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Balance of Power
Balance of Power
WORK
CONCEPT OF BALANCE OF
POWER
Associate Professor
ROLL NO
-909 C.N.L.U
1ST YEAR
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Writing a project is one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever faced.
Though this project has been presented by me but there are many people who remained in
veil, who gave their all support and helped me to complete this project.
First of all I am very grateful to my subject teacher Dr. S.P Singh without the kind support of
whom and help the completion of the project was a herculean task for me. He donated his
valuable time from his busy time to help me to complete this project and suggested me from
where and how to collect data.
I am very thankful to the librarian who provided me several books on this topic which proved
beneficial in completing this project.
I acknowledge my friends who gave their valuable and meticulous advice which was very
useful and could not be ignored in writing the project. I want to convey most sincere thanks
to Sir Anuj Tiwari and Sir Animesh Jha for helping me throughout the project.
Akshay Mishra
Roll No. 909
IInd Semester
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Bandwagoning
Chainganging
Buck passing and Blood letting
Offensive and Defensive Realism
Balance of Threat
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CHAPTER I
Concept of Balance of Power Definition and Meaning
Balance of power theory is the idea that national security is enhanced when military
capabilities are distributed so that no one state is strong enough to dominate all others.1 If one
state gains inordinate power, the theory predicts that it will take advantage of its strength and
attack weaker neighbours thereby providing an incentive for those threatened to unite in a
defensive coalition. Some realists maintain that this would be more stable as aggression
would appear unattractive and would be averted if there was equilibrium of power between
the rival coalitions.2
When confronted by a significant external threat, states may balance or bandwagon balancing
is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat, whereas bandwagoning refers to
alignment with the source of danger.3
States may also employ other alliance tactics, such as buck-passing and chain-ganging. There
is a longstanding debate among realists with regard to how the polarity of a system impacts
on which tactic states use 4 however, it is generally agreed that balancing is more efficient
in bipolar systems as each great power has no choice but to directly confront the other.5
Along with inter-realist debates about the prevalence of balancing in alliance patterns, other
schools of international relations such as constructivists are also critical of the balance of
power theory, disputing core realist assumptions regarding the international system and the
behaviour of states.6
Balance of power, in international relations, the posture and policy of a nation or group of
nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power
against the power of the other side. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two
ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the
competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as
when embarking upon a policy of alliances
6 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp.
118, 121
7 Mearsheimer, John (2010), "Structural Realism", in Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; Smith, Steve,
International Relations Theories, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 7985
8 Ibid
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States happy with their place in the system are known as "status quo" states, while those
seeking to alter the balance of power in their favour are generally referred to as "revisionist
states" and aspire for hegemony, thus repairing the balance.9
A party or person may also hold a theoretical 'balance of power' in a chamber without any
commitment to government, in which case both the government and opposition groupings
may on occasion need to negotiate that party's legislative support.11
Balance of power theory grew out of many centuries of multipolarity and a few decades of
bipolarity. Today the world is characterized by unprecedented unipolarity. Balance of power
theory, therefore, cannot provide guidance for the world we are in.12
Balance of Power is equilibrium of power sufficient to discourage or prevent one nation or
party from imposing its will on or interfering with the interests of another.13
In international relations, an equilibrium of power sufficient to discourage or prevent one
nation or party from imposing its will on or interfering with the interests of another. The term
came into use at the end of the Napoleonic Wars to denote the power relationships in the
European state system. Until World War I, Britain played the role of balancer in a number of
shifting alliances. After World War II, a Northern Hemisphere balance of power pitted the
U.S. and its allies against the Soviet Union and its satellite in a bipolar balance of power
backed by the threat of nuclear war. China's defection from the Soviet camp to a nonaligned
but covertly anti-Soviet stance produced a third node of power. With the Soviet Union's
collapse (1991), the U.S. and its NATO allies were recognized universally as the world's
paramount military power.14
The term balance of power came into use to denote the power relationships in the European
state system from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War I. Within the European
balance of power, Great Britain played the role of the balancer, or holder of the balance.
