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Misztal Theories of Social Remembering
Misztal Theories of Social Remembering
remembering
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Theorizing Society
www.openup.co.uk
Theories of Social
Remembering
Barbara A. Misztal
The book consists of six chapters, with the first three devoted to
conceptualizing the process of remembering by analysing memorys
function, status and history, and by locating the study of memory in
a broader field of social science.The second part of the book
directly explores and discusses theories and studies of social
remembering.The glossary offers a concise and up-to-date
overview of the development of relevant theoretical concepts.
Barbara A. Misztal
THEORIES OF SOCIAL
REMEMBERING
THEORIES OF SOCIAL
REMEMBERING
Barbara A. Misztal
In memory of my mother
CONTENTS
ix
1
6
8
Memory experience
The forms and functions of memory
The communities of memory
The institutions of memory
The status of memory
Further reading
9
9
15
19
22
26
Metamorphosis of memory
Memory in oral cultures
The art of memory
Memory in pre-modern Europe
Memory in modern society
Memory today
Further reading
27
27
30
32
37
46
49
Theorizing remembering
Halbwachs: the social context of memory
The presentist memory approach: the invention of
traditions
The popular memory approach: confronting the
dominant ideology
The dynamics of memory approach: memory as a
process of negotiation
Further reading
50
50
56
61
67
74
viii
Contested boundaries
Memory and history: ways of knowing the past
Memory and time: the continuity of the past
Memory and imagination: the meaning of the past
Contested memories
Further reading
99
99
108
115
120
125
Studying memory
Memory and commemorative activities
Memory and identity
Memory and trauma
Memory and justice
Further reading
126
126
132
139
145
154
Epilogue
155
Glossary
Bibliography
Index
75
75
83
91
98
158
162
181
S E R I E S E D I TO R S
F O R E WO R D
Sociology is reexively engaged with the object of its study, society. In the
wake of the rapid and profound social changes of the later twentieth
century, there is extensive debate as to whether our theoretical frames of
reference are appropriate for novel congurations of culture, economy and
society. Sociologists further need to ask whether recent theoretical pre
occupations for example with the cultural turn, post-modernism, decon
struction, globalization and identity adequately grasp social processes in the
Millennium. One crucial issue here is the relationship between contempor
ary social problems and theories on the one hand and the classical heritage
of Marx, Durkheim, Weber and Simmel on the other. Sociology is still
reluctant to forget its founders and the relevance of the classical tradition is
both powerful and problematic. It is powerful because the classics constitute
a rich source of insights, concepts and analyses that can be deployed and
reinterpreted to grasp current problems. But it is problematic because the
social world of the classics is largely that of industrial, imperial and high
bourgeois European societies prior to the First World War. How do we begin
to relate the concepts formed in this milieu to the concerns of the globalized
social world that is post-colonial, post-industrial and has seen the rise and
collapse of Soviet socialism? Social theory in the twenty-rst century further
needs to grasp the fateful contemporary paradox that resurgent nationalism
and religious attachments, exposing the fractured and dispersed basis of
intolerance, accompany the growth of globalized culture, politics and econ
omies. How does sociology recongure the understandings of identity, cul
ture, history and society in appropriate ways? These are some of the major
challenges for sociology that this series, Theorizing Society, aims to address.
This series intends to map out the ways in which social theory is being
transformed and how contemporary issues have emerged. Each book in
the series offers a concise and up-to-date overview of the principle ideas,
xi
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1 directly addresses the issues concerning the functions and forms
of memory. After a short presentation of the various forms and kinds of
memory, sociological denitions of memory and collective memorys signi
cance in modern societies are discussed. Collective memory is dened as the
representation of the past, both that shared by a group and that which is
collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the groups
identity, its present conditions and its vision of the future. The next two
sections examine the social formation of memory by looking at communities
and institutions of memory. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the
evolution of the status of memory, where it is argued that the shift in the
prestige of memory can be linked to cultural change, seen as associated with
the advancement of the means of communication and the transformation of
techniques of power.
In order to throw light on changes in the status and meanings of memory,
Chapter 2 briey examines how cultures have been affected by the shift
in the means of communication and social organization. It presents the
history of memory by discussing the changes in aids to memory, from visual
mnemonic techniques, through writing and print, to todays computerenhanced methods of storing, transferring and constructing memory.
Chapter 3 is a summary presentation of the main theories of social
remembering. It starts with Halbwachs theory of social memory which
draw on the Durkheimian perspective. This is followed by an overview of
another inuential approach, known as the invention of tradition, or the
presentist approach. This approach describes how the social past has been
constructed or reappropriated in order to serve current social interests and
needs. In the next part of the chapter we critically evaluate the popular
memory approach that explores how, when and why some social events are
likely to form part of popular or unofcial memory. The nal section exam
ines recent works on social memory and directs our attention to the social
and institutional relations of the production of memory, arguing that
memory, far from being mechanical or stable, is actively restructured in a
process of negotiation through time.
