Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Insufficient Warning
Insufficient Warning
SCOPE:
Not confined to period prior to filing of
informationPeople v. Maqueda, 3/22/95 (abrogating P. V. Ayson,
175 SCRA 216[1989] )
Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB)
was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife,
Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the
occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims
identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and
Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the
two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that
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FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision dated April 26, 1988, of
the Regional Trial Court , finding theaccused guilty of the crime of
Violation of Section 4 of Article II in relation to Section 21, Art. IV of
Republic Act 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Law), as amended,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of P20,000
plus costs.It was established during the trial that in early November,
1987, police operatives of the DrugEnforcement Unit, Police Station
No. 3 of the Western Police District were informed that there
wasrampant drug using and pushing on Dinalupihan Street, Tondo,
Manila. The pusher was described to themas a boy of about 20 years,
5'5" in height, and of ordinary build. He allegedly sold marijuana to
anybody,regardless of age.In light of these reports, Police Lieutenant
Manuel Caeg and the other members of the unitorganized a "buybust" operation , to effect the arrest of the notorious drug pusher. On
November 13,1987 at 10 o'clock in the morning, before the group left
the office for the area of operation, two (2) ten-peso bills were given to
Pat. Corpuz who had marked them with his initials "T.C." He gave
one of themarked bills to the informer. The said marked bills was
then found tucked in the waist of the accusedafter he was frisked and
arrested by the police for handing over to the informer and police
poseur-buyerten
(10)
cigarette
sticks
of
hand
rolled
marijuana.Linsangan denied the charge. He alleged that at around
10:30 in the morning of November 13,1987, he was in the vendor's
stand of his neighbor Emeterio Balboa, alias Rey Galunggong, on
DinalupihanStreet to buy his breakfast, for he had just awakened. He
lived with his widowed mother, Erlinda, on theground floor of a twostorey house on the alley at 1284 Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila.
The upperfloor was occupied by his mother's brother, Geosito Diaz,
who is engaged in the second-hand tirebusiness. Although once in a
while, his uncle helped them financially, he earned his living by
driving atricycle on a 5 p.m. to 12:00 p.m. shift. He admitted that he
had witnessed some men in Dinalupihanengaged in drinking sprees
and smoking marijuana.ISSUE:Whether or not the lower court erred
in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial
theP10-bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to
remain silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial
investigation.HELD:The appeal has no merit. The appellant was not
denied due process during the custodial investigation.Although he
was not assisted by counsel when he initialled the P10-bills that the
police found tucked inhis waist, his right against self-incrimination
was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did
notconstitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of
selling marijuana cigarettes. Hisconviction was not based on the
presence of his initials on the P10 bills, but on the fact that the trial
courtbelieved the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him
while he was actually engaged in sellingmarijuana cigarettes to a
member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to
theircategorical declarations than to the appellant's denials. That is as
it should be for as law enforcers, theyare presumed to have
performed their official duties in a regular manner. Their task of
apprehendingpersons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult
enough without legal and procedural technicalities tomake it doubly
so.
THERE IS NO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATIONS
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ABALLE
RULING: Whereupon, an information was filed against Aballe,
charging him with homicide penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. 8 At his arraignment on April 13, 1981, he
pleaded not guilty. 9 He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession
on the ground that it was obtained through coercion and in the
absence of counsel.
Aballe's repudiation of his earlier confession notwithstanding, the
trial court convicted the accused of the crime of homicide. 10
In this petition for review on certiorari, Aballe contends that the trial
court erred in giving full weight to his extrajudicial confession taken
during custodial investigation and in imposing a penalty which was
not in accordance with law.
The argument that Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been
disregarded by the lower court for having been obtained in violation
of Aballe's constitutional rights is well taken. Throughout the
custodial interrogation, the accused's parents and relatives were
almost always around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it
shown that the youthful offender was ever represented by counsel.
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Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution], for the obvious reason
that he is no longer under custodial interrogation.
There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the
admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are not
violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed
facts that it was not exacted by the police while he was under custody
or interrogation. Hence, the constitutional rights of a person under
custodial investigation as embodied in Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, are not at issue in this case.
However, the accused -- whether in court or undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor -unquestionably possess rights that must be safeguarded. These
include: 1) the right to refuse to be made witnesses; 2) the right not to
have any prejudice whatsoever imputed to them by such refusal; 3)
the right to testify on their own behalf, subject to cross-examination
by the prosecution; and 4) while testifying, the right to refuse to
answer a specific question that tends to incriminate them for some
crime other than that for which they are being prosecuted.
