Evidence Case Digest R130 - 17 To 19
Evidence Case Digest R130 - 17 To 19
one which no longer forms part of the record and the trial of the case is made on the
basis of the amended pleading only (see Ruymann and Farris v. Director of Lands et al.,
34 Phil. 428 [1916]). In the case at bar, respondent Ng, in his amended complaint
brought an action for breach of contract not to enforce his rights as manageradministrator but as lessee of the petitioner corporation. In the course of the trial, parol
evidence was introduced to prove that the contract in question was not a management
contract as it appeared on its face but a lease contract.
Rule 130, Sec. 7 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the
following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity
of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the failure of a contract to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties is raised. The fact that the allegations of respondent Ng with
respect to his rights as lessee of the petitioner corporation were made on the basis of'
Exhibit A which was marked as Annex "A" in the amended complaint meets the
procedural requirement that said failure be put in issue by the pleadings.
In ruling that the subject contract is a lease contract and not a management
contract, we adopt the findings of fact made by the trial court and affirmed by the
respondent court.
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300
August 6, 1986
VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA,
SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO LOZA, CARMELITA LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA,
ERLINDA LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against respondents,
alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully
entered lots A and B corresponding to the middle and northern portion of the property
owned by petitioner known as Lot 5456. She allegedly appropriated the produce thereof
for themselves, and refused to surrendered the possession of the same despite demands
made by petitioner.
Petitioner bought the land now subject of dispute from Leoncia Lasangue as
evidenced by a public Deed of Absolute Sale registered with the Office of the Register
of Deeds. Defendants on the other hand, maintain that the land which petitioner bought
from Leoncia Lasangue in 1950 was different from the land now subject of this action.
The complaint was dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the CFI of Iloilo. While the
case was pending, petitioner instituted another action before the CFI of Iloilo for recovery
and possession of the same property against private respondents. The two cases were
tried jointly. After trial, CFI dismissed the two cases. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals
sustained the dismissal of the cases. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA had no legal justification when it subjected the true intent and
agreement to parol evidence over the objection of petitioner.
HELD:
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in
admitting the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue. The petitioner claims that Leoncia
Lasangue was the vendor of the disputed land. The petitioner denies that Leoncia
Lasangue sold Lot No. 5522 to her. She alleges that this lot was sold to her by one
Leonora Lasangue, who, however, was never presented as witness in any of the
proceedings below by herein petitioner.
As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to raise the issue of an
intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the Policy, or of the failure of
said contract to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in its
Complaint. There was therefore no error on the part of the appellate court when it
affirmed the RTCs Order disallowing the recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such
disallowance is in accord with the rule that when the terms of an agreement have been
reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such other terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
The rationale behind the foregoing rule was explained in Ortanez vs. Court of
Appeals, where we stated: The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First,
private respondents oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who
has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is
not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously
undesirable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under
the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms
agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. xxx.