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COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

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IN THE MATTER CONCERNING


JUDGE VALERIANO SAUCEDO
CJP NO. 194

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CLOSING ARGUMENT BEFORE SPECIAL MASTERS

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SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA

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April 27, 2015

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REPORTED BY:

SANDRA LEE HOCKIN

CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER NO. 7372

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UCCELLI & ASSOCIATES


Certified Shorthand Reporters
1243 Mission Road
South San Francisco, California 94080
Tel: 650.952.0774 Fax: 650.952.8688
www.UccelliReporting.com
Silicon Valley: 408.275.1122

CLOSING ARGUMENT BEFORE SPECIAL MASTERS

Honorable Louis R. Hanoian


Superior Court of California, County of San Diego
Examiner
James F. Harrigan, Esq.
Victoria Henley, Director-Chief Counsel
Office of Trial Counsel
Commission on Judicial Performance

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Counsel, I think we should have the record


indicate why we were -- we started an hour later than we
anticipated. Certainly none of us thought that the first
flight out of the San Francisco/Oakland area would be
canceled, and that's why Mr. Harrigan was not able to be
here by 11:00. Fortunately he was able to get on the
10:00 clock flight and has literally come straight from
the airport. So I appreciate, Mr. Miller, your
flexibility on this. And with that, we will be ready to
proceed.
Counsel, the judges and I had an opportunity to
chat before we began this morning. We are going to
conduct this in a very traditional closing argument
setup. We will -- absent something extraordinary
happening, we will not be interrupting you in your
closing arguments. However, at the end of your closing
arguments, if there is something that we feel needs to be
covered that has not been, there may be questions from
the bench. There may not be.
So, Mr. Harrigan, when you finish yours, we will
ask questions.
Mr. Miller, then, after your closing, we'll ask
any questions.
But we thought that would be a better way to
proceed than interrupting you so that your train of
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11:58 A.M.
---oOo--SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: We are here in the
Commission on Judicial Performance inquiry concerning
Judge Valeriano Saucedo. I'm Justice Haller, presiding
over these proceedings. To my right is Judge Hanoian,
and to my left is Judge Dugan.
Counsel, I'm going to ask you to make
appearances for the record so that we have everything on
the record.
Mr. Harrigan, starting with you, sir.
MR. HARRIGAN: Thank you.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: And I'm just going to
ask you also to come to the microphone here.
MR. HARRIGAN: James Harrigan; I'm the examiner
in this case. And Victoria Henley from the Commission is
with me.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
And, Mr. Miller, sir.
MR. MILLER: Good afternoon, Your Honors.
Randy Miller for the respondent, Judge Valeriano Saucedo,
as well as Caroline van Oosterom.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: And the record shall
reflect also that Judge Saucedo is present with us. All
right.
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Honorable Becky Lynn Dugan


Superior Court of California, County of Riverside

April 27, 2015

Special Masters:
Presiding Special Master
Honorable Judith L. Haller
Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,
Division One

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PARTICIPANTS:

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04-27-2015

Respondent's Counsel:
Randall A. Miller, Esq.
Caroline van Oosterom, Esq.
Miller LLP
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INDEX
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Page
4 EXAMINER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
5 RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
6 EXAMINER'S REBUTTAL
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will largely treat many of the issues that I have -- I am


not going to discuss today. However, I thought that
there were some points that should be made, and I hope to
do so.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right.
MR. HARRIGAN: This is a case that involves a
lot of paperwork and a lot of documents. And in
preparing for this argument, it became clear to me that
this case might be analogized to a painting. The
painting that I have thought about is a painting by a
Belgian artist, Rene Magritte. He is one who often
presented a male figure in a black bowler hat. One of
his famous ones involved a green apple in the place of a
face.
The painting that I'm thinking about is called
The Blank Signature or The Rider. And it's a painting of
a woman on a horse, a chestnut horse, a beautiful horse,
riding through a scene of a forest with very vertical
trees. And you may be familiar with this.
At first glance, it's an ordinary, normal scene.
But the more you examine it, the more you view it
critically; you find that it's not at all normal. There
are elements of that that jar the senses and that don't
add up with our initial impression.
And this case is much the same. The more
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Now, in a single week, there might well be,