We do not, however, agree with the Sandiganbayans
characterization of petitioners Counter-Affidavit as an extrajudicial
confession. It is only an admission. Sections 26 and 33 of Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as
follows:
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
SEC. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an
admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving
an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which one is charged. Thus, in the case at bar, a statement
by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against
him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an
admission, not a confession.
9.
10.
11.
which
the
arresting,
detaining,
inviting
or
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torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His
will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they
continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag
and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The
prisoner could not take any more. His body could no longer endure
the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will
had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted
him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later,
against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators,
purporting it to be a reenactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him.
RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not
satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of
his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should
be several short and clear questions and every right explained in
simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under
investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was
not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend.
In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks
after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to
visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one.
At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
The modifiers competent and independentwere terms
absent in all organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their
addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant to stress the
primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the
uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by
according the accused, deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing
individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices
given to him by a competent and independent lawyer."
There is denial of the right to counsel if the accused was not asked
whether he wishes and can afford to retain his own lawyer. He was
not made aware that he could choose his own lawyer. Furthermore,
the PAO lawyer who assisted him did not dutifully and faithfully
assisted the accused during the course of the investigation.
The
A.
"TO BE INFORMED"
SCOPE:
1. the right includes the right of the accused
to be informed of his right to counsel, but also that he has
the right to have counsel of his own choice and must be
afforded the opportunity to exercise it. People v.
Binamira, 277 SCRA 232.
the accused was not told of his right to have
a competent and independent counsel of his choice. He
was not asked if he had any such counsel in mind, and if
he could not afford to hire the services of such lawyer,
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D. "RIGHT TO BE SILENT"
ISSUE:
Is the confession is admissible in evidence.
HELD:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engage by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there
is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his
arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative
or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had
been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about 2 weeks after
he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to see him. His
statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet
during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These
constitute grave violations of his rights.
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under
custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a
crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to
such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession
of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of
acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would
appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against selfincrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of great
importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against
self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for
liberty. It reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of
aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those' suspected of
crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; the fear
that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment
and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality
and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life."
The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are
inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to
law.
P. V. Arciaga, 99 SCRA 1]
No inference of guilt may also be drawn against an accused upon his failure
to make a statement of any sort. The neglect or refusal of the accused to be a
witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 21 Most
importantly, both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, an accused has
the right to remain silent. 22 Such silence cannot be used as presumption of
his guilt. Only recently, in People vs. Gargoles, 83 SCRA 282, this Court
held, citing People vs. Esmundo, 27 Phil. 554, that an accused has the right
to decline to testify at the trial without having any inference of guilt drawn
from his failure to go on the witness stand. We likewise held therein that a
verdict of conviction on the basis solely or mainly, of the failure or refusal of
the accused to take the witness stand to deny the charges against him is a
judicial heresy which cannot be countenanced. Moreover, the foregoing is in
consonance with the rule that an accused should be convicted on the strength
of the evidence presented by the prosecution and not on the weakness of his
defense.
The assertion made by the police investigators to the effect that the appellants
were informed of their fundamental rights will not overthrow the fact that
appellants were not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation
even if they had waived the right. The fact that the appellants were never
assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation is confirmed in the
testimony of prosecution witness Sgt. Esmeraldo Romero.
From the foregoing, it clearly appears that the Tanza, Cavite police
investigators informed the accused-appellants Ferdinand Camalog and
Novelito Sotto about their constitutional rights in a rather sloopy manner.
The type of questions and answers recited in their extra-judicial confessions
is Identical to that of their co-accused Armando de los Reyes. There was not
even a semblance of conformity with the fundamental law.
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With more reason, the accused in this case cannot be faulted merely for
failure to give any statement before trial. Besides, the rules do not make it a
condition precedent for a witness to give his affidavit before g the witness
stand. The procedure is simply adopt to safeguard the parties from
recalcitrant witnesses.
the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the
holding of the trial in the national penitentiary. Besides, there is a ruling
that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid
Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for
reversal of the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).
The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule
that the trial court may motu propio exclude the public from the courtroom
when the evidence to be offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The
court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every
person except the officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution
and defense.
FACTS: At around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso
Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, went to
the toilet to answer a call of nature and to fetch water. The accused, Jose
Tampus and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal institution, followed
Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him.
