Digest
Digest
Held:
(1) The position held by the petitioner is primarily confidential. There are two instances
when a position may be considered primarily confidential:
(1) When the President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service
(now Civil Service Commission) has declared the position to be primarily
confidential; or
(2) In the absence of such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the
office, there exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing power
which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from
misgiving or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In the case
before us, the provision of Executive Order No. 265, declaring ...confidential agents
in the several department and offices of the Government,
regulations of the office. He was suspended by the Mnetary Board desoie the
recommendation of the investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no basis
for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him resigned as of the date of his
suspension. Corpus moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of
Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the Board as null and void. He was
awarded P5,000 as attorneys fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the judgment.
Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him contending that it was lower than what
he has spent for attorneys fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer holding highly
technical position may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing
power who was Governor Cuaderno.
Issue:
Is the lack of confidence by the appointing power be a ground for removing an employee or a
public officer?
Held:
The Constitution distinguishes the primarily confidential from the highly technical
employees, and to the latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not applicable.
No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
a cause provided by law. Pertaining to the petitioners claim for damages, the agreement
between a client and his lawyer as to attorneys fees cannot bind the other party who was a
stranger to the fee contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover reasonable
counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must lie primarily in the discretion of the trial
court. Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.
place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so
appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the
validity of the respondents appointment.
Issue:
WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his
replacement.
Held:
No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had
the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter
alia the power to approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions
in the civil service .and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by
the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment
in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person
was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city
mayor.
Dato had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, thus, he could not be
legally extended a permanent appointment. He was extended a temporary appointment, which
was renewed annually.
January 1, 1974 Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from
temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not
favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Dato did not
possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His
appointment remained temporary and no other appointment was extended to him.
March 16, 1976 Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges
were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to
evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement.
Two years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the
Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Gov. a letter informing him
that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the
latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status
was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant
Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla.
Dato was subsequently acquit ed of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the
Gov. for reinstatement and backwages. His request was not heeded. Dato filed an action
before the RTC
RTC Decision: Ordered the payment of back wages of Dato equivalent to five years. Province
of Camarines Sur appealed the decision to the CA.CA: Affirmed RTCs decision. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:
W/N Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he
was suspended on March 16,1976.
Petitioners contention: When Gov. Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the
employment status of private respondent from temporary to permanent, which the CSC
approved as only temporary pending validation of the results of private respondent's
examination for supervising security guard, private respondent's appointment in effect
remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for civil service eligibility did not
ipso facto convert his temporary status to that of permanent.
SC Held:
Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not
entitled to his claim for back wages for the entire period of his suspension.
Ratio:
At the time Dato was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not
yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a
civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term
and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private
respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the
supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment
into a permanent one.
What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation
of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority The
letter communicated by Mr. Lope Rama to the Gov. of Camarines Sur is a clear arrogation of
power properly belonging to the appointing authority. CSC has the power to approve or
disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment
itself or to direct the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee.
CSC should have end edits participation in the appointment of private respondent on January
1, 1974 when it confirmed the temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil
service eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March 19, 1976, it
stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby encroaching on the discretion vested
solely upon the latter.
petition for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the
ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application for
foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a
letter to SSS informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their payment of the
monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of
foreclosure. This request remain unheeded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages
against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of the
government performing government function. The trial court and court of appeal nevertheless
awarded damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.
Held:
Negative. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages. The SSS
does not enjoy immunity from suit by express statutory consent. It has corporate power
separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it
can sue and be sued in court. These words sue and be sued embrace all civil process
incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of the explicit provision of
the afore cited enabling law, the government must be deemed to have waived immunity in
respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law has
given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The
SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.