all
suffering. And it is perfectly natural, despite its incoherence. By
understanding emptiness, Ngrjuna intends one to break this
habit and extirpate the root of suffering. But if in doing so one falls
into the abyss of nihilism, nothing is achieved. For then action
itself is impossible and senseless, and one's realization amounts to
nothing. Or again, if one relinquishes the reification of phenomena
but reifies emptiness, that issues in a new grasping and cravingthe grasping of emptiness and the craving for NirvQa-and a new
round of suffering. Only with the simultaneous realization of the
emptiness, but conventional reality, of phenomena and of the emptiness of emptiness, argues Ngrjuna, can suffering be wholly
uprooted.
Let us consider now more carefully what it is to say that emptiness itself is empty. The claim, even in the context of Buddhist
philosophy, does have a somewhat paradoxical air. For emptiness
is, in Mahyna philosophical thought, the ultimate nature of all
phenomena. And the distinction between the merely conventional
nature of things and their ultimate nature would seem to mark the
distinction between the apparent and the real. While it is plausible
to say that what is merely apparent is empty of reality, it seems
122. This point requires emphasis. For Niigiirjuna is not merely speaking to and
correcting philosophers. He is no Berkeley, suggesting that bis own position is that
of common sense and that only a philosopher would reify. In fact, it is fundamental
to any Buddhist outlook, and certainly to Niigiirjuna's view, that one of the root
delusions that afflicts all non-buddhas is the innate tendency to reify. But that
tendency is raised to high art by metaphysics. Niigiirjuna intends bis attack to strike
both at the prereftective delusion and at its more sophisticated philosophical counterpart. But in doing so, he is not denying, and is in fact explaining, the
nonmetaphysical part of our commonsense framework-that part that enables us to
act and to communicate and, especially for Niigiirjuna, to practice the Buddhist
path.
315
316
317
into metaphysical extravagance and brings it back to sober pragmatic scepticism. ~24
37.
318
319
320
321
certain Buddhist doctrines). Then from the identification of emptiness with dependent arising would follow- the nonemptiness of
emptiness. Moreover, if conventional phenomena are empty, and
dependent arising itself is nonempty and is identified with emptiness, then the two truths are indeed two in every sense. Emptinessdependent arising is self-existent, while ordinary phenomena are
not, and one gets a strongly dualistic, ontological version of an
appearance-reality distinction. So the argument for the emptiness
of emptiness in Chapter XXIV and the identity of the two truths
with which it is bound up depend critically on the argument for the
emptiness of dependent origination developed in Chapter l.
Having developed this surprising and deep thesis regarding the
identity of the two truths, Nagarjuna turns in the next chapter to
the nature of the relation between saQlsiira and nirviiQa and the
nature of nirvaQa itself.
Chapter:XXV
Examination of Nirvana
.
This chapter continues the study of the nature of what are often
thought of as ultimate realities an~ that of their relation to the
conventional world. It follows quite naturally on the preceding
chapter, which considered the relation between emptiness and the
conventional world. For insight into emptiness is, from the standpoint of Mdhyamika philosophy, an important precondition for
entry into nirvl).a. And just as the ultimate truth is related to the
conventional as an understanding of the way things really are as
opposed to the way they appear to be, nirvl).a is related to saqsra
as a state of awareness ofthings as they are as opposed to a state of
awareness of things as they appear to be. But given the results of
Chapter XXIV, and the surprising identification in entity of the
conventional with the ultima te and the doctrine of the emptiness of
emptiness, one might well wonder about the status of nirvl).a. Is it
no different from saqsra? lf it is, how, and how is it related to
saqsra? lf not, why pursue it, or better, why aren't we already
there? Is nirvl).a empty? lf not, how does it escape the Mdhyamika dialectic? If it is, can it really be different from saqsra?
Ngrjuna begins the examination with a challenge from the
reificationist, raised by the previous chapter:
l.
If aH this is empty,
Then there is no arising or passing away.
Examination of Nirvdl}a
323
Unrelinquished, unattained,
Unannihilated, not permanent,
Unarisen, unceased:
This is how nirviiQa is described.