conservatively, 100 instructions from the judge to his
clerk, which would be roughly 5,000 in a year or. In the
three years they worked together, 15,000 times when he
told her to do something, and she did it. She would have
followed every one of those instructions. She trusted
him, and she was told what -- she did what she was told
to do.
Also, we shouldn't fail to recognize that he is
a graduate of University of California Berkeley and
Stanford Law School. She's a high school graduate. He
enjoyed a position of power over her. And throughout the
course of the months involved, he used that position to
inculcate himself into her life, to control her, to
threaten her, to gain her dependence on him, to identify
her vulnerabilities, to test her trust and obedience, to
forge an intimacy. And when his advances were ultimately
rejected, he humiliated her. He injected the possibility
of her being criminally prosecuted. These are the facts.
As the judge testified on April 10th, on
Page 1203, Lines 15 to 17, the quote is: "I have always
lived a very ethical, very orderly life, and that period
of time was -- I've expressed it already -- was a lapse."
And I submit that that's -- it was quite a
lapse.
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evaluation of the evidence is undertaken, the more a


different picture emerges.
And this is not simply the case of improper
gifts provided by the judge to a subordinate court clerk
or a mentoring relationship that got out of hand. No.
The evidence demonstrates a compulsive, singlemindedness
of purpose, a design by the judge to apply increasing
pressure to secure a special-friend relationship with
Mrs. Tovar. This is a case of seduction, of
psychological manipulation intended to achieve financial
dependence with a quid pro quo of intimacy.
And this is important, I believe, to direct our
focus on the context within which the judge's conduct
occurred. He was her boss in the parlance of those who
serve in the courts. She is subordinate to him. They
worked in his department together for three years. She
was used to doing what she was told.
For example: Call the next case. Is the jury
panel ready? Have the jury instruction -- requested
instructions been received? Do we have a probation
report? Have you heard from the public defender? Is
there a general appearance of counsel on file? Is there
a surety bond posted? Is conflict counsel identified?
Please contact the district attorney. We need to reset
this motion.
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Now, as I mentioned, the post-hearing brief will


explore, in detail, the evidentiary record and provide a
full treatment of the issues that will supplement what I
have to say today, but I wish to discuss four different
topics: the primary reason the judge is not credible and
the significance of certain falsehoods, why his conduct
is not mentoring and is unethical, why the evidence
establishes that he is the author of the anonymous
letter, and finally the type of misconduct committed by
the judge, prejudicial misconduct and, in some instances,
willful misconduct.
Now, the judge has shown ongoing willingness to
lie to advance his interests. He admitted lying to
Ms. Tovar about intercepting the letter at the hospital.
He repeated that lie 12 days later in the September 30th
long note about the risk he took. He falsely denied that
this risk was intercepting the letter in his verified
answer. He was impeached by Witness Lisa Buehler on this
point.
The significance of the interception lie was to
make her feel grateful, beholding to him for what he was
doing. It also suggests that the authorship of the
letter is -- he is the author because it only makes sense
that he decided not to actually contact the hospital
after saying he would if he knew there was no letter to
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be intercepted.
Now, the judge lied in his written response to
the Commission and in testimony at the hearing as to what
Mrs. Tovar told him was her relationship with
Deputy Knoy. He claimed she told him there was an
ongoing affair; that she was trying to extricate herself
from it. This was a fabrication.
Both Mrs. Tovar and Deputy Knoy testified there
was no romantic relationship between them in -- after
2008. This was corroborated by Tessie Velasquez. And
the judge was impeached by his own wife, who testified
that he told her that Tovar reported just a financial
connection had existed. Lisa Buehler, who testified that
he told her Tovar said there was just a financial
connection, also impeached him on this point.
The significance of his lie about the existence
of an affair between Mrs. Tovar and Deputy Knoy in 2013
is that it was his rationale for much of his ensuing
conduct. He was helping her through a crisis, ending an
affair she had in order to strengthen her marriage.
Additionally, he sought to develop the fiction of this
affair because without one, the pool of theoretical
suspects as to being the authors of the letter
evaporates.
Now, the judge was untruthful as to why he gave
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of course, as you know, we have records from the flower


