Proto Industrialisation

Download as pdf or txt
Download as pdf or txt
You are on page 1of 4

ReFresh

Spring

10
1990

Recent Findings of Research in Economic & Social History

Proto-industrialisation
Proto-industrialisation (PI) is considered to be a phase in the
development of modern industrial economics which preceded and
paved the way for industrialisation proper. Mendels first put forward
the notion two decades ago [1]. He had two basic propositions. First,
the proto-industrial phase was dominated by the spread of rural
domestic manufacturing which linked more and more families to the
pulse of national and international markets. Secondly, rural
industrialisation was so widespread and so dynamic economically and
socially that it became the major force propelling economies in the
direction of phase two, or industrial capitalism proper, based in
centralised urban production.
From these propositions an exciting and novel field of debate has
arisen exploring the links between industrial development and social,
political and cultural life, and seeing these as integrated rather than
separate fields of study. Thus, increasing involvement of men, women
and children in manufacturing has been related to their changing
agrarian roles, gender attitudes, sex lives, age of marriage, and living
standards. Also to the emergence of regional specialisation,
commercial, financial, and work skills which were vital for later more
mechanised and more urbanised society.

Mendels model
In this model the PI phase in West Europe dated from the late
seventeenth to the early nineteenth century and was set in train by
overseas demand. Urban production with high wage costs and guild
restrictions responded less well to the demand for cheap mass
manufactures than did rural areas. There labour was cheap,
manufacture was carried out largely as a by employment (often
seasonal), and there existed a range of peasant handicraft skills,
particularly in textiles and metalwares, which could be harnessed to
commercial production. PI was thus a process of regional
specialisation occurring as a result of comparative advantage. As
infertile upland areas adopted manufacturing sidelines, their food
needs stimulated inter-regional trade in agricultural products.
So the emergence of large-scale commercial agriculture and the

improvement of agrarian techniques were part and parcel of the PI


process. Different regions moved through a process of reciprocal
trading towards that specialisation of function which was to become
a major feature of fully-fledged urban, industrial society.
Proto-industry was dominated by the putting-out system in which a
merchant capitalist distributed raw materials to working families,
took in the goods when processed, paid piece rates for labour, and
arranged for the finishing and sale of commodities. These
arrangements dominated the English and much of the European
production of cottons and woollens, lace, hosiery, glovemaking,
straw-plaiting, and all types of metalwares from nails to trinkets.
Mendels saw PI impelling the economic system towards phase two
in a variety of ways. First, he saw as important the accumulation of
capital in the hands of entrepreneurs who could then use it to build
factories and to purchase machinery. Putting-out could generate
significant differential profits which were not possible in a fully
fledged wage-economy. These came from the employers' ability to
pay wages below the subsistence minimum. The rural workforce,
unlike the later wage-dependent industrial proletariat, had access to
the land (even if this was only through common rights to hunt and
graze animals). Employers could thus always rely on their workers'
ability to provide part of their own food needs - thus subsidising
industrial wage costs, stimulating profits and creating funds for reinvestment. Secondly, the acquisition of entrepreneurial skilled and
contacts in marketing and exporting, in securing credit and in
technical knowledge are

seen to have paved the way for continuous expansion and innovation
into phase two. Similarly, the extension of manufacturing skills in the
workforce is stressed, including adaptation to divisions of labour
which created repetitive tasks and-which could separate workers from
the finished product of

their labour. Thirdly, workers became increasingly dependent on


ernployers who controlled raw material supplies and markets and who
often owned the tools and equipment. This dependence was hastened
by increasing landlessness: the possibilities of manufacturing incomes
meant that families could exist with only very small plots of land or
with no land at all. Mendels believed that PI encouraged the
subdivision of landholdings amongst heirs.
Finally the most import ant dynamic aspect of PI in Mendels
view was the effect which it had on population growth. Industrial
activity enabled population expansion to take above that which
would have been supported by available foodstuffs. The
pre-industrial Malthusian cycle of population growth and decline,
working through positive as preventive checks (see figure 1), was
thus ended and the prospect of self-sustaining population growth,
allied to manufacture and trade, emerged (see figure 2). Earning
potential in manufacture often reached a maximum early in life and
enabled the setting up of a new household. There was no longer the
need for marriage to await the inheritance of a plot of land or for it to
be arranged by parents with dowry foremost in mind. Mendels found
that in Flanders the rate of marriage increased with cyclical
upswings in the price of linen [2]. Levine found a similar
relationship between prices and nuptiality in the Leicestershire
stocking-knitting area [3]. The marriage rate and marriage age were
being conditioned by `industrial' rather than `traditional' factors.
Thus, PI is seen as the major determinant of that upsurge in
eighteenth-century European populations which, through the supply
of cheap industrial labour and the demand for food and
manufactures, stimulated the onset of phase two.