324
that could serve as a referent for the term, there is the terrible
temptation when speaking of nirvaoa to think that, to the extent
that one is saying anything true of it in any sense, one is literally
asserting an ultimate truth about an inherently existent thing or .
state. One forgets that once one transcends the bounds of convention, there is no possibility of assertion. 125
The discussion in XXV: 4-18 is framed by the tetralemma that
would follow from considering nirvaoa to be something indepen- dent about which something could be said; oras a proper subject
for a theory; or as a genuine alternative to saQlsara, from which it
is inherently different. If it were so, it would have to either be
existent, nonexistent, both, or neither. (Note that here Nagarjuna
uses the terms "existent"/"non-existent" in both their adjectival
and nominal forms [Tib: dngosldngos-minl/dngos-poldngos-med,
Skt: bhiiva/bhiivollabhiiva/abhiivo] deliberately calling attention to
their correlation. 1 have generally translated the Tibetan "dngospo" as "entity'' throughout this text. But for the purposes of this
discussion in order to highlight the structure of the text, 1 switch in
the next few verses to "existent. ") Nagarjuna will now argue that
none of these alternatives ispossible.
4.
Examination of Nirv11a
325
see in a moment, neither do we want .to say that nirvaQa is nonexistent. But moreover, Nagarjuna will want in another sense to identify
nirvaQa and saq1sara (see XXV: 19,20 below), and there is clearly a
sense in which we can say that samsaric phenomena exist anda sense
in which we can say that they do not. (Again, see the discussion of
the positive tetralemma in XVIII: 8 above.) The point here is that
though things seen from the standpoint of saq1sara and from the
standpoint of nirvaQa are not different in entity, from the standpoint
of saQlsara they can be characterized and appear as entities. But
from the standpoint of nirvaQa, no characterization is possible since
that involves the dualities and dichotomies introduced by language,
including the positing of entities and characteristics, as well as their
contraries and complements. These have only conventional and
nominal existence, and no existence at all from the standpoint of
nirvaQa. (See also the discussion of XXVII: 30 below.) In a sense
this discussion can be seen as a useful commentary on chapter IX of
the Vimilakirti-nirdesa-stra and, in particular, on the drama tic concluding remarks by Manjusri and nonremarks by Vimalakirti on the
subject of nonduality and insight into emptiness: Manjusri indica tes
that the distinction between the conventional and ultimate is itself
dualistic and hence merely conventional. To realize it is hence to enter into nondual awareness of emptiness. He then asks Vimalakirt,i
to comment on nonduality. Vimalakirti remains silent. 126
5.
126. His Holiness the Dalai Lama in oral remarks (Columbia University 1994)
notes that "The ultimate nature of things-emptiness-is also unknowable, in that
one cannot comprehend it as it is known in direct apprehension in meditation."
Nayak (1979) writes:
Being firmly entrenched in snyatii and realizing that language has only a conventional use, an arya or a philosopher regards silence or noncommitment as the
highest good or paramiirtha. And the attainment of paramiirtha in this sense, not
in the sense of a transcendent reality, constitutes an essential feature of nirviil]a
or Iiberation. (p. 478)
326
All empirical phenomena are compounded. But being compounded involves phenomena in the round of sarpsara. For since
the recognition of compounds as unitary phenomena demands
conventions of aggregation, to be compounded is, ipso facto, to
have a merely Conventional existence. And it is the treatment of
merely conventional, nominally existent phenomena as inherently
existent entities that generates sarpsara. That is because from the
standpoint of Buddhist so~eriological theory, the foundation of
suffering-the basic condition of sarpsara-is craving and the
foundation of craving is the root delusion of taking to be inherently existent-and so worthy of being craved-that which is
merely conventionally, or nominally existent. We are hence trapped
in sarpsara exactly to the extent that we mistake the conventionally existent as inherently existent. So given the contrast between
nirvaQa and sarpsara and the fact that everything in sarpsara is
compounded, nirvaQa cannot be compounded. So it is not existent, even conventionally.
6.
