The Name Issue Revisited - Sofos
The Name Issue Revisited - Sofos
REVISITED
ISBN 978-9989-2072-8-0
Macedonian Information Centre
Mircela Dzuvalekovska Casule, Editor-in-Chief
Naum Naumovski Borce 73, 1000 Skopje
Republic of Macedonia
www.micnews.com.mk
[email protected]
In the original texts, some of the authors used the United Nations provisional reference or the
abbreviation when referring to the Republic of Macedonia. All changes by the publisher to the
United Nations usage or the abbreviation are clearly marked as [MIC ed.].
Contents
Preface........................................................................................................................9
Part I:
Testimonials
Preface
Dear Readers,
It is our great honor to present this anthology of academic articles focusing on a dispute
unprecedented in contemporary international relationsthe ongoing dispute regarding the
constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia and the right to use derivations of the
name Macedonia. The peculiarity of this issue does not alter the fact that the name issue
remains the single greatest impediment to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Republic of
Macedonia, with detrimental effects upon the countrys image on the international stage.
A multidisciplinary approach has been applied in the preparation and creation of this
anthology of academic texts, with articles by authors from a number of different scientific
fields analyzing various aspects of the name issue. The Editorial Board of this publication
has no intention, however, of implying that the academic debate is fully exhausted with this
volume; on the contrary, this anthology is intended to provide an impetus for further scholarly
dissection of the problem in all its aspects and for the development of solutions to the issue.
Over the past two decades, the name issue has been the subject of innumerable conferences,
round-table discussions, articles, analyses and interpretations from diverse and numerous
perspectives. What has been lacking thus far, however, is a substantiated and well-argued
academic debate addressing the broad spectrum of problems arising from the deeply conflicting
views on this issue and exploring the roots of these problems and their possible implications.
These implications are of a historical, political, legal, sociological, anthropological, ethnological,
linguistic and even psychological nature. Twenty years into this dispute, there is a clear need
for an academic volume presenting the standpoints of a range of authors considered most
knowledgeable about this issue from different academic disciplines and different countries,
including the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Macedonia.
In terms of its scope, inclusiveness and multidisciplinary approach, this volume is a
unique publication in the Republic of Macedonia. Twenty of the articles have been written
specifically for the needs of this volume, while the remaining seven articles have been selected
on account of their academic relevance from previously published papers in scholarly journals
and book excerpts.
On 8 September 2011, the Republic of Macedonia marked the 20th anniversary of its
independence following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and a referendum held on
8 September 1991 in which an overwhelming majority of Macedonian citizens voted for a
sovereign and independent Republic of Macedonia.
The appearance of the Republic of Macedonia as an entity in international relations
revived the forgotten Macedonian Question and rekindled disputes amongst neighboring
10
countries over questions related, directly or indirectly, to the history of the wider region of
Macedonia as well as for legitimacy in using the Macedonian name and state symbols.
In the past two decades, bilateral relations between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia,
dominated by the dispute over the latters constitutional name, have undergone several different
stages. In the initial stage, between 1991 and 1993, the dispute between the two countries led
to Greece imposing a unilateral economic embargo on the independent Macedonian state and
obstructing Macedonias admission to regional and international organizations. The damage
caused to the Macedonian economy by the Greek embargo was irreparable and the countrys
political stability was gravely threatened. It was not until April 1993, meanwhile, that the
Republic of Macedonia was admitted to the United Nations, albeit under the provisional
reference established in the UN Resolutions.
The second stage, from 1993 to 1995, saw intense international involvement in the name
dispute and an eventual easing of tensions between Skopje and Athens, resulting in Greece
lifting its unilateral economic embargo and the two countries signing the Interim Accord in
September 1995. This agreement established a fundamental framework that still regulates
relations between the two countries. On the crucial issue of Macedonias name, however,
the Interim Accord limited itself to terms binding both parties to continue negotiating for a
resolution under the auspices of the United Nations.
Relations between Greece and Macedonia improved and intensified between 1995 and
2008. This third stage in the dispute was primarily reflected in an increase in bilateral trade
and an influx of direct investments from Greece to the Republic of Macedonia.
The latest stage in relations between the two countries was initiated by Greeces refusal to
allow the Republic of Macedonia to become a fully-fledged member-state of NATO, blocking
Macedonias bid to join the Alliance at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008. This
stage witnessed a deterioration in mutual trust and the drawing of red lines in negotiations on
the part of the Greek leadershipa leadership which denies Macedonias national, linguistic
and cultural identity. It should be noted in this respect that Macedonia subsequently filed an
application for a ruling by the International Court of Justice on the legality of Greeces action
at the 2008 NATO summit. In December 2011, the ICJ confirmed that Greece had indeed
breached the Interim Accord by blocking Macedonias membership of NATO, since the terms
of the Accord obliged Greece not to seek to obstruct the Republic of Macedonias integration
within international organizations as long as it did so under the provisional reference established
in the aforementioned UN Resolution.
This brief overview of Greek and Macedonian relations over the past twenty years provides
a background for the comprehensive analysis of the ongoing dispute that is presented in these
pages. This volume addresses the following aspects of the name issue: the prehistory of the
name issue, with articles focusing on the legacy of historical topics that have proved contentious
between the two countries; the genesis of the problem and the development of relations after
the Republic of Macedonias declaration of independence, with analyses from the perspectives
of politics, international law and economics; the meaning of the right to national, linguistic and
cultural self-determination as an integral part of the right to a personal and collective identity, with
articles addressing the name issue from philosophical, anthropological and linguistic viewpoints.
11
The volume is divided into four thematic parts: international law; politics; culture,
anthropology and philosophy; and history. A fifth and final part includes testimonials regarding
the name issue from former high-ranking politicians and diplomats.
Any comprehensive analysis of the name issue must take into account the rights of states
as international legal entities. The importance of such rights in relation to this issue is reflected
in the dedication of the first and largest part of this volume to international law, with extensive
analysis of the legal issues arising directly or indirectly from the name issue.
The international law part opens with an article by Professor Matthew Craven, Whats
in a Name? The Republic of Macedonia and Issues of Statehood, in which the author analyzes
the legal aspects of the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
the recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the contradictions involved in Greeces
demand that the Republic of Macedonia change its constitutional name with a number of
established international legal principles.
The following article in this part, The Name and Symbols of the State in International
Law, by Jean-Pierre Queneudec, examines the use of Macedonias constitutional name through
the prism of existing rules and principles of international law concerning a states use of a name.
In Macedonia: Cultural Right or Cultural Appropriation?, Larry Reimer analyzes
Greeces arguments that the use of the name Macedonia by the Republic of Macedonia
undermines Greeces right to its cultural heritage.
In his article Putting the Name Issue in a Comparative Perspective, Professor Carlos
Flores Juberas sets forth a comparative legal analysis of the established principle of recognizing
the right of all ethnic communities to identify with their names and traditional characteristics,
and consequently the absence of any right to the exclusive use of a name or symbol related to
a historical territory divided by at least two subjects of international law.
In her article entitled The True Substance of the Name Issue: Consequences of an Invented
Dispute for the Republic of Macedonia, Jana Lozanoska argues that by claiming an exclusive right
to the history and culture of the territory of ancient Macedonia, as well as to the very use of the
term Macedonia, Greece is attempting to delimit (physically) the territory that existed in the past
from the territory and state that exists in the present and that has a defined system and borders.
In The 1995 Interim Accord and Membership of the Republic of Macedonia in
International Organizations, Professor Budislav Vukas focuses on the practical implementation
of the provisions of the Interim Accord in relation to the membership of the Republic of
Macedonia in international organizations and also examines the meaning of the Judgment
of the International Court of Justice in regard to the application of Article 11 of the Accord.
In Legal Validity of the ICJ Advisory Opinions in the Context of the Republic of
Macedonias Admission to the UN, Dr. Ernest Petri examines the illegality of the UNs
imposition of additional conditions on the accession of the Republic of Macedonia and the
possibility of appealing to the ICJ against the organizations act of ultra-vires.
In his article Normative Power Role of the European Union in the Settlement of the
Difference Over the Name? A Macedonian View, Professor Sao Georgievski scrutinizes the
role of the EU in attempts to resolve the name issue and the Unions insufficient application
of the concept of normative power in its foreign policy.
12
The political part begins with a previously published but updated article by Professor
Richard Caplan entitled The European Communitys Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia,
which examines the consequences of the delayed recognition of the Republic of Macedonia
by the (former) European Community and its member states.
In The Greek Dispute With the New Republic of Macedonia to 1995, Professor John
Shea discusses the economic embargo imposed by Greece immediately after Macedonias
independence and analyses its impact on the countrys stability.
In her article David vs. Goliath: The Macedonian Position(s) in the So-Called Name
Dispute, Professor Biljana Vankovska notes the absence of a consistent state strategy in the
Republic of Macedonia on the name issue and argues that this issue has serious implications
for the security of the country and the wider region.
The political part closes with an article by Spyros Sofos entitled Beyond the Intractability
of the Greek-Macedonian Dispute, in which the author endeavors to deconstruct the current
crisis in relations between the two countries with his own model of transformation for the
resolution of the long-standing dispute.
The part on culture and anthropology opens with Victor Friedmans article entitled The
So-Called Macedonian Name Issue in the Context of Modern Macedonian Historiography,
Language, and Identity, in which the author investigates the 19th century development of
Macedonian ethnic and linguistic identity and concludes that the denial of Macedonias
constitutional name is a continuation of the Greek policy of denying the right to a distinct
Macedonian identity.
In The Scholar and the State: Evangelos Kofos on the International Recognition of the
Republic of Macedonia, Loring Danforth presents a critical anthropological review of the
works of Evangelos Kofos, particularly his assertions that Alexander the Great and ancient
Macedonians represent an integral part of Greek culture and that throughout history the
name Macedonia has been associated solely with the Greek cultural and historical heritage.
The article A Survey of the Macedonian Question: The Greek States Campaign to Prevent
International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia and Greeces Refusal to Recognize the
Macedonian Minority in Greece, co-authored by George Vlahov, Vasko Nastevski and Chris
Popov, provides a modern interpretation of the term national/ethnic identity, emphasizing
the untenability of invoking ancient history as a basis for claiming historical continuity and
denying Macedonias name and identity. The authors further present a number of human rights
violations that have been perpetrated against the Macedonian minority in Greece.
In her philosophical essay Living Beyond Identity?, Katerina Kolozova stresses that
the name of a people and their language is crucial to the development of a collective sense of
belonging and to the formation of an entity, and thus essential for sustaining peoples desire
to continue as a collective.
The cultural and anthropological part of this volume ends with the article Name Trouble:
A Refusal Especially Difficult to Understandand Its Inevitable Failure by Akis Gavriilidis,
in which the author addresses conceptually and theoretically the Greek denial of Macedonias
constitutional name with methods used in psychoanalysis and deconstruction, concluding that the
arbitrary demand for the name of the Republic of Macedonia to be changed is impossible to meet.
13
The fourth part focuses on a number of historical issues from various periods which have
strained relations between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece. In the first article in this
part, Real and Created Perceptions of Macedonia and the Macedonians in Byzantine Sources
from the 4th to the 11th Century: Reconstruction and Deconstruction, Mitko B. Panov provides
a detailed survey and analysis of Byzantine historiographical perceptions of Macedonia and
its borders and population from the 4th to the 11th century.
In Science and PoliticsThe Creation and Promotion of the Northern Line of the Greek
Aspirations in Ottoman Macedonia, Professor Dalibor Jovanovski provides a historical overview
of the emergence and inclusion of geographic and historical Macedonia in the aspirations of
the Greek kingdom in the last decades of the 19th century, pointing out the inconsistencies of
the educational, academic and political elite regarding this issue.
The authors of the following four articles address issues relating to the Greek Civil War
of 19461949. In Incompatible Allies: Greek Communism and Macedonian Nationalism in
the Civil War in Greece, 19431949, Andrew Rossos draws on archived materials from the
Greek Civil War to highlight the role of the Macedonian minority in the war on the side of
the Greek left and their failed aspirations to attain human rights. The attitude of Great Britain
toward the Macedonian national issue during World War II is addressed by Professor Todor
Cepreganov in his essay The Great Powers and the Macedonian National Issue During World
War II, a product of the authors extensive research in the archives of the British Foreign
Office. In The Civil War in Greece (19461949): One Event in HistoryOne Lesson for the
Future, co-authored by Cepreganov and Liljana Panovska, the Greek Civil War is examined
from the point of view of the political reality created after the end of World War II with the
division into spheres of influence and the beginning of the Cold War, as well as the impact
of these developments on the future status of the Macedonian minority in Greece. Finally,
in The Naming of Macedonians by the Greek State (19461949): Options and Dilemmas,
Dimitar L. Vamvakovski examines the different terms used and proposed by the official
authorities to designate the Macedonian minority in Greece in the wake of the foundation of
the Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav federation after World War Two.
The historical part closes with the article The Skopjan Enemy by Dimitris Lithoksou, in
which the author traces the creation in the late 1980s and early 1990s of a Greek perception of
Macedonia as the enemy from the north intent on usurping the essential rights of the Greek nation.
The last part includes testimonials by two authors directly involved in the events and
the name issue that unfolded after the Republic of Macedonias declaration of independence:
Zhelyu Zhelev, former President of the Republic of Bulgaria, the first country to recognize
the new state; and foreign British diplomat Robin ONeill, the first international mediator
in the process of resolving the name issue between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece.