Other perspectives
The Kreidte, Medick and Schlumbohm (KMS) model [4], though
rather differently specified, includes most of the dynamic factors first
stressed by Mendels. They argue that PI characterised the transitional
period in Europe between a domination of feudal structures in the
middle ages and fully fledged industrial capitalism from the
nineteenth century onwards. By viewing PI as a distinct
socio-economic system or mode of production KMS expose what was
unique to the period, and also clarify how social and cultural changes
can be

Hudson, Refresh 10 (Spring 1990)

related to the character of work and employment. For KMS the


hallmark of PI was the inter-relationship between the rural family
and merchant (or circulating) capital (as opposed to capital sunk in
fixed plant and equipment). Unique also to the centuries of PI was
the fact that labour was not yet fully separated from the means of
production and subsistence on the land. But it was free from the
coercive feudal ties and restrictions which had earlier characterised
much of Europe.
Medick further considers the relationship between
domestic industry, family size and work motivations.
He argues that PI favoured the production of a large
number of child labourers to maximise the
productive capacity of the family work unit. Thus a
population dynamic can be seen to have worked not
only through increasing marriage rates and declining
age of marriage, but through pressure to increase
fertility within marriage. Medick has also argued that
the peasant family economy had as its objective a
basic subsistence level unaffected by a desire for
non-essential purchases. Thus when conditions of
bouyant demand gave an upward impetus to piece
rates, workers might prefer to work just enough to
cover customary needs. M edick argues that this
weakness of the PI system encouraged the onset of
factory industry with its greater ability to discipline
and organise labour to the dictates of demand.
Conversely, however, the system did have its
advantages in times of lower demand or increasing
competition when piece rates fell.
Because the rural family traditionally motivated itself to achieve a
labour/consumer balance it had a capacity for periods of self-exploitation
(hard work and long hours) beyond that found with developed wage
labour which had to be negotiated with, and disciplined in, the factory.
Finally, this and other research has suggested that PI stimulated
radical cultural changes . Apart from freeing young people from parental
control over courtship and marriage, rural manufacture is said to have
given women and children greater power and independence within the
family unit because of their vital role in production and household
earnings. It has been argued that traditional sex roles became blurred so
that men did housework whilst women were busy producing goods:
women became metalworkers and men were found in lacemaking and
textile activities previously confined to women. Women workers
became more liberated involving themselves in varied leisure activities
like smoking and drinking which had previously been associated with
men. It has been suggested that freer courtship and greater freedom of
women from the control of husbands and fathers, coupled with the
intimacy of indoor working by young girls and male apprentices within
the same household, may have resulted in more pre-marital sex and a
higher illegitimacy rate. Finally, the wider range of available consumer
goods and the greater spread of the wage economy is said to have
encouraged the decline of traditional attitudes to work and to leisure.
The ideal of sufficiency and high leisure preference retreated in favour
of acquisitive individualism.
The decline of proto-industry is seen by most theorists as
inevitable because it bore the seeds of its own destruction. In the
absence of technological change, domestic industry could only
expand extensively; rising marginal costs were the result of
extending production over a wider geographical area. Furthermore,
as competition increased, production deadlines and quality were both
more important and more difficult to ensure without a regulated and
centralised workforce. Embezzlement of raw materials became a
problem. Workers still determined their own pace and rhythm of
work often giving preference to agrarian or leisure activities. These
problems inherent in the proto-industrial system either resulted in the
transition to factory manufacture, or forced areas of rural industry to
de-industrialise in the face of snore efficient production elsewhere.