Sarpsara and dependent arising go hand in hand. For a phenomenon to be dependent is for it to be impermanent and for it to be
subject to destruction. (See the discussion in Chapter XV.) NirvaQa
is supposed to be beyond all this. It is, by definition, liberation from
all that characterizes sarpsara. So again, nirvaQa cannot be a conventionally existent entity. (It is important to see that there is a sense in
which nirvaQa is dependent and a sense in which it is independent,
and these are not contradictory: NirvaQa is achieved in dependence
upon the practice of the path and the accumulation of wisdom and
merit. But once attained, inasmuch as from the standpoint of
nirvaQa there are no entities at all, there is nothing on which nirvaQa
can be said to depend. In this sense it is nondependent.) But all of
this raises the obvious possibility that nirvaQa is simply not real at
all-that it is completely nonexistent. This possibility is considered
and rejected in the next two verses:
Examination of NirviiTJa
7.
327
To say that nirvar;ta possesses the positive property of nonexistence is not coherent either. For then there would be nothing to
which the predicate "nonexistent" could in fact apply. Note the
difference between saying, in the sense relevant here, "nirvar;ta is
nonexistent" and "Santa Claus does not exist." The latter, Nagarjuna would certainly agree, is not only coherent but true. But in
explaining the semantics of the latter, we can posit a concept of
Santa Claus and interpret the sentence as asserting that that concept is not instantiated. But when, in trying to characterize
nirvar;ta, one is tempted to say that it is a nonexistent, this is in
response to the difficulty we have just noted in asserting that
nirvar;ta in fact exists. The temptation is to assert then that it is real,
but has sorne kind of ghostly reality as a substratum of the property
"nonexistent." But that is simply incoherent-an attempt to have
it both ways. So the predicate "does not exist" cannot, in this case,
even be applied. If there is no nirvar;ta at all, there is no such basis
of predication. Even this apparently negative discourse about
nirvar;ta is then blocked, to the degree that it is taken literally as
positive attribution of a negative predicate.
8.
328
10.
Yukti$~tika
Examination of Nirval'}a
3Z9
that each of the conjuncts is individually impossible, their conjunction, even were it nota conjunction of contradictories, could certainly not be coherent. In particular, we don't want to say tbat one
does and does not pass into nirva1.1a upon release from saiJlsara.
12.
330
15.
NirviiQa is said to be
Neither existent nor nonexistent.
If the existent and the nonexistent were established,
This would be established
But this can't be so either. For really to assert this as the nature
of nirvaoa would be to suppose that both of these possibilities
made sense with respect to it, but that neither happened to be
realized. But it makes no sense for nirvaoa to exist. And it makes
no sense for it not to exist. So of each, the negation can't be
assigned any coherent meaning. And conjoining two pieces of nonsense only yields further nonsense.
16.
If nirviiJ.la is
18.
Examination of Nirviil}a
331
20.
To distinguish between saq1sra and nirvl}.a would be to suppose that each had a nature and that they were different natures.
But each is empty, and so there can be no inherent difference.
Moreover, since nirvl}.a is by definition the cessation of delusion
and of grasping and, hence, of the reification of self and other and
of confusing imputed phenomena for inherently real phenomena,
129. See Nagao (1991), pp. 42-43, for a similar account.
130. This reading contrasts with that of !nada (1970), who asserts that nirviiQa,
in fact, is transcendent, belonging toa wholly different ontological realm. 1 find his
reading very difficult to reconcile with XXV: 19,20 or indeed, with any of Chapters
XXII, XXIV, or XXV.
332
Examination of Nirviif)a
333
ness of all entities, and the ultimate truth is merely the essenceless
essence of ihose conventional things. So nirvaQa is only sarpsara
experienced as a buddha experiences it. lt is the person who enters
nirvaQa, but as a state of being, notas a place to be. 133
21.
The kind of metaphysical speculations that the Buddha discouraged in the famous discussion of the unanswerable questions regarding the origins and lmits of the world and what les beyond the
universe in space and time, are grounded, Nagarjuna asserts, in the
view that cyclc existence-the entire phenomenal world-can be
conceived as an entity against which stand other entities or other
regions. This is the same kind of picture that motivates the view that
nirvaQa is someplace or something beyond cyclc existence or that
nirvaQa is bounded or eternal. But there is no vantage point from
which the universe is one place among many. That is why talking
about what les beyond it is nonsense and why reifying or characterizing nirvaQa temporally is one example of that nonsense.
22.
