Indian Penal Code
Indian Penal Code
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LIABILITY OF A SOLDIER UNDER THE I.PC. - In the case of a soldier, the I.PC. does not
recognize the mere duty of blind obedience to the commands of a superior officer as sufficient to protect him
from the penal consequences of his act. The law requires that he should exercise his own judgment, and he
cannot escape the penal consequences of his own act, if he does not believe in good faith that he is bound by
law to do it.
In Shew Mongal Singh v. State (1981 Cri. L.J. 84), where a policeman had fired as ordered by his
superior authority, and death of two persons ensued, the Calcutta High Court held that having regard to the
circumstances of the case, the policeman was not guilty. It was observed that the police force plays a vital
role in the maintenance of law and order in any State. Like the armed forces, the police force is a disciplined
force; and if discipline is not maintained, the force disintegrates. Acting in strict accordance with the order of
a superior is indeed a part of discipline. In the course of the judgment, the Court observed as follows:
If an order to fire is given, and there are casualties, can the policeman who opened fire be
prosecuted for a criminal offence? If the order is not necessary and on the face of it illegal, such as an order to
shoot an innocent passer-by or to torture a person, the policeman carrying out the order is certainly entitled to
protection under the law.
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.- This expression means act done by the order of a superior. In
criminal law, the maxim respondent superior does not apply. The order of a superior to an inferior servant to
commit an offence is not a valid defence. Nothing but fear of instant death is a good defence for a policeman
who tortures any person by the order of a superior. The maxim respondent superior has no application in
such a case: Lalit Khan (1825) 20 Bom. 364.
So also, where under order of their naik, three sepoys of a regiment fired a shot at a mob which,
otherwise, was by no means violent, it was held that they were guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, and that they were not bound to obey an illegal order : Gurdit Singh, (1812) PR. 16.
A more extreme case on the point is the case of the soldier who commanded the guards at the
execution of Charles I. His plea was that all he did was as a soldier under the command of his superior officer,
whom he had to obey or die. It was held that this was no excuse, for his superior was a traitor, and all who
obeyed him were equally traitors.
The Courts have laid down that whenever justification of a mistake of a fact is pleaded, the following
five guiding principles are to be applied, viz.I.
When act is in itself plainly criminal, but is more severely punishable if certain circumstances exist,
then ignorance of those circumstances is no answer to a charge for the aggravated offence.
II.
(ii) If, however, an act is prima facie innocent, but is an offence if certain circumstances exist, then
ignorance of those circumstances is a good defence to the charge.
III. (iii) If the act itself is wrong, and becomes criminal under certain circumstances, the person who
commits such a wrongful act cannot argue that he was ignorant of the facts which turned the wrong into a
crime.
IV. (iv) The state of the defendant's mind must amount to absolute ignorance of the existence of the
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Shortly stated, criminal intention means the purpose or design of doing an act forbidden by criminal law
without just cause or excuse. Now, there are certain acts which appear to be criminal, but are done without
any criminal intent. It is but fair that such acts should not be penalised. They are, therefore, rightly exempted
from the category of 'offences'. Under this head, seven acts are mentioned in Ss. 81 to 86 and 92 to 94. These
are as under:
(a) Act done to avoid other harm : S. 81.
(b) Act of a child,(i) under seven. S. 82.
(ii) above seven and under twelve, but of immature understanding S. 83.
(c) Act of lunatic : S. 84.
(d) Act of an intoxicated person: Ss. 85-86.
(e) Bona fide act for another's benefit : S. 92.
(f) Communication made in good faith : S. 93.
(g) Act done under compulsion or threat : S. 94.
It will be seen that in all these seven acts, a criminal intention (mens rea) is not present. All these
seven acts are discussed below in detail.
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PRINCIPLE OF S. 81.- The principle upon which S. 81 is based is that when on a sudden and extreme
emergency, one or the other of two evils is inevitable, it is lawful so to direct events so that the smaller evil
only shall occur.
them. The protection is afforded by Ss. 82 and 83 which can be analysed thusAn act of a child(i) under seven years is no offence: S. 82. (ii) above seven and under twelve years,
who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his
conduct, is also no offence : S. 83.
LEGAL PRESUMPTION AS TO CAPACITY OF INFANTS.- It will be seen from S. 82 that under the age
of seven years, no infant can be guilty of a crime. For, under that age, an infant is, by presumption of law, doli
incapax, i.e. not endowed with any discretion so as to distinguish right from wrong. If the accused is shown
to be child under seven, the proof of the fact would, ipso facto, be an answer to the prosecution.
