Administrative Law Digests
Administrative Law Digests
PENACHOS
FACTS:
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) published an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory
Building. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of requirements was on
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988
at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their requirements at
two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. They were not allowed to participate in
the bidding as their documents were considered late.
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their
refusal without just cause to accept them as pre-qualified bidders. A restraining order was
issued prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. The
defendants filed a motion to lift the order on the ground that the court is prohibited from
issuing such order in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. The trial
court lifted the restraining order and declared that the building sought to be constructed at
the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the
subject law.
ISSUE:
Whether ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818
HELD & RATIO:
The Administrative Code defines an instrumentality as any agency of the government, not
integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. The same Code describes a
chartered institution as any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by
the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the
project.
DE LA LLANA v. ALBA
FACTS:
In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds therefore
and for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana assailed its validity because, first of all, he
would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the
security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court, and not
the Congress, can remove judges.
ISSUE:
Whether the reorganization violates (1) the independence of the judiciary and (2) the
security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution
HELD & RATIO:
What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and
justices from their services, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. It is a well-known
rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of
course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office.
It is a well-settled rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of
its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good
faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any
impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
US v. ANG TANG HO
FACTS:
In 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said
act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to
this Act, the Governor General issued EO 53 which was published on August 20, 1919. The
said order fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a
rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold rice to Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the order. The sale was
done on August 6, 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged in violation of the said order.
He was found guilty and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He
appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the
Governor General.
ISSUE:
Whether there is undue delegation of power to the Governor General
HELD & RATIO:
Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the
publication of EO 53. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one
cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the law when
both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt. The said Act, as
to the judgment of the Supreme Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the
standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
MARCOS v. MANGLAPUZ
FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. In his
deathbed, he has signified his wish to return to the Philippines. But President Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and
prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines
HELD & RATIO:
The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional
provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to
the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners
and respondents were represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's
decision. Hence, this act cannot be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously.
Further, the ponencia (the coups, the communist threat, peace and order issues especially in
Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting) bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will
only exacerbate the situation in the country.
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce,
have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Based on the provisions of the
Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has become final and
executory.
CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG
FACTS:
Cruz brought a petition before the CFI of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Youngberg,
requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of 10 large cattle imported by the petitioner
and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at
present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippines. He also
asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle
diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The CFI dismissed the complaint, but the petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court. Youngberg contended that even if the law be declared
unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner
cannot be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155
were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 (Administrative Code) would automatically
become effective.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the
Governor General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act
constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers
HELD & RATIO:
No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful
delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
ARANETA v. GATMAITAN
FACTS:
The League of Municipal Mayors of municipalities near the San Miguel Bay, between the
provinces of Camarines Sur and Camarines Norte, manifested in a resolution that they
condemn the operation of trawls in the said area and resolving to petition the President of
the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay. In another resolution, the League
prayed that the President ban the operation of trawls in the San Miguel Bay area. In
response to the pleas, the President issued EO 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel
Bay but the EO was amended by EO 66 apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial
Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl-fishing during the typhoon
season only. Subsequently, EO 80 was issued reviving EO 22.
Thereafter, a group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for injunction praying that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Director of Fisheries be enjoined from
enforcing said EO and to declare the same null and void. The Court held that until the
trawler is outlawed by legislative enactment, it cannot be banned from San Miguel Bay by
executive proclamation and held that the EOs 22 and 66 are invalid.
ISSUE:
Whether the said EOs were valid as it was not in the exercise of legislative power unduly
delegated to the President
HELD & RATIO:
Yes. For the protection of fry or fish eggs and small immature fishes, Congress intended with
the promulgation of the Fisheries Act, to prohibit the use of any fish net or fishing device like
trawl nets that could endanger and deplete our supply of seafood, and to that end
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by regulations and
such restrictions as he deemed necessary in order to preserve the aquatic resources of the
land. When the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of
Camarines Sur issued EO 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters
comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the
welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern
which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law.
PEOPLE v. MACEREN
FACTS:
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated AO 84-1. It was alleged in the complaint that the five
accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz using a
device or equipment to catch fish thru electric current which thereby destroy any aquatic
animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The
municipal court quashed the complaint and the CFI affirmed such dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether the regulation penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the
old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission is valid
HELD & RATIO:
No. The court held that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1 because the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary and the Commissioner are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself
cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute.
BAUTISTA v. JUINIO
FACTS:
LOI 869 was issued in 1979 to respond to the protracted oil crisis dating back to 1974,
banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays
from 12 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the
holiday; but exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant
thereto, Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Edu,
then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued MC 39, imposing "the
penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the
above-specified vehicles" found violating such LOI. MC 39 does not impose the penalty of
confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of
cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for 90 days,
whichever is longer. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39 through a
prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether LOI 869 and MC 39, banning certain vehicles from using the motorways in specified
time, are constitutional and/or valid
HELD & RATIO:
A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that such
an act falls within constitutional limitations. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the
mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil
products and measures conducive to energy conservation (e.g. require and establish taxi
stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication systems, strict implementation
and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries, strict observance of traffic rules) are
left to the discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited to
whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.
