La Bugal-Blaan Tribal Association, Inc. et al.

v. Ramos et al.
27 January 2004
Parties
Petitioners:
LA BUGAL-BLAAN TRIBAL
ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondents: VICTOR O.
RAMOS,
SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENT
AND
NATURAL
RESOURCES
(DENR), HORACIO RAMOS, DIRECTOR, MINES AND
GEOSCIENCES BUREAU (MGB-DENR), RUBEN
TORRES, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, and WMC
(PHILIPPINES) , INC.
Background:
Nature and Case History
25 July 1987 EO 279 authorized DENR to accept,
consider and evaluate proposals from foreignowned corporations or foreign investors for
contracts
or
agreements
involving
either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals,
which,
upon
appropriate
recommendation of the Secretary, the President
may execute with the foreign proponent. In
entering into such proposals, the President shall
consider the real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country that
will be realized, as well as the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources that
will be promoted by the proposed contract or
agreement.
Until Congress shall determine
otherwise, large-scale mining, for purpose of this
Section, shall mean those proposals for contracts
or agreements for mineral resources exploration,
development,
and
utilization
involving
a
committed capital investment in a single mining
unit project of at least Fifty Million Dollars in
United States Currency (US $50,000,000. 00)
3 March 1995 RA 7942 signed into law
30 March 1995 Government entered FTAA with
WMCP 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North
Cotabato .
9 April 1995 30 days after publication on 10
March 1995, RA 7942 took effect
20 December 1996 DENR Secretary Victor
Ramos issued DAO 96-40
10 January 1997 counsels for petitioner sent
letter to Ramos demanding DENR to stop
implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40.
No response, thus this petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with prayer of TRO and preliminary
injunction (denied) claiming that petitioner
Ramos acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the assailed Constitutionality of RA
7942 [1], of DENR Administrative Order 96-40 [2],

and of the Financial and Technical Assistance

Agreement entered into on 30 March 1995
between the Republic of the Philippines and WMC
(Philippines) , Inc..
23 January 2001 Manifestation of respondents
that WMCP is no longer foreign-owned as WMC
has sold 100% of its equity to Filipino company
Sagittarius Mines, Inc. which is 60% owned by
Filipinos or Filipino-owned corporations. WMCP is
renamed as Tampakan Mineral Resources
Corporation.
18 December 2001 DENR approved the transfer
and registration of FTAA to Sagittarius from
WMCP.
Supreme Court said that this manifestation and
transfer does not render the issue moot since the
question of validity of the FTAA will affect even
that held by Sagittarius.
FACTS OF THE CASE
-Stated in case historyISSUE/S
Preliminary Issue: Standing of Petitioners
1WON EO 279 is an invalid law having been
issued two days before President Aquinos
legislative powers expired with the convening of
Regular Congress and having thus took effect
after which.
2WON
RA
7942
and
DAO
96-40
are
unconstitutional and consequently the FTAA
entered pursuant to above stated laws is invalid
Ratio Decidendi
Preliminary Issue: Petitioners have standing since
they are residents of the land covered by the
FTAA. Since the petition if for mandamus and
prohibition and the issue is of constitutionality of
a statute, the Supreme is no longer concerned
whether or not petitioners are real parties of
interest to the contract/agreement.
1NO. EO 279 is valid and whether or not the laws
effectivity date lies beyond the expiration of the
Presidents legislative power is irrelevant since it
was still enacted when the president held such
power. It does not run counter to EO 200
requiring laws to have 15 days after publication
requirement before its effectivity since EO 200
also provides unless it is otherwise provided,
EO 279 having stated its own effectivity as shall
take effect immediately. In addition, the 15-day
post-publication requirement
was for
the
information of the public and does not in any way
affect the date of enactment and is not a ground
for invalidation. EO 279 nonetheless was

published on the Official Gazette on 3 August

1987.

Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines,

Inc.

2Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides The

President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, or utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.[3]

Appendix:
[1] Philippine Mining Act of 1995
[2] Implementing Rules and Regulations pursuant
to RA 7942 issued by the DENR
[3] Cont. Art. XII, Sec. 2, par. 4

The Constitution provides for four modes by

which the States may explore, develop, and
Utilize Natural Resources
(1) State may directly undertake such activities
(2) State may enter into co-production, jointventure or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens or qualified corporations (60%
Filipino owned)
(3) Congress may allow small-scale utilization of
natural resources by Filipino citizens
(4) For the large-scale exploration, development,
or utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporation for
technical or financial assistance.
The framers of this Constitution expressly omitted
the phrase service contracts that was provided
for in the 1973 Constitution which allowed foreign
companies to manage and operate mining
activities and replaced it with technical or
financial assistance only.
RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA between the
government
and
WMCP
allows
for
the
management and operation of the foreign-owned
corporation for the large-scale exploration,
development,
or
utilization
of
minerals,
petroleum, and other mineral oils. Although
counsel for respondents claim that technical is
a very broad term that may cover the
management and operation of such activities, it
is still clear from the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission that they intended to
limit the utilization of the natural resources for
the sole enjoyment of the Filipinos.
DECISION
Petition Granted. Certain provisions of RA 7942
are declared null and void. So are all provisions of
Department
of
Environment
and
Natural
Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996
which are not in conformity with this Decision,
and the Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement between the Government of the

Const. Art. XII Sec. 2.