23.
ena are empty, through studying Miidhyamika philosophy, perceives them as inherently existent and only reasons her/himself into the knowledge that these phenomena are really empty and that these truths are merely conventional.
133. Kalupahana (1986) reads this verse differently. He translates it as follows:
"Whatever is the extremity of freedom and the extremity of the life-process, between them not even a subtle something is evident." He then takcs the purport to
be the denial of any entity such as a "seed of release" mediating between the states
of sa1f1Sdra and nirva,a (p. 367)
334
134. Padhye (1988) points out (pp. 68-70) that Niigiirjuna should also be read
here and in this chapter as a whole as emphasizing that, in virtue of the emptiness of
all phenomena in saTtJSara and of the self that experiences them, nirvaf]a, which is
defined simply as that self's Iiberation from positing those phenomena, must be
equally empty. For it, too, can only be understood as a characteristic of that empty
self and of its relation to empty phenomena.
Chapter XXVI
Given an analysis of the nature of nirvaoa, one might well ask how
to achieve it. In this chapter, Nagarjuna provides a straightforward
answer. The twelve links of dependent origination are regarded by
all Buddhist schools as providing an analysis of the nature of interdependence in the context of human existence. The tone of this
chapter is decidedly positive, marking the tuming of a dialectical
comer in the preceding two chapters. Having elucidated the
Madhyamika account of the nature of ct>nventional and ultimate
reality, Nagarjuna does not need at this point so much to. emphasize the emptiness of the twelve links. Rather he can assume that to
provide an account of them as dependently arisen is, ipso facto, to
demonstrate that fact. Their emptiness is therefore simply presupposed. This chapter is thus a straightforward exposition of how, in
light of the interdependence of the twelve links, to enter into and
to exploit the cycle in the service of liberation.
l.
336
337
ways (perceptual or conceptual "sets") and actions upon thern leading to our becorning aware of external or internal phenornena (consciousness), which leads to our representing thern as having deterrninate locations and denorninations (narne and forrn). These two levels
of analysis are obviously quite compatible, and while the forrner
plays a central role in Buddhist cosrnological and soteriological
theory, the latter is irnportant in Buddhist psychology and practice.
3.
The first two lines ernphasize that contact-that is, the initial
relation between the sense organ and its object-has three necessary and sufficieJlt conditions: sense organ, the object, and the
cognitive state to which the sense organ gives rise (apprehension/
dran byed). The last two lines are continuous with the next verse:
5.
That which is assembled from the threeEye and form and conseiousness,
338
ous verse, which is in Buddhist psychology a form of consciousness. But it should not be confused with the consciousness whose
condition is contact, on pain of a hopeless explanatory tangle.
Contact, as we have seen, is dependent upon the existence of the
organ, the object, and the functioning of the sense faculty. Dependent upon that contact is sensation. The exposition here is perfectly traditional. It only derives its punch from the context: In
light of the connection that has been developed between the dependence that is central to this model and emptiness, the entire
Theravada model of the nature of the phenomenal world comes to
look like an analysis in terms of emptiness.
6.
Pleasurable sensations lead to craving; painful ones lead to craving for their end. That craving leads to grasping-an attempt to
appropriate and make one's own the source of pleasure or the
means for the alleviation ofpain, and to excessive valuation of the
grasped object. The four spheres probably denote the four realmsthe desire, the form, the formless, and the pure, entities in each of
which could be the objects of grasping.
7.
9.
339
136. " 'du byed" (Skt.: salfJSkara). This term is often translated in this text as
"disposition." It can also mean "to compound" or "compounded phenomenon."
Here it must function as a verb. Both Streng (1967) and lnada (1970) prefer the
reading "to compound" or "to construct." But given Niigarjuna's theory of action,
as we have seen, dispositions and actions are of a kind. And what generales the
karma that creates and maintains cyclic existence is action. Hence, 1 read the term
here as denoting action and disposition together, via its primary meaning, "disposition." This receives further support from the use of the nominal "byed-po, "which is
cognate with the compound " 'du byed" and is most naturally translated as "agent."
340
The place to pick up the tangle in order to unravel it, from the
standpoint of practice, Nagarjuna suggests, is with action and disposition, here comprised together under the single tenn "action"
('du byed), which in this context conveys not only the unity of
action and disposition as seen from the soteriological point of view,
but also their role in creating or bringing about future existence.
