Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Taylor Commission Report
The Taylor Commission Report
(b)( 1)
(b)(3)
6 December 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR
rROM
Jack B. Pfeiffer
SUBJECT
1. As specified in Attachment 1 to this request. I submitted an UNCLASSIFIED version of my manuscript on the Taylor
Committee Investigation of the Bay of Pigs to Charles E. Wilson,
Chairman, Publications Review Board on 8 November 1984 on the assumption that his concurrence was required on the classification
of the manuscript prior to my seeking possible non-official publication. My presumption was based on HR 6-2, Revised: 7 August
1984 (1677).
2. As indicated in Attachment 2 to this
my assumption that the Publications Review Board was the proper reviewing authority was in error ...
3.
Following Mr. Wilson's suggestion. I contacted Gay
Haran of your office; and she subsequently informed me that you
and she believed that the appropriate procedure for me to follow
was to request a mandatory review of . , manuscript through IPD.
To that end, I su'bmit the enclosed manuscript of The Taylor Committee Investigati\n of the Bay of Pigs.
(See Attachment 3)
4.
Inasmuch as my Agency employment is scheduled to
terminate on 31 Decem er 1984. it would be most helpful to have
your decision soonest.
5. Please let$e know if I can be of assistance to you
in this effort.
rh,
aa ap.,"'.'
Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
APPROVED FOR
RELEASEL DATE:
25-Jul-2011
.-
ATTACHMENT 3
9 NOVEMBER 1984
JACK B. PFEIFFER
CSI/OTE, 1036 COC
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
11
Chapter 3
24
Chapter 4
The Taylor
177
Chapter 5
222
Chapter 6
231
Epilogue
252
253
256
Appendix C
258
Appendix D
261
272
274
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix E
Appendix F
Source References
Report
293
That the
It focuses on the
administrations.
Theodore Sorensen,
and,
Senate where the President had closer ties than with the House,
but each had its full quota of egos to be massaged, special
interests with. which to contend, and post-election fences
(poth inter- and intra-party} to be mended.
As the new administration moved into operation, it faced
the us.ual domestic issues of the ecnomic health of the nation,
social welfare, resource and defense policies, and clearly
emerging civil rights issues.
were, in addition to the continuing problems of any new administration of reassuring members of the Western alliance that
the US could be depended on to be the linchpin of the alliance,
the ongoing challenges presented by the USSR and its Eastern
Bloc allies and by China and its surrogates in SEA, especially
in Laos and Vietnam.
- tion, the new administration also showed its concern for developing
active programs to meet the challenges presented by the African
nations and Latin America.
I''':
."
handed over to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State for implementation.
President
Under Agency
As polemicists and
"
..
I','
"
f1
in Miami by the FRO, the general inability of Cubans-particularly the leaders of the numerous exile factions--to
retain confidentiality, and persistent pursuit of leads by
To
In addi-
c:
.)
"
Pressures to
use the Brigade came not only from the Agency, which had been
conducting training activities since June 1960, but also from
the Government of Guatemala which provided the air and ground
training sites for the Cubans and from the Government of
Nicaragua wh.ich had agreed to the use of Puerto Cabezas as
the operational base for launching the invasion of Cuba.
Whatever else concerned the Kennedy administration during
the period between 22 January 1961 when the principal cabinet
members first were briefed by CIA on the details of the
anti-Castro plan until the evening of 16 April 1961 when--after
consultation with Secretary of State Rusk--the President
cancelled the D-Day air strike, the planned anti-Castro
operation was a burr under its saddle and could not be wished
away.
incumbent.
At the time. that he was asked to serve President Kennedy
in Ap,t'il 19.61, Taylor was, perhaps, the most Universal Man
of the 20th Century--decorated soldier and military commander
"-
concern for the Oval Office; Admiral Arleigh Burke's for the
welfare of the JCS and the military; and Allen Dulles's for
CIA.
't.
"
It is
Even before
service.
All witnesses testifying before the Taylor Committee
had interests to protect, but it was evident before the close
of the hearings that those military officers who had been
involved in the anti-Castro project from early on risked career
damage if, during their testimony, they suggested that the
".'
....
10
Chapter 2
Organization and Procedures
of the Committee
1 '"
t
j.
....
'I
In that
2/
For all practical purposes the Taylor Committee investigation was completed by 11 May 1961--four days earlier than the
15 May date that President Kennedy had indicated as desirable
Completion of the
of Naval Operations,
13
3/
* Taylor
The
meeting were, of course, the most obvious choices; and consequently, their appearance at the first meeting was no surprise.
The appearance of other Agency personnel was in most instances
- at the direct request of the committee or at the suggestion
of one of the witnesses who was testifying.
:,,-
15
In an historical context,
'. .,
16
'l
"J
The significant
Once having
made his notes, Tarwater said that he then erased the tapes,
following this procedure throughout the course of the hearings.
Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell characterized the
record keepin.g as "just plain amateur."
Once completed, a copy of the notes was made for each of
the four members of the committee--with all copies to be returned
/
for Taylor's files.
Ignoring the plan, however, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy retained his copies of the memorandums of
17
...... .
.
';
..
..
..,
meeting of the CSG (25 April 1961) practically all of the most
criticial and controversial problems which would be considered
during the course of the committee's life had been surfaced-control of the air, cancellation of the D-Day air strike,
internal support from anti-Castro elements, capability of the
Brigade to pass to. guerrilla status, and interdepartmental
planning and cooperation during the course of the operation.
Another decision which was made with reference to the
CSG's request for papers from the anti-Castro task force
C!=! . g., WH/4t was that no pseudonyms, cryptonyms, or aliases for
Everything would be
"
19
.,,.;
the type of aircraft and the particular air bases in the United
States which would receive such personnel.
The memorandum
* consider
"General
'.
20
Mr. Hevia's
President
. ..,
committee was ready to make its final report and specified that
four memorandums were. attached to the transmittal.
In addition
...
It was not until the late 1970's that the writer was able
to obtain a complete copy of the Taylor Committee Report.
Requests to the National Archives and Records Service for
access to the report under the Freedom of Information Act
precipitated the move toward review for sanitization
and declassification of the report. The bulk of Parts I
and II Of the Taylor Committee Report have been DECLASSIFIED
or SANITIZED
DECLASSIFIED, and published commercially
as Operation Zapata (Frederick, MD1 University Publications
of America, 1981). As of March 1983, PartIII was still
in the process of declassification review and the writer's
last recommendations on this subject were that practically
all of Part III be declassified/sanitized as well as all
of the remaining testimony of witnesses and the "conversations" of part II.
23
.. ,
. .i'l
or.
Chapter 3
Testimony of the Witnesses'
This
posed problems because the interrogations frequently were confusing to both interviewer and interviewee;
were asked or
questions
knowled9"eability of witne.ss or committee members;' not infreqtt.ently topics were. dropped abruptly or left
though. the
for the
There was no
single committee member nor any single witness who, at any time
during the course of the investigation, had all of the facts
25
....
This is
the only meeting of the Taylor Committee for which there are known
to be two separate reports--a verbatim transcript of four
reels of the testimony and the "official" Memorandum for
the Record--the latter would be used as the format for all
subsequent
As in the
26
u.s.
for possible survivors and escapees from the beach at Playa Giron-were introduced during the course of the initial meeting.
Some
Background
Agency's relationship:;; with the Cuban exile leadership-especially questi'ons concerning the choice of leaders and the
failure of the
27.
reaction of
Esterline said:
"My
friend you sound like military men have been shouting down
2/
the hall" and then quickly changed the subject.
The official
transcript of this meeting omitted Esterline's reference to the
impact of political decisions on the failure of the operation.*
Toward the end of the first meeting, Taylor and Kennedy
debated Burke and Bissell on the merits of the planned operation
and whether or not the Kennedy administration would have gone
alon9 with the proposed invasion plan had there been discussion
2841
l
similar to that which was taking place during the course of this
-4/
first meeting.
that the Agency had been wrong to engage in such a large scale
activity saying:
We can handle 200 or 300 men, and we
can send in small guerrilla landing
parties etc., that's within our channel
Basical1y I would like to get out of
this business. It is going to ruin the
Agency, bad enougg/as it is, it has been
a terrible blow. _
The bogy of Soviet and/or East Europen participation with
the Cuban troops in fighting the anti-Castro invaders was
raised; and as a part of this story were charges that Castro's
Fuerza Aerea Revo1ucionaria (FAR) was utilizing MIG aircraft.
There was a strong thrust by the CIA representatives to emphasize
that not only had EUropean voices been picked up on the communications network at the beach, but in addition, that European
bodies had been found in one of the tanks which had been destroyed
by the
forces.
29
,.
follows:
The Attorney General then asked what
step should we have taken at that time
.rat the time the anti-Castro policy
was being formulated in March of 1960]
if we had known what we know now, and
did we have any policy then. Mr. Dulles
replied we did have a policy, which was
8/
to overthrow Castro in one way or another.
In the verbatim transcript of that exchange, the Attorney General
g/
"
...
'J
,.
'.'
>4l
ought to be overthrown."
In subsequent
Col. Jack
Under certain
31
In
12/
invasion on 17 April and the early morning hours of 19 April.-Col. Stanley Beerli, the Acting Chief of the Agency's
air arm, contributed the first of several errors with his
comrr.ent that all of the aircraft lost by the Cuban brigade
had been a result of shoot downs by T-33's.
