Professional Documents
Culture Documents
30YearsOfTheCPC HuChiao Mu 1951
30YearsOfTheCPC HuChiao Mu 1951
ON
PEOPLE'S DEMOCR.ATTC
Cornmunfst Party
DICTATORSHIP
\\Ihat kind of State is the
Peo1rle"s
Rcpublic of
I What ure the positions and relationships of the variclus classes :.'rnd ol the various
secticns of national econorlly ? What is the
future of such a State'J To these cluestions
China
of 6HINA
40
pp.
LAWRENCE
1'u11
and sal"isthctory
ansrvers.
ls"
6d.
BY HU CHIAO.MU
W.C"2
AN OUTI'NE HISTORY
216
THIRTY YEARS
OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY
OF CHINA
AN OUTLINE HISTORY
by
HU CHIAO.MU
Vice-Director of the Propaganda Department of the
Central Coritmittee'of the Commu.nist Party of China
1951
LAWRENCE
&
WiSUENT LTD.
LONDON
.r'i
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I Tnn FouNoerroNr
il
V A
"
in Great Britain
by
GsNeRAr,
26
W.AR., THE
oE
Revrew oF
THE
47
Tnrnry Ye,*s
67
86
FOREWORD
Tnn Communist Party of China, which was founded on July 1,
1921, is now thirty years old. Its thirty yearsr history is the
history of how Marxism-Leninism has attained a great victory in
a vast country with almost a quarter of the world's population,
in a country which was semi-feudal and semi-colonial in character.
It is the history of how the Chinese working class has led the
broad masses of the peasants and otller democratic forces in
waging heroic struggles against the imperialists and their lackeys,
in finally overthrowing their reactionary rdgime after going
through a long period of difficulties and traversing a circuitous
course, and in founding a People's Democratic Republib led by
the,working class and based on an alliance of the workers and
peasants, thereby opening a broad road for the future transition
to Socialism.
' (3)
Chapter One
il
8
China's
i\
of influence" by
means
WAR
lished in 1912. The change that occurred after 1912 was that
China's superlicial unity became an open split. Backed by their
respective imperialist masters, the warlords continuolrsly fought
among themselves. Both before and after 1912 lhe various factions of fendal rulers reflrsed to carry out any real soeial reformf
Thus to fight against feudalism and to overthrow its mle in China
became another most fundamental task of the Chinese revolution.
In the circumstances described above, the fundamental demands
of the Chinese people were the overthrow of the oppression of
imperialism and feudalism and the realjsation of the countrv,s
independence, democracy and freedom.
Correct leadership was needed to realise these vital demands.
From the time of tho Opium War to the eve of the May Fourth
Movement, the Chinese people had waged many struggles against
imperialism and feudalism. The most significant of ihese struggles
were the Peasants' Revolutionary War of 1851-1864, which broke
out ten years after the Opium War and gave birth to the .,Taiping
Kingdom", ,and the bourgeois revolution of lgll which took
10
'
part
ing
the
the
tl
in Hunan Province,
of the
prarty
the same year formed the Socialist Youth League. After the
First Par,y Congress, ho returned to Hunan to take up the post
#,
12
o(
Thr.ts,
a genuine
democratic
democracy.
". . Lcs elinrinats civil strifo, overthrow the war-lords and eslablish
intclna[ peace; 10 overlhrow the oppression of iLltemational imperialism arrd achievo the compilete independence of the Chinese
to
nation
republic."
13
WAR
,FI
14
COMMUNIST PAR.TY OF CHINA
it was necessary to for-m an anti-imperialist and
class.
by tho warlord Chen Chiung-ming, thus adding to the disinte,gration within the KMT.
15
anti-feudal
alliance with the peasants, who constituted 80 pr cent of the
country's population, with the scores of millions of urban petty
revolution.
The Party then took positive steps to' unite with the Kuomintang (KMT), led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, by which means it was
hoped that the allianco of the working class and other democratic forces could be brought about. The Revolutionary League
(Tungmenhui), prodecessor of the KMT, was the chief organiser
of the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Manchu
government. Politically, the Revolutionary League was a loose
alliance of groups raqging from the radical elements of the
bourgeo,isie and petty bourgeoisie and the liberal elements of
the bourgeoisie to the anti-Manchu el'ements of the landlord
WAR
The second deviation was the "closed-door" policy as represented by Chang Kuo-tao. The exponents of this deviation argured
that the Communist Party must not co-operate with the KMT,
that only the working class could carry through the revolution,
and that tho KMT could not carry through the democratic revolution. Therefore, they opposed Communist Party members,
workers or peasants joining the KMT. The,Congress criticised the
erroneous views both of the Right and of the "Left", and decided
to co-operate with the KMT and to allow members of the Communist Party to join the KMT so as to reorganiss the KMT into
l6
a democratic revolutionary alliance, while at the same time preserving the organisational and political independence of the Com-
munist Party. Nevertheless, the Third Party Congress did not pay
proper attention to the peasant question and the question of revolutionary armed forces.
Party.
widespread campaign of
in a
t7
to attend
classes,
business.