These are most easily controlled through philosophical reftection,
through meditation, and through assiduous practices of various_
virtues. By changing the way that we act physically, verbally, and
mentally, we thereby change the way that we perceive, think, and
act and thereby change what we see and the consequences of our
actions.
11.
12.
341
And this is not only the analysis Nagarjuna offers of the world
and of our experience of it, but bis final soteriological recommendation given the doctrine of the emptiness of all phenomena. Human
existence and experience are indeed governed by the twelve links
of dependent origination. But since they are essentially dependent, they are essentially empty and, hence, are impermanent and
subject to change. The twelve links provide an anatomy and an
etiology of suffering. But by understanding their impermanence
and dependency, we also see the cure for that condition. For by
cultivating a clear and accurate philosophical view of the nature of
things-the view so explicitly articulated in Chapter XXIV, by
internalizing that view, and by taking up with the world in accordance with it, we can cease the reification of the "this" and the
"that," grasping for which binds us to suffering. Nagarjuna argues
that if we can achieve that, we can achieve the nirvaQa characterized in Chapter XXV-a nirvaQa hot found in an escape from the
world but in an enlightened and awakened engagement with it.
Chapter XXVII
Examination of Views
The final chapter of the text, like the previous chapter, applies the
results of the climactic analyses f Chapters XXIV and XXV. lt is
noteworthy that all of the classic erroneous views discussed and
refuted in this chapter are refuted earlier in the text. Indeed, Chapters XXIV and XXV are immediately preceded by a chapter on
errors. One might therefore think that this chapter is otiose, or at
least misplaced. For here Nagarjuna considers a range of alternative metaphysical views conflicting with Nagarjuna's analysis in
terms of emptiness. These views are all well-known and considered
false by all schools of Buddhist philosophy. So why does Nagarjuna
return to them as a collection at the close of the text?
The previous chapter demonstrated the positive payoff of the
analysis of emptiness and its relation to conventional phenomena.
Nagarjuna there argued that one can exploit emptiness and an
understanding of emptiness in following the path to nirvaQa. But
the pursuit of the path entails the elimination of error. In fact, it
can negatively be characterized, as we saw in the nirvaua chapter,
spcifically as the elimination of error. So it is important for
Nagarjuna to show that the analysis developed in XXIV and XXV
can not only promote positive movement toward nirvaua but also
the eradication of the erroneous views that bind us to saq1sara.
That is the burden of this final chapter. lt is also important dialectically to see that Nagarjuna is demonstrating that the root of all of
Examination of Views
343
these erroneous views is the view that the self or the external world
exist inherently. If, he will argue, one grants either of those claims,
one is stuck with one or more of these errors. lt therefore follows
that any ~iew, including any view of any other Buddhist schoolincluding:an of the schools that castigate these views on independent grounds-that posits inherently existent entities will succumb
to these errors. Nagarjuna thus concludes by arguing not only that
bis position is capable of leading to nirvaga, but that it is the only
position capable of doing so.
l.
The views "in the past 1 was" or "1 was not" And the view that the world is permanent, etc.,
All of these views
Depend on a prior limit.
The view "in the future 1 will become other" or "1 will not do
so"
And that the world is limited, etc.,
All of these views
Depend on a finallimit.
344
Examination of Views
345
1\vo problems are developed in this verse: First of all, the self
that the reificationist wishes to posit is a permanent, enduring self.
But appropriating is a momentary action that arises and ceases
constantly with new objects of appropriation. A sequence of such
actions is hardly a substantial subject. This is a straightforwardly
Humean argument. Second, Nagarjuna points out, even if one
argued that the self was substantial and also identical to that sequence, there is a further difficulty: The self that is posited by this
interlocutor is an enduring subject of these acts of appropriation.
But sorne of the members of the sequence have yet to come into
existence. lf the self exists entirely at all moments of time, as an
unchanging substantial subject, it cannot be identified with a sequence, sorne of whose members are not presently existent.
7.
346
nonappropriator who once was an appropriator. But if appropriation is the basis of the identity of the one who has been liberated
with the one who was not, that appropriation should persist in the
nonappropriator, which would be contradictory.