At least two B-
265 were lost to ground fire and two more to Castro's Sea
Furies.
During the course of the second meeting of the Cuban
Study Group one of the most significant oversights in the
story of the Bay of Pigs surfaced, but it was completely
ignored by all participants--witnesses and committee members
alike.
...,...., -)
.
-L....
Writer's emphasis. The Trinidad Plan was the one which the Agency
had worked out and which had been approved by the DOD. It
called for an air supported amphibious invasion of the CasildaTrinidad area on the southern coast of Cuba in Las Villas Province.
This was a populated area in which it was expected that the
invaders would attract a reasonably high degree of anti-Castro
support. The port facilities would require no across beach
landing. Although it was planned to use the captured air
strip for C-46s, there was no plan to use it for B-26 operations.
In case the invaders found that they could not maintain the
area, it was planned that they would head into the nearby
Escambray area as an organized guerrilla force. Trindad lay
approximately 180 miles southeast of Havana.
The Zapata Plan called for an invasion in the area of the Bahia
de Cochinos in Las Villas Province about 100 miles nearer Havana
than Trinidad. This alternate plan was dictated by President
Kennedy and Secretary Rusk's desire for a quieter, "less like
World War 11" invasion. The Zapata area was sparsely settled
and the plan called for night landings across three separate
beaches with air support to be withheld until the air strip at
Giron could be captured and two of the Brigade B-26s landed
and then flown off the strip. All of this was intended to support
the "pl aus ible denial" of U.S. involvement in the operation. The
area offered no viable guerrilla option in case the brigade faced
defeat. The DOD supported, the Agency's contention that none of
" the alternatives to the Trinidad ("T") plan were as good as Trinidad,
II. '''''but agreed with the Agency that Zapata
(liZ") was feasible.
(referred to in
I;
and the
The
byl
* Except
members of the CSG and two military officers-Lt. Col. Tarwater, the official recorder, and Commander Mitchell,
Admiral Burke's. ai.de--Col.
attended more sessions of the
CSG than anyone else. He was present at nearly two-thirds of
the sessions.
35
.'.
,I.J/i
after I
IViews on training
responsibilities.
volunteered answers.
lhowever, unhesitatingly
Hawkins's questioning of
**
Each of the American pilots had a Cuban copilot and the other
four B-26's on the mission had Cuban crews.
36
f'"
unit.
was guilty of at least two other errors
__- L
and I
---------
and Blue beaches were correct, but at the time that the troops
were to have been landed, it was decided that the 200 men
scheduled to. go ashore at Green beach would be held for landing
at
37
19/
..
,II.;
"
33
At this
39
The most
The
19.61 of the Zapata plan which moved the site of the invasion from
Trinidad to the Bahia de Cochinos.
* JCSM-16i-6l
of
Of the
At this
41
attention.
ignored when
that:
42
Bissell
noted that if the beachhead could have been held for a period
of several weeks, Castro's microwave links could have been
destroyed and the Cubans forced into open voice communications-thus giving considerable advantage to the invading troops.
The
point that Bissell failed to make was that the original plan
for the D-Day air strike had included Castro's microwave
facilities as primary targets, but with the cancellation of the
D-Day strike,
Unlike
presumable by direction--the
43
As an example, there is
put Castro's T-33 jet trainers out of action and the failure
to use napalm in the attack on the three Cuban airfields on D-2,
Hawkins said that the prohibition against napalm was an internal
CJ,A decision.
Additionally,
Hawkins was out of bounds with his comment about being surprised
* Beginning with the third meeting the official record omitted
the distribution list
copies of the record. In addition
to the four CSG members, copies of the record of the first
and second meetings had been sent to General Gray, Mr. Bissell,
Colonel King and Jake Esterline.
"
.,
"
44
This seems a
In his testimony
While Beerli
himself may have lacked knowledge about the T-33s in the inventory of Castro's
The Department of
45
..... ,.f'
",'
Esterline:
46
th.at:
If this decision [to cancel the D-Day
strikesJ had been communicated to the
paramilitary staff a few hours earlier,
the operation would have been halted
and
withdrawn with troops
on board. 3 /'"
In similarly blunt fashion the Chief, WH/4/PM wrote that:
"The
Emphasis in original
** Writer's emphasis.
'.
47
33/**
** This-wa8 one of the few meetings where Mr. Dulles was not
listed among the committee members in attendance. However,
specific remarks attributed to him toward the end of the
meeting indicate that he was present for at least part of the
session. 34/
48
For example,
months prior to
36/
A more important tactical consideration concerning the employment of FAR by Castro was his order that the first target which
should be taken under attack was the shipping that was bringing
the forces into Cuba--this was
of 16 April.
* As
49
to' the infantry units, excuses were made for the apparent
willingness of Castro's forces to stand up to what had been
claimed would be far superior fire power.
As
There was no
38/
* Cabell
with reference
50
the number likely to support the invasion had been reduced from
somewhere be.twe.en 20,000 - 30,000 down to 2,500 - 3, 000; but in
the next breath it was stated:
One of the factors that made us think that
the resistance potential within Cuba was
substantial was the fact that we had a backlog of 19 requests from our agents for supplies,
and ammunition for 8,000 people. These
people were crying for supplies. Had we been
able to provide this equipment, these people
would have had something to rise with. 39/
As would be pointed out in subsequent meetings of the committee,
this euphoric point of view was hardly in keeping with. the lack
51
week with the planned air operation, that in itself would have
* In
52
.....
"
all three should have known and recalled that the JCS preference
- for Trinidad over Zapata had been enunciated clearly in
JCSM-166-61 of 15 March 1961 which had been sent to Secretary
of
53
"
.,
Whether
43/
details." -
45/
and/or Bissell did not have the authority to cancel this operation
at that late stage, that was an error in fact.
If on the other
At the
time that the meeting with Rusk had been concluded, the vessels
carrying the brigade were still lying off shore of the invasion
beaches--debarkation probably had not started, or, if started,
could not have been so far along that reloading could not
have been completed before daylight.
who were well aware of the need for air support if the
invasion were to have a chance of success, probably would
not have attempted any such take-over.
Certainly in an
55
In his
apologia, Bissell overlooked the basic fact that even with the
best of pilots and more aircraft, there was no way B-26s could
compete in the air with T-33s or Sea Furies.
."
Based on
of Bissell and Cabell, the discussions
with SecretarY of State Rusk were concluded by approximately
10:30 p.m. (Washington and Cuba time). Departure of Gray Lynch
and the UDT team of Cubans to mark Blue Beach did not begin
until approximately 1:00. a.m. (Cuban and Washington Time) on
17 April 1961. Within that two to two and a half hour time
frame, a cancellation message could have been sent from
Washington to the vessels standing off Cuba.
56
'I
quotations:
Question: Db you think it was in the
President's mind that these men [the
Cuban Brigade] could disappear as a
guerrilla force if necessary?
Answer:
Yes
57
i:
This
organi.zation." "-----
beach movement as the LCVPs and LCUs unloaded the supply ships
at these separate landing sites in a night conducted operation.
As in other instances durin<J the course of the committee's
49/
investigations, no one present challenged the witness.
The sixth meeting be<Jan with the reading of a report of
a session between a CIA representative and some 60 Cuban
who had belonged to the brigade's air force contingent.
These witnesses put an end to the stories that had circulated
through the previous meetings that Castro's FAR had employed
MIG aircraft.
. ..
,
59
,I,.,
Lnchls LCI provided the communication link between the brigade on the
beach and Washington.
The
had received were good dispatches and clear and that they
were all carried out fully."
A40s were then launched they were unable to reach the invasion
area in time to protect the B-26s--one of which was shot down by
a FAR T-33 and another one was downed by ground fire.
According
to the Admiralr
We arr;j.ved over the beach area 40
minutes before 0630 Romeo. However,
by that time the CEF aircraft had
. already made their strikes and
left. 51/
The failure of the combat air patrol to carry out its mission,
therefore, was obviously the fault of the CIA not the USN.
No one in attendance. at the seventh meeting saw fit to
question Admiral Clark's testimony.
61
As detailed in
USN air CAP illustrates how CIA became the whipping boy for
the failure of others at the Bay of Pigs.*
Inasmuch as Gar Teegen, the commander for the air
operations at the Nicaragua air base, had sent an emergency
message to the commanding officer of the Essex pointing out
that without assistance from the Navy jets on D+2, "[we] will
be sitting ducks without your help--these are American boys,"
it w.as particularly disheartening to have to report the loss of
two B-2Gs each carrying an American pilot and copilot.**
62
As stated in Appexdix E:
Perhaps indicative of the Navy's sensitivity
about its performance during the Bay of Pigs
operation is the fact that the operational
records of its participation were ordered
destroyed presumably at the direction of
Admiral Burke.
Admiral Clark was not reluctant to jump into other areas
where his competence was even more suspect.
In response to a
que.stion about the. failure of the invasion, Clark popped out the
answer that Castro'!;! forces had not been taken by surprise.
When he was pulled up short by a question from one of the
committee members indicating that the evidence previously
presented to the committee indicated that there had been complete
tactical surprise, Clark volunteered that because Castro's opposition
had formed up so quickly "I think Castro's people saw the CEF forces
from a lighthouse and they could have seen them from the air."
