40 Great Submarine Simulator War Adventures

40
GREAT
Submarine
Simulator
War Adventures
Richard G. Sheffield
COMPUTE! Books
Radnor, Pennsylvania
Maps of the Pacific Theater courtesy of MicroProse Simulation Software.

All photographs courtesy of the National Archives.
Editor: Robert Bixby
Copyright 1989, COMPUTE! Publications, Inc. All rights reserved.
Reproduction or translation of any part of this work beyond that permitted by
Sections 107 and 108 of the United States Copyright Act without the permission of
the copyright owner is unlawful.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Sheffield, Richard G.
40 great submarine simulator war adventures/ Richard G. Sheffield.
p. cm.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-87455-172-2
1. War games, Naval. 2. Computer war games. 3. World War, 1939-1945-Naval operations, American--Computer simulation. 4. World War, 1939-1945-Naval operations--Submarine--Computer simulation. I. Title. II. Title: Forty
great submarine simulator war adventures.
V250.S54 1989
88-63162
793.9'2--dc20
CIP
ISBN 0-87455-172-2
The author and publisher have made every effort in the preparation of this book to ensure the accuracy of the information. However, the information in this book is sold without warranty, either
express or implied. Neither the author nor COMPUTE! Publications, Inc. will be liable for any
damages caused or alleged to be caused directly, indirectly, incidentally, or consequentially by the
information in this book.
The opinions expressed in this book are solely those of the author and are not necessarily those of
COMPUTE! Publications, Inc.
COMPUTE! Books, Post Office Box 5406, Greensboro, North Carolina 27403, (919)
275-9809, is a Capital Cities/ ABC, Inc. company and is not associated with any manufacturer of personal computers.
Silent Service is a trademark of MicroProse Simulation Software.
Up Periscope! is a trademark of ActionSoft.
Contents
Foreword
.............. . ...... . ........ . .................. v
Chapters
1. The Submarine War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Attack Basics and Terminology ... . .... ... ... .. . . . . . ..... . .. 5
Navigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Over from Midway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Up from Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. USS Triton
3rd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. S-44
3rd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4. USS Guardflsh
1st Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5. USS Guardflsh
8th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6. USS Slivers/des
4th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7. USS Slivers/des
10th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8. USS Pogy
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
9. USS Wahoo
3rd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10. USS Wahoo
4th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
11. USS Wahoo
7th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
12. USS Trigger
6th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
13. USS Seahorse
2nd Patrol ... . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . . ...... . . . ....... . . ..... 77
14. USS Seahorse
3rd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
15. USS Seahorse
4th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
16. USS Bowfln
2nd Patrol . . . ... . . .... . . ..... . . . .. .... ............. . ... 91
17. USS Seawolf
12th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
18. USS Snook
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
19. USS Gunard
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
20. USS Sand/once

2nd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
21. USS Barb

8th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22. USS Barb
9th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23. USS Barb
11 th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24. USS Harder
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25. USS Spadeflsh
l st Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26. USS Spadeflsh
2nd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27. USS Spadef/sh
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28. USS Porche
2nd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29. USS Ray
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30. USS Ray
6th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
31. USS Rasher
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32. USS Cabrllla
6th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
33. USS Hammerhead
2nd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34. USS Atule
l st Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35. USS Flasher
5th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36. USS Tlrante
l st Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37. USS Sea Dog
4th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38. USS Tang
l st Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39. USS Tang
3rd Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40. USS Tang
4th Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41. USS Tang
5th Patrol and Loss of the Tang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
118
123
l 30
l 36
142
149
154
161
165
171
l 76
180
184
189
193
197
202
207
215
227
236
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
Foreword
Purchasers of submarine simulators put great store in becoming expert submarine commanders, but they lack the opportunity to measure their skills against real submarine
commanders-the brave men who brought Japan close to collapse with their unstoppable attacks on enemy shipping
throughout the South Pacific and Far East. World War II was
the only great submarine war. The British and the Japanese
discovered how vulnerable they were to attacks on their vital
sea lanes.
Now, simulator submariners can look over the shoulders
of the men who made it possible-listen to their private
thoughts, learn from their mistakes and successes. But most
important, simulator submariners can get to know and understand genuine American heroes.
Read the remarkable tales of the brave captains' adventures as they slip in and out of the Emperor's dominion,
claiming the high seas for their own. Follow the exploits of
submarines like S-44, Pogy, Wahoo, Snook, Cunard, Sandlance,
Parche, Cabrilla, Atule, Flasher, Sea Dog, and Tang. Learn about
the strategies of the submarine war: attack basics and terminology, navigation, and common routes taken into and out of
battle.
These are 40 of the best and most exciting adventures,
following the day-to-day actions of the most successful combat
submarine skippers. Watch with them as the big freighters go
down, listen to the sound of shearing metal, and wait out the
depth charge attacks in close, airless quarters, hundreds of feet
underwater.
Share the thoughts and perceptions of legendary commanders like "Mush" Morton, Charles Kirkpatrick, J.R.
"Dinty" Moore, Thomas Klakring, N.G. Ward, C.R. Burlingame, John S. Coye, and Dick O'Kane as they stalk their prey,
wait in ambush, and face the rigors of failing equipment, unpredictable torpedoes, and ramming attempts by freighters and
escorts.
v
This book is full of the stuff that makes heroes of ordinary men. See what it takes to match these adventures, attack
for attack, using a simulator, the powers of the imagination,
and these sterling examples of valor collected by noted author
Richard G. Sheffield.
vi
The Submarine War

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor launched the greatest naval war of all time. The attack was brilliantly timed and executed, but fatally flawed. Many say that failing to catch the
U.S. carriers in port was the biggest error. Possibly so. In any
case, the carriers weren't there to be attacked.
The U.S. Pacific submarine force was there however, and
it was totally ignored. Hundreds of Japanese torpedo-plane pilots flew right over-and sometimes next to-the submarine
base and its munitions dump on neighboring Kuaha .. In doing
so, they missed a golden opportunity to destroy the one arm
of the U.S. Navy capable of attacking the weakest link in the
Empire's chain: shipping.
Figure 1 1. Another Japanese Freighter Goes Down
Chapter 1. The Submarine War
Japan was an overpopulated island nation totally dependent on imports for everything from rice to oil. The large surface ships either damaged or destroyed at Pearl Harbor were
impressive and powerful, but it would have been many
months, or even years, before the ships could operate deep
into the Japanese controlled areas of the Pacific. However, on
the afternoon of the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7,
1941, the order was given: Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan. The subs, with their supplies and
harbor facilities spared in the attack, were the only forces capable of responding immediately, and respond they didslowly at first, but with gathering speed.
The year 1942 was a tentative one for the submarine
forces. Outdated tactics had to be discarded, unaggressive
skippers replaced, exploratory reconnaissance conducted, and
new tactics developed. Only 139 ships were sunk by submarines in 1942, but the foundation was laid. With many of the
tactical problems behind them, the U.S. submarine forces
moved into 1943 with but one major problem: faulty
torpedoes.
The year 1943 saw increasing numbers of successful patrols, most notably those of Commander Dudley "Mush" Morton and the USS Wahoo, whose outstanding patrols are
described in detail in this book. His aggressive attacks gave
the entire corps a lift just when they needed it.
Torpedo problems remained, highlighted by the experience of the USS Tinosa. On one occasion, the Tinosa intercepted and attacked a large tanker. Four torpedoes were fired,
and although several appeared to hit the ship, only minor
damage resulted. The tanker was stopped but not ready to
sink. The submarine's captain, Commander Daspit, had a sitting duck and so moved in for the kill, conning the boat to a
perfect firing position 875 yards away.
He fired nine torpedoes, one after another. All hit. All
were duds. In all, 15 shots were fired at the tanker; 13 hit
their target, but after the attack, the ship was in no danger of
sinking. The captain held onto his last torpedo and headed for
home. A similar incident happened to the Wahoo.
Testing showed that the better the setup, the more likely
2
40 Great Submarine Simulator Adventures
it was that the torpedo would be a dud! The problem was the
firing pin: If the torpedo struck the target at a perfect 90-degree angle, the firing pin would almost always shear off and
the torpedo would fail to explode. Even with this serious torpedo problem, the 1943 total went up to 307 ships sunk.
The year 1944 would see the virtual destruction of the
Japanese merchant fleet. By the end of the first half of 1944,
the war in the Pacific was no longer in doubt. Three of the
five Japanese aircraft carriers remaining at the beginning of the
year were lying on the bottom-two of them downed by submarines. The "back" of the fleet was finally broken.
With the Japanese fleet severely depleted, the submarines
turned their attention to the tankers carrying fuel oil for the
fleet and aircraft. One tanker after another went to the bottom.
Fuel became so critical that training missions for new pilots
were severely cut, and as a result, the "green" Japanese pilots
were easy pickings for the now-veteran U.S. naval aviators.
The USS Tang, under the command of Dick O'Kane, had
her legendary run in 1944 (her entire career is set down in
Chapters 38-41, so you can trace her path and try to equal her
record). With properly running torpedoes and many new boats
in service, submarines sank 548 ships in 1944, effectively
isolating Japan from the resources they needed to continue
the war.
The year 1945 was a year of mopping up; still, one more
major submarine offensive was needed to convince the Japanese leaders to give up the fight. Ships were being sunk faster
than they could be replaced, and the pickings were getting
slim. United States submarines hadn't ventured back into the
Sea of Japan since the Wahoo was lost there in 1943, but with
new mine-detecting devices, it was now time to reenter "Hirohito's Lake" and avenge the loss of the Wahoo.
Admiral Lockwood, COMSUBPAC, put together and ordered "Operation Barney." Nine fleet subs-the Sea Dog, Crevalle, Spadefish, Tunny, Skate, Bonefish, Flyingfish, Bowfin, and
Tinosa-ventured into the Sea of Japan to show the Emperor
that the U.S. had the capability of cutting him off from the
mainland completely. The operation was a resounding success
with 28 merchant ships and assorted others sunk, but unfortu3
Figure 1-2. Japanese Destroyer Torpedoed by the Seawaff
nately, the Bonefish didn't return. Going down with all hands,
she was the last Pacific sub lost in the war.
With the Empire on the verge of starvation, atomic bomb
attacks on Japan several weeks later pushed the tiny empire
over the edge. The result was surrender. While the crews of
the "flat tops" and pilots stole most of the headlines, the submariners of the Silent Service carried the ball for much of the
war. Although they numbered fewer than 2 percent of U.S.
Navy personnel, these men accounted for well over half the
ships sunk.
Figure 1-3. Battle-weary Subs and Crews at Pearl Harbor
Attack
Basi~s and Terminology

Submariners use terminology standard to all nautical activities.
Some of the most common terms are:
Bow
Stern
Starboard
Port
Quarter
The front or forward part of a ship.

The rear or aft part of a ship.
The right side of a ship when facing forward.
The left side of a ship when facing forward.
An area off to one side of a ship; for example, the
right rear area would be the aft starboard quarter.
Many of these terms will be used in the patrol section of

this book while others, not listed here, will also be used from
time to time. Those will be explained either at the time of
mention or in the glossary at the end of the book.
A submarine attack is normally divided into three parts:
The classification phase
The approach phase
The attack phase
The classification phase consists of sighting a possible

target and tracking it long enough to determine the target's direction of travel. Most games sight the targets for you, so all
you have to do is determine the direction of travel. If the target is too far away for the game to make a determination for
you, you can do it yourself by heading directly toward the
contact.
Note the relative motion of the target to your heading. Its
movement to your right or left will give you an idea of its direction. If it doesn't move in either direction, it's either moving
directly toward or away from you.
The approach phase consists of moving to a firing position undetected by the enemy. After determining the target's
course, you should determine if the target is ahead of or behind you. If he's ahead of you, most likely you'll need to perform an end-around maneuver to get ahead of him. This is
normally executed on the surface to avoid running down your
batteries; as such, you may need to pull away from the target
to avoid being spotted when you surface.
If the target is behind you, you should use a standard approach course. This can be accomplished while you're submerged during the day or on the surface at night. The rule of
thumb for a standard approach is to take an intercept course
to the target track that is 90 degrees off the line of sight to the
target. You should try to reach a firing position ahead of the
enemy, off his track by 1000-2000 yards. It's best to get there
ahead of him and wait in silent ambush, but you can attack on
the move if it looks like the target may get by you.
The attack phase involves remaining undetected until
time to fire, firing the torpedoes, and then withdrawing if necessary. If you're waiting in an ambush position, it's best to
point the target-keep turning slightly so that as the target approaches, your bow is always pointing directly at him. That
way, you always present a minimum angle to lookouts and
sonar operators. Your best firing position is one in which the
target will be at a perfect right angle to you when the torpedo
hits. This will give you a wide broadside target.
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Chapter 1. The Submartne War
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Shooting at a target headed straight for you is called a
down-the-throat shot. Conversely, shooting at a target headed

directly away from you is called an up-the-kilt shot. These
aren't very "high percentage" shots, but they'll work on occasion. You must weigh the possibilities of the success of t!:tis
shot against the possible returns. If you're attacking a convoy
with only one escort, a down-the-throat shot might be worth
the risk if the escort crew spots you. With the escort out of the
way, you can easily take care of the whole convoy. In this
case, firing three or four torpedoes down-the-throat might be a
good risk.
If there are more escorts, however, it's not worth throwing away valuable torpedoes; your chances with the rest of the
group aren't improved by this tactic. One exception is a situation in which you've been spotted on the surface, a destroyer
is coming at you, and you know he'll reach you before you
can attain a safe depth. In this case, one shot down-the-throat
might hit him or at least cause him to turn to avoid the shot,
which would give you the chance to avoid passing directly under him and thus reduce the effectiveness of his depth
charges. By the time he gets around for another pass, you
could get down to a safe depth.
There are countless other tactics, each designed for a certain situation, but one other worth mentioning is the parallel
approach. One problem often encountered by captains is finding a way to use the stern torpedo tubes ..This approach makes
good use of them.
If you find yourself ahead of the target ship, rather than
waiting for it to come to you, you can head toward it on a
reverse heading. As you close on the target, tum hard in one
direction or the other and fire your stem tubes. This has two
benefits: First, you get the chance to use your stern tubes; second, you're already heading away from the enemy at a good
speed, which increases your chances of escaping the destroyers or escorts that may come to challenge you.
Chapter 1. The Su b m artne War
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As mentioned, there are many other tactics, and one of

the joys of simulations is in discovering those tactics for yourself. These maneuvers should get you started. Pay close attention to the following patrol descriptions for other techniques.
Figure 1B. Photo or the Seawolt Picking Up Survivors
Navigation
Although the Pacific Ocean is very large, WWII submarine
captains tended to use the same routes when traveling to and
from patrol areas. Surprisingly, even as late as 1940, many
areas of the Pacific were not accurately mapped, so to be on
the safe side, captains would use routes that had been safely
used by others.
Over from Midway

When on patrols from Midway Island to Empire waters, several routes are normally used. When going into the waters south
of Japan, such as the East China Sea, U.S. you'll usually make
your passage through the Ryukyu Islands via the Colnett
Strait. If traveling into the Sea of Japan, use the La Perouse
Strait to the north or the Tsushima Strait to the south. Entry
12
into the Inland Sea is made through the Bungo Strait (made
famous in the movie Run Silent, Run Deep).
A little farther south of the main routes and shipping bottlenecks is the Luzon Strait, just north of the Philippine Islands, and the Formosa Strait, running between Formosa and
the Chinese mainland.
Up from Australia
When traveling north from Australia, the main route used is
through the Lombok Strait or occasionally through the Sunda
Strait. Once into the Java Sea, you would continue north
through the Makassar Strait. In the Philippines area, you
would use the Sibutu Passage or the Balabac Strait.
You can locate these locations on the map in Figure 1-9.
1. Colnett Strait
2. Tsushima Strait
3. Bungo Strait
4. Luzon Strait
5. Formosa Strait
6. Lombok Strait
7. Sunda Strait
8. Makassar Strait
9. Sibutu Passage
10. Balabac Strait
13
Figure 1-9. Travel Routes Map
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14
USS Triton
3rd Patrol
Figure 21. Photo of USS Triton
The first of the Pacific Fleet's submarines to cruise against the

Japanese was the USS Triton. Her keel was laid at the U.S.
Shipyard in Portsmouth, New Hampshire on 5 July 1939. On
15 August 1940, she was commissioned and quickly became a
member of the pacific fleet. On 18 April 1942, Commander
Charles Kirkpatrick took the boat out of Midway on her third
combat patrol. It was his first patrol in command of the Triton.
Torpedo Attack # 1
While the Triton was still a long way from the Japanese mainland, the watch sighted a large trawler near Marcus Island, a
Japanese stronghold. Captain Kirkpatrick fired two forward
torpedoes from the surface and both missed. Not wishing to
waste more torpedoes, the captain ordered the gun crew to the
deck. They opened fire with both the deck gun and the 50caliber machine gun. The trawler was quickly in flames and
going down.
On 27 April, the Triton entered its patrol area near the
Bonin Islands south of Japan. On 1 May, it moved into the
East China Sea.
15
Chapter 2. USS Triton
Torpedo Attack # 2
That morning, smoke was sighted and a loosely formed convoy came into sight. The Triton had no trouble closing on the
enemy track, and she approached submerged to a firing position. Captain Kirkpatrick fired two torpedoes at the leading
freighter. They hit. Two more were fired at the second shipboth missed.
An escort turned and followed the wake of the first torpedo back to its starting point and dropped several depth
charges, but none came close. By this time, the captain had
taken the boat deep and moved around to the other side of
the convoy. When it became obvious that he had evaded the
escorts, Captain Kirkpatrick ordered the tubes reloaded as quietly as possible as he moved in from the other flank. The target of the first attack was still afloat but damaged. It seemed
to be adrift and was being left behind. Kirkpatrick pulled to
within 800 yards and put a torpedo from the stern tubes into
the damaged ship. The explosion broke the ship's back and it
sank in pieces.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Early in the morning on 6 May, the Triton was making a surface patrol when a large dark shape appeared off the starboard
bow. Soon, other vessels came into view and Captain Kirkpatrick began his approach. The escort ships couldn't be located,
so the commander assumed they were ahead and on the sides
of the convoy. With this in mind, he decided to let the group
pass and attack the tail end as it went by. The largest targets
seemed to be to the rear of the group.
At 0245, the Triton fired two torpedoes at a large freighter
in the rear of the convoy. The first shot failed to run-once
free of the tube, it simply sank. The second shot missed ahead
of the target. Since neither torpedo exploded and there was
still no sign of the escorts, the submarine moved in again to
attack.
Everything came together at once. An escort was seen
bearing down, the escort crew saw the sub, and the freighter
was in target position. The Triton fired two torpedoes and put
on all four engines and pulled away from the escort. At least
16
3rd Patrol
one torpedo hit with a resounding explosion that shook the

boat several thousand yards away. The sub continued on the
surface to regain a position ahead of the convoy.
Torpedo Attack #4
As dawn was approaching, Captain Kirkpatrick maneuvered
his sub into a satisfactory position and waited for the ships to
come to him. When the convoy passed, he fired two torpedoes
each at the third and fourth ships. The third ship took a hit
and started to list, but the fourth ship was able to turn and
avoid the torpedoes.
Now that the sub had been sighted, the captain took the
boat down to 90 feet and crossed under the middle of the convoy in an attempt to lose the escorts. The destroyers closed
and dropped a number of depth charges, but they caused no
damage. When the Triton was able to return to periscope depth,
the convoy had moved on, and the sub couldn't catch it.
The next several days were spent crossing the China Sea
and looking for traffic in the shipping lanes, but none was
sighted. On 14 May, the sub intercepted a message from Task
Force Seven relaying information about a possible carrier in
the area toward which they were headed. Although he wasn't
directly ordered to intercept, Captain Kirkpatrick decided to
look for the carrier group. During the search, he came upon
two large fishing boats and sank them with the deck gun. He
only had one torpedo forward and four aft.
While the sub was patrolling submerged on 16 May, the
enemy carrier group seemed to "pop out of the haze." The
Triton tried to approach, but it was difficult to do so submerged. Once, Kirkpatrick closed the gap, but by the time he
could turn to bring the stern tubes to bear, the carrier had
moved out to 9000 yards.
The Triton tried to follow as best she could but finally lost
contact. When Commander Kirkpatrick saw the quarry was
lost, he ordered the boat to surface and broadcast the contact
report, hoping someone else could catch the carrier group.
17
Chapter 2. USS Triton
Torpedo Attack # 5
While the Triton was working her way back toward the Bonin
Islands, a Japanese sub suddenly appeared at 6200 yards. This
would be a real trophy to bag, so Kirkpatrick approached
cautiously.
He ordered two torpedoes fired, resulting in one hit at the
rear of the enemy boat. The explosion blew the stern section
100 feet into the air and the sub sank by the stern as the crew
scrambled out. Another attack was made using the stern tubes
on the way back to Midway, but no hits were scored.
The USS Triton's career was cut short when she failed to
report in during her 6th war patrol: When she failed to return
to Australia on time, she was presumed lost. It was not until
after the war that the results of her 6th patrol and her fate
were learned. She had been tacking a convoy on 6 March
1943 and had made one successful attack, sinking a 3000-ton
freighter. She continued to track this group for several days
and was probably making another attack when after a severe
depth charge attack, pieces of wood, cork, and a great quantity
of oil surfaced. It appears that the Triton was lost in battle off
the Japanese coast on 15 March 1943.
Slmulatlng This Patrol

Kirkpatrick was credited with sinking five ships and two fishing vessels for a tonnage total of 16,000-an excellent performance that early in the war when submarine tactics were
still being refined and many boats were plagued by torpedo
problems.
With Silent Service. For this patrol, your goal is to sink

five ships with your torpedoes and to sink at least one with
the deck gun. The tonnage total should be 16,000 tons or
more. Use scenario #4, the USS Seawolf.
With Up Periscope! Since the deck gun isn't of much use
in this game, you must only sink five ships to duplicate Commander Kirkpatrick's efforts. Use scenario #l, the USS Wahoo,
and choose the Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
18
3rd Patrol
Figure 2.2. Patrol Route Map
CHIM
WW
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ISINIDS
ISINIDS
NEW
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19
S-44
3rd Patrol
_ _ ___
Figure 31. The Brave llttle S-44

;
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,...,..,.
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. . .'"'"'"''!I'.'
The activities of the S-Boats or sugar-boats as they were called,

will long live in submarine history. Comparatively tiny World
War I-era boats like the S-Boats were outdated by the time
the U.S. Navy went to war. However, the S-Boats' efforts undeniably influenced the war in the Pacific. That they could
participate at all was nothing short of miraculous. They were
designed to operate close to shore and in shallow water, and
yet were asked to cross the vast Pacific Ocean-no one knew
if S-Boats would survive the 12,000-mile run. Operated out of
Brisbane, Australia they made up Task Force 42. The most
famous member of the group was S-44.
20
3rd Patrol
Although her war career was brief, few subs could match
the courage and aggressive attacks of S-44. She was authorized
in 1916 and finally commissioned in 1925. The S-Boats were
very small-only 850 tons-had only four forward tubes and
no rear torpedo tubes, could dive only to shallow depths, had
only two engines, were slow on the surface, had no air conditioning, and seemed to leave an oil slick wherever they went.
In addition to those basic design problems, most of the SBoats were old and just about worn out.
The S-44's best trip out was her 3rd war patrol, which
started on 24 July 1942 at Brisbane, where she battled bad
weather on the trip to the patrol area, the Solomon Sea. The
captain was Lt. Commander J.R. "Dinty" Moore.
The watch sighted several ships in the patrol area, but
Captain Moore was unable to close in to attack because of the
boat's slow speed. Fate, however, placed S-44 in the proper
position on 10 August.
It so happened that on the previous day the Japanese had
attacked the U.S. Navy forces around Savo with four heavy
cruisers. Circling around the island, they made a surprise attack and dealt the Allied forces a severe setback: Four U.S.
cruisers and one Australian cruiser sank with only minor damage to the Japanese ships. But on this day, the S-44 would
dampen the victory party aboard the withdrawing Japanese
ships.
At 0750 on 10 August, four heavy cruisers were sighted
heading toward the sub. The S-44 was submerged. She quickly
turned to open the distance to the target track. The captain
stopped and set up for the attack from a scant 700 yards. He
let most of the group pass as he waited to attack the last ship.
When the last cruiser arrived, he fired four torpedoes and
headed for 130 feet.
After a short run of only 35 seconds, four hard torpedo
hits were heard, followed by a boiler explosion, and the
sounds of a ship breaking up and heading for the bottom. And
so ended the story of the first major Japanese warship, the
8800-ton Kako, sunk by a lone submarine attack.
A surprisingly short depth charge attack followed, but
none were close. Apparently, the cruisers were more con21
Chapter 3. S-44
cerned with getting away from the sub than attacking her. The
significance of the Kako's sinking is much larger than is appar-
ent at first: During that time, the fate of the Marines on Guadalcanal hung in the balance. The second Japanese attack was
certainly delayed by the threat of a large U.S. submarine force
in the area, which was, in fact, only one lonely but brave
sugar boat.
Aggressive attacks would be both the hallmark and the
end of S-44: She was the only S-Boat in the Pacific to be lost
due to enemy action. On 26 September 1943, she left on her
5th war patrol, under the command of Lt. Commander F. E.
Brown, and she was never heard from again.
The story of her fate was finally learned upon the release
of two surviving crewmen from the Japanese prison camps,
where they spent the remainder of the war. She was patrolling
on the surface when a plane forced her down by dropping
several depth charges. When she surfaced, she made radar
contact with what seemed to be a small merchant ship. Captain Brown approached on the surface and called for the gun
crew. At close range, the gun crew opened fire .
The fire was immediately returned. The target turned out
to be a destroyer. Totally outgunned, S-44 took hits right
away. The captain ordered her down, but then a shell hit the
control room and the order couldn't be carried out. With the
situation lost, the captain ordered the executive officer to wave
a pillow case to signal surrender.
Although the flag of surrender could be seen plainly in
the beam of his powerful search light, the captain of the destroyer continued to fire. As the boat began to sink, the crew
tried to abandon ship, but only eight crew members made it
into the water before the ship went down. Two of them survived in the 47-degree water long enough to be picked up by
the destroyer.
22
3rd Patrol
Slmulallng This Patrol

To simulate the S-44's 3rd patrol, you will have to use only
the capabilities of the S-Boats. You can't use the rear torpedoes, fire more than four torpedoes at a time from the forward
tubes, dive deeper than 200 feet, fire more than 14 torpedoes
total, and exceed ten knots on the surface.
With Silent Service. You only have to sink one ship on
this patrol, but it must be a warship. Try to find one or two
sailing alone, and remember to observe the limitations of the
S-Boats. Use scenario #3, the USS Growler.
With Up Periscope! Observing the above-listed limitations, you must sink one Japanese warship. Try to find one or
two sailing alone. Use scenario #3, the USS Tang, and choose
the Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
23
Chapter 3. S-44
Figure 32. Patrol Route Map
11
000
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SEA
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CHINA
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~ BATAH
:. MARWrtA ISLAHDS
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CAllOllNI
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ISIAHOS
GILBERT
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HEW
CAUOONIA
24
c""
"USS Guardtish
1st Patrol
Figure 4 1. The USS Guardtlsh
After the war began, the USS Guardfish was one of the first new
boats to enter the fleet. Built by the Electric Boat Company in
Groton, Connecticut, she was launched on 20 January 1942.
Training was the first order of business for the new crew
as they headed out of Pearl Harbor en route to Midway. The
drilling was continuous as Commander Thomas Klakring
molded the group of young men into a fighting unit. The results of this training became evident soon after the Guardfish
sailed from Midway on 7 August 1942.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Her first encounter with the enemy came on 19 August off the
coast of Japan near Tokyo. A freighter came into view with
one escort. Just before dawn the Guardfish made her attack
25
Chapter 4. USS
Guardfish
submerged. Captain Klakring fired three torpedoes at the target and headed down. Two good hits were heard, but a periscope check showed the ship undamaged and increasing
speed. A closing destroyer and the coming dawn made further
attacks impossible.
Over the next several days, the Guardfish patrolled the
northern coast of Honshu. She made contact with, and then
avoided, a number of patrol boats; several trawlers were located and sunk with the deck gun.
Torpedo Attack # 2
On 24 August, the Guardfish had better luck. A good-sized
freighter was seen coming out of a harbor. At 1657, three torpedoes were fired at the ship from 1200 yards, resulting in
two hits. This time, there was no doubt that the ship was
damaged: The bow was blown off completely. The target sank
vertically, bow-first, with the screws still turning as she went
under.
Captain Klakring cleared the area to head up the coast to
try to catch a group of ships seen heading that way. A near
collision with a sampan foiled his plan. The sampan must
have radioed the Guardfish's position because when the
Guardfish arrived, the ships were nowhere to be found.
Torpedo Attack # 3
On the following morning, around dawn, the Guardfish contacted another lone freighter, and Captain Klakring fired two
torpedoes from 1400 yards. The first hit right under the stack,
but the second was erratic. The captain watched through the
periscope as this torpedo made a series of 12-foot leaps into
the air and then passed behind the target. The target was settling somewhat but not sinking. It was slowly making its way
into the mist close to shore. As the Guardfish surfaced to give
chase, radar picked up four planes and Captain Klakring ordered the boat to submerge again. The target successfully escaped to the shore.
The day and night of 26 August was spent playing tag
with a tenacious patrol boat that followed, possibly with the
aid of radar.
26
1st Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 4
Early September was a bad time to be at sea northwest of Japan. The weather turned foul and Captain Klakring spent several days preoccupied with just keeping his boat afloat. Even
at 150 feet, the sea still moved the boat several degrees.
When the Guardfish was again patrolling the surface in
very heavy seas on 2 September, the watch sighted a freighter
at a range of eight miles. The sub put on speed to get ahead of
her, and at 0727 she submerged and moved in for the attack.
Three torpedoes were fired for two hits; the third torpedo
broached due to the high seas. The target ship stopped and
appeared to take on a list, but it wasn't sinking, so the captain
fired another torpedo. It's track couldn't be seen through the
periscope and it wasn't heard from again.
At 0850, the crew of the freighter began to abandon ship.
Suddenly, the target broke cleanly in half and sank in pieces.
Several patrol vessels were heard approaching, so Klakring
cleared the area submerged and then surfaced to put some
miles behind him.
Torpedo Attack # 5
The Guardfish's attacks continued along the northern coast of
Honshu on 4 September as she tracked two freighters about
half a mile offshore. Due to a strong current the sub wasn't
able to close and, finally, the captain ordered a long-range
shot from 5000 yards . Only one torpedo was fired, but it
missed as the ship headed away to safety.
Torpedo Attack # 6
Later that afternoon, the Guardfish wandered into the path of
two large ore carriers. Captain Klakring ordered a quick setup
with the stern tubes. At 1744 the captain fired one torpedo at
the first ship and two at the second, resulting in a hit on each
ship. The targets were heavily laden and each sank in less
than ten minutes. As they went down, several other freighters
came over the horizon then turned and headed away. The
Guardfish was clearly having an effect on shipping in the area.
27
Chapter 4. USS Guardflsh
Torpedo Attack # 7
One of the escaping freighters moved into a harbor and
dropped anchor, probably to wait for the cover of darkness.
But Captain Klakring and his crew were feeling confident.
They decided to try a long-range shot. The Guardfish moved
quietly to within 6500 yards of the sitting ship and fired one
torpedo. After a seven-minute and 20-second wait, the ship
was struck amidships with a terrific explosion. The officers and
crew were permitted to watch the ship sink through the periscope. This was one of the longest torpedo shots of the war.
Torpedo Attack # B
During the attack on the anchored ship, another freighter appeared. With the ship in the harbor sinking nicely and escorts
heading to greet it, the Guardfish moved at high speed to take
the new target.
It turned out to be another ore ship. Captain Klakring
moved in close on the surface and fired two torpedoes from
1000 yards. One hit just under the bridge and the freighter
started to settle. Another shot was fired on a quick setup. It
missed. The ore carrier's crew was already jumping from the
ship, and it sank with the stern pointing straight up toward
the sky. This fourth sinking of the day occurred a mile
offshore.
There was a light depth charge attack, but as soon as all
was quiet, the Guardfish surfaced and slid out of the area and
eventually returned to Midway.

Commander Thomas Klakring was probably rendered a disservice by the postwar investigation. He actually watched the
ships sink that he claimed, and credit for many of them was
rescinded after the war. He claimed to sink eight ships for a
total of 51,000 tons. The official total was changed later to reflect only five ships and a meager 16,700 tons.
For purposes of re-creating the patrol, Klakring will be
given the benefit of the doubt on one more sinking.
28
1st Patrol
With Silent Service. Your goal will be to sink six ships for
25,000 tons, but if you believe the commander's report, you
should go for eight ships. Also, you should try and duplicate
the captain's long-range shot by making at least one torpedo
hit from a range of 4000 yards or more. Use scenario #4, the
USS Seawolf.
With Up Periscope! Since it's easier to sink ships and run
up high tonnage totals with this simulation, your goal is to do
it the way Klakring told it-sink eight ships for 51,000 tons.
Take a try at a long-range shot to see if you can hit the
bullseye from over 4000 yards. Use scenario #1, the USS Wahoo. Choose the Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
29
Chapter 4. USS Guardfish
II
1110
CHIM
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....
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COLfDONIA
30
'
Chapter 5
USS Guardtish
8th Patrol
The Guardfish left Midway on 18 June 1944 under the command of Lt. Commander N.G. Ward to patrol in the South
China Sea, Luzon Straits area. The first few days on patrol
were spent on rescue duty or repairing small problems that
had developed. Aircraft contacts kept them on their toes, but
no shipping was spotted until 5 July. Distant explosions were
heard, but the Guardfish couldn't get in on the action due to
constant air leaks, which continued to attract aircraft.
On 11 July, Lt. Commander Ward received a contact report form the USS Thrasher and opened up the engines to try
to intercept. They made radar contact with the convoy at
30,000 yards and commenced a wide end-around to gain a firing position ahead of the group.
The convoy consisted of nine ships and at least five escorts. The watch made visual contact shortly after midnight,
and by 0300, the Guardfish was in good attack position.
The half moon was bright, preventing a surface attack, so
Captain Ward dove at 0331 when the convoy was 17,000
yards away. At 9000 yards, the group made a wide zig that
went undetected by the tracking party. When they looked up
again, the firing range was a long 3800 yards. They made a
quick adjustment to close the gap but were unsuccessful.
At 0512, the Guardfish surfaced to try another end-around.
Distant explosions were again heard and planes drove them
down, and when they came back up, the convoy was nowhere
to be found. Once again, they were beaten to the punch.
Torpedo Attack # 1
At 0335, on 16 July 1944, another contact report was received
and again Captain Ward raced to intercept. By' 0945, the crew
had located the convoy and started an end-around. Through31
Chapter 5 . USS
Guardfish
out the afternoon, they dove to avoid planes, but the loud
pinging of the escorts always allowed them to keep track of
the convoy. At 2235, they were in position 11,000 yards from
the convoy-ten ships with three escorts.
The Guardfish let the escort slip past, and then, at 2342,
the captain fired all six forward torpedoes at five overlapping
ships from 3300 yards. Guardfish swung hard to the right to
attempt a shot on the next group with the stern tubes. All six
shots then hit along four ships. A large tanker blew sky-high
on impact, throwing flames thousands of feet into the air. A
large freighter, presumed to be loaded with combustibles, also
blew up. The third ship in line, a medium freighter, broke in
two at the middle and sank, and the fourth ship went down
by the bow. Four ships down with one salvo!
The other ships then scattered, making a follow-up shot
impossible. Captain Ward picked a large target on the radar
and began to track. Eventually the sub caught up with the
freighter and swung around to use the stern tubes. Three torpedoes were fired, resulting in two hits. An escort was seen
coming on hard, and as the Guardfish withdrew from the scene
to reload, the target rolled over on its side and disappeared.
Another target appeared, heading towards the Guardfish.
Captain Ward again set up for a stern shot and fired two torpedoes-a little early-at 2500 yards. Right after firing, the
target made another large zig and both torpedoes missed.
Moving ahead at flank speed, the Guardfish turned hard while
making two bow tubes ready. Tubes 3 and 4 were fired from
1250 yards, both resulting in hits. A close escort and a rising
moon forced the Guardfish to retreat once again. The target
started to settle and disappeared from radar at 13,000 yards.
It's believed to have sunk but Ward only claimed damage.
Torpedo Attack # 2
The next afternoon, 17 July, the tracking team was back in
business as a ship came into view at 12,000 yards. It soon became clear that it was part of a large, fast-moving convoy. The
captain had to act fast or miss the opportunity. At least two
aircraft carriers were seen as well as two tankers, but a large
freighter was the closest target, so he chose it. With sound
32
8th Patrol
conditions very bad and the seas high, he approached at twothirds speed, making frequent periscope observations. He fired
three bow torpedoes at the closest target: range 1370 yards, 75
port track, gyros 0.
Ward was setting up on a tanker when the first hit was
heard, followed by a second. He swung the periscope back to
see the freighter hit amidships, sinking fast. When he swung
back to the tanker, it had changed course. A shot would have
been impossible so he went deep and waited out the short
depth charge attack. Back at periscope depth, Ward saw that
the convoy was gone and an escort was circling the area of the
attack, presumably picking up survivors. No chase of the remainder of the convoy was possible due to the state of the
seas and dwindling fuel supply.
Torpedo Attack #3
Ship contact was made on the SJ radar at 22,000 yards on 19
July 1944. Captain Ward ordered his crew to battle stations.
Rain squansmade tracking difficult and forced the Guardfish to
dive early to avoid detection. The sub made periscope contact
again at 0639, and Ward was pleased to see that the convoy
had made an obliging turn in his direction.
A large, modern freighter was selected as the target, but
the submarine was forced to submerge to 120 feet to duck under an escort. By the time the sub returned to the surface, the
target had moved past and was presenting an unfavorable angle on the bow of 130 degrees. The captain lined up the next
target and once again discovered he was fortunate enough to
have overlapping targets at 1000 and 1500 yards. He fired the
last four forward fish.
The first ship took two hits, one amidships and one forward; she broke in half immediately. The second ship took
one hit, but the last torpedo was heard to pass back over the
Guardfish after a dangerous circular run. Since depth control
was having a hard time, the captain ordered deep water.
The first two depth charges were very close and shook
things quite a bit. Two escorts made a systematic search, but
the Guardfish quietly slid away. Since his boat was low on
33
Chapter 5. USS Guardflsh
fuel, had few remaining torpedoes, and was leaking water in

several places, Ward decided to head for home. The submarine arrived back at Midway on 31 July 1944.
Slmulatlna This Patrol

Commander Ward executed some fine shooting on this trip
and was lucky to escape the circular run of that last torpedoothers would not be so fortunate. In his report to his superior,
Ward claimed seven sinkings for 50,700 tons. Ward and the
crew were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their efforts. After the war, investigation reduced the total, but left it
at a respectable four ships for 20,400 tons sunk.
With Silent Service. Good setups with overlapping targets
were the key to success on this patrol. See if you can line up
your targets to overlap, creating a much larger target at which
to shoot. Your goal is to sink four ships and exceed 20,000
tons. Use scenario #5, the USS Spadefish.
With Up Periscope! Overlapping targets show up fairly
frequently with this simulation, so learn to take advantage of
this setup. Your goal for the patrol is to sink four ships. Use
scenario #5, and choose the Northern Theater from the Big
Chart.
34
8th Patrol
Figure 5 1. Patrol Route Map
000
'""
CHINA
WW
ISlAHOS
GlllEAT
ISlNIOS
~ .
CAlO(WM
35
USS Sil11ersides
1'th Patrol
Figure 61
The USS Sllversldes pulls Into port with Commander Burlingame on the bridge
In his Australian "digger" hat.
The Silversides was one of a handful of valiant boats to see the

entire war. She made her first patrol early in 1942 and her last
in 1945, and she was quite active in between, tallying 13 patrols by the war's end.
Some of the patrols ex'\mined so far are examples of what
can happen when things are going your way, but the fourth
patrol of the Silversides is an example of just how much can be
36
4th Patrol
accomplished when everything seems to be going wrong. With

outstanding courage and fortitude, the men of the Silversides
beat the odds and turned in an outstanding patrol even
though the trip had a very rocky start.
On 17 December 1943, the Silversides departed Brisbane,
Australia under the command of Commander C. R. Burlingame. Her mission was to patrol in the area of Truk Island.
Without the usual training period, the sub immediately headed
for the assigned area.
Torpedo Attack # 1
While Silversides was still en route, on 23 December, the
watch spotted what appeared to be a submarine. As the boat
was close to the edge of her boundary, the captain assumed
the sub was friendly and tried to work his way around it, but
as the Silversides passed between the sub and the low moon,
the dim shape suddenly turned toward them. Flank speed was
ordered, but even at 20 knots, the Silversides was going to be
overtaken.
In desperation, the captain tried to signal the boat to determine if it was indeed friendly or not. The answer to their
signal was not Morse code, so two stern torpedoes were sent
down the throat of what turned out to be a small destroyer.
The first exploded prematurely and the second was never
heard from, so Commander Burlingame took the boat deep
and rigged for depth charges. After the destroyer made a couple of runs over the sub with no damage, the captain ordered
the boat back to periscope depth. The target was sighted but
approach was impossible.
Later, at about 0900, just after a periscope sweep, a Japanese bomber dropped three large bombs directly on top of
them in rapid succession. Every light in the forward torpedo
room and the conning tower was knocked out, and men were
thrown off their feet and out of their bunks. Many were cut by
broken glass. Burlingame ordered the sub down and quickly
found the bow planes to be jammed on hard dive. After 15
difficult minutes, the depth was stabilized and the boat
brought under control. They had taken quite a beating and
had yet to make an approach.
37
Chapter 6. USS Silversides
Torpedo Attack # 2
Life was s low and easy for several days as the Silversides
made her way to Truk. All possible repairs were made; then,
suddenly, late in the afternoon on 6 January, a large enemy
sub appeared 5000 yards off the starboard quarter. The Silversides turned quickly and fired three torpedoes. Again, the first
went off too soon but the second struck the target and stopped
her dead in the water.
The captain ordered a dive after firing to avoid the almost
inevitable air search that would follow. The Silversides only received credit for damaging the enemy sub, but it's quite likely
that she either sank or was put totally out of commission.
Torpedo Attack # 3
A tanker was spotted on 7 January, the following day, but it
zigged away and couldn't be tracked. The crew of the Silversides agonized over missing the opportunity, but a second .
chance came on 18 January, when another tanker was sighted
at 0100.
This time the captain was able to gain a marvelous firing
position ahead of the target. He slowed the sub and turned
her to bring the stern tubes to bear. At 0255, four stern shots
were fired with very satisfactory results. Burlingame described
it as "A tremendous explosion and pillar of black smoke 200
feet high, flame and sparks at its base and out the stack."
Evasive action began: The sound man listened to the
sounds of the tanker breaking up; escorts quickly arrived and
dropped a series of charges-the first barrage blew the gasket
off a safety vent. Air had to be added to one of the safety
tanks, but the air went straight to the surface instead. The escort used this convenient marker to drop another series of
"tooth shakers" on Silversides.
The escort finally left, but later, a plane located the sub
and dropped a bomb. Fortunately, it missed astern. An oil leak
explained how the plane found them. Fuel had to be transferred out of the leaking tank, and the list of damaged or unworkable equipment grew.
38
4th Patrol
Torpedo Attack #4
Undaunted, the captain pursued a group of three warships the
following day but couldn't close for an attack. This chase led
them outside the assigned area so they turned and headed
back to Truk. While the sub was traveling on the surface on
20 January, a watch spotted smoke. The sub trailed four goodsized freighters with two escorts, one in front and one in the
rear. After following them for about six hours, the captain
knew the convoy's base course and zig pattern. With this information in hand, he pulled ahead of the group to attack at dusk.
The convoy was silhouetted against the setting sun. Silversides closed in for the kill as the ships took a zig in the opposite direction. The convoy presented itself at such an angle
that three ships were lined up bow to stern, forming a huge
target. Even though the range was over 4000 yards, the
chance for a hit was quite good and the captain ordered all six
forward torpedoes fired.
The sub immediately went deep to avoid the escorts. Five
good torpedo hits were heard and all three ships were hit. Explosions and the sound of ships breaking up .were heard as the
escorts closed in. The depth charges fell but none appeared to
cause serious damage; however, one of the torpedo doors was
jammed open and the sub developed an air leak.
The Silversides later surfaced and left the area at full
speed. A man was put overboard to assess the damage to the
jammed door only to find torpedo number 6 still stuck in the
tube, half in and half out. Another fuel leak was discovered
and the air leak was still unaccounted for. Shortly after starting ahead again, an explosion occurred in the main generator
due to a short circuit caused by salt water. At the same time, a
breakdown of the induction operating gear revealed a box of
breakfast food under the bell crank lever.
Thus, with a dangling torpedo with warhead attached, a
fuel leak, an air leak, an explosion in the generator, and
Cream of Wheat in the main induction, the sub turned toward home a little early, headed for Pearl Harbor.
Upon its return, the Silversides was given credit only for
damaging the target ships since they had not actually seen the
39
Chapter 6. USS
Silversides
ships sink. But shortly thereafter, intelligence reports confirmed the sinkings and Burlingame was credited with sinking
four ships for a tonnage total of 27,798.

With Silent Service. While you won't have to take on all
of this damage, you will have to sink at least four large ships,
probably more, to beat Burlingame's total tonnage of 27,798.
Use scenario #3, the USS Growler, and return to Midway.
With Up Periscope! If you can search out four really large
ships, you might be able to beat 27,798 tons with only four
sinkings. Give it a shot! Use scenario #3 the USS Tang 1st patrol and the southern Big Chart.
40
4th Patrol
Figure &2. Patrol Route Map
000
CHIM
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WNf>f
, =
.. ,
~ .
....
41
USS Sil11ersides
1Oth Patrol
figure 71. The USS Sllversldes
By the time Silversides' 10th patrol rolled around, she was under the capable command of John S. Coye. With a couple of
patrols already under his belt, Coye was about to reach his
stride. On 26 April 1944, he set out from Brisbane, Australia
to patrol the area around the Marianas Islands.
Torpedo Attack # 1
On 8 May, he made landfall on Guam and immediately noticed almost continuous air activity. Shortly after noon, a large
group of ships was sighted heading in the direction of the sub.
A short run put Silversides just off the target track and she
moved in submerged.
The convoy consisted of six or seven ships in a rough formation of three columns. Five escorts were also sighted, three
of which were the Chidori class. An unfavorable zig left Coye
42
10th Patrol
in a bad position for a bow shot, so he quickly turned the boat

and fired all four stern tubes on a 5000-ton transport ship and
took the sub down deep, anticipating a strong reaction by the
escorts.
One hit was reported, but a sinking could not be confirmed. The escorts milled about for a while, dropping a few
depth charges here and there, but they never had a good fix
on the Silversides. The sub surfaced after dark and again noted
air activity over Guam.
Torpedo Attack # 2
At 0821 the following morning, a seven-ship convoy was
spotted heading out of the harbor toward Japan. The ships
formed up into three columns and headed out to sea. Coye
tried his best to close to a firing position, but being so close to
the air base on Guam, he had to remain submerged. Late that
afternoon, with the batteries well down, he surfaced and
looked for the convoy's smoke. He regained contact with the
ships and increased speed to overtake them. Tracking was difficult as the radar choose this moment to break down.
A wide end-around was executed to put Silversides in a
good position ahead of the group. At twilight, she dove for the
attack. The ships had just finished a zig, which put the sub in
a good position for a shot on their flank; many ships were
overlapping. John Coye ordered six torpedoes fired, resulting
in five hits. He took the sub deep and rigged for depth charges.
The escorts dropped several charges, but not close enough
to cause concern. The sub headed back up to periscope depth.
One ship had already sunk and another was in flames. The
captain let the entire crew have a look and take pictures.
They waited until the following morning for the other
ship to sink. She kept hanging on despite the fact that she
seemed on the verge of going down. That afternoon, as the
captain ordered the crew to prepare a torpedo to finish her off,
the smoldering ship silently slipped under the waves.
Coye chased the remainder of the convoy during the
night, but just as he came in for the attack, the moon clouded
over and the ships couldn't be seen. By the time light condi43
Chapter 7. USS
Silversides
tions improved, the convoy had slipped past. Dawn was approaching and Guam was still within sight, so he couldn't
follow on the surface.
Torpedo Attack # 3
During a patrol' off Saipan, the Silversides sighted smoke, and
closed in for a look. What looked to be a large convoy turned
out to be two sub-hunting ships, putting out a good bit of
"come hither" smoke to attract unsuspecting subs. Coye
cleared the area without detection. The next day he again had
to avoid this pair as they wandered around the area.
The next several days were spent patrolling the Guam-toSaipan route. Finally, on the afternoon of 20 May, smoke was
sighted coming toward the sub. A cautious approach revealed
a single transport with at least four escorts.
Undaunted by the odds, Coye closed in for the kill. At a
range of 1600 yards-dose for a daylight attack-Coye fired
four torpedoes at the transport. Two good hits were heard as
he ordered a dive. He left the surface none too soon: The escorts and air support let them have it. Due to the shallow water the sub could find nowhere to hide. Coye kept his speed
up and tried to avoid the attack. In all, 61 depth charges were
dropped, including one salvo of 24 dropped in rapid succession. The sound man thought he could hear the sound of the
target breaking up, but he couldn't be sure because the depth
charges drowned out everything.
Silversides surfaced later for a quick look and came face to
face with another escort. The captain had to go deep for another hour. Finally, around 2100 the sub surfaced and cleared
the area. Again, several days passed with little action.
Torpedo Attack #4
Early in the morning on 28 May 1944, a group of ships came
over the horizon and headed straight for the sub. Coye and
crew tacked the convoy from ahead for a while and decided
that due to the glassy calm surface of the water, they would
wait until after dark to attack.
Later that afternoon, he let the group go by and gave it a
good looking over. The group consisted of two freighters and
44
10th Patrol
four escorts. When night fell, the sub surfaced and pursued.
At midnight, the moon set and Coye moved in closer on
the surface. As he was setting up the shot, an escort turned in
the direction of the sub. Feeling that a long shot was better
than no shot at all, he fired six torpedoes-three at each target
from a range of 3400 yards. He watched as both ships took
two hits each and exploded. The flames lit the whole area as
bright as day. Still on the surface, the sub pulled away at
emergency speed and watched the ships burn. Apparently the
ships were loaded with gasoline and "a million or so gallons
burning is truly an awe-inspiring spectacle."
After this busy period, the boat headed north past Asuncion Island, and after one more unsuccessful attack, the captain ordered a course back to Pearl Harbor because he was out
of torpedoes.
Silversides was initially given credit for sinking five ships
for a total of 23,600 tons. These figures were eventually revised to show six ships sunk for a total of only 14,141. The
extra ship, however, should have pleased Coye as it moved
him into a small group of only eight commanders who sank
six or more ships in one patrol.

With Silent Service. To beat Commander Coye, you must
sink six ships. In this game, six ships should put you well over
his 14,141 tonnage mark. Use scenario #3, the USS Growler
2nd patrol. Leave from Brisbane and return to Midway.
With Up Periscope! Six ships is your goal. If you reach

that, you should be well over the 14,141 tonnage goal. Use
scenario #l and choose the Northern Theater from the Big
Chart.
45
Chapter 7. USS Silversldes
000
180
CHINA
.
ISlANOS
ISIAHOS
GILBERT
ISIAHOS
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NEW
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N!W
CAUOONIA
46
USS Poor
5th Patrol
Figure 81. The USS
Poov
The keel for the USS Pogy was laid at Manitowoc Shipyards in
Wisconsin in September 1941. It was the start of a long and
distinguished performance record. She left for her first war patrol in January 1943 and continued to patrol enemy waters until the end of the war. She completed her 10th and final patrol
in August 1945. Along the way, she sent over 60,000 tons of
Japanese shipping to the bottom. Perhaps her finest hour came
during her 5th patrol in February 1944.
Her 5th patrol sent her west from Midway to conduct an
47
Chapter 8. USS Pogy
antishipping sweep of the coast of Formosa. Seas were rough

during her trip to the area, but she still arrived a little ahead
of schedule.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Once the Fogy moved into her assigned area, the watch immediately contacted a six-ship convoy. A night surface approach
seemed out of the question due to the excellent visibility and
watchful eye of three well-placed escort vessels. The captain,
Commander R. M. Metcalf, decided to track the group for a
while. The group moved in close to shore; then one ship
moved away from the group with no escort. The Fogy began
to track this lone ship and moved in to attack.
The target was making 11 knots and the Fogy was heading in at a similar speed. At a range of 2500. yards, she fired
three torpedoes, but the target saw the sub and made a quick
course change. All the torpedoes missed. The captain decided
that if he were to follow the lone ship for another attack, he
wouldn't have time to catch and attack the other component
of the convoy. So he broke off the attack and changed course.
Torpedo Attack # 2
By the time the submarine caught up with the other ships, a
heavy mist had set in which reduced visibility to about 3500
yards. The captain maneuvered Fogy to a position about
10,000 yards ahead of the group and then turned to head directly toward them on an opposite heading.
As the first ship approached, he turned the boat to head
in on its flank. When the target came into view, it was immediately apparent that it was not a freighter at all but a dangerouslooking destroyer. A quick order was given to change the
torpedo settings to run shallow and two fish were fired. A
large freighter came into view and three shots were fired at it.
Then the situation became "rather confused," as the two
torpedoes hit and the destroyer completely exploded. Two torpedoes hit the second ship as well, and it sank in about a
minute. Then, a torpedo was heard running toward the sub!
The captain attempted to turn to use the stern tubes on
another ship, but instead of running, this target turned, with
48
5th Patrol
the clear intention of attempting to ram the Pogy. She put on

four engines and slowly pulled away while the crew of the
freighter shot at the sub with everything from pistols to a
four-inch gun. Metcalf was so engrossed in watching the display that he missed a golden opportunity for a down-the-throat
shot, for at one point, the freighter was only 800 yards away.
Torpedo Attack # 3
On 13 February, a target was spotted on radar at 20,000 yards,
and the sub moved in to check it out. At first, it appeared to
be dead in the water; later, Commander Metcalf saw that it
was a damaged freighter with two escorts, moving at two
knots. Metcalf moved in for a shot, and just before dawn, he
fired two torpedoes. Both ran erratically and neither hit the
target. Heavy seas prevented a second attack so the Pogy
moved out to open water to reload.
Torpedo Attack #4
Fifteen minutes after midnight on 20 February, the sub contacted another convoy at 20,000 yards. Pogy moved ahead of
the group and waited for it to approach. As the convoy came
closer, Metcalf headed slowly toward the two target ships.
When the range was 3000 yards, the targets made a zig toward the Pogy and Metcalf stopped the boat and set up to
shoot. At a range of 1300 yards, he fired two torpedoes. Both
hit. The freighter went to the bottom, still under power, in 52
seconds.
Several hours later, the Pogy caught up with the second
target ship. The captain managed to put one torpedo into it,
but it pulled away and wasn't seen to sink. Another attack
several days later had similar results with only one ship
damaged.
Torpedo Attack # 5
On 23 February, Metcalf caught up with a convoy he had tried
to attack the night before with limited success. A first attack
attempt netted them zero hits after six shots, but Metcalf
wouldn't give up. He pulled ahead of the group and made a
surface approach.
49
Chapter 8. USS Pogy
At about 3500 yards, the convoy made a convenient zig

towards the Pogy so she just stopped and waited. At 2600
yards, she turned and fired all four stern tubes at a large
freighter. Torpedoes number 8 and number 9 hit with normal
explosions and Pogy pulled away from the area. As they were
leaving the area at 0449, the bridge crew saw the freighter
sink with its bow pointing straight up.
Now with only one torpedo left, the Pogy headed for
home. She made a short stop at Rasa Island to use the deck
gun to bombard a large phosphate plant there, but with limited success. That out of their system, the crew of the Pogy
headed back to Midway.

Commander Metcalf claimed credit for sinking four ships for
22,000 tons, but later intelligence showed that one of the damaged ships did indeed sink and he was credited with it also.
His total then was five ships for 26,044 tons.
With Silent Service. Your goal is to sink five ships and

26,000 tons-no easy feat with this game. Better look for big
game, such as tankers, and leave the smaller targets alone.
Use scenario #5, the USS Spadefish.
With Up Periscope! Your goal for this patrol is to sink
five ships in the Formosa area. The tonnage mark of 26,000
should be easy to reach. Patrol the area just south and east of
Formosa. Use scenario #7, the USS Harder. Choose the Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
50
5th Patrol
Figure 8-2. Patrol Route Map
000
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"'"
YELLOW
SEA
CHI/IA
MIDWAY
,; RVUKU
. ...
ISL.ANO
~A
BONIN ISLANDS
WIW.
-IWHOS
GUAM
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A/ISTRALIA
r.AUOONIA
51
uss wahaa
3rd Patrol
As the year 1942 came to a close, many of the older submarine commanders who started the war were being replaced by
younger, more aggressive skippers. Such was the case with the
Wahoo. Her first two patrols had been ineffective and frustrating for the crew and officers-the captain was of the old
school and continued to follow the prewar attack doctrine that
was rapidly proving to be too cautious. So, after riding along
as an observer and prospective commanding officer on the
previous patrol, Captain Dudley W. (Mush) Morton took command on 31 December 1942.
Before even leaving the dock, Morton made his intentions
clear with regard to the coming patrol: In each compartment,
he placed placards that read in big red letters, SHOOT THE
SONS OF BITCHES. A brief meeting was held and Morton explained that they would carefully check each contact, and if it
proved to be an enemy ship, they would attack until it was on
the bottom. Period.
Now with a rejuvenated crew, the Wahoo headed out from
Brisbane, Australia on 15 January 1943. Her orders were to
conduct training exercises with the U.S. destroyer Patterson for
several days, and then proceed on to the Palau Islands
through the Vitiaz Strait, which runs between New Guinea
and New Britain off Solomon Sea.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Training went well, and by the morning of 24 January, Wahoo
was deep into the Solomon Sea, approaching the strait. While
the captain was investigating an anchorage near Karsu Island,
several ships were spotted in the harbor. As Morton conned
the boat to a good attack position, a destroyer appeared. While
52
3rd Patrol
he was certain the Wahoo hadn't been spotted, he couldn't ignore the approaching destroyer without endangering the boat.
Morton gave the order to switch targets and rapidly the
officers began to plot the attack. With but a quick chance for a
setup, Executive Officer Dick O'Kane gave the order, and three
torpedoes were fired. It was immediately obvious to O'Kane
that they had misread the speed and that all three fish would
shoot behind the target. He increased the speed estimate and
fired one more shot, but the lookouts on the destroyer were
now alert and the ship turned in time to avoid the torpedo.
The destroyer continued its turn and was then headed directly
toward the Wahoo . The crew was only slightly surprised when
Morton said they would ignore the standing doctrine, which
called for the Wahoo to dive such a situation and attempt a
down-the-throat shot.
O'Kane fed readings to the captain and conned the destroyer so that it was dead ahead. As the range narrowed past
1200 yards, the first torpedo was fired. Another set of readings
and the second was away-with the range only 750 yards!
The Wahoo headed for the bottom and rigged for depth
charges.
The sound of exploding depth charges was followed by a
much louder explosion and the sound of cracking as hot boilers came into contact with seawater. They had scored a hit! A
quick pop-up to periscope depth revealed a sinking destroyer
with the crew abandoning ship. Not bad for a first engage. ment. They slowly made their way out of the area.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Now clear of the straits and headed northwest, the Wahoo settled into a normal patrol routine. Just before breakfast on 26
January, the routine was interrupted by the call of "smoke on
the horizon." Morton kept her on the surface and determined
the makeup of the convoy. He was in luck: It was a large convoy with no apparent escort ship. Morton concluded that the
destroyer they sank two days earlier must have been headed
out to meet this group. Still on the surface, the captain took
53
Chapter 9. USS Wahoo
the boat to a position well ahead of the convoy and waited. At

last, the tops of the masts appeared over the horizon and Morton ordered the Wahoo down.
Figure 91. The Wahoo Sinks the Dakar Maru
O'Kane, at the periscope, called out the range and described each ship. Then as they prepared to open fire, the convoy took a sudden zig toward them. The target track was now
too close for the torpedoes to have time to arm. Morton ordered full speed and full right rudder. The Wahoo spun around
and put some distance between itself and the anticipated track
of the enemy. As they reached a new firing position, Morton
slowed the boat and O'Kane took the scope. The convoy was
really coming on now-no time for a second look.
The order was given and two torpedoes were sent toward
the lead ship-one to the mainmast, and one to the foremast.
They repeated the procedure and fired two more at the second ship as the first two scored hits. This second salvo scored
one hit.
Through the scope, O'Kane saw the first ship listing to
one side and sinking. Confused by the excitement, he took the
long way around to find the second ship. As he was turning, a
54
3rd Patrol
third ship was spotted heading right for them! Morton decided
to shoot down-the-throat again, but as soon as he said the
word shoot, the firing officer hit the plunger and fired a torpedo in error. Seeing this shot, the ship started to tum away.
This gave O'Kane his first good look at it. It turned out to be a
big one, a troop carrier! The troop ship captain made a big
mistake by turning away from the sub. Now it presented a
much bigger target of which O'Kane and Morton quickly took
advantage. When the range was called out at 1200 yards and
the angle-on-the-bow was 70 degrees port, two more torpedoes were fired.
The crew of the Wahoo then turned its attention back to
the second freighter, which had been hit once. It was still under power, at six knots, and was headed straight for the sub. It
was time for another down-the-throat shot. Just before firing,
they were gladdened by two explosions that could only have
been the two fish headed for the troop ship. Two more torpedoes were now ready and immediately heading for the freighter. The first proved to be a dud but the second hit and
exploded. All in the conning tower were surprised to see the
freight shake it off and keep on coming!
There was nothing to do now but go deep. They sat quietly at 100 feet, letting the sound man sort out the ships left
on the surface. After a short break, they headed back up,
ready to shoot. Back at periscope depth, they saw the freighter
heading away and the troop ship dead in the water. It would
be the next victim. They lined the ship up and fired. The first
shot was another dud, but the second did the job.
Torpedo Attack #3
The heading of the damaged freighter and another ship were
plotted for pursuit. After putting a charge on the Wahoo's batteries, all engines went online as Morton began a long chase
and end-around maneuver. Keeping the ships just below the
horizon, Morton conned the ship to a position ahead of the
group. He then ordered her down for a submerged approach
and attack. The second undamaged ship was a tanker, which
would be the first target.
The submerged approach brought Wahoo to a good firing
55
position, and quickly, three fish were headed toward the tanker. Immediately, Morton ordered full speed and full rudder as
he swung the sub around to bring the stern tubes to bear. As
the Wahoo was turning, one torpedo hit the tanker and, with a
flash, started a fire_:but she wasn't about to sink yet. Now
they had four torpedoes left to sink two damaged ships.
Getting a good shot on the damaged freighter was a problem. It seemed that no matter how he approached, the sub
was spotted and the ship took evasive action. After a while,
Morton ordered all ahead back and they went back after the
smoking tanker, backwards. Two shots were fired and they
were rewarded with a hit. That should do it, Morton decided,
ordering all ahead full. Once more they pursued the sturdy
freighter. A surface approach was foiled by gunfire from the
freighter and Wahoo went deep.
After a short while they surfaced again, moved ahead of
the freighter, and waited. As the ship moved into firing position, a destroyer appeared on the horizon. They would have
one last shot. Keeping the stern pointed at the target as it approached, Morton gave the order and the last two torpedoes
were fired. All fingers were crossed-they wanted a sinking,
not merely damage.
After a long three-minute run, both fish hit; finally, the
tough Arizona Maru-class freighter began to sink. The Wahoo
headed for Pearl Harbor, flying a broom tied to the mast to indicate a clean sweep. Morton radioed his attack report and received the now famous reply from Admiral Hulsey, "Your
picture is on the piano!"
On the way back to Pearl, O'Kane had the unusual experience of two birthdays when they crossed the international
date line and gained another 2 February 1943. This was the
best patrol of the war so far and the Wahoo was awarded a
Presidential Unit Citation.

With Silent Service. Use scenario #3, USS Growler, August 1942. You will leave, as did the Wahoo, from Brisbane.
Follow the course on the map through the Vitiaz Strait and
then patrol northwest. End your patrol at Midway. To be a
56
3rd Patrol
000
BONIN ISi.ANOS
h'iO-
'
MARSHAi.
'.:
ISLANDS
ISIMOS
GtllEAT
ISIANOS
NEW
. ' : HEBRIDES
.""
success, you must sink four ships, including at least one warship (you might even try that down-the-throat shot).
With Up Periscope! Use scenario #3 USS Tang 1st patrol.

Move the sub around New Guinea and through the strait;
then patrol northwest. You must sink four ships, including at
least one warship.
57
10
uss wahaa
1'th Patrol
The Wahoo's successful third patrol was the shortest on record

at that time-only 24 days. So after an equally short rest of
eight days, they were off to sea again. Their reward for such a
successful patrol was a trip into Empire waters, heading to
Midway and on to the East China and Yellow seas.
After an uneventful Pacific crossing, the Wahoo and crew
passed through the Colnett Strait and into the East China Sea
in the cover of darkness on 11 March 1943. The Colnett Strait
is a major passageway between Japan's large Kyushu Island and
a group of smaller islands to the south, known collectively as
the Ryukyu Islands. Morton then headed north to the Formosa-Nagasaki shipping lanes. Several days of submerged patrolling during the day and on the surface at night didn't produce
a single contact.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Finally, on 13 March, near the large island Saishu To, the call
of "smoke on the horizon" sent the crew to battle stations. A
small freighter slowly came into view and the captain determined that it was worth one torpedo. The Wahoo was sitting
almost directly on her track, so the captain conned the ship
slightly out of her path and waited.
One torpedo in the aft torpedo room was readied. The
target's estimated speed was 12 knots, and when she presented a favorable angle, O'Kane gave the order to fire . The shot
broached the surface and then headed toward the target, finally passing in front of it. The freighter turned out to be smaller
than they originally thought, leading to an overestimation of
her speed, which was probably closer to 10 knots.
58
4th Patrol
Figure 101. The Wahoo Pulls Into Port
'/,
,,. . '
The crew learned from this mistake and vowed not to repeat it. At least the freighter hadn't seen the errant shot, so
the sub's presence in the area was still unknown.
59
Figure 10-2
Richard O'Kane (left} and Commander Dudley "Mush" Morton on the bridge of
the Wahoo.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Another uneventful day passed and the Wahoo headed north
to the Yellow Sea. Early on the morning of 19 March, the
Bells of Saint Mary's sent the crew to battle stations again.
The sub raced to gain a position ahead of the large freighter
coming into view, and when it reached a position 750 yards
off her track, the captain ordered the sub to submerge. He
waited until the ship was headed slightly away from the
sub-on a 120 degree angle-to fire. This aspect would allow
for maximum enemy evasive maneuvers and still ensure a hit.
The order to fire was given and, quickly, a single torpedo
was on its way. After a short 49-second run, there was a huge
explosion. This was the first hit with the new Torpex explosive
head, and it was quite impressive. The ship's stem was totally
blown away; two minutes and 26 seconds later, what was left
of the ship sank.
60
4th Patrol
Torpedo Attack #3
Later on the morning of 19 March, as the captain finished
breakfast, the call came again-another freighter was sighted.
The ship had already pulled even with the sub, so a long
chase to firing position was in store. By 0900 their submerged
chase brought them into firing position at a range of 2000
yards.
The captain waited for the 120 degree track again and
then gave O'Kane the go-ahead to fire. Two torpedoes hit the
freighter-in the bow and amidships, but she didn't appear
ready to sink.
Two more fish were fired, but the skillful Japanese captain
managed to avoid them both. With low batteries, the sub
couldn't continue the chase submerged and it would have
been foolish to surface and face the ship's large guns. So,
when the Japanese started firing at the periscope, Morton decided to head for deep water and clear the area.
Torpedo Attack #4
The evening of 21 March found the Wahoo just off the Korean
shore, waiting for ships along a logical shipping lane. As the
off-duty officers were settling in for the night, a call from the
Officer of the Deck (OOD) brought them running.
A ship had been spotted. There seemed to be plenty of
time to move to a firing position. The initial range was 7000
yards. During the setup, the ship made a zig in the Wahoo's
direction that made the approach even better. The ship was at
least 7000 tons, probably a passenger freighter. Again, they
waited as the ship passed perpendicular to them. When the
ship was at the 120 degree position, Wahoo fired. Three torpedoes were on their way, one in the stern, one in the bow, and
one in the middle. The first missed behind, the second missed
in front, but the third hit right in the middle. The ship started
down almost immediately. Four and a half minutes later, she
was gone.
61
Torpedo Attack # 5
Shortly after dawn on 21 March, another ship came over the
horizon. Little maneuvering was necessary as she moved toward them. It was a perfect setup-all they had to do was wait.
As the target passed in front of the Wahoo, three torpedoes were sent on their way from the after torpedo room. The
run was short; it only took 52 seconds to cross the 800 yards.
Two solid hits followed and the members of the crew took
turns watching as the ship slid beneath the flat sea. A battle
surface was immediately ordered and shortly thereafter, swimmers were sent into the flotsam to look for code books and
maps. A number of books were retrieved along with numerous
souvenirs for the crew, which included two large flags of the
steamship line and a life preserver bearing the ship's name,
Nitu Maru.
Torpedo Attack # 6
Just before dawn on 23 March, radar picked up a ship; the
Wahoo was patrolling the western side of the Yellow Sea near
the entrance to the Gulf of Po Hai. A quick surface run put
the Wahoo ahead of her and on her track-they would submerge and attack at dawn. O'Kane took the scope and
watched the ship approach: The range closed to 1000 yards;
the angle-on-the-bow was 88 degrees. Another perfect setup.
One torpedo was fired, hitting right under the ship's
stack, raising a large black cloud as it was carrying coal. With
such a heavy load, it started for the bottom immediately. The
Wahoo was definitely on a roll.
Torpedo Attack # 7
On the evening of 24 March, the crew was settling in to watch
the evening movie when the bells rang to bring them to battle
stations. A large tanker was headed straight for them.
A stern shot seemed appropriate. Morton conned the boat
to a favorable position and O'Kane took the TBT (Target Bearing Transmitter) on the bridge. At 1700 yards, three torpedoes
were on their way. Two exploded prematurely 18 seconds later, rocking the Wahoo, but not the enemy. The third was
62
4th Patrol
knocked off course. One more torpedo was fired, but the ship
had changed course by then and it missed also.
The tracking team and Morton decided that the tanker
must be headed for the port in Dairen. If the sub surfaced and
"poured it on," it could beat her there. An hour or so running
at flank speed on the surface put the Wahoo in good position
ahead of the target and still four miles from the port. The
tanker was silhouetted in the rising moon so they could use
the scope and attack submerged.
This close to port, the tanker's captain was obviously feeling safe: He brought the ship straight down the track and
made a perfect target. O'Kane lined it up and Morton ordered
three shots. The first two missed fore and aft, but again, the
third struck right in the middle-the best place to hit a tanker.
They watched in the conning tower as the Syoyo Maru, 7500
tons, sank by the stern. Morton ordered the Wahoo to the surface to leave the area and the crew returned to watching their
movie.
Torpedo Attack # 8
Later on the night of 24 March, the fire control party was quietly called to the bridge. Another ship had wandered into
Wahoo territory and conditions were good with enough moon
for tracking and enough time before dawn to obtain a good
position.
Finally in position just before 0400-and they had an excellent position 10,000 yards ahead of the enemy and 1000
yards off her track-the Wahoo submerged and the crew was
called to battle stations.
As the ship pulled broadside to the sub, two torpedoes
were fired. The first fish exploded before it reached the target,
but the second hit with a loud explosion. It was a solid hit,
but the freighter just kept going. Morton ordered, "Battle surface, gun!" A quick 12 minutes later, the Wahoo was on the
surface and pumping shells into the freighter.
The captain's attention was then drawn away by the reported sighting of another ship. Afraid that it might be a warship, he ordered cease fire and turned to investigate. The
sighting turned out to be a small tanker apparently approach63
ing to determine the source of smoke. By this time, the freighter was full of holes, on fire, listing, and sinking. The gun crew
took a short rest while Morton conned the Wahoo toward the
small tanker. A running gun battle gave the gun crew another
good workout, and in the end, they set the tanker ablaze. As
the sub left the area on the surface, the crew on deck watched
both ships sink.
Torpedo Attack # 9
With only two torpedoes left, the Wahoo spent the next several
days in search of shipping in the Yellow Sea and back into the
East China Sea. Finally, in the early morning darkness of 30
March, the crew spotted a ship. Morton conned the boat patiently for another submerged dawn attack. As the sun began
to rise in the east, the bells sounded, sending the Wahoo's crew
to battle stations for the last time of the patrol. With its last
two torpedoes, the Wahoo sent this medium-sized freighter to
the bottom.
Morton put the boat on the surface and headed back
through the Colnett Strait toward home.
Slmulatlnu This Patrol