It is to be noted that the immunity of children under seven years of age from criminal liability is not
confined to offences under Code only, but extends to offences under any special or local law.
The immunity of a child from criminal liability can be analysed in a tabular form thus:
CHILD
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Under 7 years
(not liable)
Example:
A child of 9 years of age stole a gold necklace, and sold it to B for half a rupee only. Evidence at the
trial indicated that the child had attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and
consequences of his conduct. Here, the child would be guilty of theft, if it is proved that he had attained
sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the consequences of his act, while B would be guilty of
receiving stolen property, knowing it to be stolen.
'MALITIA SUPPLET OETATEM'.- The wording of S. 83 shows that if it is. shown that a child under 12 and
above 7 had attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature of his conduct, he will be liable.
The circumstances of a case may disclose such a degree of malice as to justify the maxim malitia supplet
oetatem [malice supplies defect of years]. It is to be noted that this maxim applies to cases falling under S. 83
only.
(c) Act of an insane person (S. 84)
Criminal law gives complete protection to an insane person. This is the third case of a person devoid
of criminal intention or any intention at all. S. 84 deals with the liability of an insane person for acts or
offences committed by him. It provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a person, who owing to
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is wrong or
contrary to law.
TEST OF INSANITY IN LAW.- The policy of the law is to control not only the sane, but so far as is
possible, also the insane. It is not, therefore, every person mentally diseased who is ipso facto, exempted
from criminal responsibility. Such exemption is allowed only where the insane person is incapable of
knowing the nature of the act or that what he is doing is either wrong or contrary to law. This section lays
down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged unsoundness of mind. It is by this test, as
distinguished from the medical test, that the criminality of an act is to be determined : Lakshman v. Dagdu,
(1886) 10 Bom. 515; Naga Kan Hla, (1914) 2 U. B. R. 28.
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INSANE DELUSION.- Akin to lunacy, is what is known as insane delusion, which is a borderline case. The
legal position as to partial delusion is as follows:
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McNaughten's Case
The legal doctrine in regard to criminal insanity was for the first time settled in England in this case.
The facts of the case are as follows:
For many years, Mr. McNaughten suffered from what is known to doctors as persecution mania.
He thought a gang of persons followed him about and slandered him and prevented him from getting a job.
One day, at the Charing Cross railway station, he shot one Mr. Drummond, thinking him to be Sir Robert
Peel, the Prime Minister of England, who, he thought, was responsible for all his misfortunes. The witnesses
who were examined stated that the prisoner, at the time of the act, was impelled by an uncontrollable
impulse, while others stated that he was insane. The Solicitor General, in summing up the case before the
jury, said, The object of the Crown is to ascertain whether at the time the prisoner committed the crime, he
was to be regarded as a responsible agent or whether all control of himself was taken away. The jury
acquitted the prisoner on the ground of insanity.
(d) Act of an intoxicated person (85. 85-86)
EFFECT OF INTOXICATION.-Whereas lunacy is a disease and, is therefore to be pitied, drunkenness is
a vice and is therefore to be condemned. Drunkenness is a species of madness for which the man is to blame.
The law provides that deprivation of a sense of judgment and human feeling which in a sober state would
have prevented the accused from offending, shall not, when produced by his voluntary act, screen him from
punishment, although he may be no longer capable of self-restraint. Qui pecat ebrius luat sobrius: Let him
who sins when drunk be punished when sober. If a man chooses to get drunk, it is his own voluntary act; it is
very different from madness which is not caused by any act of the person. That voluntary species of madness
which it is a party's power to abstain from, he must answer for.
Now, so far as intoxicated persons are concerned, Ss. 85 and 86 are relevant. S. 85 lays down that
nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, owing to intoxication, is incapable of knowing the
nature of the act, or that what he is doing is wrong or contrary to law, provided that the thing which
intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.
TEST OF DRUNKENNESS.- The test to apply in cases of drunkenness is not the test applied in cases of
insanity, viz., whether the accused person knew what he was doing was wrong or was able to appreciate the
nature and quality of his act. The correct test is whether by reason of drunkenness, the accused was incapable
of forming an intention of committing the offence. (Samman Singh, (1943) Lah. 39)
S. 86 states the presumption for certain offences committed by intoxicated persons. Thus, if an act is
an offence only when done with a particular intention or knowledge, and such an act is committed by an
intoxicated person, he will be presumed to have possessed the knowledge requisite for the offence, unless he
can show that he was intoxicated without his knowledge or against his will.
In other words, when intention or knowledge is an ingredient of the offence, a person who is
voluntarily drunk must be considered to have got the same knowledge as lie would have had if he had been
sober.
It is pertinent to note that although the above presumption applies to the knowledge of the accused,
there is no such presumption as regards his intention. The section does not say that the accused is to be dealt
with as if he had the same intention as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated. Thus, S. 86 attributes
to an intoxicated person the knowledge of a sober man, but does not attribute to him the same intention. In
such cases, his intention would have to be gathered by the Court from the facts and circumstances of every
individual case, having due regard to the degree of intoxication.
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In one case, X became very drunk, but knew what he was doing. He went to his house, took hold of a
sword and going along the road shouted his intention to kill Y with whom he had a dispute. Z, a passer-by,
gently tried to pacify X, who thereupon inflicted wounds on Z of which Z died within a few minutes. In the
circumstances, X would be guilty of culpable homicide.
The above is the case of Nga Sein Gale, (1934) 12 Rang. 445, where it was held that X must be
imputed with the same knowledge as he would have had if he had been sober and his act amounted to murder,
for which there was no extenuating circumstances. X got drunk voluntarily, and knew well what he was
doing. His case, therefore, clearly falls under S. 86.
Example
1. A is intoxicated with aicohol. He takes a large knife and is going along the road. B tries to pacify
him, but A declares his intention to kill him, follows him and inflicts injuries on B of which he dies. A is guilty
of murder. He has got drunk voluntarily and under S. 86, he will be liable for his act as if he was sober when
he did it.
2. A, a drunken person, enters another's house believing it to be his own, and beats an inmate of the house to
drive him out, supposing him to be a trespasser. Here, A should be held guilty of both the offences, viz.,
criminal trespass (S. 441) and assault (S. 351 I.PC.).
3. In another case, the accused ravished a girl of thirteen, and in furtherance of the act or rape, placed
his hand on her mouth, thereby causing her death by suffocation. The sole defence of the accused was that he
was drunk. The Court held him guilty of murder, and observed that drunkenness was no defence, unless it
was established that at the time of the rape, the accused was so drunk that he was incapable of forming the
intent to commit it. (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard (1920) A.C. 479)
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(d) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A drops the child
from the housetop knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child, but not intending to kill the child,
and intending, in good faith, the child's benefit. Here, even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed
no offence: S. 92.
PRINCIPLE UNDERLYING THESE ILLUSTRATIONS.- In the above illustrations, there is what may
be called a temporary guardianship justified by the exigencies of the case and by the humanity of the motive.
The law extends to acts done in the exercise of this temporary guardianship, a protection very similar
to that given to acts of regular guardians.
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thing which is an offence by law, for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force open the door
of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of the exception : S. 94.
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5. ACT DONE BY CONSENT (Ss. 87-91)
Ss. 87 to 91 lay down the law as to how far an act done by consent will be excused in law.
Consent (S. 90)
Consent is defined in S. 90, which runs in negative terms. It lays down as to what is not consent, and
can be analysed as under:
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A consent intended
(a) a person underby the Codes not
such consent, if it
is given bythe consent was given in
consequence of such fear or
misconception; or
(b) a person who from- unsoundness of mind or
intoxication, is unable to understand the nature and
consequence of that to which
he gives his consent, or
(c) a person under 12 years of age : S. 90.
MEANING OF CONSENT- S. 90 lays down what is not consent. Jurists have defined consent as an act of
reason accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in balance in good and evil on each side. In an
old but well-known case on the point, Emp. v. Poonai Fattemah, (1896) 12 w.R. (Cr.) 7, the accused, who
professed to be a snake-charmer, persuaded the deceased to allow themselves to be bitten by a poisonous
snake, inducing them to believe that he had power to protect them from harm. It was held that the consent
given by the deceased in allowing themselves to be bitten did not protect the accused. Such consent was
given on a misconception of facts, that is, in the belief that the accused had the power to cure snake-bites, and
the accused knew that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. The accused was,
therefore, convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
It is also to be remembered that consent and submission are not the same thing. Every consent
involves a submission, but it does not follow that a mere submission amounts to consent. Thus, mere
submission by a person who does not know the nature of an act is not consent.
A consent given on a misrepresentation of fact is one given under a misconception of facts within the
meaning of S. 90, and would not be a valid consent as contemplated by the Penal Code. (Parshottam
Mahadev, 64 Bombay Law Reporter, 788)
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Illus.- A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of
each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play, and if A, while
playing fairly hurts Z, A commits no offence: S. 87.
PRINCIPLE OF S. 87.- This section covers injuries which may result whilst engaging in games and sports.
It proceeds upon the maxim 'Volenti non fit injuria': he who consents, cannot complain. This rule is founded
upon two simple propositions, viz.- (1) that every person is the best judge of his own interest; and (2) that no
man will consent to what he thinks is harmful to himself.
SCOPE.- It is to be remembered that the section does not permit a man to give his consent to anything likely
to cause his own death or grievous hurt. It only justifies any harm short of grievous hurt. In Shive Kin, (1915)
16 Cr. L.J. 581, A claimed to be proof against edged instruments and invited B to put his claim to test. B
thereupon cut A on the arm inflicting a wound as a result of which A bled to death. It was held that A's consent
was given under a misconception of fact, but that B could not be supposed to be aware of his mistake. B had
no intention of causing death or grievous hurt, and was therefore entitled to the benefit of S. 87.
A prize-fight is illegal, and all persons aiding and abetting it are guilty.
But mere presence at a prize fight is not an offence.
2. An act is not an offence if it is not intended or known to be likely to cause death, which causes any
harm to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith with his (express or implied) consent to suffer it :
S.88.
Illus.- A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers
under a painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z's death, and intending in good faith, Z's benefit,
performs that operation on Z with Z's consent. A has committed no offence: S. 88.
SCOPE.- This section protects surgeons and surgical operations as also reasonable acts of teachers. In State
v. Ghatge (1949) 51 Bom. L.R. 103, the facts were as under:
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it is done in good faith by his guardian, or by consent (express or implied) of his guardian is not an
offence: Provided the act is not(i) the intentional causing of or attempting or abetting to cause death; or
(ii) any thing known to be likely to cause death for any purpose other than- (a) the preventing of
death or grievous hurt, or (b) the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity; or
(iii) voluntarily causing or attempting or abetting to cause grievous hurt for any purpose other than
the-ray (a) prevention of death or grievous hurt, or (b) curing of any grievous disease or infirmity.
Illus.-A, in good faith, for his child's benefit, without his child's consent, has his child cut for the
stone by a surgeon, knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child's death, but not intending to
cause the child's death. A is within the exception, inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child: S. 89.
It is also clarified (by S. 92) that mere pecuniary benefits are not covered by the term benefit
appearing in Ss. 88 and 89 above.
Lastly, S. 91 enacts a corollary to Ss. 87, 88 and 89. It lays down that the exceptions contained in
Sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may
cause to the person giving the consent : S. 91.
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Illus.-Causing miscarriage (unless caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the
woman) is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman.
Therefore, it is not an offence by reason of such harm, and the consent of the woman or of her guardian to
the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act : S. 91.
6. TRIFLING ACTS (S. 95)
The sixth general exception lays down the laws as to trifling acts. S. 95 deals with commission of
trifling acts and runs thus: "Nothing is an offence by reason that (i) it causes, or
(ii) is intended to cause, or
any harm,
(iii) is known to be likely to cause
If that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX.- There are several acts of human beings which, if strictly viewed, might
amount to an offence. Suppose two strangers are dining on the same table or travelling in the same
compartment of a train. Suppose further that one of them picks up a wafer from the plate of the other, or lights
his own cigar from a match-box belonging to the other without the other's permission. Strictly speaking,
these are cases of theft, but no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it.
S. 95 is based on the maxim De minimis non curat lex. The law does not take account of trifles. It
deals with those cases which come within the letter of the penal law, but not within its spirit. Thus, dipping a
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pen in another man's ink-pot would, in the eyes of law, be theft, but the same would not be punished as an
offence, the act being extremely trifling.
7. RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE (8s. 96-106)
The important law relating to the right of private defense is laid down in Ss. 96 to 106 of the Code.
NATURE OF RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE.-Every person has a right to defend his own person
against injury or restraint, and his own property against any act which is an offence falling under the
definition of theft, robbery, mischief, or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit such an offence.
And what he may do for himself he may do for anyone else under similar circumstances. This right is not
dependent on the actual criminality of the person resisted; it depends solely on the wrongful or apparently
wrongful, character of the act attempted. If the apprehension is real and reasonable, it makes no difference
that it is mistaken. It is lawful to kill a lunatic who attacks a man, though the lunatic himself is not punishable
for his act.
S. 96, therefore, declares that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of
private defence.