Saminado died upon arrival in the prison hospital. After emerging from the
toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives.
They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The
officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report
submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated
that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado
when the latter was armed in the comfort room and his back was turned to
Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck Two days after
the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and
Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted
that they assaulted Saminado. The trial was held at the state penitentiary at
the insistence of the Avila. The court found Tampus and Avila guilty for the
murder of Saminado.
In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio of appellant raises
the following issues:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the confession of Tampus was taken in violation of Section
20, Article IV of the Constitution (now Sec. 12, Art. IV of the 1987 Const)
2. W/N the trial court should have advised defendant Tampus of his right to
remain silent after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and
when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify
3. W/N defendant Tampus was denied to his right to public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence,
petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been
held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even
an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said
suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
HELD:
1. No. Even before the investigation for the killing was inititated, Tampus
and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the scene of the
crime, they surrendered to the first guard whom they encountered, and they
revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous
statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and
at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on
the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right
to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was
confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in
court. Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to
rely on the rulings in Escobedo vs. Illinois and Miranda vs. Arizona
regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to remain
silent during custodial interrogation. It should be stressed that, even without
taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of guilty
and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this
substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a
counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead
opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case.
What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
3. No. The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from
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through a jalousie window[40] while Capt. Flores testified that the persons in
the police line-up were in full view of Corazon. [41] This and other
contradictions in the testimony of prosecution witnesses weaken the
reliability of the out-of-court identification of appellant. We are now
constrained to agree that the in-court identification of the appellant made by
private complainant and her sister could have been tainted by the out-ofcourt (police line-up) procedure, even if we grant, arguendo, that such lineup did take place. Jk
INDEPENDENT:
provided by the investigator and agreed to by the
accused People v. Calvo, 269 SCA 676
Having been cleared of any irregularity, we therefore uphold the
admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession which, by itself, is
sufficient basis for his conviction. A confession, to recall, constitutes
evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that
no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. This presumption of
spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise. [9]
Even if the extrajudicial confession be ignored by assuming, for argument's
sake, that the alleged "irregularities" indeed marred its execution, there is
nonetheless other evidence particularly the identification made by
prosecution witnesses Beatriz Bido and Lucila Gorospe upon which
appellant's guilt was duly established. Witness Bido identified appellant as
one of the two (2) men (the other was Bobby Gaspar) who went out of
deceased Ignacia Mauleon's room and who angrily told her not to shout
otherwise she will be shot. She further testified that after appellant and
Bobby Gaspar left the room and went downstairs already carrying a bag, she
went inside the room which was already in disarray and saw the bloodied,
lifeless body of Ignacia Mauleon sprawled on the floor. [10] Witness Gorospe
corroborated Bido's identification of appellant when she testified that from
her vantage point (in front of her own store which is just seven (7) meters
away from deceased Ignacia Mauleon's bakery), she identified appellant who
was carrying a shoulder bag, as one of the two (2) men coming down from
the stairs of deceased Mauleon's bakery and who thereafter ran away at a
very fast pace, with one Henry Jordas giving chase. Henry Jordas, according
to Gorospe, nonetheless gave up his pursuit when appellant pointed a gun at
him. Witness Gorospe also stated that she was familiar with appellant,
having seen the latter in front of deceased Mauleon's bakery on three (3)
previous occasions.[
The totality test has been fashioned precisely to assure fairness as well as
compliance with constitutional requirements of due process in regard to outof-court identification. These cited factors must be considered to prevent the
contamination of the integrity of in-court identifications better. In this case,
the carnapping happened at 8:30 p.m., and the evidence does not disclose
whether the locus criminis was sufficiently lighted for purposes of
identification. In fact, while Corazon testified that the jeep was not lighted at
the time of the incident, [37] her sister claimed that the jeep was in fact lighted,
which enabled her to recognize appellant herein as one of the carnappers.
[38]
Although Corazon reported the incident to the Porac Police the following
day, she did not furnish said policemen a description of the perpetrators of
the crime.[39] Hence, the authenticity as well as accuracy of the present and
future descriptions of the suspected assailants has been placed in doubt for
lack of basis. Furthermore, the crime occurred some two (2) years and (8)
months prior to the arrest of appellant. Because of this lapse of time, certain
physical changes might have occurred in his physical appearance and other
attributes already. Corazon also claimed that she viewed the police line-up
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We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered
by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and
another individual.[46] It governs the relationship between the individual and
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the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and
its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without
need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by
government, rights that government has the duty to protect.