This final part ends with the article Plans for Macedonia by Takis Michas, which discusses
relations between Greece and former FR Yugoslavia, as well as the place of independent
Macedonia in the politics of both countries.
The Editorial Board selected the authors and articles for this volume in accordance
with strict academic criteria and the priority of scientific clarity. A number of scholars were
consulted to provide separate confirmation of the relevance and expertise of each article, and
14
all the articles were subject to rigorous revision and evaluation by carefully selected foreign
reviewers, including Professor Jernej Letnar erni from the European University Institute
in Slovenia, Professor Wawrzyniec Konarski from the University of Warsaw, Professor Matej
Avbelj from the European University Institute in Slovenia, Professor Christina Kramer from
the University of Toronto, and Professor Ivan Balta from the University of Osijek.
The Editorial Board would like to thank all the authors who made this publication possible
with their selfless contributions. We would also like to extend our gratitude to our reviewers, as
well as the translators and proofreaders responsible for making this work available in English
to a broader audience. We hope that this publication will prove highly useful in European and
global academic circles as well as providing a significant contribution to scholarly research and
a valuable source of information regarding the name issue.
Editorial Board
Part I
Part II
223
Spyros A. Sofos
Abstract
The main propositions put forward by this article are that the name dispute between
Greece and the Republic of Macedonia (a) has been approached by both parties and the
international community in an unimaginative and highly legalistic way, stripped of its dynamic
and continuously evolving nature and (b) constitutes just one dimension of a broader latent
conflict, one which touches upon the fundamentals of the two societies involved in it so
much so that it is often argued that we are facing an intractable conflict. Focusing on the
main actors, interests and objectives, as well as strategies and tactics, this article explores
the symbolic and pragmatic dimensions of the dispute, its framing given the constraints
posed by prevailing societal insecurity and perceptions of cultural trauma that underpin the
national narratives of both societies, and then attempts to sketch the contours of a (complex
and lengthy) multilevel conflict transformation intervention and the deconstruction of the
current crisis in the relations between the two countries.
* * *
It is almost two decades since the Republic of Macedonia declared its independence from
a violently disintegrating Yugoslav Federation. The road to the consolidation of the new state
has not been easy. Prompted by different perceptions of what the independence of Macedonia
entailed for their states, Bulgarian and Greek governments expressed reservations about the
emergence of a new Balkan state, with Greece objecting to the international recognition
of Macedonia. A less significant but by no means negligible objection was voiced by the
Serbian Orthodox Church, which mobilized against the further erosion of Serbian claims
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the territory of the republic.
1
I attempted a cursory examination of the issues examined here in an earlier article published in The GreekMacedonian dispute; time to return to the drawing-board (See: http://www.transconflict.com/2010/03/
the-greek-macedonian-dispute-%E2%80%93-time-to-return-to-the-drawing-board/ last accessed on 4 June
2011). I am indebted to Nicolas Demertzis, Alexia Stainer, Umut zkrml and students of my ICM420
Managing and Resolving Conflict MA module for their stimulating ideas.
224
The Kosovo crisis of the late 1990s tested Macedonias coherence as it exacerbated the
misgivings of Macedonian ethnic Albanians about living in a state which they felt did not
give due recognition of their co-ownership of the new republic. A mixture of aspirations for
statehood and autonomy, but also for greater integration and recognition within Macedonia
and frustration with their perceived second-class citizenship, culminated in a brief yet traumatic
civil war between the government and ethnic Albanian insurgents from March to June 2001
when a NATO ceasefire monitoring force oversaw the disarming of Albanian insurgents
while the internationally brokered Ohrid Agreement devolved greater political power and
cultural recognition to the Albanian minority.
To date, however, the major obstacle to the normalization of Macedonian politics and
the countrys aspirations for integration into Europe remains the notoriously protracted name
dispute between Macedonia and Greece.
The Dispute
The most frequently rehearsed interpretation of this dispute stresses Greeces concern
that its northern neighbours use of the name Macedonia constitutes an act of usurpation
of Greek history and, more importantly, implies irredentist plans to bring about a Greater
Macedonia at Greeces expense.2 Realising that the issue of Macedonian independence could
become a significant resource for acquiring political capital, a loose alliance led by Antonis
Samaras, the former foreign minister (and, at the time of writing, leader of the opposition party,
New Democracy), together with nationalist circles within the government and the opposition
and the clergy, argued that the independence of the Republic of Macedonia under this name
was an act of territorial and identity contestation. They successfully mobilized historically
conditioned fears, as well as profound societal insecurities caused by the destabilization of the
Balkan order and the mismanagement of the Greek economy by subsequent governments,
and focused these energies on the name issue.
This unlikely and disparate coalition of nationalist and opportunist conflict entrepreneurs
set the scene for one of the most persistent and intractable contemporary disputes in the region
and demarcated the boundaries of Greek foreign policy for almost two decades. Despite the
different positions which subsequent governments have held on the relationship between
Greece and Macedonia, these were still expressed in the idiom of a national threat that the
mass popular mobilizations of 1992 had institutionalized and which left very little room for
meaningful negotiations. Greek foreign policy has fluctuated over the past two decades between
the urge to impose a solution and to find a compromise; and although Greeces primary aims
have not included challenging Macedonias statehood since the signing of the 1995 Interim
Accord, overall it is difficult to overlook the aggressive rhetoric that has dominated public
2
See: Evangelos Kofos, . in -. (19952002), ed. Evangelos Kofos and Vlasis Vlasidis. (Athens:
Papazisis Publishers, 2003), 157-8; and Aristotle Tziampiris, Greece, European Political Cooperation
and the Macedonian Question, (Aldershot: Ashgate 2000), 207232).
225
debate within Greece, the imposition of a crippling blockade between 1994 and 1995 against
the Republic of Macedonia and the veto exercised by Greece at the Bucharest summit in
April 2008 to block Macedonias accession to NATO.
On the other hand, Macedonians argue that this is the name by which the majority of
the population of the young republic recognize themselves, their language, their land and their
ancestors (although how deeply they probe into the past remains an issue of contention).3
Macedonian governments have repeatedly assured Greece that they have no irredentist designs
and moved promptly to change the first contested flag of the republic and to amend articles
of the first constitution that referred to a duty of care for the Macedonian minorities in the
region and the diaspora (though not its preamble that links the current polity to the ideals
of the short-lived Krushevo Republic).4
Having said that, VMRO-DMPNE-led governments over the past decade, while
continuing to reassure Greek governments and the international community of their
commitment to the inviolability of Balkan borders, have often tested the strength of the
symbolic boundaries that are central to the dispute. The policy of antiquization (antikvizacija)
backed by VMRO-DMPNE which was put in motion in response to Greeces blocking of
Macedonias NATO accession and which included the renaming of public sites after ancient
Macedonian personalities and the transformation of public spaces through the erection of
monuments and statues from antiquity and the Middle Ageshas been intended to challenge
the established monopoly over the past enjoyed by Greece and has been interpreted in Greece
as an act of provocation. As such it constitutes a break with the policy of the early 1990s of
removing contentious symbols and references to the past from the framework of the name
dispute.
