SD-3C v. Biwin Tech - Summary Judgment Trademark PDF
SD-3C v. Biwin Tech - Summary Judgment Trademark PDF
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
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SD-3C, LLC,
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Plaintiff,
v.
BIWIN TECHNOLOGY LTD, et al.,
Defendants.
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Plaintiff SD-3C, LLC, moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, default judgment
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against Defendants Biwin Technology Ltd., Wintek Enterprises Ltd. (the Company Defendants),
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Sun Rixin, Zhou Zhengxian, Lu Wei and Xu Linxian (the Individual Defendants). As the
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Company Defendants have not participated in the case since July 2013 and the Individual
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Defendants have never appeared in the case, the motion is unopposed. The court GRANTS
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SD-3Cs motion for summary judgment as to the Company Defendants and orders that the case be
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reassigned with a report and recommendation that summary judgment be granted as to the
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
I.
This is a case about a licensing agreement gone awry. In 2006, Biwin sought a license for
patents and related intellectual property to manufacture and sell SD memory cards for use in digital
cameras and related devices. 1 The terms of the card license agreement (CLA) required Biwin to
make accurate quarterly sales reports and pay SD-3C a six percent royalty on its SD card sales. 2
Over the course of the next two years, SD-3C grew skeptical about Biwins sales reporting andin
line with the CLAconducted an audit to review Biwins financial records. 3 Biwins financial
records painted an incomplete picture but were adequate to establish that Biwin had underreported
and concealed its true SD card manufacturing and sales operations to avoid paying SD-3C the full
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royalty to which it was due. 4 SD-3C terminated Biwins license on August 22, 2009. 5
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Just a few months later, WintekBiwins alter egoentered the scene and approached
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SD-3C for a CLA of its ownwhich was promptly grantedwithout informing SD-3C of its
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affiliation with Biwin. 6 In fact, the relationship between Biwin and Wintek is extensive: they are
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owned and operated by the same four individualsthe Individual Defendantsthey share
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personnel and addresses in China and Hong Kong and orders for SD cards placed with one
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Nearly three years after SD-3C terminated Biwins CLA, SD-3C discovered that Biwin was
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still claiming to produce SD cards pursuant to a valid license agreementa claim that has not yet
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been withdrawn to this day. 8 And in deposition, Joseph JamesBiwin Americas former marking
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See id.
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See id.
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
directortestified that as recently as 2012, Biwin was still manufacturing two million SD cards
each month, representing between ten and thirty-three percent of the companys total revenues. 9
As a result of Biwins ongoing breach of the CLA, SD-3C filed its initial complaint on
January 25, 2013 alleging breach of contract, fraud, trademark infringement and unfair competition
under both the Lanham Act and under California law. 10 SD-3C was only able to effect service on
Biwin and Wintek through the Hague Convention in September 2012, at which point the complaint
had evolved into a Third Amended Complaint. 11 Biwin and Wintek answered that complaint and
defended the lawsuit through July 2013, when SD-3C sought leave and filed a Fourth Amended
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and civil conspiracy and specific facts learned through discovery. 12 Within two weeks of SD-3C
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amending its complaint, Biwin and Wintek ceased participation in the lawsuit. Their counsel
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sought leave to withdrawwhich was granted by this courtand neither Company Defendants nor
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Individual Defendants answered the operative complaint. 13 SD-3C now moves for summary
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II.
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This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, 28 U.S.C. 1332 and 28 U.S.C. 1338.
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SD-3C and the Company Defendants further consent to the jurisdiction of the undersigned under
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The Individual Defendants have not entered an appearance and thus have not consented to the
jurisdiction of the undersigned. A report and recommendation as to the Individual Defendants thus
is included within this order, together with an order that the claims against the Individual
Defendants be reassigned.
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. 15 A dispute as to a material
fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the
non-moving party. 16 All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. At this stage, a court does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply
determines whether there is a genuine factual issue for trial. 17 Initially, the moving party bears the
burden to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. 18 If this burden is met, the burden
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Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), the court may enter default judgment against a
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defendant who has failed to plead or otherwise defend an action. 20 The district courts decision
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III.