Chapter 4 addresses the issue of the nature of remembering by exploring
how collective consensus is connected with the actual thought processes of
any particular person. It discusses the embodiedness of memory as well as
what makes an individual memory social. The role of generation and the
signicance of tradition, as a chain of memory, in shaping processes of
remembering is also examined.
Chapter 5 examines the complex relationships between social memory
studies and historiography, philosophy and psychology and argues that
there is a need for an interdisciplinary integration of memory studies. After
suggesting that further developments in our understanding of social
memory should be built upon careful integration of various vocabularies
and ideas with a continuation of the sociological tradition in the study of
Further reading
Olick, J.K. and Robbins, J. (1998) Social memory studies, Annual Review of
Sociology, 24(1): 10541.
Zelizer, B. (1995) Reading the past against the grain, Critical Studies in Mass
Communication, 12: 21439.
Zerubavel, E. (1997) Social Mindscape: An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology.
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
M E M O RY E X P E R I E N C E
10
autobiographical memory, which is the way we tell others and ourselves the
story of our lives. Although autobiographical memories are not necessarily
accurate, they are mostly congruent with ones self knowledge, life themes,
or sense of self (Barclay and DeCooke 1988: 92). When talking about
cognitive memory, we refer to remembering the meaning of words and lines
of verse: What this type of remembering requires is, not that the object of
memory be something that is past, but that the person who remembers that
thing must have met, experienced or learned of it in the past (Connerton
1989: 23). Yet another kind of memory is habit memory, which refers to our
capacity to reproduce a certain performance and which is an essential
ingredient in the successful and convincing performance of codes and rules.
Habit is the mode of inscribing the past in the present, as present. In this
case, memory denotes a habitual knowing that allows us to recall the signs
and skills we use in everyday life. This kind of memory, like all habits,
is sedimented in bodily postures, activities, techniques and gestures. Such
conceptualization of the process of remembering, where memory gets
passed on in non-textual and non-cognitive ways (Connerton 1989: 102),
allows us to study social remembrance by focusing on the performance of
commemorative rituals.
Habit-memory differs from other types of memory because it brings the
past into the present by acting, while other kinds of memory retrieve the past
to the present by summoning the past as past that is, by remembering it.
Remembering submits the past to a reective awareness and it permits, by
highlighting the pasts difference to the present, the emergence of a form of
critical reection and the formation of meaningful narrative sequences.
Although remembering, like habit, can be seen as a constant effort to main
tain and reconstruct societal stability it, unlike habit, is also a highly active,
effortful process (Young 1988: 97). While remembering, we deliberately
and consciously recover the past, so whatever memories route into con
sciousness, they need to be organized into patterns so that they make some
kind of continuing sense in an ever-changing present (Young 1988: 978).
Hence, memory, as the knowing ordering or the narrative organization of
the past, observes rules and conventions of narrative. For example, success
ful narratives about the past must have a beginning and an end, an interest
ing storyline and impressive heroes. The fact that memorizing is not free of
social constraints and inuences suggests the importance of another type of
memory namely, collective or social memory, which is our main concern
here.
This book focuses on similarities between the ways in which people assign
meanings to their common memories, while adopting the intersubjectivist
approach which allows us to avoid both theories rooted in social determin
ism (which subordinate individuals totally to a collectivity) and visions of an
individualistic, atomized social order (which deny the importance of com
municative relations between people and their social embeddedness). Its
MEMORY EXPERIENCE
11
12
recording of the past but active re-working of the past is more likely to be
transmitted if it happens in high-prestige, socially consensual institutions
than if it happens at or beyond the edges of conventional organization
(Schudson 1995: 359). That remembering is social in origin and inuenced
by the dominant discourses is well illustrated by Zerubavels (1997: 12)
example of cognitive battles over memory, which are typically between
social camps rather than simply between individuals. The fact that major
changes in the way we view the past usually correspond to major social
transformations that affect entire mnemonic communities, as shown in
many studies of changes in attitudes to the past in postcommunist countries
after the collapse of communism (Szacka 1997), also provides the evidence
that remembering is more than just a personal act and the nature of political
power can inuence the content of our memories.
Memory is also social because remembering does not take place in a social
vacuum. We remember as members of social groups, and this means assum
ing and internalizing the common traditions and social representation
shared by our collectivities. Memory cannot be removed from its social
context, since whenever we remember something for example, our rst day
at university we also recall the social circumstances in which the event took
place: the city, the university, friends and so on. Moreover, collective mem
ory constitutes shared social frameworks of individual recollections as we
share our memories with some people and not others, and in turn with
whom, for what purpose and when we remember, all of which contributes to
what we remember. Furthermore, memory is social because the act of
remembering is itself interactive, promoted by cultural artefacts and cues
employed for social purposes and even enacted by cooperative activity
(Schudson 1997).