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State. The State may directly undertake such
activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned
by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period
not
exceeding
twenty-five
years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth
in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale
utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens,
as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority
to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in
rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical of financial assistance for large-scale
exploration, development, and utilization of
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the
country. In such agreements, the State shall
promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every
contract entered into in accordance with this
provision, within thirty days from its execution.

Chavez vs PEA
GR 133250, July 9, 2002
Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public
Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on
PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari
Coastal Bay and Development Corporation
(AMARI) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore
areas of Manila Bay and to construct Phases I and
II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP
obligated itself to carry out all the works in
consideration of fifty percent of the total
reclaimed land. . The petition further seeks to
enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with
AMARI involving such reclamation.
Issue: Whether or not stipulations in the
Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of
Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?
Ruling: Under CA No. 141, known as the Public
Land Act, authorized the lease, but not the sale,
of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. Since the Amended
JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer
is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain. PEA may
reclaim these submerged areas. The transfer of
such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Amended JVA violates Sections 2 and 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and is
therefore declared null and void ab initio.
Chavez vs PEA
G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner
asked
to
legitimize
a
government contract that conveyed to a private
entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands
along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila. However,
published reports place the market price of land
near that area at a price higher than negotiated
price. The private entity somehow managed to
deceive the government to sell the reclaimed
lands without public bidding in patent violation of
the Government Auditing Code. The Senate
Committees established the clear, indisputable
and unalterable fact that the sale of the public
lands is grossly and unconscionably undervalued
based on official documents submitted by the
proper government agencies during the Senate
investigation.

Issue: Whether or not stipulations in the

Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed on portions of
Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?
Ruling: The bulk of the lands subject of the
Amended JVA are still submerged lands even to
this very day, and therefore inalienable and
outside the commerce of man. Of the 750
hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 78% of the
total area is still submerged, permanently under
the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended
JVA, the PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged
lands even before their actual reclamation,
although the documentation of the deed of
transfer and issuance of the certificates of title
would be made only after actual reclamation. To
allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands
is in violation of Sec. 2 Article XII of the
constitution.
USERO vs, CA
G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005
Property Law
FACTS: This is a consolidated petition assailing
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Petitioners and the private respondent are
registered owners of neighboring parcels of land
wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of
land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there
is a storm or heavy rain, the water therein would
flood thereby causing damage to houses of the
Polinars prompting them to build a concrete wall
on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters
from their house and riprapped the soil in that
portion.
The Useros claimed ownership of the strip,
demanded the halt of the construction but the
Polinars never heeded believing that the strip is
part of a creek. However, the Polinars offered to
pay for the land. As the parties still failed to
settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible
entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of
the petitioner, while the regional trial court
reversed and ordered the dismissal of the
complaint and confirmed the existence of the
creek between the lots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed strip of land
is part of the creek hence part of public domain
Held: YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil
Code (NCC) provides for properties which are part
of public domain. A creek is included in the
phrase "and others of similar character". A creek,
which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a
property belonging to the public domain,
therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
Being a public water, it cannot be registered
under the Torrens system under the name of any
individual.

Vda. De Tantoco v. Muncipal Council of Iloilo

[G.R. No. 24950. March 25, 1926.]
Facts: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal
council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40,
being thepurchase price of two strips of land, one
on Calle J. M. Basa consisting of 592 sq. m., and
the other on CalleAldiguer consisting of 59 sq. m.,
which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated
for widening said street. The CFI Iloilo sentenced
the said municipality to pay the Tantoco the
amount so claimed, plus the interest.
Said judgment was appealed, and was affirmed
by the Supreme Court.On account of lack of funds
the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay the
said judgment, wherefore
plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the
property of the said municipality, by virtue of
which thesheriff attached two auto trucks used
for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile,
the police stations onMabini street, and in Molo
and Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with
the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo,
Molo, and Mandurriao. After notice of the sale of
said property had been made, and a fewdays
before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed
a motion with the CFI praying that the
attachment on the said property be dissolved,
that the said attachment be declared null and
void as being illegal and violative of the rights of
the municipality. By order of 12 August 1925, the
Court declared the attachment levied upon
the aforementioned property of the municipality
null and void, thereby dissolving the said
attachment. Fromthis order Tantoco has appealed
by bill of exceptions.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
appealed from with costs against Tantoco.
HELD: Property of public domain applies to
municipal property for public use; both not within
the commerce of man
The principle governing property of the public
domain of the State is applicable to property for
public use of the municipalities as said municipal
property is similar in character. The principle is
that the property for public use of the State is not
within the commerce of man and, consequently,
is unalienable and not subject to prescription.
Likewise, property for public use of the
municipality is not within the commerce of man
so long as it is used by the public and,
consequently, said property is also inalienable.
Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of
Zamboanga 22 SCRA 1334
Facts
Prior to the incorporation as a chartered city, the
Municipality of Zamboanga was the provincial
capital of Zamboanga Province. By virtue of
Commonwealth Act 39, section 50 providing that
the buildings and other properties that the
Province will abandon in view of its conversion as
Zamboanga City shall be paid for by the City of

Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor

General, the said properties consisting of 50 lots
were identified and the price were fixed thereof.
An allotment for its payment was authorized by
the BIR Commissioner. In June 17, 1961, RA 3039
was approved and it amended section 50 of the
Commonwealth Act 39 providing that all
buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the
Province of Zamboanga and located in the City of
Zamboanga are transferred free of charge in
favor of the City of Zamboanga. The Province of
Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction
contending that the RA 3039 is unconstitutional
as it deprives the Province of its properties
without just compensation and due process.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
RA
3039
is
unconstitutional?
HELD:
The court held that to resolve the issue it is
important to identify the nature of the properties
in dispute. The properties that are devoted for
public purpose are owned by the province in its
governmental capacity. Those that are not
devoted for public use remain as patrimonial
property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held
valid in so far as the properties that are devoted
for public use or owned by the province in its
governmental capacity and thus must retain its
public purpose. Hence these governmental
properties need not be paid by the City of
Zamboanga.
With respect to the patrimonial properties from
the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039 cannot be
applied in order to deprive the province of its own
patrimonial properties that are not devoted for
public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall
pay just compensation to the Province of
Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties.
G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his capacity
as Governor of the Land Authority; and LORENZO
GELLA, in his capacity as Register of Deeds of
Manila, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge
of Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of Manila;
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of
the City of Manila; and the CITY OF MANILA,
respondents-appellees.
FACTS: City of Manila owner in fee simple of a
parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 557 of
Cadastral Survey of City of Manila, containing an
area of 9689.80 sqm. On various dates in 1927,
City of Manila sold portions of the parcel of land.
When the last sale was effected August 1924,

Transfer Certificate of Title 22547 covering the

residue of the land 7490.10 sam was issued in
the name of City of Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila
adopted a resolution requesting the President to
consider the feasibility of declaring the land
under Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as
patrimonial property of Manila for the purpose of
selling these lots to the actual occupants thereof.
The resolution was then transmitted to the
Congress. The bill was then passed by Congress
and approved by President, and became Republic
Act 4118, converting the land from communal
property to disposable and alienable land of
State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested
City of Manila to deliver the Citys TCT 22547 in
order to obtain title thereto in the name of Land
Authority. The request was granted with the
knowledge and consent of City mayor, cancelling
TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in the name of
Land Authority.
City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an
action to restrain, prohibit, and enjoin Land
Authority
and
Register
of
Deeds
from
implementing RA 4118, and praying for the
declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.
Trial
court
declared
RA
4118
to
be
unconstitutional and invalid on the ground that it
deprived City of its property without due process
of law and payment of just compensation.
Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that
the land is a communal land, or a portion of
public domain owned by State; that the land has
not been used by City of Manila for any public
purpose; that it was originally a communal land
not because it was needed in connection with its
organisation as a municipality but rather for the
common use of its inhabitants; that the City
mayor merely enjoys the usufruct over said land
and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling
parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land
into a patrimonial property of City of Manila nor
divert the State of its paramount title.
Issue:

Whether the aforementioned land is a private or

patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
Held: The land is public property.
As a general rule, regardless of the source or
classification of the land in the possession of
municipality, excepting those which it acquired in
its own funds in its private or corporate capacity,
such property is held for the State for the benefit
of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental
or proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the
same if the State itself holds the property and
puts it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which
it did not acquire in its private or corporate
capacity with its own funds (the land was
originally given to City by Spain), the legislature
can transfer its administration and disposition to
an agency of the National Government to be
disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did
so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of the people.
The property was not acquired by the City of
Manila with its own funds in its private or
proprietary capacity. The land was part of the
territory of City of Manila granted by sovereign in
its
creation.
Furthermore,
City
expressly
recognised the paramount title of the State over
its land when it requested the President to
consider the feasibility of declaring the lot as
patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the
fact that said land belongs to the State and was
simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila
for municipal purposes. But since the City did not
actually use said land for any recognized public
purpose and allowed it to remain idle and
unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by
squatters, no presumption of State grant of
ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be
acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own
private or patrimonial property.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with the
free and untrammeled implementation of
Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from
the respondents. Without costs.