two

The role of proto-industry is more questionable than Pi models


suggest. First, the process of regional specialisation which is
associated with PI is unclear. Much commercial
domestic
manufacturing
was found not in barren upland areas but dovetailing
with comniercial agriculture: East Anglian textiles,
Essex silk, Murray Firth
woollens, and cottons in
Normandy. This coexistence
might arise either
where agricultural work
was confined to men (leaving
an underemployed
female labour force), or
where a commercial crop
was highly seasonal in its
labour demand. Secondly,
the idea of Pi stimulating
capital accumulation is a
problem because many factory masters and much early factory capital
did not come from domestic industry. Thirdly, it is also unclear
whether proto-industrial workers became the first generation of
factory employees. They, like their employers, appear to have resisted
change in their accustomed way of life. Factory labour came in the
first instance from young migrants; women, children and paupers
whose connection with proto-industry and proto-industrial skills was
tenuous. Fourthly, the mercantile and handicraft skills of Pi were, in
any case, not those most appropriate to factory industry. New
accounting techniques were required to deal with fixed assets and
their depreciation. And the skills needed for labour management
within the factory was wholly new, although it was often aided at first
by the employment of family work groups which disciplined
themselves through the traditional role of the male household head.
Finally, the other claims for PI: that it broke down the subsistence
sector, accelerated proletarianisation and created new attitudes to
consumption, may be true but proto-industry was scarcely the only or
even the major force acting in this direction. Not all rural
manufacturing households lost their independence or their land, nor
did all become rampant individualists in terms of earning and
spending. In fact many manufacturing communities were anxious to
preserve their customary lifestyles.
The blanket nature of the models, especially their identification of
PI largely with the putting-out system, tends to disguise the enormous
historical variations in the structure and the dynamism of rural
manufacturing household. Although putting-out appears to have been
the most common form, artisan structures and larger workshop units
were also common in rural manufacture. In some areas such as the
woollen belt of Yorkshire or the gun making area of the Bas Meuse
many families worked as independent small businesses buying their
own raw materials, using their own tools and selling finished product.
Such units appear to have differed in terms of apprenticeship training,
incomes, motivations, inheritance and marriage patterns from
households in which individual members were employed on single
processes by different putting-out concerns. And between these two
extremes existed a broad spectrum of structures each with their own
mix of industry and agriculture, their own division of labour based on
ages and sex, their own degree of independence from or dependence
on merchants or employers. The differing labour needs of different
products also made proto-industry and its effects on social and
cultural life a good deal more complex and varied than the theory
suggests.

Hudson, Refresh 10 (Spring 1990)

Apart from its neglect of the variety of rural manufacturing Pi theory


underplays other sources of dynamism in the early
modern economy, especially
the roles of towns and
centralized industries. Towns
provided banking, mercantile
and finishing centres on
which proto-industrial areas
depended. Guild structures
were not always so strong or
restrictive as the theory suggests and urban manufacturing could be as dynamic
as PI. Furthermore, towns
were probably a more potent
force than proto-industry
in promoting agricultural
improvement,
regional
market integration and new
consumption patterns and
horizons.

Shipbuilding, construction, mining and smelting were all large


concentrated employers of wage labour. The role of such centralised
industries is especially important when considering the nature of
nineteenth century industrialisations in much of central Europe where
phase two was headed by the capital goods sectors and not by textiles
and consumer goods. The direct links between Pi and phase 2 in
these cases of industrialisation were inevitably tenuous.
Rapid population increase was experienced in most protoindustrial areas but immigration of young people may have been
more important in their demographic growth than the dynamic
ascribed to PI. Furthermore, high population densities, rapid
population growth and an increased marriage rate were not unique to
proto-industrial regions, especially by the later eighteenth century.
Unless we believe that most urban growth, migration and agricultural
change were set in train by PI, we must accept that these were
important forces acting alongside PI to influence demographic
behaviour.
Deindustrialisation was the fate of many areas of buoyant rural
industry which does much to undermine the general validity of the
model. Only four out of ten proto-indtistrial areas in Britain proved
sufficiently dynamic to move to the factory stage. Coalfields rather
than prior PI appear to have been the major locational influence in
phase 2. An important factor influencing the impact of Pi was the
context of rural institutional and landholding arrangements. In a
region of firm peasant proprietorship proto-industrial earnings could
add stability to traditional landholding arrangements. Within
structures of feudal obligations, found in large areas of Eastern
Europe in particular, PI did not break down old restrictions, create
much regional specialisation or alter faimiliar power structures but
did tend to enrich the feudal elites who drew enlarged surpluses
through taxation. Clearly, both the variety of forms of PI and the
social and political framework were important in explaining change.
So too was competition from factory production elsewhere which
could do much to deflect the dynamic evolution of PI.

