Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Prudential V Dukoff 12-18-09
Prudential V Dukoff 12-18-09
Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF
DECISION AND ORDER
-against- 07-CV-1080 (ADS)(MLO)
Defendants.
---------------------------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES:
suit to void a life insurance policy it issued on the life of decedent Shari Dukoff for
which her husband, Neil Dukoff, was the beneficiary. Prudential contends that the
policy was obtained by fraud and is void. The defendants counterclaimed for the full
value of the life insurance policy, $500,000, plus interest. After discovery, both
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 2 of 24
parties moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
I. BACKGROUND
entered into a group insurance contract through which AICPA members could obtain
application was filed electronically with Prudential in the spring of 2004 for
dependant life insurance on the life of Shari Dukoff, Neil Dukoff’s wife. The
application requested that Shari Dukoff describe any negative medical history she had
within the past five years, including surgery or symptoms of cancer. The applicant
affirmed that Shari Dukoff had none. Based on this application, Prudential issued a
Certificate of Coverage on Shari Dukoff’s life for $500,000, naming Neil Dukoff as
the beneficiary. The policy was dated and commenced on June 1, 2004, and the
On May 23, 2006, Ms. Dukoff died from complications stemming from
cancer. On June 8, 2006, Mr. Dukoff submitted a claim form to Prudential, and on
September 20, 2006, Prudential sent him a letter approving the claim. However, on
September 26, 2006, before the claim was paid, Prudential informed Mr. Dukoff by
letter that it was denying the claim based on material misrepresentations made in the
2
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 3 of 24
application for life insurance. Both agree the application was completed and
submitted through the internet, without a handwritten signature. The defendants state
that Ms. Dukoff completed the application sometime in March or April of 2004,
while Prudential claims the application was submitted on May 15, 2004, a day after
Ms. Dukoff underwent surgery to remove a cancerous tumor. Prudential also asserts
that Ms. Dukoff did not submit the application. The parties agree as to the content of
the insurance application and contract, but they disagree as to their respective
meanings.
On March 13, 2007, Prudential filed the present action in the District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, alleging fraudulent procurement of life
Prudential seeks to void the Certificate of Coverage on the policy and to revoke Mr.
Dukoff’s ownership interest therein. On May 2, 2007, the defendants answered and
counterclaimed, seeking full payment on the insurance policy. On March 16, 2008,
after the close of discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment on all of the
The plaintiff seeks summary judgment on two grounds: first, the plaintiff
contract between Prudential and Neil Dukoff, yet Neil Dukoff is not the person who
submitted the application for insurance. Second, the plaintiff argues that Shari
3
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 4 of 24
Dukoff’s medical records demonstrate that there are materially false statements
The defendants dispute both of these contentions, and further argue that they
are entitled to summary judgment because (1) the plaintiff did not contest the validity
of the insurance policy within the contractually agreed-to period, (2) the statements
made in the application for insurance cannot be used to rescind the contract because
the application failed to comply with electronic signature and electronic records laws,
and (3) the plaintiff waived its right to contest the contract by initially approving Mr.
Dukoff’s claim and by failing to timely return the premiums paid on the contract.
II. DISCUSSION
only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is “material” within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
when its resolution “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d
202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. In determining whether an issue
4
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 5 of 24
interrogatory answers, and depositions must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion.” Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 202 (2d
Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L.
Ed. 2d 176 (1962) (per curiam), and Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d
Once the moving party has met its burden, “the nonmoving party must come
forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct.
doubt” upon the evidence produced by the moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
586. Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party can show that “little
Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
Here, as both parties are moving for summary judgment, the Court takes the
evidence and pleadings in the best light for the defendants when ruling on the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and in the best light for the plaintiff when
5
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 6 of 24
The plaintiff’s first contention in support of its motion for summary judgment
is that there is no valid contract for insurance between Prudential and Mr. Dukoff
because he was not the person who submitted the application for insurance. The
plaintiff argues that Mr. Dukoff’s failure to submit the application demonstrates that
there was no “meeting of the minds” between Mr. Dukoff and Prudential, thus
obviating the contract. The defendants do not directly contravene this argument, but
rather assert that the insurance contract was with Shari Dukoff, who they claim did
submit the application, rather than Neil Dukoff, who did not.
fact as to who submitted the application for insurance. Prudential has produced a
computer printout showing that the application was submitted on May 15, 2004, a
date on which the parties agree Ms. Dukoff was in the hospital recovering from
surgery. This evidence suggests that Ms. Dukoff did not submit the application.
