Villanueva vs. Caparas
Villanueva vs. Caparas
the niece of Edna; the affidavit of Lourdes Miguel, Renatos sister; and the affidavit of Jovita Caparas, Renato and
Lourdes mother, who were all witnesses to the incident. Villanueva submitted as well as the opinion of Dr. Valentin
T. Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation Medico-Legal Division (NBI opinion) as to the cause of Renatos
7
head injuries.
?r?l1
Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for homicide 8 against Villanueva on October 3,
9
2006. Villanueva sought reconsideration of the prosecutors resolution, but the prosecutor denied the motion on
10
March 22, 2007. Before he could be arraigned, Villanueva filed a petition for review before the Department of
Justice.
The DOJ Secretarys Resolution
On July 27, 2007, the Secretary set aside the prosecutors resolution and directed the prosecutor to move for the
withdrawal of the information. The Secretary found the evidence against Villanueva insufficient to support a prima
facie case. With the Secretarys denial of Ednas motion for reconsideration on January 4, 2008, Edna sought
11
recourse with the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
?r?l1
Edna, in her response,14 argues that, first, the issue raised before the CA is whether the Secretary committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing his resolution which was cited as basis for Villanuevas motion to withdraw the
information; thus, after setting aside the Secretarys resolution and finding probable cause, the CA correctly ordered
the reinstatement of the information; and second, the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary gravely abused his
discretion when he reversed the finding of probable cause as he relied on the unconfirmed affidavit of Jovita and on
the NBI opinion, and disregarded the testimony of Edna and her witness and the autopsy report.
The petition poses to us the issue of whether the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary exceeded the bounds of his
jurisdiction when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to indict Villanueva for homicide
and, pursuant to this conclusion, ordered the withdrawal of the resolution.
The petitioner posits that: (1) the CA passed upon the findings of the RTC although the latters findings were not in
issue before the CA; (2) the Secretary is specifically granted the power, among others, to reverse the findings of
the prosecutor when, as in this case, they are contrary to the evidence; and (3) the CA completely disregarded the
affidavits of Lourdes and Jovita, and the NBI opinion, among others.
We find the CA decision and resolution in accord with law and jurisprudence in finding that the Secretary acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he reversed the prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge Villanueva
with homicide.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient to incite a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. 15 Only such facts
16
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not absolute certainty. Probable
cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that
17
would justify a conviction. The strict validity and merits of a party's accusation or defense, as well as admissibility
18
of testimonies and pieces of evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case.
?r?l1
The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, 19 lodged in the first place on the
20
21
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation on the offended partys complaint. The prosecutors
22
ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter, has the power to
23
reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutors determination. As a rule, the Secretarys findings are not subject to
24
interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
25
26
jurisdiction; or when he grossly misapprehends facts; or acts in a manner so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law; or when he acts outside the
27
contemplation of law.
?r?l1
In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged, homicide in this case, should be
present.28 Jurisprudence laid out the elements of homicide as: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him
without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing
was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. 29 All of these elements are present in this
case, as adequately shown by the affidavits of Edna and her witness, and by the autopsy report.
We agree with the CA that the Secretary, in this case, calibrated the evidentiary weight of the NBI opinion vis-a-vis
the autopsy report, as well as Ednas complaint-affidavit vis--vis the affidavit of Jovita, and in so doing, already
went into the strict merits of Villanuevas defenses. We note that the NBI opinion was procured at Villanuevas
30
instance and was based on the documents and in response to the questions Villanueva posed, while Jovita was
unable to recall the events that transpired relative to Renatos death when asked during the preliminary
investigation. Whether the alternative scenario on the cause of Renatos injuries and death (as supported by
Jovitas affidavit and the NBI opinion and which Villanueva proposed by way of defense) is more credible and more
likely than the narrations of Edna in her complaint-affidavit, in the affidavit of her witness, and the NBI autopsy
report should best be left for the trial court to determine after a full-blown trial on the merits. When the Secretary
made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against Villanueva, he
effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted
outside his jurisdiction.
Finally, while the CA may have discussed the propriety of the RTC's order granting the withdrawal of the information
- a matter not directly raised in the petition before the appellate court - the discussion was done only in response to
Villanueva's own manifestation and motion for the dismissal of the petition by reason of the order of the RTC. 31 In
this light, the CA's discussion of the matter is fully justifiable and understandable. We agree with the CA that the
order of the RTC for the withdrawal of information simply relied on the Secretary's resolution granting the
32
withdrawal of the information. Since the Secretary's resolution is void, the consequent order of the RTC, made on
33
the basis of this void resolution, should likewise be void and of no effect.
?r?l1
In sum, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it nullified and set aside the resolution rendered by the
Secretary with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the C A also did not err in ordering the reinstatement of the
prosecutor's resolution of probable cause and its accompanying information.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit, and accordingly AFFIRM the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2009 and its resolution dated January 11, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 102128.
Costs against petitioner Baron A. Villanueva.
SO ORDERED.