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As an initial matter, SD-3C asks this court to grant summary judgment, or in the alternative,
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default judgment. This court finds that default judgment would likely otherwise be appropriate but
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ultimately is not viable here. While Biwin and Wintek answered the third amended complaint, 22
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neither the Company Defendants nor the Individual Defendantswho were added for the first time
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See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (Only disputes over facts that
may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.).
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See id.
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See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Assn, 809 F.2d 630, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
in the Fourth Amended Complaintanswered the operative complaint. In fact, Biwin and Wintek
stopped paying their attorneys, leading this court to grant Defendants lawyers leave to withdraw
from the case. 23 Ultimately, Defendants ceased participating in the litigation in or around July
2013. Although Biwin and Wintek responded to the third amended complaint, [a]n amended
complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as nonexistent. 24 This case
thus falls within the ambit of default judgment consideration, but SD-3C failed to follow the proper
procedure to seek default judgment from this court. In the Ninth Circuit, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55 25 requires a two-step process consisting of: (1) seeking a clerks entry of default,
and (2) filing a motion for the entry of default judgment. 26 SD-3C has skipped straight to step
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two.
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Brantley v. Boyd, Case No. 07-cv-06139, 2013 WL 3766911, at *6 (N.D Cal. July 16, 2013)
(citing Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 649 F. 3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation and
quotation omitted)); Employee Painters Trust v. Ethan Enters., 480 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir.
2007) (default judgment proper where defendant failed to answer amended complaint even after
filing an answer to original complaint and disputing counterclaim).
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Marty v. Green, Case No. 10-cv-01823, 2011 WL 320303, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Eitel apparently fails to understand the two-step process required by Rule 55); accord Symantec
Corp. v. Global Impact, Inc., 559 F.3d 922, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that Rules 55(1) and (b)
provide a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment); see also Norman v. Small, Case No.
09-cv-02235, 2010 WL 5173683, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010) (denying plaintiffs motion for
default judgment because the clerk had not yet entered a default); Cramer v. Target Corp., Case
No. 08-cv-01693, 2010 WL 2898996, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2010) (Obtaining a default
judgment in federal court is a two-step process that includes: (1) entry of default and (2) default
judgment.); Bach v. Mason, 190 F.R.D 567, 574 (D. Idaho 1999) (Plaintiffs have improperly
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
Notably, SD-3Cs motion for summary judgment is unopposed. While [a] district court
may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because the opposing party has failed to file
an opposition, 27 [t]he court may . . . grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment if the
movants papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not on their face reveal a
genuine issue of material fact. 28 The court finds that SD-3C has sufficiently established its case to
warrant granting the motion as to each of its four causes of action: (1) breach of contract,
(2) trademark infringement and counterfeiting, (3) unfair competition and (4) fraud.
First, regarding the breach of contract claim, it is undisputed that Biwin and Wintek entered
CLAs with SD-3C, establishing the existence of the contract itself. 29 SD-3C also provided
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Defendants with the license, as required under the CLAs. 30 Biwin and Wintek underreported their
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manufacturing and sales activities as required under the CLAsa material breachincenting SD-
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3C to terminate the CLAs. 31 Finally, SD-3C claims damages based on royalty payments due under
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the CLAs and attorneys fees and other expenses incurred as a result of Defendants breaches. 32
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Based on the record before the court, there is no material dispute that Defendants in fact breached
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asked this court to enter a default judgment without first obtaining an entry of default by the clerk.
Since plaintiffs motion for entry of default judgment is improper, it is denied.).
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McColm v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., Case No. 02-cv-05810, 2007 WL 1575883, at *10 (citing
Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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Id. (citing United States v. Real Property at Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995)
(local rule cannot mandate automatic entry of judgment for moving party without consideration of
whether motion and supporting papers satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 56)).
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See Docket No. 64 at 62-68; Docket No. 105-9 at Attachment 2; Docket No. 104-2 at Nos.