If in the exercise of the right of private defence against an assault which reasonably causes the
apprehension of death, the defender be so situated that he cannot effectually exercise that right without risk
of harm to innocent person, his right of private defence extends to the running of the risk: S. 106.
Illus.- A is attacked by a mob who attempts to murder him. He cannot effectually exercise his right of
private defence without firing on the mob, and he cannot fire without risk of harming young children who
are mingled with the mob. A commits no offence if by so firing, he harms any of the children.
The right of private defence is the right to protect one's own person and property against the unlawful
aggression of others. It is a right inherent in man, and is based on the cardinal principal that it is the first duty
of man to help himself.
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In connection with the right of private defence, the following four general points may be noted :
1. There is no right of private defence under the Code against any act which is not in itself an offence
under the Code. An act done in 11 exercise of the right of private defence is not an offence and does not,
therefore, give rise to any right of private defence in return : Gouri v. Sheikh, (1917) 18 Crl. L.J. 864. Thus - A
attacks Z with a knife. Z in self-defence pulls out a revolver. This is not an offence on the part of Z. A cannot
say, Z was about to shoot me, so I killed him. It will be seen in this case that if, A had not started the trouble,
nothing would have happened.
The Supreme Court also has affirmed that the right of private defence is not available to the initial
aggressors. (Oilbagh Singh v. State of U.P. (1980) 4 S. C. 402)
2. The right of private defence cannot be pleaded by persons who, believing they will be attacked,
court the attack.
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3. The general rule is that the accused must specifically plead the right of private defence. Even if he
does not so plead, but if the evidence shows that he did, in fact, act under self-defence, the Court is bound to
consider it. As the Supreme Court has observed, It is well-settled that even if an accused does not plead selfdefence, it is open to the Court to consider such a plea if the same arises from material on record.
In Gangadas v. State of Rajasthan (1975 Crl. L.J. 1445), the Rajasthan High Court has observed that
the omission to take the plea, of private defence in the committing Court is not a bar to taking such a plea at
the trial, or even in appeal.
4. Where a party of men are determined to vindicate their right (or supposed right) by unlawful force,
and they engage in a fight with another party of men, equally determined to vindicate they right (or supposed
right) by unlawful force, no question of the right or private defence can arise. (Basan Bhowmick v. State,
A.I.A. 1963 Cal. 3)
The right of private defence is either of body or of property. Each of these is considered separately
below.
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(A) - RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE OF THE BODY
(SS. 97-102, 104 & 108)
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2. Acts against which there is no right of private defence of body (S. 99)
There are two acts stated in S. 99 against which the right of private defence of the body cannot be
exercised.
(a) Public servant (S. 99)
There is no right of private defence of the body against an act which does not reasonably cause the
apprehension of death or of grievous hurt if done, or attempted to be done by (or by the direction of) a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act (or direction) may not be strictly
justifiable by law. S. 99.
A person is not deprived of the right of private defence of the body against an act of a public servant,
unless he knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is a public servent: S. 89. Expln. 1.
This right of private defence also exists when the act is done by the direction of a public servant,
unless he knows or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless
such person states the authority under which he acts, or, if he has authority in writing, unless he produces
such authority, when so demanded: S. 99, Expln. 2.
In other words, the right of private defence of body or property can be exercised against a public
servant only in the following three cases:
(a) When the act of the public servant reasonably causes apprehension of grievous hurt.
(b) When the public servant does not act in good faith under colour of his office.
(c) When the person exercising the right does not know, or have any reason to believe, that the
attacker is a public servant or is acting under the direction of a public servant.
(A reference may be made to S. 21 (in Chapter IV) for the definition of the term public servant.)
'PUBLIC SERVANT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH.' -Whether a public servant is acting in good faith in a
given case is always a question of fact. Thus, an officer of the Court who acts under a warrant which has
expired and attaches property cannot be said to have acted in good faith. (Raghubir, (1941) 17 Luck. 311)
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'UNDER COLOUR OF HIS OFFICE.' - In one case, certain custom officials, on a search, found that
goods were smuggled from Yanam into Indian territory. The smugglers in the course of the search, attacked
the officials and caused injuries. They contended that the officials had no power to search, because there was
no notification declaring Yanam to be foreign territory under S. 5 of the Indian Tariff Act. It was held that the
officials had acted in good faith and under colour of their office, and that therefore no right of private defence
was available to the accused. (Public Prosecutor v. Suryanarayana, (1937) M.W.N. 741)
Thus, if a police officer, acting bona fide under colour of his office, arrests a person without
authority, the person so arrested has no right of self-defence against the police officer.