8.
10.
Examination of Views
347
We could make no sense of the actual empirical fact of conventional personal identity; action done at one moment would be done
by one person, and that person would experience non e of its consequences. To the extent that we could make sense of them at all, the
phenomena of memory and experiencing the consequences of
one's previous actions would become interpersonal affairs, which
seems at least a bit odd.
12.
Moreover, since the past, as per the discussion of time in Chapter XIX and the discussion of dependent origination in VII, does
not actually exist, we would have the consequence of an existent
(the present person) being brought into existence dependent upon
something that no longer exists (sorne past person). Anything that
exists has sorne past.
13.
348
sense. And the "neither" option is not open since there is no third
alternative. Nagarjuna now points out that the argument applies
straightforwardly to the future existence of the self:
14.
Examination of Views
349
That is, the "both" and "neither" horns of the tetralemma stand
or fall together. Permanence and impermanence are mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives. They can neither be co-present,
nor co-absent. (The option of asserting them in different voicesconventional and ultimate-is not open to the opponent here, who
is trying to defend an inherently existent self.)
19.
If nothing is permanent,
350
Nagarjuna begins by questioning the sense of the question regarding the limits of the world: It seems to be like a question
about the size of a table. But it is not. It is not, that is, a question
about whether there is anything beyond the world. For suppose
that the world is limited. That suggests that there is some.thing
beyond it. But that just means that we haven't cometo the end of
the world. The whole world includes that stuff that lies beyond.
Or suppose that the world is unlimited. That suggests that there is
nothing beyond the world. But that just means that everything
that is in the world is, in fact, in the world, which is trivial. The
question regarding the limits of the world, so Nagarjuna suggests,
is nonsensical.
22.
Examination of Views
351
27.
352
The appropriator here is the self; the appropriation, the existence of the world. Nagarjuna in these two verses is summing up
and drawing together the conclusions of the two main arguments in
the chapter. We want to say on the one hand that neither the world
nor the self is permanent. Both are thoroughly characterized by
impermanence. On the other hand, we want to say of both that
they endure in time and of each that there is no fixed boundary to
its identity. But it can't be that either has both of these properties.
28.
This verse echoes XXVII: 18. If either the self or the world
could be conceived as both finite and infinite, finitude and infinitude would make no sense at all. They are contradictory properties
and cannot characterize the same thing at the same time. Moreover, they are exhaustive alternatives.
29.
1 prostrate to Gautama
Who through compassion
Taught the true doctrine,
Which leads to the relinquishing of all views.
Examination of Views
353
354
We can now return to this verse with more of Niigiirjuna's analysis available: For the practicioner who directly realizes emptiness,
nothing is present to consciousness but emptiness itself. For such a
138. Both the Most Ven. Khamtrul Rinpoche and the Most Ven. Samdhong
Rinpoche emphatically support the second reading as the primary meaning of the
verse and as the final expression of the emptiness of emptiness (personal communication). !nada (1970) waffles. In bis commentary (p. 164), he endorses the "all
views" reading. But in bis translation (p. 171), he inserts "false" parenthetically
before "views." These are clearly not consistent inoves. Ng (1993) also agrees with
the "false view" reading. See pp. 18-20.
Examination of Views
355
356
Examination of Views
357
can be said truly about the final nature of things and having defended this thesis exhaustively in the text, bis words and those of
the Buddha cannot even be taken as literally true about the final
nature of things. Hence in order to realize that nature, one must
relinquish even a literal, nonostensive reading of these texts. 139
139. The Ven. Prof. Geshe Yeshes Thap-Khas (oral commentary) points out
that emptiness as it appears in direct realization does not appear as an entity (ngospo). From the ultimate point of view there are no entities. Since a view is always a
view of an entity, in direct realization of emptiness, there is a necessary relinquishing of all views, including all Buddhist and all Miidhyamika views. But, he argues, it
does not follow that one not directly realizing emptiness can relinquish all views or,
in particular, that one should relinquish true ones. Insofar as direct realization of
emptiness is a primary goal of Buddhist practice, he argues, and especially of the
practice of Buddhist philosophy, it is hence appropriate to read this verse in this
way as well as in the more conventional way.