Can you match Morton?
With Silent Service. Use scenario #1. The USS Tang 3rd
Patrol, June 1944 from Midway-you'll find plenty of shipping in the Gulf of Po Hai. Or, just sit in one of the straits or
channel openings and wait for the ships to come to you. To
beat the Wahoo's performance, you must sink nine ships, or
more than 20,000 tons.
With Up Periscope! Use scenario #l, Wahoo 2nd Patrol;
this is actually the patrol you're simulating. It was listed as the
Wahoo's 2nd patrol, but it's actually the 2nd patrol under Captain Morton, which was the Wahoo's 4th patrol of the war. Select the Northern Pacific. To beat the Wahoo, you must sink
nine ships.
64
4th Patrol
Figure 1o-3. Patrol Route Map
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7th Patrol
Figure 11 1
"Mush" Morton (foreground) In the conning tower of the Wahoo.
The Wahoo 's sixth patrol turned out to be a nightmare for

Commander Morton: The crew had driven deep into the Sea
of Japan, found numerous targets, and then came away with
no success stories. The problem was the MK 14 torpedo. Time
after time, Morton conned the boat to a good firing position
and fired perfect shots only to be greeted by a thud at impact
and no explosion. After attacks on nine ships with no detonations, Morton wisely decided that it was futile to keep shooting bad torpedoes and that it would be better to take them
back to Pearl Harbor where the failures could be investigated.
66
7th Patrol
Morton's stay at Pearl was short, and he demanded to be

allowed to return to the Sea of Japan, this time with "live
fish." His request was granted, and in early September 1943,
the Wahoo and the USS Sawfish left Pearl for Empire waters,
both secretly armed with new MK 18 torpedoes. The Wahoo
had a full load of 24; the Sawfish carried a load half MK 14
and half MK 18.
What actually happened aboard the Wahoo during this last
patrol will never be known. Numerous writers have speculated as to her fate, but the most convincing account was written
by one of the men who knew the boat and its skipper bestRichard O'Kane. By this time, O'Kane had left the Wahoo to
assume his own command, but his interest and love for the
Wahoo led him to investigate her fate after the war. His account was based on tracking reports by the Japanese Navy,
Japanese newspaper accounts of ships lost, his knowledge of
Commander Morton, and his own tragic personal experience
with the MK 18 torpedo.
Torpedo Attack # 1
The Wahoo entered the Sea of Japan again through the La Perouse Strait; the night transit was uneventful. After careful patrolling down the coast, the crew sighted a group of ships
headed their way. Crew members went to battle stations for
the first time in that patrol, confident in Morton's ability to
sink enemy ships. A medium freighter pulled into view and
the tracking party went to work.
A steady approach was made and two torpedoes were
fired from close range. The wait during the run must have
seemed endless: The electric MK 18 traveled only half as fast
as the MK 14, but left no wake to point a finger at the firing
sub. The wait did end eventually with the impact and explosion of both torp_edoes; the freighter was completely blown up.
Torpedo confidence regained, Morton cleared the area. He
often used this hit-and-run tactic, not staying in one place
long enough to let the antisubmarine ships close in.
67
Chapter 11. USS
Wahoo
Torpedo Attack #2
Five days later, another ship showed up on the SJ (surface) radar and the crew started tracking. With sundown just ahead,
there wasn't enough time for a periscope attack, but they did
get a good look at her-a small cargo ship. The Wahoo surfaced and waited; the target was coming right down the track
toward them. Two shots were fired, resulting in a hit, and the
target broke in two and sank. The Wahoo was back in
business.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Morton had made a prewar trip into these waters and he
knew he should move the sub to a position in a heavily used
traffic lane across the southern part of the sea. On 5 October,
escorts were sighted. The Wahoo approached slowly and made
contact with a large ship. Easily slipping past the escorts, the
captain took up a position off the target track and set up for a
straight bow shot. From only 950 yards, they opened fire with
four torpedoes spread to hit along the ship's length. They all
hit and exploded, ripping the side out of the large troop transport.
Flooded totally on one side, the transport rolled over and
sank. This sinking was reported in the Japanese press and
could only have been attributed to the Wahoo. A brief depth
charge attack followed, but it was quickly put astern as the
Wahoo once again moved out of a hot area before a massive
antisubmarine operation could be mounted.
Three ships down so early in the patrol must have lifted
the crew's spirits after the disappointing 6th patrol. The mood
stayed high as another ship appeared on the SJ; battle stations
were called, but most of the stations were already manned.
Again, the Wahoo had a good set up, and tubes both fore
and aft were made ready in case of a wild last-minute zig.
None came. Two fish were fired from the stern tubes, again
resulting in hits. The Wahoo followed its familiar pattern: Dive,
clear the area, and cheer.
68
7th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 4
Weather turned bad as the Wahoo approached the Tsugaru
Strait area, but the SJ burned through the muck to spot a ship
moving down a track toward them. Morton moved onto the
ship's tack; then, keeping the stern pointed at the ship to
show only a minimum angle, he fired three torpedoes at the
medium-sized freighter. It was immediately obvious that
something was wrong. One of the torpedoes made a wide zig
to the side, possibly hitting the bow on the way out of the
tube, and started to circle.
Emergency 'power was called, but it wasn't enough. The
torpedo came all the way around and struck the Wahoo, flooding several departments. She was damaged, but not down for
the count. If at all possible, Morton would have headed for
home to return the MK 18s for investigation. Unable to dive,
he tried to make it through the La Perouse Strait on the surface under overcast skies. The sub was spotted by a shore artillery battery and fired upon. Left with no choice but to dive,
Commander Morton blew the tanks and headed down, but
those on the shore had called for air attacks and arrived shortly.
Oil leaking from ruptured fuel tanks was easily spotted by
the bombers and they closed in for the kill. Numerous small
bombs reportedly were dropped on this oil slick, followed by
several large depth charges that brought up a large piece of
bright metal identified as a propeller. This was most likely the
end of the Wahoo.
It's unfortunate that Morton didn't return with the MK
18s; if he had, he would surely have prevented similar disasters. After the war, the MK 18 was tested, and its tendency to
make circular runs was verified.
Commander "Mush" Morton was a true pioneer in submarine tactics. This captain and his ship were greatly missed
by the Pacific sub forces. His legacy was the men he trained,
such as Dick O'Kane. O'Kane went on to do great things with
his own command, the USS Tang. He was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor by President Truman in March
1946.
69

After the investigation at the end of the war, Morton and the
Wahoo were given credit for sinking four ships on their last
patrol
With Silent Service. Your goal is to go into the Emperor's
private lake-the Sea of Japan-and sink at least four ships.
Stay close to the shore and beware of the shallow water. Use
scenario #l, the USS Tang.
With Up Periscope! Your goal is four ships (although the
Wahoo probably sank six or seven) in the Sea of Japan. Use
scenario #2, the USS Wahoo. Choose the Northern Theater
from the Big Chart.
70
7th Patrol
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71
12
USS Trigger .
6th Patrol
The 6th patrol of the USS Trigger was short in duration but
long in achievement. The entire patrol was accomplished in
the month of September 1943. It was a lesson in dogged determination as the captain and crew latched onto a large convoy and made repeated attacks until they had damaged or
sunk almost the entire convoy.
They set sail from Pearl Harbor on 1 September 1943,
headed for their patrol area in the East China Sea.
Torpedo Attack # 1
More than half the month passed before the crew of the Trigger had a chance to make a real approach on a target, the first
of which came on the afternoon of 17 September as a fiveship convoy was sighted moving at high speed. They opened
up the engines and made an attempt to gain a firing position
ahead of the group but were finally forced to admit that they
were not going to catch it. By 1745 they had lost contact with
the convoy.
The sub slowed to normal patrol speed, and the crew was
about to settle in for another night when the lookouts spotted
two ships running on an opposite course from their own. The
captain allowed the two large freighters. to pass by and prepared to surface and attack after dark.
Darkness fell with authority that night-visibility was almost nil. The Trigger approached quietly on the surface and
fired four torpedoes at the largest ship from 1100 yards. The
captain and crew were stunned to see two hits-both of which
were duds!
The target was now alerted to the sub's presence, so the
captain ordered the Trigger to submerge for a reload as the
Japanese sailors opened fire with deck guns. Captain Domin
72
6th Patrol
took the boat around to the other side of the ship and came
up to fire again. The Trigger moved in to 1000 yards and fired
four torpedoes. Two hits were seen, and the shocks from the
explosions were felt throughout the submarine. The target ship
was in trouble with the first hit; after the second, it quickly
sank.
With this warm-up successfully under their belt, the
crew went looking for a serious convoy and found it on 21
September.
Torpedo Attack #2
In the late afternoon, masts were sighted on the horizon; the
Trigger approached at high speed. A convoy was contacted
consisting of one large tanker, two small tankers, and three
medium-sized freighters; it had air coverage but no escorts.
After dark, the Trigger surfaced and chased the group.
Once abeam of the tanker column, the captain turned the sub
to make a surface attack. As the range closed, he fired three
torpedoes at the large tanker from 1600 yards and then turned
the sub again and fired three more at a second tanker.
One torpedo hit toward the stern of the first tanker and
flames shot 500 feet into the air. A second torpedo hit her
amidships but nothing could add to the holocaust already taking place. The second tanker took a hit amidships and began
to burn also; after being hit, she turned hard away from the
Trigger.
One shot that missed hit a tanker in the next column and
broke it in two; this tanker sank immediately. The burning
tankers completely lit the area so all the ships, as well as the
sub, were plainly visible. The remaining ships all opened fire
on the sub, but their aim wasn't true and the shots missed the
Trigger by a comfortable margin. One tanker did get the captain's attention, however, when it turned and rushed toward
the sub firing its bow gun.
Captain Domin turned the sub and headed away from the
oncoming tanker; it seemed to take forever to build up speed
as the tanker grew larger and larger. As the sub turned, it sent
three torpedoes after the tanker, but all missed. Once the sub
steadied her course, the captain fired one torpedo down-thethroat and scored a hit as he pulled away.
73
Chapter 12. USS Trigger
By this time, shells from the ships' guns began to close in,
so Captain Domin ordered the Trigger to dive in order to sort
things out. There was momentary confusion in the conning
tower as the captain fell into the periscope well, but he was
able to catch himself by the elbows. He called to the quartermaster just in time to stop him from lowering the scope.
When several violent explosions were heard, the captain
ordered the sub to periscope depth to take a look around.
Tanker number 1 and tanker number 2 were both stopped and
burning; tanker number 3 was down by the bow; one of the
freighters had sunk. Trigger surfaced and pursued a freighter
that was trying to run to the north. They approached on the
surface and fired the last two bow torpedoes, resulting in two
hits. The target started sinking immediately.
Back at the scene of the first attack, things were very confused: It appeared that two of the damaged ships were firing
at each other! Neither one scored any hits.
The freighter the Trigger had just attacked was down a little in the bow but not ready to sink; the captain ordered the
sub to close in so he could finish off the ship. Two stern torpedoes were fired at the stationary target from 2200 yards, but
nothing happened-there must have been at least one dud.
The ship was now able to get underway again and was getting
very close with the deck gun, so Domin took the Trigger
down, and they made several approaches before they could
get a shot with the stern tubes. The last two torpedoes were
fired from a perfect setup-a 90-degree target angle and a
range of only 1000 yards. Screams and curses filled the boat
as both turned out to be duds. The captain considered a battle
surface and gun action, but the old three-inch gun had never
fired more than five consecutive rounds in its history without
jamming, so the idea was dropped.
All torpedoes expended, the crew of the Trigger pointed
their bow toward Midway.
74
6th Patrol
Simulating This Patrol

Commander Domin was officially only credited with sinking
four ships on this patrol but his tonnage total of 27,095 was
sufficient to put him at number 16 on the " Best Patrol by Tonnage Sunk" list.
With Silent Service. Your goal for this mission is to be a

convoy wrecker. You should search until you come upon a
large convoy and then attempt to sink at least five ships from
the same group. Once you attack, they'll scatter, so be sure
your first shot is a good one. Your tonnage total should be at
least 27,000 tons. Use scenario #4, the USS Seawolf. Also,
choose the DUD TORPEDO option from the start-up list.
With Up Periscope! Your goal for this patrol is to sink a
complete convoy. Try to find a group with at least five ships
and keep after it until all are on the bottom or you're out of
torpedoes. Use scenario #4, the USS Tang's 3rd patrol. Choose
the Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
75
Chapter 12. USS Trigger
Figura 12 -1. Patrol Route Map
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13
USS Seahorse
2nd Patrol
Figure 13-1. The USS Seahorse
One of the most consistent boats of the war was the Seahorse,
who turned in a string of very successful patrols. The first of
these was her 2nd patrol, the first under Commander Slade
D. Cutter. Commander Cutter and crew departed Midway on
20 October 1943 to patrol south of the Empire in the East
China Sea.
The Seahorse had been at sea for only nine days when it
approached a small trawler and sunk it with the deck gun.
The scene was repeated the next day and this time, valuable
charts were recovered as well as fresh fish for supper.
77
Chapter 13. USS
Seahorse
Torpedo Attack # 1
A few hours after the gun action, a large 17-ship convoy was
sighted. Through the, night the skipper tried to obtain a good
firing position. At about 0300, the Seahorse was submerged
and ready to fire; then, one of the escorts turned and the entire setup was ruined as the captain had to take the sub deep
to avoid being rammed in the darkness.
Back on the surface a little later, he began yet another
end-around maneuver. This time as he approached, he saw an
explosion toward the end of the convoy-another U.S. sub
was making an attack! Rather than being upset over having to
share his quarry, Cutter felt the action might drive some of the
ships his way. It was extremely dark, and so the captain decided to remain on the surface for the attack.
Several dark shapes appeared off the bow, and he closed
in for an attack. Three torpedoes were fired at a small freighter, resulting in hits. The freighter broke up and sank. The captain ordered full speed and headed away from the convoy to
set up again.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Four hours later, the sub returned to the surface. This time, a
large tanker and a medium-sized freighter were the targets.
Three fish were fired at each and each ship took two hits.
With an escort now on his tail, Cutter ordered flank speed and
the sub pulled away.
After that, things were slow for "the Horse" for a while,
and for several days the crew was unable to find any enemy
shipping.
Torpedo Attack # 3
On 22 November, the Seahorse's luck finally changed: A convoy of two freighters and three escorts steamed over the
horizon.
An approach was made, but the escorts were very active
and constantly in the way. After several attempts, a firing position was reached and four torpedoes were fired at the lead
freighter. Two hit and she went down in several pieces. Before
78
2nd Patrol
the sub could fire at the second target, an escort forced her
deep, and by the time she got back to the surface, the Seahorse
had lost contact with the other ship.
Torpedo Attack #4
At dusk on 27 November, the gong once again sounded to
bring the crew to battle stations.
A heavily loaded freighter and two large tankers came
into view, along with three escorts riding herd. Again, several
surface approaches were foiled by the escorts and changes in
direction. The group appeared to be heading for the Tsushima
Straits, which were believed to be mined. If they made it that
far, Cutter knew he couldn't follow-he had to catch them
before they got there.
He poured on the fuel, drew as close as he dared, and
fired four torpedoes at one of the tankers. The range was extreme. He immediately turned to try a stern shot, but the
range was now too great. He maneuvered again to try one
more shot and was welcomed by two torpedo hits from the
first salvo.
The tanker broke in two and each part sank separately.
Dodging an escort, Commander Cutter fired four more fish at
the second tanker, resulting in two more hits. The bridge crew
watched for several seconds as flames slowly appeared from
the tanker. At first, it didn't seem badly damaged, but then
they were all shocked by an enormous explosion. Flames shot
3500 feet into the air and parts of the ship flew huge distances
in all directions. An escort made a halfhearted attempt to attack the Seahorse, but it, too, may have been damaged by the
explosion.
Now low on fuel, the submarine started back to Midway.
Torpedo Attack # 5
While heading home, the Seahorse happened upon a small,
fast-moving convoy. Having torpedoes left only in the stern
tubes, the approach was very difficult. Each time the Seahorse
pulled ahead of the convoy, it had taken a turn and wasn't
where the sub thought it would be.
79
Chapter 13. USS Seahorse
Finally, everything came together at once: The Seahorse

fired four stern torpedoes and the entire convoy began firing
deck guns at the Seahorse. In the resulting pandemonium, no
one could say for sure whether any of the torpedoes hit. The
captain was almost certain he had hit something, but to his
credit, he didn't claim damage.
He did claim to sink seven ships on the Seahorse's 2nd patrol, but his official total was changed after the war to show
five ships sunk for a very respectable total tonnage of 27,500.
Slade Cutter had mastered the night surface approach and
used it well on this patrol. It was a very effective maneuver
when executed properly.

With Silent Service. You have some big numbers here to
beat. Sinking 27,500 tons wouldn't be easy under any conditions, but to beat Slade Cutter's mark, you'll have to do it all
at night and on the surface. Use scenario #l, the USS Tang 1st
patrol.
With Up Periscope! The tonnage mark of 27,500 should
be easy to beat, but you must learn to attack on the surface at
night to_beat Cutter's mark. Five ships is your goal. Use the
start-up menu to set the time of day to midnight for your attack. Use scenario #2, the Wahoo's 6th patrol. Choose the
Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
80
2nd Patrol
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81
14
USS Seahorse
3rd Patrol
After a quick fueling at Midway, the Seahorse was off to Pearl
Harbor for a refit and training. On 6 January 1944, she sailed
from Pearl Harbor on her 3rd war patrol to sweep the seas in
the area of the Palau Islands.
Torpedo Attack # 1
While Seahorse was underway on the morning of 16 January,
the watch spotted a freighter and four escorts. Hoping to use
some of the stern torpedoes early, Captain Cutter maneuvered
the boat to a good firing position, but the target zigged away
at the last minute.
With all four escorts on his side of the ship, Cutter decided to hold fire and circle out for a surface end-around. By
1607, after avoiding a depth charge attack launched by one of
the escorts, Seahorse was on the surface and running at flank
speed. At 2009, they were far enough ahead of the group to
turn and start the approach. Heading in as close as possible,
they fired four torpedoes at the freighter, three solid hits were
seen. The first two set the target ablaze and the third blew off
her stern.
The next several days were spent correcting damage
caused by depth charges. The captain's questions regarding
how the escort managed to keep contact with them were answered when the sub surfaced-they spotted a large oil slick
on the water, where an oil filler cap had come loose. Once the
cap was tightened, the oil slick disappeared.
Torpedo Attack # 2
On 19 January, they approached Pais Island for reconnaissance. After entering the area, the Seahorse contacted two enemy cargo ships with three escorts on 21 January. The captain
82
3rd Patrol
tracked the ships all day and then as dusk drew near, he made
a surface approach and fired three torpedoes at one of the
freighters.
Two hits were scored on the target, and one torpedo hit a
ship behind the target. "The Japanese were no more surprised
[by the third hit] than we were," noted Cutter. Both ships
stopped and opened fire in every direction while the escorts
randomly dropped charges. The Seahorse followed at a safe
distance and watched as the first ship sank bow first. Two
more shots were fired at the second ship, but both missed.
The fire team huddled, and after recalculating the numbers,
fired two more with the same results. Again they huddled and
decided that the Target Bearing Transmitter must be "out of
whack." A third salvo was fired, and this time, both torpedoes
were dead on. Down went the target.
Torpedo Attack # 3
By 29 January, the Seahorse had moved down to Palau Island
and contacted three freighters and five escorts coming by the
island. Several attempts to close on the surface in the dark
were foiled by escorts continually moving between the sub
and its targets.
Realizing that this was not going to work, Commander
Cutter raced the sub ahead for a submerged approach. At
dawn, the convoy changed course and once again left the
Seahorse out in the cold. She tracked the convoy all day and
surfaced again at dusk and moved in to attack. Again the escorts frustrated the captain but he stayed with the attack. Finally, at 0130, the freighters made a mistake: They made a
radical zig that put the escorts out of position. It was a race to
the firing point and the Seahorse was much faster than the escorts. She moved in and fired three torpedoes, resulting in
three hits. The target sank as she withdrew.
Torpedo Attack #4
At dawn, the sub lost contact with the convoy but managed to
maintain a bearing on it by listening to the destroyer's sonar
"pinging." By midaftemoon, the convoy split. After dark, the
Seahorse surfaced again to continue the hunt. She regained ra83
dar contact, and shortly after midnight, finally fired four torpedoes at a large freighter. All missed. Another two shots also
missed. The torpedoes couldn't hit the freighter because of its
defensive zig-zag pattern.
Torpedo Attack # 5
Now Cutter had only two shots remaining, and he wanted to
make them count. At 0300, he started a submerged approach
and closed to within 800 yards of the target. As soon as the
last two tubes were cleared, the Seahorse headed deep to avoid
three escorts close at hand. Torpedo hits were mixed with the
sound of depth charges for the next several minutes. Later,
Commander Cutter surfaced to find that he had hit the target.
He watched as it sank, framed by burning gasoline.
All out of torpedoes, the Seahorse headed back to Pearl
with five new victims for her battle flag.

Commander Cutter claimed five ships and a tonnage of 30,900
tons. As usual though, this amount was changed after the war.
His claim of five ships was upheld, but the tonnage was reduced to 20,900 tons. Still, it was an excellent performance.
With Silent Service. The goal for this patrol is five ships
and 21,000 tons in the area of Palau Island. Choose scenario
#l, the USS Tang's 3rd patrol.
With Up Periscope! Five ships is the goal for this patrol,
though you'll probably hit the 20,000-ton mark with just one
sinking. Use scenario #3, the USS Tang's 1st patrol. Choose
the Southern Theater from the Big Chart.
84
3rd Patrol
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15
USS Seahorse
4th Patrol
With two very successful patrols now under his belt with the
Seahorse, Slade Cutter sailed confidently from Pearl on 16
March 1944. His destination was the Mariana Islands-he
wanted to make three excellent patrols in a row.
After avoiding another submarine and several aircraft attacks, they started to patrol on 28 March.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Just off of Tenian Island on 4 April, the Seahorse came into
contact with her first convoy of the patrol. Seahorse followed
the convoy until it slipped into the harbor, preventing an approach.
Cutter stayed in the area for a few days hoping to catch a
group coming out of the harbor. His persistence was rewarded
on 7 April as the watch sighted a five-ship convoy-three
freighters and two escorts. Around 0100 the next morning, he
submerged well ahead of the convoy and slipped past the escorts to a good firing position. The ships then made a turn to
the right and Cutter decided to fire rather than wait for a better setup.
Three torpedoes were fired at the first target at a range of
1200 yards, with only showing a 30-degree angle on the bow.
As the second target was about to be overlapped by the first,
they fired three shots at it. The second target was at a range of
2200 yards with a somewhat better angle on the bow of 50
degrees.
The first target took all three hits with a tremendous explosion. The captain turned the periscope around to look for
escorts, and by the time he turned back to the target, it was
gone. The second ship also took a hit and was on fire but apparently on an even keel.
86
4th Patrol
The escorts closed in and the crew of the Seahorse waited

out the barrage of 28 depth charges. The escorts kept them in
shallow water for quite awhile before they could break contact
and move out to sea. After quickly charging the batteries,
Commander Cutter tried to locate the second ship again to finish the job, but when the sub returned to the scene, all that
was left was a large oil slick.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Cutter's luck held and 9 April found him on the trail of yet
another good-sized convoy. With the periscope fogging badly,
it was hard for him to determine the exact makeup of the
group, but there were at least 15 or 20 ships.
The largest freighter moved to the opposite side of the
group and out of range, but a quite respectable one moved
into a position it would later regret. With an excellent setup of
1800 yards and 85 degree angle on the bow, the Seahorse fired
a four-torpedo spread, but just as the third torpedo was fired,
the ships made a sharp turn. All four shots missed. Undaunted, Cutter set up and fired two more with the new course
information and scored two quick hits.
He had several tense moments then: One of the first torpedoes circled back toward him and ran in rings for quite a
while. The escorts closed in for a harmless counterattack and
the crew of the sub listened to surface explosions and breakingup noises from their target.
Back at periscope depth somewhat later, Cutter was discouraged to see the target still afloat. He surfaced and cleared
the area to get a quick battery charge. The Seahorse eluded two
destroyers and closed in on the scene of the earlier attack.
After a long night of trying to get back to the damaged ship,
they were glad to find only floating debris in the area. The
ship had sunk during the night, and wreckage was strewn all
the way to the horizon. It's possible that another ship was hit
and sunk as well.
The Seahorse and crew spent several days playing tag with
a group of destroyers and aircraft sent out from Guam.
87
Chapter 15. USS
Seahorse
Torpedo Attack # 3
Cutter took the boat over to Saipan for a while, hoping to let
things cool off in the area. While the crew tried to judge the
depth of the water west of Saipan, a Japanese submarine was
sighted on the surface at 210 degrees. Because of the amount
of time he had spent in the area earlier in the patrol, Cutter
was confident as he approached the other boat submerged.
Having tracked the sub for long enough to make out its
base course and zig-zag pattern, he moved in to attack.
Seahorse slowed to let the sub pass. When its range was 1600
yards, it presented a good 85-degree angle on the bow. Two
torpedoes were fired: One very loud hit was heard and Captain Cutter believed the enemy sub blew up.
Torpedo Attack #4
At breakfast time on 26 April, another convoy was spotted,
and the crew went to battle stations. The convoy was making
slow speed, so it was decided to secure from battle stations
and track the group all day; then they would attack at night.
After dark, the Seahorse took up a position dead ahead of
the convoy and waited for it to approach. When contact was
again made, the group was heading straight for the sub. Cutter
turned the boat toward the convoy. Although he hadn't
reached a good firing position, it appeared that one of the escorts had spotted them, so Cutter took the boat around to use
the stern tubes. Four torpedoes were fired. Even though the
angle on the bow was a narrow 38 degrees, three hits were
observed through the periscope and the target sank quietly by
the stern. The escort counterattack was "hardly worth the
name." A few charges were dropped but none came close.
There wasn't enough time for another attack that night,
and since the Seahorse had orders for lifeguard duty shortly,
Commander Cutter broke contact with the convoy and headed
toward his next station.
When lifeguard duty was completed, she headed to Brisbane for a well-deserved rest. The Seahorse was out of
torpedoes.
88
4th Patrol

With Silent Service. Cutter received credit for sinking five
ships at a tonnage of 19,375-that's your goal for this patrol.
Sail from Midway and patrol the Guam area; return to Brisbane, Australia. Use scenario #4, the USS Seawolf.
With Up Periscope! Five ships is your goal for this patrol
around the Mariana Islands. Use scenario #3, the USS Tang's
1st patrol. Choose the Southern Theater from the Big Chart.
89
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90
16
USS Bawtin
2nd Patrol
Figure 16-1. The USS Bawtln
Admiral Christie, the commander of all U.S. submarines based

in Australia, was so pleased with the first patrol of the Bowfin
that he promoted its skipper, Commander Willingham, to
head a submarine division. Christie's choice for replacement
was Lt. Commander Walter Thomas Griffith, recently the XO
(Executive Officer) aboard the USS Gar.
On its first voyage, the Bowfin had formed an impromptu
wolf pack with the Billfish with very good results. Impressed
by their performance, Christie assigned the two to work together again.
91
Chapter 16. USS Bowfin
On 1 November 1943, after an appropriate period of leave

and a week of get-acquainted drill and training, the Bowfin set
out of Freemantle, Australia on its second patrol of the war.
After a quick stop at Exmouth Gulf (a forward fuel station) to
top off its tanks, Griffith headed toward Lombok Strait to pass
into the Java Sea and Japanese-controlled territory. During this
period, Griffith was irritated to notice that an oil slick was
present after every morning trim dive. He attributed this to
overfilling the tanks at Exmouth. After several days of travel,
the fuel level was down but the slick appeared again, and so
the crew spent a hard day's work plugging and tightening
connections. This seemed to cure the problem, but the cruise
was off to a rocky start.
On the morning of 9 November, lookouts spotted a
schooner, but seconds later, the hunter became the hunted as
a Japanese bomber came out of the clouds and forced the Bowfin to crash dive. The plane loitered around for 20 minutes
before giving up and heading away. When the boat surfaced,
it was faced with not one but five schooners under sail. Griffith ordered battle-stations-gun and the crew quickly sank
three of the ships with the four-inch gun. The craft sank so
uncommonly fast that the commander justified the attack by
stating that they must have been carrying something heavy.
The crew, however, felt the attack was unwarranted since
women and children were aboard.
Another patrol plane forced the Bowfin to break off the attack. The plane circled overhead long enough for the two remaining ships to escape, obviously protecting them. Even so,
Griffith would later state that he regretted the attack.
The sub surfaced again later in the afternoon only to be
driven deep immediately by another bomb-carrying patrol
plane. Griffith decided they were too close to shore and headed out to deeper waters toward Balikpapan and the Celebes
Sea. Later that evening, they sank another schooner with the
deck gun.
92
2nd Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 1
The Celebes Sea area was reputed to be a heavy Japanese
shipping zone, and Griffith was discouraged after several days.
The only things sighted had been Japanese planes. His luck finally changed around 1700 on 11 November when lookouts
spotted smoke on the horizon-a convoy. The ships were zigzagging and hard to keep up with, so Griffith decided they
must be headed for the Sibutu Channel and he set out to beat
them there.
Around 1930, two ships steamed into sight in the moonlight. The book identified them as coastal tankers, and they
were traveling without an escort. Griffith examined the situation and decided that if he attacked from his current position,
one of the ships would escape into a nearby bay where he
couldn't follow, so he decided to attack from the mouth of the
bay to prevent either ship from getting away. By 2100, the
Bowfin was in position, and by 2130, the targets were close
enough to tell that they weren't armed. A surface gun attack
would be safe. At 2150, the Bowfin opened fire, and shortly afterward, both targets were in flames. Being so close to the
shore again made Griffith nervous, so he quickly left the area
and headed north at full speed.
Several days of patrolling Mindanao and the Philippines
were uneventful, and on 14 November, the Bowfin headed
into the South China Sea in a storm to try and meet with the
Billfish. After several missed connections, the two subs finally
found each other, exchanged information, and parted again.
The Bowfin headed on toward the Indochina coast, and on 25
November, made landfall. Due to the poor quality of his maps
of the area, Griffith wasn't certain exactly were he was, and
on several occasions, he barely managed to keep from running
aground in the storm that plagued his boat for days.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Around 0200 on 26 November, a dark shape suddenly appeared on a collision course. Several minutes later, when the
collision almost happened again, Griffith realized that he had
wandered into the middle of a Japanese convoy! A radar
sweep showed five ships and an escort craft.
93
Chapter 16. USS Bowfin
Griffith lined the submarine up for an attack on the two

largest ships. At 0351, he fired three torpedoes at the first one.
As he started setting up for the second ship, two of the three
torpedoes hit the first ship and stopped it dead in the water.
He managed to get off one torpedo at the second target
before having to change course and reverse engines to avoid a
collision with the first ship. The shot ran true and the second
ship took its first hit. He swung the stem around hoping to
take care of the first ship before the escort arrived. One of the
stem torpedo tube doors jammed, so three shots were fired:
One hit the first ship and one was a lucky hit on the second
ship. With both targets in bad shape and all tubes empty, the
Bowfin headed away from the area to reload.
By 0530, the Bowfin was ready to head back in at full
speed. On the way back to the area of the attack, the sub almost ran head-on into the hull of one of the tankers hit earlier, now sinking rapidly. Finding only an oil slick at the scene
of the battle, the captain headed after the convoy and tried to
contact the Billfish.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Around 0830, the watch spotted a steamer of approximately
5000 tons. After a two-hour chase and maneuver period, Griffith fired four torpedoes and was rewarded with four hits. The
ship went under in less than two minutes.
Torpedo Attack #4
By now Griffith was seriously lost. The maps were of little
help. He searched for the convoy the rest of the day and came
up dry. Most of the morning of 27 November was spent trying
to get a fix on his location; then, around 1000, a small ship
was spotted. Closer inspection showed a light gun mounted
aft. In a remarkable display of overkill, Griffith fired three torpedoes at the small vessel. All three hit and the craft disappeared in seconds.
Later that night, the Billfish was finally contacted-she
had been out to sea battling a storm for several days. Griffith
94
2nd Patrol
managed to determine his location and felt a little more comfortable; they were sailing off the coast of Indochina near
Varella.
Torpedo Attack # 5
At 0200 on 28 November, the Billfish contacted the Bowfin
about a convoy seen headed their way. Aided with this information, Griffith managed to get the Bowfin ahead of the convoy and into attack position in only an hour. The convoy
consisted of five large ships and several smaller escorts. Griffith quietly slipped between the escorts and the ships, and at
0314, he opened fire.
Six torpedoes from the bow tubes left two of the largest
ships sinking in a matter of minutes. The captain of the third
ship had other ideas however; he turned toward the Bowfin intent on ramming, and opened fire with his five-inch deck gun.
Griffith swung the stern of the sub toward the convoy
hoping to finish off the second ship now wallowing deep in
the water, but the third ship was closing fast. As it came within 500 yards, one of the five-inch shells found its mark on the
rear of the sub. A quick glance at the second ship showed that
it should be going under on its own shortly, so angered by the
shell hit, Griffith and his crew turned their attention to the
third ship, which was getting uncomfortably close. With this
ship only 300 yards away and coming on like a locomotive,
the Bowfin fired two stern torpedoes. Both hit home . The Japanese ship broke in half and sank by the middle.
Surprisingly, the escorts hadn't come after the Bowfin but
had concentrated on moving the rest of the convoy away.
Griffith gave chase on the surface, afraid to dive because he
was unsure of the damaged caused to the pressure hull by the
gun hit. By 0340, he caught up with the convoy again and
fired his last two torpedoes. Both missed. Griffith continued to
track the group and directed the Billfish on an intercept course.
When the Billfish made contact with the convoy, Griffith
moved the Bowfin away from the area to check the damage.
An inspection showed that a number of pipes and induction lines had been broken, but the pressure hull was intact.
Repairs were made as best they could be. The boat still took
95
Chapter 16. USS Bowfln
on water when submerged, but the pumps were able to handle it, so with all torpedoes expended, the Bowfin turned and
headed for home.
Along the way on 2 December, back in the Makassar
Strait, they spotted and sank another yacht with the deck gun.
On 9 December, a happy crew was welcomed back to Freemantle after a very successful patrol.
Admiral Christie gave the Bowfin credit for sinking nine
ships and five small schooners for a grand total of 71,000 tons.
Postwar analysis reduced that number and gave her credit for
sinking 26,000 tons and nine small craft. The real number,
most assuredly, lies somewhere in between. Even taking the
most conservative estimate, it was a very good patrol. Griffith
received the Navy Cross and the entire crew received a Presidential Unit Citation.