It was not permanently identified with the policies of any European nation, and it would
throw its weight at one time on one side, at another time on another side, guided largely by
one considerationthe maintenance of the balance itself. Naval supremacy and its virtual
11 Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 2000)
12 Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984.
13 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/balance%20of%20power
14 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473296/balance-of-power
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immunity from foreign invasion enabled Great Britain to perform this function, which made
the European balance of power both flexible and stable.
The balance of power from the early 20th century onward underwent drastic changes that for
all practical purposes destroyed the European power structure as it had existed since the end
of the Middle Ages. Prior to the 20th century, the political world was composed of a number
of separate and independent balance-of-power systems, such as the European, the American,
the Chinese, and the Indian. But World War I and its attendant political alignments triggered a
process that eventually culminated in the integration of most of the worlds nations into a
single balance-of-power system.15 This integration began with the World War I alliance of
Britain, France, Russia, and the United States against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The
integration continued in World War II, during which the fascist nations of Germany, Japan,
and Italy were opposed by a global alliance of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain,
and China.16 World War II ended with the major weights in the balance of power having
shifted from the traditional players in western and central Europe to just two non-European
ones: the United States and the Soviet Union. The result was a bipolar balance of power
across the northern half of the globe that pitted the free-market democracies of the West
against the communist one-party states of Eastern Europe. More specifically, the nations of
Western Europe sided with the United States in the NATO military alliance, while the Soviet
Unions satellite-allies in central and Eastern Europe became unified under Soviet leadership
in the Warsaw Pact.17
Because the balance of power was now bipolar and because of the great disparity of power
between the two superpowers and all other nations, the European countries lost that freedom
of movement that previously had made for a flexible system. Instead of a series of shifting
and basically unpredictable alliances with and against each other, the nations of Europe now
clustered around the two superpowers and tended to transform themselves into two stable
blocs.18
There were other decisive differences between the post-war balance of power and its
predecessor. The fear of mutual destruction in a global nuclear holocaust injected into the
foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union a marked element of restraint19. A
direct military confrontation between the two superpowers and their allies on European soil
was an almost-certain gateway to nuclear war and was therefore to be avoided at almost any
cost. So instead, direct confrontation was largely replaced by -
(1) A massive arms race whose lethal products were never used and
(2) Political meddling or limited military interventions by the superpowers in various Third
World nations.
CHAPTER II
Balance of Power Various Aspects
18 Abu-Lughod, Janet (2004) Before European Hegemony: The World System AD12501350. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
19 Paul, T.V., James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (eds) (2004) Balance of PowerTheory and Practice in the
21st Century. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
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Bandwagoning
Bandwagoning in international relations occurs when a state aligns with a stronger,
adversarial power and concedes that the stronger adversary-turned-partner disproportionately
gains in the spoils they conquer together.20 Bandwagoning, therefore, is a strategy employed
by weak states. The logic stipulates that an outgunned, weaker state should align itself with a
stronger adversary because the latter can take what it wants by force anyway.21 Thucydides
famous dictum, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must, captures
the essence of bandwagoning.
Bandwagoning was coined by Quincy Wright in A Study of War (1942) and popularized
by Kenneth Waltz in Theory of International Politics (1979). Bandwagoning occurs when
weaker states decide that the cost of opposing a stronger power exceeds the benefits. The
stronger power may offer incentives, such as the possibility of territorial gain, trade
agreements, or protection, to induce weaker states to join with it.22
Realism predicts that states will bandwagon only when there is no possibility of building a
balancing coalition or their geography makes balancing difficult (i.e. surrounded by enemies).