On the other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of
registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that
portion of MC 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if
warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law.
ISSUE:
Whether DECS has the power to prescribe school fees
HELD & RATIO:
Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe
school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school
fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly
and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or
an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and
hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. The Court believes that
Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS is in the exercise of its legislative function. The
assailed Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private
schools in the country for school year 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing
are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
Appeals ruled that the reclassification made by the Commissioner is of doubtful legality
and enjoined its enforcement.
ISSUE:
Whether RMC 37-93 is valid despite the lack of notice of hearing to Fortune Tobacco
Corporation
HELD & RATIO:
CIR may not disregard legal requirements in the exercise of its quasi-legislative powers
which publication, filing, and prior hearing. When an administrative rule is merely
interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it
gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. But when,
upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means
that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, the agency must accord, at least to
those directly affected, a chance to be heard, before that new issuance is given the force
and effect of law.
The BIR not simply interpreted the law. Verily, it legislated under its quasi-legislative
authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication
should not have been then ignored.
US v. PANLILIO
FACTS:
The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the putting in quarantine of
animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him
to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs
of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and
while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinderpest was still in effect,
permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were
quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts
alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No.
1760
ISSUE:
Whether the accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture
HELD & RATIO:
No. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited
or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.
Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act
shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit
acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within
any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by
paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau, while they
may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal
statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself
somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a
violation of the orders of the Bureau made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in
any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, par. 2 of the Penal Code which
punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic
disease among animals.
development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). Former
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution
Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be
known as the NGC. Thereafter, then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding
150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826
and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona
fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation
No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to
maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the
governments socialized housing program. President Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law RA
9207.
ISSUE:
Whether petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does
not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function
HELD & RATIO:
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by RA 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed
IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and
purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued
by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail
its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
OPLE v. TORRES
FACTS:
On December 12, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order 308, entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System." It was published in 4
newspapers of general circulation. Senator Blas F. Ople, as a Senator, taxpayer and member
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), filed instant petition against then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies who, as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation
of Administrative Order 308.
ISSUE:
Whether the President can issue an Administrative Order for the adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System, independent of a legislative act
HELD & RATIO:
AO 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the
life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates
their right to privacy. As said order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
deals with a subject that should be covered by law. The Order is a law, negating claims that
it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under it, a
citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the
people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this
identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear that without
the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. AO 308
does not merely implement the Administrative Code of 1987, but establishes for the first
time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. An administrative order is an
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The authority to
prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws. AO 308
was beyond the power of the President to issue.
PSDSA v. DE JESUS
FACTS:
RA 9155, Governance of Basic Education Act 2001, was promulgated, stating that each
regional office of the Department of Education (DepEd) shall have a director, an assistant
director, and an office staff for program promotion and support, planning, administrative and
fiscal services. A division, on the other hand, is headed by a schools division superintendent.
The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each district is
headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion. On the
school level, an Elementary School Principal (ESP) was designated as school head for all
public elementary schools; and a Secondary School Principal (SSP) for high schools or a
cluster thereof. The ESP and the SSP serve as both instructional leaders and administrative
managers.
DepEd Secretary De Jesus issued DECS Office Order No. 1, which constitutes the IRR of RA
9155. The Public Schools District Supervisor Association (PSDSA) allege that provisions of
the IRR are invalid because they extended or expanded and modified the provisions of RA
9155. They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with other existing
educational laws.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisions in the IRR issued by respondent Secretary are invalid
HELD & RATIO:
The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute
is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The IRR of a law
cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is
vested in the legislature. It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed
under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a
statute by filling in the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the
objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms
with the standards prescribed by law. Moreover, as a matter of policy, the Court accords
great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because
of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and
expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction.
GUEVARRA v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article which tended to interfere with
and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy then
pending. The article pertained to the contracts entered into by COMELEC regarding the
requisitioning and preparation of ballot boxes to be used in the elections. Petitioner
appeared and filed a motion to quash upon the ground, among others, that the Commission
has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous
article. The COMELEC denied the motion to quash but granted petitioner a period of 15 days
within which to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC has the power to conduct contempt proceedings
HELD & RATIO:
No. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy
between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the
Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of
elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a
ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not
exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature.
BERNARDO v. ABALOS
FACTS:
Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong City and his son, Benjamin
Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May 1998 elections.
Petitioners herein interposed that respondents conducted an all-expense-free affair at a
resort in Quezon Province for the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters
of the said city and who are members of the Board of Election Inspectors therein. The said
affair was alleged to be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle
was played all throughout and his shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos
Sr. also made an offer and a promise
to increase the allowances of the teachers. In this regard, petitioners filed a criminal
complaint with the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote buying, further
alleging that they conspired with their co-respondents in violating the Omnibus Election
Code. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Director of the Law Department of the
COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due course without the
petitioners first submitting a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC
HELD & RATIO:
No. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there is no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instant case,
it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC is the most
expeditious and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give
the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. As the petitioners then did
not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their
instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised any plausible
reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant petition was ruled
to fail.