However, the plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence to prove that the printout
accurately reflects the date of submission. Moreover, Mr. Dukoff has stated under
oath that Ms. Dukoff applied for the insurance in March or April of 2004. There is
thus a genuine issue of fact as to whether Ms. Dukoff submitted the insurance
whether Neil Dukoff or Shari Dukoff—or both—was or were the intended party or
6
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 7 of 24
parties to the contract with Prudential. Prudential argues that the application for
insurance required Neil Dukoff to submit it, and that he is therefore the intended
counterparty to Prudential. But in at least one section of the application, the applicant
states that “I” authorize Prudential to access “my” medical records to determine
eligibility for insurance. (Gisonni Aff. at Ex. C.) This suggests that it was Shari
Dukoff who was to submit the application, since there would be no need to release
Neil Dukoff’s records, because Neil Dukoff’s life was not being insured.
The Certificate of Coverage Prudential sent to the Dukoffs does not help to
clarify the issue, as both Shari Dukoff’s and Neil Dukoff’s name appears on its face,
and neither is identified as the party to the contract. Moreover, with respect to the
person the law usually views as a party to an insurance contract, the plaintiff itself
asserts that:
(Pl’s. Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 14 (citing Maslin v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins.
Co., 3 F.Supp. 368, 370 (2d Cir. 1932)).) Taking the pleadings and the evidence in
the best light for the defendants, the Court finds there is a genuine issue of fact as to
Mr. Dukoff and Prudential, there is also a question of fact as to whether Ms. Dukoff
had apparent authority to complete the application as Mr. Dukoff’s agent, allowing
7
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 8 of 24
Mr. Dukoff to later ratify it. See, e.g., RLI Ins. Co. v. Athan Contracting Corp., ---
intention to affirm or adopt the transaction of his agent through his acts or words.”
(internal citations omitted)). The Court thus finds that there are genuine issues of
material fact with respect to the plaintiff’s contention that the insurance contract was
not validly formed. Accordingly, the application for summary judgment in this
regard is denied.
The plaintiff’s second argument is that the application for life insurance
includes material misstatements concerning Ms. Dukoff’s medical history, and that,
fraud. The plaintiff maintains that even if Ms. Dukoff submitted the application for
insurance before she was hospitalized in May 2004, she nonetheless misrepresented
her medical history by failing to disclose, among other things, the fact that she had
multiple sclerosis and had undergone surgery in 2001 to remove a cancerous tumor.
The plaintiff seeks to substantiate these claims through submission of Ms. Dukoff’s
medical records. The defendants dispute the admissibility of these medical records.
The Court finds that it need not address whether material false statements
were in fact made in the application or whether the medical records are admissible. A
separate issue precludes summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Namely, the
Court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
8
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 9 of 24
Prudential challenged the validity of the insurance policy within the contractually
required period.
There is no disagreement that the stated effective date for the insurance policy
was June 1, 2004, and that the earliest date that Prudential challenged the policy, by
any definition of “challenge”, was September 26, 2006, more than two years after its
effective date. The parties further agree that the contract—with debated exceptions—
provides that Prudential may use statements made in the application to challenge the
policy only within two years of its effective date. However, the plaintiff claims that
the terms of the insurance contract allows it to use these statements to challenge the
contract after the two year period has run, provided that Ms. Dukoff died within that
two year period. The defendants disagree. The relevant provision appears in both the
Group Insurance Contract and the Certificate of Insurance, and states in pertinent
part:
9
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 10 of 24
(Angle Aff. at Ex. A.) “Participant” is not expressly defined in the agreement, but
Under New York law, when the terms of a contract are unambiguous, they
411 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir.2005). However, here the Court finds the contractual
sure, the definitions of Participant Insurance and Dependent Insurance suggest that
“Participant” refers to Neil Dukoff, the member of AICPA, and “Dependent” refers to
Shari Dukoff, his dependant. However, the contract later provides that “[Participant’s
statements] are statements made to persuade Prudential to accept you for insurance,”
and “[t]hey will be considered to be made to the best of your knowledge and belief.”
(Angle Aff. at Ex. A.) This, by contrast, suggests that “Participant” refers to Shari
Dukoff, since she is the person who is to be accepted for insurance. Similarly, the
contract provides:
10
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 11 of 24
(Angle Aff. at Ex. A.) Here, “Participant” and “dependant” appear in the same
sentence, suggesting that the former refers to Neil and the latter to Shari Dukoff. Yet,
if “Participant” refers to Neil Dukoff, then the contract appears to provide that the
statements made by him will not be used to contest the policy on Shari Dukoff’s life
after the policy has been in force for two years during his lifetime. However, even if
this interpretation is correct, it is unclear whether the policy could be said to be “in
force” after Ms. Dukoff had died, and thus Prudential may still be entitled to use the
statements against the Dukoffs if she died within the two year period. On the other
hand, if “Participant” refers to Shari Dukoff, then the contract provides that
statements made by her regarding her health may be used to challenge the policy after
the two year period has run, provided she died within the period.
The Court in its own anecdotal experience has noticed that, all too often,
insurance policies contain language that is confusing not only to consumers, but even
to experienced attorneys. This appears to be one of those cases. The Court finds the
language in the Group Insurance Contract to be ambiguous, and therefore must look
Indiana, 31 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1994) (“When faced with ambiguity in an
the parties to assist in determining their actual intent.”). Here, the parties have
provided little extrinsic evidence of their intent. Indeed, the primary “evidence”
presented is New York Insurance Law § 3220, which provides in pertinent part:
11
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 12 of 24
(1) That the policy is incontestable after two years from its date
of issue . . . and that no statement made by any person insured
under the policy relating to his insurability shall be used in
contesting the validity of the insurance with respect to which
such statement was made after such insurance has been in force
prior to the contest for a period of two years during such
person’s lifetime. . . .
Prudential maintains that the parties intended to draft the contract to conform
to the language in subparagraph (1) of Section 3220, and that the Group Insurance
Contract thus provides that the relevant statements may be used to challenge the
contract’s validity within two years of the lifetime of the insured, Ms. Dukoff. The
defendants, on the other hand, disagree and contend that, pursuant to Section 3220,
the parties elected to include a term that is “more favorable to the certificate holders”
Lacking additional evidence as to the parties’ intent, and taking what evidence
there is in the best light for the non-moving party—here, the defendants—the Court
finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the meaning of this contractual
term. Therefore, because the contract term may in fact bar the use of the statements
persuasive, the Court thus denies the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment in its
entirety.
12
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 13 of 24
The defendants assert several bases for summary judgment, all of which they
opposition, the plaintiff contends that none of these bases merit summary judgment
on the defendants’ affirmative claim for relief, because they all rely on the existence
asserts that no such contract was ever entered into. The Court has already found that
the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment in its own favor based on this
argument, but has not determined whether the argument is nonetheless sufficiently
for relief. The Court finds this to be a close issue, and decides that it need not rule on
the question, as the defendants’ motion for summary judgment fails in its entirety for
other reasons.
The defendants assert that Prudential is contractually time barred from using
statements made in the application for insurance to challenge the validity of the
insurance policy, and that Prudential therefore has no valid claim based on fraud so as
to rescind the contract. The defendants also assert that, even if Prudential may use
statements made in the application in its challenge, it has not submitted admissible
medical records to show that material misstatements were made. The defendants
argue that the insurance contract is therefore valid on its face, and that Prudential
13
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 14 of 24
whether the parties’ contract time bars Prudential from using insurance application
there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Ms. Dukoff was recovering from surgery
for cancer when the application for insurance was submitted. If she was, the
of the admissibility of her medical records. Taking the evidence in the best light for
the non-moving party—now, the plaintiff—the Court finds for the reasons set forth
above that there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment
on these bases.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff is further barred from using Ms.