Think that you can out-gun Lt. Commander Griffith?
With Silent Service. Select the Bowfin 2nd Patrol. Follow

the course shown on the map, from Freemantle up through
the Lombok Strait, and the Makassar Strait into the Celebes
Sea. From there, move across west of Mindanao and into the
South China Sea and patrol the coast of Indochina. To beat
Griffith, you need to sink more than five large ships or rack
up a tonnage total in excess of 26,000.
With Up Periscope! Select scenario #3, the USS Tang 1st
patrol. Patrol the area shown on the map. To simulate the patrol successfully, you must sink more than 26,000 tons of
shipping.
96
2nd Patrol
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17
USS Seawalt
12th Patrol
Figure 17-1. The USS Seawalf
By the !nd of 1943, the USS Seawolf was already legendary

among submariners for her continuous 48-hour attack on a
group of three cruisers near Christmas Island. "Fearless" Freddie Warder had been replaced in command by Commander
Royce Gross; this patrol would show all that he was a worthy
successor.
The boat was underway for the East China Sea from Midway on 26 December 1943. The patrol area was entered on 9
January 1944, and on the following day, they made their presence known.
98
12th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 1
At 0936, smoke was sighted, and Captain Gross proceeded to
close on its position. The source was identified as a sevenfreighter convoy with two escorts moving at eight knots at a
range of 20,000 yards. Battle stations were called, and the
Seawolf made a submerged approach.
At a range of 2000 yards the group made a zig, leaving
one freighter in a good firing position. The Seawolf fired three
torpedoes, resulting in two hits. A minute later, another explosion rang out. It's possible that the third shot hit a ship in the
next column.
The entire convoy made a zig in Seawolf's direction except
for the escorts, which remained on the far side. The largest
ship in the bunch presented a good angle for the stern tubes,
and all four were fired at the target from 3500 yards. Two hits
were heard.
The captain swung the periscope to view the first target,
which was now sinking. The second target showed no evidence of sinking but was stopped. A destroyer closed in on
the Seawolf but Gross held the sub at periscope depth. The destroyer dropped several charges but none were close-it didn't
have a good fix on the sub.
Commander Gross decided to remain submerged until
after dark, and at that time, would attempt to finish off the
second target. At 1827, the sub surfaced and picked up the
target still stopped at 30,000 yards. The captain ordered her to
move in to make visual contact. Another freighter had joined
the ship and was starting to tow her, and a destroyer was also
in the area. At 1500 yards, the captain fired three torpedoestwo at the towing ship and one at the debilitated ship. One hit
on the towing ship; Gross then swung the boat around and
fired all four stern torpedoes. Three hits were heard and the
towing ship quickly disappeared. The other ship appeared
much lower in the water also, so he assumed it had been hit
by one of the shots.
A destroyer suddenly appeared at 1000 yards-she must
have been behind the incapacitated ship to have appeared so
quickly. The Seawolf went straight to 280 feet and made a
hard left turn. Two hours later, the Seawolf surfaced and found
99
Chapter 17. USS Seawolf
all clear. After a quick battery charge, she headed back toward
the damaged ship, which was still afloat. Passing through the
wreckage of the towing ship, the captain made a surface approach; at 5200 yards, the sub was spotted and a destroyer
headed toward it. Gross fired three forward torpedoes from
this range and put on all four engines while turning away
from the escort. Three hits were heard, and as they pulled to
12,000 yards away, the target disappeared from the radar
screen.
Another escort appeared out of the darkness and was
closing in on the sub. Gross took her down and underwent
heavy depth charging. After spending more than 11 hours
submerged, the Seawolf finally surfaced to find all clear.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Having only three torpedoes left-all forward-Captain Gross
went looking for an appropriate target. On 14 January, smoke
was sighted around 0800, and an approach showed four
freighters with two escorts. The sub tacked this group all day
and closed in after dark.
The first attack was foiled by a timely zig that left the
Seawolf way out in left field. The sub surfaced and approached
again. This time, the Seawolf had better luck. Another setup
was ruined by a zig, but immediately the ships turned again,
this time presenting a good target if the Seawolf crew could set
up fast enough.
The tracking party made the calculations in record time
and the last three torpedoes were fired from 1500 yards. Two
hits were scored and the ship was set ablaze. They came up
for a gun action but could only fire six shots before being driven away by fire from several ships in the area. The light from
the fire illuminated the sub, so Gross turned the boat and
headed away, securing from battle stations. The Seawolf continued to follow the group and called for help. The USS
Whale, nearby, came on to attack the convoy and finish off the
burning ship.
All torpedoes expended, the Seawolf headed back to Pearl.
100
12th Patrol

This is another case in which stubbornness paid off. Gross
continued to attack until the targets sank or he ran out of torpedoes. He was credited with sinking four ships on his own
and received half credit for the burning ship finished off by
the Whale. His total tonnage was 25,793.
With Silent Service. Your goal is to sink five ships on this
patrol-you should sink four with torpedoes. To sink the fifth,
try your hand at slowing a ship up with a torpedo and then
finishing it off with the deck gun. See if you have better luck
than Commander Gross. Your tonnage total should be at least
25,000. Use scenario #4, the USS Seawolf, and return to Midway.
With Up Periscope! Your goal is to locate and sink four
ships in the East China Sea. Try at least one night surface attack. Use scenario #4, the USS Tang's 3rd patrol. Choose the
101
Chapter 17. USS Seawolf
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18
USS Snook
5th Patrol
Figure 181. The USS Snook
The USS Snook sunk or damaged over 150,000 tons of Japanese shipping before being lost on her 9th patrol just before
the war's end. Her hunting took her from the Kurile Ice Fields
to the South China Sea and many areas in between.
Built in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, she was commissioned there on 24 October 1942 and left shortly thereafter for
her first war patrol. In January of 1944, she made a patrol into
the South China Sea and had her best outing of the war. She
departed Midway for her patrol area on 6 January 1944.
103
Chapter 18. USS Snook
Torpedo Attack # 1
Late in the evening of 23 January, a lone freighter with one
escort steamed into view making nine knots. Since visibility .
was poor, Commander Charles Triebel decided to make a surface approach using sight and radar.
The target ship was heading almost due north and Snook
approached on a course of 270 degrees, straight into her flank.
When the sub reached a position about 1600 yards from the
target, she opened fire with all six forward tubes. The crew listened quietly. The first three fish missed their mark, but torpedoes 4 and 5 hit the target and exploded. One minute later,
the target exploded, and five minutes after that, it sank. The
escort was completely incapacitated by the darkness and
didn't pose a problem.
Torpedo Attack # 2
The next attack occurred on the night of 8 February. Ten large
freighters were contacted by radar at a range of about 22,000
yards. There were several escorts milling about also. Captain
Triebel tracked the group on the surface for a while, and when
the time for the attack came, he ordered the boat to submerge
because it was a bright night.
The targets were most cooperative in moving into position, and once the range was less than 2000 yards, four stern
torpedoes were fired. Two hits were scored on one freighter
and one on another. Six minutes after the hit, a large explosion was heard from the first target, which then broke up several minutes later. Two escorts closed in and dropped 21
depth charges over a period of an hour, but none came close.
By the time the Snook could return to the surface, the convoy
had slipped away and the sub couldn't regain contact.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Two days later on 10 February, another convoy was sighted.
Captain Triebel allowed a properly marked hospital ship to
pass and then noticed a destroyer heading straight for them,
its sonar pinging. The captain moved the Snook off the target
track and fired four stern shots from long range on periscope
data. Apparently, the Snook overestimated the size and speed
104
5th Patrol
of the destroyer-all torpedoes missed ahead of the target.

The submarine went deep to avoid combat and lost contact
with the convoy.
Torpedo Attack #4
A late night radar contact turned out to be a large unescorted
freighter. The freighter wasn't zigging but continued straight
on its base course. Captain Triebel approached boldly and
fired three torpedoes from the surface at 1600 yards. Two hit
but only one exploded. The one hit was enough to do the job.
The target quickly disappeared from radar.
Torpedo Attack # 5
On 15 February, a smoke contact developed into a small
freighter also traveling alone. Without the fear of escorts, the
Snook closed to 650 yards and fired two torpedoes. One hit
and sent the freighter quickly to the bottom. The sub moved
on to patrol just south of Korea.
Torpedo Attack # &

While en route back to Midway, the crew of the Snook contacted a friendly sub, which turned out to be the USS Plunger.
The Snook surfaced to exchange information but immediately
dived when smoke was sighted on the horizon.
The Snook approached the convoy from the south and the
Plunger approached from the north. The Plunger was in position first and scored a hit that scattered the rest of the targets
in the convoy. The two subs tracked the scattered freighters as
well as they could during the next day and then surfaced at
dark to attempt contact.
Although the Snook was below its safe fuel level for the
return trip, the captain searched until contact was made with
the convoy. Two freighters came into radar range escorted by
at least 11 smaller ships. The sub weaved through the escorts
and took up a firing position at a range of 3200 yards. A fivetorpedo salvo was fired at two freighters. Two good hits were
observed two minutes later. After a brief wait, a terrible explosion shook the boat and the targets disappeared from the radar screen.
105
Chapter 18. USS Snook
Now the Snook made for Midway in earnest with very little fuel to spare.

Commander Charles Triebel was credited with sinking five
ships in the South China Sea for a total of 21,046 tons.
With Silent Service. To beat Commander Triebel's mark in
the South China Sea, you must sink five ships for more than
21,000 tons-not an easy task. Use scenario #5, the USS
Spadefish. Return to Midway.
With Up Periscope! Once again you have a goal of five
ships. See if you can find them in the South China Sea as
Commander Triebel did. Use scenario #2, the USS Wahoo's
6th patrol. Choose the Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
106
5th Patrol
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107
19
USS Gunard
5th Patrol
Figure 191
The USS Gunard on sea trials, observed by a Navy blimp.
The USS Gunard was one of the lesser known subs of the war;
she had a respectable career during the war starting in the
middle of 1943. Her best outing was her 5th patrol: During
this sweep south of the Philippines, she sank one third of the
ships she would sink for the entire war. The Gunard set out on
this historic patrol on 16 April 1944 under Charles Andrews.
108
5th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 1
While patrolling on the surface on the morning of 6 May, the
watch sighted a great deal of smoke on the horizon. Captain
Andrews cbmmenced his approach.
Tracking showed the sub to be about 19 miles off the
track of the convoy. The sub closed in submerged and at high
speed. When Gunard drew a little closer, Captain Andrews
could see that the convoy was made up of at least seven merchant ships formed into three columns. There were at least six
or seven escorts as well, but no planes were sighted. A glasssmooth sea limited the number of periscope observations he
could make safely, so the captain moved in mainly on information from the sound man.
After dodging the escorts, he picked a group of ships from
the middle of the convoy to be his targets. At 1300, he fired
three torpedoes at the first target and three more at the second
target. All torpedoes were running normally, but they left
trails of blue smoke that were spotted by a destroyer. The
crew of the destroyer must have felt helpless as they watched
all six torpedoes find targets. The two target ships each took
two hits and two other overlapping ships each took a hit.
As the destroyer closed on the sub, the first two torpedoes
hit. Noises of the ships breaking up were heard, and Captain
Andrews assumed that the first two ships sank. He took the
sub deep to wait out a shaking up from 98 depth charges
before the Japanese broke off their attack. Back at periscope
depth, the captain observed two ships in the process of sinking. A destroyer drove him deep again, and when he returned
to the surface, only one ship was visible and it was on fire.
The sub closed in. The captain ordered his men to finish her
off with the deck gun, since all the destroyers had left.
After a fusillade of four-inch rounds, the ship refused to
sink. Finally, the captain ordered up one more torpedo.
Helped along by the torpedo hit and the ventilation provided
by the deck gun, the last ship sank rather quickly.
109
Chapter 19. USS Gunard
Torpedo Attack # 2
Patrolling was extremely calm until 17 May when a goodsized target steamed into view. Rain squalls reduced visibility
but made the scope almost impossible to see as the sub approached.
The target turned out to be a battleship with two destroyer escorts. All were zigging wildly and running at 23 knots.
Commander Andrews had a hard time with the approach but
finally managed to get within 2300 yards to fire all six forward
torpedoes.
A faulty poppet valve almost caused the sub to breach
after firing, and the negative ballast had to be flooded, which
took the boat too deep for the periscope. The crew heard two
hits as they headed deep; then the depth charges started to
fall. Several were "too nicely placed for comfort," but the sub
weathered the storm and came up to periscope depth to see
the target departing, now at only 15 knots. She hadn't sunk,
but maybe the Cunard had put her out of commission for a
while.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Rain, planes, and subchasers were all the Cunard could find
for several days until a sighting on 24 May just off the southern tip of Mindanao.
The captain approached the convoy of two small freighters and fired two torpedoes, which both missed. The freighters
were running empty with a very shallow draft and the fish
probably ran under them.
Escorts forced the sub down, but the depth charge attack
was brief. When Commander Andrews brought his boat back
to periscope depth, another group of ships was making an appearance. This turned out to be a much better group of targets:
There were two good-sized freighters and two tankers being
guarded by three escorts. A quick approach was all that was
needed, and the four loaded forward torpedoes were fired at a
large tanker. Captain Andrews heard and saw three hits before
he was forced deep by an escort.
The tanker was burning furiously. In all, 27 depth charges
were dropped while the sound man listened to breaking-up
noises from the direction of the target. When the sub was able
110
5th Patrol
to come up again, there were no signs of the target ship, and

the others were steaming off at high speed.
An up-and-down routine of dodging planes followed for a
number of days, and on 31 May, the routine was broken as
three battleships came into view. The captain and crew made
a valiant attempt to attack the group, but they were extremely
disappointed. Unable to close to within firing range, the
Cunard continued on to the south and arrived at Freemantle
Australia on 11 June.

Three of the ships from the first attack were verified as sunk,
along with the large tanker. Commander Andrews' official total was four ships for 29,700 tons. The Cunard's 5th patrol was
number 11 on the list of best single patrols by tonnage sunk.
With Silent Service. A total of 29,000 tons with four ships
is very difficult but not impossible. Be very selective in choosing your targets. You'll need to search for large freighters and
tankers if you're going to match Commander Andrews' patrol
performance. Use scenario #4, the USS Seawolf.
With Up Periscope! Your goal is to sink at least four ships
for 29,000 tons. One of these ships must be a tanker. Use scenario #3, the USS Tang's 1st patrol. Choose the Southern Theater from the Big Chart.
111
Chapter 19. USS Gunard
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112
....
20
uss Sandlance
2nd Patrol
After coming off a successful 1st Patrol in the icy waters north
of Japan with four confirmed sinkings, the captain and crew of
the USS Sandlance were glad to head into the warmer waters
of the Philippine Sea for the next patrol. Commander Garrison
took the Sandlance out to sea on 20 April 1944 from Pearl
Harbor, heading for the Mariana Islands.
Torpedo Attack # 1
The crossing to the patrol was quite uneventful, so crew members were well trained and rested by the time they made their
first contact on 3 May, just north of Saipan.
They found a freighter with one escort. Commander Garrison watched as the setup went by the numbers. When the
range closed to 1700 yards, he was ready to shoot. With a prefect 90-degree target track and torpedo gyro angles set at 0, he
fired three shots. When the stopwatch held by the exec said
there should be hits, there was nothing but silence. The Captain was shocked: He had been counting on three hits. The firing team reviewed the log and found an error in the target
speed to account for the misses.
Now it was a race against the rising sun to get into position for another shot. At 0435, they moved in again on the
target's flank and fired three torpedoes from 2300 yards. They
waited again, and this time were greeted by one solid hit. Seventeen minutes later the ship went to the bottom. The escort
made a halfhearted attack, but none of the depth charges fell
close by.
The following day, the sub made an approach on what
appeared to be a convoy, but it was only a group of small escort ships. Although the sub was in a favorable firing position,
113
Chapter 20. USS Sandlance
Cor;nmander Garrison held fire-the boats had such a shallow

draft that torpedoes often ran right under them. He broke off
the attack and withdrew.
Torpedo Attack # 2
On 11 May, the captain was beginning to feel discouragedhe hadn't contacted a ship in nine days. Some other sub in the
area was able to do some damage, but all the Sandlance got
were the results of the "stirred-up hornet's nest." Heavy antisubmarine activity continued.
That afternoon, a ship's mast was spotted on the horizon.
Commander Garrison turned in that direction to track. When
the targets came "over the hill," he saw a large freighter and a
large old gunboat, along with four escorts. At 1500 yards, he
fired four torpedoes at the freighter. He was going to fire at
the gunboat but lost depth control and had to go deep. Two
torpedoes were fired by sound bearings on the way down, but
both missed.
The Sandlance crew heard two torpedoes hit the freighter,
followed by loud breaking-up noises. The Sandlance then took
a good pounding as all the escorts and several planes dropped
depth charges on them at once. Except for a severe shaking up
and some broken light bulbs, they incurred no damage.
Torpedo Attack #3
On 14 May, the submarine had moved just south of Guam
and contacted a small convoy. The captain moved in for a
short-range submerged shot from 1400 yards. Four torpedoes
were fired at the leading freighter for two timed hits. An escort bore down, preventing Commander Garrison from swinging around to use the stem tubes, and the sub headed deep.
Avoiding the escorts put the sub closer to the damaged
ship. The popping and breaking-up noises were so loud, the
captain was afraid the target was sinking right on top of them.
There was no doubt that the ship sank. The sub went down to
450 feet and maneuvered away from the escorts.
Since their attempt to use the stern tubes had been foiled,
they were left with eight torpedoes in the rear, and none in
the forward tubes. Future attacks would be awkward.
114
2nd Patrol
Torpedo Attack #4
Back in the Saipan area on 16 May, the sub made contact at
dusk with several ships. The next several hours were a constant duel with a radar plane, which forced the sub down several times, preventing an end-around maneuver. But the plane
was only able to follow the ships for 50 miles.
Once the convoy was out to sea, the Sandlance came up
and made the maneuver, moving into firing position at midnight. The captain swung the rear end around and fired four
shots at a large freighter from 2800 yards and then went deep.
Two good hits were observed and the following depth charge
attack was very light. The entire crew heard the breaking-up
noises.
After avoiding the escorts, they surfaced to chase the convoy but couldn't regain contact.
Torpedo Attack # 5
Smoke was seen on the horizon the following morning. The
sub raced ahead at full speed on an end-around. Later, a plane
came out of the clouds and had a perfect shot at the Sandlance
as she scrambled to dive. The pilot wasn't up to the task,
however, and missed the sub by several hundred yards.
Sandlance returned to the surface and continued trying to
get ahead of the ships. This went on until after dark when the
sub made radar contact with the group at 20,000 yards. It was
too dark to use the periscope, so they slowly approached on
the surface, finding two large ships stopped and two escorts
patrolling around them. At 3000 yards, the captain turned the
boat for a stern shot. As he was about to fire, one of the target
ships turned a search light on the Sandlance and Commander
Garrison was forced to dive, firing four torpedoes on the way
down. One sure hit was heard, but other torpedo hits may
have been lost in the noise of the depth charge explosions that
followed.
An hour later when the Sandlance surfaced, the damaged
ship was half underwater and burning fiercely. Having disposed of the stern torpedoes in a fine manner, the Sandlance
headed for Freemantle and a refit.
115
Chapter 20. USS Sandlance

This case is a good example of the value of the postwar inves-
tigations conducted with the help of the Japanese. Commander

Garrison only claimed to have sunk three ships on this patrol,
while damaging two others. A later investigation, however,
showed that two ships at the location of the last two attacks
actually sank; therefore, those two were added to the list,
bringing Garrison's achievement to five ships sunk for 18,300
tons.
With Silent Service. Your goal is to match Garrison and
sink five ships for a tonnage total in excess of 18,300 tons. Patrol in the Mariana Islands and return to Freemantle. Use scenario #4, the USS Seawolf.
With Up Periscope! Since you can get over 18,000 tons
with only one ship in Up Periscope!, your goal is five sinkings
for the patrol. Try to get them in the area surrounding the
Mariana Islands. Use scenario #3, and choose the Southern
Theater from the Big Chart.
116
2nd Patrol
Figure 2o1. Patrol Route Map
000
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ISlANOS
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117
Chapter 21
USS Barb
8th Patrol
Figure 21-1. The USS Barb
The USS Barb was launched from Groton, Connecticut, in

April 1942. Unlike many of the subs launched during the war,
she didn't get off to a flying start; in fact, she wasn't credited
with her first official sinking until May 1944. Once the Barb finally got going, however, she quickly made up for lost time
with a series of successful patrols.
The first of this string was her 8th patrol, which started
on 21 May 1944, when she sailed from Midway to patrol off
the northern tip of the Empire in the Sea of Okhotsk with
Commander Buckley in command.
118
8th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 1
On 31 May, the watch spotted a large tanker, and Commander
Buckley commenced the approach. He had to withdraw when
it was noticed that the tanker was showing proper Russian
lights. Later, when the haze finally lifted, a large merchant
ship came into view.
An air attack forced the Barb down, but she quickly
popped back up to periscope depth to fire three torpedoes at
the target. With a range of only 1400 yards and a small gyro
angle, the shots looked good. Several hits were scored amidships, and steam rushed out of the opened hull as the 1000ton merchant ship sank.
Immediately after the sinking, a passenger-cargo ship
came into view and picked up a number of survivors of the attack. Commander Buckley decided against a gun attack due to
aircraft in the area and a large-caliber machine gun on the target ship. Instead, he made a quick end-around to attack from
the port quarter. At 1000 yards off the target track, he pulled
the plug and went to periscope depth.
The target came nicely into view, so Captain Buckley
quickly swung the rear around to use some stern torpedoes
while he had the chance. At 1600 yards, he opened fire with
three shots. All three torpedoes hit, opening the ship up from
one end to the other. The 3800-ton ship followed the first target to the bottom.
Torpedo Attack # 2
The captain and crew learned a valuable lesson about attacking lone high-speed targets on 2 June, when the Barb approached a rapidly moving solitary ship. As the target sped
past, she fired three torpedoes set to run shallow. All three
missed, probably passing under the target.
Of course, the target turned out to be a destroyer, which
turned and followed the trail of the torpedoes back to the Barb
with its guns blazing and depth-charge throwers and racks in
action. The destroyer gave the Barb quite a scare before turning and leaving the attack to continue its urgent business
elsewhere.
119
Chapter 21. USS Barb
The crew of the Barb patrolled on the surface among the

ice flows for the rest of the day, feeling safe from observers
because of the glare of the sun off the ice.
Torpedo Attack #3
The Barb moved further into the Sea and patrolled the shipping lanes near the La Perouse Strait, where constant mist and
fog reduced visibility to almost zero. On 11 June, she sank two
trawlers with the gun after a chase through the ice fields.
After the gun action, the watch saw two smoke streaks on
the horizon. A four-hour chase brought them even with a
two-ship convoy consisting of one large and one mediumsized freighter. It was one of the blackest nights the captain
had ever seen. Visibility was very limited, but Commander
Buckley was able to use the radar to keep tabs on the targets
while he moved into position. He fired three torpedoes at the
first ship from 1600 yards, and then swung and fired three
more at the second ship, which was now at 1900 yards. The
first ship took one hit and slowed considerably; the second
took two solid hits and sank stern first.
Commander Buckley then turned back to the damaged
ship, which had unleashed a gun amidships. The captain ordered the lookouts and quartermaster below and continued on
the surface. He maneuvered for a good broadside shot at the
crippled ship; finally, it presented its side to them and the captain turned hard to use the stern tubes. He fired the 7, 8, and
9 tubes for three perfect hits. The target, which was only traveling at half a knot, suddenly blew sky-high-a torpedo must
have touched one of the target's magazines. Once again, the
Barb was alone on the surface.
Torpedo Attack # 4
On 13 June, the captain was again faced with "whitish" visibility conditions, due to the ice. He again took advantage of
the situation to patrol on the surface, increasing his camouflage by tying a white sheet to the periscope shears to hide the
dark gray paint.
Around 1700 hours, the watch sighted smoke. Captain
Buckley set a course to move ahead of the target. He followed
120
8th Patrol
until after dark and adjusted the course to match the target's
new zig-zag plan. The night was very dark, but because the
water was extremely luminescent, the captain decided he
would have to attack from a stopped position, using the stern
tubes. The stern tubes were chosen so the Barb would be
pointing in the right direction for a getaway.
The Barb .stopped dead ahead of the target and waited for
the expected zig. The wake from the bow looked huge as the
ship closed in on them; finally, it made a zig, leaving them in
perfect firing position.
The last two stern torpedoes were fired from 1475 yards.
One hit amidships and the other blew off part of the ship's
fantail. The ship stopped and started to settle by the aft with
its whistle blowing. An escort then appeared, and it was a race
to get away. Just as it appeared that the escort would overtake
the sub, it turned away and returned to the sinking ship.
After waiting several hours, Commander Buckley saw that
the target wasn't going to sink, so he headed back in to finish
her off. The target sank by itself as they were making the
approach.
The rest of the patrol was spent surveying the area and
taking pictures. On 4 July, they arrived back at Midway.

This was a very successful patrol in the northern areas; the
captain claimed five sinkings for a total of 37,500 tons. It appears that he was somewhat off in his tonnage estimates, as
the. postwar investigation upheld his five sinkings, but slashed
his tonnage total by more than half to 15,400 tons.
With Silent Service. Your patrol objective is to sink five

ships in the seas around Northern Japan, with torpedoes, and
to sink at least one extra ship with gunfire. Your goal for tonnage is 15,400. Choose scenario #4, the USS Seawolf.
With Up Periscope! Your goal is to sink five ships in the
seas north of Japan. Try to make at least one attack night surface action. Use scenario #4, the USS Tang, and choose the
121
Figure 21 2. Patrol Route Ma11
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22
USS Barb
9th Patrol
The 9th patrol of the USS Barb could very well have been the
much higher on the list of best patrols ranked by tonnage
sunk, but many of her targets were taken off the official list
after the war. Even so, the official total for this patrol put her
and the captain, Commander E. B. Fluckey, fifth on the list.
The patrol started on 10 August 1944 with the sub's departure from Midway, heading for the Luzon Straits near the
Philippines. It was part of a three-boat wolf pack that included
the USS Tunny and the USS Queenfish.
Torpedo Attack # 1
The patrol was very routine and uneventful until early in the
morning on 31 August. A convoy came into sight just north of
Luzon, and as the Barb was approaching with the other boats
in her wolf pack, the radar operator picked up interference
from three other radars of similar type. This indicated that another U.S. wolf pack was also tacking the group. Captain
Fluckey said it "looked like a three-ring circus was about to
start with two wolf packs and one convoy." Several torpedo
hits were heard as the Barb maneuvered to gain a good firing
position.
By the time the convoy closed to within visible range of
the Barb, several ships had already sunk, but there were still at
least eight afloat, including escorts. The largest ship left was a
freighter in the middle of the group, which Fluckey chose
along with a nearby tanker as targets.
At 0624, he was in a good firing position with a chance to
wipe out an entire column of ships. Then, it all came apart as
the other subs started shooting. Two torpedoes were heard
running close by and the nearest escort took the hits and blew
up. Two more torpedoes were heard running and one was
123
headed directly toward the Barb. The captain ducked the periscope, letting the fish swim over the boat. The large freighter
turned to evade at this point, but Captain Fluckey swung his
stern tubes to bear and fired all four torpedoes. The first two
hit the freighter with considerable effect; the third missed the
freighter but hit a small tanker in the next column.
The Barb turned hard to line up a target with the bow
tubes, but by the time she was set up, the ships were all out
of range. Captain Fluckey turned back to the damaged freighter, but it was already sinking, stern first. Several planes arrived and began dropping bombs, and the escorts were all
sliding depth charges off the racks. None were close to the
Barb.
The Barb continued to chase the group, but at 1250, the
watch could no longer see the smoke, and Captain Fluckey
gave up the high-speed chase.
Torpedo Attack # 2
About an hour later, at 1349, the sub was back in business.
Smoke was sighted and another high-speed chase began. This
was probably one of the ships scattered by the merry-goround attack that morning. Although the engineer was concerned about the batteries, the captain continued to approach
<it high speed submerged.
At 1730, while looking for escorts with the periscope, the
Barb encountered the "latest fiendish antisubmarine weapon"
of the Japanese-a large bird! Each time the scope was raised,
the bird perched upon it and draped its tail feathers over the
window. Needless to say, this proved extremely confusing to
the approach officer. He banged the scope, shook it, and
ducked it under but the bird hung on and hovered over until
the scope came back up. Finally, the officer raised both scopes,
thereby disorienting the bird long enough to get a good reading. The bird, of course, was photographed for the antisubmarine file .
At 1752, all tubes were made ready. The Barb waited for
the expected zig. At 1300 yards the ship made the turn and
three bow torpedoes were fired. All three hit. Fifteen or so
lookouts on the catwalk in front of the bridge of the Japanese
124
9th Patrol
freighter were knocked into the drink, and when the second
and third torpedoes hit, the ship broke in two and rapidly sank.
When too many members of the crew were allowed to
view the sinking ship, a subchaser spotted the scope and
turned to attack. Captain Fluckey took the sub deep and sat
out a bone-jarring depth charge attack.
The Barb and the Tunny cleared the area to head toward
quieter waters .
Torpedo Attack #3
The next several days were spent avoiding very persistent radar-equipped aircraft. A number of depth bombs were
dropped on the Barb-several uncomfortably close.
The sub moved on to patrol in the Bashi Channel, south
of Taiwan. On 8 September, the Barb received a call from the
Queenfish about a convoy in the area. Captain Fluckey poured
on the fuel to catch it. After tracking the convoy into the
morning of 9 September, he was unable to close and the
group passed them by. Disappointed by the close call, the captain turned his attention to a trailer that appeared, thinking he
might be able to close on that target.
The ship turned out to be a Chidori-class destroyer, but
the captain was determined to shoot at something. He expressed his reservations about attacking the target, but then
added, "However, once in every submariner's life there comes
the urge to let three fish go, particularly after a convoy skids
across his nose while his hands are tied. I dood it."
At 3000 yards, he fired tubes 1, 2, and 3. All three
missed. He evaded the destroyer at high speed on the surface,
but planes too numerous to count entered the fight and he
was forced to dive. By the time he surfaced again, the convoy
was hopelessly out of reach and so he returned to patrol.
Once again, the Barb was constantly harassed by planes.
The sub's log had reached Plane Contact number 67 on 14
September when radar picked up targets at 0003 in the morning. Barb commenced the approach.
125
Torpedo Attack #4
The targets turned out to be two Chidori-class destroyers. The
captain hadn't learned his lesson from the first encounter, so
he headed in on the surface to attack.
At a range of only 1380 yards, he fired three torpedoes. It
looked like a snap, but all three missed and the destroyers
turned to attack the sub. The Barb headed away at high speed
on the surface with the destroyers following.
A torpedo attack on one of the destroyer's starboard flank
made the ship turn away. Apparently the Queenfish had come
to the rescue.
The torpedoes missed but caused the escort to shift its attention. Captain Fluckey attempted a difficult narrow angle
shot with two torpedoes-both missed. He then took the boat
deep. The misses were chalked up to expert sound men on the
target ships.
On 16 September, Captain Fluckey received orders to go
at high speed to an area where a U.S. sub had sunk a Japanese transport ship that was carrying Australian and British
POWs. They left immediately and prepared the boat to take
on 100 survivors, if necessary.
Torpedo Attack # 5
While en route to pick up the survivors, the Barb came across
another convoy being tracked by the Queenfish. Having a good
position, Captain Fluckey decided to delay briefly to see if he
could attack. He came in on the starboard bow of what
seemed to be a group of tankers. Fluckey moved in on the
largest pip on the radar and at 2325 exclaimed, "Ye Gods! It's
a flat top!" He came in with a good angle and maneuvered so
that there were several ships overlapping, which formed about
1000 feet of targets.
All tubes were made ready, and at 2332, all six bow tubes
were emptied. An escort spotted the sub, so Captain Fluckey
took it deep. The crew heard two hits on a tanker and three
on the carrier. When they heard breaking-up noises, it was obvious that one ship had sunk-possibly both. No one could be
certain which ship went down. Captain Fluckey thought it was
126
9th Patrol
the carrier, but the captain of the Queenfish said it was the
tanker. They would sort it out after the war.
Having been sidetracked for five hours, they surfaced at
the first chance and once again headed for the survivors. The
captain later said that he would have gladly given up the pleasure of sinking the carrier to rescue just one of the men they
eventually picked up.
On 17 September, the Barb picked up 14 survivors who
had spent five long days and nights in the sea. They were
covered with oil, which probably saved their lives. Too much
credit cannot be given to the captain and crew of the Barb for
their efforts in rescuing and tending to the 14 men they saved.
They carried the men through the boat from one location to
another until all were cleaned up, tended to by the pharmacist's mate, fed, and put to bed in bunks. Many were so weak
from starvation, dysentery, and malaria that they were unable
to thank the crew of the Barb, but their tear-filled eyes spoke
to all who were aboard in a way that would never be forgotten.
With this very valuable cargo aboard, the Barb headed to
Saipan.