Bandwagoning is considered to be dangerous because it allows a rival state to gain power.23
Bandwagoning is opposed to balancing, which calls for a state to prevent an aggressor from
upsetting the balance of power.24
20 Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company. pp. 162
21 Mearsheimer, John (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and
Company. pp. 163
22 Walt, Stephen M. (Spring 1985). "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World
Power". International Security 9 (4): 7. Retrieved 8 May 2013.
23 Langer, William L. (1953). The Diplomacy of Imperialism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 434
435.
24 Brown, Seyom (1968). The Faces of Power. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 217
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States choose to balance for two reasons. First, they place their survival at risk if they fail to
curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong; to ally with the dominant power
means placing ones trust in its continued benevolence. Secondly, joining the weaker side
increases the likelihood that the new member will be influential within the alliance.25 States
choose to bandwagon because it may be a form of appeasement as the band wagoner may
hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewherea defensive reasonor because it may
align with the dominant side in wartime to share the spoils of victoryan offensive reason.
Realists claim that balancing is when states ally against the prevailing threat and results in a
more secure world whereas in a bandwagoning world security is scarce as rising hegemons
are not kept in check.26 With bandwagoning, the threatened state abandons hope of preventing
the aggressor from gaining power at its expense and instead joins forces with its dangerous
foe to get at least some small portion of the spoils of war.27
Chain ganging
Chain-ganging occurs when a state sees its own security tied to the security of its alliance
partner. 28It chains itself by deeming any attack on its ally the equivalent of an attack on itself.
This is another aspect of the balance of power theory, whereby the smaller states could drag
their chained states into wars that they have no desire to fight. A key example of this was the
chain-ganging between states prior to World War I, dragging the entire European continent to
war over a dispute between the relatively minor powers of Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Thus
states "may chain themselves unconditionally to reckless allies whose survival is seen to be
indispensable to the maintenance of the balance".29
25 Mearsheimer, John (2010), "Structural Realism", in Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; Smith, Steve,
International Relations Theories, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 85
26 Walt, Stephen M. (1987), The Origins of Alliances, New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 5, 20
27 Mearsheimer, John (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, pp. 147
28 Christensen, Thomas J.; Snyder, Jack (1990), "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting
Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", International Organization 44: pp.139
29 Ibid
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30 Mearsheimer, John (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, pp. 149
31 Ibid
32 Bull, Hedley and Adam Watson (1984) The Expansion of International Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press
33 Buzan, Barry and Richard Little (2000) International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of
International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press.
34 Ibid
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Offensive Realism
Offensive realists accept that threatened states usually balance against dangerous foes,
however, they maintain that balancing is often inefficient and that this inefficiency provides
opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries.37 Buck passing,
rather than joining a balancing coalition, is another tactic offensive realists point to when
disputing the balance of power theory.
Offensive realists believe that internal balancing measures such as increasing defence
spending, implementing conscription, are only effective to a certain extent as there are
usually significant limits on how many additional resources a threatened state can muster
35 Howard, Sir Esme (May 1925), "British Policy and the Balance of Power", The American
Political Science Review 19 (2): 261
36 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.
Mearsheimer tries to mend BOP theory after it was unable to predict or explain the end of the Cold
War. He describes himself as an "offensive realist" and believes that states do not simply balance, but
because they want to survive in an anarchical system they get frequently aggressive. This is in
contrast to Waltz, whom he describes as "defensive realist", who says that states primarily seek
survival through balancing.
37 Ibid
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against an aggressor. However, since offensive realists theorize that states are always seeking
to maximize their power, states are "effectively engaged in internal balancing all the time".38
Balance of Threat
The balance of threat theory is an offshoot of the balancing, coined in 1985 by Stephen M.
Walt in an attempt to explain why balancing against rising hegemons has not always been
consistent in history. In contrast to traditional balance of power theorists, Walt suggests that
states balance against threats, rather than against power alone.39 The theory acknowledges that
power is an extremely important factor in the level of threat posed by a state, but also
includes geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions.