Dukoff’s statements to challenge the validity of the insurance contract because the
support of this contention, the defendants cite both to the Group Insurance Contract
14
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 15 of 24
The parties agree that no physical signature was obtained from either Shari or
Neil Dukoff in connection with the application. The plaintiff asserts, however, that
pursuant to the New York Electronic Signatures and Records Act (“ESRA”), the
part:
N.Y. Tech. L. § 302. In 2002, the New York State legislature amended ESRA,
N.Y. Tech. L. § 102 (amended 2002, renumbered 2004). No such “identifier” is now
required.
15
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 16 of 24
Prudential electronically. The final internet page the applicant saw before submitting
(Gisonni Aff. at Ex. C (emphasis in original).) Before arriving at this page, the
applicant must input his or her personal information, including his or her address and
social security number. The plaintiff asserts that this process satisfied the
The Court is unaware of any other court that has addressed the validity under
New York law have generally held that, under ESRA, an electronic signature is a
valid signature. See On Line Power Technologies, Inc. v. Square D Co., No. 03 Civ.
Stephenson v. Food Bank for New York City, 21 Misc.3d 1132(A), 875 N.Y.S.2d 824
(N.Y.Sup. 2008). In support of their argument that the electronic signature on the
General Counsel for the State of New York Insurance Department. The first opinion,
16
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 17 of 24
Op. N.Y. Ins. Dep. (Oct. 14, 2003) (available online at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/
pertinent part:
Op. N.Y. Ins. Dep. (Sept. 16, 2005) (available online at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/
on the Court, and cite to Medical Society of State v. Serio, 100 N.Y.2d 854, 864, 768
N.Y.S.2d 423 (N.Y. 2003) for the proposition that “the Superintendent’s
17
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 18 of 24
deference to his special competence and expertise with respect to the insurance
industry, unless it runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). The defendants argue that, pursuant to the Insurance
did not satisfy the requirement that the document be “signed” because Prudential did
not have a method of verifying who was providing the electronic signature. The
defendants contend that, because this requirement was not satisfied, the plaintiff may
not use the defendants’ statements to challenge the validity of the contract.
The Court notes at the outset that Serio was concerned with deference to
clear indication that opinions by the Insurance Department are due similar deference.
Id. The Court also notes that the 2005 Insurance Department opinion provides little
support for the conclusion that ESRA requires an insurance company to positively
identify who is signing an insurance document. To the contrary, in 2002 when the
legislature amended the ESRA provision defining the requirements for an “electronic
the person signing. N.Y. Tech. L. § 102 (amended 2002, renumbered 2004). Further,
contract that is signed electronically. Here, the issue is different: the defendants do
not claim that the contract is unenforceable, but rather claim that Prudential may not
18
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 19 of 24
Prudential may use statements made in the insurance application to challenge the
insurance contract’s validity only if Prudential could reasonably identify the person
who made them. Op. N.Y. Ins. Dep. (Sept. 16, 2005). Here, it is at least possible that
Prudential satisfied this requirement. While it is true that the final page of the
the application. As such, the Court finds that there is at least a triable issue of fact as
to whether this is sufficient to satisfy the requirements set forth in the Insurance
Department’s opinion letter. The defendants are therefore not entitled to summary
judgment based on the argument that the lack of a valid signature on the insurance
The defendants similarly maintain that the statements made in the application
for insurance cannot be used to challenge the policy because Prudential did not
comply with federal requirements for the use of electronic records. The defendants
contend that the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
several additional disclosures in the on-line application for its electronic signature to
19
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 20 of 24
the defendants cite, Section 1007(c), relates solely to the use of electronic records,
and not to the use of electronic signatures. Section 1007(c) requires companies to
electronic, rather than print, form. Here, there is no allegation that the plaintiff
provided the defendants with any records in electronic form. To the contrary, the
parties agree that Prudential sent the Dukoffs hard copies of both the Certificate of
Insurance and their application. Summary judgment based on the contention that
The defendants further assert that they are entitled to summary judgment
because the plaintiff waived its right to contest the validity of the insurance contract.
The defendants assert that, by initially informing Mr. Dukoff by letter that his claim
had been approved, Prudential waived its right to later deny the claim.
As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that Prudential did inform Mr. Dukoff
on September 20, 2006 that his claim had been approved. While the plaintiff contests
this, its own submissions include a letter to Neil Dukoff dated September 20, 2006
that states “[w]e have approved your group life insurance claim.” (Angle Aff. at Ex.
C, P007.) Mr. Dukoff confirms that he received this letter. (Dukoff Aff. ¶ 16).
However, the parties agree that the applicable law provides that an insurance
company will not be deemed to have waived its right to challenge a policy unless it
makes that waiver with full knowledge of the possible bases for challenge. See Boro
20
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 21 of 24
Precision Products Corp. v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 223 F.Supp. 584, 588
(2d Cir. 1963). Here, the defendants assert that the plaintiff had full knowledge of
any potential basis for challenging the policy when it approved Mr. Dukoff’s claim.
On the other hand, the plaintiff claims that it did not complete its investigation of the
claim until immediately before it informed Mr. Dukoff that his claim was rejected.
The defendants, who have the burden on their motion for summary judgment,
support their argument by citing to Mr. Dukoff’s release in June 2006 of Ms.
Dukoff’s medical records and doctors’ names. (Gisonni Aff. at Ex. H.) They argue
that this shows that Prudential had knowledge of the basis for any denial of claims
when, three months later, Prudential initially approved Mr. Dukoff’s claim. Taking
the evidence in the best light for the plaintiff, the Court finds that this evidence is not
sufficient to show that Prudential had knowledge of the bases for contesting Ms.
Dukoff’s claim on September 20, 2006. As such, there is a genuine issue of material
fact for trial, and the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds
The defendants additionally urge that they are entitled to summary judgment
because the plaintiff waited until March 2007 to return the insurance premiums
tendered by Mr. Dukoff, despite having informed him in September 2006 that his
Under New York law, an insurer seeking to rescind a contract based on fraud
need not return premiums to the insured until the claim goes to trial. See Berger v.
21
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 22 of 24
Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 805 F.Supp. 1097, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[W]here an
insurer declares an executed rescission, sues to rescind the contract for fraud or on
equity requires that the insurance company tender back the premium prior to trial, or
at the time of trial if the insurer acquires knowledge of the ground for rescission after
the insured's death.”). Prudential tendered the premiums in March 2007, thus
U.S., 251 A.D.2d 315, 673 N.Y.S.2d 730 (2d Dep’t 1998), Continental Ins. Co. v.
Helmsley Enterprises, Inc., 211 A.D.2d 589, 622 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep’t 1995), and
D’Onofrio v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 70 A.D.2d 945, 417 N.Y.S.2d 778 (2d
Dep’t 1979), in support of their argument that Prudential lost its right to challenge the
policy by failing to return premiums. All these cases are inapplicable. Each of the
cases cited deals with an insurer who continued to accept premiums from an insured
despite knowledge of a basis for rescinding the relevant insurance contract. There is
no allegation here that any premiums were paid to Prudential after Ms. Dukoff died,
or that Prudential had knowledge of a basis for rescinding the contract before her
death. The Court thus finds that the timing of Prudential’s return of the premium
The defendants also move separately for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
claim for unjust enrichment. The defendants contend that the claim is unripe, as
22
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 23 of 24
Prudential has not yet made any payment to Mr. Dukoff. The plaintiff maintains that
the claim is ripe, because Mr. Dukoff was unjustly enriched by his improperly
The parties agree that a party is unjustly enriched when that party “holds
property that he should not.” (Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J at 25 (citing
Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 242, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359 (N.Y. 1978)); Pl.’s
Resp. at 25.) The operative question is therefore whether Mr. Dukoff has a property
interest in the insurance policy on Ms. Dukoff’s life. If he does, then the plaintiff’s
While the Court is not aware of other courts that have addressed this question
under New York law in this context, courts have held that a party may hold a property
interest in an insurance policy in the context of matrimonial law. See, e.g., Marra v.
Marra, 279 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1013 (N.Y.Sup. 1967) (“A named beneficiary can, of
course, acquire a property interest in a life insurance policy.”) The Court thus finds
that Mr. Dukoff does have a property interest in the insurance policy, and therefore
denies the defendants’ motion for summary judgment with regard to the plaintiff’s
persuasive, the Court denies the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in its
entirety.
III. CONCLUSION
23
Case 2:07-cv-01080-ADS-MLO Document 57 Filed 12/18/09 Page 24 of 24
ORDERED that the parties are directed to appear for a pre-trial conference on
SO ORDERED.
24