The vicious circle of Greeces intransigence and Macedonias tacit symbolic contestation
continues unabated. Its effects are obvious: progressive alienation between Greeks and
Macedonians, the potential for radicalizing segments of the Macedonian populationethnic
Macedonian and Albanian alikeand of undermining the young republic as well as degrading
public debate and democracy in both countries.
The international community has tried to facilitate a compromise between the parties;
but their efforts have largely been detached from the pragmatics underlying the dispute and
have often ignored the complex social dynamics at play. While the Ohrid Agreement required
considerable energy and international brinkmanship in order to address the grievances of
the Albanian minority, the name dispute with Greece has been treated as a purely bilateral
3
See, for example, Loring Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4255; Bernard Lory, Approches de l Identit Macdonienne, in La Rpublique de Macdoine, ed. Christophe Chiclet and Bernard Lory (Paris: Editions LHarmattan,
1998), 2132.
To clarify, I am not advocating here that the preamble to the Constitution should have disavowed the Krushevo
Republic; I am only suggesting that in the climate of suspicion in which the constitutional arrangements of the
new state were discussed it was used by critics as a source of continuous misunderstanding. It is worth noting,
however, that roughly thirteen years after the signing of the Interim Accord between the two countries, the
past has proved a resource of high symbolic value as well as ambiguity.
226
issue to be resolved within the framework of ongoing UN negotiations.5 The name issue has
been addressed in an unimaginative and highly legalistic way, stripped of its dynamic and
continuously evolving nature, thus revealing the dearth of conceptual, methodological and
practical rigour in our approaches to conflict transformation in the region. The fact remains
that through our current approaches to the name dispute we are still unable to see the wood
for the trees and are thus not in a position to start thinking about long-term solutions to
some of the problems of the region. A better understanding of the multilayered character
of the disputethe historically conditioned perspectives of the parties, the main actors and
their perceived fears, aspirations, interests and objectivesis needed in order to build a strong
relationship that can withstand future challenges.
A notable exception was the rather crude attempt by the European Union to convince the Macedonian public
and leadership to consider a compromise at the end of 2009 through the publication of an article by Javier
Solana and Olli Rehn with the title It is time for statesmanshp! in the daily newspaper Dnevnik on 27 November 2009. Although the dispute was still nominally treated as something to be resolved between the two
parties, the EU made a clear and unequivocal signal of its preferred outcome. The very content of the article
betrayed the inability or perhaps unwillingness of European foreign policy and enlargement decision-makers
to empathize and engage creatively with the conflict.
227
dispute is seen by some circles within the VMRO-DPMNE, but also by some in civil society
such as refugee and diasporic activists, as providing a unique opportunity structure for the
achievement of long-term political hegemony premised on the perpetuation of an apparently
intractable antagonistic relationship.
If one adds to this the existing grievances that many Macedonians with origins in Greece
have about their own or their families flight from Greece at the end of the Greek Civil
War in 1949, the expropriation of their lands and the human rights violations of those left
behind, it is not difficult to recognize that the name dispute is simply one of a multitude of
issues that affect the relationship between the two countries. Aegean Macedonian historians
have played a significant role in the historiography of the Republic of Macedonia6 and
Aegean Macedonian refugee organizations have been active in the Republic of Macedonia
and have had considerable success in informing the countrys political agenda. Their aims
go far beyond the name issue and vary from a demand for recognition of their treatment
on the part of Greece to the expectation of comprehensive financial restitution of their
human, political and property rights. One should not underestimate the significance of the
articulation of the refugee experience in the narratives of contemporary Macedonianness:
although at times suppressed, the experience of displacement and dispossession of the ethnic
Macedonians of Greece is not only recognized and remembered among Macedonians but
also has acquired a prominent role in the national mythology upon which contemporary
Macedonia is premised. Contemporary Macedonia is largely the product of the profound
sense of loss, pain, separation and being in exile experienced by the Aegean Macedonians
as the final chapter of the Greek Civil War reached its conclusion. The exodus from Greece
at the end of the Greek Civil War is seen as an instance of constitutive violence exercised
against Aegean Macedonians by the Greek state, the same state that, according to the very
same national narrative, organized the uprooting of the Macedonians of Greece under
the 1919 exchange treaty with Bulgaria7 and the colonization of the Greek province of
Macedonia by Asia Minor settlers in the 1920s.8
6
Examples of this extensive and influential historiographical and topographical work include Risto Kirjazovskis
Narodnoosloboditelniot front i drugite organizacii na Makedoncite od Egejska Makedonija, 19451949 (Skopje,
1985), which provides a Macedonian national narrative linking the Ilinden Uprising and the participation of
Macedonians in the Greek Civil War; and Todor Simovskis Naselenite mesta vo Egejska Makedonija: geografski,
etnicki i stopanski karakteristiki (Skopje: Institut za Nacionalna Istorija, 1978).
The 1919 Convention Respecting the Reciprocal Emigration of the Greek and Bulgarian Racial Minorities
provided for the resettlement of Bulgarians from Greece in Bulgaria and of their Greek counterparts from
Bulgaria in Greece. The category Bulgarians included many Macedonian Slavs who either had Bulgarian
consciousness or belonged ecclesiastically to the Bulgarian Exarchate, or even decided to leave Macedonia for
economic or political reasons. See Dimitri Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on
Greece (London: Hurst, 2002), 60-1, and Umut zkrml & Spyros A. Sofos, Tormented by History; Nationalism in Greece and Turkey (London: Hurst: 2008), 14751.
In many ways, this experience can be described as what Alexander, Eyerman, Giesen, Smelser and Sztompka
call cultural trauma (in Jeffrey Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2004) as it constitutes a successful process of collective representation of a traumatic event
that defines (a) the nature of the pain, (b) the nature of the victim, (c) the relation of the victim to the wider
audience and (d) attribution of responsibility (p. 21).