Mr. Dulles pointed out to the Admiral that again there had been
no evidence that the brigade had been observed from the lighthouse
in question.
63 ...
He was the
I
- - - -
the plans that had been laid on the infantrymen for going
guerrilla should the situation at the beach become untenable.
He made quite clear that while many of the men were capable
ot
of the group going into guerrilla status was a last option-the last resort--that was to be employed.
64
call for it, it was planned that the troops would be evacuated
by boat--according to the colonel using some of the aluminum
boats which had been acquired for assistance in off-loading
men and supplies.
One important caveat offered bY[
[Csubsequentl Y
He
said that a man could find enough small game, fish, and fresh
water to insure survival.
In his words:
With
AgenC\
65
'j.
the possible exception of CSG members Admiral Burke and DCI Dulles,
who themselves appeared as witnesses, Bundy is the only other
individual who is known to have had an opportunity to review his
own testimony.
of the paramilitary study group shows that the meeting was convened
in Bundy's office at the White House and is prefaced with the
following comment, liThe notes of Mr. Bundy's interview have been
replaced by the Memorandum dated 4 May 1961."
This memorandum on
Whi te. House stationary and dated 4 May 1961 begins as follows:
Dear General Taylor:
I regret to say that lam not satisfied
with the account of our interview which appears
in the Memorandum for Record submitted to me today
by Col. Walmsley. It seems to me that I can do a
better job of presenting my views on this matter
by sending you a memorandum covering my position
on the points which are discussed in the Memorandum
of Record. 56/*
This memorandum from Bundy is a classic example of a
rear guard action to protect a President's rear.
Bundy
66
J
wrote that "as work on this plan progressed, the gradual impression
developed that on balance the CIA preferred this plan to the
'57/
In like fashion,
the planners also were aware that the marsh lands of the Zapata
swamp provided little, if any, possibilities for conducting
formidable guerrilla type activities.
of the fact that Trinidad lay a hundred miles further away from
Havana than did Playa Giron, a matter of distance which might
have a direct bearing on success or failure of the invasion.
In an operation which already had been found wanting in certain
aspects of its logistical planning, the requirement that initial
use of B-26 aircraft would be contingent upon capture of the
airstrip at Playa Giron concurrent with the invasion required
67
the air battle should be won," Mr. Bundy simply was repeating a
position which he had advanced at the time that the Trinidad and
Zapata plans were being discussed (11 - 16 March 1976).
In a
68
Certainly
69
According to
70
lZ
acceptable, but that Trinidad was best of the plans that had been
proposed_
where this issue had been raised, the albatross was once again
around the necks of the Joint Chiefs; and no comment was
made about the position, or lack thereof, of the Secretary of
Defense.
Jnasmuchas there
71
.'
.'
;;::iij'
In reinforcement
Similarly in their
72
,"
73
-flo'
list were made as as result of pressures from the administration-including among other deletions the planned strikes against
Castro's microwave facilities and a napalm attack on the
tank/truck park at Managua.
Another of the hard to swallow propositions advanced by
Mr. Bundy--and this was straight party line from the White
House--was his comment "I specifically endorse the comment
attributed to me lin the official record of the seventh
meeting of the CSG] that if the military had said at any
time that calling off or modifying the air strike would
cause the operation to fail--or even damage it severely--the
President would have reversed any such decision as that on
Sunday."
. 64/*
74
One of
6.5/
Was this
have been more explicitly laid out and that the responsibilities
more clearly defined.
66/*
75
1961, and among the witnesses called for this session were
viously testified (at the 6th meeting of the Cuban Study Group)
where he spelled out his role in marking the route for the landing
craft coming in at Blue beach.
at the
Mr. Lynch was probably the one who came closest to encouraging the
Cubans in their belief that they would get direct
during the course of the invasion.
us
support
.appearance was:
* The
76
.,; .1.1.
Both
and Lynch submitted detailed reports of their
efforts at the landing sites during the course of the invasion
- operation. Both were technically in violation of the Presidential
restriction about the direct participation of Americans in the
operation. Both men subsequently received the Agency's second
highest award for valor, the Intelligence Star. In the late 1970's
Lynch appeared on a TV program and recounted most of his experiences. Robertson was an emergency medical evacuee from Southeast
Asia in the 1970's and died shortly following his return to the US.
77
When
rY
as a witness before
covered much the
78
/
same ground that had been gone over by Lynch and Robertson.
In resI?onse to a direct question,
lindicated the
Rio Escondido in an
Blagar.
men out of this, but Gray Lynch, on the other hand, indicated
that there. was some degree of force that he and some of the other
crew members of the' Blagar applied to regain control of the
73/
vessel,
explained to the committee that the
plan to resupply the beachhead with ammunition had been cancelled
on 0+2 because air cover would not have been available and he
--------
pointed out that the ships which they had been forced to use
were really inadequate for the task; and he noted that in
his own case he would have pre-ferred to have a vessel
similar to a Coast Guard cutter. j
jClosed his
75/
80
76/
81
'.)".:1
8;2
., .
u.s.
83
15 March 1961 had been prepared for the Secretary and clearly
stated the JCS preference for the Trinidad plan over any
of the alternative plans that had been presented, McNamara
none-theless testified as follows:
The JCS had reviewed the plan in early
JanuarY1 and while they considered it
marginal, they still believed it had
sufficient chance of success to warrant
i.ts implementation. After all the
modifications to the original plan were
made they still believed the chances of
success were marginal, but they still
wanted to give it a try. There was one
important modification that the Chiefs
never knew about and one about which
they all felt strongly. This was a decision
to cancel some of the D-Day air strikes.
This decision was made at the only meeting at which neither I nor the Chiefs
participated. It was my understanding
that both the CIA and Chiefs preferred
Zapata to Trinidad. For while Trinidad
offered the advantage of close proximity
to Escambray or guerrilla territory,
Zapata offered an air strip and was
likely to be less well protected by
Castro, thereby raising the chances of
success for the initial landing. 79/*
This response by Secretary McNamara raises a number of questions.
Did he even read JCSM-166-6l?
84
..
",'
keeping with the cables that were coming in from the Chief
of Air Operations in Puerto Cabezas regarding the need for
strikes against 'Castro's airfields.
When asked by the committee if control of the air was
essential to the success of the invasion, Secretary McNamara
responded:
It was understood that without control
of the air the chances of success would
be considerably decreased. The understanding of Castro's Air Force was not
adequate, particularly in terms of the
numbers and types of aircraft. Furthermore, it was assumed that a larger number
of aircraft would be incapacitated.
This appears to have been a major
error. However, to get back to the
question of control of the air, it
was certainly understood that it was
very important. It doesn't appear
that we would have achieved complete
control of the air even if we had
made the dawn air attack. '81/
This response contained so many errors that one might even
speculate that
motive in mind,
Even Mr.
85
,Ii
Based on
but "ultimate
g;
86
,
'J"
,.,/
-,I;
JCSM-l46-6l specified that "if only one Cuban combat plane escapes
destruction and interdicts the field [in this case the airfield
at Trinidad], the oper,ation would be seriously handicapped."
If
gl
the CIA run an operation of the sort which had been brought
to an end on the beach at Playa Giron, Secretary McNamara
was quite positive that the Department of Defense was in a
better position to handle sizable paramilitary operations than
'07
./
CIA was.
84/
88
.':
.',
89
In sharp contrast to
As
r..o
.
\'. :
"
'
,"
could say was that the Zapata had a reputation for being the
base for guerrilla operations of one sort of another.
General Wheeler finally did concede that no such study had been
made, but he noted that CIA had informed JCS that a group of
possibly 100 guerrillas were operating in the region.
Following this statement by General Wheeler, someone,
probably one of the committee members and most likely the
General, made the following remark:
Of course, a second point was that
while it might have been usable as
a guerrilla area at one time, this
was before the time of helicopters.
It would seem that some of these
military experts should have been
able to figure this out. 88/
The alternative of sea evacuation for the invaders also
came up during the course of Wheeler's interview, and he
reported that both he and
L-1
89/
Guerrilla action, of
course, never was "practical" for Zapata, not only for the
problems which would have .been presented by the immediate
terrain and the long distance from the Escambray, but because
government was strongly supported by the population
of the area, sparse though it was.
Social improvements,
closest associate with the CIA planners during the BOP operation
* As with various other of the flag and general officers who
appeared before the Taylor Committee, General Bonesteel's
remarks were addressed to suggested improvements in the
US capability to respond to crises in the Cold War and had
no bearing on the Cuban Operation.
92
..
..
but
the strip at Playa Giron, with its harder surface, would support
the aircraft.
When pressed by the committee about the short length of
time that the JCS had in which to evaluate the Zapata plan,
General Gray pointed out that the changes from Trinidad to
Zapata were easily understood by the Joint Chiefs, particularly
as the revised plan also included the heavy D-Day air strikes.
93
I
ing
His sins of
the following:
The risks of the operation were
accepted, however, because the
importance of success was fully
appreciated. Time was running
out. It was the last chance in
some time to have this job done
by Cubans. Otherwise we might have
to do this with American personnel
and this would be less desirable.
Castro's police power was increasing,
94
He emphasized the
* Emphasis
by writer.
95
1.
2.
Mr. Hi1sman's
94/
96
Zapata.
It would have
In any event,
97
get a
It went as follows:
98
air force have. already been discussed with reference 'to other
wi tnesse,s before the Taylor Coromittee.