CHAPTER III
Balance of Power: Its Relevance in Contemporary Era
The concept of balance of power is considered as one of the oldest and fundamental concept
in the field of international relations.40 International relations theorists had been defining
balance of power differently to highlight its significance and relevance in international
38 Wolfforth, William C. (1999) The Stability of a Unipolar World, International Security 21(1): pp. 12.
39 Walt, Stephen M. (1987), The Origins of Alliances, New York: Cornell University Press, pp. 19
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politics, as David Hume declared balance of power as scientific law due to its significance in
international politics.
Glenn Snyder highlighted balance of power as a core theoretical concept in international
relations. Hans Morgenthau called balance of power as iron law of politics and Henry
Kissinger, regarded balance of power as more an art than a science.41 Significance and
relevance of balance of power even in contemporary times cannot be ignored, though it was a
fashionable trend among states in historical times.
Power is unevenly distributed among states in international system of states. Therefore, some
of the states are powerful and others are comparatively weak. There is no instrument to
measure power of states, though power is always measured in relative terms. States,
especially small and weaker states, often cannot achieve security on their own. So they have
to depend upon other states for enhancing their security. This way smaller state, by
concluding alliances with other powerful (friendly) states try to attain balance of power
against a powerful adversary or a threatening state. The term Balance of Power refers to the
general concept of one or more states power being used to balance that of another state or
group of states.42
Strategies to maintain Balance of power
The concept of balance of power ideally ensures that power is distributed in such a way that
no single state or entity is able to dominate the remaining states or entities. Objective
characteristics such as relative military power and economic resources determine the
distribution of capabilities and hence play a central role in establishing which states occupy
the positions of major powers. Major Powers keep strategy of balancing as topmost priority
44 NATO was formed by United States and its West European Allies to combat threat of Communism and
tocounter United States military might with her Western allies Soviet Union concluded Warsaw pact to maintain
a
power balance between them.
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other but later on with Kissingers secret visit to Beijing in July 1971 both the states
improved their ties to end rivalry and set in new era of relationship.
As there is no permanent friend in international politics, therefore states prefer to adopt a
policy of internal balancing to consolidate their defense, which sounds more reliable for a
state than any other ally.
Internal Balancing
States carve out various strategies to keep a check on external threats. Threatened states could
also adopt the internal balancing strategy of building up weapons, that is, to obtain
countervailing capabilities and thereby attempt to balance the rising powers military strength
which can pose serious threats to its security in future. The key means of internal balancing
by which states balance one another are, building up arms through internal production. This
trend was more in fashion during 18th century. States had been quite busy in making stronger
armies, well equipped with latest weapons to cope with enemies in the battlefield. But this
trend of balancing was not efficacious in enhancing security of the state. Whatever the quality
of weapons one could produce and strengthen its military power but when enemy was in a
position to attack from various sides with the help of their allied states then it was hard to
defend against two or more states. However states realized that internal balancing is crucial
but not sufficient to avert external aggression.
Pakistan and India two rival states in South Asia also adopted internal balancing as a first
strategy to secure national integrity, but limited resources on both sides compelled them to
see other substitutes. Both the rival states in South Asia could not rely heavily upon internal
resources due to limited internal resources and depended on external factor to enhance and
strengthen their security against each other. Additionally, cold war provided golden
opportunity to find friends with great powers. United States and Soviet Union were also
looking for allies to extend their areas of influence.
South Asian region is crucial due to its geopolitics in international system. But before
drawing attention to South Asian region and its geopolitics we should bear in mind that
during cold war era there were only two super powers who divided the world into two rival
camps, Communist and capitalist. Both the superpowers engaged in intense competition to
rule the world. They had the capability to destroy their enemies and even each other, they had
nuclear arsenals thats the reason cold war remain cold war and could not turn into hot war,
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South Asia is significant in its geopolitics that there are two nuclear powers in South Asia.
