Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264

June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B.
TAN, Respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The petition before us is a petition for certiorari 1 with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and/or status quo ante
order, that seeks to annul: (1) the respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) March 27, 20132 and May 14, 20133 COMELEC Resolutions
cancelling petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes' (petitioner or Reyes)
Certificate of Candidacy ( COC) for the position of Representative in the
lone district of Marinduque, and (2) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of
Finality4 declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and executory in SPA
Case No. 13-053(DC).
I. THE CASE AND THE DISSENT IN CONTEXT
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my strong reservations to the
majority's outright dismissal of this most unusual case a term I do not use
lightly as shown by the reasons stated below.
I clarify at the outset that the present case is at its inception stage; it is a
newly filed petition that the Court is acting upon for the first time and

which the majority opted to DISMISS OUTRIGHT after an initial review,

based solely on the petition and its annexes and its "finding that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections."
Subsequent to the COMELEC's rulings, however, intervening events
occurred that might have materially affected the jurisdictional situation and
the procedural requirements in handling and resolving the case. The
petitioner was proclaimed as the winner by the Marinduque Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC), and she subsequently took her oath of office.
This Dissent is filed, not on the basis of the intrinsic merits of the case, but
because of the outright and reckless denial of the minoritys plea that the
respondents be required to at least COMMENT on the petition in light of
the gravity of the issues raised, the potential effect on jurisprudence, and
the affected personal relationships within and outside the Court, before any
further action can be made. The presented issues refer to
- the Courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition, which jurisdiction should now lie with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and
- the grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in handling the case
that led to the assailed COMELEC decision.
Viewed in these lights, it should be appreciated that the Court in effect did
not rule on the merits of the case after considering the parties legal and
factual positions. The majoritys Resolution is in fact only a ruling that the
Court no longer wishes to review the COMELECs rulings despite the
issues raised and the attendant intervening circumstances.
Despite its seemingly simple approach, the Courts outright dismissal of
the petition is replete with profound effects on the petitioner on the
indirect beneficiary of the ruling, and on jurisprudence, as it effectively
upholds the disqualification of petitioner and leaves the remaining
candidate in Marinduque as an unopposed candidate. 5What is not easily

seen by the lay observer is that by immediately ruling and avoiding the
jurisdiction of the HRET on the matter of qualification, the majority avoids
a quo warranto petition that, if successful, would render petitioner Reyes
disqualified, leaving the congressional position in Marinduques lone
district vacant.
Significantly, the Dissent is not a lonely one made solely by the
undersigned; he is joined by three (3) other Justices. 6 Seven (7)
Justices7 formed the majority with three (3) Justices inhibiting for personal
reasons,8 with one (1) Justice absent.9
II. SUMMARY OF THE DISSENTS SUPPORTING POSITIONS
That this unusual case at least deserves further proceedings from this
Court other than the OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL the majority ordered, is
supported by the following considerations:
First, the questions raised in the petition are NOT too unsubstantial to
warrant further proceedings.
a. Under Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the Court may
dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for delay, or the
questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
In the present case, the majority dismissed the petition outright
despite the threshold issue of jurisdiction that Reyes squarely raised.
b. The due process issues Reyes raised with respect to the COMELEC
proceedings cannot be taken lightly, in particular, the COMELECs
failure to accord her the opportunity to question the nature and
authenticity of the evidence submitted by the respondent Joseph Tan
(Tan) as well as controverting evidence the petition cited. In fact, no
less than COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr., echoed this
concern in his Dissenting Opinion from the May 14, 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC en banc.

