Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Chimel V California (1969)
Chimel V California (1969)
California
395 U.S. 752 (1969)
U.S. Supreme Court
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)
Argued March 27, 1969
Decided June 23, 1969
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
Syllabus
Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant but not a search warrant,
were admitted to petitioner's home by his wife, where they awaited
petitioner's arrival. When he entered, he was served with the warrant.
Although he denied the officers' request to "look around," they
conducted a search of the entire house "on the basis of the lawful arrest."
At petitioner's trial on burglary charges, items taken from his home were
admitted over objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized. His
conviction was affirmed by the California appellate courts, which held,
despite their acceptance of petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant
was invalid, that, since the arresting officers had procured the warrant
"in good faith," and since, in any event, they had had sufficient
information to constitute probable cause for the arrest, the arrest was
lawful. The courts also held that the search was justified as incident to a
valid arrest.
Held: Assuming the arrest was valid, the warrantless search of
petitioner's house cannot be constitutionally justified as incident to that
arrest. Pp. 395 U. S. 755-768.
(a) An arresting officer may search the arrestee's person to discover and
remove weapons and to seize evidence to prevent its concealment or
destruction, and may search the area "within the immediate control" of
the person arrested, meaning the area from which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Pp. 395 U. S. 762-763.
(b) For the routine search of rooms other than that in which an arrest
occurs, or for searching desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas
in that room itself, absent well recognized exceptions, a search warrant
is required. P. 395 U. S. 763.
(c) While the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest depends upon
"the facts and circumstances -- the total atmosphere of the case," those
facts and circumstances must be viewed in the light of established
Fourth Amendment principles, and the only reasoned distinction is one
between (1) a search of the person arrested and the area within his reach,
and (2) more extensive searches. Pp. 395 U. S. 765-766.
(d) United Ste v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, and Harris v. United
States, 331 U. S. 145, on their facts, and insofar as the principles they
stand for are inconsistent with this decision, are no longer to be
followed. P. 395 U. S. 768.
(e) The scope of the search here was unreasonable under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as it went beyond petitioner's person and the
area from within which he might have obtained a weapon or something
that could have been used as evidence against him, and there was no
constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant, for
extending the search beyond that area. P. 395 U. S. 768.
68 Cal.2d 436, 439 P.2d 333, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case raises basic questions concerning the permissible scope under
the Fourth Amendment of a search incident to a lawful arrest.
constitute probable cause for the petitioner's arrest, that arrest had been
lawful. From this conclusion, the appellate courts went on to hold that
the search of the petitioner's home had been justified, despite the
absence of a search warrant, on the ground that it had been incident to a
valid arrest. We granted certiorari in order to consider the petitioner's
substantial constitutional claims. 393 U.S. 958.
Without deciding the question, we proceed on the hypothesis that the
California courts were correct in holding that the arrest of the petitioner
was valid under the Constitution. This brings us directly to the question
whether the warrantless search of the petitioner's entire house can be
constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest. The decisions of this
Court bearing upon that question have been far from consistent, as even
the most cursory review makes evident.
Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems first to
have been articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum inWeeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383, in which the Court stated:
"What then is the present case? Before answering that inquiry
specifically, it may be well, by a process of exclusion, to state what it is
not. It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the Government,
always recognized under English and American law, to search the
person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the
fruits or evidences of crime."
Id. at 232 U. S. 392. That statement made no reference to any right to
search the place where an arrest occurs, but was limited to a right to
search the "person." Eleven years later, the case of Carroll v. United
States, 267 U. S. 132, brought the following embellishment of
the Weeks statement:
"When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon
his person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and
which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as
evidence in the prosecution."
Id. at 276 U. S. 158. (Emphasis added.) Still, that assertion too was far
from a claim that the "place" where one is arrested may be searched so
long as the arrest is valid. Without explanation, however, the principle
emerged in expanded form a few months later inAgnello v. United
States, 269 U. S. 20 -- although still by way of dictum:
"The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the
place where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was
committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from
custody, is not to be doubted. See Carroll v. United States,267 U. S.