shop that they were delivered on the 24th.
The fact that he sent these flowers anonymously
was an example of his effort to control the situation.
He didn't want anybody else to know that he sent them.
In fact, he told her to lie about who sent them. It was
a way that he tested her to see if she was willing to lie
for him.
The judge maintained, in his testimony, that he
believed Mrs. Tovar had all along told her husband the
truth about the gifts and the money and the trips. But
when he texted her on November 3rd to say she would -when she texted him on November 23rd -- November 3rd, to
say she wouldn't tell her husband anything, he thanked
her for saving his life. This is inconsistent with his
position.
Now, he told his staff that he submitted a
resignation letter and decided to rescind it.
Tessie Velasquez corroborates this fact. He falsely
stated, in his written response, that he had told
Mrs. Kennedy he thought of drafting a resignation letter
for her to hold, quote, "in my file." Kennedy impeached
him on this point.
Now, there are several other examples of where
the judge falsely claimed the facts to be other than
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Mrs. Tovar his brother's contact information. He said,


in his response, it was only in connection to her son's
arm injury. He denied, in his answer, that he ever told
her his brother would take care of her financially. He
falsely claimed, in that answer, that Buehler did not
even ask him why he gave Tovar his brother's number.
Buehler impeached him on this point. He
testified he gave his brother's number because of her
son's medical issue. However, Lisa Buehler testified
that he told her he did so because he had made a
commitment to pay $200, and Tovar could continue to
receive this with his brother's help as the judge wanted
her to be financially free, meaning financially free of
Deputy Knoy, not of the judge.
Now, the judge was evasive when he was asked to
explain his text of October 29th, when he told Mrs. Tovar
that he had had a wonderful conversation with his brother
about her, and he didn't -- she didn't know how well she
was covered.
The judge lied about seeking permission to send
flowers to Mrs. Tovar. If he had done so, the flowers
would have been delivered on the anniversary of her
brother's death, not a week or two earlier. This
explains why he denied, in his answer, that the delivery
was on September 24th. He said it was October 1st. And
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alleged, sought to supply evasive answers, testified


nonresponsively to avoid answering specific questions, or
gave explanations intended to obscure and to dodge
culpability. The post-hearing brief will incorporate
these examples.
His credibility is critical to the findings of
fact, and I submit that the record convincingly
demonstrates that he has no credibility at all.
I think Sir Walter Scott said it best in 1808:
"Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice
to deceive."
Now, the judge was not engaged in mentoring
Mrs. Tovar. That claim is simply nonsensical. His
conduct toward her was nothing at all like the examples
his character witnesses described.
First, they sought his help. She did not.
Secondly, they had a specific reason such as
studying for the Bar exam. She did not.
And third, they were not subordinate employees.
She was.
Mentoring is guidance and the imparting of
wisdom to one less experienced. Described here, from the
earliest days, the judge had his interests as paramount.
He tested the waters by giving her cash for her
son. He gave her cash for her birthday when he had not
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done so before. He gave her cash for a new cell phone.


He used the letter -- anonymous letter to find out the
depth of her financial relationship with Knoy. He gave
her cash the next day to substitute himself for
Deputy Knoy. Within days, he sent her flowers and gave
her $500 more, unrelated to any payment for a Jeep loan.
He gave her luxury items like Disneyland vacations and a
BMW automobile. He regularly told her that she had no
financial worries as long as she agreed to be his special
friend, to trust him completely and to tell him
everything about her life. He would pay for body
sculpting if it made her feel better about herself.
He used various means, mechanisms to insert
himself into her life such as writing the legal advice
letter to -- for her son, scheduling auto repairs once he
overheard that she was having a car problem, buying a AAA
card for her protection on a trip she was taking with her
daughter.
He obtained her bank account number to control
and manipulate her with deposits of money. For example,
he wanted his texting privileges reinstated and wrote
that in the October 18th note while depositing $500 in
her account.
He apologized to her on October 31st, at 7:42 in
the morning and twice later that day after they had gone
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emotional affair that she did not want.