99
/
which the Agency gave for secretary Rusk and other Kennedy
cabinet members, specific mention was made of plans for extensive air strikes from the beginning through the end of
the operation.
At Secretary Rusks 16 April meeting with Mr. Bissell
and General Cabell, both had spelled out the threat to the
invasion shipping which would result should Castro's air
arm not be destroyed.
It also
stated that:
100
101
apparent as for air drops and getting the ships back in there,
particularly in regard to getting them some tank ammunition."
100/
At this time, on 4 May 1961, Rusk still did not understand what
General Cabell and Mr. Bissell had told him on the evening of
16 April 1961--that the exposure of the brigade's ships to
102
One
Secretary Rusk
date had been passed on to the Cubans by the Soviets who had
picked up the information in Mexico.
aware that 17 April 1961 was the planned date for the invasion,
there is no indication that they transmitted this information
103
"
. 103/
It is clear
that the landings at Playa Giron and Playa Larga caught the
Cubans by surprise--this despite the contrary suggestions
made by earlier witnesses who claimed that the invasion
forces probably had been spotted by Castro people in the
light house of Cayo Guano.*
Secretary Rusk had objections to what he identified as
the operational. aspects of the anti-Castro effort.
Included
raised any questions with Secretary Rusk about his own failure
to check with State's intelligence people on such matters, for
example, as the prospects for support of the anti-Castro effort
from dissident elements within Cuba.)
104
to the brigade, Secretary Rusk said that "if you are not
prepared to go all the way, you shouldn't put 1,200 men ashore."
This piece of testimony raises the question of why, since the
brigade was going to be committed, did Secretary Rusk support
the one action which was most certain to eliminate all
possibilities of victory for the brigade--the cancellation of
the D-Day air strike?
Secretary Rusk, who said that his had been the only dissent
concerning the invasion plan, should have tried harder to
obtain a cancellation of the invasion or, to insure success,
siven up on deniability, supported the D-Day strike, and
105
Certainly
106
To a question
107
As noted in this
In this diary two days prior to his appearance before the Taylor
committee, Ber1e indicated his particular displeasure about the
failure of the Latin American nations to recognize the danger
posed by the growing Soviet presence in Cuba. The diary stated:
"The other American republics in general were not facing up to the
situation.
sectors of their public opinion did not know that
Cuba was now in effect a Sino-Soviet tool. Some sectors
but did not wish to know. Some knew but wished
to play that the problem was not there. A great many
sectors including the politicians and intellectuals wished
to hide behind cloudy un-realities. The doctrine of "nonintervention" was used as an excuse for not facing the
savage fact that high intentions, good words and even good
deeds would not stop Cold War activities carried on with
agitation, money, bought demonstrations, and surreptitious
organization of guerrillas with arms. To leave this
situation without clarification merely meant that the
process would go on. Then circumstances would probably be
created
require much larger military action. 107/
108
,t:.
the invasion, probably had the best track record in support 'of
this position of any of those in either the Eisenbower Administration or the Kennedy Administration who were involved in the
planning or the Bay of Pigs Operation.
As usual, Colonel
first CSG meeting, however, this may be the only other session
where what was reported was verbatim.*
Because it is relatively short, and because Mr. Teegen
was obviously the most knowledgeable individual about the air
operations this conversation is repeated in full as follows:
109
Thatls right.
Question:
Answer:
Yes.
110
It was enough.
111-
Yes.
112
Yes.
108/*
One
113
It
It speaks
The
was that the Chairman of the JCS, rather than the other
members, was most likely to have been party to planning
sessions for the Bay of Pigs Operation.
114
manner:
Que,stion: The JCS commenting on Trinidad
said that it had a fair chance of success. Then I
think that the record shows that they viewed the
next alternatives and said that Zapata was the
best of these three plans, but that they still
. preferred Trindad.
General Shoup: Yes, sir, any corporal would
have said that
Question: Did you have any misgivings
labout the planned amphibious operation]?
General Shoup: I very frankly made this
statement, if this kind of an operation
can be done with this kind of a force with
this much training and knowledge about it,
then we are wasting our time in our divisions,
we ought to go on leave for three months out
of four . '109/
This response obviously rubbed Allen Dulles the wrong
way for he sharply criticized General Shoup pointing out that
representatives of the. Department of Defense rather than CIA
personnel had been called on to render military judgments.
General Shoup then noted that if he had known more about the
operation, he. might have been more optimistic about its chances
for success.
he would have liked to have known about the plan, but recognized
110/
that he wasn't supposed to know all such details.
115
116
Admiral Burke:
structure.
117
/
General Shoup:
Absolutely not.
118
119
was to hold that beachhead. I think it is important that when the President and the Secretary of State think that they have your view,
that they do have your view. 112/*
This hassle went
120
I
General White also noted that the JCS had agreed that of the
alternative plans that had been presented, Zapata was the best
of the lot.
necessity for gaining control of the air than General Shoup had
been.
Staff was one of the principals involved in the D-2 strike and
121
Yes.
General Wbite:
factor, sir.
to find that the T-33s were armed, General White was jumped on
122
been made during the first and second meetings of the CSG that
if President Kennedy had only known that the T-33s posed a
threat he undoubtedly would not have cancelled the D-Day air
strike.
and stated that if he had known that the T-33s were armed he
would have made certain that the airfields where the T-33s
were based were brought under attack.
123
With
General White's
though the JCS spent far less time studying the Zapata plan
than it had spent studying the Trinidad plan, the basic
question .was a change of location rather than any significant
I
Pseudonurn
124
The primary
When
queried about the origin of the 0-2 strike, the officer had
to plead ignorance.
about the wisdom of the 0-2 strike, one committee member took
a cheap shot at Colonel Germosen by saying "I have real doubt
in my mind as to whether you did well by accepting those other
118/*
D-2 strikes."
* The
record does read " other 0-2 strikes," but there was only
one 0-2 strike at three airfields. It was not Germosen's responsibility "to accept" or not accept the 0-2 strike plan.
125
;j
was any possibility that the support from the US could have
remained deniable, and he thought that the JCS had acted
properly in giving its best evaluations on the basis of the
information that they had available.
As with other
...""
126
General Smith's
127
i;
In this context
128
He also doubted
129
responsible for reviewing the naval plan, but his actual contact
the naval contingent had been limited to four days at
Puerto Cabezas prior to the departure of the invasion vessels
for Cuba.
and out before daylight at which time they would have been
subject to air attack from Castro's Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria.
The committee made a point in asking why the ships hadn't been
put at risk since it was known that there was an ammunition
shortage at the beach.
the two LCls had survived serious air attacks on D-Day and
with the other vessels had fled safely into international
\
waters.
130
"We
had to procure them, get them assembled, send them down to Puerto
Cabezas, load them aboard ship, and train some crews to run
123/
them." This was .over-simplication of the problem of trying
to acquire the three dozen 18' aluminum boats with 75 h.p. outboard motors which had been laid on WH/4's logistic component
when the plan was changed from Trinidad to Zapata.
This was a
complication that was passed over too lightly during the Taylor
Committee hearings; and, unfortunately, Capt. Scapa missed an
opportunity to present some of the details which would have helped
to explain the difficultie.s in handling the boats at the time of
the invasion.**
*
of all five witnesses who had been engaged in the action from
Red beach down to Blue beach was that they had lost because
they did not receive the air support which they had been
promised.
The
escapees also were particularly critical of the aluminum boats-a subject which had been discussed with Captain Scapa at the
previous day's meeting.
132
I
133
In
referred was JCSM-44-61 which recommended that an interdepartmental planning group be established and charged with
defining the overall plan of action for the overthrow of the
Castro Government.*
Although the Chairman of the JCS apparently never got to
discuss this memorandum with the Secretary of Defense, he
* MEmorandum
134
135
For whatever
137'"
129/
138
members of the eSG specified that the air plan was significantly
different as the invasion site was shifted from Trinidad to
Zapata, stating:
The objection to one of the plans
[Trinidad] was the fact that the
airstrip wasn't adequate. That
same objection wasn't made in
connection with the Zapata plan.
The second thing is that the
Zapata plan, as it was originally
considered, anticipated capturing
this airport Iactually the airstrip] and then have the planes
take off from the airoort.
..
-130/
This was a point of fact to which General Lemnitzer
only moments earlier had agreed, but in response to the above
remark the following curious exchange took place:
General Lemnitzer:
No, sir.
That's wrong.
I don't know.
I wasn't there.
139
Statement:
Absolutely vital
1.4 t'6
The change
"
Even here,
142
the story that the Brigade B-26s could not have operated off
the Trinidad airfield--a1though as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
it is easier to excuse his lack of knowledge on this
particular point than it is to excuse either General Gray
of the Joint Staff or General White of the Air Force for
not knowing better.
As with previous
As with the
Yet another
members of the committee who then asked, "Would you say it was
given de facto approval?"
"Yes."
135/
137/
Certainly
145
In their testimony
As
146
* Admiral
147
* Appendix
148
This meant
When
command or not."
The
Esterline,/
\
access to Mr. Bissell, the DDP. E. Howard Hunt's explanation
for King's presence is that "Colonel J.C. King emerged as
its ITaylor Committee's] general factotum." 142/ Dick
Drain, C/OP/WH/4 stated that there were "numberless irritations
that arose from the fact that J.C. King was neither 'in'
it nor 'out' of it. He was just sort of 'in-and-out' and
almost never had enough of the picture, understandably, to
know what the hell he was talking about." 143/
149
i-that if necessary
150
Someone on the
Esterline
Esterline himself
happened that the LCls and the other vessels had survived
the attacks on D-Day, Esterline's contention was that it
was sheer luck.
which had been given for some USAF C-l30s to be used for
ammunition resupply, and he suggested that if approval for
this air re-supply had been given 6 - 8 hours earlier it
might have been feasible to get the aircraft in and out
under the cover of darkness.
252....
Esterline's re-
153
Esterline
went through the drill, noting that the use of American pilot
instructors had been approved early in the game; and finally
on
use of Americans in the maritime activities, Esterline reported that initially there had been an absolute prohibition
against the use of American crewmen on infi1tration-exfi1tration
exercises; but later that had been modified to permit their use
aboard the ships--but not to go ashore.
154
drill about all of the high level people that he had talked
to in the Kennedy Administration and the assurances that had
been made for the future of Cuba.
",:,..,...
l:Jj
.(1,
. ,'P
Particular
Dulles was
Kennedy said:
"' r-6
-.
i)
some of
on
rejoinder to Dulles was that while that may have been the
opinion of some of the, assignees to CIA, the Joint Chiefs never
accepted that estimate.
In the course of his discussion, Dulles indicated that
he was "surprised" about the effectiveness of the Castro
'aircraft, a comment which indicated an unfortunate lack of
preparation on his part, particularly inasmuch as the success
of the anti-Castro plan was keyed to air operations.
Jake Esterline or the Air Force assignees
air
As
in charge of the
a sky protected by
He did know
that Castro had no MIGs but he went on to say that the Cubans
did have.:
.-
'.
"
forces going
might escape from the Zapata area, but the prospects for the
guerrilla option would have been far better from Trinidad.
This was contrary to the response which probably was hoped
for by one of the committee members (Robert Kennedy most
likely) who had asked if Dulles, like the President, believed
that the disaster potential for the operation was low because
if worse came to worst, the group could go into the hills
and become guerrillas?* With respect to the possibility of the
In this instance Dulles apparently had done his homework following his session with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on 2 May 1961. At that time he had suggested that escape
through the Zapata swamps was not an unreasonable prospect in
any weather. 153/
159
deniability
1./0.
.,.;
He failed to support
161
was launched.
The DCI also weas1ed in his testimony with regard to
the question of whether General Cabell and Mr. Bissell had
to go to the Secretary of State for decisions on operational
matters and did not have direct access to President Kennedy.
Dulles's response to a statement of this nature was:
Yes, that was our general view, that
Mr. Rusk spoke for the President with
regard to policy considerations which
permitted or inhibited certain types
of actions. Let me go back to the
fact that on the 5412 Committee we looked
to the State representatives to tell us
whether this could or couldn't be done.
Question: Do you think that after D-Day
CIA did not have direct access to the
President?
Response: General Cabell and Mr. Bissell
would say, yes, but their understanding of
procedure was that the Secretary of State
was acting on these things in the name of
the President.
Mr. Kennedy: I just note that I was there
during those few days and they were in
continuous presence. Mr. Bissell was talking
with the President practically continuously.
All the decisions that were made, were made
by the President. They weren't made by
Dean Rusk ..
Statement: Yes, but I gather that when
D-Day started, there were a number of
requests for relaxation of the ground
and that the senior CIA representatives
they should go to State
162
No never.
DCI suggested tbat the Agency had not had the best of advice
from the Department of Defense; but Admiral Burke immediately
challenged this by suggesting that the Defense people didn't
have all the information that they should have had.
Dulles
It
163
and sundry people at the White House and the Agency that he
* The visits by the Joint Staff officers to training sites to
evaluate the anti-Castro infantry and air force and the
numbers of DOD personnel who might be permitted to attend
certain CIA briefings were closely controlled. There is no
question that it seemed that senior project officers involved
in the anti-Castro effort did tend at times to hold DOD personnel at arms length. It should be kept in mind,
however, that many of these restrictions also applied to
other CIA personnel, even some affiliated with the project.
For the most part restrictions on access to information
were for the purpose of protecting the security of the
operation rather than for any ulterior motives.
Mr. Dulles's sniping at the DOD was somewhat similar to the
criticisms he had made during his briefing of the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on 27 April 1961.
At that time the DCI indicated that the JCS representatives
had reservations about the anti-Castro plan and he implied
that any flaws in the military aspects of the operation
should be blamed on the ,,'military specialists"
assigned to CIA as advisors.
--
was going to take off, and nobody told him to stay home and
mind the store.
It was predictable
even before Dulles left this country that CIA was going
to be charged with the responsibility of the air raid.*
Certainly if anyone needed to be on hand during the course
of the invasion, it was the DCI--the person in CIA who had
the easiest access to, and highest credibility with, the
President of the United States.
The Agency has long been remiss for its failure in this
case to call a spade.
1OJ
166
'--
.OJ
'1'
167 . ':.
168
169
170
January 19.61, and they had to devote their full time and
effort to teaching basic infantry tactics and the use and
- employment of the weapons which now were to be used by the
brigade.
171
__
"Mr. Bissell came. to my office and that was the statement that he made to me, and he made it quite clear to
the President.
Hawkins
173
they would fall back on the beach for sea evacuation and
if that didn't work, then they should go guerrilla?"
Hawkins
that
about having
guerrilla status.
The questioning of Col. Hawkins then focused on air
operations, particularly on the question of whether the T-33s
per se were planned as targets for the air strikes.
Once again,
1/4
.-
you knew the T-33s were armed with .50 caliber machine guns;
however, in the Air Annex of the field order they were listed
as trainers.
us
175
......
When
176
CHAPTER 4
The Taylor Committee Report
A.
the President was given a briefing by the General on the preliminary findings of the Committee on 16 May 1961.
This
16 May
171
..
'
178
179
Letter of Transmittal
On 13 June 1961, General Taylor forwarded
180
Memorandum No. 1
"Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation
There also
181
With
- * The
182
Insofar as Esterline
183
!/
* There is some indication that as plans for briefing Presidentelect Kennedy were being made consideration had been given
to establishing a joint CIA/DOD force of 1,500-3,000 Cubans
to undertake the invasion. Unfortunately the three Agency
principals thought most likely to be knOWledgeable of this
plan--DDP Bissell, project chief Esterline, and project
operations officer Drain--were unable to recall the plan.
184
At the time of
185
It is most difficult
of Staff evaluation of the Agency's paramilitary plan (JCSM57-61, "Military Evaluation of the CIA Paramilitary PlanCuba," 3 February 1961) had been submitted to the Secretary
of Defense.
and to air
;rt also
187
for the airfield targets was to carry 2-750 lb. napalm bombs,
16-220 lb. fragmentation bombs, and 2,400 rounds of .50
caliber machine gun ammunition for the a-gun nose.
This
188
The CSG
In
of
190
"Mr. Bissell
'),1211;,.;
,
",
Among
the Taylor Committee accepted that the senior officials responsible fo1;' approving the operation assumed that the guerrilla
option was, at worst, available.
192
The
superior US aircraft
with which the T-33 aircraft could destroy the obsolete B-26
type aircraft, the CIA leaders decided to attempt, by a bombing
193
In reporting on the
The reader might recall that the original air plan called for
all out air strike on both the morning and afternoon of
and D-Day and subsequently as required.
**
President Kennedy initially cancelled all D-Day
air strikes, he and Rusk finally agreed to permit the B-26s
to fly ground support actions in the immediate area of Red and
Blue Beaches on D-Day. Attack against any of the targets
originally scheduled for D-Day was specifically prohibited.
194
The report
195
The memorandum
then stated:
The technical performance of the CIA
communications net was reported to
have been excellent. There was an
impressive volume of traffic transmitted
over it. Nevertheless, the President,
the Secretary of State, and others had
insufficient knowledge of the situation
to react in time and to make the needed
decisions. This inadequacy resulted from
many factors: the loss of important signal
equipment in the sinking of the Rio
Escondido, the wetting of the portable
radios carried ashore and the resulting
failure of radio communications within
the Brigade net ashore, the lack of
information on the part of the Brigade
commander himself, and, most importantly,
the absence of an experienced American
officer or Headquarters in the combat
area with the responsibility to summarize
and present the changing situation to the
authorities in Washington.
As a result of these factors, the President
and hi$ advisors were generally in the
dark, about important matters as to the
situation ashore and were uninformed of the
flight of the cargo ships. To clarify the
196
There
Inasmuch
Similarly, on at least
197
198
199
The tales
In
If the ammunition
Consequently the
20 0
b.
Memorandum No. 2
"Immediate Causes of Failure of the Operation
given in the
As suggested in a
Consider the
following examples:
1. We entered playa Giron practically without
firing a shot and found loaded artillery, artillery
that had been loaded some time before, tanks in
position, machine guns, rocket launchers, and huge
amounts of rockets and munitions
This means that they did not fight bravely and resolutely
to the end as they could have done.
2. That cowardice was demonstrated later by the
number of prisoners who are present today--a brigade of
1,400 men, where there are 1,200 prisoners . A
brigade in which not one battalion leader has died in
combat; a brigade whose battalion and company leaders
are all here as prisoners
3. President [i.e., the presiding judge] - Do you
remember the state you found them in when they were captured?
202
Both the
-----*Both Manuel Artime and Jose Perez San Roman, two of the leading
figures in the anti-Castro brigade, signed confessions of
treason and blamed the U.S. for having conned them into joining
the attempt to overthrow Castro. l/
25/
that they would be met by a FAR T-33 or Sea Fury, yet Thorsrud
said that only three fliers quit.
"The
205 i::".
0430
Navy.
Memorandum No. 2 also suggested that the ammunition
shortage at the beach was not fully understood because
Headquarters could not keep up with what was happening in
the combat area.
have been to have had "a command ship in the sea area with
206
'
r.
It is correctly pointed
""07 }.
,:.. ,
c.
Memorandum No. 3
Of the eleven "Conclusions of the Cuban Study
These conclusions,
in the dispute.
3. The leaders of the operation did not
always present their case with sufficient force
and clarity to the senior officials of the government
to allow the latter to appreciate the consequences of
some of their decisions. This remark applies in
particular to the circumstances surrounding the
cancellation of the D-Day strike.
The "leaders of the operation" against whom this particular
charge was directed were General Cabell and Mr. Bissell.
Based on
of the Taylor Committee Report (but after he had seen "a preliminary draft of the conclusions"), Bissell may have had the
above conclusion in mind.
209
210
I
31/
One of the
It might be re-
211
The
Moreover, it
The
*The actual beachhead was about 20 miles long from Blue beach
to Red beach. No landing was made at Green beach which was
18 miles SE of Blue beach.
212
Arthur Schlesinger
32/
213
instance was in not suggesting that all parties-the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
State, and the Department of Defense--were remiss
for not having made specific studies of developments
which had taken place in the Zapata area since Castro's
take over.
To
214
accomplish such a feat from the beachhead implied a breakthrough and a journey of SO - 70 miles through hostile country
to reach the foothills of the Escambray area.
of this conclusion stated:
"The guerrilla
AThe question is, of course, why the committee did not recognize
this. Perhaps in their hurry to meet the President's deadline,
they didn't take time to read a memorandum dated 31 May 1961.
215
Memorandum No. 3 of
the Taylor committee stated "This [lack of understanding about the state of affairs at the beachhead] was particularly the case on the night of
D+l when an appreciation of the ammunition situation
would have resulted in an appeal for US air cover
in an all-out effort to supply the beach by all
available means."
to grant more than one hour for the Navy CAP on the
morning of D+2 would not seem to warrant a judgment
that the President would have loosened the reins in
favor of overt US support for the Brigade.
7.
216
I
217
Both the US and Cuban pilots who were preparing for the'
anti-Castro effort were thoroughly familiar with the
capabilities of the T-33s; and, in addition, the Cuban
pilots were also familiar with their compatriots who
had remained loyal to Castro.
Memorandum No. 4
The final eleven page memorandum of the Taylor Committee,
"Recommendations of the Cuban Study Group," contained six recommendations, four of which dealt with the broad aspect of
preparations that the United States should make for meeting
Cold War threats and included:
1.
operations;
3.
field; and
218
4.
34/*
219
The committee
It concluded by stating:
"It
21/
221
CHAPTER 5
General Taylor's Retrospective Views
I am afraid that I could not be of real assistance
to you in providing qualified answers. While I worked
very intensively on the broad aspects of this affair in
1961, I have forgotten many of the details which were
available to our committee. I would only say that I felt
at the time that the committee had access to all the
facts necessary to allow us to form a qualified judgement
[sic] as to the major causes of the failure of this
undertaking.
Albert C. Persons, Bay of Pigs (Birmingham,
AL:
222
/
1) sanction a
ana Sea Furies into the air, there was no way that the Brigade
B-26s--even with more B-26s and more Cuban pilots--could control
the air.
223
He wrote:
224
"Such an analysis
"if
made in May 1980 did not necessarily jibe with what he had
written in 1972.
225
"Was Desert I
4/
intent of the Bay of Pigs operation was the ouster of Fidel Castro
and the installation of a provisional government--preferably one
which was anti-communist and pro-US.
Taylor's article then reiterated the points made in the
conclusions to the Taylor Committee report:
some of his advisers understood:
226
6/
As
Certainly
1/
227
What the
Chiefs did point out during the course of the hearing was
that this belief was based on the assumption that there would
be a heavy D-Day air strike as had been outlined in the last
operational plan that each of them had seen or been briefed
on.
In fact:
228
l
The only
At no point, however,
its conclusions--
229
230
/
CHAPTER 6
Assessment of the Taylor Committee Investigation
231
investigation..
image, he would have waited at least until all the troops had
been returned from the. invasion area or otherwise been accounted
for; he. would have eliminated Dulles, Burke, and his brother from
as members of the committee; and he would have
selected a group of "statesmen" with reputations similar to
Taylor's for the committee.
There. is no question that the report of the Cuban Study
Group suffered from the haste with which it was prepared.
For all practical purpose.s, the Committee had completed its
report by 11 May 1961--less than three weeks from the initiation of the project, four days in advance of the date on
which the President had requested a preliminary report, and
prior to the appearance of Admiral Burke, General Lemnitzer,
DCI Dulles, and Jake Esterline as witnesses.
Moreover, the
the following:
C. Tracy Barnes who, as Bissell's principal
deputy, had the closest and most continuous contact
with--and input to--the project of anyone outside
of liH/4. Barnes had been responsible for the
controversial 8 April 1961 briefing of Adlai
Stevenson about the operation.
See page 205.
232
J.ng
en erroneous-warranted an
that Amory ",,'as not informed at any point about any aspect of the
operation," and Roger Hilsman, State's intelligence chief, stated
that Amory was "kept in the dark,"
1/**
*Drain commented that: "I was standing by all the time ... [but]
I was never called before Bobby Boy's little proctological group." '1./
**As late as 1975, one newspaper report stated that "When the 'covert
operations' people were organizing the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961,
they did not tell the Agency's own Deputy Director of Intelligence,
Robert Amory, who might have figured the whole trip would be a
bummer."
233
1attended
a special NSC
He was present
when DCI Dulles briefed the CIA subcommittee of the House Armed
Services Committee on all phases of the Trindad plan, including
't'h
...e
paramllOt
1 ary InvasIon.
0
y*
234
../
One of those
of varying
U.e
linclUdin g
235
It
This wasn't
236
/
objections
Each of the
237
In the period
between 22 April 1961 whe!1 the committee held its first meeting
and 16 May when General Taylor gave the President the preliminary briefing he had requested, more than forty witnesses
had completed testimony.
238
of various individuals.
239
3.
240
The loss of
241
Had
this been done, even under the deadline set by the President
for completion of the report. useful corrections and clarification of the record might have been accomplished before the
final report was forwarded.
nn
point of reason.
242
I
9/
"Associates of President
11/
Taylor,
The most
One
Secretary Rusk would subsequently continue to provide disabout the Agency's estimates and the importance of
the air operations.
Secretary of Defense McNamara's opinions could have had
a significant impact on the planning of the anti-Castro operation,
particularly if he had studied the two JCSM's which seem to have
disappeared from sight after having been sent to his
regarding the importance of the cancelled air strike on
D-Day were ones about which the Attorney General would continue to
be most protective of the President--even to the point of disingenuousness. This topic is discussed in detail in Volume I of
this history (pp. 295-305).
**The papers were JCSM-44-6l, 27 Jan 61, "US Plan of Action in Cuba,"
and JCSM-166-t51, 15 Mar 61, "Evaluation of the Mil i tary Aspects of
AlternAte Concepts, CIA paramilitary Plan, Cuba."
245
For whatever reason, the Taylor Committee did not pursue the
breakdown in the system which resulted in this loss.
After
Cuba began that both Dulles and the CIA were going to be targets
for attack by Castro and the pro-Communist nations.
For all
Although not
*The severest critic of Dulles was Dick Drain, C/OP/WH/4 who said
the DCI upon his return was more concerned about I
I .
the fate of tne on-golng
246
In view of Stevenson's
247
248
/
Jes,
With the
The significance of the failure at the Bay of Pigs-particularly in light of the current disarray in Central American,
is perhaps best illustrated in the contrast between Richard
Rovere's optimistic piece in 1961 and an historian writing in
1981.
Rovere wrote:
There is widespread recognition of the fact
that the paramilitary operations of the
Communists have confronted the West with a
new kind of danger, and that some means of
dealing with them must be found. And there
is some recognition of the possibility that
the President may, in his moment of failure
and error [at the Bay of Pigs], have done
something to give pause to the Khrushchevs
and Castros of this world. The Russians
have been put on notice that the United
States cannot be counted on to abide by
all the rules of late-nineteenth-century
diplomacy .. We may not try anything of this
sort again, but Khrushchev cannot be sure of
this, and there is always a certain gain, in
dealing with men of his kind, in increasing
the element of risk involved in his maneuvers.
16/
251
EPILOGUE
Kennedy began as
of the U.s. with the aggression
that was underway, that he inherited, that he approved, and that
he lost. The most difficult day for the revolution was the 19th
of April 1961 when in sight of our troops was part of the North
American fleet with marines, destroyers, aircraft carriers, etc.
Kennedy vacillated. If at that moment he had decided to
invade us, he could have suffocated the island in a sea of blood,
but he would have destroyed the revolution.
Luckily for us, he vacillated. If instead of Kennedy we
h2d had any of the later presidents, they would have intervened
and destroyed the revolution.
(Translation of a comment by Raul Castro during
an interview with Teresa Gurza of El Dia,
Mexico, 19 September 1975)
'.
252
APPENDIX A
Topics for Discussion by the
Taylor Committee
2S April 1961
Appendix A
Topics for Tuesday [25 April 1961?]
1. Was there any doubt about the necessity of some such
military action against Castro?
2. What was the estimate of the probability of success
of ZAPATA before D-Day?
3.
254
14.
255
APPENDIX B
Letter for the President from
McGeorge Bundy, undated
,)56 "
4w_
",,
COpy
Here is
You
in any way, I hope you will send me off - and if you choose
differently, you will still have this letter for use when
you may need it.
257
/l.PPBNDIX C
protecting the KennedY Image
..
258,:
APPENDIX C
1.
2.
259
260
APPENDIX D
Study of the Anti-Castro
Invasion (Zapata)
11 May 1961
11 May 1961.
STUDY OF THE ANTI-CASTRO INVASION (ZAPATA)
1.
This
ammunition.
4.
Thtl air attack which sunk these ships caused all others
He
8.
The
This failure
264
Iwho
was aboard
the U.S. Navy in the vicinity brought them back to the scene of
action.
265
The Cubans
It seems reasonable to
believe that with control of the air they could have maintained
themselves for some days, although the vastly superior Castro
forces which appeared qUickly on the scene made a break-out
unlikely by such a small landing force.
exercise the guerrilla option and take to the hills would have
been virtually impossible because of the presence of the encircling Castro forces and of the instructions which the Cuban
invasion units had received to fall back on the beaches in
case of a penetration of the beachhead.
266
We are inclined to
u.s.
assistance.
As noted
the following:
a.
Operational restrictions
267
c.
268
e.
The
269
I
"i
g.
Individually, they
.- rr
,,
1
I
j.
have been
Thereafter,
there was a need for a formalized procedure for interdepartmental coordination and follow-up with adequate
record-keeping of decisions.
14.
Such operations
APPENDIX E
Letter to President Kennedy
from General Maxwell D. Taylor
13 June 1961
COPY
Room 2E980, The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.
13 Jme 1961
Dear Mr. President:
By your letter of April 2.2, 1961, you charged me in association with
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Director of
Central Intelligence Allen Dulles to study our governmental practices
and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerrilla and
anti-guerrilla activity which fell short of outright war with a view to
strengthening our work in this area. You directed special attention to
the lessons which can be learned from the recent events in Ma.
On May 16, our Cuban Study Group submitted to you an interim oral
report of .our conclusions as of that date. We are now prepared to make
our final report to you orally, supported by the following memoranda:
2734'
ef
APPENDIX F
Bitter Recriminations:
The Navy CAP at the Bay of Pigs
19 April 19_61
2 74
APPENDIX F
BITTER RECRIrUNATIONf.:
TilE NAVY CAP AT THE BAY OF PIGS
19 APRIL 1961*
1.
To support the planned air strike, President
Kennedy authorized the USN to fly a CAP for one hour on
19 April.
2. The
for the CAP set by the President
was agreed to by the USN and CIA as 0630-0730 Cuba (and
Washington) time.
3. For whatever reason, the USN CAP and the B-26s
missed their rendezvous; and two B-26s and four Americans
were lost.
275
::,$
early and the Agency claiming that the CAP arrived too late.
Degeneration of this dispute to firm assertions and positive
denials ignored the available evidence which makes clear that
the failure
The
On 1 April, Rules of
_serving as the Agency's liaison officer with the JCS set forth the
Rules of Engagement for the carrier task group which set limits
on the distance from Cuban territory for both carrier ann aircraft
276
..,
and conditions under which carrier aircraft could engage unfriendly aircraft.
Beginning on D-Day (17 April 1961) Navy aircraft were in
evidence in the invasion areas.
,..
appea:l for immediate support from the jet aircraft aboard the
Essex.
277
the Navy
In
jets were not to seek air combat nor attack ground targets. 3/
Once this decision was made, Headquarters sent a message to
Puerto Cabezas stating among other things that there would be:
"positive aggressive Navy air support and cover" from l130Z to
l230Z, on 19 April and that all "enemy forces on approaches
leading into Playa Giron airfield should be attacked."
, But even as this authorization for one hour of a CAP was
being flashed to Nicaragua; the air base was sending a message
through Headquarters at 08l5Z (0215 Nicaragua/03l5 Washington)
to the commanding officer of the Essex specifying that the USN
air CAP be, provided at the area of "Blue Beach not at
the 12 mile limit."
Less than an hour after the message was sent to Gar Teegan
confirming the one hour CAP for 19 April, JCS sent a message to
both Admiral Dennison,
The USN pilots were not to seek air combat, but were
to play a purely
C-46s. ,!I
The Task Group also was alerted to the possibility that
the invading forces might need to be evacuated from Blue Beach,
and Admiral Dennison
Again, however,
there were restrictions on the extent to which the rescue operations could be performed.
remain deniable!
51
279
There had been a meeting in DCI Dulles's office about 8:30 a.m.
on 19 April attended by McGeorge Bundy and the key personnel
1nvolved in the project--DDCI Cabell, Mr. Bissell, Jake Esterline,
Dick Drain, Colonels Hawkins, Beerli, and Germosen, and Captain
Scapa. Bundy called President to request that Navy air be
authorized to attack both ground and air targets. The President
refused to authorize
extension beyond the hour granted for
the morning.
280
concerned the absence of the Navy CAP when the Brigade B-26s were
nearing their eIP tCoast in Point) on the morning of 19 April-even if the planes from Puerto Cabezas arrived earlier than
scheduled as claimed by the Navy.
In his testimony about the Bay of Pigs before the Taylor
Committee, Admiral Clark stated that his orders were for a CAP
from 0630R-0730R on 19 April, but:
I decided to play this one safe and ordered by
people to be on station one-half hour early [0600R]
in the event that the CEF [Cuban Expeditionary Force]
aircraft made the trip quicker than they had anticipated.
However, they
over our ship one hour early [OS30R],
and consequently we launched our aircraft immediately.
We arrived over the beach area fortv minutes before
0630 Romeo JOSSORJ. However, by that time, the CEF
aircraft had already made their strikes and left. 6/
If the Navy CAP was launched and over the beach at the
time specified by Admiral Clark in the above testimony, why
did the message transmitted from the Task Force to Puerto
Cnbezas via Headquarters l128Z [0628R] on 19 April fail to
meption that the Brigade's B-26s had already overflown the
Essex?
time of launch of the CAP from the Essex, then the time sequence
specified to the Taylor Committee by Clark was grossly in error.*
Gar Teegen, the air commander at Puerto Cabezas, had
little to say about the time problem.
In his testimony
2 81
I
there was some confusion as to the time the Navy CAP was to
be provided, Teegen's terse answer was:
of the time.
provided.
II
S/
Mission Summary Report of 26 April 1961 for
been well within the time COSSOR) that Admiral Clark testified
his CAP was "over the beach area."
In the r1ission
Table 1 fo1lows
The two-and-one-half hour flight tiMe
from Puerto Cabezas to Cuba probably errs on the side of a higher
average airspeed (230 mph) than was operationally feasible (190200 mph>'. Albert C. Persons was a C-46/C-S4 pilot/instructor during
the BOP
TABLE 1
1968 Revision of
Mission Stmn'ary of
26 April 1961
Mission SUrm'ery,
26 April 1961
Pilots/Crew
.
:
Take-off
(575 s .rn./230
nph)
.
\
0700
.,
Ray/Baker
Shannon
"Doug"
nph)
0930
(0430)
0845
1115
(0615)
0845
1115
(0615)
0845
1115
(0615)
0845
1115
(0615)
0900
1130
(0630)
0855
1125
(0625)
0900
1130
(0630)
0900
1130
1030
1300
1030
1300
0900
1130'
(0630)
1030 (0900?) I
1300 (1130?)
(ni1n?,
I !
Simpson
(pseudo)
(575 s.rn.J230
0700
"
Shamburger/
Gray
Est:i.rra ted
rni.ni.rnum arrival
time over
target
0930
(0430)
Goodwin
Take-off.
tine
target
,,"
Herrera
Estimated
minimum arrival
tiIre ovel'
ti.Ir.e
1030
(recalled)
1300
0700 (?)
0930
IHII
(0630)
(0800)
waoO)
that the Essex was unaware of the approaching B-26s until "they
came over our ship one hour early."
time he launched his CAP and got them over the beach, the
B-26s "had already made their strikes and left."
10/
Estimates
11/*
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED RADAR INTERCEPT RANGES,
USS ESSEX AND BRIGADE B-26's, 19 APRIL 1961
Height of
Aircraft
(Feet)
Intercept Range
(Statute miles) *
100
Time Required
B-26 t s to
reach ESSEX**
(Minutes)
28
32
500
45
12
1,500
68
18
2,000
76
20
3,000
90
23
5,000
113
30
154
....
-40
200
10,000
,',
"
286
2,000'
It would appear
12/
As
Herrera and,
possibly "Doug" in the first two B-26s over the target area might
have been in and out prior to the arrival of the CAP; but
according to Buck Persons, Doug was intercepted by one of the
USN jets as he was en route back to Puerto Cabezas.