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES v. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the
Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal
operating contract in the so-called Giporlos Area. IEI was later advised that in line with the
objective of rationalizing the countrys coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator
in the area would be Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and
transferred to MMIC its rights in the area but later filed an action for rescission with damages
against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with its obligations. IEI prayed that the
Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI. Strangely enough, Mr.
Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the rescission and
declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to
issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEIs application. CA
reversed the decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action
considering that under PD
1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration,
exploitation and development of coal blocks.
ISSUE:
Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case
HELD & RATIO:
Yes. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in
many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative
agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is
such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are
involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy
will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be
granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the
BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the
matter. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the
dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the
competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
in the government arising from abuses or violations of the merit system. When the law
bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific
matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that
another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. PD 1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems
Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties aggrieved by decisions of appointing
officers involving personnel action. The Commission therefore cannot take original
cognizance of the cases specified under Sec. 5 of PD 1409, except in the cases specified
under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it such power.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken
and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A
of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of
the private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the
proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
VALMONTE v. BELMONTE
FACTS:
Valmonte wrote Belmonte, requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the opposition
members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a loan on guaranty of Imelda
Marcos and also to be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing
their loan. Belmonte referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS), Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever
they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and
that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by
the courts." Apparently not having yet received the reply of Tiro, Valmonte wrote Belmonte
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves
free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in
pursuance of public interest." Valmonte filed an action invoking his right to information and
prayed that Belmonte be directed to furnish them with their requested documents.
ISSUE:
Whether Valmonte may access GSIS records pertaining to behest loans secured by Marcos in
favor of certain members of the opposition in the Batasang Pambansa
HELD & RATIO:
Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred
by the people. Yet, like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute.
Peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the
administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its
funds assume a public character. Considering the nature of its funds, it is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with end
in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees.
Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to
see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that its
transactions were above board.
MANGUBAT v. OSMEA
FACTS:
No. The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark, as well as the
vessel on which it was loaded, were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting
documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR for official
disposition and appropriate action. These allegations would have been sufficient to alert
respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that administrative
proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment. Under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. Moreover, the plaintiff in the replevin suit
who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative
remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to
dismiss the replevin suit outright.
The Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only
because of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest
in having the matter settled.
KBMPBM v. DOMINGUEZ
FACTS:
The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, through its Mayor Carlos, entered into a contract
with petitioner for the latters management and operation of its New Muntinlupa Public
Market. The contract provides for a 25 year term renewable for a like period unless sooner
terminated and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties. Subsequently, Mayor
Bunye, Carlos successor, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the 50-year term of the
agreement, contrary to Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, and the patently inequitable rental,
directed the review of the contract. Consequently, the Municipal Council approved a
Resolution abrogating the contract.
Petitioner filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for breach of contract, specific
performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its
officers. The writ applied for was denied, the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of
Bunye and company to complete the take-over. Thereafter, Perez, Gerneral Manager of
KBMBPM, filed with the Ombudsman a complaint charging Bunye and his co-petitioners of
harassment, oppression, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for taking over the management of the public market.
Respondents Madriaga and Coronado, accompanied by the Bunye and the latters heavily
armed men forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners purportedly to serve
upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the
same by taking over and disbanding the incumbent Board of Directors of KBMBPM.
Petitioners claim that the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the
Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere photocopy. Thus, petitioners filed a petition
praying that respondents refrain, cease and desist from enforcing the questioned Order and
that the order be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners needed to exhaust administrative remedies available
HELD & RATIO:
No. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval
of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency
ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need to appeal the
decision to the Office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other
exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or
where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of
petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
The Director of Mines rendered a decision giving Buqueron the preferential right over the
disputed mining claims. Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who reversed
the previous decision. On further appeal, the Deputy Executive Secretary, Office of the
President, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and reinstated the
decision of the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences.
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims
HELD & RATIO:
The findings, although reversed by the Minister of Natural Resources, were affirmed by the
Office of the President. Judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is of course
subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance, findings
of fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but
review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud,
collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led
to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse
of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. None of such circumstances is
present in the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the
Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in
accordance with the prevailing principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the
reviewing Court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted
therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative
agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must be respected. As ruled by the
Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even
if not overwhelming or preponderant.
National Police Commission by limiting its power to administrative control over the PNP
thus, control remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC and the
PNP were placed.
ISSUE:
Whether the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA
6975
HELD & RATIO:
The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Under the doctrine of
qualified political agency, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all
at the same time and in person, thus he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members. In short, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the
members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other
offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the
reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system of
coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law
enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the
funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
receipt, with a threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure
would be issued if the fine will not be paid.
NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil action for certiorari before the
CFI of Manila against the respondent. Respondent contended that petitioners have not
exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE:
Whether the contention of respondent is correct
HELD & RATIO:
The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector committed grave abuse of discretion
because petitioner NDC was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set
involved is not a cargo that needs to be manifested. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not required where the appeal to the administrative superior is not a plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as where it is undisputed that the
respondent officer has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process.