Title of the case: Macalintal v.

PET
GR No.: G.R. No. 191618

(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal"
with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at
the discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the
Clerk of the Tribunal; and

Date: June 11, 2011

Ponente: NACHURA, J.

(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the
Supreme Court seal.

Topic: 5. Powers under Special Constitutional Bodies/MEMORIZE

COMPOSITION and JURISDICTION Electoral Tribunals (SET and HRET Art. VI,
Sections 17 and 19, PET under Art. VII)

Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked

constitutional provision does allow the "appointment of additional
personnel."

Doctrine: PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an

institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department.

Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC which

peripherally declared that "contests involving the President and the VicePresident fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the
exercise of quasi-judicial power." On this point, petitioner reiterates that the
constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as
Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions.

Facts:
Confronting us is an undesignated petition filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal
(Atty. Macalintal), that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution: The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to
promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a
purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget allocation, a seal,
a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional
mandate. Petitioners averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of
the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules),
specifically:

The OSG, as directed in our Resolution dated April 6, 2010, filed a Comment
thereon. The OSG points out that the petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is
unspecified and without statutory basis; "the liberal approach in its
preparation x x x is a violation of the well known rules of practice and pleading
in this jurisdiction."
In his Reply, petitioner maintains that:
1. He has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of
transcendental importance of the issues raised therein;

(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members,"
respectively;

2. The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court,
violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and

(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees
and confidential employees of every member thereof;

3. The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions

contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Issue:

1) Whether petitioner has standing to file the present petition.

2) Whether the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this
Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
Held:
1) No.
2) No.
Ratio:
1) The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a
judicial inquiry:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who
has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
the act complained of.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided
by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be
accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds
or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are
of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply
alleged a generalized interest in the outcome of this case, and succeeds only
in muddling the issues.
2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the
use of public funds and the issue raised herein is of transcendental
importance, it is petitioners humble submission that, as a citizen, a taxpayer
and a member of the BAR, he has the legal standing to file this petition.
But even if his submission is valid, petitioners standing is still imperiled by
the white elephant in the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election
protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr. before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal, because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above,
requires that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Such appearance as counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind,
would have been the first opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of
the Tribunals constitution.
Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in
this instance. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared
and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a
seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his
unconditional acceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case he was
defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for
the proper invocation of this Courts power of judicial review. Even on this
score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
2) The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically and exclusively clothed with
jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President

and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of cases, this

Court has long recognized that these electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction
over election contests only after a candidate has already been proclaimed
winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election
protest or quo warranto may be filed after the proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before
this Court involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among
others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),18 cannot claim ignorance
of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the
overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections19 is
that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and
vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an
independent Electoral Tribunal.
Despite the foregoing, petitioner is adamant on his contention that the
provision, as worded, does not authorize the constitution of the PET. And
although he concedes that the Supreme Court may promulgate its rules for
this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the constitution of the PET is
unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers that it allows the Court to
appoint additional personnel for the purpose, notwithstanding the silence of
the constitutional provision.
Petitioners pastiche arguments are all hurled at the Court, hopeful that at
least one might possibly stick. But these arguments fail to elucidate on the
scope of the rules the Supreme Court is allowed to promulgate. Apparently,
petitioners concept of this adjunct of judicial power is very restrictive.
Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioners opinion, we are guided by wellsettled principles of constitutional construction.
Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and nugatory.
On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the
establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit,
otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations which, though
unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his restrictive view one which
really does not offer a solution.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should
be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel
provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and
exercise of judicial power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court
acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal from the unequivocal grant of
jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution is
sound and tenable.
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rulemaking power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not as restrictive as petitioner
would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise
exclusive authority to promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To
this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and then emphasized that the sole
power ought to be without intervention by the legislative department.
Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve
presidential and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making
power connected thereto.
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation.
The precursors of the present Constitution did not contain similar provisions
and instead vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and vicepresidential elections from the canvassing of election returns, to the
proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even
the determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations
may be contested. Unless the legislature enacted a law creating an institution

that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-Presidential

race, a defeated candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the
votes cast for the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the
proclaimed candidate. Effectively, presidential and vice-presidential contests
were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu.
Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the
PET was permitted to recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public
officers or private individuals, who in its opinion had participated in any
irregularity connected with the canvassing and/or accomplishing of election
returns.
The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a
specific budget from the national treasury or Special Activities Fund for its
operational expenses. It was empowered to appoint its own clerk in
accordance with its rules. However, the subordinate officers were strictly
employees of the judiciary or other officers of the government who were
merely designated to the tribunal.
Clearly, petitioners bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are
unwarranted. His arguments that: (1) the Chief Justice and Associate Justices
are referred to as "Chairman" and "Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses
a different seal; (3) the Chairman is authorized to appoint personnel; and (4)
additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in order to bolster
his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to
merit further attention by the Court.
Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate
progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members
of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an "awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot
overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of
power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not
unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although

the method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not
specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation
on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof. The Supreme Courts method of
deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the
PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in
the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent
to the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed
on numerous occasions.
The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit
it has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was
constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and
it faithfully complies not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The
adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the
Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral court.
As regards petitioners claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in
contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that
the issue in Buac v. COMELEC43 involved the characterization of the
enforcement and administration of a law relative to the conduct of a
plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections.
However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared,
in an obiter, that "contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power."
The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.

The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law." Consistent with
our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the
settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to
courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was
expanded to include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The power was expanded, but it
remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over
election contests is vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and
the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional
and senatorial exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC
and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which
are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of
law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which
involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit
constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the
COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and
the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial
review via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party if there is a
showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the
Supreme Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power
wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts
of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution
draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in
the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional
proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will be
among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in
Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices
shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively
exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12,
Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article
VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the
same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which
Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by
the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not
separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v.
State of Maryland49 proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it,
is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the
Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners
during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a
microscopic view, like the petitioners, should not constrict an absolute and
constitutional grant of judicial power.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.