Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Dr. Fernando P. Solidum, Petitioner, vs. People of The Philippines, Respondent.
Dr. Fernando P. Solidum, Petitioner, vs. People of The Philippines, Respondent.
Maynila, Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella, private complainant Luz Gercayo, the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.17
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their solidary liability, 18 the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the
damages, modifying its decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Dr. Fernando Solidum, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year,
one (1) month and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum and to indemnify jointly and severally with Ospital ng Maynila, private
complainant Luz Gercayo the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled. 19
Decision of the CA
On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum, 20 pertinently stating and ruling:
The case appears to be a textbook example of res ipsa loquitur.
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x x x [P]rior to the operation, the child was evaluated and found fit to undergo a major operation. As noted by the OSG, the accused himself testified
that pre-operation tests were conducted to ensure that the child could withstand the surgery. Except for his imperforate anus, the child was healthy.
The tests and other procedures failed to reveal that he was suffering from any known ailment or disability that could turn into a significant risk. There
was not a hint that the nature of the operation itself was a causative factor in the events that finally led to hypoxia.
In short, the lower court has been left with no reasonable hypothesis except to attribute the accident to a failure in the proper administration of
anesthesia, the gravamen of the charge in this case. The High Court elucidates in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals 321 SCRA 584
In cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without
the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an
inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without
need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way,
under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
The lower court has found that such a nexus exists between the act complained of and the injury sustained, and in line with the hornbook rules on
evidence, we will afford the factual findings of a trial court the respect they deserve in the absence of a showing of arbitrariness or disregard of
material facts that might affect the disposition of the case. People v. Paraiso 349 SCRA 335.
The res ipsa loquitur test has been known to be applied in criminal cases. Although it creates a presumption of negligence, it need not offend due
process, as long as the accused is afforded the opportunity to go forward with his own evidence and prove that he has no criminal intent. It is in this
light not inconsistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the modified decision of the lower court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.21
Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion on May 7, 2010. 22
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
Dr. Solidum avers that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT IN UPHOLDING THE
PETITIONERS CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TRIAL COURTS OPINION, AND NOT ON THE BASIS OF
THE FACTS ESTABLISHED DURING THE TRIAL. ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS WHICH IF
CORRECTED, WILL RESULT TO THE ACQUITTAL OF THE PETITIONER. FURTHER, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE SAID DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT, AS THIS BREACHES THE CRIMINAL LAW PRINCIPLE THAT THE
PROSECUTION MUST PROVE THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE INFORMATION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, AND NOT ON THE
BASIS OF ITS PRESUMPTIVE CONCLUSION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) WHEN THE
DEFENSE WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AND NO OVERDOSING
IN THE APPLICATION OF THE ANESTHETIC AGENT BECAUSE THERE WAS NO 100% HALOTHANE ADMINISTERED TO THE
CHILD, BUT ONLY ONE (1%) PERCENT AND THE APPLICATION THEREOF, WAS REGULATED BY AN ANESTHESIA MACHINE.
THUS, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR (sic) CONTRADICTED THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE
LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE.
III.
THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IS NOT JUSTIFIED THERE BEING NO NEGLIGENCE ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER. ASSUMING THAT THE CHILD IS ENTITLED TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATION, IT SHOULD BE ONLY AS
A FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BECAUSE THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE, AND NO OVERDOSING OF ANESTHETIC AGENT AND AS
SUCH, THE AWARD IS SO EXCESSIVE, AND NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS. 23
To simplify, the following are the issues for resolution, namely: (a) whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable herein; and (b)
whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that
the accident arose from want of care." 24 It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very
nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the
injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human
experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge." 25
Jarcia, Jr. v. People26 has underscored that the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof, and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.27
The applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases was significantly and exhaustively explained in Ramos v. Court of
Appeals,28 where the Court said
Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. The application of res ipsa
loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances
does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference.
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has
deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony
is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony
applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind
which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify
as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and
acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert
witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to
the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an
inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily
required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus
between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without
need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way,
under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an
operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the body
when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye
while the patient plaintiff was under the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all cases of
medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa
loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each
case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation,
that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be
made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment
rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have
no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon
is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the
desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment
was not accomplished. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event
outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if
unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. If there was
such extraneous intervention, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain the matter, by evidence of
exculpation, if he could.