[47]
Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down
these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and
unwarranted interference by any department of government and its agencies
competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his
clients defense without any intervening conflict of interest.
2. Political Law; Rights of Accused; Waiver of the right to remain silent,
and to counsel and to be informed of such rights, must not only be
voluntary,but must also be made knowingly and intelligentlyMoreover, the answer of the accused (Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya
hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado) is a palpable indication that she did not
fully understand her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. The rule espoused in People
v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289, [1986], bears repeating: x x x Like other
constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the
right of a person under investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of
the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and
intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is
being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been
adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person
interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he
answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.
Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made
under duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to support the
same. In People v. Villanueva, this Court declared that voluntariness of a
confession may be inferred from its language such that if upon its face the
confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt
upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which could possibly be
supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaniety and coherence which
psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and
torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary. [13] A scrutiny of
the sworn statement discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the
commission of the offense charged which the accused himself could only have
known.
Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a
Constitutional infirmity. In their supposed statements dated September 9,
14, and 21, 1975, the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when
they "waived" their rights to counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of
counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in contemplation of law, 'involuntary,'
even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically." 13
Section 12(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution favors the accused and
is fully applicable to this case. It is also elementary that a Fiscal or
Prosecutor cannot be a lawyer for the accused at the same time. In his
testimony, Assistant Fiscal Mendoza stated that his main functions as
Assistant Fiscal in the City of Manila are to prosecute cases and to render
duties as an inquest fiscal. Whether or not the subsequent trial of a
confessants case will be assigned to him as prosecutor is immaterial. He
cannot pretend to act as defense counsel. An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for
that matter, cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even during
custodial investigation. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory
the protection given to the accused during custodial investigation. What the
Constitution requires in Article III Section 12 (1) is the presence of
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In the case before us, the main evidence relied upon for the
conviction of appellants were their own extrajudicial confessions
which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and with
the assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the
NBI. Such counsel cannot in any wise be considered independent
because he cannot be expected to work against the interest of a police
agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later, he in fact was
admitted into its work force. For this violation of their constitutional
right to independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After the
exclusion of their tainted confessions, no sufficient and credible
evidence remains in the Courts records to overturn another
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investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustins
defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at gunpoint in the
Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer,
Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for
his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from
only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not
push through since Quijano escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since
conspiracy was established. Hence the appeal.
P. V. Alegria, 9/28/90,
The Court is familiar with such statements and has consistently found them
invalid. They do not persuade that the accused was fully and fairly informed
of his rights in the sense that they were each painstakingly explained to him
and he was apprised of the effects of their waiver or forfeiture. Such
statements are especially unacceptable where they are made by persons of
limited education, and more so if no counsel was at hand to assist and advise
him.
In the case at bar, Labuac was hardly literate, not even having finished Grade
1, and, like Buenaflor and Alegria, was not represented by counsel. While
there was a lawyer who was allegedly called to be present at their
interrogation, he did not actively assist and advise them, being there merely
to give a semblance of legality to the proceedings. There is nothing in the
record to show that the lawyer made a single manifestation or representation
on behalf of the person he was supposed to protect against any possible abuse
of the investigators.
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
statements
BILL
extrajudicial
The right to the assistance of counsel is one of the basic rights of the person
under investigation for the commission of an offense. Lawyers are supposed
to be well-versed in the intricacies of criminal proceedings with which the
ordinary layman, not to mention the uneducated suspect, is not familiar.
Without a lawyer's advice and active representation, the suspect is likely to
be ensnared into making damaging admissions the legal significance of
which he may not understand or realize. The lawyer is required to be there to
prevent the suspect from making rash statements that may later be used
against him at the trial. The lawyer is required to be there to see to it that the
investigation is conducted in accordance with the Constitution, without the
employment of violence, force, intimidation or threat, or any other means
vitiating the free will. So vital is this right that where the suspect cannot
afford the services of counsel, he will be provided with one for free. Any
confession obtained from a suspect in the absence of counsel and without his
assistance shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. The only exception
is where the right to counsel is categorically waived and such waiver is made
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
14 |
accused-appellants
GLAD.
We rule that the counseling given by Atty. Dizon to Villareal was not
sufficiently protective of Villareal's rights as an accused as contemplated by
the Constitution. To start with, Atty. Dizon is not really known to
Villareal. He was requested to act as counsel because he happened to be at
the NBI following-up a client's case. Given that circumstance, it cannot be
expected that Atty. Dizon would give an advice to Villareal that would
offend the agent conducting the investigation. Thus, it appears that Atty.
Dizon did no more than recite to Villareal his constitutional rights. He
made no independent effort to determine whether Villareal's confessions
were free and voluntary. He swallowed hook, line and sinker, Villareal's
story that he was ready to confess oblivious of the fact that they were then
inside the NBI office and before an agent or in an atmosphere hostile to a
crime suspect. He did not inquire from Villareal how he was treated in the
last 24-hours. He did not seek any of Villareal's relatives or friends to find
out if he has any defense which Villareal was not free to disclose due to his
confinement. He did not even assist Villareal when the latter was made to
re-enact the crime at bar.
ABI
On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accusedappellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he was
assisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. In People vs. Bandula,[26] it was held that a Municipal
Attorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.
[27]
As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and
support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It
is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no
better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during
custodial investigations.[28] Consequently, for being violative of the
Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is
inadmissible.
A
municipal
mayor
cannot
be
considered
a
competent
and independent counsel qualified to assist a person under custodial
investigation. Hence, the extrajudicial confession taken from the accused
with His Honor as counsel is inadmissible in evidence. Without this
confession, the remaining evidence, which is circumstantial, fails the test of
moral certainty. Hence, acquittal is inevitable.
Facts:
The
accused
was
charged of robbery
with
homicide.
During investigation he was investigated and made an extrajudicial
confession during the interrogation in the absence of a counsel. It was 2
weeks later that he was provided with one in the person of Atty. Zena,
amunicipality attorney where he was made to sign a sworn statement
admitting the shooting of the victim.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was accorded with due process
of custodial investigation.
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended.
Held: No, the right of the accused for due process was clearly violated since
the authorities failed to provide him counsel during the interrogation and he
was not informed of his right to remain silent and right to a counsel.
Furthermore, the counsel to be provided to the accused should be one who is
impartial, independent and of his own choice. If the accused cannot afford to
have his own counsel then he will be provided by the authorities with one.
Providing the accused with municipality attorney as counsel would be
prejudicial because of conflict of interest involved in the performance of duty
of said counsel. The court held the evidence inadmissible to court for failure
to meet the requisites of due process for conductingcustodial investigation.
When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado
Peralta conferred with Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional
rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta
gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty.
Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was
accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial
statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by
Lucero.
COMPETENT
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
People v. COMPIL, 244 SCRA 125, the court said: The belated
arrival of the lawyer before the actual signing of the confession does
not cure the defect, because the investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from the accused.
15 |
BILL
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
GLAD.
ABI
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was
tortured. He was not informed of the offense for which he was being
investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other
accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office
during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr.
Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly
demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty.
Peralta. Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is
hereby reversed.
P. V. Paule, 261 SCRA 649
It cannot be gainsaid that Lt. Esteban was not in a position to give relevant
and reliable information on whether Atty. Dela Cruz provided appellant
effective and vigilant counsel in the course of appellant's custodial
investigation. He only overhead snatches of conversation between Atty. Dela
Cruz and appellant. He admitted he was ". . . going out of my office for
personal necessity" in the course of appellant's custodial interrogation.
Thus, the records do not show whether Atty. Dela Cruz effectively counseled
appellant during the crucial aspects of his custodial interrogation. During
these times, Atty. Dela Cruz could have been out of sight and out of hearing
distance. Given the circumstances of the case, Atty. Dela Cruz was the best
witness to establish the critical fact that he gave effective and vigilant
counsel to the appellant. Unfortunately, the prosecution did not present him
for reasons difficult to divine. By this lapse, he prosecution failed to discharge
the state's burden of proving with clear and convincing evidence that
appellant enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before he extrajudicially
admitted his guilt to the police authorities. Consequently, the extrajudicial
confession of appellant cannot be given any probative value.
16 |
BILL
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
GLAD.
ABI
Enrile and reiterated on March 20, 1985, in P V Galit. While this doctrine
eventually becomes part of Sec12 (1), Art 3, the requirements and
restrictions therein have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made
prior to Apr. 26, 83, the date of promulgation of Morales.
to be valid, there should be proof (prosecutions
burden) that the lawyer assisted the accused during the
interrogation, and that he to the accused explained the
contents and purpose of the document. People v. Pagaura, 267
SCRA 17
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
Any evidence derived from admissions obtained in
violation of the right also inadmissible:
17 |
BILL
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
GLAD.
