Case Digest in Civil Procedure
Case Digest in Civil Procedure
FACTS:
1. In May 26, 2005 RTC rendered decision convicting the
petitioner of estafa. Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9,
2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC,
alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that
would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted. (Denied)
2. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC,
alleging that pursuant to our Neypes v Court of Appeals, she
had a fresh period of 15 dys from Nov. 3, 2005, the receipt
of the denial of her motion for new trial or up to Nov. 18,
2005 within which to file a notice of appeal.
3. December 8, 2005, Prosecution filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal for being filed 10 dys late, arguing that Neypes v
Court of Appeals is inapplicable to appeals in criminal
cases.
4. Petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injuction to enjoin the RTC from acting on
the prosecutions motions to dismiss the appeal and for the
execution of the decision.
ISSUE: w/not RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the
prosecutions motions when she filed her notice of appeal
within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules
of Court, applying the fresh period rule enunciated in
Neypes.
HELD:
The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural
or inherent
it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin
and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by
statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the provisions of the law.
In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil
cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to
appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15
days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration
within which to appeal.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also
apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal
Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on
petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule
aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil
cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to
appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in
criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on
which the Rules of Court is based, makes no distinction
between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a
criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that
[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed
from. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also
ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though
differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no
substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as
legal results are concerned the appeal period stops
running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the
order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It
(Petition Denied)
Santos vs Go
Petition on Certiorari
HELD:
Facts:
Records show that petitioner failed to comply with the
foregoing rules.
The Petition must be accompanied by a Verification and
Certification against forum shopping. Copies of the relevant
pleadings and other material portions of the record must
likewise be attached to the Petition.
1. The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of FilEstate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI allegedly entered into a
Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development
Corporation (MSDC), whereby FEPI undertook to develop
several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly
owned by MSDC.
Jaro vs CA
Petition for Review
Gonzales vs CSC
Petition for Review
Facts:
1. Petitioner Gonzales was one of the two Utility Workers II
assigned at the Pharmacy Section of respondent Philippine
Childrens Medical Center (PCMC). Petitioner started
absenting himself without an approved leave (AWOL) and
without explaining the reason for his absence to his
superiors.
2. In view of the exigency of petitioners functions, HR
Manager Officer, wrote a letter directing the petitioner to
report for work within three (3) days from receipt of said
notice, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls.
3. During his absence, petitioner was seen on several
occasions within the premises of PCMC, particularly in the
Budget Office, Billing and Cashier, and Personnel Clinic. He
allegedly visited the clinic without consulting any medical
problem and when Dr. Galero once made a surprise visit, he
was not found in his house.
4. officer-in-charge of the Pharmacy Section, reported
petitioners irresponsibility and lack of concern for his work to
Dr. Lillian V. Lee, Executive Director of PCMC,
recommending that petitioner be dropped from the rolls.
Despite the written letter-notice sent to him, petitioner failed
to report for work thus constraining PCMC to drop him from
the rolls.
Facts:
1. Rosario Vda. de Pelaez (respondent for brevity) filed a
complaint for prohibition under Section 27 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Act (R.A. No. 1199) against petitioner before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,
Provincial Adjudicator Board, Lucena City, Quezon
(Provincial Adjudicator for brevity).
2. Respondent alleged in the complaint that the late
Rosenda Reyes y Padua (Rosenda for brevity) was the
original owner of a parcel of coconut land.
3. Rosenda allegedly instituted respondent and her husband,
the late Igmedio Pelaez, as tenants of the land. In 1978,
Ricardo Padua Reyes (Ricardo for brevity), the heir of
Rosenda, sold the land to petitioner who, respondent
alleged, now wants to eject respondent from the land.
4. Petitioner countered that respondent is not and had never
been a tenant of the land for respondent never shared in the
harvests nor was respondent given any share as payment
for her work. In 1978, when petitioner purchased the land
from Ricardo, petitioner allowed respondent to remain on the
land allegedly with the understanding that petitioner could
remove respondents house at any time if petitioner so
desired.
5. Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner.
In ruling that respondent was not a tenant, the
Provincial Adjudicator noted that the affidavits presented as