132, 267 U. S. 158; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 232 U. S.
392."
269 U.S. at 269 U. S. 30. And in Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192,
two years later, the dictum of Agnello appeared to be the foundation of
the Court's decision. In that case, federal agents had secured a search
warrant authorizing the seizure of liquor and certain articles used in its
manufacture. When they arrived at the premises to be searched, they saw
"that the place was used for retailing and drinking intoxicating
liquors." Id. at 275 U. S. 194. They proceeded to arrest the person in
charge and to execute the warrant. In searching a closet for the items
listed in the warrant, they came across an incriminating ledger,
concededly not covered by the warrant, which they also seized. The
Court upheld the seizure of the ledger by holding that, since the agents
had made a lawful arrest,
"[t]hey had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the
place in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal
enterprise."
the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest. But there
must be something more in the way of necessity than merely a lawful
arrest."
Id. at 334 U. S. 705, 334 U. S. 708.
In 1950, two years after Trupiano, [Footnote 3] came United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, the decision upon which California primarily
relies in the case now before us. In Rabinowitz, federal authorities had
been informed that the defendant was dealing in stamps bearing forged
overprints. On the basis of that information, they secured a warrant for
his arrest, which they executed at his one-room business office. At the
time of the arrest, the officers "searched the desk, safe, and file cabinets
in the office for about an hour and a half," id. at 339 U. S. 59, and seized
573 stamps with forged overprints. The stamps were admitted into
evidence at the defendant's trial, and this Court affirmed his conviction,
rejecting the contention that the warrantless search had been unlawful.
The Court held that the search in its entirety fell within the principle
giving law enforcement authorities "[t]he right to search the place where
the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the
crime. . . .'" Id. at 339 U. S. 61. Harris was regarded as "ample
authority" for that conclusion. Id. at 339 U. S. 63. The opinion rejected
the rule of Trupiano that,
"in seizing goods and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and
use search warrants wherever reasonably practicable."
The test, said the Court, "is not whether it is reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id. at339 U. S.
66.
Rabinowitz has come to stand for the proposition, inter alia, that a
warrantless search "incident to a lawful arrest" may generally extend to
the area that is considered to be in the "possession" or under the
"control" of the person arrested. [Footnote 4] And it was on the basis of
that proposition that the California courts upheld the search of the
petitioner's entire house in this case. That doctrine, however, at least in
the broad sense in which it was applied by the California courts in this
case, can withstand neither historical nor rational analysis.
Even limited to its own facts, the Rabinowitz decision was, as we have
seen, hardly founded on an unimpeachable line of authority. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter commented in dissent in that case, the "hint"
contained in Weeks was, without persuasive justification, "loosely turned
into dictum and finally elevated to a decision." 339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 75.
And
the
approach
taken
in
cases
such
as Go-Bart,
Lefkowitz, and Trupiano was
essentially
disregarded
by
the Rabinowitz Court.
Nor is the rationale by which the State seeks here to sustain the search of
the petitioner's house supported by a reasoned view of the background
and purpose of the Fourth Amendment. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wisely
pointed out in his Rabinowitz dissent that the Amendment's proscription
of "unreasonable searches and seizures" must be read in light of "the
history that gave rise to the words" -- a history of "abuses so deeply felt
by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution. . . ."
339 U.S. at 339 U. S. 69. The Amendment was in large part a reaction to
the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated the
colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence.
[Footnote 5] In the scheme of the Amendment, therefore, the
requirement that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,"
plays a crucial part. As the Court put it in McDonald v. United
States, 335 U. S. 451:
"We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant
serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth
Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the
police. This was done not to shield criminals, nor to make the home a
safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind
might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.
The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion
of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. .
. . And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of
the police before they violate the privacy of the home. We cannot be true
to that constitutional requirement and excuse the absence of a search
warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the
constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that
course imperative."
Id. at 335 U. S. 455-456.
Even in the Agnello case, the Court relied upon the rule that
"[b]elief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a
dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place
without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding
facts unquestionably showing probable cause."
269 U.S. at 269 U. S. 33. Clearly, the general requirement that a search
warrant be obtained is not lightly to be dispensed with, and "the burden
is on those seeking [an] exemption [from the requirement] to show the
need for it. . . ." United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 342 U. S. 51.
Only last Term, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, we emphasized that "the
police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure," id. at 392 U. S.
20, [Footnote 6] and that "[t]he scope of [a] search must be strictly tied
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible." Id. at 392 U. S. 19. The search undertaken by the officer in
that "stop and frisk" case was sustained under that test, because it was
no more than a "protective . . . search for weapons." Id. at 392 U. S. 29.
But in a companion case, Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, we applied
the same standard to another set of facts and reached a contrary result,
holding that a policeman's action in thrusting his hand into a suspect's
pocket had been neither motivated by nor limited to the objective of
been made without a search warrant. In any event, even apart from the
possibility of such police tactics, the general point so forcefully made by
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202,
remains:
"After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his
papers in search of whatever will convict him appears to us to be
indistinguishable from what might be done under a general warrant;
indeed, the warrant would give more protection, for presumably it must
be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis, the power would not
exist if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is
small consolation to know that one's papers are safe only so long as one
is not at home."
Id. at 203.
Rabinowitz and Harris have been the subject of critical commentary for
many years, [Footnote 14] and have been relied upon less and less in our
own decisions. [Footnote 15] It is time, for the reasons we have stated,
to hold that, on their own facts, and insofar as the principles they stand
for are inconsistent with those that we have endorsed today, they are no
longer to be followed.
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the facts of this
case produces a clear result. The search here went far beyond the
petitioner's person and the area from within which he might have
obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as
evidence against him. There was no constitutional justification, in the
absence of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.
The scope of the search was, therefore, "unreasonable" under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and the petitioner's conviction cannot
stand. [Footnote 16]
Reversed.
[Footnote 1]
The affidavit supporting the warrant is set out in the opinion of the Court
of Appeal, 61 Cal.Rptr. at 715-716, n. 1, and the State does not
challenge its insufficiency under the principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U. S. 108, and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410.
[Footnote 2]
The Court assumed that the arrests were lawful. 282 U.S. at 282 U. S.
356.
[Footnote 3]
See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451.
[Footnote 4]
Decisions of this Court since Rabinowitz have applied the abstract
doctrine of that case to various factual situations with divergent
results. Compare Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 374 U. S. 42; Abel v.
United States, 362 U. S. 217, and Draper v. United States, 358 U. S.
307, with Kremen v. United States, 353 U. S. 346 (per curiam). Cf.
Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610; Jones v. United States, 357 U.
S. 493, 357 U. S. 499-500.
[Footnote 5]
See generally Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 116 U. S. 624625; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 232 U. S. 389-391;Davis v.
United States, 328 U. S. 582, 328 U. S. 603-605 (dissenting
opinion); Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145, 331 U. S. 157-162
(dissenting opinion); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U. S. 476, 379 U. S. 481482.
[Footnote 6]
See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721, 394 U. S. 728; Katz v.
United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 356-358; Warden v. Hayden, 387
U. S. 294, 387 U. S. 299; Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, 376 U.
S. 367.
[Footnote 7]
Our Sibron opinion dealt with two case. We refer here to No. 63,
involving the appellant Sibron. See infra at 395 U. S. 764.
[Footnote 8]
See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 389 U. S. 357-358.
[Footnote 9]
Our holding today is, of course, entirely consistent with the recognized
principle that, assuming the existence of probable cause, automobiles
and other vehicles may be searched without warrants
"where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought."
Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 153; see Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U. S. 160.
[Footnote 10]
Some courts have carried the Rabinowitz approach to just such
lengths. See, e.g., Clifton v. United States, 224 F.2d 329 (C.A.4th
Cir.),cert. denied, 350 U.S. 894 (purchaser of illicit whiskey arrested in
back yard of seller; search of one room of house sustained); United
States v. Jackson, 149 F.Supp. 937 (D.C.D.C.), rev'd on other
grounds, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 250 F.2d 772 (suspect arrested half a
block from his rented room; search of room upheld). But see James v.