228
The leadership of the Albanian community has trodden carefully between subtle criticism
of the government and a display of remarkable patience in expectation that the Euro-Atlantic
integration process will soon move forward. Any challenge by other forces within the Albanian
community, or outbreak of popular resentment of a breakdown of the fragile social and
political contract that followed the Ohrid Agreement, might force a rethink of the adopted
stance. Indeed, parliamentary election results from 5 June 2011 indicate that the Albanian
community leadership has not managed to mobilize its constituency: the Albanian parties
gained a combined vote of just over 16% of the electorate and lost six seats. Such a poor
and potentially destabilizing outcome for the Albanian elitesand, possibly, for post-Ohrid
political arrangementswill undoubtedly prompt a rethink of the Albanian position.9
Under the recently re-elected government which has adopted a more confrontational
approach to the name dispute that in the past, Macedonias BATNA (best alternative to a
negotiated agreement) is twofold: to continue insisting on the application of the Interim
Accord with Greece which obliges the latter to accept the formers Euro-Atlantic integration
under its provisional internationally recognized name as the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, to pursue its complaint with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against
Greeces allegedly unlawful exercise of its veto at the NATO Bucharest Summit in April
2008, and to persevere in its effort to render its widespread recognition under its constitutional
name a fait accompli. Given that the ICJ process may be a lengthy one and that Greece in the
meantime can continue blocking Macedonias EU and NATO accession, the Macedonian
government needs to weigh its BATNA against the possibility of further popular frustration
and internal destabilization.
The dispute is framed in quite different terms in Greece. The public position10 of Greek
governments over the past two decades has been that the use of the name Macedonia is
provocative since they understand it to constitute an attempt to appropriate Greek history
and to conceal further territorial demands. The Greek educational system and dominant
Greek historiography have contributed over a period of more than two hundred years to
the seamless integration of the Macedonian and Hellenistic past in Greek history, as have
historians internationally, to the point that any attempt to challenge such views, or merely
even to use the term Macedonian to designate a different country or nation, is widely seen as
unjustified and suspect. The Greek authorities, as well as various social and political actors, refer
to Yugoslav claims to the Greek province of Macedonia after the end of the Second World
War and cite irredentist references in school textbooks, political statements by nationalist
politicians and diaspora activists, as well as the recent antiquisation policy as evidence of
Macedonian designs against Greece.
10
I have elaborated this point in a comment posted in the Southeastern Europe: from Triglav to Caucasus blog
(http://triglavtocaucasus.blogspot.com/) on 6 June 2011.
I should point out that it is important to distinguish between public and actual positions here, as there have
been substantial differences in the perspectives of different governments over the past two decades. Having
said that, both major parties have been torn over the name dispute issue since both party cadres and voters are
deeply divided.
229
Public debate on the name issue is rife with misinformation and misunderstandings;
opinion-leaders often conflate the positions of the Macedonian authorities with the views and
actions of other actors, such as diaspora activists or Aegean Macedonian refugee campaigners,
and therefore tend to develop perceptions and representations of the dispute that homogenize
and occasionally demonize the other side. What is more, they invariably refuse to recognize
the expulsion of the bulk of the local Slavic population from Northern Greece and the right
of those expelled as well as those remaining to designate themselves Macedonians.
The initial and overwhelmingly popular mobilizations in 19924 against the use of the
name Macedonia by the former Yugoslav republic and the tireless lobbying of nationalist
circles in parliament and civil society have entrenched the issue in the political agenda and
generated considerable inertia that still serves as a powerful constraints in the development
of a forward-looking Greek foreign policy. In this context, referring to the Republic of
Macedonia in public discourse is not widely acceptable. The internationally recognized
acronym FYROM, or the name of the capital (Skopje), is preferred and often expected to
be used, while the country is often (although with diminishing frequency as time passes)
referred to as a statelet in order to convey a sense of diminished international personality.
It is clear that behind the Greek stance on the name issue there is a complex array of
aims, desires and objectives on the part of multiple actors. Whereas Greek policy does not
officially challenge Macedonias statehood, the insistence on terms that are unlikely to be
accepted by the Macedonian government and public has the potential of radicalizing segments
of the population and destabilizing the Macedonian political system. Most Greek political
parties and organizations do not view such a prospect with concern as they have not as yet
reconciled themselves with the reality of Macedonian statehood and nationhood or because
they derive considerable political capital from their intransigent position.
But this intransigence is not solely the product of political opportunism and cynicism as
several critics of the Greek stance seem to assert. The fixation of Greek public opinion on the
issue of the name of the neighbouring country and the strength of feeling displayed not only
in public mobilizations but also in quotidian contexts is in no way as artificial or capricious as
it is often represented in Macedonian public debate. Apart from the fact that Macedonia has
been seamlessly integrated within notions of Greekness over time, as I noted earlier referring
to the struggles over the past, it should be pointed out that the Balkan wars that led to the
annexation of Greek Macedonia were experienced and have remained in popular memory as
wars of liberation from the Ottoman yoke and from Bulgarian designs. In such recollections,
the issue of a heteroglot Slav minority in the region, given the oscillation of individuals, families
and villages between the use of Greek and the local Slavic language, has traditionally been
considered a product of longstanding Bulgarian attempts to extend influence into the region.
Macedonia has not featured in popular representations as a foreign land, as it was and is
home to indigenous populations that spoke Greek, accepted the ecclesiastical authority of
the Patriarchate of Constantinople, or considered themselves Greek out of belief, choice or
expediency,11 just as it was home to a considerable array of other linguistic, religious and ethnic
groups. Macedonia inspired songs, laments and popular stories, mobilized people to work
11
230
and fight for its (re)incorporation12 within the Greek motherland and exacted considerable
human and material sacrifices. More importantly, the Bulgarian annexation of the Greek
province of Macedonia during the Axis occupation, the traumatic events of the Greek Civil
War, the intensity of its final chapter in 1949 and the realization that its conclusion was to
determine the fate of Macedonia, were internalized by many Greeks living in the province
or further afield as a deep cultural trauma that goes a long way towards accounting for the
intensity and often irrational aspects of Greek popular reactions to the name dispute. 13
Today, alongside the traumatic recollection of the near loss of Greek Macedonia
during the Greek Civil War, one can also cite Greeces current economic woes and the highly
precarious legitimacy presently enjoyed by the government, as well as the existence of a highly
reluctant interlocutor on the Macedonian side in the shape of a VMRO-DMPNE-led
government which, for the time being, seems to derive considerable benefits from maintaining
this stalemate. To this tangled web one should add the position of many proponents of a
harder stance towards the Republic of Macedonia who suggest that Greeces BATNA is to
walk away from the UN-sponsored talks and simply stall the future accession of Macedonia
to any international organizations. It is argued that this should be done in tandem with an
informational and consultative campaign with Greeces international partners and, in cases
where this avenue does not bear fruit, through the exercise of its right of veto where applicable.
Bearing all this in mind, one can gain a better understanding of why the current Greek
government, despite realizing that it has nothing to gain internationally by undermining or
abstaining from the negotiation process, has neither the will nor the capacity to make a breakthrough
in the process. It is quite clear that this does not constitute a viable long-term alternative, for
such an obstructive approach is likely to affect the interests of some of Greeces key partners
and might contribute to destabilizing Macedonian politicsin turn inevitably destabilizing
regional politics and affecting Greece in unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, the short-term
political costs of engaging constructively with the Republic of Macedonia seem to have prompted
consecutive Greek governments to pass on difficult decisions irresponsibly to future incumbents.
At the centre of the dispute we can locate a complex identity conflict. Both parties
appear to consider their positions on the use of the term Macedonia difficult to reconcile.
This sense of intractability is also affected by a number of misconceptions fostered by the two
parties: Macedonian identity and statehood, however recent in historical terms and socially
constructed as it may be,14 is in no way artificial in the terms that it has been represented
in Greek public debate. Several generations of Macedonians have considered themselves as
such and are not likely to stop doing so even in the event of an agreement being concluded
between Greece and Macedonia. It is difficult to imagine that their identification can be
replaced by international recognition under a different name. Thinking beyond the name
12
13
14
I am using the term (re)incorporation here to indicate the duality marking the process of Macedonias incorporation in the Greek state. Whereas in geopolitical terms it constituted the capture and annexation of Ottoman
territory, in popular phenomenology it constituted a returna reunification.
Again, the term cultural trauma is used in the sense outlined in Alexander et al., Cultural Trauma.
Needless to say, all national identities are the product of processes of social construction. But this construction
does not imply artificiality since its viability depends on its internalization and enactment by the very people
it addresses as nationals.
231
issue, however, it is not hard to realize that the relationship between the two countries is
even more complicated and would be far from normalized even if the name dispute were to
be settled. One has to consider the several thousands of refugees and even more emigrants
from Greek Macedonia who have been denied the right of return to their villages, families
and properties precisely because they have regarded themselves as ethnic Macedonians, even
at times of extreme adversity during the Greek Civil War. One can also think of the small yet
existent ethnic Macedonian minority of Greece which over the years has found itself deprived
of the spatial and symbolic contexts of practices and resources central to its cultural survival15
and has increasingly been forced to look to the Republic of Macedonia for these, a minority
which, although not experiencing the authoritarian persecution of previous years, still does not
dare speak its name. It is not hard to realize, therefore, that a resolution of the name dispute,
however desirable, would not make the tensions and mutual suspicions go away. From the
Macedonian point of view, the current crisis reflects Macedonian anxieties about the future
of their country and society, the grievances of Macedonians displaced and dispossessed as a
result of the Greek Civil War and of a long tradition of repression in Greek Macedonia and
concerns over the fate of the Macedonian minority in Greece.
On the other hand, dismissing the often emotionally loaded Greek popular reactions as
merely irrational and chauvinistic will not bring a resolution to the dispute any nearer. The
apparent irrationality of Greek responses to the crisis is not merely the product of the hard
work of various conflict entrepreneurs who have invested a great deal in a stalemate situation,
but also the expression of a deep anxiety over the future of a Macedonia whose fate has been
inextricably linked to that of Greece as a whole. It is not an exaggeration to say that the name
dispute has been framed in such a way that a substantial part of Greek society lives it as an
extension or revival of the traumatic experience of the Civil War and evokes the memories
of sacrifice and struggle that Macedonia conjures.
Moving from the emotional to the rational, from the Greek point of view the crisis
reflects anxieties over the potential of Macedonia to raise territorial issues and, perhaps more
importantly, demands for financial compensation or restitution on behalf of Macedonian
citizens originating in Greece. Even more significant looms Greeces fear of having to deal with
a Macedonian minority despite the fact that the latter is for all intents and purposes already
visible nationally and internationally and hard to ignore. This fear is perhaps exaggerated
because it underestimates the post-1924 strategy of national homogenization whose impact
on contemporary Greek self-identification cannot be ignored.
Overcoming the obstacles imposed by such fears through the successful conclusion of a
formal negotiation process is hardly possible; the recognition that the dispute is broader than
the name issue needs to be factored into any attempt to normalize the relationship between
the two parties. As a matter of fact, it seems very difficult to imagine a win-win outcome
emerging from such a process unless an adequate and possibly lengthy conflict transformation
intervention is planned and initiated.
15
See Jane K. Cowan and Keith Brown, Introduction: Macedonian Inflections in Macedonia: The Politics of
Identity and Difference, ed. Jane K. Cowan (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 1112. Also see: zkrml and Sofos,
Tormented by History, 11213.
232
233
being blameless. This is one of the most common characteristics of intractability in conflicts
and the Greek-Macedonian dispute is a case in point. In this climate of antagonism and of
overwhelming us vs. them dilemmas, dissenting voices are suppressed or not heard and the
overall quality of public and democratic debate deteriorates. Thus it is important to establish
and support grassroots or third-party initiatives that establish or enhance spaces of information
and communication. Examples from the region show the way. During the height of the
violent conflicts in other republics of former Yugoslavia, institutions such as Alternativna
Informativna Mrea played a modest but crucial role in providing information and allowing
communication between parts of the Yugoslav Federation that had been alienated from each
other.16 This might be a possible model for such institutions, although there is ample space
for further experimentation and innovation.
Circum-negotiating the problem:17 Recognizing the perspectives of both parties, in
particular those relating to fundamental issues of identity and self-determination, is of paramount
importance despite the practical difficulties of such an endeavour. Instead of the conclusion
of a name treaty that does not address other aspects of the broader issues, the two countries
will eventually need to grapple with a framework comprising gestures of mutual recognition
and respect that reassure both parties of their shared commitment to regional stability and
neighbourly relations. Given the current political and economic instability experienced in
both societies, it is important to ensure that any progress in the dispute resolution process
enjoy considerable legitimacy from the constituencies affected. This effectively means that
a longer, incremental process should be devised with tangible benefits at different stages.
In such instances it may be important to think small at the same time as dealing
with the entirety and complexity of the conflict. Practical hands-on localized projects that
entail sustained cooperation between the two sides (i) might have the capacity to disrupt
the networks of power and influence that sustain intransigence on both sides by providing
alternative empowerment opportunities to people or groups who have found rewards in
conflict entrepreneurship; (ii) provide spaces of encounter between strangers and, hopefully,
opportunities to gain an insight into the standpoint of the other18, reduce mutual suspicion
and build confidence and understanding; and (iii) channel energies that have traditionally
been expended in conflict towards shared goal-seeking projects
Initiatives such as the meeting hosted by Greece in November 2009 of the prime
ministers of Albania, Greece and Macedonia in the border region of the Prespa lakes to
16
17
18
Other examples include the Greek-Turkish Forum, the Turkish-Greek News initiative (a civil peace journalism
project) and a host of similar initiatives in both sides of Cyprus.