However, if the act of a public servant is ultra vires, the right of private defence may be exercised
against him. The law negatives the right of selfdefence where a public servant acts irregularly in the
,exercise of his powers, but not where he acts outside the scope of his powers.
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reasonably cause him to 'apprehend that he will be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his
release.
4. Right when commences and how long it continues (S. 102)
Section 102 provides that the right of self-defence commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension
of danger of the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit the offence, though the offence may not
have been committed; and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.
REASONABLE APPREHENSION.- It is to be noted that the apprehension must be reasonable, and
not fanciful. Thus, X cannot shoot his enemy Y who is at a great distance, even if Y is armed with a sword. The
reason is that, as yet Y has not attacked X, and therefore, it cannot be said that has a present and reasonable
apprehension of being attacked by Y:S sword. Hence, there is no right of private defence, in fact, there is no
attack at all. Or, suppose the threat proceeds from a woman or a child and is addressed to a strong man. In
such a case, there could hardly be a reasonable apprehension. Present and imminent danger should be
present.
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PROBLEM.- A, having armed himself with a ringed thick stick rushed to beat B, but B was not injured. At
that very moment, B who had a spear with him gave a spear blow in the stomach of A and A was brutally
killed. What offence if any, has been committed by B?
Ans.- B has not committed any offence. B has given one blow in order to protect himself, and there
was a reasonable apprehension in his mind that death or grievous hurt will otherwise be caused to him.
CASES IN WHICH THE RIGHT WAS NOT AVAILABLE TO THE ACCUSED.- (i) Emp. v. Gokoo,
(1866) 5 WR. 33- The accused killed a weak old woman found stealing at night. (ii) Emp. v. Durwan (1866)
WR. 73: The accused caught a thief in his house at night and deliberately killed him with a pickaxe to prevent
his escape. (iii) Emp. v. Dhunanjai, (1870) 14 W. R. 68-A : A number of persons apprehending a thief
committing house-breaking strangled him and subjected him to gross maltreatment when he was fully in
their power. In all these cases, the right of private defence was negatived.
So also in Rex. v. Hollaway, (1628) 1 East RC. 327, a parker finding a boy stealing wood in his
master's ground bound him to his horse's tail and beat him. The horse took fright and ran away, and dragged
the boy on the ground till his shoulder was broken whereof he died. The Court held that this amounted to
murder.
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CASE.- A, finding a thief entering into a house in the middle of the night through an entrance in the side wall,
seized him while intruding his body and held him with his face down to the ground to prevent his further
entrance and thereby caused his death by suffocation. At the trial, A pleads the right of private defence. Is this
plea good justification?
The above facts are from the case of Kurrim Bux, (1865) 3 w.R. (Cr.) 12, where it was held that the right
of private defence was a good justification. It is not the intention of the law that the right to defend property is
available only when the thief has already effected entry, for property may be protected by attacking the thief
inside the house as much as by preventing his entry into it A has, therefore, acted legally.
2. Acts against which there is no right of private defence of property (S. 99)
S. 99 then proceeds to lay down the limitation to the right of private defence of property. There are
two acts against which the right of private defence of property cannot be exercised.
(i) There is no right of private defence of property against an act which does not reasonably cause the
apprehension of death or grievous hurt, if done, or attempted to be done, by (or by the direction of) a public
servant acting in good faith under colour of his office, though that act (or direction) may not be strictly
justifiable by law: S. 99.
A person is not deprived of the right of private defence against an act of a public servant, unless he
knows, or has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is a public servant.
Such a right also exists when the act is done by the direction of a public servant, unless he knows, or
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has reason to believe, that the person doing the act is acting by such direction, or unless such person states the
authority under which he acts, or if he has authority in writing, unless he produces such authority, when so
demanded.
(ii) There is also no right of private defence of property in cases in which there is time to have
recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
S. 99 also provides that the right of private defence in no case extends to the inflicting of more than it
is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence: S. 90 (This rule applies to private defence of the body also,
as seen earlier.)
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(3) Against criminal trespass or mischief,as long as the offender continues in the commission of such
offence.
(4) Against house-breaking by night,- as long as the house-trespass continues : S. 105.
It is to be noted that the right of private defence against housebreaking continues only so long as the
house-trespass continues. Hence, where a person followed a thief and killed him in the open after housetrespass had ceased, it was held that he could not plead the right of private defence. [Balakee Jolahed, (1868)
10 W. R. 9]
Ss. 102 and 105 indicate that the right of private defence of the body or property commences and
continues as long as the danger lasts. The extent to which the exercise of the right will be justified will
depend, not on the actual danger, but on whether there was reasonable apprehension of such danger. There
must be an attempt or threat, and consequent thereon, an apprehension of danger; but it is not an idle threat or
every apprehension of a rash or timid mind, that will justify the exercise of the right. Reasonable grounds for
the apprehension must be proved.
4. The right extends to the causing of death or any other harm to the offender in the following cases
only, viz.,-
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(i) Robbery;
(ii) Ho use-breaking by night;
(iii) Mischief by fire to any building, tent, or vessel, used as human dwelling or as a place for the custody of
property;
(iv) Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause an apprehension
that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised : S. 103.
Subject to the above restrictions, the right of private defence of body or property extends to the causing of
any harm short of death resulting in damage of the standing crop. Then, the deceased and four others,
reached the spot. When the deceased questioned their high handed acts, they started inflicting injuries as a
result of which he died.
Decision: The trial court held that there was no justification to cause the death of Bhim Singh in the
alleged exercise of the right of private defence because the accused could not have had reasonable
apprehension of death or grievous hurt. The High Court observed that the accused were within their rights to
inflict injuries on the complaint partly short of causing death in exercise of the right of private defence of
property.
The Supreme Court observed A conspectus of the facts lead to the inevitable conclusion that the
accused clearly exceeded his right of private defence and caused much more harm then necessary. He
cannot, therefore, claim immunity under the garb of section 97 of the I.P.C. The right of private defence
under section 97, J.P.C. is expressly subject to the restriction contained in section 99. Therefore, it was held
that, we are of the view that Sher Singh, is liable to be punished under section 326 read with section 322,
I.P.C. Accordingly, he is convicted under section 326, I.P.C and sentenced to undergo R.I. for a period of five
years.
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JOINT LIABILITY
The law relating to joint liability or group liability has been elaborately dealt with and covered by
sections 34, 149, 120A and 120B of the Code. The doctrine of combination in crime is, that when two or
more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or
proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose win contributed to the wrong doing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone1.
JOINT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 34, I.P.C.
Section 34, LP.C. says:
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The principle of joint-liability arises out of common intention followed by an act in furtherance of
such common intention. This is clearly illustrated by the well-known case Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, 721
IA 148 (PC): AIR 1945 PC 118, wherein one Allah Dad was shot dead by a bullet from the gun used by one of
the accused who came to rescue their cousin who had been attacked by Allah Dad and shouted for help. The
two accused were armed with guns, and each one of them aimed at two different individuals shot from the
gun of Wali Shah, the latter only received injuries from a bullet shot by Mahboob Shah. (See the case in
detail, infra). Of the three accused, Wali Shah, whose shot killed Allah Dad absconded and could not be
brought to trial, and the other two were prosecuted for murder under section 302 read with section 34,
I.P.C. The Sessions Judge convicted him of the offence and sentenced him to
death. On appeal, their Lordships of the Lahore High Court held that the case fell within the ambit of section
34, and as to their common intention, it was said that common intention to commit the crime which was
eventually committed by Mahboob Shah and Wali Shah came into being when Ghulam Qasim Shah shouted
to his companions to come to his rescue and both of them emerged from behind the bushes and fired from
their respective guns.
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Their Lorciships of the Privy Council however disagreed with the view of the judges of the High
Court. In their opinion there was no evidence of common intention to the evidence that the appellant just
have been acting in concert with Wali Shah pursuance of a concerted plan when he along with him rushed to
the help of Ghulam Qasim . In their view the common intention of both was to rescue Ghulam Qasim and
both of them picked up different individuals to deal with. Evidence is lacking to show that there was any premediation to bring about the murder of Allah Dad. At the most, they can be stated to have similar intention
but similar intention is different from 'common intention' and one should not be confused with the other.
Their Lordships, therefore, set aside the conviction and sentence of the offence of murder imposed
by the High Court.
Common intention should be prior to the occurrence
In Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216: 1955 Cr U 572 their Lordships of the
Supreme Court observed that it is well established that a common intention presupposes prior concert, it
requires a pre-arranged plan because before a person can be vicariously convicted for the criminal act of
another, the act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention of them all. The inference of
common intention should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference deducible from the
circumstances of the case. The incriminating facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused
and incapable of explanation on any other reasonable hypothesis.