Now, it's very rare that a case will have a
significant evidentiary issue; that is, both the smoking
gun and a red herring. And this is what is presented in
a discussion of the authorship of the anonymous letter.
It's a red herring because for purposes of the
charges in this case, authorship does not need to be
established. The actions of the judge following receipt
of the letter are prejudicial misconduct and, arguably,
willful misconduct. Nevertheless, I ask for a finding
that he did write this letter based on the following
circumstantial evidence that I believe is convincing as
to his authorship.
Now, the judge is the only person to have ever
received this letter. Why? Because he wrote it. His
subsequent and immediate conduct after receipt of the
letter demonstrates that he had the motive to write it.
It served as the mechanism he used to insinuate himself
into her life, to secure a close relationship, a special
friend. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates his
desire for a closer relationship. And we also know that
the various ways in which he used the letter, the threat
of disclosure of the letter, were part and parcel of his
design.
Now, despite obvious potential for a physical
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to the BMW dealership together. Those texts are at 1:52


and 2:00 p.m. And he followed those apologies up with
another deposit in the afternoon of $500.
He claimed that everything was over after
November 3rd, but he deposited $200 on November 12th.
When he realized that she was going to seek a
transfer from the HR office of the court, he deposited
$8,000 to buy her silence, to ward off disclosure as to
the reason for her transfer request.
I submit the evidence is undisputed regarding
his misconduct in the following ways: He embarked on an
undue and oppressive level of unsolicited attention to a
subordinate court employee, including more than 450 text
messages over 63 days and notes seeking a special-friend
relationship. He lied to a subordinate court clerk. He
encouraged her to lie to coworkers. He continually
sought an improper relationship, a personal one, with a
subordinate. He gave her multiple gifts and cash
totalling over $26,000. And he ultimately told her he
was committing suicide unless she spoke with him after
she had made it crystal clear that she did not want to
receive any more texts, any more phone calls.
He regularly sought reassurance that she liked
him, appreciated what he was providing, notwithstanding
her expressed concerns that he was asking for an
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confrontation, he did not report it to the court


administration, to the Human Resources Department, to his
PJ or to the sheriff. He never reported it to anyone.
Why? Well, there was no need to. He had the only copy
because he wrote it.
Despite his expressed concern for Mrs. Tovar's
safety, including telling his wife that he was concerned
her husband might beat her up, he did not tell her of the
letter until the following day.
Now, if a person gets what is a copy of a
letter, normally I think it's reasonable to conclude that
the person getting a copy would get it at the same time
or after the original letter was delivered to the
addressee. So his decision to do nothing about this on
the 17th of September, provide no immediate notification
to her at all until the next day, is implausible given
his concern for her safety.
Now, he did nothing to preserve the letter or
the envelope for fingerprints, although he knew such
tests existed. His claim that he wasn't concerned with
determining who wrote it is implausible. He offered to
commit a federal crime in intercepting United States mail
at the hospital only because he wasn't going to contact
them because there was no letter waiting for delivery to
her husband.
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Now, he lied to Mrs. Tovar that the letter was