According to Saunders, circum-negotiation comprises the times and the tasks apart from negotiation that have
the purpose of beginning, sustaining, and nourishing a peace process by changing relationships and paving the
way for negotiation or other peaceful steps to resolve conflict. (Harold Saunders, Prenegotiation and Circumnegotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process in Managing Global Chaos, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson
and Pamela Aall, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press) 1996, 421.
The term standpoint of the collective other has been theorized in Iris Marion Young, Communication and
the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy in Democracy and Difference, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1996), 12035.
234
20
At the time of writing, cross-border interactions (leisure trips, exchanges of goods, shopping trips, etc.) are
pretty much common practices in the border regions. However, I would argue that what characterizes these
interactions is their short-term, opportunistic character. What I am suggesting constitutes durable, sustainable
and goal-oriented activities characterized by a deeper mutuality.
I am not advocating here a history cleansed of memories which would be offensive to all parties, but rather
the development of a history that transcends the logic of physical or mental borders and identifies instances
of past coexistence and interaction as well as conflict. A history in which frames of identification other than
the nationsuch as region, locality, religion, guild and work or gender identificationare also brought to the
fore of analysis.
235
region with a rich and diverse heritage which peoples with diverse faiths, languages
and identities have been calling home throughout its long history
an expression of determination on the part of both countries not to engage in the
symbolic warfare witnessed over the past few years
an acknowledgment that this multicultural heritage constitutes a resource and not a
matter of ownership
a commitment on the part of Greece to support Macedonias integration into EuroAtlantic structures
a recognition that current borders should be seen as zones of contact and exchange,
facilitating encounters, bonds, and solidarities between populations on both sides
236
References:
Alexander, Jeffrey, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser and Piotr Sztompka, Cultural Trauma
and Collective Identity, Berkeley: University of California Press (2004).
Cowan, Jane K. and Keith Brown, Introduction: Macedonian Inflections in Macedonia: The Politics of
Identity and Difference, edited by Jane K. Cowan, London: Pluto Press (2000), 127.
Danforth, Loring. The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press (1995).
Kofos, Evangelos. . , in -:.
(19952002), edited by Evangelos Kofos and Vlasis Vlasidis, Athens: Papazisis
Pubishers (2003), 154264.
Lory, Bernard. Approches de l Identit Macdonienne in La Rpublique de Macdoine, edited by Christophe
Chiclet and Bernard Lory, Paris: Editions LHarmattan (1998), 1332.
zkrml, Umut and Spyros A. Sofos, Tormented by History; Nationalism in Greece and Turkey. London:
Hurst (2008).
Pentzopoulos, Dimitri, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact on Greece, London: Hurst (2002).
Saunders, Harold, Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process, in Managing Global
Chaos, edited by Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall, Washington DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press (1996), 419432.
Tziampiris, Aristotle, Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question, Aldershot:
Ashgate (2000).
Young, Iris Marion, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in Democracy and
Difference, edited by Seyla Benhabib, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (1996), 120135.
Part III
Part IV
511
Matthew Craven
512
Jean-Pierre QUENEUDEC
513
Counsel for Guinea in the Guinea/Guinea Bissau Maritime Boundary Arbitration (1983-85). Legal adviser of
Kuwait, U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission (1991-93). Counsel for Gabon, U.N. Secretary
Generals Mediation concerning boundary problems between Gabon and Equatorial Guinea (2003-2005).
Counsel and advocate before the International Court of Justice in the following cases: Libya/Malta Continental Shelf (1982-85); Application for Revision and Interpretation of the 1982 Tunisia/Libya Continental
Shelf Judgment (1984-85); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain,
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (1991-95), Merits (1995-2001); Territorial and Maritime Dispute between
Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (1999-2007); Maritime Boundary between Romania and
Ukraine in the Black Sea (2004-09).
Experience in international arbitration:
Member of the Canadian-French Arbitral Tribunal concerning Filleting in the Gulf of St. Lawrence (198586). Arbitrator nominated by France in accordance with Annex VII of the U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea (1998). Member of the Arbitral Tribunal between France and UNESCO on the Question of taxation of pensions paid to former officials of UNESCO living in France (2001-2003). Member of the Court of
Arbitration for Sport (2005- ).
Other responsibilities:
Member: International Narcotics Control Board (1989-92), U.N. Group of Experts on the Impact of the
Law of the Sea Convention (1992-93), Council of Europe Committee on State Practice in the field of International Law (1993-96).
President: French Society for International Law (1999-2004); Hon. President (since 2005).
514
Larry Reimer
515
516
Jana Lozanoska
517
Budislav Vukas
518
Ernest Petri
Dr. Ernest Petri graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of
Ljubljana in 1960, winning the Preeren University Award. He was also
awarded a Doctorate in Law from the same Faculty in 1965. After taking a
position at the Institute for National Issues, he was first an Assistant Professor,
then an Associate Professor, and finally a Full Professor of International
Law and International Relations at what is presently the Faculty of Social
Sciences of the University of Ljubljana. At this Faculty, he was the director
of its research institute, the Vice Dean, and the Dean (19861988). He has
occasionally lectured at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana
and also as a guest at numerous prestigious foreign universities. For three
years (19831986), he was a Professor of International Law at the Faculty
of Law in Addis Ababa.
He pursued advanced studies at the Faculty of Law of the University of
Vienna (particularly with Prof. A. Verdross and Prof. S. Verosta), at the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law
in Heidelberg, at the Hague Academy for International Law, and at the
Institute for International Law in Thessaloniki. He has been a member of
numerous international associations, particularly the ILA (the International
Law Association), the IPSA (the International Political Science Association),
the Yugoslav Society of International Law, and currently the Slovene
Society of International Law. He is a member of the ILC (the International
Law Commission), whose membership comprises only 34 distinguished
international legal experts from the entire world, representing different
legal systems.
In the ILC, he actively participates in the work on the future international
legal regulation of objections to reservations to treaties; the deportation
of aliens; the responsibilities of international organizations; the effects of
armed conflicts on treaties; the international legal protection of natural
resources, in particular, underground water resources that extend to the
area of several states; and the problems of extradition and adjudication.He
served as President of the Commission from 2008 to 2009.
Between 1967 and 1972, he was a member of the Slovene Government (the
Executive Council), which was presided over by Stane Kavi, in which Dr.
Petri was responsible for the areas of science and technology. Subsequent
519
to 1989, he was the ambassador to India, the USA, and Austria, and the non-resident ambassador to Nepal,
Mexico, and Brazil. He was a permanent representative/ambassador to the UN (New York) and to the IAEA,
UNIDO, CTBTO, ODC, and OECD (Vienna). From 1997 to 2000, he was a state secretary at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. In 2006 and 2007, he presided over the Council of Governors of the IAEA (International
Atomic Energy Agency). During the time of his diplomatic service, he also dealt with important issues of
international law, such as state succession with regard to international organizations and treaties, border
issues, and issues concerning human rights and minority rights.