In todays societies, which are no longer societies of memory (HervieuLeger 2000: 123), social memory refers not so much to living memory but to
organized cultural practices supplying ways of understanding the world, and
providing people with beliefs and opinions which guide their actions. As
modern societies suffer from amnesia, we witness the transformation of
living memory into institutionally shaped and sustained memory (Assmann
1995). Cultural memory, memory institutionalized through cultural means,
is embodied in objectivations that store meaning in a concentrated manner
(Heller 2001: 1031). As memory that is shared outside the avenues of
formal historical discourse yet . . . is entangled with cultural products and
imbued with cultural meaning (Sturken 1997: 3), cultural memory refers to
peoples memories constructed from the cultural forms and to cultural forms
available for use by people to construct their relations to the past (Schudson
1995: 348). These cultural forms are distributed across social institutions
and cultural artefacts such as lms, monuments, statues, souvenirs and
so on. Cultural memory is also embodied in regularly repeated practices,
commemorations, ceremonies, festivals and rites. Since the individual
MEMORY EXPERIENCE
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14
MEMORY EXPERIENCE
15
loss of memory (Gunn Allen 1999: 589). However, we need also to remem
ber that since the nineteenth century, memory has seemed the mechanism
by which ideology materializes itself (Terdiman 1993: 33).
Memory, functioning as organized practices designed to ensure the repro
duction of social and political order, is a source of factual material for
propaganda. Its task is to provide social groups or societies with identities
and a set of unifying beliefs and values from which objectives are derived for
political programmes and actions. Memory, when employed as a reservoir
of ofcially sanctioned heroes and myths, can be seen as a broad and always
(to some degree) invented tradition that explains and justies the ends
and means of organized social action and provides people with beliefs and
opinions. This role of memory has been important since the end of the
eighteenth century, when the new nation states started to construct their
citizens national identities with commemoration rituals, marches, cere
monies, festivals and the help of teachers, poets and painters (Hobsbawm
and Ranger 1983). Thus, collective memory is not just historical knowledge,
because it is experience, mediated by representation of the past, that enacts
and gives substance to a groups identity. In order to understand the produc
tion of social memory we need to examine how a group maintains
and cultivates a common memory. One way to start studying the social
formation of memory is to analyse social contexts in which memories are
embedded groups that socialize us to what should be remembered and
what should be forgotten; so-called mnemonic communities.
16
our mental structures, and therefore make sense to us groups identities and
collective memory are continuously reinforced. Due to a groups mnemonic
tradition, a particular cognitive bias marks every groups remembering.
Typically, such a bias expresses some essential truth about the group and its
identity and equips the group with the emotional tone and style of its
remembering. For instance, the partition of Poland in the eighteenth century
gave that country an essential identity as the Christ among nations: cruci
ed and recrucied by foreign oppression, and through this established
prism of victimhood many Poles still interpret their national fate.
Furthermore, a groups memory is linked to places, ruins, landscapes,
monuments and urban architecture, which as they are overlain with sym
bolic associations to past events play an important role in helping to pre
serve group memory. Such sites, and also locations where a signicant event
is regularly celebrated and replayed, remain concrete and distinct regardless
of whether they are mythological or historical (Heller 2001: 1031). The fact
that memories are often organized around places and objects suggests that
remembering is something that occurs in the world of things and involves
our senses. This was well understood by the ancient Greeks (see Chapter 2).
Halbwachs, on the other hand, brings to our attention the fact that there are
as many ways of representing space as there are groups and that each group
leaves its imprint on its place. Arguing that our recollections are located with
the help of landmarks that we always carry within ourselves, Halbwachs
observes that space is a reality that endures, thus we can understand how
we recapture the past only by understanding how it is preserved by our
physical surroundings ([1926] 1950: 848). In The Legendary Topography
of the Gospels in the Holy Land, Halbwachs (1941) demonstrates the work
ing of memory. He shows how Jews, Romans, Christians and Muslims
rewrote the history of Jerusalem by remodelling the space according to their
religious beliefs. Hence, When one looks at the physiognomy of the holy
places in successive times, one nds the character of these groups inscribed
(Halbwachs [1941] 1992: 235). The discovery of several strata of memory
superimposed on the Holy Land leads Halbwachs to argue that memory
imprints its effect on the topography and that each group cuts up space in
order to compose a xed framework within which to enclose and retrieve its
remembrance.