South Asia is geopolitically and geo strategically important due to unique location. Starting
from Russia to downward China, India and Pakistan are four nuclear powers, whereas North
Korea and Iran are suspected of possessing nuclear capability if not, then sooner they will be
having nuclear bomb. One shares border with the other nuclear actor.45 Security factor is very
crucial in this nuclear armed belt where states with inimical track record are dealing with
each other.
India had been engaged with Pakistan in two full-fledged wars (1965, 1971) and several
armed clashes (1948, 1984 and 1999) which despite huge human and capital costs remained
unsuccessful in resolving disputes. Now the nuclear weapons have enhanced risk of
catastrophic war in subcontinent. Any event of war can escalate into a nuclear war between
India-Pakistan. If such an undesirable mishap occurs then neighbouring states wont be in a
position to save them from effects of nuclear war. But the balance of power theorists see
nuclearization of the region ripe for maintenance of peace between nuclear armed states. If
the Balance of Power is maintained in the region it may create an environment of mutual
deterrence. As cold war between United States and Soviet Union remained a cold war due to
Quasi Balance of Power between nuclear powers. Both the superpowers had realized that if
war erupts will be collective death of both the nations. In case of India and Pakistan its quite
obvious that whenever the balance of power in the region got disturbed there happened a war
between Pakistan and India. China as a biggest stake holder in Asia, after the demise of
USSR, plays a vital role in the maintenance of Balance of power in the region.
Theories explain events; analyse their happenings, present causes and effects of international
events (war and peace).Theories help to make predictions about possible outcome of
circumstances. No theory in the field of international relations is universal to explain all the
events in a precise manner but some are more applicable in some specific case and others
less.
Jack Donnelly describes Theory as an artful abstraction which averts our attention from
goofing up with ambiguous details. Theory precisely directs our attention at the case study,
45 Russia a nuclear armed state and a former superpower shares border with China, China shares border with
India, Pakistan and North Korea, While Iran shares border with Pakistan. Historically India-China had fought
war on territorial dispute. The same between Pakistan and India, China and USSR also did not have amicable
relations and Pakistan and Russia were also unfriendly and engaged in Afghan war. Now the nuclear belt makes
it unique in the world on one hand but on the other side its the most dangerous region of the world where four
nuclear powers of the world are living in proximity.
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International relations scholars had been trying hard to figure out the basic reason of war.
Their extensive studies had been dealing with human nature and declared it a major reason of
war.
Men wherever they live, cannot live in an absolute peace, so conflict amongst them is
inevitable.
Kenneth Waltz augmented Morgenthaus argument about causes of war. He says that the
reasons that often times cause war are found in human nature. War is the outcome of selfish
behaviour, misguided and aggressive impulse, and foolish actions and policies. He describes
the other causes of war as secondary and need to be understand in the context of these basic
causes of war,50 another notion that made an attempt to make it clear that why states cannot
live in an absolute peace is due to anarchy.
This World is anarchic and almost all the states are sovereign actors and there is no central
authority in international society of states which could regulate relations among them. All the
states operate in international system of states as autonomous actors. They are independent in
their decision making, formulation of policies and implementation of laws. They enjoy the
legality of using force against those elements that could endanger it security and integrity.
Every state does have her respective national interest and each state struggles to maximize its
power in the anarchical global system to protect and promote their national interest. States
dont compromise their national interest rather promote it through various means. If some
states do not acquire sufficient power, they can be more prone to become subservient to other
powerful states and their will, ultimately, lose their sovereignty, security and prosperity.