The Ven. Geshe Yeshe Topden (also in oral commentary) puts this a bit differently: Emptiness, he argues, when it is known inferentially, is known as a positive
phenomenon and appears as an inherently existent entity, even though the subject
of such a cognition knows that it is not so (compare a mirage that appears as water
even to someone who knows that it is merely a mirage). And in order to realize
emptiness in this way, one must make use of the Miidhyami~a view while rejecting
all false views. To one who directly apprehends emptiness, however, he claims,
emptiness, while an object of such an awareness, is nota positive phenomenon, but
a mere negation of all positive phenomena and is not different in entity from tbe
mind cognizing it. In such an awareness, he claims, since emptiness does not appear
as qualified in any way and since such an awareness is nonconceptual, there is no
view of emptiness. So, he argues, even the Miidhyamika view is to be relinquished
at the stage of direct realization. Nonetheless, the verse indicates first, on his
reading, the necessity to relinquish all false views, and then, in direct realization to
relinquish the Miidhyamika view.
Mukhetjee (1985) makes a similar point:
A significant point that the Miidhyamikas never fail to make out is that reason
and concepts have a place in Vyavahara. It is possible to select a pattern, hold a
position without clinging to it, i.e., without being dogmatic. It teaches one to
look at a view as something relative and shows that the error of clinging is not
essential to reason .... Did not the Buddha himself use words, concepts without
clinging to them? .. .
By being free of clinging one attains a level that is transcendent to all the
views, but at the same time he remains fully cognisant of the other levels in their
minutest details without losing sight of the undivided reality. He sees these levels
as not yet perfect; he sees them as various stages on the way to the perfect." (pp.
221-22)
See also Kalupahana (1986), p. 80. But Kalupahana also says that these finallines
"clearly show that Niigiirjuna was aware that the Buddha did not speak 'metaphysically' but only 'empirically' " (p. 391). That conclusion certainly does not
follow. lb refuse to give a metaphysical theory of the nature of phenomena and to
358
One must realize the ultimate truth dependent upon the conventional, but abandon all of these necessarily collventional designations as characterizations of an ultimate nature that is ultimately
uncharacterizable.l40
The anticipation of Wittgenstein's clase of the Tractatus is
remarkable:
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when
he has used them-as steps-to climb beyond them. (He must, so to
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
Examination of Views
359
References
While not all of these texts are explicitly cited in my discussion, all
have inftuenced my views and my treatment of the text in sorne
ways. With sorne 1 am in almost complete agreement; with others 1
take issue in whole or in part. But all have been helpful to me in
thinking about Nagarjuna's argument. This is not, however, by any
means meant to be a complete bibliography of useful works on
Nagarjuna-only an indication of what inftuenced me. The English translations of canonical texts are given where available.
Earlier Translations of Mlamodhyamakakdrikd
loada, Kenneth K. (1970). Niigiirjuna: A Translation of his Mulamiidhyamikakiirikii With an Introductory Essay. Tokyo: The Hokuseido
Press.
Kalupahana, David J. (1986). Niigiirjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle
Way. Albany: State University of New York Presi.
Streng, Frederick (1967). Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville: bdingdon Press.
362
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363
364
References
References
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366
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of Hawaii Press.
Index
J\ction, 178-82,231-44,312-13,318,
335-36,339-40
and change, 179
classification of, 232
consequencesof,234-44
andignorance,335-36
and pleasure, 233
as a promissory note, 236-37, 239
and soteriology, 180, 318
speech, 232-33
J\gent, 178-82
J\ggregates, 141, 142, 176, 245-46,
276-78
J\ppropriation, 182, 184-85, n. 58, 279
J\rising, 163-64, 267-74
basic, 163-64
ryadeva, 213, 300n. 112, 353n. 137
Asat, 116
J\ssertion, 100-101, 212-15, 324-25,
355-59
J\ssociation, 155-58
J\ttachment, 236-37
Bala, 103n. 15
Becoming. See J\rising
Bhiiva, 324
Bhiivaviveka, 300n. 112
Bondage, 225-30
Brten nas bdags-pa, 305
Buddha,275-83,295,310-11
Buddhahood,91,275-83,332n. 132
Buddhapiilita, 97, 300n. 112
Butterlamp, 164-67
Bya-ba, 103
368
lndex
Index
and impennanence, 264-65,317
and nihilism, 300-304, 314-15
and nonexistence, 133
realization of, 248, 325, 332-33,
355-59
Endurance, 171-76
Errors, 284-92 .