intercepted and destroyed because he knew there was no
letter. He never spoke with Deputy Knoy to warn him
because there was no letter on its way to Mrs. Tovar's
husband. He had no reason to warn Knoy even though, on
its face, one would have to assume he would do so
immediately.
Now, he demanded that she keep it quiet. And
days later, he reinforced that she not mention it to
anyone, particularly Knoy, since he knew that if the
deputy found out about it, an investigation might be
possible. He did not give her a copy of the letter and
never convincingly explained why he didn't.
Now, the text of the letter itself serves no
one's interest other than the judge because it's a false
statement.
And also, by looking at the letter and the
envelope, it's a bit of a head-scratcher because there
were several gratuitous details that seemed highly
questionable to be included by one who had the intent of
fomenting trouble for either Knoy or Mrs. Tovar.
It is, for example, implausible that the writer
would carefully include "Care of Tulare Regional Medical
Center" on the top of the letter. And writing "Sent this
to her judge" similarly, I think, is an unlikely detail.
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her about her husband's temper, whether there was any


past history of violence, although he had claimed that he
was very concerned for her safety.
The fact that the forensic analysis of his court
computer -- the fact that that analysis did not reveal
the anonymous letter is simply not dispositive because we
know that that analysis also didn't find other letters
that he admitted writing and he admitted writing on that
computer.
And now, his court reporter of more than
12 years saw an error in structure. As she stated to
Lisa Buehler, quote, "When Priscilla Tovar showed me the
letter, I remember saying, 'The punctuation, this is a
mistake the judge would make,'" close quote.
There are no other suspects as the author, and
none have surfaced in 20 months. In fact, the only
evidence that the judge did not write the letter is his
own testimony, and he simply is not credible at all.
Now, the Notice of Formal Charges states clearly
that the judge is charged with willful misconduct in
office as well as conduct prejudicial. And it provides a
time frame of mid September to mid November 2013 and
alleges a course of conduct over that period as
exemplified by subsequent facts and allegations contained
in the notice.
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Writing "Personal and Confidential" on the


envelope doesn't make any sense unless it was mailed to
the court, where somebody else could open it, but it was
sent to his house.
Now, the judge has shown a proclivity for
gratuitous language such as including "Working on
prescription orders for inmates" in his September 23rd
e-mail to the court supervisor, including "The red car"
in a text when he's contemplating suicide, and including
"I submitted a resignation letter and rescinded it"
during his November 15th staff meeting. And many of his
notes and texts also contain gratuitous details that I
think are part of his writing style.
Now, he knew of Mrs. Tovar's tattoos. They were
plainly visible.
It's also highly likely that he knew of the
other details contained in the letter from overhearing
conversations at the court. The inclusion of "J.K." in
the letter, I believe, is another red herring since
Jeremy Knoy's full name is spelled out in the body of the
letter, and the only "J.K." entry is just once as an
abbreviation at the very end.
Now, in the two meetings that he had with
Mrs. Tovar lasting well more than an hour on the 18th of
September, there's no evidence at all that he ever asked
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While clearly there are detailed allegations


described in that document, not every transgression or
ethical violation need be spelled out. The notice frames
this matter as a course of conduct undertaken during the
time period specified as exemplified by the allegations
contained in it.
It is the examiner's position that the judge's
course of conduct in this matter was prejudicial
misconduct involving bad faith, and in some instances,
the judge committed willful misconduct.
This analysis will be more thoroughly developed
in the post-hearing brief, but I wish to make a few
comments now.
First, as to prejudicial misconduct: The
standard is that it's conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial office
into disrepute. It is -- prejudicial misconduct is
established when one would appear, to an objective
observer familiar with the facts, that the conduct in
question is prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial
office. And prejudicial misconduct occurs when a judge,
even acting in good faith in a nonjudicial capacity,
engages in conduct that adversely affects public regard
for the judiciary. It may also involve acts done in bad
faith in a nonjudicial capacity, and in that context,
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"bad faith" means a culpable mental state beyond mere


negligence consisting of either knowing or not caring
that the conduct being undertaken is unjudicial and
prejudicial to public esteem.
Because the public's esteem for the judiciary is
measured by the objective observer standard, the
subjective intent or the motivation of the judge is not a
significant factor in assessing whether prejudicial
misconduct has occurred.
And all the case cites and analysis will be
provided in the post-hearing brief.
Now, the record in this matter clearly
establishes that the judge engaged in an entirely
inappropriate workplace relationship with his subordinate
clerk.
At a minimum, his conduct was prejudicial
misconduct involving bad faith. Lavishing expensive
gifts and cash on an employee, obtaining access and using
that access to her bank account to manipulate and control
her, excessive text messaging after hours, lying to the
employee, directing her to lie to others, pressuring her
to obtain attention and a close personal relationship,
making the employee fearful with threats are all conduct
inimitable to the role of supervisor in a workplace, let
alone a judge.
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chambers, and he never gave her a copy nor did he give