Anarchical structure, therefore, pushes states to increase their power, because security and
survival cannot be dissociate from power maximization. Consequently, the competition for
power enhancement becomes a natural state of affair in world politics.51
49 Renowned six principles of Power Politics by Hans J Morgenthau, Three of them are explaining more
relevancies to the topic. Hans J Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations(Revised by Kenneth W Thompson)
(1992),Peking University Press Beijing,p5
50 Kenneth Waltz, Man the State and War; A theoretical Analysis,(2001), Columbia University Press,
New York,P16
51 Paul.op.cit.p4
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States remain engaged in a constant struggle to achieve a satisfied level of security against
internal and external threats. As Pakistan and India both, had been trying to achieve a
satisfied level of struggle against each other and any external threat. Kenneth Waltz writes
that the state conducts its affairs in an uncertain situation and remains in a constant fear of
being attacked by other rival states. Due to uncertainty, some states may use force any-time to
endanger the survival of others, so all the states must be prepared to face such a surprise
attack or live at the mercy of their militarily more powerful neighbours. As Pakistans
integrity was threatened by India immediately after independence and consequently weaker
(economically and militarily) Pakistan depended on United States and cultivated friendly ties
with China to seek economic, military and diplomatic aid from allied states. Waltz maintains
that among states, the state of nature is a state of war. This does not mean that war occurs all
the times but in the sense that such an uncertain situation can lead states to war and war may
break out anytime. Conflict (minor, major) among individuals and states is inevitable.52
The notion of security has been at the heart of international affairs for centuries. If historical
wars are taken into account (the Peloponnesian war, Thirty years war, and the First and
Second World Wars), it helps us to frame that how the world politics is conceptualized.
Security indeed doesnt have any structure, but it depends upon the actors how do they view
and define it. The way one secures oneself may not have the same effects for others. One fact
is indisputable that every state in the world desires to be secure from internal and external
threats, for that reason they pursue the objective by enhancing their military power. 53
CONCLUSION
Balance of power, in international relations, the posture and policy of a nation or group of
nations protecting itself against another nation or group of nations by matching its power
against the power of the other side. States can pursue a policy of balance of power in two
ways: by increasing their own power, as when engaging in an armaments race or in the
competitive acquisition of territory; or by adding to their own power that of other states, as
when embarking upon a policy of alliances
The balance of power theory is a core tenet of both classical and neorealist theory and seeks
to explain alliance formation. Due to the neorealist idea of anarchism as a result of the
international system, states must ensure their survival through maintaining or increasing their
power in a self-help world. With no authority above the state to come to its rescue in the
event of an attack by a hegemon, states attempt to prevent a potential hegemon from arising
by balancing against it. According to Kenneth Waltz, founder of neorealism, "balance-ofpower politics prevail wherever two, and only two requirements are met: that the order be
anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive".
The notion of security has been at the heart of international affairs for centuries. States
remain engaged in a constant struggle to achieve a satisfied level of security against
internal and external threats. Waltz maintains that among states, the state of nature is a state
of war. This does not mean that war occurs all the times but in the sense that such an
uncertain situation can lead states to war and war may break out anytime. Conflict (minor,
major) among individuals and states is inevitable. Kenneth Waltz writes that the state
conducts its affairs in an uncertain situation and remains in a constant fear of being attacked
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by other rival states. Due to uncertainty, some states may use force any-time to endanger the
survival of others, so all the states must be prepared to face such a surprise attack or live at
the mercy of their militarily more powerful neighbours.
Every state does have her respective national interest and each state struggles to maximize its
power in the anarchical global system to protect and promote their national interest. States
dont compromise their national interest rather promote it through various means. If some
states do not acquire sufficient power, they can be more prone to become subservient to other
powerful states and their will, ultimately, lose their sovereignty, security and prosperity.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS REFERRED
Liselotte Odgaard, The Balance of Power in Asia Pacific Security: US-China Policies
on Regional Order, Taylor and Francis, 2001
Goldstein S.Joshua, International Relations, 6th Edition, Peking University Press, 2005
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, 4th
Edition 1967.
ONLINE SOURCES
www.brittanica.com
www.foreignaffairs.com
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www.merriam-webster.com
www.dictionary.reference.com
www.goodreads.com
www.infoplease.com
www.foreignpolicy.com
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