Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A.M. Sison, Jr. & Associates For Petitioner. Pedro L. Laso For Private Respondents
A.M. Sison, Jr. & Associates For Petitioner. Pedro L. Laso For Private Respondents
from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreement. In this regard, we held in the earlier case of Molave Motor Sales, Inc. vs. Laron, 129 SCRA 485 (1984), viz:
Before the enactment of BP Blg. 227 on June 1, 1982, Labor Arbiters, under paragraph 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code had
jurisdiction over "all other cases arising from employer-employee relation, unless expressly excluded by this Code." Even then, the
principal followed by this Court was that, although a controversy is between an employer and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have
no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved. In Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome, 116 SCRA 597, 604 in negating jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter, although the parties were an employer and two employees, Mr. Justice Abad Santos stated:
The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code has any relevance to the reliefs sought by
plaintiffs. For if the Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the statutes amending it and
whether or not they have retroactive effect is unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
And in Singapore Airlines Limited vs. Pao, 122 SCRA 671, 677, the following was said:
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no benefits under the Labor Code.
The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items
demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes, such
as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items claimed are the natural
consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
xxx xxx xxx
In San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719 (1988), we crystallized the doctrines set forth in the Medina, Singapore Airlines, and Molave
Motors cases, thus:
. . . The important principle that runs through these three (3) cases is that where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be
resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general
civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such
situations, resolutions of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms
and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of
competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such
claims to these agencies disappears.
Civil Case No. 92-2486 is a simple collection of a sum of money brought by petitioner, as creditor, against private respondent Romana Lanchinebre, as
debtor. The fact that they were employer and employee at the time of the transaction does not negate the civil jurisdiction of the trial court. The case
does not involve adjudication of a labor dispute but recovery of a sum of money based on our civil laws on obligation and contract.
Secondly, the trial court erred in holding that petitioner does not have capacity to sue in the Philippines. It is clear that petitioner is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines. Petitioner is covered by the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987. Said law defines "doing business," as follows:
. . . shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service contracts, opening offices, whether called "liaison" offices or branches;
appointing representatives or distributors who are domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year stay in the Philippines for
a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any
domestic business firm, entity or corporation in the Philippines, and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial
dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization. 5
There is no general rule or governing principle as to what constitutes "doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business in the Philippines. Each case
must be judged in the light of its peculiar circumstances. 6 In the case at bench, petitioner does not engage in commercial dealings or activities in the
country because it is precluded from doing so by P.D. No. 218, under which it was established. 7 Nonetheless, it has been continuously, since 1983,
acting as a supervision, communications and coordination center for its home office's affiliates in Singapore, and in the process has named its local
agent and has employed Philippine nationals like private respondent Romana Lanchinebre. From this uninterrupted performance by petitioner of acts
pursuant to its primary purposes and functions as a regional/area headquarters for its home office, it is clear that petitioner is doing business in the
country. Moreover, private respondents are estopped from assailing the personality of petitioner. So we held in Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 211 SCRA 824, 837 (1992):
The rule is that a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering
into a contract with it. And the "doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence applies to foreign as well as to domestic
corporations;" "one who has dealth with a corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate
existence and capacity." The principle "will be applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking
advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received the benefits of the contract, . . .
(Citations omitted.)
Finally, the trial court erred when it dismissed Civil Case No. 92-2486 on what it found to be the misjoinder of private respondent Teofilo Lanchinebre as
party defendant. It is a basic rule that "(m)isjoinder or parties is not ground for dismissal of an action." 8 Moreover, the Order of the trial court is based on
Section 4(h), Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
A married woman may not . . . be sued alone without joining her husband, except . . . if the litigation is incidental to the profession,
occupation or business in which she is engaged,
Whether or not the subject loan was incurred by private respondent as an incident to her profession, occupation or business is a question of fact. In the
absence of relevant evidence, the issue cannot be resolved in a motion to dismiss.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Orders, dated December 21, 1992 and March 8, 1993, in Civil Case No. 92-2486 are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC of Makati, Br. 59, is hereby ordered to hear the reinstated case on its merits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
March 9, 2000
16
In spite of the many errors assigned by petitioner,17 we find that here the core issue is whether or not the trial court may take cognizance of the complaint
filed by petitioner and consequently provide the injunction relief sought. Such cognizance in turn, would depend on whether the acts complained of are
related to, connected or interwoven with the cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor arbiter or the NLRC.