her his copy.
I think we must, therefore, accept that the
first two prongs of the willful misconduct predicates are
satisfied, leaving the question of whether he was acting
in a judicial capacity.
Now, I acknowledge that there is no bright line
defining conduct that falls within the definition of the
faithful discharge of judicial duties. Analytically, the
determination of when a judge is acting in a judicial
capacity has proven to be fact based -- a fact-based
evaluation and somewhat elusive as a standard applicable
in all cases. Here, however, no such difficulty is
presented.
And of the two incidents, I submit the evidence
supports your finding that the judge committed willful
misconduct, first on September 18th, when he instructed
Mrs. Tovar to meet him in chambers to disclose the
letter; his reservation of the law library conference
room and directing his subordinate to meet with him again
over the lunch hour; his decision to ensure that the
letter be kept a secret and not reported to the Court or
law enforcement, placing the staff and the public at
risk; his intentional prohibition against her reporting
or disclosing the letter; his false claim of intercepting
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The evidence, I believe, convincingly


establishes that the judge either knew or did not care
that his conduct was unjudicial and prejudicial. Thus,
he acted in bad faith within the meaning as it has
developed.
I submit that there are two incidents in which
the judge committed willful misconduct. Now, willful
misconduct is unjudicial conduct that is committed in bad
faith by a judge acting in his or her judicial capacity.
So it's a three-pronged test.
There could be no doubt that the course of
conduct engaged in by the judge was unjudicial. Bad
faith is established when a judge acts for any purpose
other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties.
I contend that the judge authored the anonymous
letter, and he did so to manipulate Mrs. Tovar into
trusting him and depending on him. Such deception and
manipulation were unquestionably done in bad faith.
Even if you determine that he did not write the
letter, his handling of it also exemplifies bad faith.
He failed to report the letter to the Court. He failed
to warn Deputy Knoy of the danger it posed. He lied to
Mrs. Tovar about having the letter intercepted. And then
he used the letter as a tool to control and manipulate
her. He also kept a copy of the letter secured in his
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the letter by contacting her husband's employer; and his


failure to warn Deputy Knoy of the potential for a
physical confrontation.
Given that case law accepts the fact that judges
have some supervision over courtroom staff, his conduct
on this date was willful misconduct committed in bad
faith.
Similarly, his actions and conduct on
November 18th: When he handed a note to Mrs. Tovar in
open court with attorneys and staff present, instructing
her to read it on the spot, the note contained an implied
threat of criminal prosecution for extortion, designed to
intimidate and humiliate her and to obtain her silence
about his conduct toward her. This conduct was done in
his judicial capacity from the bench and committed in bad
faith.
I appreciate you making yourselves available for
closing arguments, and I respectfully submit that the
evidence in the record clearly and convincingly
establishes the violations contained in the Notice of
Formal Proceedings.
And I would like to reserve ten minutes for any
rebuttal after counsel speaks.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right, Mr. Harrigan.
Judge Dugan, do you have any questions?
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04-27-2015

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SPECIAL MASTER DUGAN: I don't.


SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: Judge Hanoian?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: I do.
And I'm wondering whether or not you would speak
to what your opinion is of the actions as it relate to
the exclusion of Deputy Ballantyne and -- from the
courtroom, the exclusion of Deputy Knoy from the
courtroom and asking Deputy Cibrian to leave the
courtroom.
Are they part of this?
MR. HARRIGAN: Well, those -- I would ask that a
finding be made as to that conduct but not a finding of
willful misconduct per se because that was not
specifically alleged in the notice.
But I will say this as it relates to Ballantyne:
He was -- this is an individual that was innocent. He
did nothing wrong. He did his job. He made a report
that -- when he was told to make a report.
And what the judge did was not only have him
removed from his courtroom once he saw him, and did so
from the bench, but then he banished him so he could
never be in his courtroom again. And I certainly think
that -- that a finding is appropriate as to that.
I'm not -- I don't have full recollection on the
Deputy Knoy matter. I do remember that he asked
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to her supervisor and in his judicial capacity.


SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Anything
further?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Not from me.
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Harrigan, yes, you may certainly reserve
that time.
We're going to take a very short break of
ten minutes. I have five minutes of 1:00. We'll be back
in session at five minutes after 1:00.
MR. HARRIGAN: Thank you.
(Recess taken.)
SPECIAL MASTER HALLER: All right. Thank you,
everyone. Please be seated.
And the record should reflect that we are
present with all counsel who are here before the three
special masters and Judge Saucedo.
All right. Mr. Miller, if you would like to
proceed, sir.
RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
MR. MILLER: Thank you. And good afternoon,
Justice Haller, and Justice Dugan, and Judge Hanoian.
Judge Saucedo and I have appreciated the opportunity to
present the facts and the evidence in this case as we see
them and also to take the opportunity to introduce
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Mrs. Tovar what he was doing there and that he wanted him
out and gone, but I don't know what the follow-up was. I
would have to deal with that in the post-hearing brief.
I'm sorry. The third one you mentioned was?
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Deputy Cibrian.
MR. HARRIGAN: Oh, Deputy Cibrian.
SPECIAL MASTER HANOIAN: Yes. November 18th or
somewhere -- somewhere in the November range.
MR. HARRIGAN: I mean, I think -- honestly, I
think it's a bit of a stretch to say he was acting in his
judicial capacity. I think that my recollection was
Cibrian and Tovar were talking in the courtroom. Court
had concluded. The judge came into the courtroom from
chambers hallway and told him to leave so he could talk
to Mrs. Tovar. That one has minimal context with, I
think, willful behavior in a judicial capacity.
There is one more, though, we would ask for a
finding on, which is: His behavior on the 20th and the
23rd of September, when he interfered with Mrs. Tovar's
attempt to communicate with her supervisor about her time
log. He kept her there, talking about what I believe was
only personal matters. He thereafter claimed they were
court matters that were discussed. And he followed up on
the 23rd with an e-mail to her supervisor, supporting her
work hours. I believe that was a false statement by him
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Judge Saucedo to you, who is here today. And his wife,


Teresa, is also here.
We appreciate the time that you all took to
listen to Judge Saucedo and Teresa and other witnesses
about his background and his story and all the live
character testimony that brought his story some
additional context.
And since we're dealing here with evaluating a
judge's alleged conduct and the serious allegations being
advanced by the Commission, it's all that much more
important to understand the type of person and judge
whose conduct you are considering. Indeed, as I stated
in opening, his background, especially in mentoring and
helping others, is directly relevant here.
I agree with the examiner's comments that this
is a factually complex case. It's an intense case with
factually intensive examination of many facts that are
disputed and testimony that's disputed. This case,
unlike the many that have proceeded to discipline under
the CJP that have involved relationships with clerks like
Steiner and Woodward and a few others, this does not
involve a consensual physical or romantic relationship at
all. It does not fit into the rubric of discriminatory
or a hostile work environment like we've seen in those
cases with improper jokes or improper contact or
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1
COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2 STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
) ss.
3 COUNTY OF ALAMEDA
)
________________________________)
4
5
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I, Sandra Lee Hockin, hereby certify:
7
I am a duly qualified Certified Shorthand
8 Reporter in the state of California, holder of
9 Certificate Number CSR 7372 issued by the Court Reporters
10 Board of California and which is in full force and
11 effect.
12
I am not financially interested in this action
13 and am not a relative or employee of any attorney of the
14 parties, or of any of the parties.
15
I am the reporter that stenographically recorded
16 the testimony in the foregoing proceeding and the
17 foregoing transcript is a true record of the testimony
18 given.
19
20 Dated: May 11, 2015
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Superior Court Corruption: Whistleblower