and defilements, 285-86
emptiness of, 290-92
and grasping, 289
and impennanence, 288
and pleasure, 287-88
and samsara, 284-85
Essence, 89-90, 100, 103, 110-11, 112,
116,118,119,121,209,220-24,
278,282
and change, 223-24
emptiness as, 91, 209, 212-13, 282
otherness-essence, 110, 221-22, 278
and pennanence, 220-'21
Examples
butterlamp, 164-67
cloth, 195
tire and fuel, 138-39, 189-95
horse, 301
light switch, 109, 110, 115
magic, 243
match lighting, 168, 259
milk and curd, 211
mirage, 237, 243-44, 302n. 114
pot, 195
seed and sprout, 106, 115, 234, 260
table, 89-90, 109, 111, 199, 209, 222,
315
tree perception, 117-18
.Existence, 116
conventional, 90, 101, 102, 116
inherent, 88-89,90, 102, 116, 117,
118,126,147-48,220,281
Meinongian, 117, 187-88, 272-73
Explanation, 91, 109, 110, 112-113,
116, 122, 145-146
Feeling,338
Fire and fuel, 138-39, 189-95
369
370
lndex
lndex
Peacefulness, 168-69
Perception, 184-87,216-17
Permanence, 224
Philosophicallnvestigations, 114n. 26
Phrad-pa, 216
Pleasant and unpleasant, 287-88
Positionlessness, 212-15, 265, 307
Potential existence, 105-6, 120, 262
Potrhapada Satra, 197n. 65
Prajaptir-upadaya, 305
Priisal)gika-Miidhyamika, 87, 97, 98,
100, 101
Prasannapada,94n. 10,96,100,307
Pratija, 358n. 140
Pratityasamutpada, 91
Pratyaya, 103-4
Properties, 149-52
Pyrrhonism, 137-38, 300, 307,317
Rang bzhin, 89n. 4, 103, 111
Ratnakata-Satra, 356
Rebirth, 199,237-38,241-42
Regularity, 116, 259-60
Reification, 122, 223, 237, 293, 302,
304,308
Rest, 130
Rgyu, 103
Rkyen, 103-4
Rnam-par shes-pa, 338
Robinson, R., 300n. 111
Ruegg, D., 250n. 93, 251n. 96
Rung-ba, 301n. 113
Rapa, 142
Samdhong Rinpoche, 98, 295n. 107,
354n. 138
Samkhya, 105
SalfiSdr, 225n. 82
Sa111siira, 101, 196n. 63, 284-85,
336
as illusion, 285
and nirviil)a, 249-50, 284-85
SalfiSkdra, 207-Sn. 69, 339n. 136
Saff'lv~ti-satya, 297
Sangha,295,310-11
371
372
Index
Svabhava,89n.4, 103
Svatantrika-Madhyamika, 87
Tathagata, 275-83
Tetralemma, 249-51,270-71,280-81,
324-31,333-34
negative, 280-81, 324-31, 333-34
positive, 249-51
Thap-Khas, Y., 98, 105n. 17, 125-26n.
35,353n. 137,357n. 139
.Tha-snyed bden-pa, 298n. 109
Tha-snyed yod-pa, 298n. 109
Third man argument, 128
Thongs-ba, 263
Topden, Y., 357n. 139
Three jewels, 295, 310-11
Thurman, R., 114n. 26
Time, 254-57, 274
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 114,
156-57,213,358
Transmigration, 225-30
and change, 226
and grasping, 226-30
TsongKhapa,92n. 8,97-98, 104~. 16,
105n. 17, 117n. 37, 184-85n. 58,
189n.60,207-8n. 69,233n. 88,
340n. 136
Thck, A., 114n. 26
1\Velve links, 335-41
1\vo truths, 88, 90, 91, 95n. 11, 27576,296-99,305-6n. 119,315-16,
318-21,322,331
Uji, 257n. 99
Ultimate reality, 89n. 3, 101
Ultimate standpoint, 101, 114