Participation
Participation is a necessary element or condition precedent to a finding of joint-liability. The
Supreme Court in Kantiah Rainayya Munipally v. State of
Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 287 observed that, it is the essence of the section 34 that the person must be
physically present at the actual commission of the crime. He need not be present in the actual spot, he can, for
instance, stand guard by a gate outside ready to warn his companions about any approach of danger or wait in
a car on a nearby road ready to facilitate their escape, but he must be physically present at the scene of the
occurrence and must actually participate in the commission of the offence in some way or the other at the
time the crime is actually committed.
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CONSPIRACY
A criminal conspiracy is the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act or to do a legal act
by illegal means. Sections 120A and 120B, I.P.C deal with criminal conspiracy. While section 120A defines
'criminal conspiracy', section 120B provides punishment for this offence.
Section 120A reads:
120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be
done,
(1)
an illegal act, or
(2)
an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in
pursuance thereof.
Explanation. It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement or is merely
incidental to that object.
In State (C.B.l./S.I.T.) v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 60 (Rajiv Gandhi murder case) the apex Court held that an
agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act amounts to criminal conspiracy. The illegal act
may or may not be done in pursuance of the agreement but the very agreement is an offence and is
punishable. Everyone of the conspirator need not have taken active part in the commission of each and every
one of the conspiratorial acts for the offence of conspiracy to be made out. The prosecution need not
necessarily prove what the perpetrators expressly agreed to do and/or caused to be done the illegal act. The
agreement may be proved by necessary implications under section 120B, I.P.C. In the impugned case the
accused were charged and convicted under section 120B read with section 302, I.P.C. by the designated
Court. The accused appealed to the apex Court to set aside the conviction.
Essential ingredients
The ingredients of section 120A, I.P.C are as stated below
(1)
There should be an agreement between two or more persons who are alleged to conspire;
(2)
The agreement should be to do or cause to be done:
(i)
an illegal act', or
(ii)
an act which may not itself be illegal but be done by illegal means.
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In Bimbadhar v. State of Orissa, AIR 1956 SC 469 the apex Court observed that, it is not necessary
that each one of the conspirators should be aware of the acts done by any of conspirators during the course of
the conspiracy. The acts done by any of conspirators in furtherance of the purpose the conspiracy are
relevant as merely indicative of what the object of the conspiracy was. What is relevant is that there should
be one conspiracy to which specific persons were parties and not series or conspiracies, for the liability of
each conspirator has to be fixed in relation to the particular conspiracy entered into by him with the others.
PUNISHMENT FOR 'CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY'
Section 120B punishes for the offence of 'criminal conspiracy' in the following manner:
ATTEMPT
The word 'attempt' clearly conveys with it the idea that if the attempt had succeeded, the offence charged
would have been committed1. In other words, attempt is the direct movement towards the commission of an
offence after preparations has been made. Once an 'act'2 enters into the arena of attempt, criminal liability
begins, because attempt takes the offender very close to the successful completion of the crime and so it is
punishable in law like a completed offence. An attempt, creates alarm which of itself is an injury, and the
moral guilt of the offender is the same as though he had succeeded. An attempt in order to be criminal need
not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is at present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof.
'ATTEMPT' UNDER THE PENAL CODE
The Indian Penal Code has not defined attempt to commit a crime but has dealt with attempt in four
different ways:
(i)
Firstly, the commission of an offence and the attempt to commit it are dealt with in the same section,
the extent of punishment being the same for both the offence as well as its attempt. These are
(i)
offences against the State, such as, waging or attempting to wage war against the Government of
India (section 121);
(ii)
assaulting or attempting to assault the President of India, Governors of States, etc., with intent to
counsel or restrain the exercise of any lawful power (section 124);
(iii)
sedition (section 124A), waging or attempting to wage war against any Asiatic Power in alliance
with the Government (section 125), public servant taking gratification (section 161), dacoity (section 391),
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etc.;
(ii)
Secondly, attempts to commit offences and commission of specific offences have been dealt with
separately, and separate punishments have been provided for attempt to commit such offences from those of
the offences committed.
For instance, attempt to commit murder, attempt to commit culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and
attempt to commit robbery have been dealt with in sections 307, 308 and 393, I.P.C. whereas murder,
culpable homicide and robbery are punishable under sections 302, 304 and 392, I.P.C. respectively;
(iii)
Thirdly, attempt to commit suicide is made punishable under section 309, I.P.C.; and
(iv)
Fourthly, attempts to commit offences in general (except those falling in the above-stated categories)
have been made punishable under section 511, I.P.C. However, section 511, I.P.C. is not exhaustive. It leaves
unpunished attempts of those minor offences which are punishable with fine only.
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NOTES
NOTES