18
WAR
19
1927 the workers in Shanghai launched an r.rprising in co-ordination with the efforts of the Northern Expeditionary Army to
occupy that city. The working-class movement ,and the peasant
movement greatly expanded throughout the country. The total
membership of the ttade unions reached 2,800,000, and that of
the peasants' associations grew to 9,500,000. The membership of
the Communist Party of China increased from some 900 prior to
Kai-shek, Chen Tu-hsiu made opportunist concessions, and satisfled Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary demands to limit the activities
of the Communist Party in the army and in the leading organs of
the KMT. At the end of 1926, Chiang Kai-shek had turned his
headquarters at Nanchang into a centre of opposition to the left
wing of the KMT at Hankow.
By the beginning of 1927 Chen Tu-hsiu's erroneous tendencies had already developed into a right-opportunist line. The
landlord and bourgeois elements jn the KMT had become extremely apprehensive of the great development of the mass movement of the workers and peasants and their revolutionary flrnrness
as displayed in the struggle. Threatened by the peasant movement
in the countryside, the landlords fled to the cities in large numbers.
They spread all sorts of rumours against the peasants, put out the
story all over the cities that "excesses are being committed in the
workers' and peasants' movements", and made use of this to
attack the Communist Party. The petty-bolrrgeois revolutionary
elements showed great vacillation. At this critical moment Chen
Tu-hsiu was overwhelmed by the overbearing attitude of the re-
20
stroke.
I
i
2I
valuable opinions of Comrade Stalin and the Cornmunist International had been succq,ssful in awakening the leaders of the
Chinese Communist Party in time, it would not have been possible for the enemy to have defeate,d the revolution at a single
the
WAR
.it.
,i;
n
rI
.:
,q'
.'i
ii,
)lI'
t
,it
'I
Com-
I
I
i1
.i
22
FIR.ST REVOLUTION,dRY
CIVIL WAR
23
correct views gained the support of a section of the Party membership, they were nevertheless rejected and suppressed by Chen
it
taught
,s
,11
24
It bore out
of the working-class
leadership in
25
WAR
'l
'1
t
li
)fi1
x
I1
r
c
"l
SECOND REVOLLTION.{RY
Ch,aPter Two
bt
1927, during
both from inside and outside the ranks of the revolution' The
Party -failed to resist these assaults in a proper way because
of eirors committed by-its leading organisations and, as a result,
suffered extremely serious blows. The Party tried to save the
revolution from defeat. On August 1, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh,
Yeh Ting, Ho Lung and other cornrades led over 30,000 men
of the Northern Expeditionary Army, who were under the
influence of ths Party, in lan armed uprising at Nanchang,
Kiangsi Province. But instead of joining with the peasant move-
of intellectuals
of petty bourgeois origin, who had joined the Party but who
lacked resolution, announced their withdrawal from the P'arty'
But the heroic Communist Party and the revolutionary people
of China, as Comrade Mao Tse-tung said in his Coalition
Government, "were not frightenod, not conquered, and not
annihilated. They stood up again, wiped off the bloodstains,
buried their fallen comrades, and went on fighting".
Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, the betrayers of the revolubourgeoisie deserted the revolution. Large groupc
26
CML WAR
27
tion, did not and could not solve any of the problenis that gave
rise to the Chinese revolution. On the contrary, China's national
crisis was aggravated by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, who
were even more thoroughly dependent upon imperialism and
who suppressed the revolutionary people even more ruthlessly
than the previous reactionary rulers. The in.rperialists made
certain formal concessions to Chiang Kai-shek (such as giving
up the rights of consular jurisdiction and conventional customs
tariffs), for they knew it made no difference whether these rights
were vested in Chiang Kai-shek or retained by themselves. But
in reality their aggression penetrated ever deeper into China.
Especiafly conspicuous was the ascendancy of American irnperialist economic and p,olitical influence in China.
Manipulated as
KMT
engaged
in
feudalism,
unceasing inlsnecine
i';:ii^Xl,,lti"o;!il'li ::#:"#:l&1
'd Slate Power
lo
\:'?i;;i
Exist.)
28
'
SECOND REVOLUTIONARY
favourable to the revolutidn ,and unfavourable to the counterrevolution. If the defeat of the First Revolutionary Civil War
resulted from the failure to correctly lead the peasants in solving
the agrarian problem, then the hope of reviving the revolutionary movement lay precisely in correctly leading the peasants'
struggle for land in the new conditions.
In the situation whero the revolution had been defeated and
Chiang Kai-shek had established his out-and-out reactionary
rule, the task of the Pdrty was to make clear to the people the
necessity of continuing the revolutionary struggle, and to lead
them along the correct path of reviving that struggle. To do
so, the Party had to sum up the experiences of the First Revolutionary Civil War, cotrect the mistakes of the Party's leadership,
29
revolutionary forces were relatively weak and where the revolution was relatively well entrenched, in order to lead the peasants
in carrying out agrnrian reform and guerilla warfiare; for another
part of the Party's organisations to refnain in the cities, go
underground, and carry on work under cover in order to
preserve the cadres arid Party organisations and preserve and
build up the revolutionary forces of the masses; and after this,
CIVIL WAR
I
t
:O
SECOND R.EVOLT]TIONARY
general task was to establish a workers' and peasants' antiimperialist and anti-feudal democratic dictatorship. The Congress
also worked out the varjous aspects of the programme for the
workers' and peasants' democratic dictatorship and put forward
the task of founding a Red Army, establishing revolutionary
bases in the countryside and carrying out land distribution. The
Congress pointed out that the revolutionary upsurge was bound
to come, but that the political situation then was one between
two revolutionary upsurges; therefore the general task of the
Party al that time was not to take the offensive or organise uprisings everywhere, but rather to win over the masses. These,were
the accomplishments of the Sixth Party Congress. The shortcomings of this Congress were: it lacked a correct appraisal of the
p,rotracted nature of the democratic revolution, the role of the
intermediate classes and the contradictions within the reactionary
forces; nor did it correctly understand that tactically the Party
should conduct a retreat, and especially that the key question was
CIVIL WAR
31
the necessity of shifting the centre of the Party's activity from the
cities, where the enemy was comparatively strong, to the rural
districts, where the enemy was comparatively weak. The leadership of the Party was still in the hands of the "Left" elements.