Verbal and non-verbal : applies to both verbal and nonverbal confession/admission People v. Bonola, 274
sCRA 238.
MALIMIT: robbery with homicide The right against selfincrimination is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract
from the accuseds own lips, against his ill, admission of his guilt. It
does NOT apply when the evidence sought is NOT an incriminating
statement but an object evidence; Miranda rights
covers only inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or admission
made during custodial investigation; other evidence (like IDs, wallet,
keys, etc) is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of
custodial investigation.
ABI
RIGHT TO BAIL
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Thus, notice to the fiscal was required only in cases in which bail was a
matter of discretion. The rule was changed effective October 1, 1988,
however, so that, as it now stands, Rule 114, 15 makes no distinction
whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion. In all instances, reasonable
notice of hearing is required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least
he must be asked for his recommendation. Respondent judge says that Girao
was brought before him after the close of office hours. It may be assumed that
there was an inquest fiscal available to whom the judge could have referred
the motion for bail recommendation.
The prosecutor must be heard even in cases where bail is a matter of right
because in fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to take into
account a number of factors, such as the applicant's character and
reputation, forfeiture of other bonds, or whether he is a fugitive from justice.
(Rule 114, 6) Had the prosecutor been heard on the bail application, he
could possibly have informed the court that the gun used was unlicensed if
this was the case.
Issue: Whether
or
GLAD.
bail
violated.
N E T.
to
FACTS: Obosa was charged with two counts of murder for the ambush and
slaying of former Secretary of Interior and Local Governments Jaime Ferrer
and his driver Jesus Calderon. However, he was only convicted of two counts
of homicide by the trial court. Obosa applied for bail with the trial court.
While this is pending, he appealed the case to the CA, which found strong
evidence of guilt. Meanwhile, the trial court approved Obosas bail bond,
prompting the prosecution to request the CA to cancel the bail bond
approved by the trial court. Hence, this petition.
RIGHTS.
right
OF
accuseds
BILL
the
Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that
before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged
is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It
shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion
islimited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once
it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a
matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer
such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor
of discretion on the part of the court.
In stressing that in the case before him bail was a matter of right, respondent
judge apparently confuses the right to bail with the right not to be arbitrarily
detained. The latter merely means that the person detained should not be
held beyond the periods prescribed by law (i.e., Revised Penal Code, Art.
125) without charging him in court. It does not mean he has a right to be
released on bail within the same period, much less without giving the fiscal
or prosecutor the opportunity to be heard. On the other hand, should the
prosecutor fail to file the corresponding information, then the person
detained should be released. In such a case, the person detained is released
not because he has a right to bail but because he has a right not to be
arbitrarily detained beyond the period prescribed by law.
18 |
Not
ABI
In the case of De la Camara vs. Enage, we analyzed the purpose of bail and
why it should be denied to one charged with a capital offense when evidence
of guilt is strong:
of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had
been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counteraffidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to preemptorychallenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)
It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts
have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings. This is withoutmerit. * The Regional Trial Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior
courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo
warranto.
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements
of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved
in
the
failed
coup.
Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack ofmerit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under
article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the
private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.
Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9,
1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was
denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due
process.
Charged for murder but found guilty of homicide, bail (applied for
before conviction) may be granted. People v. Plaza, GR 176933,
10/2/09
B. Guidelines in fixing the amount of bail
Villasenor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312
Facts:A criminal case filed at the CFI of Marinduque for the murder of Boac
police sergeant AlfonsoMadia, lodged by the Provincial Fiscal against
petitioner. Petitioner, on motion, was admitted to aP60,000.00-bail. The
amount of the bond was, on verbal representation of Petitioners
wife,reduced to P40,000.00. Petitioner posted a property bond, was set at
provisional
liberty.
Beforearraignment on the murder charge, however, respondent Provincial Fis
cal amended theinformation. This time he accused petitioner with Direct
Assault
Upon
an
Agent
of
a
Person
inAuthority with Murder. Respondent judge sua sponte cancelled petitioner
s bond, ordered hisimmediate arrest. On petitioners motion to reconsider,
respondent judge, after hearing, resolved toadmit him to bail provided he
puts up a cash bond of P60,000.00. On petitioners motion that theoriginal
bond previously given be reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix the
bond anew inreal property in the amount of P60,000.00, but to be posted
only
by
residents
of
the
province
of Marinduque actually staying therein with properties which must be in the
possession andownership of said residents for five years. Petitioner came to
this Court on certiorari, with a prayer for preliminary injunction. He seeks
to set aside respondent judges orders; to reinstate the bail bond
theretofore approved by earlier by respondent judge.Issue: WON respondent
judge acted without any or in excess of his jurisdiction and with graveabuse
of discretion, and with violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted theprovisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.