Louisiana, 382 U. S. 36 (per curiam).
[Footnote 11]
Cf. Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting comment in Harris:
"The difficulty with this problem for me is that, once the search is
allowed to go beyond the person arrested and the objects upon him or in
his immediate physical control, I see no practical limit short of that set in
the opinion of the Court -- and that means to me no limit at all."
331 U.S. at 331 U. S. 197.
[Footnote 12]
It is argued in dissent that, so long as there is probable cause to search
the place where an arrest occurs, a search of that place should be
permitted even though no search warrant has been obtained. This
position seems to be based principally on two premises: first, that, once
an arrest has been made, the additional invasion of privacy stemming
from the accompanying search is "relatively minor", and second, that the
victim of the search may "shortly thereafter" obtain a judicial
determination of whether the search was justified by probable cause.
With respect to the second premise, one may initially question whether
all of the States, in fact, provide the speedy suppression procedures the
dissent assumes. More fundamentally, however, we cannot accept the
view that Fourth Amendment interests are vindicated so long as "the
rights of the criminal" are "protect[ed] . . . against introduction of
evidence seized without probable cause." The Amendment is designed to
prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action. In any event, we
cannot join in characterizing the invasion of privacy that results from a
top-to-bottom search of a man's house as "minor." And we can see no
reason why, simply because some interference with an individual's
privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, further
intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the absence of a
warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require.
[Footnote 13]
Although the warrant was issued at 10:39 a.m. and the arrest was not
made until late in the afternoon, the State suggests that the delay is
accounted for by normal police procedures and by the heavy workload
of the officer in charge. In addition, that officer testified that he and his
colleagues went to the petitioner's house "to keep from approaching him
at his place of business to cause him any problem there."
[Footnote 14]
See, e.g., J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 87117 (1966); Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959
I
The modern odyssey of doctrine in this field is detailed in the majority
opinion. It began with Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383(1914),
where the Court paused to note what the case before it was not.
"It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the Government, always
recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the
accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or
evidences of crime. This right has been uniformly maintained in many
cases. . . . Nor is it the case of burglar's tools or other proofs of guilt
found upon his arrest within the control of the accused."
Id. at 232 U. S. 392. (Emphasis added.) This scope of search incident to
arrest, extending to all items under the suspect's "control," was
reaffirmed in a dictum in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U.
S. 158 (1925). Accord, Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 269 U. S.
30 (1925) (holding that "the place where the arrest is made" may be
searched "is not to be doubted"). The rule was reaffirmed in Marron v.
United States, 275 U. S. 192, 275 U. S. 199 (1927), where the Court
asserted that authority to search incident to an arrest "extended to all
parts of the premises used for the unlawful purpose."
Within five years, this rule was qualified by two Prohibition Act
cases, Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 282 U. S.
356-358 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 285 U. S.
463-467 (1932).
If Go-Bart and Lefkowitz represented a retreat from the rule of Weeks,
Carroll, Agnello, and Marron, the vigor of the earlier rule was
reaffirmed in Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 (1947), which has,
but for one brief interlude, clearly been the law until today. The very
next Term after Harris, in Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S.
699 (1948), the Court held unjustifiable the seizure of a still incident to
the arrest of a man at the still site, even though the still was contraband,
had been visible through an open door before entering the premises to be
"searched," and although a crime was being committed in the officers'
III
This line of analysis, supported by the precedents of this Court, hinges
on two assumptions. One is that the arrest of petitioner without a valid
warrant [Footnote 2/7] was constitutional as the majority assumes; the
other is that the police were not required to obtain a search warrant in
advance, even though they knew that the effect of the arrest might well
be to alert petitioner's wife that the coins had better be removed soon.