These shortcomings of the Sixth Party Congress militated against
the thorough rectiflcation of trho "Left" deviations in the Party.
Comrade Mao Tse-tung was not present at the Sixth Party
Congress. The Congress elected him to the Central Committee of
the Party.
The problems that had not been correctly solved by the Sixth
Party Congress were solved later by Comrade Mao Tse-tung
bottr in practice and in theory. In October 1927, Comrade Mao
Tse-tung led a contingent of the newly formed workers' and
peasants' revolutionary army in a withdrawal to the Chingkang
Mountain aroa, on the borders of Kiangsi and Hunan Provinces,
established there the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Region Workers' and
Peasants' Government, repulsed repeated attacks by the enemy
and started to lead the peasants in distributing the land.
After the tr.oops under Comrades Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai
had successively joined forces with the troops under Comrade
Mao Tse-tung, the revolutionary bases with the Chingkang
Mountain as their centre gradually expanded. During this period,
under the leadership of the Party, peasant guerilla warfare and
Tse-tung
I
i
32
revolutionary forces.
"(2) The influence of the First Revolu[ionary Civil War slill remained among the people in vast areas of the counlry.
"(3) The revolutionary situation throughout the country c'ontinued
to
develop.
"(4) There existed the Red ArLny to support thc Red state power.
"(5) There existed ths Communist Party, whose organisation was
powerf ul and whose policy was corre ct, to guide the Red state
power."
In the
SECOND REVOLUTIONARY
CIVIL WAR
33
Since the war was the main form of struggle and the army was
the main form of organisation in the Chineso revolution, and
since the characteristic of the revolutionary war at that time was
34
SECOND REVOLUTIONARY
CIVIL WAR
35
that tho enemy was strong while we were weak, the enemy was
big while we were small, andthat the enemy was divorced froin the
masses while we were closely united with the masses, Comrade
Mao Tse-tung correctly laid down such basic principles as that
tho Red Army must be propagandists and organisers in the work
of the Party, of the people's state power, of the agrarian reform
and of all other local work; that the Red Army rnust develop
strong political work and strict mass discipline among its rank
and file; that the war waged by the Red Army must be a people's
war relying on the masses, with guerilla.warfare, or mobile warfaro having the character of guerilla warfare, as its main form of
fighting at that time; that strategically tho Red Army must carrv
on a protracted war, but tactically it must flght battles of quick
decision; that it must at ordinary times send troops to mobilise
the masses and must at the time of battle concentrate superior
forces to encircle and annihilate the enemy.
All these basic principles and certain other military principles
Lung.
In
of whom over
Ho Ying-chin
Influenced
10,000
troops of the KMT 26th Route Army which was sent to attack
the Red Army mutinied at Ningtu, Kiangsi Province, in December 1931 under the lti:adership of Comrades Chao Po-sheng, Tung
Chen-tang and otherg, and joined the Red Army. Because of
such victories tho strength of the Red Army continued to grow,
;r
i
I
1931.
In January
1932,
it
SECOND REVOLT.]TIONARY
36
it
of
it
occtrpied
Chahar Province' In
of Hopei
set
it
37
[:acks.
Provincc.
The Japanese imperialist invasion brought about a fundain the political situation in China. To resist
mental change
warfare and did not have Comrade Mao Tse-tung as its centre.
Imbued with petty-bourgeois impetuosity and ignorant of lhe
+,
signiflcance and laws of Red Army warfare, the "teft" oprportunists, who cherished illusions of organising uprisings in cities
which were under connter-revolutionary white terror, continned
to occupy leading positions in the central organs of the party.
Headed by Comnade Li Li-san, the bentral leading organs of
the Party, from June to October of 1930, clemanded that general
uprisings be organised in the key cities and that a general offensive against the key cities ,be launchecl by all Red Army forces.
This er.roneous plan caus,ed serious losses to the nnderground
organisations qf the Party in the KMT-controlled areas, but it
did not produce serious effects on the Red Army where Comrade
CIVIL WAR
strr-rggle
B38
brought about in China's domestis political situation and regarded the various cliques in the KMT and the middle groups
as equally counter-r'evoltrtionary; therefore thoy demanded that
tfre Party should wage a "life-and-death struggle". against all of
them without distinction.
