ADR Digests
ADR Digests
FACTS:
Augusto Salas, Jr., the registered owner of a vast tract of land in Lipa City, Batangas,
entered into an Owner-Contractor Agreement with Respondent Laperal Realty
Corporation to render and provide complete construction services on his land. The
agreement contains an arbitration clause that in all cases of dispute, there should
be one representative for owner and contractor and one representative acceptable
to both.
Salas, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Respondent Laperal Realty
to exercise general control, supervision and management of the sale of his land, for
cash or on installment basis. Laperal Realty then subdivided said land and sold
portions thereof.
Salas left in 1989 and never returned. In 1998, the heirs of Salas filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Sale, Reconveyance, Cancellation of Contract. The RTC
dismissed the petition for non-compliance with the arbitration clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arbitration clause in the Owner-Contractor Agreement is binding
upon the Respondent Lot Buyers?
RULING:
No. The respondent Lot Buyers are neither parties to the Agreement nor the latters
assigns or heirs. Consequently, the right to arbitrate as provided in Article VI of the
Agreement was never vested in Respondent Lot Buyers.
Respondent Laperal Realty, on the other hand, as a contracting party to the
Agreement, has the right to compel Petitioners to first arbitrate before seeking
judicial relief. However, to split the proceedings into arbitration for Respondent
Laperal Realty and trial for the Respondent Lot Buyers, or to hold trial in abeyance
pending arbitration between Petitioners and Respondent Laperal Realty, would in
effect result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay.
On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice if the trial court hears the
complaint against all herein Respondents and adjudicates Petitioners rights as
against theirs in a single and complete proceeding.
There is no need for prior request for arbitration by the parties with the CIAC in
order for it to acquire jurisdiction because when a contract contains a clause for the
submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties
to enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the
jurisdiction of CIAC. The arbitral clause in the agreement is a commitment on the
part of the parties to submit to arbitration the disputes covered therein.
arbitration. In the case at bar, private respondent filed an action for a sum of money
with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. Undoubtedly, such action involved
the same subject matter as that in arbitration. However, the civil action was not a
simple case of a money claim since private respondent has included a prayer for a
writ of preliminary attachment, which is sanctioned by section 14 of the Arbitration
Law. Participants in the regional clearing operations of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation cannot bypass the arbitration process laid out by the body and seek
relief directly from the courts.
any procedural sanction, much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the
case.
This Court's ruling is pursuant to the case of Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, where it was held that the trial court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure
of the parties to submit a compromise agreement.
The Supreme Court ruled that EO. No. 1008 vest upon the CIAC original and
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts
entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines, whether the
dispute arises before or after the completion of the contract, or after the
abandonment or breach thereof. By express provision of Section 19 thereof, the
arbitral award of the CIAC is final and unappealable, except on questions of law,
which are appealable to the Supreme Court.
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues
raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the
power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Yes. The CIAC is vested with the original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
arising from or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that
have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.
The parties submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commission. Petitioner
continued participating in the arbitration even after the CIAC Order had been issued.
It even concluded and signed the Terms of Reference. The document clearly
confirms both parties intention and agreement to submit the dispute to voluntary
arbitration. In view of this fact, we fail to see how the CIAC could have been
divested of its jurisdiction.
The Court will not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat the
objective of voluntary arbitration for its own private motives. After submitting itself
to arbitration proceedings and actively participating therein, petitioner is estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter rendered an
adverse decision.
the cargo and other charges. AMML alleges that Sea-Land should be liable and filed
a third-party complaint against petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the
third-party complaint on the ground that there exists an arbitration agreement
between it and respondent AMML. The petition was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's prayer for arbitration
HELD:
Yes. For respondent Court of Appeals to say that the terms of the contract do not
require arbitration as a condition precedent to judicial action is erroneous. In the
light of the Agreement clauses, it is clear that arbitration is the mode provided by
which respondent AMML as Principal Carrier can seek damages and/or indemnity
from petitioner, as Containership Operator.
responsibility and scope than President and Chief Executive Officer. He demanded
that he be given termination benefits as provided for in the Employment
Agreement.
MCHC did not accept respondent Zosa's resignation, but instead informed him that
the Employment Agreement is terminated for cause, in accordance with the said
agreement. Disagreeing with the position taken by petitioners, Zosa invoked the
Arbitration Clause of the Employment Agreement. However, instead of submitting
the dispute to arbitration, Zosa, filed an action for damages against petitioners
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu to enforce his benefits under the
Employment Agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arbitration clause is valid and effective.
HELD:
The Arbitration clause is invalid in so far as the composition of panel of arbitrators is
concern.
Petitioners MCMC and MCHC represent the same interest. Thus, it could never be
expected, in the arbitration proceedings, that they would not protect and preserve
their own interest, much less, would both or either favor the interest of the plaintiff.
The arbitration law, as all other laws, is intended for the good and welfare of
everybody.
The two petitioners have one arbitrator each to compose the panel of three
arbitrators. Hence, respondent would never get or receive justice and fairness in the
arbitration proceedings from the panel of arbitrators. In fairness and justice to the
both petitioners which represent the same interest should be considered as one and
should be entitled to only one arbitrator to represent them in the arbitration
proceedings.
MMI filed a complaint against Del Monte on alleged violations of Arts. 20, 21 and 23
of the Civil Code. Respondent claimed that they had exhausted all possible avenues
for an amicable resolution and settlement of their grievances. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings invoking the arbitration clause in their Agreement
with private respondents. Trial Court denied petitioners motion. Court of Appeals
affirmed the Trial Courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dispute between the parties warrants an order compelling them
to submit to arbitration
HELD:
The arbitration clause in the Distributorship Agreement between petitioner DMCUSA and private respondent MMI is valid and the dispute between the parties is
arbitrable. However, this Court must deny the petition.
Splitting of the proceedings to arbitration as to some of the parties on one hand and
trial for the others on the other hand, or the suspension of trial pending arbitration
between some of the parties, should not be allowed as it would result in multiplicity
of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay.
The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a dispute.
Clearly, the issue before us could not be speedily and efficiently resolved in its
entirety if we allow simultaneous arbitration proceedings and trial, or suspension of
trial pending arbitration. Accordingly, the interest of justice would only be served if
the trial court hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding.
An information for libel was filed before the RTC of Manila against private
respondents Baskinas and Manapat, with petitioner Francisco Chavez as the
complainant.
Private respondents moved to quash the Information and the warrants of arrest
which was denied by the RTC. Private respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA, which was granted, holding that the Information against private
respondents states that the libelous matter was "caused to be published in Smart
File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila." CA held that the information did
not indicate that the libelous articles were printed or first published in Manila, or
that petitioner resided in Manila at the time of the publication of the articles.
ISSUE:
Does the subject information sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the Manila trial courts to
hear the libel charge, in consonance with Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
NO.
The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and
not that they were published in Manila.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in
Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be
no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is
in general circulation.
If this disquisition impresses an unduly formalistic reading of the Information at
hand, it should be reiterated that the flaws in the Information strike at the very
heart of the jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. It is settled that jurisdiction of a court
over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.