Thus, it is necessary to examine the constitutionality of the arrest, since,
if it was illegal, the exigent circumstances which it created may not, as
the consequences of a lawless act, be used to justify the
contemporaneous warrantless search. But for the arrest, the warrantless
search may not be justified. [Footnote 2/8] And if circumstances can
justify the warrantless arrest, it would be strange to say that the Fourth
Amendment bars the warrantless search, regardless of the circumstances,
since the invasion and disruption of a man's life and privacy which stem
from his arrest are ordinarily far greater than the relatively minor
intrusions attending a search of his premises.
Congress has expressly authorized a wide range of officials to make
arrests without any warrant in criminal cases. United States Marshals
have long had this power, [Footnote 2/9] which is also vested in the
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, [Footnote 2/10] and in the
Secret Service [Footnote 2/11] and the narcotics law enforcement
agency. [Footnote 2/12] That warrantless arrest power may apply even
when there is time to get a warrant without fear that the suspect may
escape is made perfectly clear by the legislative history of the statute
granting arrest power to the FBI.
In United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633-636 (C.A.2d Cir.1950),
the court held that an arrest and search were invalid because there was
an insufficient showing of danger of escape, and therefore there was
time to obtain a warrant. The opinion, written by Judge Learned Hand
and joined by Judges Swan and Frank, reviewed the common law power
of arrest, which permitted arrests for felonies committed in the past "if
[the officer] had reasonable ground to suppose that the person arrested
had committed the felony." However, the court concluded that this
power of warrantless arrest had been limited by the congressional
requirement that there must be a "likelihood of the person escaping
before a warrant can be obtained for his arrest."
The next month, the Congress was moved by this very decision to
amend the law, consciously deleting the language upon which Judge
Hand had relied so as to make it clear that warrantless arrests were
authorized even if there was time to procure a warrant. Act of January
10, 1951, c. 1221, 1, 64 Stat. 1239; H.R.Rep. No. 3228, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1950). [Footnote 2/13] Thereupon, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, passing on the very same arrest which had
induced the congressional action, held that this "unmistakable" revision
made it clear that there was in the FBI a power to arrest without warrant
even when there was time to procure one. For this reason, the court
upheld the arrest and contemporaneous search. Coplon v. United
States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 191 F.2d 749 (1951). Certiorari was
denied in both Coplon cases. 342 U.S. 920, 926 (1952). Moreover, the
statute under which the FBI exercises that power was later said by this
Court to state the constitutional standard, Henry v. United States, 361 U.
S. 98, 361 U. S. 100 (1959), since it requires "reasonable grounds to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing" a
felony, 18 U.S.C. 3052, before a warrantless arrest my be made. And
the Court today has declined to review a warrantless arrest under the
narcotics agent statute. Jamison v. United States, post, p. 986. See
also my dissent in Shipley v. California, post, p. 395 U. S. 821.
The judgment of Congress is that federal law enforcement officers may
reasonably make warrantless arrests upon probable cause, and no
judicial experience suggests that this judgment is infirm. Indeed, past
cases suggest precisely the contrary conclusion. The validity of federal
arrests was long governed by state law, United States v. Di Re, 332 U. S.
581, 332 U. S. 589-592 (1948), and no requirement that warrants be
sought whenever there is time to do so was imposed either by common
law history [Footnote 2/14] or by decisions of this Court. This Court has
exigent circumstance, since the police had lawfully gained entry to the
premises to effect the arrest and since delaying the search to secure a
warrant would have involved the risk of not recovering the fruits of the
crime.
The majority today proscribes searches for which there is probable cause
and which may prove fruitless unless carried out immediately. This rule
will have no added effect whatsoever in protecting the rights of the
criminal accused at trial against introduction of evidence seized without
probable cause. Such evidence could not be introduced under the old
rule. Nor does the majority today give any added protection to the right
of privacy of those whose houses there is probable cause to search. A
warrant would still be sworn out for those houses, and the privacy of
their owners invaded. The only possible justification for the majority's
rule is that, in some instances, arresting officers may search when they
have no probable cause to do so, and that such unlawful searches might
be prevented if the officers first sought a warrant from a magistrate.
