Mathew
Mathew
JS-6
CV 14-07832-RGK (AGRx)
Title
Present: The
Honorable
Date
Not Reported
N/A
Deputy Clerk
Tape No.
Not Present
Not Present
Proceedings:
I.
INTRODUCTION
On November 19, 2013, Royce Mathew (Plaintiff) filed an Amended Complaint against The
Walt Disney Company, et al. (Defendants), alleging the following claims: (1) Federal Copyright
Infringement from June 10, 2010 until the present, (2) Federal Copyright Infringement from July 1,
2007 until June 9, 2010, (3) Rescission of Fraudulently Procured Release Agreement, and (4) Federal
Copyright Infringement from July 2003 through June 2007. On February 11, 2015, the Court granted
Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings dismissing the First, Second, and Fourth claims, and
dismissing the Third claim for rescission with leave to amend.
On February 18, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleging the
following claims: (1) Rescission of the Fraudulently Procured Release; (2) Federal Copyright
Infringement from May 28, 2010 until the present; and (3) Federal Copyright Infringement from July
2003 until the present.
On February 25, 2015, Defendants filed their Motion to Stay Discovery. On February 27, 2015,
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6).
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS without leave to amend Defendants Motion to Dismiss
and DENIES as moot Defendants Motion to Stay.
II.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges the following:
In the 1980s and continuing in the 1990s, Plaintiff authored and created an array of original
supernatural stories and other original works. Among these works were a Supernatural Pirate Story
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JUDICIAL STANDARD
A party may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must
assume that the allegations in the challenged complaint are true and construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 33738 (9th Cir.
1996). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory legal allegations; threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Dismissal is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal
theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr.,
521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, a pleading must contain sufficient facts that, accepted as true,
state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim is facially plausible when there
are sufficient factual allegations to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct. Id. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but a plaintiffs
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires that he plead more than labels and
conclusions. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
IV.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Rescission claim should be dismissed because he fails to
properly allege notice of rescission in his SAC. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs Second and
Third claims fail in light of the Courts February 11 Order and Plaintiffs inability to properly plead
rescission. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A.
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs 2009 Letter and all subsequent communications with
Defendants via Alert Line do not constitute notice, as required by California Civil Code
1691. See Cal. Civ. Code 1691(a).
Pursuant to California Civil Code 1691, to effect a rescission a party to the contract must,
promptly upon discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind . . . (a) Give notice of rescission to the
party as to whom he rescinds . . . . Civ. Code 1691. While [i]t is not necessary that the notice to
rescind shall be formal and explicit . . . notice shall be given to the other party which clearly shows the
intention of the person rescinding to consider the contract at an end. Wilson v. Lewis, 106 Cal. App. 3d
802, 809 (1980) (quoting Hull v. Ray, 211 Cal. 164, 167 (1930)) (internal quotations omitted); see Zeller
v. Milligan, 71 Cal. App. 617, 625 (1925) (The general rule is that the act of rescission by one party to
the agreement implies some notice to the other party thereto of an intention and determination to
extinguish the contract.).
In the 2009 Letter attached to the SAC, Plaintiff states that Defendants have committed fraud,
and that the 2009 Letter is notification of the advancement of the process of filing formal complaints
and charges of conspiracy, fraud, corruption, obstruction of justice, evidence tampering and such against
[Defendants] hiding behind the corporate Mickey Mouse logo. (SAC, Ex. 3.) The 2009 Letter further
states that it is pointless to ever seek accountability by way of any logical resolution, fair mediation or
by way of the court. (Id.) Plaintiff concludes the 2009 Letter by stating that he await[s] a prompt reply
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Plaintiff does not point to any other language in the 2009 Letter that would suggest notice of rescission.
Plaintiff does mention the subsequent communications with Alert Line, and concludes that those communications
further constitute notice.
2
While not attached to the SAC, the Court takes notice of the communications because Plaintiff references
them in his SAC, they are central to Plaintiffs Rescission claim, and no party questions the authenticity of the
communications. See United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011).
3
The letters were in conjunction with some of the phone calls made to Alert Line.
As discussed in the Courts February 11 Order, a viable claim for rescission would have revived
Plaintiffs copyright infringement claims from May 28, 2010 until the present.4 (See February 11, 2015
Order, ECF No. 85, p. 8.) However, because the Court finds that dismissal of Plaintiffs Rescission
claim is warranted, the Court declines to address Plaintiffs Second and Third claims in light of the
Courts February 11, 2015 Order and the present Order. Plaintiffs Second and Third claims are moot.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS without leave to amend Defendants Motion to
Dismiss, as amendment would be futile. In light of this ruling, Defendants Motion to Stay Discovery is
DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
:
Initials of Preparer
Plaintiffs Third claim would still be barred by res judicata even if the Rescission claim were to survive.
(See February 11, 2015 Order, ECF No. 85, p. 4.)