As to the question of Red Army warfare, this "Left" group
opposed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's ideas of guerilla warfare
and mobile warfare and persisted in demanding that the Red
Army seize all the key cities. On the question of the Party's
underground work in the KMT-controlled areas, they opposed
tho view of utilising legal forms iand accumulating revolutionary
strength, as firmly held by Comrade Liu Shao-chi, and conti'nued
to carry out the adventurist policies which isolated them from
tho masses. Under this erroneous leadership, alrnost all the Party
organisations in the KMT-controlled areas were finally
destroyed, ,although they had cohducted many heroic stru,ggles
under extremely difficult conditions. lliho provisional central
leading organs formed by the "Left" elements were cornpelled
to move to the bases of the Central Red Army in 1933. The
provisional central leading organs, following their arrival in the
Red Army bases, joined up with the Central Committee members, such as Comrade Mao Tse-tung and othe'rs who had been
working in the Red Army and the revolutionary bases, and later
became the formally established official central leading ofgans.
But Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership, especially his leadership in the Red Army, was thrust aside, and thus the" revival
of the revolution as demonstrated by the victories of the Red
, Army and the upsurge of the mass movement in the KMTcontrolled areas was undermined.
From June 1932 to February 1933, Chiang Kai-shek, immediately after selling out the Anti-Japanese War in Shanghai,
employed ninety divisions totalling 500,000 men in tho fourth
all-out encirclement campaign against the Chinese Workers'
and Peasants' Red Army. Guided by Comrade Mao Tse-tung's
strategy, the Red Army qgain won great victories in this
SECOND REVOLUTIONARY
CIVIL
WAR
In
the
Party leadership, and established Comrade Mao Tse-tung,s leading position in tho whole Party. From that time on, the Communist Party of China and tl.re Chinese revolution have been
continuously under the Marxist-Leninist leadership of this outstanding, great and completely reliable leader-and this is the
most important guarantee for the victory of the revolution.
With incomparable tenacity, after overcoming innumerable military and political difficulties as well as natural obstacles, and
after completing the Long March of 25,000 li (over 8,000 miles)
and crossing almost impassable snow-clad mountains and steppes,
in October 1935,
q
40
SECOND REVOLUTIONARY
one year after the beginning of the Long March, and joined hands
with the Red Army r-rnits in North Shensi. The Red Army units
led by Comrades Jen Pi-shih and Ho Lung and the Red Army
r-rnits led by Comrade Hsu Hsiang-chien also joined forces with
the Central Red Army in October 1936 in the ShensiKansu area.
Chang Kuo-tao, who worked in the Red Army units led by
Comrade Hsu Hsiang-chien, lost faith in the future of the revolution and engaged in activities to split and betray the Party. He
refused to go northward from North-Western Szechuan in company with the Central Red Army, coerced part of the troops into
retreat towards Sikang Province and unconstitutionally set up
another central leading organ. Thanks to the correct policy on
inner-Party struggle adopted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and
thanks to tho persevering efforts of Comrades Chu Teh, Jen Pishih, I{o Lung, Kuan Hsiang-ying and others, the splitting intrigr.res of the traitor, Chang Ktto-tao quickly met with complete
failure, but not before they had caused further great losses to
the Red Army. Before the flfth KMT encirclement campaign, the
Red Arrny had expanded into a force of 300,000 troops, but after
reaching North Shensi at the end of the Long March, owing to the
many setbacks caused by erroneous leadership within the Party,
the Red Army totalled less than 30,000 troops. These were the
most precious flower of the Red Army and the Party.
The victorious Long March of the Chinese Workers' and
Peasants' Red Army marked the turn from danger to safety in
the Chinese revolution. It gave the Chinese people hope in the
future of the revolution and in the future of the anti-Jailanese
national salvation movement. It convinced China and the whole
world of the invincible strength of the Communist Party of China
and of the Chinese Red Army and forced them to see that, in
order to defeat Japanese imperialism, whose ambitions of encroachments on China were insatiable, China had to rely upon
the Comr-nunist Farty and had to put an end to the civil war
against the Communists.
Army units which had marched northward from the HupehHonan-Anhwei border areas, jointly smashed the third encircle-
CIVIL WAR
4I
bases
SECOND REVOLUTIONARY
follows:
the
o[ democratic revoiution.
The correct political line of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China rapidly achieved great results and
in
May
43
CIVIL WAR
In this situation, the Communist Party of China conit necessary to secure a peaceful solution of the Sian
Incident in order to resist Japanese imperialist aggression, and
nation.
sidered
peace
achieved.
44
SECOND REVOLUTIONARY
CIVIL WAR
45
revolution today.
The Party tided over the extremely serious reactionary period
1927-1937. During this period, on the one hand, the enerny
attempted to annihilate our Party completely, and our Party
conducted most difficult, intricate and heroic struggles against
them; on the other hand, having overcome the Right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu, the Parly was assailed several times by
"Left" opportunism, and was placed in grave danger. However"
thanks to the correct creative 1\{arxist-Leninist leadership of
Comrado Mao Tse-tung, his unusual patience and his spirit of
observing discipline, the Party finally succeeded in overcoming
the opportunist errors with perfectly satisfactory results and in
extricating itself frorn an extiemely dangerous'position. Thus,
during the ten-year period of reaction, the Party, in spite of being
't
46
Chapter
"
,ru
T.hree
wAR oF RESISTANcE To
JAPANESE ACGRESSION
,,'
48
the Chinese people, but they were too weak to exert any serious
influence.