The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition
forhabeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp
Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after
hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after
more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.
Issues:
(1)
Whether
or
Not
there
was
denial
of due
process.
(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.
Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities
to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion
19 |
BILL
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
GLAD.
ABI
opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of
P1,195,200.00 (P840,000.00 for the 14 counts of multiple murder plus
P355,200.00 for the 12 counts of multiple frustrated murder.) There was a
motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Enage however remained
adamant. De la Camara then files a petition for certiorari assailing Enages
order and prays for its nullification.
March 5, 1971- Enage answers that set forth the circumstances concerning
the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to
his mind, would disprove any charge that he was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the challenged order would find
support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by this
Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
March 31, 1971- both De la Camara and Enage did not appear at the hearing
with De la Camara, upon written motion was given 30 days to submit a
memorandum in lieu of oral argument, Enage in turn having 30 days from
receipt of memorandum to file his reply. De la Camara submitted the
memorandum on April 6, 1971.
May 26, 1971-Enage, instead of a reply, submitted a supplemental answer
wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April
28, 1971 and had since been remained at large. There was a reiteration then
of the dismissal of his petition for lack of merit, to which petitioner countered
in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with
this plea: The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose
opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondents prayer for dismissal of the
present petition for lack of merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the
fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The issue in the present petition that
calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate of countless
other Ricardo de la Camaras who may be awaiting the clear-cut definition
and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail.
* While the facts of this case is moot and academic, it did not preclude the SC
from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of
fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the
Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
ISSUE: WAS THE AMOUNT OF BAIL ORDERED BY ENAGE
EXCESSIVE?
HELD: Yes yes yo kabayo! Sayang lang at pumuga/tumakas si mayor, kaya
nga moot (court) & academic ang petition
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and
academic. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SCs rationale for requirement of non-excessive bail:
1.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with
capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the lass of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not beyond the
realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially
so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and the
frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such
an intent would be thwarted. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying
this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is
strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding
against him with a death sentence, an ever present threat, temptation to flee
the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
2.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered
nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution
commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the
right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. Nothing
can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970
fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional
provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged,
the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for
frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the Department
of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
3.
There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what,
on its face, appears to be indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v.
20 |
BILL
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
GLAD.
ABI
Abao case. The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the
opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and
reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8)
forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice
when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases. Enage ignored the decisive consideration appearing at the
end of the above opinion: Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon
to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal
thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not
hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the
challenged order. Nor is there any justification then for imputing his
inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision
of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear misreading of the
Abao opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine
refinement may elicit approval if to do so would be to reduce the right to bail
to a barren form of words.
with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very
nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the
prisoner can be delivered. 6 And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to
deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. This is
clearly deducible from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. At any time after the amount of bail is
fixed by order, the defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the
nearest collector of internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the court a
proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody. Money
thus deposited, shall be applied to the payment of the fine and costs for which
judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be returned to the
defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist
that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
Two issues are posed to us for resolution: First, whether the respondent judge
has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner's
attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty, and second, whether
the amendment to the information, after a plea of not guilty thereto, was
properly allowed in both substance and procedure.
1. As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may
be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of
requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his
conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 1
In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to
conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence
of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution, 2 and may
not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention, 3 or
by reason of his prior absconding. 4 In order to safeguard the right of an
accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall
not be required." This is logical cause the imposition of an unreasonable bail
may negate the very right itself. We have thus held that "where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof
and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would not hesitate to
exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." 5
Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if
considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if
demanded in the form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require an
actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the property owner,
and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused
upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or
credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which the
property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the
production of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to
his conviction or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond
would entail a transfer of assets into the possession of the court, and its
procurement could work untold hardship on the part of the accused as to
have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.
Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have
provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the
nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of
bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court,
and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor
revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a cash bond in lieu
of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly
provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash
21 |
BILL
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
GLAD.
ABI
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed
before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to
leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United
States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9
and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief
of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from
leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and
function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity
for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions
cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
OF
RIGHTS.
N E T.
GLAD.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.
BILL
22 |
ABI