Petitioner avers that court a quo erred in dismissing the third-party claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Further, it contends that the NLRC-CAR did
not acquire jurisdiction over the claim for it did not impugn the decision of the NLRC-CAR but merely questioned the propriety of the levy made by Sheriff
Ventura. In support of its claim, petitioner asserts that the instant case does not involve a labor dispute, as no-employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties. Nor is the petitioner's case related in any way to either parties' case before the NLRC-CAR hence, not within the jurisdiction of the
Commission.
Basic as a hornbook principle, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complainant18 which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause of action.19 Thus we have held that:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complainant, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein - a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. 20
Petitioner filed the third-party claim before the court a quo by reason of a writ of execution issued by the NLRC-CAR Sheriff against a property to which it
claims ownership. The writ was issued to enforce and execute the commission's decision in NLRC Case No. 01-08-0165-89 (Illegal Dismissal and Unfair
Labor Practice) against Green Mountain Farm, Roberto Ongpin and Almus Alabe.
Ostensibly the complaint before the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction, but in essence it was an action challenging the legality
or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of execution, including the acts performed by the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff implementing the
writ. The complainant was in effect a motion to quash the writ of execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter, to wit: Illegal Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice. Considering the factual setting, it is then logical to conclude that the subject matter of the third
party claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional trial courts.
Precedents abound confirming the rule that said courts have no labor jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including
the execution of decisions, awards or orders.21 Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains exclusively to the proper labor official concerned
under the Department of Labor and Employment. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of
justice.22
Petitioner failed to realize that by filing its third-party claim with the deputy sheriff, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Commission acting through
the Labor Arbiter.1wphi1 It failed to perceive the fact that what it is really controverting is the decision of the Labor arbiter and not the act of the deputy
sheriff in executing said order issued as a consequence of said decision rendered.
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. 23Whatever irregularities attended the
issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. 24 This is
because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and
to control its own processes.25
The broad powers granted to the Labor Arbiter and to the National Labor Relations Commission by Articles 217, 218 and 224 of the Labor Code can only
be interpreted as vesting in them jurisdiction over incidents arising from, in connection with or relating to labor disputes, as the controversy under
consideration, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Having established that jurisdiction over the case rests with the Commission, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge
Cabato in denying petitioner's motion for the issuance of an injunction against the execution of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Moreover, it must be noted that the Labor Code in Article 254 explicitly prohibits issuance of a temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order in
any case involving or growing out of labor disputes by any court or other entity (except as otherwise provided in Arts. 218 and 264). As correctly
observed by court a quo, the main issue and the subject of the amended complaint for injunction are questions interwoven with the execution of the
Commission's decision. No doubt the aforecited prohibition in Article 254 is applicable.1wphi1
Petitioner should have filed its third-party claim before the Labor Arbiter, from whom the writ of execution originated, before instituting said civil case. The
NLRC's Manual on Execution of Judgment,26 issued pursuant to Article 218 of the Labor Code, provides the mechanism for a third-party claimant to
assert his claim over a property levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to an order or decision of the Commission or of the Labor Arbiter. The power of the
Labor Arbiter to issue a writ of execution carries with it the power to inquire into the correctness of the execution of his decision and to consider whatever
supervening events might transpire during such execution.
Moreover, in denying petitioner's petition for injunction, the court a quo is merely upholding the time-honored principle that a Regional Trial Court, being
a co-equal body of the National Labor Relations Commission, has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of
any decision of the latter.27
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED. The assailed Orders of respondent Judge Fernando P. Cabato dated November 7,
1994 and December 14, 1994, respectively are AFFIRMED. The records of this case are hereby REMANDED to the National Labor Relations
Commission for further proceedings.1wphi1.nt
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ETPIs bank accounts.28 Atty. Garcia manifested that he was no longer filing any responsive pleading to the Very Urgent Motion to Lift/Quash Writ of
Execution because the Labor Arbiter lost jurisdiction over the case when an appeal had been perfected. 29 In an Order dated 10 December 2002, Labor
Arbiter Reyes denied the Very Urgent Motion to Lift/Quash Writ of Execution, explaining that it still had jurisdiction over the reinstatement aspect of the
decision, notwithstanding the appeal taken, and that the grounds relied upon for the lifting or quashing of the writ were not valid grounds. 30 Labor Arbiter
Reyes subsequently issued a 1st Alias Writ of Execution dated 11 December 2002 ordering the sheriff to proceed to the premises of ETPI to reinstate
Atty. Garcia and/or garnish the amounts prayed for.31 Per Sheriffs Return dated 17 January 2003, the 1st Alias Writ of Execution was satisfied with the
amount of P450,000.00 being released for proper disposition to Atty. Garcia.32
ETPI and Atty. Hizon appealed the decision to the NLRC, filing a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal, 33which appeal was opposed by Atty.