The Soviet Union resolutely carried out a policy of supporting
China in the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression. In
August 1937, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of non-aggression
tionary two-sided policy towards them, that is, to unite with them
in opposing Japanese aggression on the one hand, and to guard
against and oppose their conspiracies against the Chinese people
on the other.
Within China, there were three kinds of forces : the people,
the Kuomintang and the traitors. The people were resolutely
opposed to Japan. The working class was the leader and the
peasantry the main force of the War of Resistance. The urban
petty-bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisio and even certa'in sections of the landlord class, especially the enlightened gentry who
stemmed ,from the landlord class, joined in fighting against
Japan. Therefore, the people's anti-Japanese united front was
extremely broad. The traitors clung tenaciously to Japan and
helped Japan to invad,e China and oppress the Chinese people.
Japan had made great efforts to buy olT the most reactionary
sections of the big landlords, big bourgeoisie and other ofiscourings as traitors, and the long-term reactionary policy of
the K;uomintang had also encouraged the activities of the traitors.
the tigers fghting from a safe place,,; secondly, they were afraid
that the growth of the Chinese people,s strength would endanger
their interests; thirdly, they were busy coping with the tense
sitLration brought about by Hitler in the West and did all they
gained
ed that
n. 'Ihe
China"'launch an active
ise the
ople
49
them in words.
s,
i
1/
to resist Japan, for otherwise the whole Chinese people and many
organised anti-Japanese forces would have risen up to fight
Japan of their own accord'and in that case he would have been
unable to maintain his rule. Secondly, the Japanese imperialist
invasion of the whole of China directly threatened his rdgime and
50
the proporty of the landlord class :ind the bourgeoisie. Ti.rus tlie
contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese imperia[ism had now become irreconcilable. Thirdly, there existed con"
tradictions between Anglo-American imperialism and Japanese
rmperialism" At that time, although Britain and the United States
did not want to offend Japan thernselves, they wanted to see
Ctr'inil nghting Japan so as to pin Japan down. These were the
reasons why'the Chiang Kai-shek clique revealed its' counterrevoluiionary, dual character in the War o'f Resistance.
'On the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek wanted to flght against
Japan and wanted other forces to flght actively against Japan.
In the early years of the war, he displayed a measure of enthusiasm in flghting against Japan and hoped to gain a quick victory.
On the other hand, he was opposed to the people and contimred
to oppress them. He was unwilling to let the people arise and
flght against Japan, and was particularly unwilling to allow the
Communist Party and other anti-Japanese forces to mobilise the
people to flght against Japan. He wanted to monopolise the
leadelship of the War of Resistance, but he refused to carry
out any of the genuine democratic reforms which were necessary
to the fight against Japan. He tried his best to curb any deveIopment of the people's strength and particularly any development of the strength of the Cornmunist Party. In the War of
Resistance he secretly planned to eliminate, at the hands of the
Japanese militarists, the Eighth R.oute Army, the New Fourth
Army and other anti-Japanese forces and to preserve his own
strength. To this end, he ordered the Eighth Route Army and
the New Fourth Army to undertake the hardest flghting at the
fronts and in the enemy's rear.
He did not believe that China's own strength could be relied
on to win victory in the War of Resistance. Hence, he did not,
nor was he willing to, rely on the strength of the Chinese people
but pinned his hopes on foreign aid. He hoped that he could
quickly stimulate Britain and the United States into intervening
against Japan, that Britain and the United States, and particularly
the United States, would do the fighting for him. But subsequent
eventsshowed that Britain and the United States were. slow in intervening 4gainst Japan and repehtedly compromised with Japan.
5I
Chiang Kai-shek differed not only from the traitors but also
fro,m the people flghting against Japan. The people fighting
against Japan den.randed unity of all the forces throughout the
country that could be united and flrst .of all the mobilisation of
all the forces of the.Feople to carry on the War of Resistance.
throughout the country for participation in the 'ivar was facilitated. It also decided that the fundamental policy to be followed
in solving the peasant problem during the war should be to
reduce rents and interest.
The controversy over the two policies in the War of Resistance
was also sharply reflected within the Party' Some comrades
represented by Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), who had committed
serious "Left" errors during the period of the Second Revolutionary Civil War, now criticised and opposed the Party line frorn .
a Right-opportunist standpoint. Furthermore, violating Party
discipline, they arbitrarily carried oufl their Right-opportunist
line in the work for which they were responsible. Seeing that
the Communist Party and its military forces were temporarily
weak, and that the Kuomintang was superficially strong, they
drew the erroneous conclttsion that victory in the War of Resistance must depend upon the Kuomintang, that it would
inevitably be a victory for the Kuomintang and not a victory
for the people, that the Kuomintang could become the leader
of the War of Resistance but the Communist Party could not.
They treated the role of Communist-led guerilla warfare in the
War' of Resistance lightly and nursed illusions about gaining a
52
as
Comrade
opposite polici
landlords and
tory.
53
condition that
people
ment,
proletariat and the people flghting against Japan. This was the'
revival in a new situation of the Right opportunism of Chen
Tu-hsiu during the First Revolutionary Civil War. Comrade
Mao Tse-tung carried out a determined struggle against such
erroneous ideas, with the result that they rvere overcoine in
practical work before they caused greater harm.