3-4, 91-97, 101-102; Docket No. 104-3 at Nos. 1-2, 31-41.
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See id.
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See Docket No. 64 at 62-68. In light of Defendants failure to respond to the Fourth Amended
Complaint, there is no dispute as to the allegations pleaded therein and they are deemed admitted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
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See id. at 62-75 (claiming at least $12,900,000 in unpaid royalties based on a 2009 audit and
available information about Biwins manufacture and sale of memory cards).
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
Second, SD-3Cs trademark infringement and counterfeiting claims are equally undisputed.
Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff can establish a trademark infringement cause of action by
showing (1) ownership of the mark by the plaintiff, (2) use by the defendant without consent of the
owner and (3) of a mark which is likely to cause confusion in the marketplace. 34 SD-3C owns and
maintains multiple trademarks and registrations for its well-known SD products in many countries,
including the United States. 35 Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 1115(b), such trademarks constitute
incontestable evidence of SD-3Cs ownership of, and exclusive right to use, the SD name and mark
related to flash memory devices and other associated goods and services. 36 This evidence is
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As for prong two, while Biwin and Wintek were authorized to manufacture and sell SD
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flash technology during the pendency of the CLAs, upon termination, that authority was nullified. 37
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But Biwin and Wintek were unrelenting and continued to produce and sell technology bearing the
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SD trademark long after SD-3C revoked its consentthe hallmark of trademark infringement. 38
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SD-3C further contends that Biwin and Winteks unauthorized actions constitute trademark
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counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C 1114(1)(a)where the infringer uses a counterfeit of a mark that
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is registered on the principal register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such
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goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use. 39 Here, Biwin and
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See Dept of Parks & Rec. v. Bazaar Del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006).
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See id. at 92; 15 U.S.C. 1115(b); see also Brookfield Commns v. West Coast Entmt, 174
F.3d 1036, 1046-48, n.10 (9th Cir. 1999) (the validity and legal protectability, as well as the
[registrants] ownership therein, are all conclusively presumed, when a marks registration
becomes incontestable.).
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See id. at 81; State of Idaho Potato Commn v. G&T Terminal, 425 F.3d 708, 721 (9th Cir.
2005); U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 130 F.3d 1185, 1190-92 (6th Cir. 1997) (proof
of continued, unauthorized use of an original trademark by one whose license to use the trademark
had been terminated is sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion).
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15 U.S.C. 1116(d)(1)(B).
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
Wintek have manufactured and sold products bearing marks that are substantially indistinguishable
from SD-3Cs SD trademarksas evidenced by shipments of Biwin products that have been seized
as counterfeit by customs authorities in various countries, including the United States. 40 Because
many of these facts are substantiated by Biwin and Winteks own admissions, the court cannot see
any dispute that Defendants are liable for trademark infringement and counterfeiting.
The third prong requires that the counterfeited SD cards are likely to confuse consumers as
to their source, origin, association or connection. Given the prolific name that SD has nationally
and internationally, and the almost indistinguishable nature of the counterfeited products, there is
no genuine dispute that it is sufficiently likely that consumers would attribute Biwin and Wintek
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products bearing the SD trademark to in fact be licensed or owned by SD. 41 Altogether, the court
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can find no dispute that Defendants actions infringed on and diluted SD-3Cs trademarks. 42
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Third, SD-3C is entitled to summary judgment on its unfair competition claim. This claim
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requires that a plaintiff establish it has a valid, protectable mark and that a defendants use of that
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mark creates a likelihood of confusion with plaintiffs mark. 43 This cause of action is substantially
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similar to that brought under the Lanham Act, such that the reasoning above applies equally to this
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claim.
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See Docket No. 64 at 29-30, 100-103; Docket No. 104-2 at Nos. 86-89, 101-104; Docket No.
104-3 at Nos. 40-43.