The investigation after the war turned the official record of
this patrol upside down. The captain claimed to sink four
ships for a tonnage total of 42,050 tons. This was later increased to 47,050 tons as a second ship in the first attack was
confirmed sunk.
After the war, however, most of the sinkings weren't allowed, but the carrier was added to the list. The final total
was three ships sunk for a total of 36,800 tons. It's almost certain that several other ships were sunk during this patrol as
they were witnessed going down by the captain, the commander of the wolf pack who was aboard, and many of the
bridge crew.
With Silent Service. Since getting a tonnage total of

36,000 tons with only three ships may not be possible with
this simulation, your goal is to get the 36,000 tons by sinking
four ships. You had better pick your targets carefully and only
127
go for the really big fish. Don't make the same mistake Commander Fluckey made, wasting torpedoes on destroyers. Use
scenario #l, the USS Tang.
With Up Periscope! Racking up 36,000 tons should be
fairly easy with this game. Your goal is to go after the big fish.
You should try to outdo Fluckey's 36,000-ton total: See if you
can sink 60,000 tons with only three ships. Use scenario #2, the
USS Wahoo. Choose the Northern Theater from the Big Chart;
or, since the Big Chart dividing line goes right through the Luzon Strait, you can use the Southern Chart and scenario #3.
128
9th Patrol
Figura 22-1. Patrol Route Map
II
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129
23
USS Barb
11th Patrol
After a quick refit at Midway following her 10th patrol, the
Barb was out again on 19 December 1944 for another legendary patrol. She headed out in company of the Queenfish and
the Picuda. Their patrol area would be the Formosa Strait and
the China Sea.
Transit to the patrol area would be quiet, so the crew celebrated Christmas by singing carols and exploding a floating
mine with gunfire.
On the morning of 7 January, the watch sighted a large
convoy on radar. Visibility was poor and a thick haze hung on
the water. Captain Fluckey slowly moved onto the target track
and waited. The sound man heard loud screws but there
wasn't a ship in sight as the captain wildly swung the periscope around.
Then, at 0902, the haze lifted showing the Barb to be right
in the middle of the convoy. A large tanker and a freighter
were in good line for a shot so the tubes were made ready,
but the two ships made a zig away from the sub, which made
the shot doubtful.
A destroyer crossed 1000 yards ahead-an easy and provocative shot, but the captain had finally learned his lesson
about such tactics, having wasted 12 torpedoes in the last
three patrols on fast-moving, shallow-draft, and maneuverable
destroyers. He was forced to grit his teeth and let the convoy
pass in hopes of surfacing later and making an end-around.
He sent a contact report and one of the other subs got into position and scored hits. The Barb continued to patrol in the
shipping lanes.
130
11th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 1
Just after noon on 16 January, the watch spotted smoke. The
other subs were contacted as the Barb began her end-around
maneuver. By 1600, the sub had good contact on at least eight
ships. Captain Fluckey was waiting for the Picuda to make
contact before attacking. When word came from the Picuda
that she was in position, the Barb submerged and commenced
the attack.
The convoy was in several columns, surrounded by escorts. The most important ship appeared to be a large fourgoal-poster transport. It seemed a snap to get into the middle
of the group, but the captain chose to attack from the shore
side of the ships to prevent them from escaping into shallow
water and to force them to run toward the other subs.
Now in position, the captain took one more look and fired
three torpedoes at the large four-goal poster and then three
more at another freighter in the column. The crew heard four
torpedo hits in close succession, followed by a huge explosion
that rocked the boat as it was turning to use its stern tubes.
The second target disappeared with the explosion. The transport was half afloat with her stern sticking up in the air, her
bow obviously resting in the mud. Captain Fluckey took the
sub deep to avoid an escort that suddenly appeared.
When the danger appeared to be over, he returned to the
surface and took off after the rest of the convoy. The Picuda
and Queenfish were already attacking. The Barb caught up
with the last ships in the group and headed in on "our normal
screaming surface approach." At 2180 yards, the Barb fired
three torpedoes: two at one ship and another at an overlapping freighter. All three hit their targets. The first ship sank
quickly, and the second ship was seen sinking on radar. The
remaining two ships in the area maintained formation but increased speed. There were nine escorts around the group.
A quick move back toward the ships brought the convoy
into view and Captain Fluckey fired three torpedoes from a
distance of 1590 yards. The sub was swinging to the right in
order to ease out and use the stern tubes when all three torpedoes hit, resulting in a tremendous explosion. The pressure
wave was literally breathtaking: A high vacuum resulted. In
131
the boat, the shirts of the crew in the conning tower were
pulled over their heads by the air rushing out the hatch. A
quick look showed both targets to be gone, along with many
of the escorts. The captain decided not to claim these as sunk:
Four ships sunk with 12 torpedoes was about all " traffic will
bear."
The Picuda and Queenfish finished off the attack and they
all withdrew to continue patrol. Aircraft kept them hopping,
and several convoys were sighted, but none were close
enough to attack. They continued to sweep the approaches to
the Formosa Strait.
Shipping in the area had virtually dried up. The Allied
sub and air attacks had made the Japanese very cautious. The
Axis convpys were traveling close to shore in shallow water
during the day and pulling into harbors at night.
The Barb received a convoy contact report and began to
search down the estimated track. When the group couldn't be
found, Captain Fluckey assumed the convoy was anchored for
the night, and so began a dangerous shallow water search. He
hit the jackpot.
On the night of 27 January, he rounded a group of islands
and picked up at least 30 ships deep in a harbor. Before beginning the attack, Captain Fluckey took the following information into account:
There were few junks in the area-junks normally avoided
mined areas.
There was evidence of Japanese radar operating in the area.
Visibility was poor.
Since anchored ships always point into the wind, they would
present a 60-degree angle-a fair angle for an attack.
He could retire through a mass of junks he had spotted earlier, making it hard for the escorts to follow him.
He would have to run on the surface for an hour before
reaching water deep enough to dive. The attack would have
to be a complete surprise.
The captain liked the odds. He called the crew to battle

stations.
132
11th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 2
As he moved in, the captain's biggest problem was how to
keep from sending too many torpedoes into the same ship.
With so many targets, he couldn't fail to hit something.
At 0404, he fired the last four bow torpedoes and swung
hard around. There were only five fathoms of water beneath
the keel. With the bow now around, tubes 7, 8, 9, and 10 were
emptied. All ahead flank!
All eight torpedoes were seen and heard to explode. A
large freighter was seen to take two hits and sink. A ship in
the second column took one hit and was damaged. Another
freighter in the third column caught torpedo 4-it burst into
flames and sank. Several other ships were hit, two of which
blew up immediately and sank. Not a bad night's work.
Captain Fluckey headed for deep water at high speed. The
captain manned the bridge, running open-field through a
maze of junks. At the 20-fathom line, he stayed on the surface
until forced down by a plane. Once at the 40-fathom line, he
went deep and the crew breathed easily for the first time in
hours.
Rain and bad weather hindered them for the next several
days, and then they returned to Midway.
Slmulatlnu This Patrol

This was a truly legendary performance. Commander Fluckey
received the Congressional Medal of Honor for his daring attack on the ships in the harbor, and although his record was
decimated after the war, he claimed to have sunk nine ships
for a total of 60,000 tons. He actually saw most of these ships
sink, but his official total was cut to show only 4 1/3 ships sunk,
for a total of 24,000 tons. This is another case in which we'll
give the captain the benefit of the doubt for simulation purposes.
With Silent Service. You would be hard pressed to sink

60,000 tons with this game. Your mission goal is to sink six
ships, some of these at anchor-it's possible to find a group of
ships at anchor at night with this simulation. When attacking
such a group, remember not to be greedy and approach too
closely. If you're spotted, all escorts will come after you and
133
the ships will tum their bows toward you, giving you an impossible down-the-throat shot. Remember, you'll have the
same getaway problem the Barb faced. Make sure you can get
to deep water if destroyers are present since you can't outrun
them on the surface. Use scenario #l, the USS Tang.
With Up Periscope! You must go for the whole bag in this
patrol. Your goal is to sink nine ships for a total of 60,000
tons. Use scenario #5, the USS Tang's 6th patrol. Choose the
134
11th Patrol
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135
24
USS Harder
5th Patrol
Figure 24 1. The USS Harder
" The most brilliant submarine patrol of the war .. .. " The normally conservative language of official navy reports was
dropped when describing this patrol. Harder's 5th war patrol
was the high point of her very successful career.
The Harder only had one commanding officer-Lt. Commander S. D. Dealey. He took command of the sleek craft
when it was placed into commission on 2 December 1942 and
went down with her while on patrol less than two years later.
In recognition of his superior work as commanding officer,
Dealey was awarded the Medal of Honor, the Silver Star, the
Navy Cross, and three Gold Stars in lieu of his second, third,
136
5th Patrol
and forth Navy Crosses. He and his crew also won the Presidential Unit Citation.
During his 4th patrol, Dealey had good luck attacking destroyers, and he used his new knowledge and confidence from
this to specialize in destroyers during the 5th patrol. The
Harder sailed from Freemantle to cruise in the area around the
Sibutu Passage north of the Celebes Sea on 26 May 1944.
Torpedo Attack # 1
On 6 June, Commander Dealey made his first effort to transit
the Sibutu passage, a heavily patrolled bottleneck of shipping
traffic. Trying to run the passage on the surface at night, he
came across a rich convoy also attempting the crossing at
night.
He began his chase. The fast moving group was composed of three large tankers and two destroyers. When Captain Dealey's sub was still 16,000 yards away from the
convoy, the moon suddenly broke through the low clouds and
the Harder was left sitting in plain view.
The nearest destroyer turned hard and put on 24 knots in
an attempt to catch the sub, which was already fleeing the
area. The sub's wake made it easy for the pursuing escort to
follow and close the gap. When it became apparent they
couldn't outrun the destroyer and that it wasn't going to quit
the chase after scaring them off, Dealey decided to go on the
offensive. He took the boat down and pulled quickly off the
track.
After a few minutes, the destroyer came steaming down
the old track, straight into Harder's ambush. Dealey fired three
torpedoes. The first missed but the next two scored solid hits
and sent the destroyer to the bottom, stern first, leaving only a
cloud of smoke on the water.
A second destroyer closed in on the sub. Captain Dealey
gave it six bow torpedoes. This time the escort was ready. She
managed to avoid the shots and went on to give the Harder a
good going-over with depth charges.
Late that night, the sub surfaced to try another approach,
only this time they were foiled by Mother Nature-the " ship"
137
Chapter 24. USS
Harder
they were approaching turned out to be a small island, which

they realized after knocking out a chunk of the island's shallow reef.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Later that night, well down the passage, the Harder was spotted by a night-flying patrol plane. The plane called for a destroyer, which arrived shortly, but Harder was waiting for it.
As the destroyer entered the area, the Harder silently
closed on it and fired three torpedoes from a scant 650 yards.
Two of the fish hit the destroyer amidships. The Harder
moved out of the area as a huge explosion ripped the destroyer apart. Another escort soon arrived and pinned the Harder to
the bottom for over two hours with one depth charge attack
after another.
Destroyers now flooded the area-no less than ten were
seen during the next day, and sometimes as many as six were
in view at one time. Dealey headed toward Borneo for a special mission.
The next night, he pulled close to shore and sent a team
in to pick up several British intelligence officers, using collapsible canoes. The mission went off without a hitch, but now the
submarine had to go back through the Sibutu Passage. Two
destroyers were patrolling the entrance, which was only six
miles from the fleet anchorage at Tawi Tawi.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Rather than waiting to sneak past after the destroyers moved
out of position, Dealey watched until he knew their patrol pattern and then went in to attack. He waited until the ships presented an overlapping target and then fired four shots from
1000 yards at the leading escort. The first shot missed in front,
the next two scored solid hits, and the last torpedo missed
astern. The captain ordered hard rudder to swing the boat
around to use the stern tubes, but before he was able to set
up, he was surprised to see the last torpedo hit the second
destroyer.
The first ship exploded when the cool water hit the boilers; it headed toward the bottom. The second ship nosed over;
138
5th Patrol
with its stern sticking straight up in the air, it sank as well.

Fifteen minutes later, air cover arrived and bombed the
area looking for the Harder, but she had already moved on.
She was heading toward Tawi Tawi to see if some large ships
from the fleet were in the area.
Torpedo Attack #4
At 1700, the watch sighted a large task force and Captain
Dealey called his crew to battle stations. Three battleships,
four cruisers, and at least six destroyers came into view. As
Harder was sneaking in to attack, a patrol plane spotted her
and directed a destroyer to her position.
Dealey decided that a depth charge attack was inevitable,
so he lined the oncoming destroyer up for a down-the-throat
shot. Soon he passed the point of no return, if he didn't hit
the rushing ship, Harder would certainly be sunk.
With the range down to 1500 yards, he fired three bow
tubes and ordered the sub to go deep. All three hit with a tremendous explosion. As they passed 80 feet, the destroyer blew
up directly over them. Gear went flying, the mooring chain
was pulled loose, and all aboard were knocked from their feet.
The explosion was much stronger than any depth charge attack.
As the other escorts entered the fray and started dropping
depth charges, one of the British officers was heard to say, "I
say, old boy, would you mind taking us back to Borneo?."
His mission complete, Captain Dealey headed back to
Australia.

Only after the war did the full importance of the Harder's 5th
patrol come to light. The numerous sightings of the Harder in
the area of Tawi Tawi led the Japanese admiral to believe that
a large sub force was closing in on the port, so he ordered his
fleet out to head for the Philippines several days early. This
threw the entire Axis timetable off: Planes that were supposed
to return to carriers had to land at the Mariana Islands after
the attack on the U.S forces in the Philippines, but by the time
they got there, the Marines had already taken the airfield. Of
400 trained pilots sent out by the Japanese, not one returned.
139
Chapter 24. USS Harder
With Silent Service. The tonnage total for this patrol

wasn't very impressive-only 8500 tons-but all the ships
sunk were destroyers, so this won't be an easy feat to match.
You're to head out into the Celebes Sea and try to sink five
destroyers. Exercise extreme caution: The destroyer crews are
good. Use even more caution if you choose the Expert Destroyer option. Use scenario #2, the USS Bowfin.
With Up Periscope! As with Silent Service, the tonnage
total for this mission isn't important-you're to go after warships only. Your goal is five destroyers. Use scenario #3, the
USS Tang. Choose the Southern Theater from the Big Chart.
140
5th Patrol
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141
25
USS S1Jadetish
1st patrol
Figure 25-1. The Control Room of the Spadetlsh
The Spadefish came along rather late in the war. Her keel was
laid at the Navy Yard in Mare Island, California on 27 May
1943. Roughly a year later, on 8 May 1944, her first sea trials
were conducted in the vicinity of San Francisco Bay.
Sound contact with the escort ship was lost during the
dive, but the crew continued the testing. They surfaced several
hours later to find that the escort had departed and that the
142
1st Patrol
Spadefish was rumored to be lost in 1200 feet of water. This

wouldn't be the last time the tough Spadefish would repudiate
such rumors.
To Sea
By 14 June 1944, crew training and boat modifications were
complete and she sailed for Pearl Harbor. There, she joined
with several other boats to head out into enemy waters under
the Commander Gordon W. Underwood.
After a short stop at Midway, the Spadefish steamed into
Japanese waters passing jl.lst south of Sofu Gan (Lot's Wife) on
August 6. For the next several days, she patrolled the area and
was frequently sent deep by Japanese scout aircraft.
On 13 August, she sailed into an intense storm. The seas
were so rough that periscope sightings couldn't be made without broaching the surface with the boat. Even at 150 feet, the
boat would occasionally roll as much as 25 degrees. The bad
weather continued and by 17 August, the Spadefish was about
70 miles south of Formosa in the Bashi Channel.
Frequent aircraft sightings kept the lookouts sharp. Late
that evening, Underwood received a message from the USS
Picuda about a sighting by the USS Redfish of a 13-ship convoy in the area. Captain Underwood hurried to start the
search based on the contact report. It quickly became obvious
that bad weather had fouled up everyone's navigation: He
found the USS Picuda where he thought the USS Redfish was,
and the convoy was no where to be seen.
Early in the morning on 18 August, the Spadefish received
word from the Redfish that she was about to attack the convoy
from the starboard flank. Captain Underwood thought he had
finally found the convoy on radar, but it turned out to be several small islands just south of the Balintang Channel. The
search was continued to the southwest.
More enemy planes were spotted, but finally, all this
wandering around paid off. At 1048, the sound man picked up
pinging and screw sounds in the direction of the channel. Apparently, a convoy was coming down the channel headed for
Luzon. The convoy turned south and away from the Spadefish,
so she surfaced and headed down the possible convoy route.
143
Chapter 25. USS Spadefish
Torpedo Attack # 1
Later that night, at 2158, a contact was picked up on radar
and the crew went to battle stations. The contact developed
into a single, unescorted ship. Visibility was zero, but contact
was maintained via radar. After several hours of pursuing the
zigging target, Captain Underwood fired four torpedoes from a
submerged position at a range of 3040 yards. All missed. Underwood suspected the trails had been seen due to the highly
phosphorescent nature of the water. Several explosions,
thought to be depth charges, sent the Spadefish deep. When
she surfaced, the contact had been lost. Shortly thereafter, another single ship appeared. The USS Rasher had attacked the
convoy and the scattered ships had run straight to the waiting
Spadefish.
They commetlced an end-around maneuver and took up a
position 7500 yards ahead of the target. It looked like a large
transport. A large zig toward the Spadefish put her in good firing position, and with a target range of 2500 yards, Underwood fired all six forward torpedoes-he didn't want to miss
again! Gyro angle was 335 degrees.
The first and second shots hit. A loud explosion followed,
and the target disappeared from the radar. Breaking-up noises
were heard for several minutes.
The following morning, the watch spotted another ship.
Captain Underwood chased it, but aircraft prevented the Spadefish from surfacing. Eventually, the quarry was lost, and at
that point, Underwood decided he was a long way from where
he were supposed to be and headed back toward Formosa.
Torpedo Attack # 2
On 27 August, the watch saw several masts on the horizon
and the captain called the crew to battle stations. A small convoy was heading out to sea through the Babuyan Channel and
the Spadefish was in a perfect position.
Captain Underwood set a standard approach course and
closed in. The targets proved to be three large tankers riding
empty. Two escorts were picked up on sound but must have
been far ahead-they couldn't be seen. Underwood and crew
performed a perfect approach and took a position ahead of the
144
1st Patrol
targets, just off their track. They waited. A small zig put the
Spadefish between the second and third ships. Three forward
torpedoes were fired at a range of 1960 yards at the second
ship, and two hits were scored.
The sound man reported that the screws had stopped.
Underwood quickly turned his attention to the third ship and
fired three stern torpedoes. One scored a hit. He fired a fourth
torpedo to score another. By now, escorts and aircraft were
heading into the area, so Underwood went deep. Depth
charges were dropped but not close enough-the sub hadn't
been spotted. Later, when Underwood ordered the sub to surface, he found one of the .tankers sunk and one beached in a
small bay being guarded by a destroyer.
Underwood spent the better part of a day trying to sneak
into the bay to finish off the tanker. At one point, he did get
into a firing position on the destroyer and fired his last four
aft torpedoes. All missed. Low on torpedoes then, the Spadefish headed for Saipan for a reload.
Torpedo Attack # 3
The Spadefish was back on station by 6 September, just to the
east of Formosa. On the morning of 8 September, she was
back in business as the watch sighted smoke on the horizon
and the sound man picked up pinging in that direction.
The target turned out to be an eight-ship convoy with at
least three escorts, and was making good speed at eight knots.
Captain Underwood couldn't close submerged, so he set a
course to trail for a while.
As darkness fell, he surfaced to overtake the convoy. Previously, he had been worried about enemy radar and had attacked submerged even at night; this time, however, he
decided to ignore the radar and fight from the surface.
The Spadefish performed an end-around on the zigging
convoy. The base course was determined to be 105 degrees.
Underwood closed in on the two-column convoy from the
flank and fired from about 2000 yards away. He fired first at
the last ship in the far column and then at the last ship in the
near coiumn, the largest in the convoy.
Both targets were hit. The first disintegrated upon impact
145
Chapter 25. USS Spadeflsh
and the second settled quickly. Underwood turned the boat to

bring the stern tubes to bear and fired four shots at a target in
the middle of the column. He heard two hits. Depth charges
started to fall, but the Spadefish crossed behind to the other
side of the convoy without being spotted.
Underwood headed in for another attack, now aided by
the rising moon. He fired three shots at each of two targets
framed nicely by the moon. He hit the first ship, and it blew
up, but he missed the second after receiving faulty range
information from the radar. Once again, the boat was turned
to bring the stern tubes into use. Four torpedoes were fired at
a transport; two hit. This ship didn't sink, however. It was last
seen beating a slow retreat, low in the water and smoking.
Another escort arrived, and shell and depth-charge attacks
became more intense, but the Spadefish was well away from
danger. Unfortunately, as she withdrew, her wake was spotted
and a destroyer was on her tail. Underwood tried to shake it
but finally had to go deep. He later surfaced and tried to attack again but the convoy had moved in too close to shore. He
ordered the crew to secure from battle stations.
The sub continued to patrol around the mouth of a small
harbor, when a small inter-island freighter came into view and
the captain fired four torpedoes. The freighter must have had
a very shallow draft. All shots missed, probably passing under
the ship. Again, depth charges started falling, so Underwood
wisely left the area.
The Spadefish continued to ride herd on the convoy for
several days, but it refused to leave the safety of the harbor.
Finally, she left the area to meet with the USS Redfish and
USS Picuda to exchange information. Leaving the convoy in
their very good hands, the Spadefish headed back to Pear Harbor for a much deserved rest, arriving on September 24. She
had been at sea for 63 days. In all the Spadefish fired 45 torpedoes, resulting in 15 hits.

The Spadefish was eventually given credit for sinking all six
ships for a total of 31,500 tons. She was also given credit for
two damaged ships.
146
1st Patrol
With Silent Service. To simulate this patrol, use the

Spadefish scenario #5. To beat Commander Underwood, you
must sink six ships and damage at least one other, or sink a
total tonnage in excess of 31,500. You must do this without reloading torpedoes, so make your shots count!
With Up Periscope! With this program, you should

choose scenario #l and the Northern Pacific chart. You must
sink at least six ships and damage one more to beat Commander Underwood. You must do this with only one load of
torpedoes-he had two.
147
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uss soadetish
2nd Patrol
After a much deserved rest and an intense training period, the

Spadefish headed out to sea for her second war patrol on 23
October 1944. She was again accompanied by two other boats,
the USS Sunfish and the USS Peto. With the Spadefish in command, they were known as "Underwood's Urchins."
Their assigned area for this patrol was the heavily traveled Yellow Sea. After a stop at Midway for fuel, the subs
headed out. The Spadefish, however, quickly developed a
knock in one prop shaft. A mooring line had been dropped
overboard upon her departure from Midway and it must have
somehow become tangled in the linkage. After turning and
heading back to Midway, a diver quickly cleared the prop and
they were back on their way at top speed.
The three boats quietly made their way into the Yellow
Sea undetected. On 12 November, Underwood received a report of two U.S. planes down in his area and spent the next
several days off the coast of Shanghai looking for the pilots.
Fortunately, this search was a success.
Torpedo Attack # 1
The next day, the watch sighted smoke for the first time on
the patrol, and shortly thereafter, a converted ore carrier came
into view with an escort. The attack was well planned, but just
as they were about to shoot, the carrier turned wildly and the
escort headed straight for them. Caught in very shallow water,
the Spadefish evaded at two-thirds speed while the escort
dropped 19 depth charges in less than two minutes. The escort
captain apparently thought he had destroyed the Spadefish and
remained in the area for some time looking for wreckage and
survivors. Undoubtedly, the Spadefish was once again reported
as sunk. Two more escorts arrived and Underwood wisely decided to leave the area.
149
He didn't leave permanently, however-the next evening

he surfaced to find a large freighter with oil drums on deck
under tow by a smaller ship with three escorts. The convoy
was zigzagging only mildly, but the towed ship was having a
hard time with it.
Underwood crossed to the open side of the group and
fired five bow torpedoes from a range of 3000 yards. Four of
the five hit and the freighter burst into flames . The holocaust
lit the entire area. Underwood quickly retreated to watch from
a distance the fire, with the escorts milling about, occasionally
dropping charges.
The sub surfaced on 14 November and headed over the
shallow Yangtze Banks. The circular currents in the Yellow
Sea made this area a gathering place for flotsam. Only by
maintaining a constant lookout was the sub able to avoid several loose-floating mines.
Torpedo Attack #2
Things were slow for several days. On 16 November, the
lookouts reported a waterspout as smoke on the horizon. The
following afternoon, they were rewarded with the real thing.
At 1434, smoke was spotted and at least four ships were visible by 1642. One of these turned out to be an aircraft carrier.
The ships were heading straight for the Spadefish.
Realizing it would soon be dark, Underwood decided to
let the group pass right over and then attack it on the surface
at night. He went to 150 feet, and at 1720 the convoy passed
over. The sound of the screws was punctuated by the pinging
of the escorts' sonars. Half an -hour later, back at periscope
depth, he could see five large cargo ships trailed by the carrier.
One of the ships was a large tanker and the rest were large
freighters. A number of other warships-destroyers and smaller escorts-were present.
At 1843, Underwood surfaced and sent his men to battle
stations. By 2119, he had slipped by several escorts and pulled
even with the carrier. He set up to attack from the starboard
flank, but the carrier took a zig away and he had to head out
again to set up for another try. Thirty-nine minutes later, he
again slipped behind the escort and set up for a shot on the
150
2nd Patrol
tanker. After a five-minute setup, he fired six torpedoes at the

carrier at a range of 4100 yards. Underwood then turned to
port to bring the large tanker into line with the stern tubes
and fired all four stern torpedoes.
Four of the six torpedoes hit the carrier. She spewed forth
a mass of flames and began to settle by the stern. Planes
rolled off the flight deck and into the sea as the ship listed to
starboard. A last look at the carrier Jinyo showed her blazing
bow pointing skyward and her stern settling on the bottom in
23 fathoms of water. One torpedo struck home on the tanker,
but she wasn't seriously damaged and was able to maintain
her position in the convoy.
Torpedo Attack # 3
There were still several large ships left, so the Spadefish wasn't
finished yet. Shortly after midnight, she drove back in for another attack. This time she was spotted by the escorts, and
tracer bullets flew around the Spadefish bridge as Captain Underwood calmly ordered the boat to turn. He unloaded the
stern tubes at a large destroyer, the nearest target, and was rewarded by several explosions. The ship disappeared in a cloud
of smoke. He ordered the sub, still on the surface, to emergency flank speed and gradually pulled away from the chasing
escorts.
Things were slow for a number of days as the Spadefish
showed up late for several encounters only to find escorts
picking up survivors of other sub attacks. After a couple of
days on lifeguard duty, watching for downed U.S. pilots after
a large bombing mission, she made her last score of the patrol.
Torpedo Attack #4
On 29 November, the watch spotted a single ship on radar. It
was zigzagging on a base course of 160 degrees at about seven
knots . Captain Underwood approached submerged to a range
of 3500 yards. The target was a heavily loaded freighter. Four
shots were fired and two struck home; the freighter sunk almost immediately. Having only one torpedo left, Spadefish
headed for home. The trip back was uneventful save for the
birth of six pups by the ship's dog, Luau.
151

Commander Underwood and the Spadefish were credited with
sinking four ships for a total tonnage of 30,400.
With Silent Service. This is one of the scenarios offered

with the game, so use scenario #5, Spadefish Patrol 2. To outshoot Commander Underwood, you'll have to sink at least
four large ships or exceed 30,500 tons sunk.
With Up Periscope! Again use scenario # 1. You must sink
four ships or beat Underwood's total of 30,500 tons.
152
2nd Patrol
Figure 26 -1. Patrol Route Map
153
27
USS S1Jadetish
5th Patrol
After a successful 3rd patrol, it was decided that Underwood
had commanded more than his share of combat patrols. He
was relieved of command and replaced by Commander W. S.
Germerhausen, who commanded the boat during its last two
patrols of the war. Germerhausen was a fitting replacementHe was a bold attacker who preferred to get in a little closer
than his predecessor. You'll note that most of his attacks were
made from less than 2000 yards, and he fired smaller salvos of
torpedoes.
On 27 May 1945, the Spadefish and crew set out from
Guam for her 5th and final war patrol. She was accompanied
by the USS Crevalle and the USS Sea Dog. This group was to
be the first of a band that eventually grew to nine ships in the
Sea of Japan.
The area had been inaccessible to American subs since
1942 after Japan placed mines across the narrow channels
leading into their "backyard" sea. But because of successful
minefield encounters elsewhere, Admiral Lockwood decided
his subs were capable of making it through the minefields.
Once inside the Sea of Japan, they would be able to sever the
last trade lines to the Japanese Empire.
The first group made it safely through the southern entrance to the sea, the Tsushima Strait minefield, on 4 June. On
each of the following two days, another group made a successful entry. With all nine subs safely through the minefield,
everyone dispersed to patrol their assigned areas. They agreed
not to fire on enemy shipping until after sunset on 9 June, to
allow everyone to get into position before the enemy was
aware of the incursion.
The Spadefish was assigned to work the northern end of
the sea, just off the coast of Hokkaido Island. During her pas154
5th Patrol
sage to the north, the watches spotted many freighters, all

running straight and with running lights on at night. They
seemed to be feeling perfectly secure. That would change over
the next several days.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Finally, dark came on 9 June. The Spadefish had been lying
quietly outside of Ishikari Wan harbor, and now she slid silently into the harbor waters expecting to find it full of targets.
The commander was disappointed to find nearly all of the
ships inside the breakwater and out of reach. One ship was
departing, but Germerhausen decided to let her go while he
explored the area more. He eventually found a small freighter
anchored with its running lights on. It looked like a perfect
target. He lined her up for a straight shot from 1600 yards,
and fired two torpedoes.
Both ran under the ship and missed. Captain Germerhausen decided to leave the small target and chase the ship
seen departing earlier. He left the harbor at flank speed.
Torpedo Attack # 2
The freighter was heavily loaded and traveling slowly. It took
only an hour and a half to take up a good position off her
flank. Germerhausen headed in to fire . At a range of 1350
yards, three torpedoes were fired on a straight track. All three
hit and the ship disintegrated and sank in less than a minute.
No sooner than that target settled into the sea, another appeared on radar, again the crew went to battle stations.
Torpedo Attack # 3
This was another medium-sized freighter. It was heading into
the harbor, and all the Spadefish had to do was sit and wait.
She took up a perfect position off the freighter's track and
fired three shots at a range of 2000 yards. Two hits were
heard and observed and the target exploded and sank. The
sub headed out to sea to clear the area and reload.
They had only been underway for about ten minutes
when another target was picked up on radar.
155
Chapter 27. USS Spadeflsh
Torpedo Attack #4
The Spadefish went to flank speed and closed on the unsuspecting target, another medium-sized freighter traveling alone.
They arrived at the firing position late and so had to
shoot with a fairly large gyro angle. This proved to be no
problem: Two of the three torpedoes fired from 1990 yards
found their mark, and the ship broke in two and quickly sank.
Feeling the ships had sunk rapidly enough to prevent them
from sending a warning, Germerhausen decided to stay in the
area for a submerged patrol at dawn.
During the day of 10 June, several ships were spotted, but
they were too small and not worth attacking. The Spadefish
continued to patrol quietly. Later that night, she surfaced for
her night patrol and spotted a gnod-sized target on radar. The
target's track was set and the sub started an end-around.
Torpedo Attack # 5
Captain Germerhausen couldn't get a good look at the target
in the darkness, but she was acting very suspiciously. Just as
he was about to fire from 1600 yards, the ship turned hard
and headed straight for the Spadefish. Germerhausen ordered
three torpedoes fired down-the-throat and he reversed course
to evade the oncoming ship. The target closed to within 1300
yards and opened fire on the Spadefish. The torpedoes missed.
With the enemy gunners getting their mark and bullets
flying on both sides of the boat, the commander took her
deep. The crew rigged for depth charges and waited. The enemy passed overhead and in three minutes dropped 18 charges
on the Spadefish, but she wasn't damaged. She continued west
submerged.
Most of June 11 was spent out to sea getting a good battery charge and allowing the crew have a much-deserved rest.
The next morning, the sub headed back toward the coast of
Hokkaido and spotted a good-sized motor sampan. Germerhausen ordered it destroyed with the deck gun, and later that
morning, two trawlers were also demolished with fire from the
deck gun.
156
5th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 6
Early on the of 13 June, two targets were picked up on radar
just west of the La Perouse Strait on the northern tip of Hokkaido. Captain Germerhausen began tracking and found one
target moving and the another lying to.
He headed after the moving ship and closed in for a flank
attack. At a range of only 1300 yards, the captain ordered two
torpedoes fired. Both hit. He immediately reversed course to
line up the other ship, which still hadn't moved, and headed
in at flank speed in an attempt to beat the coming dawn. Concerned about the nationality of the freighter, Captain
Germerhausen closed to within 8000 yards and confirmed that
it was a Russian freighter, so he left it unmolested. By the time
the identity of the second ship was confirmed, the first had
sunk.
Torpedo Attack # 7
Just before dawn on 14 June, when the Spadefish was still patrolling just offshore, the watch spotted a promising target.
Luck was with the crew of the sub-the ship was lying to. At
5000 yards, Captain Germerhausen got a good look and saw
that it was a heavily loaded freighter. The captain brought the
sub to within 2000 yards, and since he had four fish aft and
only two forward, he swung around for a stern shot. He fired
one torpedo at the center of the ship on a perfect 90-degree
track. It hit, but the target didn't sink. He fired another on the
same track. This one hit also. Captain Germerhausen watched
as the target started to roll, and all lifeboats were deployed.
Several minutes later, the target capsized and sank. The Spadefish headed out to sea and submerged to 150 feet to avoid the
predictable air search, which could be expected with the
morning light.
Germerhausen continued to patrol to the south for several
days without seeing anything worthy of attack until just after
midnight on 17 June, when the Spadefish made a good radar
contact.
157
Chapter 27. USS
Spadefish
Torpedo Attack # 8
The watch spotted three ships, and Captain Germerhausen ordered the crew to battle stations. After maneuvering for a
good position, he fired the last two bow torpedoes at a medium freighter, the largest of the three ships. A gyro angle of
zero was used from a range of 2100 yards-a perfect setup.
One torpedo hit the target, and before the sub could set up for
a stern shot, the ship sank.
Torpedo Attack #9
After dawn on 18 June, a small freighter came into view, and
there was a brief scare when the Spadefish encountered what
appeared to be a destroyer. When Germerhausen was certain
the sub wasn't in danger, he closed to 1000 yards and fired
one stern torpedo at the freighter. The torpedo ran straight
and true but passed under the light freighter. The last shot
was fired, set to run shallower. It, too, passed right under the
ship.
After patrolling the area for several days in search of targets that could be sunk with the gun, the Spadefish finally
gave up and headed north through the La Perouse Strait, and
home.
Although the commander claimed a total tonnage sunk of
over 28,000 tons, postwar investigations only gave him credit
for 10,000 tons. He was given credit for five ships and several
smaller sampans.
While the Spadefish was being readied for another patrol
in the Sea of Japan, peace arrived. A few weeks later, she
steamed home to Mare Island with a marvelous war record:
Decorated with the highest award-the Presidential Unit Citation-and four Battle Stars, she had conducted five successful
war patrols without a single casualty, and fired 78 torpedoes,
resulting in 53 hits-a truly outstanding achievement.
By directive dated January 1947, the USS Spadefish was
placed out of commission at Mare Island.
158
5th Patrol

With Silent Service. To better Commander Germerhausen, you'll have to sink at least five ships, and one must
be sunk with fire from the deck gun. If you down five ships,
you'll almost certainly beat his official tonnage of 10,000 tons.
Use scenario #5. You won't be able to get all the way up to
Hokkaido on the map, but patrol as far north in the Sea of Japan as you can.
With Up Periscope! You must sink five ships to better the
commander. Follow the course set on the map. Choose the
Northern area from the Big Chart.
159
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28
USS Parche
2nd Patrol
One of the most daring and exciting attacks of the war was
turned in by the Parche during her second patrol near Formosa. It was certainly the closest in terms of range to the enemy-the combatants were frequently within rock-throwing
range of each other.
The Parche was part of a three-ship wolf pack. The other
ships in the pack were the Steelhead and the Hammerhead.
Transit to the patrol area was quiet, and the patrol was rather
unproductive until the evening of 4 July when Commander
" Red" Ramage took the boat in on the surface to attack a
group of ships. Upon closer inspection, the ships turned out to
be destroyers and cruisers. As Captain Ramage turned and
made full speed away, the Japanese provided an impressive
fireworks display.
Captain Ramage battled bad weather and equipment
problems for the remainder of the month until he received a
contact report from the Hammerhead: A large convoy was
heading his way. After chasing the radically maneuvering convoy for several hours, it finally showed on radar just after
midnight. He took an approach course and closed in.
By 0330, he was close enough to make out the convoy
and its escorts. It was then that one of the escorts headed for
the submarine at full speed. The Parche was also moving at
full speed. Captain Ramage made a hard turn to the rear of
the group, which placed him suddenly between the escorts
and the convoy. The range was closing fast. A large freighter
was in good position, but by the time he could set up, the
range was only 450 yards-too close to fire torpedoes.
He turned hard and pulled out of the freighter's path,
missing by a scant 200 yards. He continued to turn and, once
clear, fired two torpedoes, but the ship had been alerted and
161
Chapter 28. USS Parche
swung hard to avoid them. This hard tum effectively cut off
one of the escorts corning after the Parche, so Captain Ramage
continued the attack.
Two large tankers appeared off to starboard, and Ramage
headed for them, still on the surface. A five-minute run at
high speed brought the tankers in range. He opened fire from
1500 yards. All four torpedoes hit the first tanker along the
side-it sank almost immediately, leaving only a burning oil
slick on the surface.
The Parche came hard right again to bring the stem tubes
to bear on the second tanker, and fired three torpedoes. Two
hit home. The target slowed but didn't stop, and the Parche
continued at high speed, as the men below hurried to reload
the empty tubes.
The escorts were becoming a problem-firing guns and
flares indiscriminately-but another ship appeared as Ramage
received word that two torpedoes were ready forward. From
800 yards, he fired both, resulting in two hits. Struck squarely
amidships, the target sank in minutes.
Ramage came right to avoid an oncoming escort and
headed back toward the second tanker. The Parche crossed
about 200 yards behind it and opened up for a stem shot. At
800 yards, Ramage fired three stern tubes at the tanker. All
hit. Having taken five torpedo hits, the tanker went down,
leaving only another oily fire behind on the surface.
Although they had already taken two ships, the real prize
of the group was a large freighter. Ramage was turning to attack it when a small, fast ship was seen heading straight for
the Parche, intent on ramming. Ramage called below for the
engineers to pour on all the oil they had. "The other fellow
had the right of way, but we were in a hurry." When halfway
across the escort's bow, Ramage put the rudder full to the
right and swung the stem clear at the last second. The Japanese were "screaming ... as we cleared by less than 50 feet.
Mutual cheers and jeers were exchanged by all hands."
Ramage then found himself boxeq in on both sides by
smaller craft and had the large freighter dead ahead with a
zero angle on the bow. There was nothing for him to do but
try a down-the-throat shot. The first fish was away but it
162
2nd Patrol
veered to the right, so he calmly held fire, recalculated the solution, and fired two more. Those two hit, stopping the
freighter dead in her tracks. The Parche passed down the side
of the damaged ship and then turned away to bring the stern
tubes around. From 800 yards, Captain Ramage fired one torpedo. It was a bullseye, hitting right in the middle of the ship.
Ramage took a moment to look around while still on the
surface. He checked on the escorts, which were still firing at
the sub and each other. The injured freighter was down by the
bow but showed no signs of immediate sinking, but as
Ramage headed back for the coup de grace, the target's stern
came up and she made a nose dive for the bottom.
With no large targets left and the gyro-setting device in
the forward torpedo room jammed, Ramage wisely decided to
put some distance between " us and this hornet's nest. " Several explosions were seen as the Parche pulled away-it was
Steelhead's turn to get in her blows.
Almost out of torpedoes and with a pharmacist's mate
suffering from acute appendicitis, the Parche headed for home.