c. A third issue raised relates to the COMELECs imposition of a

qualification for the position of congressman, other than those
mentioned in the Constitution. The Courts Resolution glossed over
this issue and did not touch it at all. For this reason, this Dissent will
similarly refrain from discussing the issue, except to state that the
issue raised touches on the Constitution and should have at least
merited a passing mention by the Court in its immediate and outright
dismissal of the petition.
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently shown to be without basis
and out of our sense of delicadeza (which we should have), the Court
should at least hear and consider both sides before making a ruling that
would favor the son of a Member of the Court.
To reiterate, the COMELEC en banc ruling cancelling Reyes CoC means
that: (1) Reyes CoC is void ab initio; (2) that she was never a valid
candidate at all; and (3) all the votes in her favor are stray votes.
Consequently, the remaining candidate would be declared the winner, as
held in Aratea v. Commission on Elections 10 Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections11 and Maquiling v. Commission on Elections.12
Third, the majoritys holding that the jurisdiction of the HRET only begins
after the candidate has assumed the office on June 30 is contrary to
prevailing jurisprudence; in fact, it is a major retrogressive jurisprudential
development that can emasculate the HRET. In making this kind of ruling,
the Court should have at least undertaken a full-blown proceeding rather
than simply declare the immediate and outright dismissal of the petition.
Note in this regard that the majoritys jurisprudential ruling
a. is contrary to the HRET rules.
b. effectively allows the filing of any election protest or a petition for
quo warranto only after the assumption to office by the candidate on
June 30 at the earliest. In the context of the present case, any election

protest protest or petition for quo warranto filed on or after June 30

would be declared patently out of time since the filing would be more
than fifteen (15) days from Reyes proclamation on May 18, 2013.
c. would affect all future proclamations since they cannot be earlier
than 15 days counted from the June 30 constitutional cut-off for the
assumption to office of the newly elected officials.
III. THE ASSAILED COMELEC PETITION
A. The Petition Before the COMELEC
The present petition before this Court and its attachments show that on
October 1, 2012, Reyes filed her CoC for the position of Representative for
the lone district of Marinduque. On October 10, 2012, Tan filed with the
COMELEC a petition to deny due course or to cancel Reyes CoC. Tan
alleged that Reyes committed material misrepresentations in her CoC,
specifically: (1) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac Marinduque
when in truth she is a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa Quezon
City or Bauan Batangas following the residence of her husband; (2) that she
is a natural-born Filipino citizen; (3) that she is not a permanent resident of,
or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (4) that her date of birth is July 3,
1964, when in truth it is July 3, 1958; (5) that her civil status is single; and
(6) that she is eligible for the office she seeks to be elected to.
B. The COMELEC Proceedings
In her Answer, Reyes averred that while she is publicly known to be the
wife of Rep. Hermilando Mandanas of Bauan, Batangas, the truth of the
matter is that they are not legally married; thus, Mandanas residence
cannot be attributed to her. She also countered that the evidence presented
by Tan does not support the allegation that she is a permanent resident or a
citizen of the United States. With respect to her birth date, her birth
certificate issued by the NSO showed that it was on July 3, 1964. At any

rate, Reyes contended that the representations as to her civil status and
date of birth are not material so as to warrant the cancellation of her CoC.
On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion to Admit
Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits consisting of,
among others, a copy of an article published online on January 8, 2013
entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes." This article
provided a database record from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) indicating that Reyes is an American citizen and a holder
of a US passport that she has been using since 2005. Tan also submitted a
photocopy of a Certification of Travel Records from the BID, which showed
that Reyes holds a US passport No. 306278853. Based on these pieces of
evidence and the fact that Reyes failed to take an Oath of Allegiance and
execute an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American citizenship pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9225 (RA 9225), Tan argued that Reyes was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative and thus, her CoC should be
cancelled.
C. The COMELEC First Division Ruling
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution
granting the petition and cancelling Reyes CoC. On the alleged
misrepresentations in Reyes CoC with respect to her civil status and birth
date, the COMELEC First Division held that these are not material
representations that could affect her qualifications or eligibility, thus
cancellation of CoC on these grounds is not warranted.
The COMELEC First Division, however, found that Reyes committed false
material representation with respect to her citizenship and residency. Based
on the newly discovered evidence submitted by Tan, the COMELEC First
Division found that Reyes was a holder of a US passport, which she
continued to use until June 30, 2012; she also failed to establish that she had
applied for repatriation under RA 9225 by taking the required Oath of
Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of her American

Citizenship. Based on these findings, the COMELEC First Division ruled

the Reyes remains to be an American citizen, and thus, is ineligible to run
and hold any elective office.
On the issue of her residency in Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque, the
COMELEC First Division found that Reyes did not regain her domicile of
origin in Boac, Marinduque after she lost it when she became a naturalized
US citizen; that Reyes had not shown that she had re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225, there being no proof that she had renounced
her US citizenship; thus, she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
America. Citing Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 13 the COMELEC First
Division held that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the
Philippines by positive acts and the period of his residency shall be
counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
Finally, the COMELEC First Division disregarded Reyes proof that she met
the one-year residency requirement when she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July
13, 2011 as it is not sufficient to satisfy the one-year residency requirement.
On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for reconsideration. Attached to
the motion were an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated
September 21, 2012 and a Voter Certification in Boac, Marinduque dated
April 17, 2012. In her Motion, Reyes admitted that she was married to an
American citizen named Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997 and thus, she
acquired dual citizenship through marriage to an American citizen.
D. The COMELEC en banc Ruling
On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its Resolution
denying Reyes motion for reconsideration and affirming the ruling of the

COMELEC First Division on the ground that the formers motion was a
mere rehash of the arguments she raised against the First Division ruling.
D-a. Commissioner Lims Concurring Opinion
Commissioner Lim concurred in the result and held that Reyes failed to
comply with twin requirements of RA 9225; she belatedly filed her
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship but failed to submit an
Oath of Allegiance. She also failed to prove that she complied with the oneyear residency requirement for lack of evidence of any overt or positive act
that she had established and maintained her residency in Boac,
Marinduque.
D-b. Chairman Brillantes Dissenting Opinion
Chairman Brillantes dissented from the majority and held that Tan failed to
offer substantial evidence to prove that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship.
He noted that the internet article by a certain Eli Obligacion showing that
Reyes used a US passport on June 30, 2012 is hearsay while the purported
copy of the BID certification is merely a photocopy and not even a certified
true copy of the original, thus similarly inadmissible as evidence. Chairman
Brillantes also emphasized that a petition to deny due course under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) cannot be a pre-election substitute
for a quo warranto proceeding. Under prevailing laws, there remains to be
no pre-election legal remedy to question the eligibility or lack of
qualification of a candidate. Chairman Brillantes was of the view that a
petition to deny due course tackles exclusively the issue of deliberate
misrepresentation over a qualification, and not the lack of qualification per
se which is the proper subject of a quo warranto proceeding.
Finally, he opined that the issues pertaining to Reyes residence and
citizenship requires exhaustive presentation and examination of evidence
that are best addressed in a full blown quo warranto proceeding rather
than the summary proceedings in the present case.

IV. EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMELEC DECISION

A. On May 18, 2013, the Marinduque PBOC proclaimed Reyes as the
duly elected member of the House of Representatives for
Marinduque, having garnered the highest number of votes in the
total of 52, 209 votes.
B. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of
Finality declaring its May 14, 2013 Resolution final and executory
citing paragraph b, Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure in relation to paragraph 2, Section 8, of Resolution No.
9523 which provides that a decision or resolution of the Commission
en banc in Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and
executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining
order is issued by the Supreme Court.
C. On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before House
Speaker Rep. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.
V. THE PETITION BEFORE THIS COURT
A. Positions and Arguments
In support of her petition before this Court, Reyes submits the following
positions and arguments:
(1) COMELEC has been ousted of jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed the winner for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque;
(2) COMELEC violated her right to due process when it took
cognizance of the documents submitted by Tan that were not testified
to, offered and admitted in evidence without giving her the
opportunity to question the authenticity of these documents as well
as present controverting evidence;

(3) COMELEC gravely erred when it declared that petitioner is not a

Filipino citizen and did not meet the one year residency requirement
despite the finding that he assumed and held office as provincial
administrator;
(4) COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in enforcing the
provision of RA 9225 insofar as it adds to the qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives other than those
enumerated in the Constitution.
B. The Issues Raised
As presented to this Court, the petition raised the following issues:
(1) Whether or not the COMELEC is ousted of jurisdiction over the
petition who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken
her oath of office for the position of Member, House of
Representatives?
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when
it took cognizance of Tans newly discovered evidence without having
been testified to, as well as offered and admitted in evidence, in
violation of Reyes right to due process?
(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when
it declared that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the
one-year residency requirement for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives?
(4) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, by
enforcing RA 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the
qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives under
Section 6, Art. VI of the Constitution?