Social sciences
Were social relations and cultural norms radically influenced by PI?
Much of our evidence for this comes from the moralising travel
books of middle-class observers who saw 'beggar-weddings' as
grossly imprudent, women's independence as amoral, and
illegitimacy as a threat to society. It is notoriously

three

difficult to get reliable evidence of changes in sexual behaviour. We


know that illegitimacy was on the increase in eighteenth century
England but this may have arisen because marriage plans were
interrupted by unemployment or migration.
It is also the case that
patriarchal domination was not
so uniform by the seventeenth
century as the PI notion
implies. Even before PI
adolescents could accumulate
savings of their own by
entering farm or domestic
service; they thus had the
possibility of marriage freed
from parental control.
Furthermore, it is likely that
freedom of courtship and
spouse selection was most
apparent in urban rather than
rural areas. In town the
immigration of young people
would
encourage
the
breakdown of older notions of
proper
behaviour.
The
influence of communal norms,
policed through gossip and
social ostracism, was also less
keenly felt in towns than in the
face-to-face society of hamlet or manufacturing village.
Proto-industry was certainly characterised by the prevalence of
employment for women and girls. But the labour of women and
youngsters had always been vital in the agrarian family economy and
it is too simplistic to assume that the possibility of increased earning
power would necessarily be translated into greater status and freedom
for women. This idea pre-supposes that individual manufacturing
wages were high enough to promote independence and also that
women had the freedom to collect and dispose of their wages as they
wished. But we know that the basis of proto-industry was cheap
labour, and that payments were often made to family groups via the
household head. Evidence suggests that, in reality, women and
youngsters mostly worked in PI not for individual gain but as a vital
prop to family subsistence.
The idea that proto-industry involved a blurring of sex roles is also
overplayed: manufacturing tasks appear most often to have been
added on, rather than substituted for, customary female household and
maternal responsibilities. They thus added to the oppressions of
female existence. In rural folklore the idea of women wearing the
trousers or dominating the household remained a matter of ridicule.
And although bout sexes were found employed on certain processes,
such as hand weaving, one finds that women worked on cheaper
products. Their piece rates remained near to half those gained by men
doing similar work.

Conclusions
Recent research on rural manufacturing regions has highllighted the
danger of generalising about the impact of proto-industry upon
economic, social and cultural life. In each proto-industrial region the
pre-existing nature of agriculture, landholding and inheritance, the
organisational structure of production, together with the nature of
particular technologies, and their adaptation to divisions of labour
with households, were all of great importance. They influenced the
role of PI in the transition to more centralised and mechanised forms
of production and in the changes in demographic and social
behaviour. Clearly not all proto-industry was dynamic; only rarely
was it the overridingly dominant source of fundamental change in
early modern European economies. Neither can the phase of PI be so
clearly isolated from structures which preceded and followed it.

Hudson, Refresh 10 (Spring 1990)

Dispersed forms of manufacturing did not disappear with the coming


of the factory but remained (and remain) viable as a way of soaking
up cheap labour, of producing certain types of goods and of using
particular technologies.
The factory has never been the
dominant form of employment in
any manufacturing economy.
Industrial structures exhibit a
complexity and flexibility which
is incapable of being understood
through using a model which
stresses a single organisational
form or a single path of
development.
Yet we would be very foolish to
abandon the concept of PI and the
insight arising from it. Models of
industrialisation are valid and
useful not because they duplicate
reality but because they aid our
understanding and analysis of
economic and social change. By
highlighting the importance of
rural
industry,
the
family
economy,
the
connections
between industrial change, the
agrarian environment and the
changing motivations and
lifestyle of ordinary working people, the PI model remains a
refreshing and exciting tool of analysis. We may be getting some
mixed answers from the research it has generated and we may
acknowledge that industrialisation involves elements ignored by PI
theory. But we are now also asking a range of fascinating questions
that are breaking down the boundaries between traditional economic
history and other social sciences.

References and further reading


[1]

F. F. Mendels, `Proto-industrialisation: the first phase of the


industrialisation process', Journal of Economic History XXXII,
1972.

[2]

F. F. Mendels, `Agriculture and peasant industry in eighteenth


century Flanders' in W. N. Parker and E. L. Jones, eds.
European peasants and their markets, (1975), repr. in [4] below.

[3]

D. Levine, Family formation in an age of nascent


capitalism, (1977).

[4] P. Kreidte, H. Medick and J. Schlumbohm,


before industrialization, (1981).

Industrialization

[5]

L. A. Clarkson, Proto-industrialization: the first phase


of industrialization?, (1985).

[6]

M. Berg, P. Hudson and M. Sonenscher, eds. Manufacture in


town and country before the factory, (1983).

[7] D. C. Coleman, `Proto-industrialization: a concept too


many',
Economic History Review, XXXVI,1983.
[8] R. Houston and K. D. M. Snell, `Proto-industrialisation?
cottage industry, social change, and industrial revolution'.
Historical Journal, 27, 1984.

four

You might also like