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See Haeger Potteris, Inc. v. Gilner Potteris, 123 F. Supp. 261, 270 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (Copying
of the product of another, as defendant is doing here, in precise detail as to design, shape and color,
and in every other respect than quality, is nothing less than piracy . . . his very act of copying
strongly impels the inference that he intends to reap commercial gain by trading on the good will of
the first comer); Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 557 (9th Cir.
1960) (when actual copying has been established, the plain inference is that the copier intended to
cause confusion).
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See Docket No. 64 at 94-95; AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
1979; Docket No. 104-2 at Nos. 1-2, 18-21, 70-78, 101-102; Docket No. 104-3 at Nos. 1, 29-30,
36, 40-41. Any award of damages is discussed below.
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Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446,
1457 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
Fourth, there is no genuine dispute that Biwin and Wintek engaged in fraud by entering
into a contract with the undisclosed intention of non-performance. Under California law, a plaintiff
must prove four elements to establish fraud: (1) knowingly false misrepresentation by defendant,
(2) made with intent to deceive or to induce reliance by plaintiffs, (3) justifiable reliance by
plaintiff and (4) resulting damages. 44 As discussed above, Biwin represented to SD-3C that it
would perform its obligations under the CLA in return for a license to SD-3Cs intellectual
property rights. 45 But Biwin concealed its intention to obtain these licensing rights and then
misreport its true sales and hide statistics that would illuminate the true royalties owed to SD-3C. 46
The misrepresentation was discovered during the 2009 audit and 2010 investigation into Biwin,
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sales operations. 47
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And when SD-3C took action to terminate the CLA, Biwin not only continued producing
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products bearing a substantially similar mark to SDs mark, but Biwin created a shell alter-ego
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Wintekwhich approached SD-3C anew to enter into a CLA of its own. 48 Wintek failed to
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disclose its substantial affiliation with Biwin and the Individual Defendantsshared offices and
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common owners and directors. 49 SD-3C extended a license to Wintek in good faith and then
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Wintek proceeded to engage in the same false reporting that had previously led to SD-3C revoking
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Biwins licenseeven going so far as to doctor invoices provided to SD-3Cs auditors to hide the
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actual sales figures of SD cards and to shield Biwins shell companies from detection by global
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Aqua-Lung Am., Inc. v. Am. Underwater Prods., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 773, 786 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(citing Glenn K. Jackson Inc. v. Roe, 273 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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See id.
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
customs officials. 50 There is no dispute that Biwin and Wintek intentionally and knowingly
induced SD-3C into the license agreements without any intention to make good on their obligations
Fifth, there is no genuine dispute that the Individual Defendants are jointly and severally
liable for the torts alleged against Biwin and Wintek under the alter ego doctrinewhich allows
inequitable purpose. 52 The alter ego doctrine prevents individual or other corporations from
misusing the corporate laws by the device of a sham corporate entity formed for the purpose of
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committing fraud or other misdeeds, 53 and it allows a court to disregard the corporate entity and
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treat the corporations acts as if they were done by the persons actually controlling the
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corporation. 54
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The Lanham Act contemplates that natural persons, as well as corporations, can be liable
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for trademark infringement because if there was an infringement by the corporation, this
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infringement was caused by some one or more persons either officers or employees of the
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corporation who caused the acts to be done. 55 Moreover, a corporate officer or director is, in
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general, personally liable for all torts which he authorizes or directs in which he participates,
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See id. at 85; see also Docket No. 104-2 at No. 97; Docket No. 104-3 at Nos. 37-38.
In California, such fraudulent conduct is separate and independent from the breach itself and
causes actual damage independent of the contract damages. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v.
Dana Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 991 (2004); see also Frye v. Wine Library Inc., Case No. 06-cv05399, 2006 WL 3500605, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2006) (fraud in the inducement alleging harm
is independent of the contract).
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Guifu Li v. A Perfect Day Franchise, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 373, 402 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 4th 523, 538 (2000).
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Mead Johnson & Co. v. Babys Formula Serv., Inc., 402 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1968); 15 U.S.C.
