15 Chapter Vii
15 Chapter Vii
15 Chapter Vii
Gurmukh Nihal Singh, Indian States and British India: Their Future
Relations:, Nand Kishore Brothers, Banaras, 1930, p. 1.
213
V.P. Menon, The Story of Integration of Indian States, Orient Longman Pvt.
Ltd., Delhi, 1957, p. 19.
214
the invasion of upstart chiefs and armies of lawless banditti; that the
British Government now occupied the place of that protecting power and
was the natural guardian of weak states3
Till the breaking out of the First World War, nationalism in India
did not grow to such an extent as to pose a threat to the British rule. There
was no upsurge of mass consciousness for the establishment of a
responsible Government in the country. The great war of 1914-1919
acted as a catalyst towards accelerating the temper of the Indian
nationalism. The doctrine of paramountcy was a peculiar strategy evolved
by the British for governing the relations with the states. As observed by
Shankar.
Paramountcy meant that the States accepted Suzerainty of the
British government and the government of India, to carry out
directions given to them by the Government of India. It was
convenient to the British government to refuse to define
paramountcy.4
Paramountcy was a special system concerning the relationship of the
states with the British government. The states had to cooperate with the
government on matters of all-India policies in respect of railways, post
and telegraphs, and defense. The crown representatives sometimes used
to station an army, construct railways on a part of the states, and used to
take the administrative control of the area. States had a series of
agreements with the British government. In addition to that, the crown
representative could seek military assistance from the government of
India in case he found it necessary for the protection of the ruler from an
3
external aggression an internal revolt.5 The relation of the states with the
paramount power was based on latters military strength and the states
were the subordinate allies. The relationship between the states and the
British crown thus remained as long as the British power existed in India.
The position of the Indian states and their relation with the British
Government were well-defined through various treaties and declarations
by the British Government from time to time. As early as 1858, the
proclamation of Queen Victoria stated:
We hereby announce to the native princes of India that all
treaties and engagements made with them by or under the
authority of the Honourable East India Company are by us
accepted and will be scrupulously maintained. We shall respect
the Rights, Dignity and Honour of Native Princes as Our
Own.6
The same assurance was further confirmed by Lord Morley, then
secretary of state for India on February 23, 1909.7 At a later date, during
World War-I in 1914, King George V observed: Paramount regard for
treaties, faith and pledged word of ruler, and peoples is the common
heritage of England and India.8 The position of the states became very
much critical at the time of the transfer of power in 1947. It was a
question whether with the lapse of paramoutcy, the states would attain
complete freedom or not.
Ibid.; also see Urmila Phadnis, Towards the Integration of Indian States, 19191947, Bombay, 1968, see Chapter VIII.
217
10
11
Cripps Mission of March, 1942 clearly stipulated:(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below for the participation of the
Indian states in the constitution making body.
(c) His Majestys Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith
the constitution so framed subject to(i) the right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the
new constitution to retain its present constitutional position, provision being
made for subsequent accession if it so decides- V.P. Menon - op.cit., pp. 565566.
V.P. Menon - op.cit., pp. 649-650.
218
states role in free India was very much important and unless those
princes were properly guided towards integrity of the country, the very
idea of building a united Indian nation would have been at stake.
Congress Attitude Towards the States: The Congress, in late nineteenth
century, was just like a voluntary organization and the functions were
three-fold:- (i) it acted as a social reformer and the same was preached by
leaders like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Iswar Chandra; (ii) it tried to maintain
the traditional values of the Indian society as enunciated by Dayanand
Saraswati; and (iii) it acted as a political organization.
On political ground, its movement was confined to the British India
only. In 1893, Dadabhai Naoroji, the President of the 9th session of the
Indian National Congress, which was held in Lahore spoke about
paramount power and the princes. He stated:
Another subject of our future work to which I need only touch
now is the relations of the government with the native states.12
The idea about the states developed in the 31st session of the Congress at
Lucknow in 1916, when the then President A.C. Mazumdar referred to
the native states with regard to intellectuals as he remarked that many
brilliant persons had shown their excellence in the princely states.13 The
congress did not want to interfere with the internal affairs of the princes
though it had full sympathy for the princes with regard to their rights and
privileges.14
Between 1920-1947: The Congress attitude at a later stage had a shift
from its earlier standpoint when it was realized by its leaders that for the
purpose of integrity of the country, the status of the princely states needed
12
13
14
15
16
17
Congress held at Madras in 1927.18 The idea of the Congress, on the eve
of freedom, was pointed towards setting of representative government; in
the states in the similar fashion as it wanted in British India. The over all
idea of the Congress was to have a federal set up in the country and an
honourable place for the princely states though the leaders did not like
unlimited involvement in the internal affairs of the states. Gandhiji
explained:
The Congress possesses no authority for enforcing its will in
India states even to the extent it does in British India proper.19
BRITISH ATTITUDE: The British Government was trying to patronize
the princes and the princes were also trying to exploit such a situation.
The resolution of the Chamber of Princes of January 29, 1947 clearly
proves how antagonistically it pursued the policy of secession when it
expressed that any negotiation with the Constituent Assembly would not
be binding on them, that they must be allowed to remain sovereign and be
guaranteed safeguard regarding their position, and that their decision
regarding joining the Constituent Assembly would rest on them alone.20 It
was desired that the States could remain outside the Union and the British
Government would not force the Princes to lose their identity.
The condition created during the period of partition was so critical
that it needed a practical and intelligent handling to get the wheel turned
towards the integration of the country without much difficulty and chaos.
Sardars Attitude towards the States before Independence: From the
beginning of his career as a political worker of Indian National Congress,
18
19
20
21
22
should find out the method of election and in his opinion the Constituent
Assembly should decide the method of the grouping of the states into a
union and not the Chamber of Princes.24 Sardar, thus, realized that in
order to counteract any evil design by the Princes, the Congress and the
Constituent Assembly, should hold full powers. Accordingly, on
December 21st, 1946, K.M. Munshi moved a resolution in the Constituent
Assembly that there should be a committee to confer with the Negotiating
Committee of the States regarding the distribution of 93 seats allocated to
the States in the Constituent Assembly. The relevant resolution was
passed and a committee of six including the Sardar was formed. Thus
Sardars idea got a passage officially.
To negotiate with the various states, a new department called
States Department was formed and Sardar Patel assumed its office on
5th July 1947. As early as December 7, 1946, Sardar, in his letter to K.M.
Munshi, made it clear that the Constituent Assembly would have the real
authority to decide about the grouping of the states.25
Nehru always believed that the verdict of the people was supreme
and there should not be any question of paramountcy and sovereign
power. Independence would not depend on anybodys declaration but on
the acknowledgement of it by other parties. In his speech at the All-India
Congress Committee on June 15th, 1947 at New Delhi, he stated:
We will not recognize any independence for any state in India.
Further any recognition of such independence by any foreign
power. Whichever it may be and wherever it may be, will be
considered an unfriendly act.26
24
25
26
Dr. Ambedkar, the key figure, in framing the Constitution of India, too
wanted that the native states should merge with the Indian Union and the
States should realize that they could not remain independent, having only
geographical boundaries with India and by acting against the will of the
people. He said:
The only way by which the Indian states can free themselves
from paramountcy is by bringing about a merger of sovereignty
or suzerainty. This can happen only when the Indian states join
the Indian union as constituent units.The states should realize
that their existence as sovereign independent states will not be
worth five years purchase27
After assuming office of the States Department, Sardar defined the policy
of the Government of India with regard to the Princely states and
persuaded them to accede to the Dominion of India on the subjects of
Defense, Foreign Affairs and Communications. He assured the States that
the policy of the government was to create harmony and to work for
mutual interest. He pointed out that the Indian states should not forget
that the only alternative to co-operation in the general interest was alike.