In order thoroughly to clarify the erroneous conceptions that
existed inside and outsido the Party concerning the War of
Resistance, Comrade lMao Tse-tung wrote On Protracted War
in May 1938. In this'book he made a comprehensive analysis
of the political and military situation in China and Japan and
polnted out that China's War of Resistance was sure of ultimate
victory. He also pointed out that the war could only be a protracted war, that there could be no quick victory and that it
was necessary to adopt the policy of a peoplo's war, if the war
was to be won.
In 'October 1938, an enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the
Central Co,mmittee elected by the Sixth Party Qongress was
held at Yenan. This meeting endorsed the line of the Central
Political Bureau, headed iby Cbrnrade Mao Tse-tung, concerning the War of Resistance and the anti-Japanese national united
front. The plenary session criticised the erroneous policy of
appeasement on the question of the united front and decided
that the entire Party should organise the people's armed struggle
against Japan without- restrictions and independently.
It
decided
55
Communist Party
and Wuhan. From that time onward, Chiang Kai-shek concentrated the main forces of his army in the south-west and
north-west of China, ryith Chungking and Sian as centres, in
order to avoid flghting the Japanese Army. In contrast, the
Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, under the
leadership of the Chinese Commnnist Party, armed the broad
masses of people in North, East, Central and South China,
developed powerfLrl guerilla warfare against Japan and established many democratic anti-Japanese bases.
By 1940, rat the time of the third anniversary of the War of
Resistance, the people's army which was fighting against Japan
under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party had grown
to about 500,000, as compared with somewhat more than 40,000
three years earlier. It was ongaging half of all the Japanese
invaders could
not
could not but turn back to attack the guerillas' The Japanese
inva<lers decided to bring their main pressute to bear on their:
rear areas. They stopped their frontal strategic offensive and
5'1
ry
Kuomintang's offensives in thoroughly prepared actions'- Moreover, the main body of the New Fourth Army became more
consolidated than it had been before the Incident and the Army
developed still more stronplly in the East China areas.
Thanks to the trentendous eftorts made by the Chinese Communist Phrty in the united front; both before and after the
Incident, Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist policy failed to
achieve its object of isolating the Communist Party, but on the
contrary it served tc bring about its own isolation by awakening
and educating many people who formerly harboured illusions
about him.
beginning
beginning
59
the
of the Japanese, to turn against the Eighth Route Army and the
New Fourth Army.
In June 1941, fascist Germany attacked the Soviet Union.
Japan attacked the IJnited States and Britain in the Paciflc in
the winter of the same year. The gains made by the fascist
camp in the initial stages of the war further encouraged the
Kuomintang reactionaries in theil shameful efforts to surrender
to the enemy, to collaborate with the enerty, to encircle the
Liberated Areas, and to attack the Communists and the people.
At
to
in
order
The Party seized on this period, when there were comparatively few changes in the situation, to conduct education
in Marxism-Leninism throughout the Party. It had been
extremely difficult to un'dertake such education on a large scale
at times when the war and the revolution were developing
swiftly or were undergoing rapid changes. Tho Party 'adopted
tho method of rectifyi:rg etroneous styles in Party work in
studies.and in writing, to lead the cadres and Party members
to recognise and overcome petty bourgeois ideas and styles of
wo,rk, which were prevalent in the Party under the cloak of
Marxism-Leninism, and especially tendencies
to
subjectivism
6I
still thought that he could rely upon the several million troops
which he had kep,t in the rear throughout the war. He did not
yet realise that his reactionary policy had long before
demoralised his own troops. This fact was fully revealed in
1944 when the Japanese launched their new offensive.
The year 1944 was a year of the victorious development of
the world anti-fascist war, a year of the imminent collapse
of the Hitlerite gang under the attacks of the heroic Soviet
Army, but it was a yeat of another disastrous rout for the
Kuomintang troops in the face of a new Jap,anssg offensive.
Japan'i position in the Paciflc was becoming more and more
difficult. Japan urgently needed to open up the lines of communication . from Peking to Canton and Nanning. For this
purpose, it launched a new offensive against the front battlelines in March 1944.'As the Kuomintang troops fled in utter
62
of all patriotic
people.
of a democratic coalition government. The Kuomintang reactionaries, secretly backed by the American imperialists, obstinately
rejected these demands of the Communist Party of China and of
other democratic parties and groups.
Before the outbreak of the Paciflc War in 1941, the American
imperialists had made every effort to reach a compromise with
Jap.an at tho expense of China. Now they wanted to take advantage of the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression to extend
their influence further in China, with the aim of taking the place
63
'an<1
64
development of the Chinese revolution since the Tsunyi Conference in January 1935, under the correct leadership of the
Central Committee of the Party. The campaign for the rectification of erroneous styles of work lziunched throughout the Party
in 1942, the discussions which were held among Party cadres
prior to the Seventh Party Congress on the historical experience
of tt Party, and the Decisions ott' tt Number of Historical
"
of the Central
Questions adopted at the Seventh Plenary Session
all p;layed
had
Congress,
Party
Sixth,
Committee electecl by the
the
within
unity
part
in
strengthening
active
and
an important
'
PartY.
65
p.o!ru^*", for
66
Cha:pter Four
in their
CIVIL
THE THIRD REVOLUTIONARY
OF TFIE
WAR, THE FOUNDATION
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
THE PERIOD OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY
in the class relationships in China
after the conclusion of the War of Resistance to Japanese
Aggression. During the,, War of Resistance the Kuomintang
reactionaries, representing the big landlords and big bourgeoisie,
pursued a policy of passive resistance to Japan and active
opposition to the Communist Party in the hope of sapping the
strength of the Communist Party and preserving and amassing
their own strength, so that after the defeat of Japan at the hands
of the Soviet Union, Britain, the United States and the Chinese
people, as represented by the Chinese Communist Party, they
might reap the spoils of victory and then launch an anti-Cornmunist war to annihilate the Communist Party and establish
their dark tyranny over the whole country. To this end all the
arms supplied to the Kuomintang by foreign countries for use
in the war against Japan had been stored up by the Kuomintang reactionaries for use against the Comrnunists. Thus, the
entire Chinese people were threatened by a civil war crisis as
soon as the War of Resistance was ended.
After the Japhnese surrender, the American imperialists tried
to step into the position formerly occupied by Japan in China,
to gain control of China's extensive markets and to convert
China into an American colony. For this purplose, the United
States had to help the Kr.romintang in its efforts to annihilate
Fnesn changes took place
68
gone
through many years of war, the people of all classes throughout the country unanimously wished for peace so that the
seriously damaged productive capacity might be revived. The
people demanded that after the victory of the War of Resistance,
national independence and political democracy should be
achieved. The peasants wanted land. The Kuomintang not only
denied all these things to the people but decided to plunge them
once more into the abyss of oivil war and bankruplcy. The
Kuomintang gave all sorts of special privileges to America in
the hope of getting American aid, with the result that the
national industries and commercial enterprises in the Kuomintang-occupied areas, under the two-fold pressure of American
capital and Kuomintang bureaucratic capital, closed down one
after another and many workers were thrown out on to the
streets. American military and other personnel in China insulted
and harmed the Chinese people. Kuomintang secret service
WAR
69
elements with every method of terror. In the Kuomintangoccupied areas, what the Kuomintang Government did for the
peasants was torconscript them by pressgangs and to requisition
their grain; in the Liberated dreas, it organised the landords to
rob the peasants of the land they had acquired.
Although the civil war planned by the I(uomintang reactionaries had become inevitable and although they had become
isolated from the people, the peace-seeking people were still
willing to strive for peace by all means before the outbreak
the
7O
ing war. He thought that after the conclusion of these agreements the Communist Party of China would relax its vigilance,
and that if he launched a surprise attack he would surely score
'a great victory. Accordingly, when the agreements were made
public he imrnediatcly started an oflensive against the Liberated
Areas. But the Chinese Commtrnist Party was already on the
alert and the rnilitary offensive of Chiang Kai-shek was smashed.
Chiang Kai-shek and his American masters discovered that
they were not yet well prepared. Chiang Kai-shek's troops which
had avoided flghting the Japanese, 'lvere stationed far away in
the remote rear, in South-West and North-West China, while the
People's Liberation Army, which had been flghting all the time
against Japan at the front, was in North, E,ast and North-East
Cl-rina. The situation at the time u'as unfavourable for Chiang
Kai-shek and his American masters to launch an all-out civil
war. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek still needed to take over
quickly the cities and communication lines which were still occupied by the enemy and to transport millions of troops to the
various civil war fronts. Chiang Kai-shek, ef sourse, was unable
to do all these things by himself. To help him to carry these
things out, American troops landed at many points along the
Chinese coast to receive the Japanese surrender and to prevent
the People's Liberation Army from doing so, and turned all
the arms taken from the Japanese armies over to Chiang Kaishek. The American imperialists ltsed aeroplanes and naval
vessels to transport over a million men of Chiang Kai-shek's
army to points around the Liberated Areas. In order to gain
time to get these things done, Chiang Kai-shek nominally acceptecl the demands of the Chinese Communist Party, the various
democratic parties and groups and the Chinese people, and on
January 10,1946, he issued a trttce order and called a Political
Ccnsultative Conference ernbracing all parties and groups' At
that time the Arnerican government also nominally advocated
a truce and sent George C. Marshall to replace Patrick J' Hurley
in carrying on "mediation" in China's civil war for the purpose
of helping Chiang Kai-shek speed up his war prep'arations under
WAR
7I
of the Political
it
to carry out
completely'
the
enemy
to
annihilate
and
encirclement operations
Unprepared and hazardous battles should be avoided. In following this policy the People's Liberation Army had evacuated
n-rany cities and localities in the first stages of the war, but it
72
also
all
smashed.
of the New
74
WAR
75
of l\orth-East China
whole
of the Central
Committee elected by
76
basic
the countryside to the cities. From the year 1927' the
in
the
strength
accumulate
to
been
had
work of tire Party
and
cities
the
to
surround
countryside
the
use
to
countryside,
the
session
sign
."uJtio.ru.y Kuomintang government, however' refused to
trickery'
its
bare
laying
completeiy
the agr6:ement, thus
On April 21, 1949,Comrade Mao Tse-tung and Comrade Chu
Teh ordered the Chinese People's Liberation Army to advance
into South and North-West China to liberate the rest of China'
On April 23, 1949, the People's Liberation Army liberated Nanmany
king and, in the course of 1949,liberated sns after another
Sian'
Hankow'
Hangchow,
Taiyuan,
including
l"ui.tg cities,
iirurlgf,ui, Lanchow, Canton, Kweiyang, Kweilin, Chungking
and
and -hengtu and vast territories. Ifunan, Suiyuan, Sinkiang
In
April
peacoful
by
liberated
lneans'
Yunnan provinces were
and May 1950, the People's Liberation Army crossed the sea
and libeiated Hainan Island and the choushan Islands. In 1950,
Iiberated.
