Philippine Savings Bank Vs Castillo
Philippine Savings Bank Vs Castillo
Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK,
Petitioner,
- versus -
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
May 30, 2011
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DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
From the release of the loan in May 1997 until December 1999, petitioner
had increased and decreased the rate of interest, the highest of which was 29% and
the lowest was 15.5% per annum, per the Promissory Note.
Respondents were notified in writing of these changes in the interest
rate. They neither gave their confirmation thereto nor did they formally question
the changes. However, respondent Alfredo Castillo sent several letters to
petitioner requesting for the reduction of the interest rates. [5] Petitioner denied
these requests.
Respondents regularly paid their amortizations until December 1999, when
they defaulted due to financial constraints. Per petitioners table of application of
payment, respondents outstanding balance was P2,231,798.11.[6] Petitioner
claimed that as of February 11, 2000, respondents had a total outstanding
obligation ofP2,525,910.29.[7] Petitioner sent them demand letters. Respondents
failed to pay.
Thus, petitioner initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
properties. The auction sale was conducted on June 16, 2000, with the properties
sold for P2,778,611.27 and awarded to petitioner as the only bidder. Being the
mortgagee, petitioner no longer paid the said amount but rather credited it to the
loan amortizations and arrears, past due interest, penalty charges, attorneys fees,
all legal fees and expenses incidental to the foreclosure and sale, and partial
payment of the mortgaged debt. On even date, a certificate of sale was issued and
submitted to the Clerk of Court and to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Manila.
On July 3, 2000, the certificate of sale, sans the approval of the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), was registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Manila.
Respondents failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption
period. However, on July 18, 2001, Alfredo Castillo sent a letter to petitioner
requesting for an extension of 60 days before consolidation of its title so that they
could redeem the properties, offering P3,000,000.00 as redemption
price. Petitioner conceded to Alfredo Castillos request, but respondents still failed
to redeem the properties.
2.
3.
4.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC partially granted the
motion in its November 30, 2005 Order, modifying the interest rate from 17% to
24% per annum.[9]
Petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA modified the decision of the RTC,
thus
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The fallo shall
now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the following manner:
1. Declaring the questioned increases of interest as
unreasonable, excessive and arbitrary and ordering the
defendant Philippine Savings Bank to refund to the
plaintiffs, the amount of interest collected in excess of
seventeen percent (17%) per annum;
Hence, this petition anchored on the contention that the CA erred in: (1)
declaring that the modifications in the interest rates are unreasonable; and (2)
sustaining the award of damages and attorneys fees.
The petition should be partially granted.
The unilateral determination and imposition of the increased rates is
violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of the Civil
Code, which provides that [t]he contract must bind both contracting parties; its
validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.[11] A perusal of
the Promissory Note will readily show that the increase or decrease of interest rates
hinges solely on the discretion of petitioner. It does not require the conformity of
the maker before a new interest rate could be enforced. Any contract which
appears to be heavily weighed in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an
unconscionable result, thus partaking of the nature of a contract of adhesion, is
void. Any stipulation regarding the validity or compliance of the contract left
solely to the will of one of the parties is likewise invalid.
Petitioner contends that respondents acquiesced to the imposition of the
modified interest rates; thus, there was no violation of the principle of mutuality of
contracts. To buttress its position, petitioner points out that the exhibits presented
by respondents during trial contained a uniform provision, which states:
The interest rate adjustment is in accordance with the Conformity Letter
you have signed amending your accounts interest rate review period from ninety
(90) to thirty days.[12]
It further claims that respondents requested several times for the reduction of the
interest rates, thus, manifesting their recognition of the legality of the said rates. It
also asserts that the contractual provision on the interest rates cannot be said to be
lopsided in its favor, considering that it had, on several occasions, lowered the
interest rates.
We disagree. The above-quoted provision of respondents exhibits readily
shows that the conformity letter signed by them does not pertain to the
modification of the interest rates, but rather only to the amendment of the interest
rate review period from 90 days to 30 days. Verily, the conformity of
respondents with respect to the shortening of the interest rate review period from
90 days to 30 days is separate and distinct from and cannot substitute for the
required conformity of respondents with respect to the modification of the interest
rate itself.
Basic is the rule that there can be no contract in its true sense without the
mutual assent of the parties. If this consent is absent on the part of one who
contracts, the act has no more efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a
person of unsound mind. Similarly, contract changes must be made with the
consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the
proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the
agreement. In the case of loan contracts, the interest rate is undeniably always a
vital component, for it can make or break a capital venture. Thus, any change must
be mutually agreed upon, otherwise, it produces no binding effect. [18]
Escalation clauses are generally valid and do not contravene public
policy. They are common in credit agreements as means of maintaining fiscal
stability and retaining the value of money on long-term contracts. To prevent any
one-sidedness that these clauses may cause, we have held in Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Judge Navarro[19] that there should be a
corresponding de-escalation clause that would authorize a reduction in the interest
rates corresponding to downward changes made by law or by the Monetary
Board. As can be gleaned from the parties loan agreement, a de-escalation clause
is provided, by virtue of which, petitioner had lowered its interest rates.
Nevertheless, the validity of the escalation clause did not give petitioner the
unbridled right to unilaterally adjust interest rates. The adjustment should have
still been subjected to the mutual agreement of the contracting parties. In light of
the absence of consent on the part of respondents to the modifications in the
interest rates, the adjusted rates cannot bind them notwithstanding the inclusion of
a de-escalation clause in the loan agreement.
The order of refund was based on the fact that the increases in the interest
rate were null and void for being violative of the principle of mutuality of
contracts. The amount to be refunded refers to that paid by respondents when they
had no obligation to do so. Simply put, petitioner should refund the amount of
interest that it has illegally imposed upon respondents. Any deficiency in the
payment of the obligation can be collected by petitioner in a foreclosure
proceeding, which it already did.
On the matter of damages, we agree with petitioner. Moral damages are not
recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They are recoverable
only if the party from whom it is claimed acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton,
reckless, malicious or in bad faith, and oppressive or abusive. Likewise, a breach
of contract may give rise to exemplary damages only if the guilty party acted in a
fraudulent or malevolent manner.[20]
In this case, we are not sufficiently convinced that fraud, bad faith, or
wanton disregard of contractual obligations can be imputed to petitioner simply
because it unilaterally imposed the changes in interest rates, which can be
attributed merely to bad business judgment or attendant negligence. Bad faith
pertains to a dishonest purpose, to some moral obliquity, or to the conscious doing
of a wrong, a breach of a known duty attributable to a motive, interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud. Respondents failed to sufficiently establish
this requirement. Thus, the award of moral and exemplary damages is
unwarranted. In the same vein, respondents cannot recover attorneys fees and
litigation expenses. Accordingly, these awards should be deleted.[21]
However, as regards the above mentioned award for refund to respondents of
their interest payments in excess of 17% per annum, the same should include legal
interest. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[22] we have held that
when an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
the interest on the amount of damages shall be at the rate of 12% per annum,
reckoned from the time of the filing of the complaint. [23]
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated August 27, 2009 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86445 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS, such that the award for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and litigation expenses is DELETED, and the order of refund in
favor of respondents of interest payments made in excess of 17% per annum shall
bear interest of 12% per annum from the time of the filing of the complaint until its
full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]