He boldly indicated:
But for there can be no question that despite this separation
a fundamental homogeneity of culture mutual interest would
continue to govern us.The safety and preservation of these
states, as well as of India demand unity and mutual cooperation
between its different parts.By common endeavour we can
raise the country to a new greatness while lack of unity will
expose us to fresh calamities.28
27
28
Sardar action: Sardar did not like to have confrontation with the rulers
unless otherwise compelled. The situation, prevailing at the time of
independence, was extremely critical due to innumerable problems
resulting out of positions which needed a careful handling to bring
stability into the administration and the social conditions. In such
circumstances, it was not desirable to have any additional problem as the
situation would have gone completely out of control. Keeping in view the
solidarity of the country and the overall aim of nation-building, Sardar
felt that a tactful handling of the problems of princely states would be
absolutely necessary to avoid the creation of an unknown third force and
thus endangering the integration of the country in future. His approach
towards the princes was a peaceful one, with friendly advice and
psychological treatment, but he did not rule out confrontation as the last
resort.
Appeal to the Princes: Sardar had close contacts with the princes. He
explained that by acceding to the Indian Union the future of the country,
and simultaneously the future of the princely states, would be brighter;
even peace would return to the country.29 Sardar appealed to the princes
for their good-will and for peaceful accession of their States to India. He
tried to impress upon the princes that for the integrity of the country, the
princes should co-operate with the Congress to form a United India. He
said:
I have a few words to say to the Rulers of Indian states
among whom I am happy to count many as my personal
friendsLet not the future generation curse us for having had
29
Shriraj Dharngadhra in his article unification of India stated that when Sardar
invited all States to unite with India for mutual benefit and relationship a
magic effect was seen and it led to the accession of most of the states G.M.
Nandurkar (Ed), This was Sardar, Vol. I, Navjivan Publishing House,
Ahmedabad, 1974, p. 142.
226
31
consequences for the defaulter. With an iron will and a strong hand, he
persuaded the rulers to merge with India.32 When his appeal failed, Sardar
did not hesitate to go to the extent of warning the princes with the worst
consequences. He indicated that at the moment when the country was
facing a heavy foreign onslaught, the princes must follow the line of
thinking of the government and the citizens of the respective states. He
even pointed out that he would not hesitate even in taking strong
measures with military contingence. His psychological approach towards
the princes paved the way for merger of the princely states.33
Sardars Friendly Approach: On some occasions, Sardar played a
friendly role with the princes. He considered them as his own friends and
tried to make them realize the consequence of the non-accession of their
states to the Indian Union. In his friendly advice to the rulers, Sardar
clearly explained to them the steps necessary for the establishment of a
United India. He said:
The real question which comes in the way of establishment of
cordial relations between the states and their people is the
reluctance on the part of most of the states to recognize the
fundamental rights, peoples natural demand for responsible
government.34
Sardar clearly realized the drawback on the part of the governments of the
states. So he advised them to establish responsible governments in their
respective states. His advice to the rulers was a very friendly one. His
analysis of the situation was so lucid and appealing to them that a number
32
33
34
36
possibly use and make you free of all those subjects which you
cannot possibly manage on your own. You cannot run away
from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any
more than you can run away from the subjects for whose
welfare you are responsible.38
This statement together with the speech of Sardar of 5th July, 1947
requesting the rulers to come forward as friends and build up a common
Indian nation, so as to avoid anarchy and chaos, had a deep-rooted effect
on the rulers.