How the public respondent COMELEC views the issues presented,

particularly the question of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion are
presently unknown elements in these proceedings as the COMELEC has
not been heard on the case. To be sure, it should have a say, as a named
respondent, especially on the matter of jurisdiction.
VI. THE MAJORITY RULING
On the issue of the COMELECs jurisdiction
Without the benefit of full blown arguments by the parties, the majority
ruling ruled on the merits of the jurisdictional issue and held that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes
qualifications and the assailed COMELEC Resolutions unless a petition is
filed with the tribunal.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives. A candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives with the
concurrence of three requisites: (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath;
and (c) assumption of office.
It went on to state that Reyes cannot be considered a Member of the House
of Representatives because she had not yet assumed office; she can only do
so on June 30, 2013. It pointed out, too, that before Reyes proclamation on
May 18, 2013, the COMELEC en banc had already finally disposed of the
issue of Reyes US citizenship and lack of residency; thus, there was no
longer any pending case at that time. In these lights, it held that COMELEC
continued to have jurisdiction.
On the issue of admissibility of the
evidence presented and due process

The majority emphasized that the COMELEC is not strictly bound to

adhere to the technical rules of evidence. Since the proceedings to deny due
course or to cancel a CoC are summary in nature, then the newly
discovered evidence was properly admitted by the COMELEC. Also, there
was no denial of due process since Reyes was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC.
On the issue of citizenship
Again ruling on the merits, the majority upheld the COMELECs finding
that based on the Tans newly discovered evidence, Reyes is an American
citizen and thus is ineligible to run and hold any elective office. The
majority likewise held that the burden of proof had been shifted to Reyes to
prove that: (1) she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that (2) she reacquired such status by properly complying with the requirements of RA
9225, and that Reyes had failed to substantiate that she is a natural born
Filipino citizen and complied with the requirements of RA 9925. It
emphasized that Reyes inexplicably failed to submit an Oath of Allegiance
despite belatedly filing an Oath of Renunciation and that her oath that she
took in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator does
not suffice to satisfy the requirements of RA 9225.
On the issue of residency
The majority similarly affirmed the COMELECs ruling that Reyes had not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the United States and thus did not
satisfy the one-year Philippine residency requirement. It held that Reyes
effectively abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque when
she became a naturalized US citizen. In the absence of proof that she had
renounced her American citizenship, she cannot be considered to have
abandoned her domicile of choice in the US. The majority also noted that
Reyes service as Provincial Administrator from January 18, 2011 to July 13,
2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency in Boac, Marinduque.

VII. COMMENTS ON THE MAJORITYS RULING

The majoritys unusual approach and strained rulings that already touched
on the merits of substantial issues raised should, at the very least, not be
allowed to stand without comments. I call these "comments" as a
"refutation" implies a consideration on the merits of properly submitted
and debated issues, which did not happen in this case.
A. No basis exists to DISMISS the petition outright.
Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court14 merely requires that the petition
be sufficient in form and substance to justify an order from the Court to act
on the petition and to require the respondents to file their comments. The
same rule also provides that the Court may dismiss the petition outright (as
the majority did in the present case) if it was filed manifestly for delay or if
the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
In the present case, the petition is indisputably sufficient in form and
substance; no issue on this point was even raised. Thus, the question before
the Court if Rule 64, Section 6 were to be followed is whether the issues
raised by Reyes were too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
I submit that the issues raised cannot be unsubstantial as they involve
crucial issues of jurisdiction and due process.
The due process issue, of course, pertained to the assailed COMELEC
ruling that admittedly can be evaluated based on the records. The matter of
evaluation, however, is not simply a matter of doing it; it is the very
problem that I raise because it must be a meaningful one that fully
appreciates the parties positions, particularly in a situation where the
petition raised arguments that are not without their merits. In this
situation, the Court cannot simply go through the motions of evaluation
and then simply strike out the petitioners positions. The Courts role as
adjudicator and the demands of basic fairness require that we should fully

hear the parties and rule based on our appreciation of the merits of their
positions in light of what the law and established jurisprudence require.
a. The Due Process Component
The determination of the merits of the petitioners claim point us, at the
very least, to the need to consider whether evidence attributed to a person
who is not before the Court and whose statement cannot be confirmed for
the genuineness, accuracy and truth of the basic fact sought to be
established in the case, should be taken as "truth." Even casting technical
rules of evidence aside, common sense and the minimum sense of fairness
dictate that an article in the internet cannot simply be taken to be evidence
of the truth of what it says, nor can photocopies of documents not shown to
be genuine be taken as proof of the "truth." To accept these materials as
statements of "truth" is to be partisan and to deny the petitioner her right to
both procedural and substantive due process. Again, at the very least,
further inquiry should have been made before there was the judgment.
Some, to be sure, may label the denial of further inquiry to lack of
prudence; others, not so charitably minded, may however refer to this as
partisanship.
b. The Jurisdictional Component.
The jurisdictional component of the petition is interesting because it
involved matters that were not covered by the assailed COMELEC rulings
for the simple reason that they were intervening events that transpired
outside (although related with) the assailed rulings. In fact, they involved
questions of fact and law separate from those of the assailed COMELEC
rulings. Yet, the majority, in its rush to judgment, lumped them together
with the assailed rulings under the dismissive phrase "did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion" in the dispositive portion of its ruling. Such was
the haste the majority exhibited in the desire to pronounce swift and
dismissive judgment. I can only surmise that the majority might have

considered the jurisdictional issues raised "too insubstantial to warrant

further proceedings."
Is this still lack of prudence? Reyes proclamation divested the COMELEC
of jurisdiction over her qualifications in favor of the HRET
The profound effect of the majoritys ruling on HRET jurisdiction and on
jurisprudence render comments on this point obligatory, if only to show
that the matter is not insubstantial and should further be explored by the
Court.
The majority held that the COMELEC still has jurisdiction because the
HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of the petitioners
qualifications, as well as over the assailed resolutions unless a petition is
duly filed. The ponencia emphasizes that Reyes has not averred that she
has filed such action.
This line of thought is, to say the least, confusing, particularly on the point
of why Reyes who has garnered the majority of the votes cast in
Marinduque, who has been proclaimed pursuant to this electoral mandate,
and who has since taken her oath of office, would file a petition, either of
protest or quo warranto, before the HRET. Why she would file a petition for
certiorari before this Court may be easier to understand the COMELEC,
despite her proclamation and oath, has issued an order mandating her
disqualification executory; she may merely want to halt the enforcement of
this COMELEC order with the claim that the arena for her election and
qualification has shifted now to the HRET and is no longer with the
COMELEC.
In any case, to stick to election law basics, the matter of jurisdiction
between the COMELEC and the HRET has always constituted a dichotomy;
the relationship between the COMELEC and the HRET in terms of
jurisdiction is not an appellate one but is mutually exclusive.

This mutually exclusive jurisdictional relationship is, as a rule, sequential.

This means that the COMELECs jurisdiction ends when the HRETs
jurisdiction begins. Thus, there is no point in time, when a vacuum in
jurisdiction would exist involving congressional candidates. This
jurisdiction, of course, refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter, which
no less than the Philippine Constitution governs. Under Section 17, Article
VI, the subject matter of HRETs jurisdiction is the "election, returns, and
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives."
Where one jurisdiction ends and the other begins, is a matter that
jurisprudence appears to have settled, but is nevertheless an issue that the
Court should perhaps continue to examine and re-examine because of the
permutation of possible obtaining situations which, to my mind,
translates to the existence of a critical issue that should be ventilated before
this Court if it is to make any definitive ruling on any given situation.
I submit on this point that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the
operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election
contests relating to the winning candidates election, return and
qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate
divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at
the time of the proclamation and the party questioning the qualifications of
the winning candidate should now present his or her case in a proper
proceeding (i.e. quo warranto) before the HRET who, by constitutional
mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the
election, returns and qualification of members of the House of
Representatives.
The Court has interestingly rendered various rulings on the points which
all point to the statement above. In Limkaichong v. Comelec, 15 the Court
pointedly held that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation.16