In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit: (1) the accident was of a kind that
does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. 29
The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the
second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr.
Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element
was undeniably wanting. Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the
imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during
the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the
slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the
administration of anesthesia to the patient, but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the
anesthesiologists, had caused the injury. In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of
oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex, prompting them to administer atropine to the patient. 30
This conclusion is not unprecedented. It was similarly reached in Swanson v. Brigham, 31 relevant portions of the decision therein being as follows:
On January 7, 1973, Dr. Brigham admitted 15-year-old Randall Swanson to a hospital for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis. The patient's
symptoms had included a swollen throat and some breathing difficulty. Early in the morning of January 9 the patient was restless, and at 1:30 a.m.
Dr. Brigham examined the patient. His inspection of the patient's air passage revealed that it was in satisfactory condition. At 4:15 a.m. Dr. Brigham
received a telephone call from the hospital, advising him that the patient was having respiratory difficulty. The doctor ordered that oxygen be
administered and he prepared to leave for the hospital. Ten minutes later, 4:25 a.m., the hospital called a second time to advise the doctor that the
patient was not responding. The doctor ordered that a medicine be administered, and he departed for the hospital. When he arrived, the physician
who had been on call at the hospital had begun attempts to revive the patient. Dr. Brigham joined him in the effort, but the patient died.
The doctor who performed the autopsy concluded that the patient died between 4:25 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. of asphyxia, as a result of a sudden, acute
closing of the air passage. He also found that the air passage had been adequate to maintain life up to 2 or 3 minutes prior to death. He did not know
what caused the air passage to suddenly close.
xxxx
It is a rare occurrence when someone admitted to a hospital for the treatment of infectious mononucleosis dies of asphyxiation. But that is not
sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The fact that the injury rarely occurs does not in itself prove that the injury was probably caused by someone's
negligence. Mason v. Ellsworth, 3 Wn. App. 298, 474 P.2d 909 (1970). Nor is a bad result by itself enough to warrant the application of the doctrine.
Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953). See 2 S. Speiser, The Negligence Case Res Ipsa Loquitur 24:10 (1972). The evidence
presented is insufficient to establish the first element necessary for application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The acute closing of the patients air
passage and his resultant asphyxiation took place over a very short period of time. Under these circumstances it would not be reasonable to infer
that the physician was negligent. There was no palpably negligent act. The common experience of mankind does not suggest that death would not
be expected without negligence. And there is no expert medical testimony to create an inference that negligence caused the injury.
Negligence of Dr. Solidum
In view of the inapplicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court next determines whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr.
Solidum for criminal negligence.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 32Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or
failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act.33
Dr. Solidums conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on
Gerald by overdosing at 100% halothane. In affirming the conviction, the CA observed:
On the witness stand, Dr. Vertido made a significant turnaround. He affirmed the findings and conclusions in his report except for an observation
which, to all intents and purposes, has become the storm center of this dispute. He wanted to correct one piece of information regarding the dosage
of the anesthetic agent administered to the child. He declared that he made a mistake in reporting a 100% halothane and said that based on the
records it should have been 100% oxygen.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the
standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of
the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et.
al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at
least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this
aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice
actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the
conclusion as to causation.
xxxx
In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of
negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of
his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainants wife
and newborn baby, this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it
consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate cause of an injury is that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred."
An action upon medical negligence whether criminal, civil or administrative calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the
following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in
accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physicians failing to act in
accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the
negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the patient. 36
In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care,
set the duty of the physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular physician in a particular case
exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving
the knowledge necessary to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be determined from
expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the
care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher
than that required of the general practitioner. 37
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does
not depend, therefore, on any individual physicians own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether
the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is
required. The judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts. 38
Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what
standard of care was applicable. It would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three elements of a
negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
Although the Prosecution presented Dr. Benigno Sulit, Jr., an anesthesiologist himself who served as the Chairman of the Committee on Ethics and
Malpractice of the Philippine Society of Anesthesiologists that investigated the complaint against Dr. Solidum, his testimony mainly focused on how
his Committee had conducted the investigation.39 Even then, the report of his Committee was favorable to Dr. Solidum, 40 to wit:
Presented for review by this committee is the case of a 3 year old male who underwent a pull-thru operation and was administered general
anesthesia by a team of anesthesia residents. The patient, at the time when the surgeons was manipulating the recto-sigmoid and pulling it down in
preparation for the anastomosis, had bradycardia. The anesthesiologists, sensing that the cause thereof was the triggering of the vago-vagal reflex,
administered atropine to block it but despite the administration of the drug in two doses, cardiac arrest ensued. As the records show, prompt
resuscitative measures were administered and spontaneous cardiac function re-established in less than five (5) minutes and that oxygen was
continuously being administered throughout, unfortunately, as later become manifest, patient suffered permanent irreversible brain damage.
