Ching Vs Enrile
Ching Vs Enrile
- versus -
SPS. ADOLFO
ENRILE,
&
ARSENIA
Promulgated:
Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 29, 2002 in CA-G R. CV No. 42985 and
the Resolution[2] dated November 21, 2002 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The assailed CA decision reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 90-064, an action for quieting
of title thereat commenced by petitioner spouses Jesus Ching and Lee Poe Tin
against respondent spouses Adolfo and Arsenia Enrile.
Section 51 of PD 1529 and not merely register an adverse claim under Section 70
of the same law. Citing the second paragraph of Section 70 which provides that an
adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of
registration, respondents insisted that the annotated Adverse Claim of petitioners
had already expired, hence, it offered no protection when respondents acquired the
disputed property through execution sale.
property as against petitioners who had previously bought the same property from
the registered owner but failed to register their deed of sale.
The CA further declared respondents as purchasers in good faith. On the premise
that petitioners filing of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim was procedurally flawed
and that the annotated adverse claim had already prescribed on December 20, 1986
after the lapse of 30 days from its registration which was November 20, 1986, the
CA ruled that it cannot be considered sufficient notice to third person like the
respondents who were not aware of the sale of the disputed lot to petitioners prior
to the levy on attachment.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the CA, in its decision [7] of August 29,
2002, reversed and set aside that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 11,
1993 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
135, Makati City in Civil Case No. 90-064 is hereby REVERSED.
The Register of Deeds of Las Pias, Metro Manila is hereby mandated not
to cancel any annotations of encumbrances in favor of defendants-appellants in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 83618 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Dist. IV.
Who among the parties has a preferential right over the disputed property.
SO ORDERED.
At the outset, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error when it
ruled that the annotated adverse claim had already prescribed by the mere lapse of
30 days from its registration. The issue is no longer of first impression. In the 1996
case of Sajonas v. Court of Appeals,[9] we explained that a notice of adverse claim
remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period provided by Section 70 of
PD 1529. Section 70 provides:
Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if
no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a
statement in writing, setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse
claimant's residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon
him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the
certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days
from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of
adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the
party in interest. Provided, however that after cancellation, no second adverse
claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
In the same case, we held that for as long as there is yet no petition for its
cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting: Thus:
At first blush, the provision in question would seem to restrict the
effectivity of the adverse claim to thirty days. But the above provision cannot and
should not be treated separately, but should be read in relation to the sentence
following, which reads:
After the lapse of said period, the annotation of the adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor
by the party in interest.
If the rationale of the law was for the adverse claim to ipso
facto lose force and effect after the lapse of thirty days, then it
would not have been necessary to include the foregoing caveat to
clarify and complete the rule. For then, no adverse claim need be
cancelled. If it has been automatically terminated by mere lapse of
time, the law would not have required the party in interest to do a
useless act.[10]
Now, as we see it, the recourse will either rise or fall on the decisive
question of whether or not respondents were purchasers in good faith when they
acquired the disputed lot despite the annotated adverse claim on their title.
The general rule is that a person dealing with registered land is not required
to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. In that case,
such person is charged with notice of the burden on the property which is noted on
the face of the register or certificate of title.[14]
Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs in cases of double sale. It provides:
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
In Bautista v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held that where the thing sold twice is
an immovable, the one who acquires it and first registers it in the Registry of
Property, in good faith, shall be the owner.
In the early case of Leung Yee v. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. and
Williamson,[17] the Court explained good faith in this wise:
One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title
in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as
against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must
be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon
such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor.[18]
Good faith, or the want of it, is capable of being ascertained only from the
acts of one claiming its presence, for it is a condition of the mind which can only
be judged by actual or fancied token or signs.[19]
It is beyond dispute that the property in question had already been sold by
La Fuente to petitioners on September 5, 1985. Petitioners immediately took
possession thereof. When the Notice of Levy on Attachment was recorded at the
dorsal portion of TCT No. 83618 and when the Writ of Execution and Certificate
of Sale were inscribed under Entry No. 3434-2 in favor of respondents, on January
26, 1989, petitioners have been, since September 5, 1985, in actual, physical,
continuous and uninterrupted possession.
The law does not require a person dealing with the owner of registered land
to go beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on the notices of the
encumbrances on the property annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any
annotation. Here, petitioners adverse claim is annotated at the back of the title
coupled with the fact that they are in possession of the disputed property. To us,
these circumstances should have put respondents on guard and required them to
ascertain the property being offered to them has already been sold to another to
prevent injury to prior innocent buyers. A person who deliberately ignores a
significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not
an innocent purchaser for value. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot
close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then
claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the
title of the vendor.[20]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice