G.R. No.

L-44061, September 20, 1976

MELANIA C. SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY SR., Auditor-General and ABELARDO SUBIDO,
Commissioner of Civil Service,respondents.
The Civil Service Commission: Appointments
Facts:
On January 20, 1960, petitioner Melania C. Salazar was appointed by the Auditor General
confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor General, Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). Her appointment was noted by the Commissioner of Civil Service. On March
28, 1962 and on February 12, 1965 she was extended another appointment by way of
promotion, as confidential agent in the same office.
On March 18, 1966, petitioner received a notice from the Auditor General that her services as
confidential agent have been terminated as of the close of office hours on March 31, 1966.
On March 31, 1966, the Auditor General upon favorable recommendation of Mr. Pedro
Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS issued an appointment to petitioner as Junior Examiner in his
office which was approved by the Commission of Civil Service. On the same day, petitioner
assumed the position.
On December 27, 1966, petitioner wrote the Commissioner of Civil Service requesting that
she be reinstated to her former position as confidential agent. However, no action was
taken on said letter. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with the Supreme Court to
compel the Auditor General to reinstate her to her former position but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition without prejudice to her filing the proper action to the Court of First
Instance.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential or not.
(2) Whether or not the services of petitioner as confidential agent was validly terminated on
the alleged ground of loss of confidence, and if not, whether or not she could still be
reinstated to said position after accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.

Held:
(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances
when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
(1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service
(now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily
confidential; or

(2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the
office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power
which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case
before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents
in the several department and offices of the Government,

unless otherwise directed

by the President, to be primarily confidential brings within the fold of the

aforementioned executive order the position of confidential agent in the Office of the
Auditor, GSIS, as among those positions which are primarily confidential.
(2) Yes. Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner cannot complain that the
termination of her services as confidential agent is in violation of her security of tenure,
primarily confidential positions are excluded from the merit system, and dismissal at pleasure
of officers or employees therein is allowed by the Constitution. This should not be
misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office
at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not removed or dismissed from office
his term merely expires, in much the the same way as officer, whose right thereto ceases
upon expiration of the fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and
cannot be deemed removed or dismissed there from, upon the expiration of said term.
The main difference between the former the primarily confidential officer and the latter
is that the latter's term is fixed of definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but
indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and determined
when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the
incumbent. When this even takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from
office his term has merely expired.

G.R. No. L-16969, April 30, 1966

R. MARINO CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MIGUEL CUADERNO, SR., defendant-appellee.
Facts:
Marino Corpus, Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank, was administratively
charged with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the internal

regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Mnetary Board desoie the
recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis
for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his
suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of
Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was
awarded P5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment.
Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what
he has spent for attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly
technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing
power who was Governor Cuaderno.
Issue:
Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a
public officer?
Held:
The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical
employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable.
No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioners claim for damages, the agreement
between a client and his lawyer as to attorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a
stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable
counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial
court. Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.

G.R. NO. L-69137, August 5, 1986

FELIMON LUEGO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and FELICULA TUOZO, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor
Solon. The appointment was described as permanent but the CSC approved it as
temporary, subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and
another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for
the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in

place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so
appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the
validity of the respondents appointment.
Issue:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.
Held:
No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had
the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter
alia the power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions
in the civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by
the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment
in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person
was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city
mayor.

G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR through its GOVERNOR, SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN and PROVINCIAL TREASURER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TITO B. DATO, respondent.
Facts:
In January 1, 1960 - private respondent Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then Gov.
of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza.
October 12, 1972 - Dato was promoted and appointed Assistant Provincial Warden by then
Gov. Felix Alfelor, Sr.

Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be
legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which
was renewed annually.
January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from
temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not
favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not
possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His
appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him.
March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges
were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to
evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.
Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the
Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him
that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the
latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status
was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant
Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla.
Dato was subsequently acquit ed of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the
Gov. for reinstatement and backwages. His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action
before the RTC
RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of back wages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province
of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA.CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:
W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he
was suspended on March 16,1976.
Petitioners contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the
employment status of private respondent from temporary to permanent, which the CSC
approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of private respondent's
examination for supervising security guard, private respondent's appointment in effect
remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility did not
ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent.
SC Held:

Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not
entitled to his claim for back wages for the entire period of his suspension.
Ratio:
At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not
yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a
civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term
and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private
respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the
supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment
into a permanent one.
What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation
of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority The
letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of
power properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or
disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment
itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee.
CSC should have end edits participation in the appointment of private respondent on January
1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil
service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it
stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested
solely upon the latter.

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION
T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA,
VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO
MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Facts:
Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by the SSS with
residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with their
monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a

petition for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the
ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application for
foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a
letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their payment of the
monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of
foreclosure. This request remain unheeded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages
against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of the
government performing government function. The trial court and court of appeal nevertheless
awarded damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.
Held:
Negative. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages. The SSS
does not enjoy immunity from suit by express statutory consent. It has corporate power
separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it
can sue and be sued in court. These words sue and be sued embrace all civil process
incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of the explicit provision of
the afore cited enabling law, the government must be deemed to have waived immunity in
respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has
given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The
SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.