For "Personal daring and outstanding skill displayed by the
commanding officer," " Red" Ramage was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. Although all of his sinkings
weren't verified after the war, Commander Ramage's word
that he saw four ships go down is good enough for me.
With Silent Service. Night surface attacks are the order of

the day. To recreate this famous battle, you must find a large
convoy and attack it repeatedly without diving for cover. You
must sink at least four ships. Try to sink a couple of tankers if
they're present. When choosing a convoy to attack, try to find
one accompanied by Kaikoban-type destroyers-you'll have a
slight speed advantage to help you stay away from them on
the surface. Use scenario #l, the USS Tang.
With Up Periscope! You're to sink four ships in night surface action. You may have to take care of the escorts first to
survive on the surface. Watch out for the freighters-they'll
try to ram you if you get too close. Use scenario #5, the USS
Tang. Choose the Northern Theater from the Big Chart.
163
Chapter 28. USS Parche
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USS Rar
5th Patrol
The Ray was one of the many fine ships to come out of the
shipyard at Manitowoc, Wisconsin. She was tested and conducted her first training maneuvers in the waters of Lake
Michigan. On 9 July 1944, she departed Freemantle, Australia
for her 5th war patrol. In charge was Commander William T.
Kinsella.
Torpedo Attack # 1
After conducting training exercises for several days, the Ray
headed toward the Lombok Strait to patrol. Sighting nothing
but patrol craft in the straits, Captain Kinsella headed into the
Java Sea and quickly located a fully loaded tanker with no escort. He pushed the sub to all-ahead flank and made an endaround maneuver.
He made his approach on the surface in the dark. At a
range of 3000 yards, Captain Kinsella fired all six forward
tubes. Three hits were scored: torpedoes 1, 2, and 4. The tanker was struck in the bow, under the bridge, and MOT (Middle
Of Target). The target seemed to shake off the damage and
continue on course at the same speed.
A hard turn brought the stern tubes to bear, and all four
tubes were fired. The target slowed as the torpedoes were
fired, and all missed ahead of the ship. Both torpedo rooms
worked furiously to reload. When three fish were loaded forward, the captain again gave the fire order: Three torpedoes
were fired at the target, which had now stopped-range 2900
yards. Shots one and two took an unexplained jig to the left
and missed. Number three hit in the bow. He ordered another
turn for the stern tubes. Once again, all four torpedoes were
set to fire, but as Kinsella was about to shoot, the tanker fired
at the sub. The first shot was very close and the captain or165
Chapter 29. USS Ray
dered flank speed to start maneuvering. During this process,

all four stern tubes were emptied with no hits.
By now Captain Kinsella had been at this enterprise for
almost two hours, and had expended 17 torpedoes, but he was
determined. The tubes were reloaded again. Dawn was approaching as the Ray made a submerged attack, and three forward torpedoes were fired when the light was good enough to
see through the scope. Two hits. Still the tanker remained
afloat! Two more forward torpedoes were fired from 1800
yards, and both hit under the stack. Finally, at about 0700, the
tanker started to sink and the Ray went deep to clear the area.
With 22 torpedoes gone, Captain Kinsella decided to return to Freemantle and reload. On July 28, the Ray once again
departed Freemantle and headed north. Back in the Lombok
Straits, Captain Kinsella tracked what appeared to be a ship.
When it suddenly dropped off the radar screen, he realized it
must have been a submarine, and the Ray quickly left the area.
Torpedo Attack # 2
The Ray crossed the Java Sea to patrol the southern entrance
to the Makassar Strait. At 0330 in the morning on 14 August,
the watch spotted a slow-moving two-ship convoy. Close inspection showed one freighter and one escort. Kinsella crept to
within 700 yards of the freighter and fired four shots, resulting
in three hits. The freighter broke in two and sank quickly. The
escort poured on the coal and headed for the Ray, but thanks
to the MK 18 wakeless torpedoes, the escort captain couldn't
get a fix on the Ray's position. He dropped his charges well off
the mark.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Several days of patrolling the southern and western coast of
Borneo proved unproductive. As the Ray moved toward the
Natuna Islands, the watch spotted smoke on the horizon. A
large convoy appeared to be headed toward the sub.
Captain Kinsella tracked the convoy until he had a good
fix on its course and destination. It appeared to be going to
Miri on the northern coast of Malaysia. The convoy was receiving air cover, so a daytime attack was postponed. Knowing
166
5th Patrol
the convoy's course, Captain Kinsella moved ahead and

waited for dark. As the convoy approached by night, the captain could finally get a good look at it. There were 12 ships,
five of which were escorts. About midnight, he slid behind an
outlying escort. A small turn brought the stern tubes to bear
and four shots were fired. Kinsella watched amazed as all
missed. The setup had been perfect; all that he could imagine
was that the boat's wake had somehow thrown the fish off
course. He immediately went to flank speed and cleared the
area.
Once safely away, he made another end-around. At 0100,
he again slipped behind one of the escorts, but this time kept
on going toward the convoy. He chose a large tanker for the
target and all six forward torpedoes were fired from 4000
yards. If they had approached any closer, the Ray would have
been surrounded by escorts. Once the torpedoes were fired,
the Ray made a hard turn in front of another escort and headed back out.
The first torpedo hit one of the freighters overlapping the
tanker. Three more hit the tanker, which erupted with "one of
the most terrific explosions I've ever seen," according to the
captain. He continued to track the convoy by radar as the Ray
left the area, and he watched the freighter and tanker drop off
the radar screen as they sank.
Torpedo Attack #4
The Ray proceeded up the coast, and on 18 August, the watch
spotted a plane circling over smoke, a sign of a convoy.
The convoy consisted of at least 12 ships, 5 of which were
tankers. The Ray ran at 120 feet during the approach to avoid
being spotted from the air. Once under the escort screen, Captain Kinsella came up to periscope depth for six quick shots. A
large tanker took three hits and a smaller freighter took another. The Ray headed for 370 feet at flank speed. On its way
down, the crew heard the tanker sink. They found a thermal
layer at 270 feet, and under it, the Ray easily avoided the escorts. Once the sub was in the clear, Captain Kinsella surfaced
and began to chase again.
167
Chapter 29. USS Ray
Torpedo Attack # 5
Several days of chasing the convoy led the USS Ray to a
chance meeting with the submarine USS Harder. The captains
exchanged information and decided to attack the convoy,
which was now just outside of Paluan Bay, at dawn.
The next morning, the Ray moved into position. The crew
heard what seemed to be torpedo explosions from the Harder,
and the convoy started moving toward the Ray. As the group
came by, Kinsella fired his last four torpedoes at a large
freighter. One good hit exploded the boiler of the freighter,
and the crew could hear the freighter breaking up as they
headed deep.
A heavy depth charge attack drove the Ray down to 425
feet, with no thermal layer to hide under. Two hours later,
Captain Kinsella managed to take the sub back up to periscope depth for a look around. The target had sunk and the
convoy had moved on. A lone escort circled the area looking
for survivors. The Ray cleared the area submerged and headed
for Freemantle.

As usual, Kinsella's claim of four ships sunk for a total of
36,400 tons was revised after the war. His official tally was
five ships for a total of 26,000 tons. Still, it was a considerable
achievement.
With Silent Service. You must sink five ships for a tonnage total exceeding 26,000 tons to beat Commander Kinsella.
You better hope to run into several tankers as Commander
Kinsella did! Use scenario #4, the USS Seawolf.
With Up Periscope! You must sink at least five ships. Use
scenario #4, the USS Tang 3rd patrol. Choose the South Pacific Theater from the Big Chart.
168
5th Patrol
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30
USS Rav
6th Patrol
The Ray-'s 6th war patrol began on 23 September 1944, when
she set sail from Freemantle for the South China Sea. The
crew conducted training while making passage up through the
Lombok and Makassar Straits.
Once in the Celebes Sea, the watch sighted a well-built
sailboat. The captain decided to attack with guns. He surfaced
and ordered the crew to clear the decks with fire from the two
20mm machine guns and then finish the ship off with the
four-inch deck gun. They approached to close range and the
order to fire was given. Both guns jammed. They headed back
out and managed to get the rear gun cleared and once again
were ordered to fire. This time, the firing pin broke. By this
time also, the ship was sending up flares and causing quite a
commotion. The captain decided to give up the whole thing.
He noted in his report that they would "stick to shooting
torpedoes."
They continued through the Celebes Sea and through the
Sibutu Passage into the Sulu Sea and the Philippine area.
Torpedo Attack # 1
In the early evening on 6 October, the sub began tracking a
large tanker with two destroyer escorts. The captain put on all
four engines and moved ahead of the target. Once in position,
he closed the range to shoot.
As he was moving in, a destroyer turned toward the sub.
Captain Kinsella didn't think the Ray had been spotted, but he
decided not to question an approaching destroyer, so, at an extreme range of 4200 yards, he fired six torpedoes at the tanker.
Moving away on the surface, he saw only one hit. A flaw
in the target-bearing transmitter had fouled up the firing solu-
170
6th Patrol
tion, and another end-around put the sub too close to an escort, so they were forced to go deep.
A third end-around put the sub in another questionable
firing position, but Captain Kinsella took the chance and fired
six more shots. Three torpedoes were heard to hit and again
the sub was forced under by the escorts. The tanker was spotted the next day, smoking but still afloat.
Things continued on a sour note as Ca.ptain Kinsella
tracked a destroyer for several days but was unable to close
on it.
Torpedo Attack # 2
Finally, on 12 October, Kinsella's luck changed as a large
freighter with two escorts steamed into view. He drove in as
the escorts conveniently moved aside to give a clear shot. Four
forward torpedoes were fired: Two hit with rocking explosions
and the freighter was literally blown to pieces.
The two escorts caused trouble for several hours before
the Ray was able to return to periscope depth. Almost immediately, Captain Kinsella starting tracking more smoke. When he
closed in, he was disappointed to find that the smoke was
from the boilers of the two destroyers looking for him! The
Ray quietly moved away.
The next day, problems arose when the sub dove to avoid
a Japanese plane in the area. As the boat slid under the waves,
the captain realized he hadn't heard the report that the hatch
was closed or felt the pressure in the boat. He immediately
dropped through the hatch to the control room as the water
poured through the conning tower hatch. The hatch had been
pulled to, but not secured.
The boat went down to 80 feet before it could be brought
under control and returned to the surface. The hatch to the
conning tower had been closed leaving the executive officer
and several others trapped. Back on the surface, the captain
went up through the engine room hatch and then up to the
conning tower.
When he opened the hatch, he was greeted by several
happy crewman who informed him that the topside crew was
all right but the conning tower was two-thirds flooded. Pumps
171
Chapter 30. USS Ray
were put to work to remove the water, but most of the electronics were damaged and shorted by the salt water bath. The
damage couldn't be repaired at sea, so a quick trip to Biak, in
New Guinea, was ordered for repairs.
Torpedo Attack # 3
After a remarkable refit-and-repair job by the USS Orion, the
Ray was back on patrol, and on 1 November, the crew was
back at battle stations.
A large convoy had been spotted in the Mindoro Strait
and Captain Kinsella closed in for a shot. The largest ship was
a freighter; there were also four small tankers. He lined up the
freighter, but before he could shoot, it was hit by another
sub's torpedoes. The attack team in the Ray started looking for
other targets. Soon the tankers turned away from the other
sub and toward the Ray.
The closer the tankers came, the better they looked. As
two of the tankers were overlapping at 900 yards, Captain
Kinsella fired three aft torpedoes. The first ship took two hits
and blew up, sending oil drums flying high into the air. The
second took one hit and stopped dead in the water. Both sank
as the Ray was heading for deep water. A good thermal layer
hid the sub well as it moved out of the area.
Torpedo Attack #4
Several days later, the sub had moved north to the Lingayen
Gulf area and spotted a burning transport ship. A closer look
revealed that the superstructure was well ablaze but the hull
was intact. It had probably been bombed from the air.
Ray moved in to finish the job. Two well-aimed torpedoes
sent it to the bottom in a matter of minutes, but then a shorebased radar appeared to have picked up the sub-an escort
was moving toward it. J{apid withdrawal was in order:
Torpedo Attack # 5
On 6 November, when the Ray was patrolling off Cape
Bolinao, a wild battle occurred when several subs closed in on
a convoy at once. Explosions were heard as the Ray moved in
at 120 feet. As Captain Kinsella was lining up a Japanese
172
6th Patrol
cruiser for a shot, torpedoes passed the Ray on the port side
and then again to starboard. The target cruiser reversed
course.
As the ship once again showed her side to the Ray, Captain Kinsella fired four torpedoes and went deep. It was a
madhouse of activity. Torpedoes from several subs were flying
about, bombs were being dropped by aircraft, and depth
charges were exploding all at once. Two good hits blew the
bow off of the cruiser, but it didn't sink.
Escorts kept the Ray deep for a while, and while he was
waiting, captain Kinsella decided to move to the shore side of
the convoy for another attack. While moving at 370 feet, he
lightly grounded the boat. It was an easy job to back her off
the bottom, but the forward sound head had been rubbed off
and the cable blew back into the forward room causing a rapid
leak.
The sub had to move back up to periscope depth so the
crew could stop the leak with a wooden plug. A tanker was
sighted taking the cruiser in tow, and the captain was heartbroken to watch the cruiser being towed off. He had a perfect
shot at it, but to fire a torpedo would have been suicide-escorts were only 800 yards away and the plug in the forward
room prevented a deep dive. He returned after dark to look
for the cruiser on the surface, but it was nowhere to be found.
Torpedo Attack # 6
Several days of repair activity and patrolling climaxed with a
contact report from the USS Raton. Captain Kinsella poured on
the oil and headed toward the contact area. Around dark, the
sub made contact and prepared for a night surface attack. The
Ray approached slowly in the darkness and watched the convoy's zig pattern.
A nice zig toward the sub put the second ship in a good
firing position, and Captain Kinsella quickly took advantage of
it. With several other subs tracking the same group of ships,
the captain wanted to be sure he came away with something.
The order was given to fire all six forward tubes at the target
freighter.
Four hits completely disintegrated the ship with such a
173
Chapter 30. USS Ray
flash that Kinsella took the boat down for fear of being spotted. Shortly after, another torpedo was heard to hit. The Ray
had "gotten lucky"-an escort on the far side of the convoy
was hit. More explosions were heard, and when Captain
Kinsella returned to the surface, he received word that there
were no more targets left.
The Ray headed out to the east, and several days later, its
last two torpedoes were fired at a ship grounded on a shallow
reef. Both missed due to strong currents. Captain Kinsella
pointed the bow towards Midway.

Kinsella claimed to have sunk five ships and damaged several
others on this patrol. Later investigation supported his claim
for five ships and gave him a third of another sinking.
With Silent Service. You should try to sink at least five
ships on your patrol and, if possible, damage another. Choose
scenario #4, the USS Seawolf. Depart from Freemantle, cruise
up through the Lombok and Makassar Straits, and patrol in
the Philippines. Shipping should be plentiful in the area.
With Up Periscope! Your goal is to sink five or more
ships and return safely. Use scenario #3, the USS Tang 1st patrol. Move up through the Makassar Strait and patrol around
the Philippines.
174
6th Patrol
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31
USS Rasher
5th Patrol
Figure 31-1. The USS Rasher
The USS Rasher saw success nearly every time she left port.
For her highly profitable 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 5th patrols, she
was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. Her 5th patrol
was particularly remarkable.
After an excellent refit at Freemantle, Australia, the Rasher
set out on her 5th war patrol on 22 July 1944. Commander
Henry G. Munson had just taken over and was in for the ride
of his life. Rasher headed north through the Lombok Strait and
toward the patrol area just off Luzon.
Torpedo Attack # 1
The Commander's first attack with the Rasher was on 6 August. A radar contact developed into a Japanese convoy with
escort. There were one large freighter, two smaller freighters,
and two escorts. The Rasher approached on the flank and fired
six torpedoes at the large freighter. Captain Munson was
176
6th Patrol
forced deep to avoid being rammed by one of the smaller

ships. Five hits were heard along with the noises of a ship
breaking up and sinking.
Lifeguard duty and tropical storms were the order of the
day until 18 August when another convoy was spotted. This
one was a major movement of at least 13 ships.
Torpedo Attack #2
Due to the extreme darkness, Captain Munson had to rely on
radar information; therefore, the exact composition of the
group was undetermined.
Around 2100, he moved in and fired two aft torpedoes at
a large target. Unsure of the gyro settings, he pulled out to recheck the situation. The setup must have been good, however,
because both shots hit home, causing a huge explosion and
fire. The target must have been a large, loaded tanker. The
bow of the ship blew off and landed 500 yards away. Both
pieces burned fiercely for a moment and then disappeared.
The escorts started firing wildly into the night. Tracers
were flying in all directions and depth charges were being
dropped rapidly. The sight was spectacular, but the captain
was busy planning his next attack.
Torpedo Attack #3
The Rasher moved ahead of the convoy and waited. The convoy took a slight zig and improved the Rasher's position.
When the targets lined up again, six forward torpedoes were
fired at one large target. The stern was swung around and four
more fish were fired at a second target.
The first ship took three hits and started to bum. The second ship took three hits, and a lucky forth hit was heard on a
ship beyond the targets. The second ship was believed to be a
another large tanker-a huge oil slick was spotted later at its
last known position, which indicated that it too had sunk.
Then an escort sighted the Rasher, and she had to pull
away from the convoy to shake it off her tail. The first target,
a large transport, was seen falling behind the group, but eventually it disappeared from radar.
177
Chapter 31 . USS Rasher
The captain now pulled away from the group and called
for help-he was almost out of torpedoes and there were still
many large targets in the area. He hoped to get several other
boats in on the action, as the convoy was breaking up into
several groups and he couldn't track them all.
Torpedo Attack # 4
Munson tracked the largest of the groups, and with all remaining torpedoes loaded, he moved in again. Four bow torpedoes
were fired at the leading ship. Rasher swung around to fire
two stern shots at the second ship; both were large targets.
Three hits were seen on the first ship and the forth was another lucky hit on a ship beyond the target. Two torpedoes ripped
into the second target. The first target stopped in her tracks
and, after several large explosions, sank.
The Rasher was now completely out of torpedoes, but she
stayed in the area to guide the USS Bluefish and the USS
Spadefish to profitable targets. After a period of such long and
furious activity, the crew was thankful for a rest. They headed
north up through the Balintang Channel and on to Midway.
The masterful shooting of Munson and crew vaulted them
close to the top of the list for tonnage sunk in a single patrol.
Munson initially claimed five ships for 45,700 tons, but later
investigation and interviews with POWs showed that one of
the targets sunk on that dark, overcast night was a 20,000-ton
aircraft carrier, so they raised his official total to 52,600 tonsquite a night!

With Silent Service. This one is going to be tough to
match. If you can sink 52,000 tons of shipping in one outing,
you'll certainly better the game's highest rank of W.G.S.C.
(World's Greatest Submarine Commander). You should try to
sink at least five ships. Take a shot at the 52,000 tons-you
might just make it. Use scenario #4, the USS Spadefish. A
good area is just off Luzon in the sea lanes from Luzon to
Indochina-a frequently used tanker route. If you're going to
sink 52,000 tons, you better go looking for tankers.
178
5th Patrol
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With Up Periscope! 52,000 tons and five ships isn't a difficult goal at all with this game, so make that your target. You
may need to hit some large targets, however. Use scenario #3,
the USS Tang's 1st patrol, and choose the Southern Theater
from the Big Chart.
179
32
USS CalJrilla
&th Patrol
Figure 32-1. The USS Cabrllla
Many of the Cabrilla's eight patrols weren't normal

antishipping sweeps, but instead, special missions. She delivered and picked up island guerrillas, laid mines, and made
photo reconnaissance deep into enemy waters. These missions
were very important but limited her time spent hunting ships,
and thus kept her overall total down. But when given the
chance, the Cabrilla showed herself to be a true hunter. She
was given such a chance on her 6th patrol, and in one week,
sank four of the seven ships she would sink for the entire war.
The Cabrilla and crew left Freemantle on 13 September
1944 under the command of Lt. Commander W. C. Thompson. The sub headed north through the Lombok Strait and on
180
6th Patrol
up toward the Philippines, passing through the Sibutu Passage

on 23 September.
The first shipping contact came the next day as the watch
sighted a large, loosely formed convoy. Captain Thompson attempted to approach submerged but couldn't gain a suitable
position. After tracking the convoy's course, it was obvious
they couldn't catch it before it reached safety in Manila, so
they broke off the attack.
Torpedo Attack # 1
On 1 October, a better opportunity presented itself: Sonar
picked up echo-ranging of a destroyer at 0919, and Captain
Thompson turned to investigate. Smoke was sighted on the
horizon at 0942, and a convoy was in sight by 1017. There
were three tankers, several smaller freighters, and two escorts.
They moved ahead to try to slip past the escort to the side of
the convoy. All the ships zigged toward them, but the Cabrilla
didn't go deep; an escort was headed straight for them but
didn't appear to have a good contact.
The crew all held their breath as the escort passed 50
yards to port; the captain took a quick look with the periscope
and saw nothing but gray paint! In the meantime, the convoy
had made a zig away and the largest. tanker was now in a bad
position for attack. The crew switched setup to a freighter and
fired four bow torpedoes for three hits. The ship blew up and
sank in pieces. The other two bow torpedoes were fired at another tanker, resulting in a hit.
The escort was now approaching from the rear. Since
there were no other good targets for a stern shot, Captain
Thompson fired four torpedoes down-the-throat at the escort.
He thought one hit but couldn't confirm what he hearddepth charges were being dropped in the distance. The arrival
of a Nell bomber caused him to break off the attack and remain submerged for the rest of the day.
Torpedo Attack # 2
After lunchtime on 6 September, a large convoy came right
down the track at the Cabrilla. Very little maneuvering was
needed, which was good, since the Cabrilla had developed a
181
Chapter 32. USS Cabrilla
shaft squeak that would limit its ability to move quietly. Several cargo ships were about to overlap, so Thompson held his
fire . When the two ships made one large target, he fired all six
forward torpedoes from 1800 yards. Five were heard to hit as
he headed for deep water-three on one ship and two on another. Loud breaking-up noises were heard from two different
directions. A good temperature gradient was found at 380 feet
where the Cabrilla sat out the 36 depth charges that came
looking for her.
Torpedo Attack # 3
That night, two destroyers showed up on radar. They were
looking for the U.S. sub. A quick setup was made and all six
forward tubes were emptied. The destroyers zigged at the
right moment and all the torpedoes missed. Thompson quickly
turned the boat to use the stem tubes . All four tubes were
fired from 3100 yards, and again all missed. The destroyers
didn't even know they had been fired upon as they continued
on their way.
Torpedo Attack #4
At 0300 the next morning, Captain Thompson received a contact report from the USS Aspro, which was also in the area. He
poured on the speed to close the estimated convoy track. A
lone freighter came over the hill and they started to track it.
He submerged at 11,000 yards in broad daylight at 0546.
There didn't seem to be a destroyer escort, so Thompson continued to approach even with the noisy shaft. The lone ship
continued. At a range of 1400 yards, Captain Thompson fired
the last four bow torpedoes: Three were hits and the target
broke in half. The captain watched through the scope as the
ship sank in a matter of seconds.
Now out of torpedoes, the Cabrilla headed for Pearl.

Commander Thompson conservatively claimed to sink four
ships for 25 ,000 tons. For once, this was upheld by the postwar investigation.
With Silent Service. Take your boat up the track shown
182
6th Patrol
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on the map and try to sink four ships for 25,000 tons. That's a
lot of weight for only four ships, so you better go for the big
ones. Use scenario #2, the USS Bowfin, and return to Midway.
With Up Periscope! Your goal is to sink four ships in the

assigned patrol area. Use scenario #3, the USS Tang, and
choose the Southern Theater from the Big Chart.
183
33
USS Hammerhead
2nd Patrol
Figure 33 1. The USS Hammerhead
The Hammerhead was unfortunate to come along rather late in

the war-it saw limited duty. Captain Martin and his crew,
however, took full advantage of what time they had. The best
performance was turned in during the Hammerhead's 2nd patrol. She left Freemantle on 9 September 1944 bound to patrol
the Java Sea and the Lombok and Makassar Straits.
Once in the Java Sea, the captain tried to make his crossing on the surface at night and under water during the day.
One evening, while the sub was traveling on the surface,
something appeared on the radar. Unable to identify it as a
ship or island, Captain Martin ordered the boat to submerge.
As he was passing through 60 feet of water, the captain received a dreaded call from the conning tower: "I think we left
a man topside, Captain." A quick nose count proved the officer to be wrong, but only after several very tense minutes.
184
2nd Patrol
Several days of patrolling suspected shipping lanes yielded few contacts and no good torpedo targets. The Hammerhead
continued to move slowly, and on 1 October, the watch finally
sighted a convoy. Captain Martin began to close.
Torpedo Attack # 1
The convoy was heading straight toward the sub. The Hammerhead pulled away a bit and then headed back in on the
convoy's flank. When the lead ship of the five-ship group was
at a range of 5500 yards and showing an angle on the bow of
60 degrees, the captain turned and headed for it.
At a range of 3800 yards, he fired three forward torpedoes
at the lead freighter. The second freighter was overlapping behind the first, so the captain hoped one of the three shots at
the first target might hit the second. He fired three torpedoes
at the third target and started to swing around to use the stern
tubes . The first two torpedoes hit on time and all bridge personnel saw a huge flame shoot up as the first target exploded.
A very bright orange explosion was seen as the forth torpedo
hit the third ship, which also blew up.
He fired two fish each at a medium freighter and a small
tanker. He saw one hit the freighter and two hit the tanker.
The Hammerhead was having quite a night. As the two ships
attempted to escape, a large white cloud poured out over the
water. The freighter sank first, followed later by the tanker.
The second ship and three escorts continued to steam on.
The captain pulled away and made a quick run around an
island to try to gain a firing position on the remaining ship,
but he couldn't regain contact and decided to make for deeper
water.
Several quiet weeks passed as the ship made routine patrols, avoided minefields, and dodged surface debris. Then,
early in the morning of 21 October, a six-ship convoy came
into contact and the crew of the Hammerhead went to battle
stations.
The target base course was 200 degrees with irregular 20
degree zigs. The starboard side of the group seemed to be the
least defended by escorts, so Captain Martin decided to attack
there. While the Hammerhead maneuvered in on the starboard
185
Chapter 33. USS Hammerhead
flank, the lone escort refused to play ball. It moved into the
approach path and continued to close, so the captain turned
his tail to it and pulled away behind the thick smoke produced by the engines on full power. The escort apparently
thought it had a false contact and didn't follow.
The sub made a turn and headed back in for another attempt. This time the escort let the sub slip behind her, but
quarters were very close. As the sub steadied to fire, the escort
fired as well. The target ships were bunched very closely together so they fired all six forward torpedoes with a wide
spread, hoping to hit something. The Hammerhead then turned
and poured on the fuel to get away from the escort. Shortly
thereafter, two hits were heard from the convoy. The escort
continued to fire, but the gun crew was shooting behind the
sub at the smoke cloud.
With the range to the escort only 1400 yards, Captain
Martin decided to try a down-the-throat shot from the stern
tubes. Two fish were sent away at zero-gyro angles. They
were heard to explode, but the escort was undamaged, so they
must have exploded prematurely or hit one of the many floating logs in the area.
Probably afraid to get too far from the rest of the convoy,
the escort turned back. Two large explosions garnered the attention of the bridge crew on the Hammerhead, and they
turned to see the last two ships in the group break out in
flames and start to fall back. At 8000 yards, one of the ships
disappeared, and several minutes later, the other vanished in
an explosion.
Not satisfied, the Hammerhead continued to track the
group, and at 0320 headed back in for another shot. At 4500
yards Captain Martin fired again at a large target showing a
nice 95-degree angle on the bow. Two explosions were seen
and the target went under in less than a minute. The escorts
started firing all around but couldn't pick up the Hammerhead
in the darkness. The sub slowly pulled away from the remaining escorts. With his boat low on torpedoes and uncomfortably
close to several airfields, Captain Martin decided to leave the
area before dawn.
186
2nd Patrol
Late that night he received a dispatch ordering the Ham-
merhead back to Freemantle.

Captain Martin only officially claimed six sinkings for a total
of 41,500 tons. There was probably at least one more ship
sunk during this patrol, but he listed it as damaged only. After
the war, as usual, this total was reduced. The official tally is
five ships for 25, 178 tons.
Captain Martin and his bridge crew actually saw most of
the sinkings he claimed, so this is one case in which we'll give
the captain the benefit of the doubt. To simulate this patrol,
you'll need at least six sinkings.
With Silent Service. You must sink six ships for a total of
25,000 tons or more. Patrol in the Lombok Strait, Java Sea
area. Use scenario #2, the USS Bowfin.
With Up Periscope! Six ships is your goal on this patrol.
Search the area around the Lombok Strait. Use scenario #3,
the USS Tang's 1st patrol. Choose the Southern Theater from
the Big Chart.
187
Chapter 33. USS Hammerhead
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34
USS Atule
1st Patrol
The captain and crew of the USS Atule probably knew the war
was coming to a close when they left on their first war patrol
in October of 1944. With time short, they must make their
mark in a hurry. In four war patrols, the Atule scored an official six sinkings. Four of these were sunk on the Atule's 1st
patrol under the command of J. H. Maurer.
The Atule set out from Pearl Harbor on 9 October 1944
bound for the Luzon Straits, South China Sea area. Training
and tracking practice were the crew's first order of business. It
was a good thing they encountered few enemy ships during
their first few weeks at sea-they had a chance to master every
drill and procedure. Actually, the crew ran into many more
U.S. subs during its transit than it did enemy ships: At least a
half-dozen American submersibles were sighted or contacted.
The first good ship contact came on 25 October, but as
they maneuvered to close the range, three explosions were
heard as a pack mate, the USS Jallao, arrived there first.
Torpedo Attack # 1
On 1 November, the Atule's luck improved: At 0331 the watch
sighted a freighter moving with two escorts. The moon was
full and there were broken clouds as the Atule maneuvered
around several rain squalls, trying to stay hidden. Several radical zigs put the captain in a position to attack if he acted
quickly. At 5600 yards, he decided it was now or never. He
turned to head toward the target, keeping his bow pointed at
the near escort. At 1550 yards, he fired all six forward torpedoes at what now appeared to be a large troop transport.
A huge explosion resulted from the first torpedo hit and
Captain Maurer ordered the Atule down. As the boat was submerging, he heard two more hits, followed by the usual break189
Chapter 34. USS Atule
ing-up noises of a sinking ship. By noon the next day, they

were back in the area to take a look at the scene. There was a
lot of debris and a single destroyer was still in the area, but
there was no sign of the target ship except for a large oil slick.
The Atule cleared the area to patrol in the Hong Kong to
Manila traffic lane. On 3 November, the Atule received a contact report from pack mate f allao regarding a five-ship convoy.
Again, she arrived just in time to see others make the attack.
More disappointment was in store on 13 November as the
sub tried to close on a carrier group they sighted, but after
chasing on the surface all night, they were forced to give it up
when dawn arrived with the threat of patrol aircraft. Once submerged, the captain knew he would never catch the group. The
ships were making 20 knots-easy enough to accomplish on
the surface but impossible under water. It was heart-breaking to
watch the huge target move over the hill and out of sight.
Torpedo Attack #2
More slow days followed until 20 November, when radar
picked up a promising target. The captain made all speed
ahead and pulled in front of the target and waited. Soon a destroyer steamed into view and Captain Maurer took aim.
Three torpedoes were fired from 2500 yards for one hit, but it
was enough. Two and a half minutes later, the destroyer's
stern stood straight up and slid under. The sub cleared the
area and headed west.
Torpedo Attack # 3
On 24 November, a group of ships that had eluded the Atule
the day before suddenly appeared, heading straight for the
sub. The captain moved around the group after the moon set,
in order to attack with a black cloud at his back.
He moved in on the starboard bow of a large transport
ship but drew to a stop as an escort came into view at 2000
yards. He kept the bow pointed toward the escort and "perspired freely." Maurer held fire until the escort was overlapping with the transport and then fired all six forward tubes.
The first two hit the destroyer and the third hit the transport.
190
1st Patrol
The Atule went flank speed ahead into a turn, bringing

the stern tubes into play. Two more shots were fired at the
transport. The destroyer suddenly exploded, shaking the boat
"like a terrier shaking a rat," and all that remained of it was
oil burning on the water.
The transport took another hit, and the Atule moved away
to open the range as the other escort opened up with sporadic
bursts of gunfire . At a range of 11,000 yards, they saw the
transport sink.
Torpedo Attack #4
Early in the morning on 27 November, the Atule made radar
contact with a target making radical zigs. The night was
bright, and with the brightest part of the sky behind them,
they had to approach with caution. This original contact was
lost, but the maneuvering put them into position to locate a
pip on the radar between two islands.
As they moved closer, it became obvious that the target
was an anchored ship-an easy target. The Atule circled to the
west to get a good background for the approach. Radar
couldn't pick the ship up due to the land behind it, so the captain moved in close enough to make out the range with binoculars. At 2000 yards, he fired four bow torpedoes and watched
as hits spread along the entire length of the ship. The ship
burned like a torch. Its flames were still visible from 15 miles
away as the Atule made for deep water.
The next day the captain headed for home.

This was by far the best outing for the Atule. Captain Maurer
claimed to sink five ships and had good evidence for all of
them, but one wasn't allowed after the war. The final total
was set at four ships down for 25,691 tons.
With Silent Service. This patrol will give you a chance to

go after one of those lone destroyers you occasionally see.
Your goal is to sink four ships, one of which must be a destroyer traveling alone. Try to make this attack on the surface
at night, if possible. You tonnage goal is a respectable total of
25,000 tons. Use scenario #l, the USS Tang.
191
Chapter 34. USS Atule
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With Up Periscope! Your goal is four ships, one of which

should be a destroyer traveling alone at night. Don't get too
close-you'll need to fire from long range to avoid detectionor, fire down-the-throat as the destroyer approaches you. Use
scenario #4, the USS Tang. Choose the Northern Theater from
the Big Chart.
192
35
USS Flasher
5th Patrol
No list of great patrols would be complete without mention of
the Flasher's 5th patrol, the famous "Great Tanker Shoot." She
was already a veteran of three successful patrols when she left
Freemantle on 15 November 1944 for her 5th patrol.
As usual, the first days at sea were uneventful as the boat
moved north through the Makassar Strait, Sibutu Pass, and
the Mindoro Strait into the South China Sea. Plane contacts
began on 23 November and kept the crew on its toes, but
nothing worth attacking came into view until 4 December.
Captain Grider received a contact report on a west-bound
convoy, and soon discovered that he was right in the path of
the group. Shortly after, the convoy appeared. Amidst low visibility and frequent rain squalls, the Flasher began tracking
from ahead of the convoy.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Large swells made depth control a problem, and visibility was
very poor; the watch could only get an occasional glimpse of a
mast top. Then, as the Flasher closed to 8000 yards, the entire
convoy was blocked from sight by a downpour.
At 2000 yards, a destroyer popped out of the mist and
steamed into firing position. At 0915, the captain ordered four
torpedoes fired on gyro angles between 28 and 51 at a range
1600 yards. The first two hit, stopping the target dead in the
water. She was settling by the stern as Captain Grider turned
his attention to a large tanker.
He set up a stern shot, and at 0918, fired the first torpedo.
He had a depth-control problem. The periscope went under
the surface and wouldn't come back out. A second torpedo
was fired without a spread. When the scope could clear the
surface again, the tanker was turning. Captain Grider checked
his fire.
193
Chapter 35. USS Flasher
A quick look at the damaged destroyer showed it still

afloat, it also revealed another escort heading straight for them
at less than 1000 yards. Grider went deep in a hurry, and as
the sub dove, he heard two timed hits on the tanker. He realized he must have underestimated her speed: The turn slowed
her enough to catch two fish in the stern. "Verily, we smell of
the rose."
A severe depth charge attack followed, with too many
close calls. Captain Grider slipped beneath a temperature gradient and moved away to reload.
Torpedo Attack # 2
With tubes reloaded, the Flasher headed back to the tanker,
which was now ablaze. The first destroyer had sunk, but another took its place. Grider planned to attack this destroyer
and finish off the tanker. A rain squall moved in and, once
again, it was difficult for him to see.
A shape appeared up ahead, on the move, so he tracked it
for a while before determining it was an escort ship. He
turned back in and found the destroyer still stopped near the
tanker. Four torpedoes were fired for hits and the destroyer
was blown apart. Again, a hard depth charging followed, lasting 29 minutes. The Flasher surfaced later to see the tanker
now burning from end to end and sure to sink. It had been totally abandoned, so the captain cleared the area.
Several frustrating weeks followed this fast start. The
Flasher was plagued by patrol planes and high seas, and no
more attacks were made until 22 December.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Spirits were starting to droop on 22 December until the early
morning radar operator reported that what he thought were
the Tortuga Islands now appeared to be underway!
The "Tortugas" turned out to be a convoy spotted the day
before but beyond attack. The tracking party went to work,
and the sub worked ahead of the convoy. A destroyer remained in perfect position between the sub and the nearest
ship, and several other escorts were seen, all to the seaward
side of the convoy. Realizing the best opportunity for attack
194
5th Patrol
was from the shore side, Commander Grider moved his boat
into position. The convoy seemed to be composed of three
large tankers.
At 0446, he moved in and fired three torpedoes at each of
the first two tankers, range 2500 yards. A hard swing to the
right brought the stern tubes around. Each of the first two
tankers took two hits. Four stern shots were fired at the third
tanker. Just after firing, the second tanker blew up, illuminating the area like a "night football game." The third tanker exploded immediately when hit, making visibility even better.
Flames from the second and third tankers flowed together
to make a very impressive fire. Hoping to avoid a depth
charge attack in such shallow water, Captain Grider moved off
at flank speed plus. A few minutes later, the first ship blew up
and added to the floating inferno. All hands had a chance to
come topside to view the string of burning tankers. Later the
crew heard explosions as all three tankers were swallowed by
the flames and never seen again. Quite a good days work.
The Flasher avoided several patrol boats and easily made
it back to Australia, arriving on 30 December in fine shape.