Against the possible protection of privacy in that class of cases, in which
the privacy of the house has already been invaded by entry to make the
arrest -- an entry for which the majority does not assert that any warrant
is necessary -- must be weighed the risk of destruction of evidence for
which there is probable cause to search, as a result of delays in obtaining
a search warrant. Without more basis for radical change than the Court's
opinion reveals, I would not upset the balance of these interests which
has been struck by the former decisions of this Court.
In considering searches incident to arrest, it must be remembered that
there will be immediate opportunity to challenge the probable cause for
the search in an adversary proceeding. The suspect has been apprised of
the search by his very presence at the scene, and, having been arrested,
he will soon be brought into contact with people who can explain his
rights. As MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN noted in a dissenting opinion,
joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICES BLACK and
DOUGLAS, in Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 362 U. S. 249-250
contents of a cabin, which it took 11 pages of fine print for the Court to
inventory, were seized. See Abel v. United States, 362 U. S. 217, 362 U.
S. 239 (1960) (Kremen distinguished as a "mass seizure").
[Footnote 2/3]
Even Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined in dissent in Rabinowitz by Mr.
Justice Jackson, admitted that there was an exception to the search
warrant requirement in cases of necessity, and noted that this applied, for
example, to vehicles which could readily be moved. 339 U. S. 56, at 339
U. S. 73.
[Footnote 2/4]
Before the burglary of the coin store, petitioner had told its owner that
he was planning a big robbery, had inquired about the alarm system in
the store, the state of the owner's insurance, and the location of the
owner's most valuable coins. Petitioner wandered about the store the day
before the burglary. After the burglary, petitioner called the store's
owner and accused him of robbing the store himself for the insurance
proceeds on a policy which, as petitioner knew, had just been reduced
from $50,000 to $10,000 coverage. On being told that the robbery had
been sloppy, petitioner excitedly claimed that it had been "real
professional," but then denied the robbery. On the night of the robbery
itself, petitioner declined an invitation to a bicycle ride, saying he was
"going to knock over a place" and that a coin shop was "all set." After
the robbery,m he told the same neighbor that he had started to break into
the coin shop, but had stopped, and then denied the whole incident. The
neighbor had earlier seen stacks of typewriters in petitioner's house,
Asked whether they were "hot," petitioner replied, "Hotter than a $3
bill." On reading a newspaper description of the coin store burglary, the
neighbor called the police.
[Footnote 2/5]
There were three officers at the scene of the arrest, one from the city
where the coin burglary had occurred, and two from the city where the
arrest was made. Assuming that one policeman from each city would be
[Footnote 2/11]
Act of Sept. 29, 1965, 79 Stat. 890, as amended, 18 U.S.C. 3056 (1964
ed., Supp. IV).
[Footnote 2/12]
Act of July 18, 1956, as amended, Tit. I, 104(a), 70 Stat. 570, 26
U.S.C. 7607(2).
[Footnote 2/13]
Congress' expedition was possible partly because the same change had
earlier been approved by a Senatorial committee. S.Rep. No. 2464, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
[Footnote 2/14]
There was no dispute between the two Coplon courts on this point, since
it was well established that even a private person could make a
warrantless arrest at common law for a felony which had actually been
committed, and a peace officer could make such an arrest if he had
reasonable cause to believe the offense had been committed. 1 J.
Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 193 (1883); 2 M.
Hale, Pleas of the Crown 71-104 (first American ed. 1847).
[Footnote 2/15]
A search without a warrant
"can survive constitutional inhibition only upon a showing that the
surrounding facts brought it within one of the exceptions to the rule that
a search must rest upon a search warrant. Jones v. United States, 357 U.
S. 493, 357 U. S. 499; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S. 48, 342 U. S.
51."
Rios v. United States, 364 U. S. 253, 364 U. S. 261 (1960); Stoner v.
California, 376 U. S. 483, 376 U. S. 486 (1964). And