He has published numerous articles and treatises in domestic and foreign professional journals, and five
books, three in the field of international law (Mednarodno pravno varstvo manjin [The International Legal
Protection of Minorities], Pravica narodov do samoodlobe [The Right of Nations to Self-Determination],
and Pravni status slovenske manjine v Italiji [The Legal Status of the Slovene Minority in Italy]) as well as
a fundamental work on foreign policy: Zunanja politikaOsnove teorije in praksa [Foreign policyThe
Basics of Theory and Practice]. He has contributed papers to numerous conferences and seminars. He still
occasionally lectures on international law at the European Faculty of Law in Nova Gorica, the Faculty of Social
Sciences in Ljubljana, and the Faculty of State and European Studies in Brdo near Kranj. He commenced
duties as judge of the Constitutional Court on 25 April 2008. He was unanimously elected President of the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia and assumed office on 11 November 2010.
520
Sao Georgievski
521
Richard Caplan
522
John Shea
523
Biljana Vankovska
524
Spyros A. Sofos
525
Victor A. Friedman
526
Loring M. Danforth
527
George Vlahov
Chris Popov
Vasko Nastevski
528
Katerina Kolozova
e-mail: [email protected]
website: www.isshs.edu.mk
529
Akis Gavriilidis
530
Mitko B. Panov
531
Dalibor Jovanovski
532
Andrew Rossos
533
Todor Cepreganov
534
Liljana Panovska
535
536
Dimitris Lithoksou
537
Zhelyu Zhelev
Zhelyu Zhelev, Phd, DSc, was born on 3 March 1935 in Vesselinovo, a small
village in northeast Bulgaria. He is married and has one daughter. Zhelev
graduated in Higher Studies in Philosophy in 1958 from the University
of Sofia. He was withdrawn in 1964 from the student fellowship at Sofia
University for dissenting from communist dogma and was banished from
the capital Sofia and forced to live in the countryside till 1972 because
of his dissertation work, On the Philosophical Definition of Matter and
Contemporary Natural Science, in which he criticised Lenins definition
of matter. He received his PhD In 1974 for his thesis on dialectics (Modal
Categories) and his DSc in 1987 for the monograph The Relational
Theory of Personality.
In 1989, Zhelev was the main originator and co-founder of the Club for
Glasnost and Perestroika, which led to his being subjected to new repressive
measures. In the same year he was dismissed from the Institute for Culture
for his dissident activities and became a co-founder of the Union of
Democratic Forces (a union of all opposition parties and movements). In
June 1990, Zhelev was elected member of the Grand National Assembly
and elected Chairman of the UDF Parliamentary Group.
On the 1 August 1990, Zhelev was elected President of the Republic of
Bulgaria by the Grand National Assembly. On 19 January 1992 he was
re-elected President for a five-year term by direct popular vote under the
newly adopted Constitution of Bulgaria. Since January 1997 he has been
President of the Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev Foundation. In 2001 he was the
initiator, founding member and first President of the Balkan Political Club.
In 2004 he became a special envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to
South Ossetia. In 2010, Zhelev was elected a fellow of the World Academy
of Art and Science and in 2011 became a special envoy of the President to
the thirteenth Summit of the the International Francophone Organization
and a special envoy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Tunisia.
538
Main publications:
Monographs: Amateur Art in the Context of the Scientific and Technical Revolution (1976); Modal Categories
(1978); Physical Culture and Sports in Urbanized Society (1979); and his most famous book Fascism.
(Zhelev completed his research for Fascism in 1967 under the initial title The Totalitarian State. Due to
Communist censorship, however he only succeeded in publishing this work with the title Fascism in 1982
after overcoming great obstacles. Shortly after publication, this first edition of the book was suppressed and
all distribution halted. Fittingly, it was published again after the Velvet Revolution in 1989. Since then,
Fascism has been published in more than ten languages, (2nd edition, 1990)). Man and His Personalities
(1991); The Relational Theory of Personality (1993). Recent political writings include The Intelligentsia and
Politics: Articles Essays, Speeches and Interviews (1995); Bulgarias New Foreign Policy and NATO (1995);
Presidential Addresses to the Nation and to Parliament (1996); In the Big Policy (1998); Political Speeches
(2003); Interviews (2004); Despite All, (2006).
Awards and Distinctions: Professor Zhelev is an Honorary Doctor of the following institutions: Graceland
College, Iowa, USA (1993); University of Maine, USA (1993); University of Tel Aviv (1993); University of
Ankara (1994); University of Seoul (1995); American University in Blagoevgrad (1996); Slavic University in
Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan (2002); South-Western University Neophyte Rilski in Blagoevgrad (2004);
Veliko Tarnovo University of Cyril and Metodius (2006). He has also been elected Honorary Chairman of
the International Academy for Art and Science and appointed an observer for the Caspian, South Caucasian
and Black Sea Region in September 2007. He has received the following awards: the Catherine Medici
Award of the International Academy Medici in 1991; the Transition Award, shared with Yitzhak Rabin
(posthumously) and presented in Crans-Montana in 1996; as well as the highest state distinctions of France,
Spain, Portugal and Venezuela. On 7 March 2005, President Zhelev was awarded the highest Bulgarian
state order, the Stara Planina 1st degree and medal ribbon, in recognition of his significant contribution to
establishing and consolidating democracy in Bulgaria.
539
Robin ONeill
540
In 1986, he was appointed British Ambassador to Austria and also head of the United Kingdom Delegation
to the Conference on the mutual reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe (MBFR),
based in Vienna.
In 1989, he became British Ambassador to Belgium.
He retired from the Diplomatic Service in 1992, and later that year he was appointed Personal Representative
of the President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community for the question of relations between
the European Community and its member states and the Republic of Macedonia.
In 1995, he was the European Community representative on a mission of the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe to organise elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He has also acted as an election
observer in Bosnia and in Kosovo.
He married Helen Juniper in 1958, and they have three children. They live near Cambridge in the United
Kingdom, and in retirement he has been active in local politics, in the affairs of the Church of England, and
in a number of organisations concerned with foreign policy and ethical government.
541
Takis Michas
CIP Ka
. ,
342.228.1( 497.7) 1991/2011 (081)
342. 228.1 ( 497.7): 327( 495) 1991/2011 (081)
The NAME issue revisited: An anthology of academic articles / [editorial board
Dragan Antonov ( .); translators Aleksandra Ilievska ... ( .)]. Skopje:
Macedonian Information Centre (MIC), 2012. 541 .; 27 cm. .
ISBN 978-9989-2072-8-0
) 1991-2011 ; )
1991-2011
COBISS.MK-ID 91563786