In order to persuade the states to participate in the Constituent
Assembly, a meeting was held between the Rulers negotiating
committee, Nehru and Patel on 8th and 9th February 1947. Though the
rulers wanted certain guarantees as per their conference of January 29,
1947, Sardar intimated that they were to proceed as per the Cabinet
Mission Plan and the Congress had no intention of changing the
boundaries and the scheme was a voluntary one. The statement had a
softening effect and the princes decided to send representatives to the
Assembly.39
Sardar did succeed in bringing some rulers together. A meeting
held at his residence on July 10th, 1947; it was attended by rulers of
Patiala, Gwalior, Baroda and Bikaner. Sardar urged that the states, which
were already represented in the Constituent Assembly, should
immediately accede in respect of three subjects which would enable them
to have a direct voice in shaping the policy of the Central Government.
The States delegation appreciated the logic of Sardar but various
suggestions were made regarding the composition, tenure and functions
38
39
40
possible only due only to the ability of Sardar Patel and his comrades. In
this connection R.K. Murthy observed:
It was miracle, performed not with threats and forebodings but
with tact and persuasion. The task was beset with immense
complications. Studded with personal predilections and
individual claims. Proper notes had to be made of the
temperament and character of each ruler, adapt the tune of
negotiations to evoke the most sympathetic chord in him. A
sensible injection of weapon of bluff too helped the early
consummation of the grand plan.41
Sardar had also acknowledged the sacrifice of the rulers. In his statement
of 16th December 1947 he said: I am particularly grateful to the rulers of
the states who showed commendable appreciation of the realities of the
situation and a benevolent regard for public good.42 In his press
conference in Delhi on January 29th, 1948 he too said:
While I give plenty of credit to the people for this bloodless
revolution in nearly one-third of the country, I have nothing but
praise for the manner in which the rulers have co-operated with
us and the people in bringing about this development.43
Sardar kept the sacrifice of the rulers foremost in mind; he tried to look
after their interests by safeguarding the payment of their privy purses. He
also acknowledged the ability of some of the rulers by appointing them as
Rajpramukh and afterwards as Governors or Ambassadors. It was
Sardars Patels large-heartedness that enabled him to ensure that the
rulers did not find them in hardship after relinquishing their offices. In
Patiala, on October 24th, 1947, Patel said:
41
42
43
No quarrel now with the Princes. They are ours and we can
make them understand and appreciate our point of view.44
The process of integration of 40 B & C states of the Eastern and Central
India and 449 states of Kathiaward was just like a veritable jigsaw puzzle.
The union of Saurastra came in February, 1948, the union Matsya, the
smaller Rajasthan, the Vindhya Pradesh, the Malwa of Madhya Pradesh
and the Pepsu came successively thereafter. The union of greater
Rajasthan and Union of Travancore-Cochin were formed in 1949. Sardar
had some strategic consideration in the process. He took Saurastra and
pepsu first due to defense considerations in the North. The bigger states
were tackled at an opportune moment.45
Sardars Scheme: To build up an Indian nation through the process of
bloodless integration was a unique work that was achieved by Sardar
Patel. The country which was never united as a nation could be brought
under one banner only through the peaceful process of accession of the
states. It was indeed integration without confrontation and an important
step towards nation building.
Sardar Patel believed in the strength of the people; he had great
hold on the masses. Especially in Gujarat, people had great regard for
him. They considered him as an excellent leader of the nation. Through
his own disciples, he could establish a strong network of political activity
in various states of Gujarat. The All India States Peoples conference
was the proof of the State Peoples alertness about their democratic
rights.46
44
45
46
47
48
For a United India, Speech dated, December 16, 1947, op.cit., p. 18.
R.K. Munshi has observed: he stressed the need for the states to accede to one
or other of the two dominions on the subjects of defense, Foreign Affairs and
communication. He pointed out that states by and a large did not have capacity
to handle these three difficult subjects by themselves
235
50
51
tried to exploit the situation. When told by V.P. Menon, regarding the
great danger in not dealing properly with the states which wanted to
maintain sovereignty, Sardar told him that if the problem was not handled
properly and promptly the new-born Free State might disappear. Sardar
agreed with Menons formula that a state should accede in respect of
three subjects.52 Sardar could take Mountabatten into full confidence and
the cabinet entrusted the viceroy to negotiate with the rulers regarding the
accession and also to deal with Hyderabad.
Sardars scheme for the integration of the States was quite
elaborate. He wanted not only in geographical integration but also social
and economical integration. He knew that once the country was
integrated geographically, it would be easier to undertake the work for
social, constitutional and financial harmony. While defining the
governments policy towards the states, he clarified in the Parliament on
October 12th, 1949:
As a result of the policy of integration and democratization of
states since December 1947, the process what might be
described as unionisation of states has been greatly
accelerated. Two important developments in this direction have
been the extension of the legislative authority of the Dominion
over the states and the federal financial integration of the
states.53
Constitutional Provision in Integration: In the beginning, it was
decided that the States would accede to the Union on three subjects and
the constitution of the States would be framed by the people of the States,
but most of the States did not have any organized administration and
52
53
V.P. Menon, op.cit., p. 91. In the words of Menon: Sardar told me that if we
did not handle it promptly and effectively our hard-earned independence might
disappear through the states door.
The Statesman, dt. October 13, 1949, press report.
237
54
55
B. Shiva Rao, The framing of Indias Constitution, Vol. IV, Indian Institute of
Public Administration, New Delhi, 1968, p. 564.
Art. 291 of the constitution where under any covenant or agreement entered
into by the ruler of any Indian state before the commencement of constitution,
the payment of any sums, free of tax, has been guaranteed or assured by the
Government of the Dominion of India to any ruler of such State as privy purse
for such period as may subject to our agreement entered into in that behalf
under Clause (1) of act 278, be determined by the order of the President.
238
56
57
58
59
ebbing out, but had a good organization for rousing the political
consciousness of the people in so far as the Congress was concerned they
attracted the attention of Sardar Patel in his very first attempt towards
their integration. The West Gujarat known as Saurastra constituted a
number of small states which did not have much potential from the point
of view of economic and political independence. In all, 327 such States
60
D.D. Basu, Introduction to the constitution of India, Prentice Hall of India Pvt.
Ltd., New Delhi, 1978, p. 42.
240
62
66
of its territory fell into the area of the States which had acceded to India.
There were two other small States called Babariwad and Mangrol headed
by Muslim rulers under the control of the Junagadh State, that had
acceded to India, but the Nawab argued that Mangrol had no authority to
negotiate any instrument of accession without the permission of
Junagadh. Till 14th August, 1947, Junagadh did not accede either to India
or to Pakistan. However, on 15th August, 1947, the people of the state
were shocked on hearing that the state had acceded to Pakistan and that
the accession had been accepted by the other party. The people resented
such an undemocratic action Sardar agreed that the armed forces on
surrounding Junagadh would be kept in readiness so that they could be
deployed in no time. V.P. Menon was sent to meet Nawab and explain
about his wrong decision.67 The Government of India press Communiqu
dated 25th September, 1947, strongly denounced such action of Nawab
and asserted firmness in dealing with the situation.68 Under the leadership
of Shamaldas Gandhi, who had taken consent of Sardar Patel, Kathiawad
Peoples Front was formed and supplies to Junagadh were stopped.
Bhutto appealed to Pakistan for help but in vain. Violence started in the
State and encouraged by the Kathiawad peoples Front, the subjects of the
State started a demonstration against the Nawab, who fled to Karachi
with his family. On October 27th, Bhutto admitted that the people did not
accept the Nawabs accession to Pakistan. Bhutto fled to Pakistan after
requesting the Union Government to take over the administration.69 The
67
68
69
Allen Campbell Johnson said Patel had responded to the challenge in a way
which, if it raises domestic moral, is hardly calculated to win over world
opinion. Mission with Mountbatten, Ibid., p. 284.
The communiqu stated, The Government of India are determined to find a
solution of this problem. Their sole aim is to see tranquility maintained
throughout Kathiawad, Government of India, Press note-national Archives of
India, New Delhi.
D.V. Tahmankar, Sardar Patel, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1970,
pp. 227-228.
243
peoples verdict and ultimately found support and Junagadh came under
India, due to the tactful handling by the States Department headed by
Sardar Patel. Sardar, in his speech on November 13, 1947 at Junagadh,
explained at length the strategy adopted by the Government of India. He
explained that the Government had tried its best through negotiations to
come to a peaceful settlement in the interest of the country. Though the
things were moving in the proper direction, the Government of India had
to take drastic steps due to a sudden change in the Nawabs policy, to
bring the state under its control, which he thought as the correct step.70
Finally Junagadh merged was merged in Kathiawad States, which became
a part of the Gujarat state. U.N. Dhebar, a dedicated Congressman and
Sardars follower, became the first Chief Minister of Kathiawad states.71
The way Junagadh was made to accede to India was very clear from legal
and democratic point of view. Junagadhs accession to Pakistan raised lot
of Public controversy; but from the point of the guideline of the British
Governments partition programme, Junagadh had to accede t India on
geographical and economical grounds, though the state was ruled by a
Muslim ruler. Taking the population into consideration the state having a
majority of Hindus should be a part of India. On similar consideration,
Bahawalpur, a state adjacent to India and Pakistan was allowed to accede
to Pakistan.72
Sardar, thus acted in a finest way in his handling of the Junagadh
situation without keeping any loopholes open for any controversy in
future.
70
71
72
K.M. Munshi, The end of an era, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1957, p.
51.
Author has observed: Lord Mountbatten should be handling them (States)
was, therefore, sure guarantees to satisfy the outside world. He (Sardar)
also knew that Sir Walter Moncktons relations with Lord Mountbatten might
make the negotiations easier
245
agree to the same, he should agree to allow the people of the state to
decide the issue of accession. But, in spite of the best efforts of
Mountbatten, the negotiations failed. Ultimately with great reluctance an
extension of two months was granted to Hyderabad to decide about the
accession. Sir Walter Monckton, in his note dated 15th September, 1947,
stated:
I know that Mr. Patel was and is against any extension of time
to Hyderabad and that the Viceroy prevailed over the cabinet of
the Dominion to allow him personally two months time to see
whether I, could find a compromise satisfactory to both
sides.74
Sardar could foresee the difficult situation which the country was facing
and in his letter dated 19th September, 1947 to Mountbatten, Sardar
explained the situation in Hyderabad and stated about the steps that
would be necessary in future due to the wrong policy of the Nizam as he
had created his own Frnakentstein-Ittehadul-Mussalmeen.75
After some more discussions with a number of delegates from
Hyderabad, some concessions were granted by Sardar to the Nizam and
the Standstill Agreement for one year and the collateral letters were
signed on 29th November, 1947. The same day Sardar made a statement
in the Constituent Assembly and explained that the period of one year
granted to the Nizam would be helpful for final accession. Thus, he
agreed with the settlement reached by the government on the ground that
accession of Hyderabad would be peaceful.76
It is said that Razvi, a member of the Ittehad-ul-Mussalmeen, and
controlling the policy of the Nizam, met Sardar Patel in Delhi to try for
74
75
76
additional concessions from him; but Sardar quickly disposed him and
firmly indicated that there was no possibility of accepting Hyderabd as
being independent. When Razvi indicated that Sardar should realize their
difficulties, and that in case Sardar did not concede his request,
Hyderabad would fight tooth and nail, Sardar remained unmoved and
replied:
How Can I stop you from committing suicide if you want
to?77
This proves that Sardar was confident that in the course of time he would
be able to merge Hyderabad with India.
As per the new agreement, K.M. Munshi a trusted man of Sardar
was sent to Hyderabad as Agent General of India and detailed reports
about the political conditions were received through him. Sardar also kept
in touch with the members of the Hyderabad Congress and formulated his
policy on the basis of the information he received from time to time.
Sardar was not at all hopeful about the settlement in Hyderabad in line
with the Stand still Agreement for one year78
Inspite of Standstill Agreement for one year, the Nizam did not
give up his hope of attaining complete independence with the help of
foreign powers. His doubtful actions, were reported to Sardar by K.M.
Munshi, other trusted people and the reports of the news-papers regarding
the reign of terror and the oppression of the Hindu Community. The
Razakars started arson and looting in the neighbouring States. The Nizam
wanted to represent his case to the Security Council to internationalize
the issue. People, in India became impatient but Sardar was preparing for
77
78
the final assault and counting the days. In his letter to Nehru, Sardar
stated:
I have already decided to issue instructions to Hyderabad and
Bhopal States regarding the composition of their armed forces.
We are telling them that we are bound to take it into account in
making allotments of arms and equipments and that the
composition of these forces should be readjusted in order to
create more confidence among the non-Muslim majority79
When the situation was becoming alarming, Sardar intimated Nehru that
the time came to tell Hyderabad that the Nizam should accede
unconditionally.80 Sardar wanted that the situation should be tackled
firmly so that it did not go out of hands. In his letter dated 21st June, 1948
to N.V. Gadgil, Sardar cautioned that the decision about Hyderabads
accession should be similar to that of the other States and the situation
could be brought under control. He advised the Indian Military to be alert
as he apprehended that the trouble, any time, might demand immediate
military action.
Sardar sought information from defense ministry and was informed
that in case of nay military action, it would not take more than three
weeks. In spite of his illness, Sardar kept in close touch with the day to
day events on Hyderabad. Though Nehru was hesitant due to the
international reaction, Sardar was firm in his stand. It was decided that
military would march into Hyderabad, on 13th September, 1948 and
Sardar did not agree to postpone the operation. At the instance of Sardar,
79
80
Sardars letter dated January 25, 1948 to Nehru, (Courtesy Miss Maniben
Patel).
V. Shankar, op.cit., pp. 106-107.
In his letter to Nehru Sardar observed: I feel very strongly that stage has
come when we should tell them quite frankly that nothing short of unqualified
acceptance of accession and of introduction of unlimited responsible
government would be acceptable to us.
248
85
86
pave the way for integration of Indore. It is interesting that afterwards the
King became friendly with Sardar.90
Bhopal was a State ruled by a Muslim ruler; but geographically it
had no connection with Pakistan. The Nawab of Bhopal was very
powerful and he was the chairman of the negotiating committee of the
Chamber of Princes. The Nawab had no intention to accede to Indian
Union, rather he was keen in maintaining his sovereignty or joining hands
with Pakistan. The Nawab and King of Indore had a joint interview with
Mountbatten, the viceroy on 4th August, 1947 when Viceroy intimated
that he did not have any authority to alter the terms and conditions of
accession and final decision rested with Sardar Patel. He, however,
assured that Sardar Patel would not be unkind to them.91 After a
considerable time Nawab did not find any alternative, so he acceded to
India. In spite of his earlier anti-Indian attitude, Sardar realized that the
Nawab was a changed man when he admitted his fault and apologized to
him. Sardar took him as his friend and exchanged his cordial relation in
the coming years.92 Nawab in later years was very helpful in tackling the
refugee problem. Sardar thus gave a humanitarian touch to politics of
integration of States.
There are innumerable instances where Sardar could bring down
the rulers of the States to terms and agree them to accession to India as
per the terms and conditions stipulated by the Government of India.
Sardar had to deal with diversified Kings having different attitude with
caution and applying varied, human, social, political and psychological
approach.
90
91
92
93
L.N. Sarin, Sardar Patel, S. Chand and Company Pvt. Ltd., Ram Nagar, New
Delhi, 1977, p. 85.
256