78
FOUNDATION OF PEOPLE'S
of the
in the previous twenty-eight years under the leadership
REPUBLIC
,19
Political
tory answers.
In his article On People's Democratic Dictalorship Comrade
Tse-tung says.:
basic
People's
The Commo
The
the
Common Pro
dictatorshiP'"
again
Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out over and over
eiample
the
follow
must
China
of
that the People's Republic
80
ECONOMIC
It
states:
RECOVERY
8I
ng of Credit
ty and
economic leadership
developrnent
of
of the
People's Republic
of China
towards
much to
Agr
peace and de
New China
China's reconstruction work.
Immediately after
Government carried
Socialism.
82
ECONOMIC
most
samo
economy,
industrial construction.
The Central People's Government regarded the carrying out
of agrarian reform throughout the country as one of the main
conditions for improving the entire economic siiuation and preparing for industrial construction. In June 1950 the Central
Peopile's Government adopted The Agrarian Reform Law of
the People's Republic of China and from the winter of 1950
'to the spring of 1951 led the peasants in the newly liberated
areas to complete agrarian reform in areas with a total rural
population of 130 million. Because the war had been mainly
conclucled, the provisions in the Basic Programme ol the
Chine'se Agrarian law promulgated in 1947 concerning the
problem of the land of the rich peasants were modifled h The
Agrafian Refornt Law of the People's Republic of China. The
of ensttring the middle peasant's enthusiasm for production. At present, the agrarian reform has been completed in
areas, inclucling the old Liberated Areas, with a total rural
population of 290 million and it will be completed in the rest
means
of the country within one or two years. The agrarian reform, the
building up of state power in the form of the peoplds representative conferences, which are being carried on
of the
all over
the
RECOVERY
83
84
E,CONOMIC RECOVERY
changed the
8-5
can aggression will end in victory, just as did the people,s War
of Liberation against Chiang Kai-shek.
GENERAL REVIEW
As has
of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and which adopts the methods
of self-criticism and rnaintains close contact with the masses
of the people," as described by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the
Chinese working class and people would have been unable to
overthrow the rule of the powerful imperialists and their lackeys
and to establish an independent people's democratice State.
Before the Chinese Communist Farty was founded there
existed in China political parties of the bourgeoisiE or the petty
bourgeoisie which endeavoured to lead the Chinese revolution.
These parties had played a certain progressive historical role,
but they all failed under the manifold attacks of the enemy.
Although the onslaughts against the Chinese Communist Party
by the imperialists and their lackeys were far rnore ruthles.s
and menacing than any previously experienced by the Chinese
people, the Party nevertheless succeeded in leading the people
to victory. This is because the Chinese Communist Party is
a revolutionary proletarian party of a new type, cast in the
mould of lhe Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).
of close ties with the masses of the people and the practice of
self-criticism. Only by integrating theory with practice has the
88
GENERAL
RIIVIEW
of Bolshe
ctory over
ment of
nd stage
B9
vigilance.
mainstay. Ttre Party opened- the palh for tbe people's political
authority and thereby Iearned the art of administering tho Slate and
maintaining public order. It created strong armed forces and thereby
leanled the art of war. All these were momentous advances and
achievements of tho Party.
"But during this great struggle some rrtErnbers were slipping or
had at one time slipped into th quagmire of opportunism. T'his was
still due to their lack of hurnility in appreciating the experiences of
the past, to their ignorance of the characteristics and laws of the
Chinese revolution, to their woefully inadequate knowledge of Chinese
history and society, and to their lack of understanding in uniting
Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution.
Hence a seclion of the Party's leadir.rg organisations was unable compJetely and at all times to grasp the correct political and organisational lines .throughout this stage. At one time the Party and the
revolution wero pilaoed in jeopardy by the 'Left' opportunism of
Lt Li-san, at another ti,me by the 'Left' opportunism in the rovolu-
of
e
s
e
\
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA
90
GENERAL
REVIEW
9I
:: :'J:l:'""#'#
I but againit
J3",ffi i"#":i
of the Middle
":,x':n
remnants
Ages."
revolution.
united front.
successfu
rule of
bourgeois
cratic united front.
part of
tung has
capitali
obvious
Tse-tung was correct, and that the ..Left,, or Right opportunists
were wrong.
-.-
92
GENERAL
REVIEW
93
ebb and flow of the revolutionaty war and the advances and
retreats of the revolutionary army reflect the fluctuation of the
Chinese revolution. Throughout the many years of revolutionary war alt the main cadres of the Pafty have lived a life of
in
world proletarian
cialist Revolution
influ
by the October
hinese revolution
_I
94
GENERAL REVIEW
of the Chinese
victory.
Imperialism
doom.
Long live the great, glorious and consistently correct CornChina and its leader, Comrade Mao Tse_tung!
teacher o,f the working p,eo,ple of the whole
Stalin!
ongolian
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