Leaked Records Show Commision on
Judicial Performance Protects Judges, Not
Consumers
CJP Director Victoria Henley charged with implementing judge-friendly discipline
process: Judges lie, commit perjury without consequences
By CATHY COHEN(Open Post)

June 18, 2015

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Leaked Documents Posted by California Judicial


Branch News Network Reveal CJP Ignores Lies,
Perjury by Judges Under Investigation
False testimony under oath by Sacramento County Judge Peter
McBrien is documented by the Commission on Judicial
Performance ina setof whistleblower leaked documents
published by the California Judicial Branch News Network,
andviewable here. The CJP is the state agency responsible for
the oversight and accountability of judges in California.
CJBNN has released a cache of leaked internal CJP documents
from the 2009 prosecution of the Sacramento judge, who has a
15-year history of controversy and lawless conduct, including a
criminal conviction for the destruction of trees in a public park.
The judge had the trees cut to improve the view from his home
on a bluff above the park.
CJP watchdogs charge that judges under investigation by the

commission routinely lieto investigators without consequences.


The CJP is, in essence, a consumer protection agency,
explained CJP reform advocate Ulf Carlsson.

ButVictoria Henley, thehead of the agency who is paid an


obscene $194,000 per year, is instead an advocate for
judges. Henley allows judges to commit perjury without
any accountability whatsoever, Carlsson explained.
Perjury is a crime. Former CJP employees tell us that to
prevent embarrassment to the Judicial Branch,
Henleyprohibits CJP investigators from pursuing criminal
chargesagainst judges, or even addingcounts for violating
the Code of Judicial Ethics when judgesare caught lying
during the course of an investigation.

Sacramento Superior Court Corruption and Judge


Peter McBrienProfiled in 2014 Documentary
Divorce Corp
Judge McBriens serial misconduct in the Carlsson divorce case
led to his prosecution by the CJP and was chronicled in the 2014
documentary film Divorce Corp. To view a clip from the movie
featuring an interview with Ulf Carlsson describing what a court
of appeal judge called McBriens judicial reign of terror, against
Carlsson,click here. The movie exposed court corruption
throughout the United States and designated Sacramento
County the worst-of-the-worst.

Court Whistleblowers Allege Family Court Division of


Sacramento Superior Court Operates as
Racketeering Enterprise
Sacramento Superior Court watchdogs allege that Judge McBrien
also is responsible for a family court criminal racketeering

enterprise involving collusion and kickbacks between judges and


local divorce lawyers who also work as part-time judges in the
same court. Click here for an investigative report by Sacramento
Family Court News, an online, nonprofit journalism organization.

Sacramento County Presiding Judge Robert Hight


and Supervising Judge James Mize
ImplicatedinMcBrien Corruption Scandal
Judge McBrien retired from the bench in 2014, but was
authorized to continue working as a family court commissioner
by controversial Sacramento County Presiding Judge Robert
Hight, and troubled family court Supervising Judge James
Mize.Superior courtwatchdogs were outragedthat McBrien
was allowed to return to the bench this year.
Judge Hight testified as a character witness in support of McBrien
at the judges 2009 CJP misconduct prosecution. Judge Mize, a
long time personal friend of McBrien,also testified as a
character witness for the judge.
The character witness testimony was cited by the CJPas a
mitigating factor in assessing punishment against McBrien,
allowing him to remain on the bench despite two misconduct
prosecutions by the CJP, and a priorcriminal conviction by the
Sacramento County District Attorneys Office.
For more reporting on Sacramento County courtcorruption, visit
Sacramento Family Court News.
Perjury and Lies by Judge Peter McBrien at the Commission on
Judicial Performance: Whistleblower Leaked CJP... by California
Judicial Branch News Network - Independent Investigative
Reporting on California Courts

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