This outstanding performance moved Commander Grider and
the Flasher close to the top of the list for best patrol rated by
tonnage sunk. The final official total was six ships for 42,800
tons.
With Silent Service. If you're going to get close to
Grider's total, you'll have to go looking for tankers. To duplicate this patrol, you'll also need to sink two destroyers in the
process. Your goal is six ships, at least two of which must be
destroyers or escorts, and 42,000 tons. Use scenario #2, the
USS Bowfin.
With Up Periscope! Tankers and destroyers are the order
of the day. For once, the tonnage total of 42,000 tons may be
at least a little difficult to reach. Your goal for this patrol is six
ships, at least two of which must be destroyers, and 42,000
tons. Use scenario #3, the USS Tang. Choose the Southern
Theater from the Big Chart.
195
Chapter 35. USS Flasher
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36
USS Tirante
1st Patrol
The USS Tirante departed from Pearl Harbor on 3 March 1945
on her first war patrol. Even in 1945, the shipyards in New
London, Connecticut continued to turn out new subs. The new
boat was placed under Lt. Commander G. L. Street III. Serving
as his executive officer was Lt. Commander Edward L. Beach,
who later wrote several classic war novels, including Run Si-
lent, Run Deep.

With a very experienced officer corps, the much younger
crewmen were quickly trained, and on 25 March, they sailed
quietly into Japanese waters.
Torpedo Attack # 1
In the early afternoon on 25 March, a small freighter was seen
on radar just south of the Japanese island of Kyushu. Captain
Street made a submerged approach, and at 1340, three torpedoes were fired. The range was only 1000 yards and the run
was a short one minute ten seconds. The crew was rewarded,
after the short wait, with a tremendous explosion. The freighter had taken one hit and sank by the bow a minute later.
From there, the sub patrolled the area south of Kyushu
and on up through the Tsushima Strait.
Torpedo Attack # 2
While still in the strait, another ship was sighted as a possible
target. The source of smoke turned out to be another small
freighter. Street made his approach from the land side of the
ship, and at a range of only 900 yards, he launched three torpedoes. The spread was one for the bow, one for the stern and
one MOT (Middle Of Target). One hit was recorded in the
MOT, and the ship sank instantly. The captain noted proudly
that the torpedo which hit was donated to the U.S . Navy by
197
Chapter 36. USS Tirante
the workers at the Westinghouse MK 18 torpedo factory in

Sharon, Pennsylvania. Their efforts were certainly rewarded.
Several local small sub hunters responded with a short
salvo of depth charges, but none were close. The Tirante headed out of the area to let things cool off.
Gun Attack # 1
Tirante spent a day or so on lifeguard duty for U.S. bombers
attacking Kyushu. A small intercoastal ship appeared, and
since it was unescorted, Captain Street decided it was a fitting
gun target. Street ordered a battle surface gun, and they headed up. Several well-placed rounds brought the ship to a halt,
and several more set it ablaze. The Tirante moved in close to
take possible POWs, when a Japanese plane suddenly appeared, forcing the boat to retire submerged.
The Tirante was still looking for targets on 6 April, just
south of the Korean peninsula. No matter where it went, all
the crew could find were fishing boats. Street figured the fishermen must know the area well, so he decided to surface and
take several prisoners. The Tirante surfaced next to a very
frightened group of Korean fishermen-but as it turned out,
the fishermen were more frightened of being drafted for military service by the Japanese than being captured by the
Americans.
Torpedo Attack # 3
Still just south of Korea on 7 April, Street ordered a submerged approach on a brand new 2800-ton freighter. The
closeness of the islands in the area wouldn't allow him to
make long-range shots.
As the target approached 600 yards, two torpedoes were
sent its way. Both hit, and the rush was on in the conning
tower. The captain wanted good pictures of the sinking ship,
but by the time they got the camera out, the freighter was already on its way to the bottom.
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1st Patrol
Torpedo Attack #4
After another day of dodging fishing nets, the watch spotted
an escorted two-ship convoy on the horizon. In order to get a
good radar fix, Street had to expose four feet of periscope. The
captain commented that showing that much scope in such
glassy seas with escorts all about made them feel like "Lady
Godiva in the marketplace!" A close inspection showed the
two ships to be a transport and a freighter, both of good size.
The Tirante managed to close the range, and Street kept his
bow pointed at the escorts to reduce the chance of being
picked up on sonar.
Finally, at a range of 1600 yards, he fired three shots at
the transport and got good bearings on the freighter. Another
quick set of calculations was made and checked, and then
three more fish were fired at the freighter. The first two shots
hit the transport. She was sinking quickly when the third blew
off her bow.
The freighter apparently managed to react in time to
avoid the torpedoes. The Tirante went to the bottom (200 feet)
and received a good going-over by the three escorts-she was
really boxed in. The escorts took turns, with one pinging and
listening and the others dropping charges. Finally, they managed to break contact and get away with only a bent propeller.
In all, 83 charges were dropped.
Torpedo Attack # 5
Street headed south to Quelpart Island, looking for bigger
game. About midnight on 14 April, he approached the island
from the north. Three hours of surface investigation showed
nothing for certain in the harbor area.
Growing impatient, Street said "let's get this over," and
headed into the harbor area. Now, for the first time, the crew
could make out ships, and Street put the tracking team to
work. All the targets were stopped, so all the tracking team
had to do was get the bearings and correct for the current. A
test shot was fired to judge the current; it missed just to the
right of the largest target.
They corrected their aim to take the current into account
and fired a second and third shot. Both hit with a tremendous
199
Chapter 36. USS Tirante
explosion. "A great mushroom of white blinding flame shot

2000 feet into the air." They had hit the jackpot-a munitions
ship.
With the bright fire burning, the Tirante stood out like a
"snowman in a coal mine," so Street ordered full rudder and
all ahead flank, but when two freighters came into view, he
quickly belayed the order. Two torpedoes were fired at the
first and one at the second. The first went up in a ball of fire
and the second quietly sank in great cloud of smoke. "Now
let's really get out of here," the captain ordered.
With only one torpedo left, Street received the order to return to Midway for a refit. On the way, the Tirante came
across a downed Japanese "Zeke" floating upside down with
its crew perched on top. Street attempted to get them to come
aboard and even brought up the Korean prisoners to try and
convince them, but they would have none of it. Abruptly, the
Japanese tossed off their life jackets, jumped into the water,
and started to swim away from the sub. When one drowned,
that convinced the other two, and they finally decided to take
the invitation to be POWs on the Tirante. Lt. Commander
Beach was given the honor of sinking the plane singlehandedly, which he accomplished with a few rifle shots.
The Tirante was initially credited with sinking eight ships
for a total of 30,445 tons. Investigations after the war reduced
that number to six ships and only 13,000 tons. As the war
drew to an end, targets were becoming harder and harder to
come by, so either way, it was a great patrol. Lt. Commander
Street was one of only eight sub commanders to sink more
than five ships in one patrol.

With Silent Service. To beat Commander Street, you'll
need to sink at least six ships, and one must be sunk with the
deck gun. Use scenario #5, the Spadefish 2nd patrol.
With Up Periscope! Your goal should be to sink at least

six ships, and your tonnage should be well over 13,000. Use
scenario #2, the Wahoo's 6th patrol. Check out the small island
just south of Korea-Quelpart Island-for good convoy action.
Use the Northern Theater on the Big Chart.
200
1st Patrol
CHINA
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37
USS Sea Dog

4th Patrol
Figure 371. The USS Sea Dag
Commanding the three-ship wolf pack in which the Spadefish

had so much success was Commander Earl T. Hydeman in the
USS Sea Dog. The Sea Dog also had a good run in the Sea of
Japan .
On 27 May 1945, the Sea Dog, along with the Spadefish
and the Crevalle, left Guam and pointed their bows toward the
Tsushima Strait. After successfully negotiating the minefield,
each boat headed toward its assigned area.
Torpedo Attack # 1
At 2000, on 9 June, as the Sea Dog was preparing to surface
between Sado Shima and Honshu, sonar reported incoming
screws. A look through the periscope revealed a 1186-ton
freighter following a steady course, with its running lights on.
202
4th Patrol
One torpedo fired from short range made quick work of the
ship. The Sea Dog surfaced several minutes later amid the lifeboats, and when the lookouts took their posts, another ship
was spotted.
Torpedo Attack # 2
A quick submerged approach put Captain Hydeman in good
firing position. One bow shot was fired and hit. The target reversed course in a cloud of smoke and tried to head away
from the sub. A second torpedo hit just forward of amidships.
With a huge explosion, the ship broke in two. The bow and
stern each sank separately.
Torpedo Attack #3
Shortly after noon on 11 June, another small freighter steamed
into view just south of Oga Hanto. Captain Hydeman tried a
submerged approach but couldn't close. The weather came to
his aid as a thick fog hung close to the water. Using the fog as
cover, he surfaced and sped ahead of the target and then submerged and waited.
When the target finally came into view, one torpedo
broke her in two. The freighter sank within a minute.
Torpedo Attack #4
The next day, smoke curls were seen to the north of Nyudo
Saki. The Sea Dog submerged and approached at high speed.
Four ships in a rough box formation were just rounding the
point.
With the ships rapidly heading for shallow water, the captain had to settle for a long-range shot. Three fish were fired
from 3200 yards. Only one hit, but it broke the target's back
and sent it to the bottom. The rest of the convoy hurried to
the safety of the shallows. Captain Hydeman broke off the approach and headed for deeper water.
Torpedo Attack # 5
On 15 June, the watch spotted yet another small freighter.
This time, Captain Hydeman took a position close to the shore
to prevent the target from making a dash to shallow water.
203
Chapter 37. USS Sea Dog
One torpedo fired from 1000 yards was all it took to sink the
freighter.
Captain Hydeman next set a course up the coast for Oga
Hanto as small boats set out from shore to pick up the
survivors.
Torpedo Attack # 6
Hydeman probably made his only mistake of the patrol during
this sixth attack. As the sub was lying in wait close to shore
on 19 June, the watch sighted an unescorted four-ship convoy
heading right for the Sea Dog.
The range closed rapidly as the Sea Dog turned to bring
the more numerous bow tubes to bear. Two shots were fired
at the lead ship and three at the second ship, but due to the
short torpedo run, the first ship was hit before the second
group of torpedoes were on their way. By the time they could
be fired, the ships had changed course and all of the second
volley missed.
The first ship sank as a plane approached, and Captain
Hydeman considered leaving the area. The sinking ship, however, blocked his way forward. He ordered the, sub to 150 feet
and tried to turn away toward the beach, but quickly found
himself in embarrassingly shallow water.
He grounded her lightly at 116 feet, an incident that won
the Sea Dog unofficial credit for the first landing and invasion
of the Japanese homeland! The captain was finally forced to
back out of the area, a feat performed with admirable depth
control by switching the bow and stern plane operators.
In accordance with the plan, Hydeman assembled his
group at the north end of the sea off the La Perouse Strait on
22 June. On the night of 24 June, the wolf pack made a highspeed surface run through the strait in cotton-thick fog. Once
safely through the straits, they set a course for Pearl Harbor.
The triumphant subs arrived on the Fourth of July with the
colors flying.
One tragedy marred the return, however. The USS Bonefish didn't return. She was the last Pacific Fleet sub lost in
the war.
204
4th Patrol

This patrol is a good example of the wise use of torpedoes.
Many of the attacks were made with only one shot.
Hydeman was officially credited with sinking six ships
and a rather disappointing tonnage of less than 10,000 tons.
With Silent Service. You must sink at least six ships to

beat Commander Hydeman; the tonnage total shouldn't be a
problem. Use scenario #l, the Tang's 1st patrol.
With Up Periscope! You should strive for a total of six
ships sunk-your tonnage will probably be about ten times
that of Commander Hydeman. Use scenario #5, the Tang's 6th
patrol. Use the Northern Theater Big Chart.
205
Chapter 37. USS Sea Dog
CHINA
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""
38
USS Tang
1st Patrol
Figure 38 1. The USS Tang
The mark of a truly great submarine commander is not a single patrol, but a consistent string of successful outings. One
such commander was Dick O'Kane of the USS Tang. O'Kane
was arguably the hottest sub skipper of the war.
He first served as "Mush" Morton's executive officer and
right-hand man on the USS Wahoo, during which time he received a complete education in approach-and-attack tactics
from Morton. They used a unique system in which O'Kane
would make all of the periscope observations during the approach and attack, leaving Morton free to plan and con the
boat to the best attack position. When O'Kane received his
own command on the Tang, there was probably no one better
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Chapter 38. USS Tang
at calling angle-on-the-bow, range, and speed through the

scope as shown by his high percentage of hits.
The Tang only went out on five war patrols. One of
these-the second-was strictly a rescue mission in which the
crew pulled 22 downed Navy aviators out of the water. On
the other four patrols, from January 1944 to October 1944, the
Tang scored an amazing total of 24 ships sunk for a career total of 93,824 tons .
Your final goal is to put together four outstanding patrols
in a row to try to beat O'Kane's career totals. What follows is
a detailed account of the attacks made by Tang, much of
which was taken directly from O'Kane's patrol reports to his
superiors.
Torpedo Attack # 1
Rigorous training was conducted during much of the transit to
the assigned patrol area near Truk Island, and after being released from lifeguard duty on 7 February, the Tang began to
patrol in earnest.
She patrolled on the surface whenever possible, and
when submerged, a constant watch was kept on the scope in
hope of sighting enemy ships. O'Kane was granted his wish
early on the morning of 17 February.
At 0025 that morning, the watch sighted a convoy on the
SJ (surface radar) bearing 305T at a distance of 31,000 yards. It
was tracked at 81/2 knots on base course 100 degrees, directly
into the rising half moon, and zigging 40 degrees every 10 to
14 minutes. As viewed on the radar, excluding side lobes, the
convoy was composed of two large ships, a somewhat smaller
one believed to be a destroyer, a small escort close ahead,
two more escorts on either beam, and two more wide-flanking
patrols.
At 0219, when nearly ahead, with range to convoy
15,000 yards, the starboard flanking escort suddenly
appeared at 7000 yards, closing at four knots . We were
forced down, deep, and given five depth charges, but
his attack was halfhearted and we were able to return
to radar depth 15 minutes after he passed by. The con208
1st Patrol
voy was still 9000 yards away and coming on nicely.

Our approach from here was quite routine, except for
additional depth charges and patrolling escorts. Went
back to periscope depth at 4000 yards, watched leading
escort cross conveniently to the opposite bow, the port
escort crossing our bow ... at 0335 fired a spread of
four straight stern shots at near [freighter], range 1500
yards, 80 port track, speed 81/2. The first three hit their
points of aim in the screws, and the after and forward
ends of the midship superstructure. Watched the
freighter sinking by the stern amidst milling escorts.
She was a split superstructure freighter with details
similar to the Mansei Maru, low in the water with
bulky deck load.
When she sank, we went to our favorite depth below the 375-foot gradient and cleared the area. Some
additional depth charging followed, but none close,
and we were able to search with the radar and surface
at 0500.
When the Tang was able to surface, Captain O'Kane again
tracked the convoy and tried to close submerged, but couldn't
achieve a suitable firing range. Bombers were a continual
problem over the next several days, and if that weren't
enough, rain squalls affected the radar, making it necessary to
establish visual identification. Often the contacts turned out to
be patrol ships and not freighters.
Torpedo Attack # 2
On 22 February:
Following two such approaches on patrols, [we]
found a Kenya Maru-type [freighter] with escorts on
starboard and bow quarter. After tracking this freighter
zigging on course 225T for another half hour, we
moved into position on his port bow, 4000 yards from
the nearest escort. An unpredicted zig required a
"dipsy-doodle" to maintain an ideal firing position, but
he came on nicely, and at 2349, with a range of 1500,
90 port track, and Tang dead in the water and holding
209
her breath, [we] let him have four torpedoes, spread his
length from aft forward by constant TBT bearings. The
enemy literally disintegrated under four hits and sank
before we had completed 90 degrees of our turn to
evade. One escort guessed right and closed at 3000
yards, but these boats always seem to find a couple of
extra knots for such occasions, and we made a sand
blower out of him.
Torpedo Attack # 3
We still had difficulty in identifying the enemy on
radar, and our next approach, in spite of sound, developed into a destroyer at 3500 yards with Tang backing
down 1200 yards off her track. Both sea and visibility
prevented anything but a defensive attack, so we
pulled clear with minimum range 2900 yards. There
followed one more approach, a bit more cautious, on
what appeared to be a submarine, before we located
what apparently was a naval auxiliary, definitely of the
Arimasan Maru class. As her leading escort conveniently moved out to 8000 yards, we moved into position
on her port bow, stopped, and kept pointed at her with
another nice rain squall for a background. As she came
on, her guns were plainly visible forward, then aft. At
0120, with range 1400, 90 port track, and gyros around
zero, [we] let her have four torpedoes, spread her
length from aft forward. The first two were beautiful
hits in her stern and just aft of the stack, but the detonation as the third torpedo hit forward of his bridge
was terrific. The enemy ship was twisted, lifted from
the water as you would flip a spoon on end, and then
commenced belching flame as she sank. The Tang was
shaken far worse than by any depth charge we could
remember, but a quick check as soon as our jaws came
off our chests, showed no damage.
As is usually the case when you hit first, the escorts were befuddled and evasion was simplified.
210
1st Patrol
Torpedo Attack #4
Patrolled on the surface, 150 miles west of Saipan,
searching with high periscope and radar. At 1109,
sighted smoke bearing 015T and immediately picked
up two targets on the SJ at 23,000 and 24,000 yards.
With clearing horizon, the enemy was shortly identified as a freighter, a large tanker, and a destroyer.
Tracking showed them on course 270, opened to maximum radar range to track.
Contact was suddenly lost but a half-hour run at
full power toward their last true bearing located them
again, this time on base course 165T. Gathering rain
squalls made it apparent that we would do well to
maintain contact with the enemy during the remainder
of the day, and that the only possibility of destroying
both ships lay in night, or night and dawn attacks.
At sunset, the destroyer came into a clear spot,
sent several signals on a large searchlight to his convoy, lined them up with the tanker astern, and started
off on a course west. The enemy zigs were of the wildest sort, sometimes actually backtracking, but their very
wildness was his undoing, for after two hours of tacking, and two more [hours] of approaches on their quarters, with outer doors open for firing on four different
occasions, the freighter, a Tatutki Maru-class ship,
made one of his super right zigs across our bow. At
2230, when the range was 1400, 95 starboard, gyros
around zero, we cold-cocked him with the first three of
our usual four torpedoes spread along his length by
constant TBT bearings. The ship went to pieces and
amidst beautiful fireworks sank before we had completed our turn to evade. The tanker opened fire fore
and aft immediately, while the destroyer nearly 3000
yards away, closed [on] the scene rapidly. After helping
out any possible survivors with 12 depth charges, she
rejoined the tanker.
The destroyer stayed so close to the tanker that for
several hours we could distinguish only one ship on radar most of the time. They continued on the same base
211
course but settled down to moderate zigs. Before dawn

we were in a position 10,000 yards ahead and 80 miles
west of Saipan. Only a change of base course could
prevent our attack.
Torpedo Attack # 5
At 0548, with gray skies in the east, submerged to
radar depth, took a last look at range 7000 yards, then
started a submerged approach. Eighteen minutes later
the tanker was in sight with an Asashio-type destroyer
patrolling very close ahead. As we were then 1200
yards from the track, [we] turned and paralleled his
base course. At range 2000 yards, the destroyer gave us
some bad moments by crossing our bow for the second
time, pointing directly at our position. But in an attempt to prevent a repetition of his mistake of the
night before, he turned right, passed down the tanker's
starboard side to that quarter. He was absolutely
dwarfed by the length of the loaded tanker, whose details were now plainly visible. She was painted slate
gray, comparable only to our Cimarron class, but with
bridge and foremast well forward, just behind the bulging bow, which mounted an estimated six-inch gun.
Her mainmast was close against her after superstructure which was topped by an extremely large short
stack. There were at least 150 uniformed lookouts on
our side alone.
A 20-degree zig put us a little close to the track,
but as we had already commenced our turn away for a
stern shot, we were far from inconvenienced. At 0639,
with escort just crossing tanker's stern to the far side,
[we] fired four torpedoes, range 500 yards, 90 starboard
track, gyros around 180 degrees. The first three hit as
aimed, directly under the stack, at the forward end of
the after superstructure, and under the bridge. The explosions were wonderful; he sank by the stern in four
minutes, and then we went deep and avoided.
With four forward torpedoes left, [we] proceeded
towards the lower Bonins, our new patrol area.
212
1st Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 6
Patrolled on the surface 180 miles northwest of
Saipan, sighted smoke which quickly developed into a
four-ship convoy. Tracked them on course 160 until
after dark, identifying one as a two-stacker. Remained
outside 10,000 yards until after moonset, when radar
tracking showed them to be worm-turning on a base
course east. Found the two-stacker shortly, astern of
the leading freighter and just ahead of a small unidentified vessel.
Escorts on either bow of the leading freighter offered no [opportunity to close] the two-stacker from the
flank. She was now tracked on a straight 090 . A column zig brought the leading freighter across our port
bow, so [we] twisted left, steadied, and fired our usual
spread of four torpedoes covering the entire length of
the two-stacker as he came by, range 1600, gyros near
zero, 100 starboard track. All torpedoes, even the one
fired at his bow, missed astern as we failed to detect
his increasing speed. Had little difficulty evading
escorts.
Though disappointed not to destroy this passenger
ship, the Horai Maru, there is no use in crying over
spilt milk. The Tang is far from cocky and just as determined as ever.
En route Midway.
The Tang, and O'Kane were officially credited with sinking five ships for a total of 21,400 tons during this maiden
patrol.
213
figure 382. Patrol Route Map
4
000
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39
USS Tang
3rd Patrol
As mentioned, the Tang's second patrol was strictly a
lifeguard/rescue operation. She performed in outstanding
fashion, picking up 22 downed aviators while often in gun
range of the shore. The best was yet to come, however; her
3rd patrol would go down in submarine history.
She departed Midway for the South China Sea on 12 June
1944 at two-engine speed. On 22 June, she made a submerged
passage of the Colnett Strait, just to the south of the Japanese
mainland. At 2145 on 25 June, the radar man picked up a
large convoy and the Tang commenced tracking.
2227: We were in what at first appeared to be a
fortunate position on the convoy's port bow, with a
three-day-old moon about to set, but as numerous bow
and flanking escorts appeared on the radar screen, it
became evident that undetected penetration from the
flank would be nearly impossible.
The composition of the convoy, which had been
confused by numerous escorts and side lobes, was now
clarified with visual sightings. There were at least six
large ships, in column sections of two, surrounded by
two circular screens of at least six escorts each, and as
we later discovered, each section was further escorted
ahead and astern.
Torpedo Attack # 1
As the quarter escorts were well dispersed, [we]
elected to approach from the stern. We passed between
them without difficulty, diverged to starboard and
avoided a third patrol, and gained a position 2300
yards on the starboard beam of the last section.
215
The leading ship was a large modern four-mast

freighter with high composite superstructure topped by
a large short stack, believed to be of the Aobasan Maru
class. The second ship was a modern tanker with a
large short funnel, similar to the Genyo Maru or
Kyoktuto Maru. Both ships were heavily loaded and
most probably diesel driven as they did not smoke.
2349: The convoy had settled on a course north at
ten knots when we stopped, turned left for straight
shots, and fired three torpedoes at the freighter, 120
starboard track, range 2600, spread by his length, followed immediately by a similar spread at the tanker,
100 starboard track, range 2450. All gyros were between 12 and 2 right. Observed two beautiful hits in
the stern and amidships of the freighter, timed as our
first and third torpedoes. The second was observed to
run erratically to the left. The explosions appeared to
blow the ship's sides out, and he commenced sinking
rapidly. On schedule, our fourth and fifth torpedoes hit
under the stack and just forward of the after superstructure of the tanker. His whole after end blazed up
until extinguished as he went down by the stern.
0000: We now had evaded the closest escort at
1400 yards apparently unobserved, so pulled up 7000
yards from the convoy and 5000 yards from where our
targets would have been. Their pips had gradually disappeared from the radar screen however, and only a
cloud of smoke marked the spot where they sank.
Torpedo Attack # 2
0020: Started in for another attack. Our approach
was spurned by an escort that closed to 1500 yards as
we passed the vicinity of the first attack, but unable to
see us in the haze of a slight [engine] overload, commenced dropping terrific depth charges. He succeeded
in calling out the dogs however, and our target, which
was first tracked at 10 knots, showed stopped, then a
216
3rd Patrol
range rate of better than 40 knots closing! We had just

time to complete a 90-degree turn when he passed
1600 yards astern, a modern-looking destroyer. He
spotted us, closed for a minute, but our team of overload experts, watching their temperatures, got us rolling at 221/2 knots. Easing off each time he showed a
slight angle, we eventually opened to 3400 yards when
he illuminated. Hoping to take advantage of the experience of others, we dived a little faster than a rock.
Though his searchlight illuminated the bridge diving
alarm for our CO, he still did not spot us, and passed
well clear.
0200: Now with time to consider, [we] believed the
Nagasaki area would be very unhealthy at dawn, two
hours hence, so [we] surfaced and rounded the Koshiki
Islands where we could guard the southern approaches
to the straits.
Torpedo Attack # 3
On 26 June:
04224: Shortly after crack of dawn [we] sighted a
ship on the SJ [surface radar] at 8000 yards. We were
already on his beam but fog and rain permitted a fullpower end-around with only occasional glimpses of the
enemy. He was a medium-sized, split superstructure
freighter, similar to Ehime Maru, tracked at 18 knots
hugging the coast. With the freighter obscured by rain,
dived 1000 yards off his track, range 7000 yards.
0551: Turned right for a stern shot as the freighter
came out of the rain and fired four MK 18 torpedoes,
range 1950, 100 starboard track, gyros near 180. The
torpedoes were set on six feet as the sea was calm and
the loading of the freighter could not be ascertained
beforehand. Though we had a zero angle on the boat,
two of the torpedoes broached several times, then settled down on a surface run, throwing continuous
plumes in the air. Needless to say, the freighter avoid217
ed the spread by turning toward. After some gunfire,

the freighter took refuge in a cove; we surfaced and
made a full power dash to the west, unsighted by a
late-arriving patrol boat.
Torpedo Attack #4
On 29 June:
1140: Sighted a freighter to the north on a westerly
course. Commenced approach but it soon became apparent that we could not reach an attack position submerged. We therefore opened the range on a diverging
course, surfaced, and commenced an end-around, bucking heavy seas. Reduced visibility permitted passing
the ship with only occasional glimpses at 15,000 yards.
1600: Having tracked the enemy on course 225 at
seven knots, dived directly on his track for periscope
attack. The freighter came on nicely, identified as the
Tanzan Maru, her mast had been cut off level with the
top of the stack, but all other details were as shown.
He was lightly loaded but in view of our experience of
27 June, decided that ten feet was the absolute minimum depth setting for this sea. After two "dipsy doodles" to adjust position, bearings checked.
1759: Fired two MK 14 torpedoes, one at his foremast and one at his mainmast, 90-degree port track,
range 1250 yards, speed 7. Raised periscope again to
see the smoke of each torpedo as it [reached its] point
of aim, but they apparently passed under.
The enemy turned toward and gave us two close
depth charges shortly after we reached two hundred
feet, 50 feet off the bottom. Fifteen minutes later, as we
were approaching periscope depth, a loud crackling
noise came over sound followed by a third fairly close
charge.
218
3rd Patrol
1910: We went back down, but searched and surfaced 15 minutes later with nothing in sight. This
points to the possibility that this last was a delayedaction depth charge used in this shallow water for the
purpose of keeping a submarine down while the ship
escapes.
2030: It didn't work in this case, however, for we
made radar contact in a little over an hour and commenced tracking again. We closed sufficiently to identify him and then turned the tracking over to the section
on watch with the plan to attack after moonset in the
lee of the Daikokusan Gunto (island).
Torpedo Attack # 5
On 30 June:
The freighter was a little out in his navigation;
however, his track crossed 15 miles north of the islands. As firing in the lee was not possible and the seas
rougher still, [we were] determined to attack from a
range to insure hits even with broaching torpedoes.
0040: Commenced approach from his starboard
bow, directly down wind and sea, stopped with a
range 1500 yards, angle on the bow 40 starboard.
0101: Killed headway as he came on, and fired an
MK 14 "feeler" torpedo set on six feet from number 5
tube, range 750 yards, 92 starboard track, 6-degree left
gyro angle, speed nine knots. In spite of heavy seas, it
ran perfectly, its phosphorescent track visible among
the white caps right to the freighter's side. The explosion amidships, just 30 seconds after firing, was as
beautiful as it was reassuring.
It broke the freighter's back, his stern sinking with
a down angle, his forward section with an up, in a
cloud of fire smoke and steam.
219
His gun crew had guts, however, and got off five
or six shots in spite of the tilting platform. When they
had ceased firing, we relieved about 20 lookouts in
rapid succession, and today our crew is discussing single- versus multiple-torpedo fire. We'll continue to fire
as many as considered necessary to sink the enemy.
0130: Proceeded north for submerged patrol after
daylight.
Torpedo Attack # 6
1015: Commenced tracking smoke which quickly
developed into two columns, and then the masts of
two ships. One ship was zigging at intervals of 3 to 12
minutes, while the other's movements indicated an escort. After gaining position ahead and tracking these
ships on base course 260 at eight knots, [we] dived for
periscope approach and attack.
1322: As the group came on, maneuvered for an
MK 18 stern shot at the escort who was about 1500
yards on the freighter's starboard bow. This placed us
directly ahead of the freighter and .insured a stern shot
at him if the escort was not hit. The escort was now
identified as small engine-aft freighter with gun forward and depth charges aft. As TDC bearings were
lagging, took several echo ranges and found his speed
had increased to ten knots.
1444: Now, with the setup checking, fired two MK

18 torpedoes, one under his foremast, the other under
his stack, 100 port track, range 1250, depth setting six
feet, then went ahead standard speed to gain position
on the freighter.
As the moments dragged out and time for the torpedoes to hit apparently passed, [we] expressed some
quiet oaths about electric torpedoes, only to have the
words jammed down our throats by a swell explosion.
Slowed and looked to see the escort's stern in the air in
220
3rd Patrol
a cloud of smoke, and the freighter turning back. At

least a half-dozen persons observed this ship sink,
timed in two minutes and 20 seconds.
Torpedo Attack # 7
We now felt that we had the freighter caught between third base and home, for he was nearly 100
miles from the Korean coast and his track led through
the probable position of both the USS Sea Lion and the
USS Tinosa. Sent them contact report on next hourly
schedule and continued trailing submerged at five
knots.
1916: With smoke still in sight, surfaced at dusk
and commenced overtaking at full power on three engines, charging [batteries] with the other. After radar
contact with the enemy had been gained, it became apparent that we would have to pass him up moon south
of Ko To, but with full power on four engines, we were
waiting for him with two minutes to spare as he approached the southern tip of the island.
2224: Dived a mile and a half off the island, 1200

yards north of the track of the enemy who was now
6000 yards away. He slowed from 11 to 9 knots as he
passed the southern tip, but with three echo ranges
and periscope bearings, the setup was checking again
and we commenced our turn for a straight bow shot.
With range 500, 90-degree port track, gyros near zero,
fired two MK 14 torpedoes by constant bearings, the
first at the middle of his after well deck, the second at
the middle of his forward one. The first torpedo hit as
aimed in 20 seconds, exploding the ship's cargo which
must have been munitions of some sort. A short section of the bow was all that remained intact of the
whole ship, and it sank in 20 seconds. The second torpedo was "robbed."
221
Torpedo Attack
#a
On 4 July:
0408: As the sky was overcast at dawn, [we] continued on the surface, and shortly sighted heavy masts
of a ship to the northeast.
[We] stopped, put him astern, and determined his
approximate southerly course, and commenced full
power dash to get on his track. We were a bit hampered by 15 trawlers or fishermen, but with the enemy's bridge and stack aft already over the horizon, it
was their presence that prevented our detection.
0506: With angle on the bow five starboard, [we]
dived and continued our approach. The massiveness of
the ship as it closed resembled a man-of-war, and 20
minutes later a wide zig gave us our first good identification look. Her hull and arrangement were similar to
Kurosio Maru, with modifications. During the next
hour, we were abaft of his beam as he closed the tenfathom curve, zigging leisurely. On our straight course
at full speed we closed the range continuously however, and though on most observations with angles on
the bow up to 150 degrees the situation looked hopeless, he finally reached the nine-fathom finger west of
Arna To and came back to a southerly course. Our fathometer, which had been allowing four fathoms under
our keel, now in quick succession showed three, two,
then merged with the outgoing signal.
0626: So we backed down and fired three MK 14
torpedoes at stack, amidships, and forward, by constant
bearings, range 2600, 90 starboard track, speed 8,
depth setting eight feet. Turned left with full speed and
rudder, and heard healthy hits timed as our first and
second torpedoes. We slowed and looked to see only
the bow, stern, and mast sticking out of the water under a huge cloud of smoke.
222
3rd Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 9
1840: Having passed Osei To, [we] sighted smoke
beyond the Oiyono group of islands, tracked on a
southerly course. While figuring out where and how
we could get him under a full moon in more than ten
fathoms, our problem was solved by a faint wisp of
smoke to the west.
[We] switched approach to this and closed at
standard speed submerged until clear of Osei To.
1953: Then surfaced in late twilight, but under a
full moon. Twenty minutes later he was sighted on the
radar at 18,500 yards. We were in a fortunate position
ahead and only had to move on to his base course of
110 which led to Osei To. His long silhouette was visible at 15,000 yards, so [we] tracked from that range,
determining his moderate zigs of 20 to 30 degrees at
five to ten minute intervals.
2041: Dived and tracked enemy by radar to 9000
yards, then commenced moonlight periscope attack.
As he came on, his silhouette developed into a
long engines-aft ship with raked bow, and with tripod
mast and king posts forward and aft. Distinctive also
was his mushroom-topped bridge structure.
2128: After closing the left zig at standard speed,
checked set up with several echo ranges, and fired last
two bow torpedoes, range 900 yards, 90-degree starboard track, gyros near zero, depth setting eight feet.
The first torpedo hit just aft of the bridge, breaking the
ship's back. The tripod foremast could be seen through
the smoke, and debris tilting aft as she sank by the
middle . Let crew hear the breaking-up noises by the
sound-IMC method, then surfaced to pick up a survivor. It was necessary to snake one of the large overturned lifeboats alongside with grapples, and threaten
with tommy gun bursts the one visible survivor to
[convince him to] come on aboard. Recovering a life
ring was much easier.
223
Both the new life boats and life ring, and visual
observation of the vessel before firing show this to
have been a new ship.
Torpedo Attack # 1o
On 5 July:
2257: When eight miles west of Choppeki Point,
after having tracked one side lobe, and investigated
several second pulse echoes, [we] sighted a ship on the
SJ at 29,000 yards. Stopped and tracked it out to
32,000 on a northwesterly course at nine knots, then
commenced a grueling end-around. Under a full moon
on a rippleless sea, the ship was visible at 20,000
yards, so to assure an unalerted enemy for our last two
torpedoes, passed him outside of 15,000.
0227: Stopped on his track seven miles ahead for
final speed and course check, then dived on a parallel

course for a submerged attack. Checked the setup by
radar observation at 5000 yards when the freighter was
temporarily lost in the surface haze, and immediately
experienced hopelessly fogging periscopes. The setup
checked perfectly, however, showing us 500 yards off
the track, so returned to 60 feet to wet the scopes. He
was clear and big on the next observation at 1100
yards by echo range.
0320: So turned for the stern shot. Fired two MK
18 torpedoes, one at his mainmast, one at his foremast,
range 900 yards, 90-degree starboard track, depth setting six feet. Both torpedoes hit exactly as aimed, and
there was only broken wreckage and floating life boats
in sight when we surfaced two minutes later.
0325: As two pips at 16,000 yards were closing,
perhaps belated escorts, and sky already pink, commenced full power run to south. Dived 50 miles from
attack.
224
3rd Patrol
At noon, on 14 July, the Tang arrived back at Midway

Island.
The USS Tang and Commander O'Kane were eventually
credited with sinking ten ships on this patrol, although he initially claimed only eight. The official tonnage mark was
39,100 tons. This patrol was tops for the war in number of
ships sunk, and only topped by three others in the most tonnage sunk on a single patrol. The three skippers that beat
O'Kane sank far fewer ships but were each fortunate enough
to score one really large hit.
Based on this performance, Richard O'Kane can lay claim
to the title of the war's best sub commander, but he was by no
means finished.
225
4
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USS Tang
4th Patrol
O'Kane said the refit received at Midway from SubDiv 62 and
Submarine Base Midway was the finest to date, and by 31
July, he was underway again to patrol Empire waters.
Torpedo Attack # 1
On 10 August:
1010: Having avoided another patrol by continuing
in, [we] sighted an old-type loaded tanker against the
beach, headed for Omai Saki (off the southeastern
shore of Japan). As four bombers were the only escorts,
took sounding to find we were still in 40 fathoms. A
standard speed approach closed him to 1200 yards
where with echo and stadimeter ranges checking, fired
three MK 23 torpedoes spread on his length, 100 starboard track, speed 8.5, set at eight feet, gyros near
zero. No hits, or explosions on the beach three thousand yards away, resulted. Two minutes after firing the
tanker, alerted, reversed course away, so commenced
evasion, thoroughly expecting bombs or aerial depth
charges. We rolled on the bottom a little at 80 feet during our turn to evade, but reached deep water and
commenced periscope patrol in another hour.
Torpedo Attack # 2
On 11 August:
0413: Having doubled back Miki Saki, [we] dived
three miles west of the point, then closed to intercept
any morning shipping.
1065: Sighted smoke.
227
1635: Smoke, which had been in two columns, de-
veloped into two freighters in column. They were escorted well to seaward by the gunboat previously
sighted, and by a smaller escort on the other bow. During the remainder of the approach, the leading ship
was identified as of the Biyo Maru class, and the second
about two-thirds her size. Both ships were heavily
loaded.
1740: When in position 1700 yards off the convoy's beam, just prior to giving a final setup, sound reported fast screws on our port quarter. A quick look
showed our gunboat coming in fast a thousand yards
away."
1741: Fired three MK 23 torpedoes at the leading
freighter range 1800, 110 starboard track, depth setting
six feet, spread 150 percent of the target's length, followed by a similar spread at the second freighter on an
80 starboard track. Took a quick low-power sweep to
observe the gunboat filling the field, boiling past our
stern evidently having misjudged our course and giving
the wrong lead. Reassured, [we] swung quickly to the
leading target in time to see the first torpedo hit right
in the middle, evidently in his Scotch boilers, for he
disintegrated with the explosion.
1743: On our way deep, timed our fourth and fifth
torpedoes to hit the second freighter, followed by a
tooth-shaking depth charge attack. The gunboats'
screws on our port side showed his intent to turn us
toward shallow water; [we] made a full speed dash.
Even at this speed, the twisting, scrunching, breakingup noises were loud in the direction of the targets.'
1821: After 22 close ones, the depth charges drew
aft and we were able to return to periscope depth in 38
minutes. The gunboat was now about 4000 yards on
228
4th Patrol
our quarter, the other escort at the scene of the attacks

apparently picking up survivors, and one plane was
circling the area. Nothing else was in sight.
Torpedo Attack # 3
20 August:
0947: Sighted tops and smoke of a freighter coming out of the mist from the north. As the enemy was
still inside the ten-fathom curve, we still had to close
the coast a little and dodge sampans, but his escorts
were well clear on his beam and port bow to seaward.
The freighter was a modem medium-sized aft-engine
ship. With range 900, 123 port track, speed 8, gyros
around 30, [we] fired two MK 23 torpedoes at his stack
and foremast.
The first torpedo evidently missed astern and exploded on the beach, while the second torpedo left the
tube with a clonk but did not run.
We had to take our first eight depth charges at
periscope depth but had gained deep water for the
next 22.
Torpedo Attack #4
21 August:
0855: A large ship and two escorts proceeded eastward, and rounding Shiono Misaki, we closed the next
freighter two hours later. She was a medium-sized new
engine-aft job with escorts well ahead, but with a
3000-yards torpedo run, [we] broke off the attack as a
better shot was practically assured.
1243: [We] sighted smoke, then a medium-sized
freighter coming up the coast unbelievably close to the
beach. Our approach mainly consisted of ducking the
two subchasers and whale killer escorts, and turning
left for a stem shot.
229
1317: At a range of 1650 yards, [we] fired three
MK 18 torpedoes spread 150 percent of the freighter's

length, 110 port track, gyros around 20 left. All torpedoes exploded on the beach.
We were at 200 feet when the first depth charges
came. Our evasion kept everything aft, including latearriving pingers. Checks on the firing bearings with our
MK 18, and plot of the firing showed everything in order. This left only the possibility of deep-running torpedoes to explain our persistent misses, so decided to
keep slugging and continue checking torpedoes.
1916: On surfacing, proceeded clear to probe the
above bay.
Torpedo Attack # 5
On 22 August:
0020: After crossing Miki Saki, slowed, crossed the
100-fathom curve, and proceeded around Kuki Saki.
Side lobes were confusing, but we soon found " a pip
where no pip ought to be." The night was black and
only the long shape of the enemy could be seen until
we circled him to get away from the land background.
There he was quite visible, identified as the gunboat
who had harassed us on our first visit, topping it off
with those "tooth shakers." He tracked at zero speed
and was obviously anchored in about 20 fathoms, two
miles northwest of Kuki Saki. Holding our breath, we
moved slowly to 1200 yards, twisted, then steadied for
a straight stern shot.
0142: Fired one MK 18 torpedo at his middle set
on three feet. The phosphorescent wake petered out
after a hundred yard run with the torpedo evidently
heading down, and hit the bottom with a loud rumble,
timed half way to the enemy, where there should have
been 250 feet of water. It was tracked by sound to this
moment, but after the rumble cleared away, nothing
more was heard.
230
4th Patrol
0144: Fired a second MK 18 torpedo set on three

feet, feeling sure the enemy had been alerted by the
first. Its wake was dimly visible directly to the target,
tracked also by sound, but it passed underneath, apparently running on the deep side too.
0158: With one salvo of three left aft, [we] circled
for a bow shot, and with range 900, fired a MK 23 torpedo from number 5 tube at his middle, set on zero
feet. Though we were stopped and absolutely steady
and the gyro angle zero, it took a 30-yard jog to the
left before settling down towards the target, missing
aft.
0200: Still whispering, though the first two torpedoes must have roared past him, [we] fired a second
MK 23 from number 6 tube, set on zero, aimed at his
gun forward. It took a jog to the left also but settled
down right for his middle. The explosion 40 seconds
later was the most spectacular we've ever seen, topped
by a pillar of fire and more explosions about 500 feet
in the air. There was absolutely nothing left of the
gunboat.
Feeling that our difficulties had been mainly in
sluggish steering and depth engines, [we] withdrew at
full power to spend the day checking afterbodies of our
remaining torpedoes.
1900: Now confident that our last two salvos
would count, [we] headed for Omai Saki and the scene
of our first attack of the patrol.
Torpedo Attack # 6
1017: With a destroyer just clear, the reason for the
activity became apparent with the sighting of masts
and superstructure of a ship coming down the coast.
He was escorted by a destroyer ahead, and escorts on
his bow and astern.
We had been forced out a little by the destroyer,
231
and a high-speed approach was necessary to insure a

sh9rt firing range. It was therefore not until the angle
on the bow opened ten minutes later that the full import of our enemy became apparent. The decks of his
long superstructure were lined with men in white uniforms as was his upper bridge.
1116: Another five -minute dash to close the track,
[we] slowed and took two echo ranges, and fired three
MK 23 torpedoes spread along his length, 105 starboard track, range 800 yards, speed 8, depth setting six
feet. Then commenced swinging for a stern shot at the
rear LSI. The first and third torpedoes hit beautifully
giving him a 20-degree down angle which he maintained as he went under with naval ensign flying.
For once, depth charging the submarine seemed to
take second priority, undoubtedly as survivors were being picked up, for it was 20 minutes before they started
to rain. We had then reached deep water and two
hours at high speed left everything astern.
1907: Following our hit-and-run policy, commenced a full-power dash to round Shiono Misaki for
another crack at the coastal traffic before a waxing
moon made evasion difficult.
On 25 August:
1135: Smoke appeared around Miki Saki. The tops,
now visible, developed into a medium freighter. Guessing that they would continue across, we turned for a
stern shot with our last torpedoes. They [turned) into a
narrow bay however, giving us a 130-degree port track
with a range between 1500 and 2000 yards. Confident
we could do better, and influenced a little by an escort
about to take off our periscope, [we] broke off the
attack.
232
4th Patrol
Torpedo Attack # 7
1715: Two, then three patrols swept the area, followed by a distant high-frequency echo ranging from
down the coast. It grew steadily louder until four escort
vessels were in sight. The coast was obscured by passing rain but soon the enemy ship came in sight, very
close to the beach.
1743: She presented a starboard angle, so [we]
closed on the beach to get on her track before turning
off for a stern shot. On the next observation, we were
on her port bow [and) so came to the reverse of her
course for low-parallax firing.
The enemy was now identified as a modern,
medium-sized diesel tanker, heavily loaded. Her quarter escort dropped astern as she came on; three others
remained fanned out on her starboard bow, while a
fifth ranged ahead. Our navigator was correct when he
tabooed turning for a straight stern shot, for our first
echo range showed 800 yards to the beach.
The second on the enemy, checked with the periscope stadimeter at 600 yards, so using constant bearings, [we] fired the first MK 18 torpedo at his stern, the
second amidships, and the last [one-]third ship length
ahead, right for the middle of the three escorts nearly
in a line-of-bearing on his starboard bow. Though the
depth was six feet and the gyros around 60 degrees,
the first two hit exactly as aimed, and the third just
blew the heck out of the leading escort.
,1808: What was left of the tanker had now sunk
and the stern escort was making a run toward where
his quarter would have been. The enemy obviously
never knew where the torpedoes had come from, and
though his search became systematic with a total of 68
depth charges, our 100-turn evasion outflanked him.
2039: With the moon hidden, [we] surfaced and

cleared the area.
233
On 26 August, the crew "headed for Pearl."

In his report to his commander, O'Kane said they would
have come back with a "fuller bag" had it not been for the
torpedo performance problems. Still, he could claim sinking
five ships for a total of more than 30,000 tons.
The postwar investigation clearly did a disservice to
O'Kane and company. Although he had seen most of the
ships go down, his crew was only credited with sinking one of
the freighters from torpedo attack #2 and the large transport
from torpedo attack number #6. His official total was reduced
to 11,463.
234
4th Patrol
CHINA
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235
"1
USS Tang
5th Patrol and Loss
of the Tang
The training and leadership of Commander O'Kane paid off
handsomely in the Tang's 5th and final patrol. Never was
there a patrol executed so well that ended so tragically. Of 24
torpedoes fired, 23 hit their targets. Ironically, the twentyfourth hit the Tang, causing her loss.
The patrol began as usual with the Tang leaving Midway
to patrol the Formosa Straits on 27 September 1944. Normal
training was carried out en route, and by the time the Tang arrived on station, the officers and crew were primed for action.
They didn't have long to wait.
Torpedo Attack # 1
On 11 October:
0400: Made radar contact at 17,000 yards on a ship
moving up the coast from Pakusa Point. Tracked him
at 14 knots making us at first suspicious of his character, but as the range closed he was observed to be a
large modem diesel freighter heavily loaded, presenting a low silhouette. [We] moved onto his track and
dived for one of those never-failing crack-of-dawn attacks. Maneuvered for an 800-yard shot as he came by
and fired three MK 18 bow torpedoes, spread his
length. The first two hit exactly as aimed sinking this
overloaded ship immediately. Surfaced as soon as the
smoke had cleared to find no survivors. Dived off of
Pakusa Point where a north- or south-bound ship
could be spotted coming in either direction, permitting
236
5th Patrol and Loss of the Tang
a submerged attack if necessary, but preferably tracking

until dark as these shallow waters cramped any ordinary evasion tactics.
Torpedo Attack # 2
1000: Masts of another north-bound freighter were
sighted down the coast. He was running inside the tenfathom curve and zigging frequently. Though we could
reach his track by moving in at high speed and have
some battery left for evasion, our original plan of tracking till dark seemed more prudent under the circumstances. Our tracks converged and he passed directly
over us at sundown.
After dark, [we] surfaced 4000 yards astern of him,
passed him at the same range, avoided a couple of stationary patrols, moved on to his track, then turned off
for a stem shot as he came by.
2100: With a salvo of three ready to fire with a liberal spread, fired a single MK 18 torpedo at his middle
with practically zero gyro, on a 75-port track, range
500. Our experience of this morning was not a mistake.
We were clicking and this one hit with a terrific explosion. Only the first few members of the fire control
party to reach the bridge saw any of the ship before it
went down.
Proceeded down the coast avoiding two stationary
patrols.
On 23 October:
0030: On the first trial of the revamped SJ the operator reported land at 14,000 yards where no land
ought to be. Commenced tracking immediately, discovering a small pip moving out in our direction. Put him
astern and bent on the turns. He evidently lost his
original contact with us for he changed course and
commenced a wide sweep about the convoy which was
now in sight.
237
A submariner's dream quickly developed as we

were able to assume the original position of the destroyer just ahead of the convoy while he went on a
20-mile inspection tour. The convoy was composed of
three large modern tankers in a column, a transport on
the starboard hand, a freighter on the north hand,
flanked by DEs on both flanks and quarters.
After zigging with the convoy in position 3000
yards ahead, we dropped back between the tankers
and the freighter. On next zig, we stopped and turned
right for nearly straight bow shots at the tankers as
they came by, firing two torpedoes under the stack and
engine room space of the nearest tanker, a single torpedo shot into the protruding stern of the middle tanker,
and two torpedoes under the stack and engine space of
the far tanker. The minimum range was 300 yards and
the maximum 800. Torpedoes were exploding before
the firing was completed and all hit as aimed. It was a
terrific sight to see three blazing, sinking, tankers but
there was only time for just a glance as the freighter
was in position crossing our stern.
Completed my setup and was about to fire on this
vessel when Leibold, my boatswaim's mate, whom I've
used for an extra set of eyes on all patrols, properly diagnosed the maneuvers of the starboard transport coming in like a destroyer aiming to ram. We were boxed
in by the sinking tankers, the transport was too close
for us to dive, so we had to cross his bow. It was really
a thriller-diller with the Tang barely getting on the inside of his turning circle and saving the stern with full
left rudder in the last seconds.
The transport commenced firing with large and
small caliber stuff, so [we] cleared the bridge before realizing that it was all over our heads. A quick glance
aft, however, showed that the tables were again turning, for the transport was forced to continue her swing
in an attempt to avoid colliding with the freighter
which had also been coming in to ram. The freighter
struck the transport's starboard quarter shortly after we
238
commenced firing four stern torpedoes spread along

their double length. At a range of 400 yards, the crash
coupled with the four torpedo explosions was terrific,
sinking the freighter nose down almost instantly while
the transport hung with a 30 degree up angle.
The destroyer was now coming in on our starboard quarter at 1300 yards with DEs on our port bow
and beam. We headed for the DE on our bow so as to
get the destroyer astern, and gratefully watched the DE
turn away, apparently having seen enough. Our destroyer still hadn't lighted off another boiler and it was
possible to open range slowly, avoiding the last interested DE. When radar range to the DD was 4500 yards,
he gave up the chase and returned to the scene of the
transport. We moved back also as [the transport's] bow
still showed on radar.
When we were 6000 yards off, however, another
violent explosion took place and the bow disappeared
from sight and the radar screen. This explosion set off
a gun duel amongst the destroyer and escort vessels
who fired at random, sometimes apparently at each
other and sometimes just out into the night. Their confusion was truly complete. It looked like a good place
to be away from so we cleared the area at full power
until dawn.
On 24 October:
0600: Convoy sighted. The staff had been correct
in their estimate of the situation that the Japanese
would likely send every available ship in support of
the Philippine campaign. The Leyte Campaign was in
progress and the ships of this convoy, as in the one of
23 October, were all heavily loaded. The tankers all
carried planes on deck, and even the bows and sterns
of the [ships] were piled high with apparent plane
crates.
239
Torpedo Attack #3
The convoy was tracked on a course following the ragged coast at 12 knots. The Japanese became suspicious
during our initial approach, two escorts commenced to
run on opposite course to the long column, firing
bursts of 40mm and five-inch salvos.
As we continued to close the leading ships, the escort commander obligingly illuminated the column
with a searchlight, using it to signal. it gave us a perfect view of our first selected target, a three-deck, twostack transport; of the second target, a three-decker
one-stacker; and of the third, a large, modem tanker.
With ranges from 1400 yards on the first transport
to 900 yards on the tanker, [we] fired two MK 18 torpedoes each in slow, deliberate salvos to pass under
the foremast and mainmast of the first two vessels, and
under the middle and stack of the tanker. In spite of
the apparent early warning and sporadic shooting
which was apparently designed to scare the submarine,
no evasive tactics were employed by any of the ships.
The torpedoes commenced hitting as we paralleled the
convoy to search out our next two targets.
Our love for the MK 18 torpedoes after the disappointing cruiser experience was again restored as all
torpedoes hit nicely. We passed the next ship, a medium freighter, abeam at 600 yards and then turned for a
stem shot at another tanker and transport astern of her.
[We] fired a single stem torpedo under the tanker's
stack and one at the foremast and one at the mainmast
of the transport. The ranges were between 600 and 700
yards. Things were anything but calm and peaceful
now, for the escorts had stopped their warning tactics
and were directing good salvos at us and the blotches
of smoke we left behind on going to full power to pull
clear of the melee.
Just after firing at the transport, a full-fledged destroyer charged under her stem and headed for us. Just
exactly what took place in the next few seconds will
never be determined, but the tanker was hit nicely and
240
blew up, apparently a gasoline-loaded job. At least one

torpedo was observed to hit the transport and an instant later the destroyer blew up, either intercepting
our third torpedo or possibly [a casualty of] the 40mm
fire from the two DEs bearing down on our beam. In
any case, the result was the same and only the transport remained afloat and she apparently stopped.
We were as-yet untouched, all the gunfire either
having cleared over our heads or being directed at several blurbs of smoke we emitted when pleading for
more speed. When 10,000 yards from the transport, we
were all in the clear so [we] stopped to look over the
situation and recheck our last two torpedoes which had
been loaded forward during our stern tube attack.
A half-hour was spent with each
torpedo, .. . drawing it from the tube, ventilating the
battery, and checking the rudders and gyros. With
everything in readiness, [we] started cautiously back in
to get our cripple. The two DEs were patrolling on his
seaward side, so [we] made a wide sweep and came in
very slow so as not to be detected even by sound. She
was lower in the water but not definitely sinking.
Checked our speed by pit log at six knots, fired our
twenty-third torpedo from 900 yards, aimed just forward of her mainmast. Observed the phosphorescent
wake heading as aimed at our crippled target, fired our
twenty-fourth and last torpedo at his foremast. Rang
up emergency speed as this last torpedo broached and
curved sharply to the left.
[We] completed part of a fishtail maneuver in a futile attempt to clear the turning circle of this erratic circular run. The torpedo was observed through about
180 degrees of its turn due to the phosphorescence of
its wake. It struck abreast of the after torpedo room
with a violent explosion about 20 seconds after firing.
The tops were blown off the only regular ballast tanks
aft and the after three compartments flooded instantly.
The Tang sank by the stern. There was insufficient time
241
to carry out the last order to close the hatch. One consolation for those of us washed off into the water was
the explosion of our twenty-third torpedo and observation of our last target settling by the stern.
As O'Kane was washed into the water, what actually happened below during the Tang's last few minutes was described
after the war by the nine survivors.
The explosion was very violent, breaking air lines, lifting
deck plates, and so forth. Men as far forward as the control
room suffered broken limbs and other injuries. The immediate
result to the ship was to flood the after three compartments
together with the number 6 and number 7 ballast tanks. No
one escaped from these compartments and even the forward
engine room was half flooded before the after door could be
secured. The steep down angle caused all in the conning tower
to fall aft, preventing them from closing the hatch.
In the control room, the men succeeded in closing the
conning tower hatch, but it had been jimmied in the explosion
and leaked badly. They then leveled the boat out by flooding
the number two main ballast tank, and proceeded to the forward torpedo room carrying the injured in blankets.
When the survivors of the forward engine room and after
battery compartments reached the mess room, they found water already above the eye port in the door to the control room.
On testing higher, up by the ventilation pipes, they found the
water had not yet reached that high, so they opened the door,
letting the water rush through, then proceeded to the forward
torpedo room. This made a total of about 30 to reach an escape position.
Escape was delayed by the presence of Japanese patrol
boats occasionally dropping depth charges. This was unfortunate as an electrical fire in the forward battery compartment
was becoming severe. Commencing at about 1800, four parties
left the ship. At the time the last party escaped, the forward
battery fire had reached such intensity that paint on the forward torpedo room bulkhead was scorching and running down.
Considerable pressure had built up in the battery room
making it difficult to secure the door sufficiently tight to pre242
vent acrid smoke from seeping by the gasket. The door gasket
probably blew out, either owing to the pressure or as a result
of an ensuing battery explosion. The remaining men were
probably asphyxiated.
Of the thirteen men who escaped, five were able to cling
to the buoy until picked up. Three others reached the surface
but weren't able to hang on or breathe. They floated off and
drowned. The other five were not seen after leaving the escape trunk.
Of the nine officers and men on the bridge, three were
able to swim through the night and until picked up eight
hours later, this included Lt. Commander O'Kane. One officer
escaped from the flooded conning tower and remained afloat
until rescue with the aid of his trousers converted into a life
belt.
The destroyer escort that picked up all nine survivors was
one of four rescuing Japanese troops and personnel. "When
we realized that our clubbings and kickings were being administered by the survivors of our own handiwork, we found that
we could take it with less prejudice."
Only four of these brave men, again including O'Kane,
were ultimately recovered from Japanese POW camps after
the war.
And so ended the amazing career of the USS Tang. She
was officially credited with sinking seven ships for 22,000 tons
on this last patrol.
Slmulatlng the Tang's Career

A truly great captain is consistent. To test your consistency,
see if you can put together a four-patrol career to match
O'Kane and the Tang. These four patrols must be consecutive
and you must make it safely back to a base on all but the last
trip. To be accurate, patrol the same areas as shown on the
maps. Try to beat the Tang's four-patrol total of 24 ships sunk
for 93,824 tons.
243
Chapter 41 . USS Tang
Figure 1' 1-1. Patrol Route Map
a
()()()
CHINA
BONIN ISlANOS
rNO JIMA
WW
'..,...
.
CAROLIN!
ISIMOS
GILBERT
ISW<OS
... ,
NEW
,.
. ' : HEBRIDES
~ ..
HEW
CN..EDOHIA
244
.""'
() .
Glossary of Terms
aft
Near or toward the back of a boat or ship.
amidships
Near or toward the middle of a boat or ship.
angle on the bow

The angle from the target track to the line of sight as seen
from the target bow.
beam
Horizontal supports on a ship, to the side of a ship.
bearing
The direction you are looking, either through your binoculars
or the scope.
bow
The forward part
of~
boat or ship.
COMSUBPAC
Commander of Submarines Pacific Fleet.
DD
Designation for a destroyer.
DE
Designation for a destroyer escort.
dive bubble
Indicator used to measure the angle of a dive.
dive planes
Large metal wing-like structures located fore and aft used to
force the bow up or down to surface or dive.
exec or XO
Executive Officer, second in command aboard a ship or
submarine.
fathom
A unit of measuring depth equal to six feet.
245
Glossary
gyro
A gyroscopic device inside U.S. torpedoes, which enables
them to be set to travel on a specified angle, or course, after
leaving the sub.
heading
The direction of a ship's travel measured in degrees from 0
(true north) to 359.
keel
The main support of a ship, which extends its entire length,
frequently used to describe a ship's bottom.
knot
Unit of speed on ships equal to one nautical mile (6080.27
feet) per hour.
llne of sight
An imaginary line from your position to another object.
magnetic detonator
A device used in some U.S. torpedoes that measures a change
in magnetic fields . It could cause a torpedo to explode if it
passed under the keel of a ship.
mark
A term used during target tracking, meaning take an instrument
reading now.
maru
Japanese term for merchant ship.
port
The left side of a ship when facing forward.
rudder
A plane mounted vertically on a ship's stern, used to change
the ships heading or direction.
SJ
Surface radar.
sonar
A method of locating and measuring the range of objects in
water by sending out a sound signal, listening for a reflection
of that signal of an object (ship or sub), and measuring the
246
Glossary
time interval between sending the signal and receiving back

the reflected signal. Also, sometimes used to mean listening
passively for sounds with a hydrophone-a device for picking
up sounds underwater.
starboard
The right side of a ship when facing forward.
stern
The rear of a boat or ship.
TBT
Target-bearing transmitter, which consisted of a pair of binoculars mounted to a device on the bridge of a sub. The device
transmitted to the torpedo data computer the direction the
binoculars were pointing.
TDC
This was a mechanical, analog-computing device used in subs
to solve the target tracking equation when given a set of input
data concerning the target range, heading, and speed. Once a
firing solution was determined, it would automatically transmit the proper gyro setting to the torpedoes.
test depth
The maximum known safe depth a submarine hull can withstand. Taking a sub deeper than this test depth was dangerous, but sometimes conditions required it.
thermocllne
Also Temperature Gradient and Layer. Refers to the dividing
line between layers of water of different temperatures. Once
below this layer, a submarine is difficult to find with sonar
due to the sound-reflective nature of this layer.
track
A line referring to a course or line of travel.
trim
The process of moving water in and out of tanks to stabilize
the submarine at a given depth.
247
Glossary
ultra
A secret radio message giving sub commanders the location of
enemy convoys. The information in these messages was
usually obtained by breaking Japanese radio codes.
wolf pack
Two or more subs cooperating to attack enemy shipping.
Figure G 1. Unidentified Sub
248
Index
Andrews, Captain Charles 108-11
Aobasan Maru 216
Arimasan Maru 210
Arizona Maru 56
Asashio 212
Australia 13
Balabac Strait 13
Beach, Lt. Commander Edward L. 197,
200
Biyo Maru 228

bow 5
Brown, Lt. Commander F. E. 22
Buckley, Commander 118-21
Bungo Strait 13
Burlingame, Commander C.R. 37-40
China 13
Christie, Admiral 91, 96
Cimarron 212
Colnett Strait 12
Coye, John S. 42-45
Cutter, Commander Slade D. 77-80,
82-84, 86-89
Dakar Maru 54
Daspit, Commander 2
Dealey, Lt. Commander S. D. 136-39
Domin, Captain 72-75
down-the-throat shot 9-10
Ehime Maru 217
end-around maneuver 6
firing positions 6
Fluckey, Commander E. B. 123-26, 128,
130-33
Formosa 13
Formosa Strait 13
Garrison, Commander 113-16
Genyo Maru 216
Germerhausen, Commander W. S.
154-59
Grider, Captain 193-95
Griffith, Lt. Commander Walter Thomas
91-96
Gross, Commander Royce 98-101
Horai Maru 213
Hydeman, Commander Earl T. 202-5
Inland Sea 13
Japan 2
atomic bomb attack on 4
destruction of merchant fleet 3
fuel scarcity 3
shipping 1
surrender of 4
249
tactical errors in Pearl Harbor attack 1

tankers 3
Java Sea 13
Jinyo 151
Kako 21-22
Kenya Maru 209
Kinsella, Commander William T. 165-68,
170-74
Kirkpatrick, Commander Charles 15-18
Klakring, Commander Thomas 25-29
Kurosio Maru 222
Kyoktuto Maru 216
La Perouse Strait 12
Lockwood, Admiral 154
Lombok Strait 13
Luzon Strait 13
Makassar Strait 13
Mansei Maru 209
Martin, Captain 184-87
Maurer, Captain J. H. 189-91
Metcalf, Commander R. M. 48-50
Midway Island 12
Moore, Lt. Commander J. R. "Dinty" 21
Morton, Commander Dudley "Mush" 2,
52-56, 58-64, 66-70, 207
Munson, Commander Henry G. 176-78
Nitu Maru 62
O'Kane, Captain Richard 3, 53-56,
58-63, 67, 69, 207-13, 215-25,
227-34, 236-43
Operation Barney 3
parallel approach 9, 11
Pearl Harbor 1-2
Philippine Islands 13
point the target 6
port 5
quarter 5
Ramage, Commander "Red" 161-63
Run Silent, Run Deep 13, 197
Ryukyu Islands 12
S-Boats 20-21
S-44 20-23
Sea of Japan 3, 12
Sibutu Passage 13
Silent Service 4
standard approach 6-7
starboard 5
stem 5
Street, Lt. Commander G. L. 197-200
submarine
routes 12-14
terminology 5
submarine attack
approach phase 5-6
attack phase 5-6
classification phase 5-6
parts of 5
tactics 6-12
Sunda Strait 13
Syoyo Maru 63
Tanzan Maru 218
Tatutki Maru 211
Thompson, Lt. Commander W. C.
180-82
torpedo
problems with 2-3
Triebel, Commander Charles 104-6
Tsushima Strait 12
Underwood, Commander Gordon W.
143-47, 149-52, 154
up-the-kilt shot 9
U.S. destroyer Patterson 52
U.S. Navy 1
U.S. Pacific submarine forces 1-3
percentage of U.S. Navy 4
USS Aspro 182
USS Atule 189-91
USS Barb 118-21, 123-27, 130-32, 134
USS Billfish 91 , 93-95
USS Bluefish 178
USS Bonefish 3-4, 204
USS Bowfin 3, 91-96, 140, 183, 187, 195
USS Cabrilla 180-82
USS Crevalle 3, 154, 202
USS Flasher 193-95
USS Flyingfish 3
USS Gar 91
USS Growler 23, 40, 45
USS Guardfish 25-28, 31-34
USS Cunard 108-11
USS Hammerhead 161, 184-87
USS Harder 50, 136-39, 168
USS fallao 189-90
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
USS
Orion 172
Parche 161-63
Peto 149
Picuda 130-32, 143, 146
Plunger 105
Pogy 47-50
Queenfish 123, 125-27, 130-32
Rasher 176-78
Raton 173
Ray 165-68, 170-74
Redfish 143, 146
Sandlance 113-15
Sawfish 67
Sea Dog 3, 154, 202-4
Seahorse 77-80, 82-84, 86-88
Sea Lion 221
Seawolf 12, 18, 29, 75, 89, 98-101 ,
111, 116, 121, 168, 174

Silversides 36-40, 42-45
Skate 3
Snook 103-6
Spadefish 3, 34, 50, 106, 142-47,
149-52, 154-58, 178, 200, 202
USS Steelhead 161, 163
USS Tang 3, 23, 40, 57, 69-70, 75, 80,
84, 89, 96, 101, 111, 121, 128, 134,
140, 163, 168, 174, 179, 183, 187,
191-92, 195, 205, 207-13, 215-25,
227-34, 236-43
USS Thrasher 31
USS Tinosa 2-3, 221
USS Tirante 197-200
USS Trigger 72-74
USS Triton 15-18
USS Tunny 3, 123, 125
USS Wahoo 2-3, 18, 29, 52-56, 58-64,
66-7.0, 80, 106, 128, 200, 207
USS Whale 100-101
Ward, Lt. Commander N. G. 31-34
Warder, "Fearless" Freddie 98
Willingham, Commander 91
USS
USS
USS
USS
250

40 Great Submarine Simulator War Adventures

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40

Maps of the Pacific Theater courtesy of MicroProse Simulation Software.

.............. . ...... . ........ . .................. v

20. USS Sand/once

21. USS Barb

The Submarine War

Figure 1 1. Another Japanese Freighter Goes Down

Chapter 1. The Submarine War

40 Great Submarine Simulator Adventures

Chapter 1. The Submarine War

Figure 1-2. Japanese Destroyer Torpedoed by the Seawaff

40 Great Submarine Simulator Adventures

Figure 1-3. Battle-weary Subs and Crews at Pearl Harbor

Basi~s and Terminology

The front or forward part of a ship.

Many of these terms will be used in the patrol section of

Chapter 1. The Submarine War

The classification phase consists of sighting a possible

40 Great Submarine Simulator Adventures

Chapter 1. The Submartne War

+->I :>RJ,l 0.l a :>uei.s J a-+

40 Great Submarine Simulator Adventures

Shooting at a target headed straight for you is called a

down-the-throat shot. Conversely, shooting at a target headed

Chapter 1. The Su b m artne War

40 Great Submarin e Simulato r Adventur es

Chapter 1. The Submarine War

As mentioned, there are many other tactics, and one of

Figure 1B. Photo or the Seawolt Picking Up Survivors

Over from Midway

40 Great Submarine Simulator Adventures

Chapter 1. The Submarine War

Figure 1-9. Travel Routes Map

The first of the Pacific Fleet's submarines to cruise against the

Chapter 2. USS Triton

one torpedo hit with a resounding explosion that shook the

Chapter 2. USS Triton

Slmulatlng This Patrol

With Silent Service. For this patrol, your goal is to sink

Figure 2.2. Patrol Route Map

Figure 31. The Brave llttle S-44

The activities of the S-Boats or sugar-boats as they were called,

Slmulallng This Patrol

Figure 32. Patrol Route Map

Chapter 4. USS Guardflsh

Slmulatlng This Patrol

Chapter 4. USS Guardfish

Figure 42. Patrol Route Map

Chapter 5. USS Guardflsh

fuel, had few remaining torpedoes, and was leaking water in

Slmulatlna This Patrol

Figure 5 1. Patrol Route Map

The Silversides was one of a handful of valiant boats to see the

accomplished when everything seems to be going wrong. With

Chapter 6. USS Silversides

Slmulatlng This Patrol

Figure &2. Patrol Route Map

in a bad position for a bow shot, so he quickly turned the boat

Slmulatlng This Patrol

With Up Periscope! Six ships is your goal. If you reach

Chapter 7. USS Silversldes

Figure 72. Patrol Route Map

Chapter 8. USS Pogy

antishipping sweep of the coast of Formosa. Seas were rough