The Court speaking through no less than Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad
in the recent case of Jalosjos, Jr. v Commission on Elections 17 held that the
settled rule is that "the proclamation of a congressional candidate following
the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in
favor of the HRET"18
Based on these considerations, it appears clear that any ruling from this
Court as the majority ruled that the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative who has been proclaimed but not yet assumed
office is a major retrogressive jurisprudential development, in fact, a
complete turnaround from the Courts prevailing jurisprudence on the
matter; such rule if it becomes established can very well emasculate the
HRET.
Thus, the Court should now fully hear this matter, instead of dismissively
ruling on a new petition where the respondent side has not been fully
heard.
The ponencias holding on the COMELECs jurisdiction vis--vis the HRET
is inconsistent with the HRET Rules
The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET is also supported by the
HRET Rules. They state:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives.
RULE 15. How Initiated. An election contest is initiated by the filing of a
verified petition of protest or a verified petition for quo warranto against a
Member of the House of Representatives. An election protest shall not

include a petition for quo warranto. Neither shall a petition for quo
warranto include an election protest.
RULE 16. Election Protest. A verified petition contesting the election or
returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by
any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of
the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant
while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee. x x x
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. A verified petition for quo warranto contesting
the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed
by any registered voter of the district concerned within fifteen (15) days
from the date of the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the
petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the adverse party shall
be known as the respondent.
Based on the above Rules, it appears clear that as far as the HRET is
concerned, the proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections
serves as the reckoning point as well as the trigger that brings any contests
relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within its sole and
exclusive jurisdiction.
In the context of the present case, by holding that the COMELEC retained
jurisdiction (because Reyes, although a proclaimed winner, has not yet
assumed office), the majority effectively emasculates the HRET of its
jurisdiction as it allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto only after the assumption to office by the candidate (i.e, on June
30 in the usual case). To illustrate using the dates of the present case, any
election protest or a petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more
than fifteen (15) days from Reyes proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall
certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for having been filed out of
time under the HRET rules.

Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared its May 14,
2013 Resolution final and executory?
By the petitioners theory, the COMELEC en bancs May 14, 2013
Resolution (cancelling Reyes CoC) did not attain finality because Reyes
proclamation on May 18, 2013 divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over matters pending before it relating to Reyes eligibility. Two material
records are critical on this point. First, the fact of proclamation on May 18,
2013 which came one (1) day ahead of the May 19, 2013 deadline for the
finality of the May 14, 2013 Resolution pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. The second is the COMELEC order of June 5, 2013 which
declared its resolution of May 14, 2013 final and executory.
How these instruments will co-exist and be given weight in relation with
one another is a matter that, at this point and in the absence of research,
deliberation, debate and discussion may not be easily be made. The Court,
to be sure, would want to hear the HRET, the COMELEC and the Office of
the Solicitor General, on this point. Of course, this hearing and debate will
not take place under the hasty dismissive action the majority made.
Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in the appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence leading it to erroneously conclude that Reyes is
not a natural born Filipino citizen and that she had abandoned and lost her
domicile of origin when she became a naturalized American citizen
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions to this rule
have been established and consistently recognized, among others, when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the
Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and
correct the COMELEC's error.19

It is also basic in the law of evidence that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it. In administrative cases, the quantum of proof
required is substantial evidence.20 In the present case, the majority
obviously believed, together with the COMELEC, that Tan did overcome
this burden and that his documentary evidence he submitted established
that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. A major clash between the parties exists,
of course, on this point as Reyes, as expressed in her petition, is of the
completely opposite view. Even a quick look at Tans evidence, however,
indicates that Reyes view is not without its merits and should not simply
be dismissively set aside.
First, Tan submitted an article published online (blog article) written by one
Eli J. Obligacion (Obligacion) entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth
About Regina O. Reyes." This printed blog article stated that the author had
obtained records from the BID stating that Reyes is an American citizen;
that she is the holder of a US passport and that she has been using the same
since 2005.
How the law on evidence would characterize Obligacion's blog article or,
for that matter, any similar newspaper article, is not hard for a law student
answering the Bar exam to tackle: the article is double hearsay or hearsay
evidence that is twice removed from being admissible as it was offered to
prove its contents (that Reyes is an American citizen) without any other
competent and credible evidence to corroborate them. Separately of course
from this consideration of admissibility is the question of probative value.
On top of these underlying considerations is the direct and frontal
question: did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it relied on
this piece of evidence to conclude that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen?
Second, Tan also submitted a photocopy of a "certification" issued by one
Simeon L. Sanchez of the BID showing the travel records of Reyes from
February 15, 2000 to June 30, 2012 and that she is a holder of US Passport
No. 306278853. This photocopy also indicates in some entries that Reyes is
an American while other entries denote that she is Filipino. The same

questions of admissibility and probative value of evidence arise, together

with the direct query on the characterization of the COMELEC action since
the COMELEC concluded on the basis of these pieces of evidence that
Reyes is not a Filipino citizen because it is not only incompetent but also
lacks probative value as evidence.
Contributory to the possible answer is the ruling of this Court that a
"certification" is not a certified copy and is not a document that proves that
a party is not a Filipino citizen.21
Interestingly, in its March 27, 2013 Resolution that the petitioner now also
assails, the COMELEC First Division ruled:
Due to petitioners submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a
Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that
respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use
until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The
burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the
conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her CoC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish
that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is,
therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the
Philippines.22
This ruling, undeniably, opens for Reyes the argument that in the absence
of sufficient proof (i.e, other than a photocopy of a "certification") that she is
not a natural born Filipino citizen, no burden of evidence shifts to her to
prove anything, particularly the fact that she is not an American citizen.
Considering that Tan might have also failed to prove by substantial
evidence his allegation that Reyes is an American citizen, the burden of
evidence also cannot be shifted to the latter to prove that she had availed of

the privileges of RA 9225 in order to re-acquire her status as a natural born

Filipino citizen.
It ought to be considered, too, that in the absence of sufficient proof that
Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship, the twin requirements under RA 9225
for re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship should not apply to her. Of course,
Reyes admitted in her MR before the COMELEC that she is married to an
American citizen. This admission, however, leads only to further arguments
on how her admitted marriage affected her citizenship. Jurisprudence is not
lacking on this point as in Cordora v. Comelec, 23 the Court held that the
twin requirements of RA 9225 does not apply to a candidate who is a
natural born Filipino citizen who did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country, viz.:
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in
Mercado v. Manzano Valles v. COMELEC, and AASJS v. Datumanong.
Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present case.
Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the
circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the
United States which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an
Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in
Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by
effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the
concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any
other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship
who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the
oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is
brought about by the individuals active participation in the naturalization
process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino
citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the

Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit

renunciation of a naturalized citizens foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003,
was enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath
found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines;
and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens
who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public
office in the Philippines shall "meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing
to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and
COMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, and Japzon v. COMELEC, all of which
involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of
another country and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In
the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

As to the issue of Reyes residency in Boac, Marinduque, the COMELEC

First Division as affirmed by the COMELEC en banc held:
Accordingly, the more appropriate issue is whether respondent had
regained her domicile of origin in the Municipality of Boac, Marinduque
after she lost the same when she became a naturalized American citizen.
xxxx
Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively
abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing that whatsoever that respondent had
already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to
conclude that she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being
no proof that respondent had renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by respondent to show that she has met the oneyear residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile
of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But
such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For,
respondent has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains
to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can
substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA.24
This COMELEC action again opens questions about its appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence and whether it overstepped the limits of its
discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, if indeed the abovecited findings and conclusions have no basis in fact and in law.

To begin with, the evidence submitted by Tan, even assuming that it is

admissible, arguably does not prove that Reyes was a naturalized American
citizen. At best, the submitted evidence could only show that Reyes was the
holder of a US passport. In Aznar v. Comelec, 25 the Court ruled that the
mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that
he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. In the present case, the fact that
Reyes is a holder of a US passport does not portend that she is no longer a
natural born Filipino citizen or that she had renounced her Philippine
citizenship. In addition, how the COMELEC arrived at a conclusion that
Reyes is naturalized American citizen can be seen as baffling as it did not
appear to have provided any factual basis for this conclusion.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
All told, the COMELEC does not appear to have an airtight case based on
substantial evidence on the citizenship and residence issues, and much less
a similar case on the jurisdictional issue, to justify a VERY PROMPT
OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL ACTION from this Court. Bolstering this view is
that petitioner Reyes is not lacking in arguably meritorious positions to
support her cause, even if only to the extent of being fully heard by this
Court.
If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING JUSTICE or at least
to BE SEEN TO BE ADMINISTERING JUSTICE in the way described in the
speeches of many a Justice of this Court, it should not deliver the kind of
hasty and imprudent action that it did in this case. The proper course of
action, if the Court indeed honestly wants to achieve this objective in the
present case, is to require the COMELEC to COMMENT on the petition
and to decide matters from that point.
ARTURO
Associate Justice

D.

BRION

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 3-37.

Id. at 40-51.

Id. at 52-55.

Id. at 163-165.

Congressman Lord Allan Jay Velasco, son of incumbent Supreme

Court Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
6

Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Marvic

Mario Victor F. Leonen.
7

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno; and Justices Teresita J.

Leonardo-de Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. del Castillo,
Roberto A. Abad, Jose Portugal Perez, and Bienvenido L. Reyes.
8

Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Jose Catral Mendoza and Estela M.

Perlas-Bernabe.
9

Justice Diosdado M. Peralta.

10

G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012.

11

G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, October 9, 2012.

12

G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013.

13

G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.

14

Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 6. Order to comment. If the Supreme Court finds the
petition sufficient in form and substance, it shall order the
respondents to file their comments on the petition within ten
(10) days from notice thereof; otherwise, the Court may dismiss
the petition outright. The Court may also dismiss the petition if
it was filed manifestly for delay or the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings. (n)

15

G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33 & 179240-41, April 1, 2009,

583 SCRA 1.
16

Id., "We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the
time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification
should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET,
the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case
involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to
the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word
"sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250
of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals'
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members."
xxxx
"Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate
in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may
assail
ones

eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file
before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition
for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET
Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections we ruled that
where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the
congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an
electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives."
17

G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012.

18

Id., "While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to

decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without
limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution
of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the
Senate or the House of Representatives.
The Court has already settled the question of when the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET
begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June
3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010
as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
19

Sabili v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012.

20

Matugas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 151944, January 20,

2004, 420 SCRA 365.
21

See Matugas v. Commission on Elections, ibid, where the Court

held:
"Furthermore, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states
that when the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, as in this case, the
contents of said document may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. The subject
letter-inquiry, which contains the notation, appears to be a mere
photocopy, not a certified copy.
The other document relied upon by petitioner is the
Certification dated 1 September 2000 issued by the BID.
Petitioner submits that private respondent has declared that he
is an American citizen as shown by said Certification and,
under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, such
declaration may be given in evidence against him.
The rule cited by petitioner does not apply in this case because
the rule pertains to the admissibility of evidence. There is no
issue here as to the admissibility of the BID Certification; the
COMELEC did not hold that the same was inadmissible. In any
case, the BID Certification suffers from the same defect as the
notation from the supposed US Embassy official. Said
Certification is also a photocopy, not a certified copy."
Moreover, the certification contains inconsistent entries
regarding the "nationality" of private respondent. While some
entries indicate that he is "American," other entries state that he
is "Filipino."
22

Rollo, p. 48.

23

G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.

24

Rollo, pp. 48-50.

25

G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703.