Spinoza and Maimonides On Prophecy
Spinoza and Maimonides On Prophecy
Malka Lebovic
Dr. Rynhold
The Early Modern Period: Spinoza and Mendelssohn
Fall 2014
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they appear in the siddur and songs and prayers have been written about
them. It is interesting to note Maimonides intended audience particularly in
contradistinction to that of the Guide to the Perplexed which was written for
a specific student with a clear stipulation to safeguard its truths from those
people who may be incapable of comprehending them and therefore could
distort the true meaning of his work. Maimonides employs many tactics, in
the Guide, to preserve its esotericism such as intentional contradictions,
obscure language, difficult content, and some have even argued that the
views Maimonides blatantly puts forth are not the ones he agrees with,
rather, those least spoken about contain the most truth.7 Bearing these
distinctions in mind, it is quite noteworthy that Maimonides definition of
prophecy in his Introduction to Perek Helek fails to mention a seemingly
essential element of prophecy and quality of the prophet that is described at
length in the Guide. This, of course, is the imaginative component.
In the Guide Maimonides outlines three different views of prophecy
that of the Pagans (the masses), the Philosophers, and Jewish Law.8 The
Pagans believe that God miraculously selects a man and turns him into a
prophet. There is nothing man can do on his own to receive prophecy. God
can choose a wise man or a foolish man, an old man or a young man. The
Philosophers have an equally extreme view yet with the focus on man. They
maintain that prophecy is a natural result of a certain intellectual and moral
perfection. If man reaches this high stature, he will become aware of certain
truths previously unknown and thereby prophecy will be bestowed upon him.
God does not choose, in effect, God plays no role in who receives prophecy.
According to this position, it is not possible for a man to be worthy of
prophecy and not receive it, being fit for prophecy and receiving prophecy
are one in the same. The final view that of Jewish Law is synonymous with
7 Maimonides, Shlomo Pines, the Guide of the Perplexed (University of Chicago Press, 1963)
Introduction pgs.5-20
8 Ibid, Secton II, Chapter 32 pgs. 360-363.
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the Philosophers position except for one caveat. God can, by an act of divine
will, prevent an otherwise fit individual from receiving a prophetic vision. 9 In
both the second opinion and the third the imaginative faculty plays an
essential role: his imaginative faculty is in its most perfect statehe will
necessarily become a prophet,10 the true reality and quiddity of prophecy
consists in its being an overflowof the Active Intellect, toward the rational
faculty in the first place and thereafter toward the imaginative facultythis
state is the ultimate term of perfection for the imaginative faculty.11 It is
interesting that such an integral part of the prophetic experience is
completely left out in Maimonides account of prophecy in Perek Helek.
The imaginative element is what separates the prophet from the
philosopher. A philosopher could possess the same wisdom as a prophet,
however the imaginative faculty is what enables the prophet to be a political
leader. Both receive an influx of knowledge from the Active Intellect on to the
rational faculty (knowledge of philosophical truths, basic concepts, and the
like) but the prophet also receives the influx on his imaginative faculty
granting him political prowess. The statesman only has the political expertise
without the rational guidance that clarifies and instructs.12 This discussion of
these three different types of influential people further identifies the
9 The line between the philosophic position and Maimonides position becomes complicated when you
try to define divine will. It seems that Maimonides very naturalistic understanding of divine will could
conflate the distinction between these two positions. Some scholars have argued that the more esoteric
and therefore correct reading of Maimonides is the philosophic understanding of prophecy while others
have preserved the distinction between the opinions of the philosophers and Jewish Law.
10 The Guide, II:32 361
11 Ibid, II:36 369
12 S. Daniel Breslauer, Philosophy and Imagination: The Politics of Prophecy in the
View of Moses Maimonides (The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 70, No. 3
(Jan., 1980), pp. 153-171), pg. 155
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justice), and due to the changing nature of imagination prophecy was rare
and even among the prophets (for the most part) occurred occasionally and
fleetingly (ex: Balaam). For Spinoza, prophecy can be understood as a lower
level alternative to philosophy as opposed to Maimonides view where the
prophet has all the skills of the philosopher plus the additional quality of the
imagination. In an ideal world where everyone has perfectly developed
intellects there would be no need for Spinozas prophet, however,
Maimonides prophet would have as important a role as ever. Norman Brown
in his article, Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinozas Hermeneutics draws a
comparison between Kants definition of tutelage as mans inability to make
use of his understanding without direction from another and Spinozas
definition of prophecy as someone who interprets for those who are
incapable on their own. Prophecy is below self sufficiency, below what Kant
terms enlightenment, namely the ability to achieve unaided understanding.22
The historical reality of the Hebrews following their Exodus from Egypt
required prophetic guidance. The Hebrews were primitive and reduced to
the most abject slavery therefore, it is fitting that Moses did not teach them
anything besides a way of life, and that not as a philosopher, so that they
might eventually live well, from liberty of mind, but as a legislator obliging
them to live well by command of the lawworship and love of God was more
servitude to them than true liberty.23 Prophecy is distinct from philosophy in
that it does not encourage free thinking. Heidi Ravven in an article discussing
Spinoza as a response to Maimonidean philosophy notes this point, he writes
we can turn to Spinoza who articulates a relevant principle Reason
promotes autonomy whereas imagination, servitude.24 For Spinoza,
prophecy resides in the realm of imagination which is perfectly befitting its
22 Norman Brown, Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics (Sage
Publications inc. Political Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2. May, 1986) Pg. 197-198
23 TTP, pg. 38-39
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Works Cited
Angel Rabbi Marc D., Maimonides Essential Teachings on Jewish Faith and
Ethics: the Book of
Knowledge and the Thirteen Principles of Faith. Woodstock, VT:
SkyLight Paths, 2012
Breslauer S. Daniel, Philosophy and Imagination: The Politics of Prophecy in
the View of Moses
Maimonides. The Jewish Quarterly Review, New Series, Vol. 70, No. 3.
Jan., 1980
Brown Norman, Philosophy and Prophecy: Spinoza's Hermeneutics. Sage
Publications inc.
Political Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2. May, 1986
Feldman Seymour, Introduction to Spinozas Ethics. Hackett Publishing
Company ,Indiana 1992
Maimonides, Shlomo Pines the Guide of the Perplexed. University of Chicago
Press, 1963
Nadler Steven, Baruch Spinoza and the Naturalization of Judaism. Cambridge
University Press,
New York, 2007
Pines Shlomo, Maimonides and Philosophy. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Netherlands, 1986
Ravven Heidi M, Some thoughts on what Spinoza learned from Maimonides
about the prophetic
imagination part 1. Maimonides on Prophecy and the imagination.
Johns Hopkins
University Press, Journal of the History of Philosophy Vol. 39, Issue 2,
Baltimore April 2001
Reines Alvin J., Maimonides Concept of Mosaic Prophecy. Hebrew Union
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Institute of Cincinnati
Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise. Cambridge University Press, New York:
2007
Twersky Isadore, A Maimonides Reader. New York: Behrman House, 1972
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