In view of the actuations of the anaesthesiologists and the administration of anaesthesia, the committee find that the same were all in accordance
with the universally accepted standards of medical care and there is no evidence of any fault or negligence on the part of the anaesthesiologists.
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, was also presented as a Prosecution witness, but his
testimony concentrated on the results of the physical examination he had conducted on Gerald, as borne out by the following portions of his direct
examination, to wit:
FISCAL CABARON Doctor, what do you mean by General Anesthetic Agent?
WITNESS General Anesthetic Agent is a substance used in the conduction of Anesthesia and in this case, halothane was used as a sole anesthetic
agent.
xxxx
Q Now under paragraph two of page 1 of your report you mentioned that after one hour and 45 minutes after the operation, the patient experienced a
bradycardia or slowing of heart rate, now as a doctor, would you be able to tell this Honorable Court as to what cause of the slowing of heart rate as
to Gerald Gercayo?
WITNESS Well honestly sir, I cannot give you the reason why there was a bradycardia of time because is some reason one way or another that
might caused bradycardia.
FISCAL CABARON What could be the possible reason?
A Well bradycardia can be caused by anesthetic agent itself and that is a possibility, were talking about possibility here.
Q What other possibility do you have in mind, doctor?
A Well, because it was an operation, anything can happen within that situation.
FISCAL CABARON Now, this representation would like to ask you about the slowing of heart rate, now what is the immediate cause of the slowing of
the heart rate of a person?
WITNESS Well, one of the more practical reason why there is slowing of the heart rate is when you do a vagal reflex in the neck wherein the vagal
receptors are located at the lateral part of the neck, when you press that, you produce the slowing of the heart rate that produce bradycardia.
Q I am pro[p]ounding to you another question doctor, what about the deficiency in the supply of oxygen by the patient, would that also cause the
slowing of the heart rate?
A Well that is a possibility sir, I mean not as slowing of the heart rate, if there is a hypoxia or there is a low oxygen level in the blood, the normal thing
for the heart is to pump or to do not a bradycardia but a to counter act the Hypoxia that is being experienced by the patient
(sic).
xxxx
Q Now, you made mention also doctor that the use of general anesthesia using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications probably were
contributory to the production of hypoxia.
xxxx
ATTY. COMIA How will you classify now the operation conducted to this Gerald, Doctor?
WITNESS Well, that is a major operation sir.
Q In other words, when you say major operation conducted to this Gerald, there is a possibility that this Gerald might [be] exposed to some risk is
that correct?
A That is a possibility sir.
Q And which according to you that Gerald suffered hypoxia is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is one of the risk of that major operation is that correct?
A That is the risk sir.42
At the continuation of his cross-examination, Dr. Vertido maintained that Geralds operation for his imperforate anus, considered a major operation,
had exposed him to the risk of suffering the same condition. 43 He then corrected his earlier finding that 100% halothane had been administered on
Gerald by saying that it should be 100% oxygen.44
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo
and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." 45However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertidos findings did
not preclude the probability that other factors related to Geralds major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the
administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side
effects did occur."46
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr.
Solidums guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. "A reasonable doubt of guilt,"
according to United States v. Youthsey:47
x x x is a doubt growing reasonably out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the
unfortunate position of the defendant, or a dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellow man. If, having weighed the evidence on both
sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important
and crucial affairs of your life, you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to a mathematical demonstration. It is not
proof beyond the possibility of mistake.
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability.1wphi1 But we cannot now find and declare
him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His
acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused.
That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the
bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are
not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of
expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising
from the offense charged.48 It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila jointly and severally liable with
Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum.
The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other material concerns that the RTC and the CA overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the
following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar.
For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not respected from the outset.
The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or
proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should
first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in
any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and
capital, and is engaged in industry.49 However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but
purely in charitable and humanitarian work. 50Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be
shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such
employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not
happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20,
2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P. Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and MAKES no pronouncement
on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.