Even
though he had no radio contact with the Navy pilot, Doug was
able to direct the aircraft back toward the beach where Joe
Shannon still faced possible attack by the T-33s which had
downed his wing man.
13/
that
287
14/*
carrier's radar and not the recce aircraft spotted the B-26s. 15/
If Krisel's version were accepted as correct and if the Essex,
even with a radar warning alert, could not get its jet aircraft
launched in time to catch any of the B-26s before they completed
their strikes, the efficiency of US carrier operations would
288
Teegen, as reportedly
19/
in his
the CAP he was told that they had no orders to fire, it would
have made no difference. at what height the A4Ds operated.
.Q./**
* In his
with Col. Beerli, Capt. Krisel apparently
did not indicate that there was any radar pickup of the B-26s. 16/
In one of his conversations with me, Krisel stated that the A4D
Skyhawks from the Essex did not carry radar and had to be vectored
by the carrier to any aircraft which they could not sight visually. 17/
Yet another version of the time frame problem was told to
Peter Wyden in a conversation with Admiral Clark's second in command, "Deacon" Fickenscher. According to Wyden:
On Wednesday \119 April 1961J at 6: 30 a.m., Deacon
lFickenscherJ received a message .. from Washington .
to launch four SkYhawks which were supposed to protect
B-26s headed for the beach .. The launch was scheduled for six-thirty, clearly no longer possible. The
planes were airborne shortly before seven-thirty.
Deacon knew they would almost certainly miss their
rendezvous .. Nobody could execute orders before
they were received. Obviously, communications with
Washington were not working right. 18/
**The writer told Krisel that this was an unbelievable story
be.cause the purpose of the CAP was to "defend CEF against air
attacks from Castro forces. Do not seek air combat, but defend
CEF forces from air attack." Krisel reported that the pilots
claimed that the Rules of Engagement must have been changed
and the pilots were unaware of the change.
289
21/
One source has indicated that the destruction of the records-including "the operation order, the deck log, the navigation
log, the combat information center log, the engineering log,
everything"--was done in the incinerator of the Essex following
the collapse of the invasion.
22/*
have been unaware that the effort against Castro was in trouble
from the. time the first B-26 went down and two of the supply
ships were sunk., then he either was listening to the wrong advisers or was engaging in wishful thinking.
Certainly McGeorge
Bundy was well aware of the air problem and he was in close
contact with key CIA personnel who were actively seeking air
support from the Navy.
290
SOURCE REFERENCES
(APPENDIX F) *
1. Operation Zapata (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 19B1}., pp. 30-31, 131.
2. Memo for the President from McGeorge Bundy, 18 Apr 61,
sub: lCuban Situation].
3. Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin,
pp. 277-278.
4. Wyden, Peter, Bay of Pigs (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1979)., pp. 125-238, 243, 267-268.
Dennison, Robert L. D., "As I Recall," US Naval
Institute Proceedings, Oct 79,
111-113.
S.
Dennison.
7.
Ibid.
8.
Ibid., p. 235.
291
17.
Pfeiffer-Krise1 conversation,
lB.
Wyden, p. 242.
19.
20.
June 78.
Wyden, p. 299..
SOURCE REFERENCES
NOTE:
(FOIA request
293
SOURCE REFERENCES
Chapter 1
Introduction
No source references
Chapter 2 Organization and Procedures
of the Conunittee
1.
22 Apr 61.
Ibid., p. 184.
4.
Ibid., p. 185.
7.
of America, 19
Chapter 3 Testimony of the Witnesses
1. Taylor Conunittee, Part II, 1st Mtg, 22 Apr 61, Verbatim
Transcript, Reel 1, pp. 16-17. (Hereafter as TCVf, R#, pp.).
2.
3.
4.
5.
Ibid., p. 8.
6.
294
8.
OZ, p. 58.
9.
10.
Ibid., p. 17.
11.
12.
Ibid., p. 75.
13.
14.
"
"
, pp. 77-78.
, p. 80.
OZ, p. 118.
OZ, p. 123.
19.
Ibid., p. 98.
20.
Te1econ with
Ibid., p. 112.
24.
25.
OZ, p. 202.
26.
27.
"
, pp. 112-113.
(Habana: Ediciones R,
1961) ,
28.
OZ, p. 134.
295
*29.
for Chief, WH/ 4 from J. Hawkins, 4 Jan 61, sub:
Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of Strike Operations Against
Government of Cuba.
30.
OZ, p. 130.
Ibid.
33.
Ibid.
34.
OZ, p. 147.
35.
Ibid., p. 141.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Ibid., p. 142.
*40. 1vemo for OCI from J. C. King, 27 Apr 61, sub: Resume
of Conditions Inhibiting Mass Uprisings in Cuba on 17 Apr [61].
41.
42.
43.
" , p. 144.
Conclusions
OZ, p. 145.
46.
47.
48.
"
"
1vemo for Sec Def from L. L. Lernni tzer, 10 Mar 61, sub:
EValuation of CIA Cuban Volunteer Task Force
Enclosure C,
p. 4.
296
49.
50.
Ibid., p. 158.
51.
"
, p. 167.
52.
"
, pp. 168-169.
53.
"
, p. 171.
54.
"
"
"
"
, pp. 172-175.
55.
56.
57.
, p. 175.
, pp. 176-177.
,p.l77.
58. MeJOO for President Kennedy from McGeorge Bundy, 15 Mar 61,
sub: Meeting on Cuba, 4 p.m., 15 Mar 61.
59.
OZ, p. 178.
60.
Ibid., p. 177.
60a. terno from McGeorge Bundy, 24 Apr 61, sub: Some Preliminary
Administrative Lessons of the Cuban Expedition.
f-
61.
OZ, p. 178.
62.
63.
OZ, p. 180.
64.
Ibid.
65.
" , p. 181.
66.
67.
" , p. 182.
OZ, p. 182.
297
70.
Ibid., p. 191.
71.
"
, pp. 184-189.
72.
"
"
, p. 190.
73.
, pp. 190-194.
75.
OZ, p. 194.
76.
77.
" , p. 201.
78.
" , p. 202.
79.
80.
81.
OZ, p. 203.
82.
JCSM-146-61, p. 2.
83.
84
OZ, p. 204.
85.
Ibid., p. 205.
86.
" , p. 8.
OZ, p. 207.
88.
Ibid., p. 208.
89.
90.
91.
298
92.
15 Oct 74.
OZ, p. 221.
96.
Summary of
Ibid.
Letter to Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer from Richard F. Pedersen,
100.
OZ, p. 223.
10l.
Ibid.
102.
Ibid.
105.
Ibid., p. 229.
106.
" , p. 230.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
"
"
"
"
. , pp. 247-248.
, p. 248.
, pp. 248-25l.
, p. 246.
299
(FDR Ly,
114.
Ibid., p. 254.
115.
tl
, pp. 258-259.
116.
tl
, pp. 259-260.
117.
tl
, pp. 262-263.
118.
tl
, pp. 267-269.
119.
tl
, pp. 269-274.
120.
121.
122.
123.
tl
, p. 288.
124.
125.
126.
Ibid., p. 313.
127.
"
, p. 317.
130.
131.
132.
tl,
pp. 325-326.
135.
300
136.
Ibid., p. 344.
, pp. 344-347.
138.
"
"
, pp. 346-347.
139.
"
, p. 330.
140.
"
, pp. 350-351.
137.
145.
RFK
146.
147.
Ibid.
148.
Ibid., p. 453.
149.
150.
Ibid., p. 29.
151.
152.
153.
Ibid., p. 401.
Memo, p.
6.
Conversation
158.
3.
4.
5.
OZ, p. 8.
*6.
sub:
with the
7.
from McGeorge Bundy, 28 Jan 61, sub:
of Discussion on Cuba.
8.
OZ, p. 9.
9..
for Sec Def from 1. L. Lenmitzer, 3 Feb 61, sub:
Military Evaluation of the Cuban Plan (JCSM-57-61), p. 3.
10.
11.
12.
Ibid., p. 1.
"
, pp. 22-23.
13 .. Ibid. , p. 14.
pp. 14-16.
14.
"
15.
"
16.
"
pp. 16-21.
17.
"
"
p. 24.
18.
, p. 16.
, pp. 34-35.
302
19.
20.
21.
"
p. 29.
26.
27.
28.
29.
*30. Memo for DCI From Richard M. Bissell, Jr., 20 May 61,
sub: Cuban Experience as It Bears on the Organization of Paramilitary Activities.
31.
32.
*
for Gen. Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Dulles,
3 Jun 61, sub: [Connnents on Memos No. 1 and 2].
*
for Gen. Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Dulles,
4 Jun 61, no subject.
*
for Gen. Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Dulles,
8 Jun 61, no subject.
303
OZ, p. Sl.
37.
38.
Chapter 5
General Taylor's Retrospective Views
on the Cuban Study Group
1.
2.
Ibid., p. 192.
3.
4.
5.
Ibid.
6.
Ibid.
7.
Ibid.
8.
Ibid.
Chapter 6
Assessment of the Taylor Committee Report
1.
2.
4.
Alsop, Stewart, The Center (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 232.
6. MR from David R.
tion with Sherman Kent.
Conversa-
*11. I
Central Intelligence, 26 Feb
I,
22 Apr 81,
OZ, p . ix.
305