Garcia.34 The appeal was docketed as NLRC NCR CA Case No. 028901-01. ETPI and Atty. Hizon filed a Supplemental Appeal Memorandum dated 23
January 2003 (With Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order).35 In a Manifestation ad Cautelam dated 28 January 2003, without
waiving their right to continue to question the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, they informed the Labor Arbiter that they had filed a Supplemental Appeal
Memorandum before the NLRC and asked that all processes relating to the implementation of the reinstatement order be held in abeyance so as not to
render moot the reliefs prayed for in said Supplemental Appeal Memorandum.36 They likewise filed on 31 January 2003 a Very Urgent Motion to
Lift/Quash Order of Garnishment ad Cautelam, praying that the notice of garnishment on ETPIs bank account with Metrobank, Dela Costa Branch, or
with other banks with which ETPI maintained an account and which received said notice of garnishment be immediately lifted/quashed. 37 On 12
February 2003, Atty. Garcia filed his Opposition to said Supplemental Appeal Memorandum. 38
On 3 February 2003, Atty. Garcia filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a 2nd Alias Writ of Execution.39 In an Order dated 5 February 2003, Labor
Arbiter Reyes lifted the notice of garnishment on ETPIs bank account with Metrobank, Dela Costa Branch. 40 On 10 February 2003, Labor Arbiter Reyes
issued a 2nd Writ of Execution.41
In a Manifestation ad Cautelam42 dated 10 February 2003, ETPI and Atty. Hizon said that they filed with the NLRC on 7 February 2003 an Urgent
Petition (for Preliminary Injunction With Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order) 43 which prayed, inter alia, for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order to restrain the execution pending appeal of the order of reinstatement and to enjoin the Labor Arbiter from issuing writs of execution or other
processes implementing the decision dated 30 September 2002. They added that they also filed on 7 February 2003 a Notice to Withdraw 44 their
Supplemental Appeal Memorandum dated 23 January 2003.
ETPI and Atty. Hizon, without waiving their right to continue to question the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter over the case, filed on 18 February 2003 a
Motion to Inhibit, seeking the inhibition of Labor Arbiter Reyes for allegedly evident partiality in favor of the complainant in issuing writs of execution in
connection with the order of reinstatement contained in his decision dated 30 September 2002, despite the pendency of an Urgent Petition (for
Preliminary Injunction With Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order) with the NLRC, which sought the restraining of the execution
pending appeal of the order of reinstatement.45 The petition for injunction was docketed as NLRC NCR IC No. 0001193-02. Atty. Garcia filed an
opposition,46 to which ETPI and Atty. Hizon filed a reply.47 Said motion to inhibit was subsequently granted by Labor Arbiter Reyes. 48 The case was reraffled to Labor Arbiter Elias H. Salinas.49
In an Order dated 26 February 2003, the NLRC, in NLRC NCR IC No. 0001193-02, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining Labor Arbiter
Reyes from executing pending appeal the order of reinstatement contained in his decision dated 30 September 2002, and from issuing similar writs of
execution pending resolution of the petition for preliminary injunction. It directed ETPI and Atty. Hizon to post a bond in the amount ofP30,000.00 to
answer for any damage which Atty. Garcia may suffer by reason of the issuance of the TRO.50
On 21 March 2003, the NLRC rendered its decision in NLRC NCR CA Case No. 028901-01 reversing the decision of Labor Arbiter Reyes and dismissing
the case for lack of jurisdiction. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED, and the instant case DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 51
The Commission ruled that the dismissal of Atty. Garcia, being ETPIs Vice President, partook of the nature of an intra-corporate dispute cognizable by
Regional Trial Courts and not by Labor Arbiters. It added that ETPI and Atty. Hizon were not barred by estoppel from challenging the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter over the instant case.
Atty. Garcia moved for the reconsideration52 of the decision, which ETPI and Atty. Hizon opposed.53 In a resolution dated 16 December 2003, the motion
for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.54
On 26 March 2003, Atty. Garcia filed a Motion to Inhibit, requesting Associate Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan to inhibit herself from further
participating in the deliberation and resolution of the case for manifest bias and partiality in favor of ETPI and Atty. Hizon. The motion was later
withdrawn.55
On 3 April 2003, the NLRC made permanent the TRO it issued pursuant to its ruling in NLRC NCR CA Case No. 028901-01, that since the Labor Arbiter
had no jurisdiction over the case, the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 30 September 2002 was void. 56
On 6 March 2004, the resolution dated 16 December 2003 became final and executory. Consequently, on 14 June 2004, an entry of judgment was made
recording said resolution in the Book of Entries of Judgments.57
On 18 June 2004, ETPI and Atty. Hizon filed a Motion to Discharge and/or Release the Appeal Bond 58 in the amount of P5,700,000.00 that they had
posted. 59
On 9 July 2004, Atty. Garcia filed a Motion to Set Aside Finality of Judgment With Opposition to Motion to Discharge Appeal Bond, 60 claiming that he did
not receive the resolution dated 16 December 2003 of the NLRC, the same having been sent to his former address at 9 Isidora St., Don Antonio Heights,
Diliman, Quezon City, and not to his new address at 4 Pele St., Filinvest 2, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, where he had been receiving all pleadings,
Resolutions, Orders and Decisions pertaining to the instant case since April 2001. On 19 July 2004, ETPI and Atty. Hizon filed their opposition thereto.
On 23 August 2004, the NLRC, admitting that it missent the resolution dated 16 December 2003 denying Atty. Garcias motion for reconsideration,
issued an order granting the motion. It recalled and set aside the Entry of Judgment dated 14 June 2004 and denied the Motion to Discharge and/or
Release the Appeal Bond.61
In its Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 September 2004, ETPI and Atty. Hizon argued that the NLRC correctly sent the resolution of 16 December
2003 to counsels allegedly old address, considering that same was counsels address of record, there being no formal notice filed with the NLRC
informing it of a change of address. They contended that the aforesaid resolution had become final and executory, and that Atty. Garcia should bear the
consequences of his inequitable conduct and/or gross negligence.62 On 10 January 2005, the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration.63
On 14 March 2005, Atty. Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari. It prayed that the Decision dated 21 March 2003 and
resolution dated 16 December 2003 of the NLRC be annulled and set aside, and that the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 30 September 2002 be
reinstated.64 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88887.
On 28 March 2005, ETPI and Atty. Hizon likewise filed a Petition for Certiorari asking that the Orders dated 23 August 2004 and 10 January 2005 of the
NLRC be set aside; that its resolution dated 16 December 2003 be declared final and executory; and that the NLRC be directed to discharge and/or
release Supersedeas Bond No. JCL (15) 00823 SICI Bond No. 75069 dated 18 November 2002 posted by them. 65 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 89066.
Upon motion of Atty. Garcia, the two petitions for certiorari were consolidated.66
On 24 March 2006, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered, the dispositive portion reading:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Without costs in both
instances.67
The appellate court, on ETPI and Atty. Hizons argument that Atty. Garcias petition for certiorari was filed out of time, ruled that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in liberally applying the rules regarding changes in the address of counsel. It likewise ruled that Atty. Garcia, being the Vice
President for Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of ETPI, was a corporate officer at the time he was removed. Being a
corporate officer, his removal was a corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy, the jurisdiction of which rested with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (now with the Regional Trial Court), and not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. It added that ETPI and Atty. Hizon were not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter before the NLRC on appeal, inasmuch as said issue was seasonably raised by ETPI and
Atty. Hizon in their reply memorandum before the Labor Arbiter.
On 18 April 2006, Atty. Garcia filed his Motion for Reconsideration. 68 On 20 April 2006, ETPI and Atty. Hizon filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.69 The parties filed their respective comments thereon.70 On 14 June 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the motions for
reconsideration.71
Atty. Garcia is now before us via a Petition for Review, which he filed on 3 August 2006.72 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 173115. On 8 August
2006, he filed an Amended Petition for Review.73 He prays that the decision of the NLRC dated 21 March 2003 and its resolution dated 16 December
2003, and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 March 2006 and its resolution dated 14 June 2006, be reconsidered and set aside and that the
decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 30 September 2002 be affirmed and reinstated.
ETPI and Atty. Hizon are also before us by way of a Petition for Certiorari. 74 The petition which was filed on 6 July 2006 was docketed as G.R. Nos.
173163-64.
In our resolution dated 30 August 2006, G.R. Nos. 173163-64 were consolidated with G.R. No. 173115, and the parties were required to comment on the
petitions within ten days from notice. 75 Atty. Garcia filed his comment on 13 November 2006,76 while ETPI and Atty. Hizon filed theirs on 29 November
2006.77
On 15 January 2007, we noted the comments filed by the parties and required them to file their Replies to said comments. 78 ETPI and Atty. Hizon79 filed
their Reply on 26 February 2007, with Atty. Garcia filing his on 2 March 2007.80
On 26 March 2007, we gave due course to the petitions and required the parties to submit the respective memoranda within 30 days from notice. 81 Atty.
Garcia submitted his Memorandum82 on 12 June 2007 and ETPI and Atty. Hizon filed theirs on 13 July 2007.83 With leave of court, ETPI and Atty. Hizon
filed a reply memorandum.84
Atty. Garcia raises the lone issue:
WHETHER THE QUESTION OF LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF THE REMOVAL OR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF AN OFFICER OF A
CORPORATION IS AN INTRA-CORPORATE CONTROVERSY THAT FALLS UNDER THE ORIGINAL EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS?85
ETPI and Atty. Hizon argue that the Court of Appeals, in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing its order dated 23 August 2004 and its resolution dated 10 January 2005, committed grave reversible error and decided questions
of substance in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decisions of the Honorable Court, and departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings, necessitating the Honorable Courts exercise of its power of supervision.
I
THE RESOLUTION DATED 16 DECEMBER 2003 ISSUED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION) HAS
ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND HAS VESTED UPON PETITIONERS ETPI, ET AL. A RIGHT RECOGNIZED AND PROTECTED
UNDER THE LAW CONSIDERING THAT:
A. RESPONDENTS COPY OF SAID RESOLUTION WAS PROPERLY SENT TO HIS ADDRESS OF RECORD, AT THE LATEST ON 15
JANUARY 2004, IN ACCORDANCE WITH WELL ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE. HENCE, RESPONDENT GARCIA HAD ONLY UNTIL
15 MARCH 2004 WITHIN WHICH TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. RESPONDENT GARCIA
FAILED TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BY SAID DATE.
B. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING, RESPONDENT GARCIA HAD ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAME AS OF 24
JUNE 2004. HENCE RESPONDENT GARCIA HAD ONLY UNTIL 23 AUGUST 2004 WITHIN WHICH TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS. RESPONDENT GARCIA FAILED TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BY SAID
DATE.
C. EVEN IF THE DATE OF RECEIPT IS RECKONED FROM 15 SEPTEMBER 2005, THE DATE RESPONDENT GARCIA ADMITTED IN HIS
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO BE THE DATE OF HIS RECEIPT OF THE COPY OF THE RESOLUTION DATED 16 DECEMBER 2003 AT
HIS ALLEGED NEW ADDRESS, RESPONDENT GARCIA HAD ONLY UNTIL 15 NOVEMBER 2005 TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DATED 11 MARCH 2005. RESPONDENT GARCIA FAILED TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BY SAID DATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE NLRCS LIBERAL APPLICATION OF RULES CONSIDERING THAT A LIBERAL
APPLICATION OF RULES CANNOT BE USED TO DEPRIVE A RIGHT THAT HAS ALREADY IPSO FACTO VESTED ON PETITIONERS ETPI, ET AL.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NLRC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER DATED 23 AUGUST 2004 AND RESOLUTION DATED 10 JANUARY 2005 CONSIDERING
THAT RESPONDENT GARCIA MAY NOT ASSAIL THE FINALITY OF RESOLUTION DATED 16 DECEMBER 2003 THROUGH A MERE MOTION.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE ON PETITIONERS COUNTER-MOTION TO CITE RESPONDENT GARCIA IN CONTEMPT
OF COURT DESPITE ITS PREVIOUS RESOLUTION DATED 30 MAY 2005 STATING THAT IT SHALL ADDRESS THE SAME IN THE DECISION ON
THE MERITS OF THE CASE.86
The issue raised by Atty. Garcia whether the termination or removal of an officer of a corporation is an intra-corporate controversy that falls under the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts is not novel. The Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, has decreed that a corporate officers
dismissal or removal is always a corporate act and/or an intra-corporate controversy, over which the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC] (now
the Regional Trial Court)87 has original and exclusive jurisdiction.88
We have ruled that an intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as the formers franchise, permit or license to
operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation, partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among the
stockholders, partners or associates themselves.89 In Lozon v. National Labor Relations Commission,90 we declared that Presidential Decree No. 902-A
confers on the SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide controversies and cases involving intra-corporate and partnership relations
between or among the corporation, officers and stockholders and partners, including their elections or appointments x x x.
Before a dismissal or removal could properly fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC, it has to be first established that the person removed or dismissed
was a corporate officer.91 "Corporate officers" in the context of Presidential Decree No. 902-A92 are those officers of the corporation who are given that
character by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws. 93 There are three specific officers whom a corporation must have under Section 25 of
the Corporation Code.94 These are the president, secretary and the treasurer. The number of officers is not limited to these three. A corporation may
have such other officers as may be provided for by its by-laws like, but not limited to, the vice-president, cashier, auditor or general manager. The
number of corporate officers is thus limited by law and by the corporations by-laws.1avvphi1
In the case before us, the by-laws of ETPI provide:
ARTICLE V
Officers
Section 1. Number. The officers of the Company shall be a Chairman of the Board, a President, one or more Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, a Secretary,
an Assistant Secretary, and such other officers as may be from time to time be elected or appointed by the Board of Directors. One person may hold any
two compatible offices.95
Atty. Garcia tries to deny he is an officer of ETPI. Not being a corporate officer, he argues that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. One of the
corporate officers provided for in the by-laws of ETPI is the Vice-President. It can be gathered from Atty. Garcias complaint-affidavit that he was Vice
President for Business Support Services and Human Resource Departments of ETPI when his employment was terminated effective 16 April 2000. It is
therefore clear from the by-laws and from Atty. Garcia himself that he is a corporate officer. One who is included in the by-laws of a corporation in its
roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a mere employee. 96 Being a corporate officer, his removal is deemed to be an intracorporate dispute cognizable by the SEC and not by the Labor Arbiter.
We agree with both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals that Atty. Garcias ouster as Vice-President, who is a corporate officer of ETPI, partakes of the
nature of an intra-corporate controversy, jurisdiction over which is vested in the SEC (now the RTC). The Labor Arbiter thus erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the case filed by Atty. Garcia, because he had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
Having ruled which body has jurisdiction over the instant case, we find it unnecessary, due to mootness, to further discuss and rule on the issues raised
by ETPI and Atty. Hizon regarding the NLRC order dated 23 August 2004 granting Atty. Garcias Motion to Set Aside Finality of Judgment with Opposition
to Motion to Discharge Appeal Bond, and its resolution dated 10 January 2005 denying their motion for reconsideration thereon. The decision of the
Labor Arbiter, who had jurisdiction over the case, was properly dismissed by the NLRC. Consequently, Supersedeas Bond No. JCL (15) 00823 SICI
Bond No. 75069 dated 18 November 2002, posted by ETPI as a requirement for the filing of an appeal before the NLRC, is ordered discharged.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari of Atty. Garcia in G.R. No. 173115 is hereby DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari
of ETPI and Atty. Hizon in G.R. Nos. 173163-64 is PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the discharge of Supersedeas Bond No. JCL (15) 00823 SICI Bond
No. 75069 dated 18 November 2002 is concerned. This ruling is without prejudice to Atty. Garcias taking recourse to and seeking relief through the
appropriate remedy in the proper forum.
SO ORDERED.