1114, 1127; see also Wilden Pump & Engg Co. v. Pressed & Welded Prods. Co., 655 F.2d 984,
990 (9th Cir. 1981) (in analogous patent infringement context, an individual is personally liable if
he actively and knowingly causes the infringement).
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation and not on his own behalf. 56 As
directors of Biwin and Wintek, the Individual Defendants were aware that Biwin and Winteks
CLAs were terminated for non-compliance, yet they continued to direct their companies to
manufacture and sell counterfeit SD cards bearing the SD mark. 57 It is undisputed that the
Individual Defendants enjoy a direct financial benefit from the infringing activity and that they
Under California law, for an individual to be treated as an alter ego of a corporate entity, a
plaintiff must show (1) that there be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the individual[s] no longer exist and (2) that if the acts are
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treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow. 59 To determine the
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requisite unity of interest, California courts consider factors such as inadequate capitalization,
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commingling of funds and other assets, holding out by one entity that it is liable for the debts of the
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other, identical equitable ownership, use of the same offices and employees, use of one as a mere
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conduit for the affairs of the other, disregard of corporate formalities, lack of segregation of
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corporate records and identical directors and officers. 60 It is undisputed that the Individual
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Defendants are the owners, managers and/or directors of Biwin, Wintek, Happy Route Ltd. and
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Great Mover Ltd. 61 and have commingled funds, established equal entity ownership of the former
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three among the Individual Defendants, used the Biwin offices, employees, equipment, invoicing
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system and computers as a conduit for the affairs of the other entities and diverted Biwin and
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56
Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1021 (9th Cir. 1985).
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See Comm. For Idahos High Desert v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing cases
that approve vicarious liability of a corporate officer for trademark infringement).
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Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 300 (1985) (quoting Automotriz etc. de Cal. v.
Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 796 (1957)).
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See Guifu Li, 281 F.R.D. at 403 (citing Virtualmagic Asia, Inc. v. Fil-Cartoons, Inc., 99 Cal.
App. 4th 228, 245 (2002)).
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Happy Route Ltd. and Great Mover Ltd.like Wintekare shell corporations of Biwin.
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
Wintek assets to themselves to evade creditors, including SD-3C. 62 These facts are sufficient to
support a finding that the Individual Defendants have a unity of interest. And any other finding
would improperly condone the practice of using shell corporations to perpetrate fraud and shield
The court therefore recommends that upon reassignment to a district judge summary
GRANTED and that the district judge find the Individual Defendants jointly and severably liable
for the intentional torts of fraud, trademark infringement, trademark counterfeiting and unfair
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$12,943,555 in unpaid royalties, $978,134 in legal and accounting expenses and $29,263,459 in
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late payment interest through July 15, 2014. 64 SD-3C engaged an expertDr. Michael
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Quackenbushto produce a report detailing the damages at issue. 65 Dr. Quackenbush considered
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all available information from the 2009 audit, the 2010 investigation and any other records SD-3C
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was able to acquire before Company Defendants ceased participation in the litigation. 66 Based on
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See Docket No. 104-2 at Nos. 5-12, 22-58, 65-69, 80-82, 93-104; Docket No. 104-3 at Nos. 3-22,
27-30, 37-43; Docket No. 64 at 55-61, 85-87.
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The undersigned is ordering reassignment to a district judge and issuing a report and
recommendation because, absent consent of all parties, a magistrate judge does not have authority
to make case-dispositive rulings. See 28 U.S.C. 636 (authorizing magistrate judges to submit
findings of fact and recommendations to the district judge); Tripati v. Rison, 847 F.2d 548,
548-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting a magistrate can prepare a report and recommendation which, after
allowing opportunity for objections, a district judge can review and adopt).
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See Docket No. 105-9 at Attachment 2. Because the Individual Defendants have not consented
to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, the court is only awarding damages as to the Company
Defendants at this time.
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See id.
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See id.
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Case No. 5:12-00407-PSG
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO COMPANY
DEFENDANTS AND REASSIGNING CASE WITH REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED AS TO INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS