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Burton, David - Is Madhyamaka Buddhism Really The Middle Way? Emptiness and The Problem of Nihilism - (Contemporary Buddhism - An Interdisciplinary Journal) - Vol 2 - No 2 - 2008
Burton, David - Is Madhyamaka Buddhism Really The Middle Way? Emptiness and The Problem of Nihilism - (Contemporary Buddhism - An Interdisciplinary Journal) - Vol 2 - No 2 - 2008
Contemporary Buddhism: An
Interdisciplinary Journal
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Is Madhyamaka Buddhism
really the middle way?
Emptiness and the problem of
nihilism
David Burton
Published online: 09 Jun 2008.
To cite this article: David Burton (2001) Is Madhyamaka Buddhism really the
middle way? Emptiness and the problem of nihilism, Contemporary Buddhism: An
Interdisciplinary Journal, 2:2, 177-190, DOI: 10.1080/14639940108573749
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14639940108573749
to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can
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Is Madhyamaka Buddhism
Really the Middle Way?
Emptiness and the Problem of
Nihilism.
David Burton
i
A common accusation made against the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness
( sunyata) is that it entails nihilism. One needs to look no further than Ngrjuna's
own workssuch as the Stanzas on the Middle Way, the Refutation of Objections,
and the Seventy Stanzas on Emptinessto find this criticism made by his
opponents. If everything is empty, the opponents contend, then nothing exists at
all. Madhyamaka philosophy thus destroys the entire world, and with it the very
possibility of the Buddhist spiritual life.1
However, Madhyamikas are quick to refute this claim that the emptiness of
things means that these things do not exist at all. Ngrjuna warns against such a
nihilistic misunderstanding of emptiness, saying that by this misperception of
emptiness 'a person of little intelligence is destroyed, like by a snake wrongly
seized or a spell wrongly cast.'2 His intention is not to negate the world, nor does
the teaching of emptiness, when rightly understood, destroy the possibility of the
Buddhist spiritual life.
On the contrary, emptiness means, Ngrjuna says, not that entities are nonexistent but rather that they are empty of, i.e. lack, independent or autonomous
being. Entities are without inherent existence {svabhvd)? Emptiness denotes that
things exist but their existence is never self-standing. The existence of entities is
always dependent on many conditions.
Some of these conditions are external to the entities themselves. The existence of a
tree, for example, depends upon various extrinsic conditionssuch as the earth in
which it is rooted, rain, sunshine, the seed from which it grew, and so on. Without
these conditions, the tree would not exist. But the Madhyamika also says that
entities depend for their existence upon intrinsic factorsnamely, the various
necessary parts which make up the entity. The tree cannot exist without its
essential constituents, such as the roots, the trunk, the branches, and so forth. So,
the tree does not have an autonomous existence. It does not and cannot stand alone
in the world, as it were, unsupported by other entities and independent of its
indispensable parts.
And what is true of the tree in this respect is equally the case, according to the
Madhyamika, for all other things. This can be most potently realised in the case of
one's own self. One's existence is clearly dependent on numerous factors both
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external and internal. One's existence depends, for instance, on the benign
environmental conditions in which one livesthat there is enough oxygen to
breathe, and that the sun has heated the world to a temperature which makes
human life possible, that one lives in a peaceful society and one without
epidemics. Further, one's existence depends on the continued functioning of one's
various partsone would cease to exist if one's essential parts such as one's heart,
lungs or brain stopped working. In terms of traditional Buddhist categories, one's
existence relies on the five constituent aggregates (skandhas) of form, feeling,
perception, volition, and consciousness.
Thus, Ngrjuna is able to claimin both the Stanzas on the Middle Way and
the Refiitation of Objectionsthat it is only because things are empty, i.e. devoid
of autonomous existence, that they can come into existence in dependence upon
various conditions. It is the rejection, rather than the acceptance, of emptiness
4
which in fact destroys all entities. If things were not empty of autonomous
existence then there could be no explanation of the manifold dependently
originating entities which undeniably do occur. The world would be static,
unchanging, which is evidently not the case. Ngrjuna declares that 'since a
phenomenon not dependently originating does not exist, a non-empty
phenomenon certainly does not exist.'5
Most importantly for the Buddhist practitioner, it is, according to Ngrjuna,
the emptiness of all things which makes spiritual life possible. It is because all
entities lack autonomous existence that change can occur. Things change when the
things change upon which they depend. And Buddhist practice is fundamentally
about change. That is, Buddhism is about transformingby means of ethical
conduct, meditation, ritual, mindfulness and so forthunskilful mental events into
skilful mental events. Buddhism is about progressing from a state of unenlightenment to a state of enlightenment, from ignorance to wisdom. If entities
were not emptyif they possessed an independent existence unaffected by any
alterations in other thingsthey would be unchanging and unchangeable. And,
thus, if we were autonomously existing beings, we would be unable to gain
enlightenment, or indeed to make any spiritual progress at all. We would be stuck,
spiritually speaking, with the way we are at present.6
So, the Madhyamaka claim is that everythingincluding, most importantly,
the spiritual life itselfis made possible by emptiness. The contention that entities
are not empty contradicts the empirically verifiable reality that things change
when the factors upon which these things rely alter, and would, furthermore,
completely undermine the possibility of spiritual transformation. As Ngrjuna
says, 'For whom emptiness exists, all things are possible. For whom emptiness
does not exist, nothing is possible.'7 The teaching of emptiness is actually an
affirmation of the dynamic interconnectedness of all things.
Thus, the Madhyamaka teaching of emptiness appears to be a re-statement of
the venerable and central Buddhist teaching of dependent origination
(pratltyasamutpada). Indeed, Ngrjuna proclaims in the auto-commentary to the
Refutation of Objections that emptiness and dependent origination are synonyms.8
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simply fabrications, merely appearances to the mind which have no further reality.
This is why in Madhyamaka texts one finds statements that dependently
originating entities do not really originate.18 In other words, the whole world of
dependently originating entities is simply a phantasm, a show, a mental creation, a
mere appearance. So, the absence of inherent existence, the emptiness, of all
things in the final analysis means, for Madhyamaka, not simply that all things
dependently originate. It means, furthermore that all these dependently originating
things are mere mental fabrications.
But how does the Mdhyamika reach this conclusion? The Madhyamaka
contention, it appears, is that the dependent origination of entities actually entails
that these entities are conceptual constructs. This is because an entity, by virtue of
its origination in dependence on various internal and external conditions, is always
analysable into these conditions. Thus, according to Madhyamaka, the entity is
simply a name or concept attributed to the conglomeration of conditions. The
Mdhyamika would challenge us to examine any entity whatsoever. A tree, for
example, is made up of various componentsthe trunk, roots, branches, bark,
leaves and so forth. And the tree is also dependent on various external factors,
such as soil, sunshine, water, and so forth. The Mdhyamika contends that, if one
examines the entity which one calls 'tree' one finds that, in reality, there is nothing
there other than these various parts and external conditions operating in
conjunction. There is not in fact a separate 'tree-entity'. As the Madhyamikas
sometimes put this point, when analysed, an entity, any entity, is actually
unfindable.19 When one searches for the tree-entity, for instance, it dissolvesso
to speakinto its components and external conditions. Actually, the Mdhyamika
would say, the entity which we call 'tree' is simply a name, a concept, which the
mind attributes to these various conditions. There is no mind-independent treeentity. Hence, dependent origination means that dependently originating entities
have a merely conceptual existence.
Buddhism is well-known for carrying out this sort of analysis with regard to
the self (tmari). The self, when examined, is discovered to be composed of five
ever-changing psycho-physical factors. Physical form, feelings, conceptions,
volition's, and consciousness. What one calls 'the self is simply the inter-play and
constant flow of these various factors. If one looks closely at one's experience,
there is no additional factor, it is argued, which might be called the self. The self
is, then, just a name, a concept, which is attributed by the mind to this everchanging psycho-physical process. The Milindapaha famously compares the self
in this respect to a chariot, which (it is claimed) is simply a name imputed to the
collection of its partsthe axle, wheels, frame, reins, yoke, and so forth.20
Madhyamaka applies this reasoning to each and every thing. Just as the self or
a chariot cannot withstand analysis, so it is with every entity. If one examines any
entity, it can be analysed into internal and external conditions. The entity itself will
be found to be nothing more than a name or concept which is used to label the
conjunction of these conditions. These conditions will themselves be found to be
mere names or concepts used to label their own conditions, and so on. In no case
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philosophy, it can be claimed, is not the Middle Way after all. It has fallen into the
extreme of nihilism.
Ill
However, Madhyamaka texts are notoriously difficult to unravel, and they can
often admit of a variety of interpretations. It is also possible that the Madhyamaka
tradition is not entirely internally consistent. There may be more than one
philosophical stance advanced in Madhyamaka texts. Furthermore, it may be that
the Madhyamikas in some respects had not considered the possible implications of
their often laconic statements, and that some of these statements may be
compatible with more than one philosophical position. In studying Madhyamaka,
one is often faced by the problem of interpretative uncertainty. But it is this very
interpretative uncertainty which can perhaps offer some possible ways out of the
nihilistic predicament. While the reading of Madhyamaka which I have presented
is supported by many textual passages, and the nihilistic interpretation of
Madhyamaka is thus plausible, it need not be the only understanding of
Madhyamaka which can be countenanced. Even if one finds that the nihilistic
interpretation of Madhyamaka is a credible reading of many Madhyamaka texts, it
is worth investigating some ways in which the Madhyamika might claim that
things have a fabricated, conceptually constructed existence, while avoiding the
charge of nihilism. I will consider briefly three non-nihilistic readings of this
Madhyamaka contention.
Emptiness and the Unconditioned.
The nihilistic interpretation of Madhyamaka says that everything is empty in the
sense that everything lacks inherent existence, which means both that everything is
dependently originating and that all these dependently originating things are mere
fabrications. But surely, it might be suggested, this philosophy of emptiness does
not for Madhyamaka apply to nirvnai Buddhists often say that nirvna is an
unconditioned (asamskrta) sphere attained by the liberated person. There is some
room for interpretation about the nature of this unconditioned sphere. However,
quite a few Buddhist texts seem to suggest that it is a permanent reality which
transcends the conditioned (sa.mskta) world of dependently originating entities, a
permanent reality which is apprehended by the liberated person and, it seems, into
which the liberated person passesin some undefined senseafter his death (the
parinirva). It is a true refuge and the source of real bliss, unlike the conditioned,
mundane things of this world. In which case the Buddhist claim that everything is
dependently originating actually means that every conditioned thing is
dependently originating. The Unconditioned is, by contrast, not subject to
dependent origination. Similarly, perhaps the Madhyamaka claim that everything
is a mental fabrication applies only to the conditioned world, and there is for the
Madhyamika an Unconditioned reality which is real, unfabricated, and blissful.
There are a number of Madhyamaka texts which might be understand as
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Leaving aside these philosophical problems, such an understanding of
Madhyamaka need not deny that Madhyamaka teaches that the things of the
conditioned world are one and all empty in the sense that they are mental
fabrications. But this mundane sense of emptiness needs to be complemented by
the teaching of the higher emptiness, which points us towards the ineffable
Unconditioned Reality.
However, here we are faced again by the problem of interpretative uncertainty.
For many Madhyamaka texts seem to imply that emptiness is not an ineffable
Unconditioned Reality, itself exempted from the general rule that all entities are
empty of inherent existence. Rather, emptiness is nothing more than the ultimate
truth about entitiesit is how they actually are. It is purely and simply their lack
of inherent existence. The Hymn to the Inconceivable says that 'the ultimate truth
29
is the teaching that objects are without inherent existence.' And in the Seventy
Stanzas on Emptiness Ngrjuna declares that the ultimate is no more than the
teaching that things are dependently originating, because they lack inherent
30
existence.
Furthermore, Ngrjuna's famous claim that 'there is no difference between
samsra and nirvna'*1 can be interpreted to mean that, just like the entities which
constitute cyclic existence, nirvaa as an unfabricated Unconditioned Reality is
itself a fiction, a mental creation. So, Candrakrti proclaims that nirvna is simply
a convention, and thus lacks inherent existence.32 It is not in fact an inherently
existing Unconditioned Reality. It is true that these statements might be read as an
attack on the term 'nirvna', if understood as ultimately denoting what is actually
an ineffable Reality. But it is also possible that Ngrjuna and Candrakrti are here
negating the ineffable Reality itself, and not just the ability of the term 'nirvna' to
describe it. In this latter case, it would appear that the only genuine nirvaa which
the Madhyamika can accept is the psychological state of freedom from craving,
attachment and suffering which supposedly results from the realisation that all
things are empty. As the Sixty Verses of Reasoning declares, 'the thorough
knowledge o samsra is nirvna'. On this verse, Candrakrti comments that the
thorough knowledge in question is that sasra arises without inherent existence.34
Nirvnafar from being an unfabricated, unconditioned ontological realmis
simply the insight into the merely conventional nature of all things.
The Madhyamaka texts which state that Madhyamikas have no views,
positions, or theses are thus to be understood as meaning only that Madhyamikas
have no views, positions or theses which assert the inherent existence of anything.
Madhyamikas do assert the emptiness, the absence of inherent existence, of all
entities. This emptiness is permanent only in the sense that the absence of inherent
existence is always and everywhere the true nature of things. Emptiness is the
emptiness of the chair, the emptiness of the tree, the emptiness of the person, and
so forth. Madhyamikas in the dGe lugs tradition of Tibetan Buddhism say,
therefore, that there are as many emptinesses as there are entities. There is an
emptiness, an absence of inherent existence, for each and every thing.35 Emptiness
is itself empty, according to this interpretation of Madhyamaka, precisely because
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'perspectival realism'1"would claim that the mind-independent entity is not
inaccessible. Yet, unlike naive realism, it acknowledges that the limitations and
contributions of the apprehender entail that the apprehended entity is never fully
available to us. One's apprehension of the entity is always mediated by the
knowing mind and its perceptual apparatus. However, this mediation does not cut
one off from mind-independent things. On the contrary, it is our only means of
access to them. But it does entail that our access is always incomplete, imperfect.
This perspectival realism seems to be compatible with the Madhyamaka
statements that prameya and prama are mutually dependent, and that pramas
cannot be established to apprehend prameyas as they are mind-independently.
Entities as known are empty in the sense that they originate in dependence upon
both the mind-independent entity and the knowing mind. But this does not mean
that the mind-independent entity remains entirely concealed from us. The Middle
Way is here between scepticism and naive realism, for the Madhyamika
acknowledges that mind-independent things can be apprehendedthere is no
unbridgeable gulf between the mind and realitybut that the apprehension of
these things is always from a particular vantage point.
Notes
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25 It is possible, perhaps, to read Madhyamakakrik XXIV, 18 and XXII, 11 as
supportive of this interpretation.
26
Prasannapad 264. See also Madhyamakvatrabhsya 178.
27 See Yuktisastikkrik 50; Vigrahavyvartan 29; Madhyamakakrik XIII, 8.
28
For a detailed discussion of this problem, see D. Burton Emptiness Appraised. A
Critical Study of Ngrjuna's Philosophy. Richmond: Curzon Press, 1999, pp. 55-7.
29 Afiintyastava 52.
30 nyatsaptatikrik 68.
31 Madhyamakakrik XXV, 19.
32 Yuktisastikkrikvtti 5.
33 Yuktisastikkrika 6.
34 Yuktisasti@kkrikvtti 6.
35
See E. Napper, Dependent Arising and Emptiness. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1989,
p. 94.
36
Vigrahavyvartan (and auto-commentary) 30-51.
37 Vaidalyaprakara@na (and auto-commentary) 2.
38 The name 'perspectival realism' was suggested to me by M. McGhee and my
reflections on it have been stimulated by his ideas.
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