The link between landscape and memory is also present in Benjamins
(1968) viewing of the city as a repository of peoples memories. Seeing the
urban landscape as the battleground for the past, where the past remains
open and contestable, he argues that the city can be read as the topography
of a collective memory in which buildings are mnemonic symbols which
can reveal hidden and forgotten pasts. Although the city offers us an
illusionary and deceptive vision of the past as many real histories are
buried and covered (Gilloch 1996: 13), new events or new encounters
can help us to uncover the citys true memories. So, memory and the
MEMORY EXPERIENCE
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18
MEMORY EXPERIENCE
19
memory, its cohesion and continuity is ensured. The content of the shared
familys narrative, symbolic of family unity across generations, reproduces
family traditions, secrets and particular sentiments. These memories,
objectied in old letters, photographs and family lore, are sustained through
family conversations, as past events are jointly recalled or co-memorized
(Billig 1990). Middleton and Edwards (1988) illustrated this process by
researching how families collectively remembered past events by talking
about photographs. As much research shows, children learn to remember in
the family environment, guided by parental intervention and shared remin
iscence. We do not remember ourselves as very young kids very clearly, so
we rely on the memories of older members of our family, with the result that
many of our earliest memories are actually recollections of stories we heard
from adults about our childhood. Our memory is more accurately described
as a collection of overlapping testimonies from our narrative environments,
which inuence our memorys emotional tone, style and content.
Presently we witness two processes: on the one hand, the growing impact
of what might be described as the quest for family roots; and on the other
the decline in the familys capability to maintain a living chain of memory.
Family history was one of the most striking discoveries of the 1960s and has
given rise to the most remarkable do-it-yourself archive-based scholarship
of our time (Samuel 1999: 169). This trend has been popularized by
the mass media, with many books and lms blending private and public
memories. The growing interest in telling a family story has been recently
assisted by new technologies such as the internet, where the numbers of
family websites devoted to the construction of families memory increases
daily. At the same time there is a trend that suggests that families are less and
less capable of maintaining their traditions due to changes in their structures
and memberships, and this reects the wider fate of memory in modern
society. The decline of the extended, multi-generational family is leading
to the destruction of a social framework that ensured the transmission of
collective memories from one generation to the next. As family size and
stability declines, the depth of family memory also suffers.
All three communities of memory (nation, ethnic group and family) are
affected by the growing differentiation of society, the globalization of the
world and by the development of new means of communication. These
factors have also caused changes in the functioning of the institutions of
memory.
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MEMORY EXPERIENCE
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22
is played by the mass media (McLuhan 1962). Before the development of the
mass media, most peoples sense of the past and the world beyond their
immediate milieu was constituted by oral traditions that were produced and
reproduced in the social context of everyday life. The shift from relying only
on face-to face exchanges to depending on mediated interaction has pro
foundly affected the ways in which people organize material for recall as
well as their modes of reconstructing the past (Thompson 1996: 95). Rapid
technological advancements in the eld of communication in the late nine
teenth and twentieth centuries and the creation of the mass audience have
ensured that the media is an extremely powerful instrument of ordering our
knowledge of the past. In the nineteenth century it was the press that was the
central means of communication and that provided people with images of
groups that they could identify with. The press helped the transition from
the local to the national by turning existing societies, through highlighting
the common past and a constant repetition of images and words, into
national communities (Anderson 1983). Now, the function of memorykeeping and presentation is increasingly assigned to the electronic media
(Samuel 1994: 25). The nature of this media and their interest in meeting
public demands for instant entertainment are not without impact on the
content and form of representations of the past. Thus, the input of media
into how and what we remember is a crucial factor inuencing the status of
memory in contemporary societies.
The shift from oral culture, through writing and print, to electronic pro
cessing of the word has induced changes in the experience of time, brought
about a new conception of the past and created growing possibilities for
abstract thought. Thus, it can be said that the evolution of the role and form
of social memory has been shaped by technological changes in the means of
communication, and this is one of the most important factors structuring the
status of memory in modern society.
MEMORY EXPERIENCE
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24
written means for preserving the past, keep their main texts alive through
commentary.
Nevertheless, although preliterate cultures do not necessarily differ in
terms of tasks and the value they assign to memory, the content of memory
and the principal domain in which memory crystallizes have been affected
by various processes such as the transformation of the technical means of
preserving the past, changes in the experience of time, the increased interest
in the past and the occurrence of dramatic events. For example, writing,
because it generates cultural innovation by promoting economization and
scepticism, encourages the production of unfamiliar statements and the
thinking of novel thoughts (Connerton 1989: 76). Furthermore, while
speech can preserve memories over long intervals of time, it is too eeting
to permit any listener to pause for recollection; thus a sense of the past that
is primarily based on hearing tales from others is different from one that is
primarily based on reading oneself (Eisenstein 1966: 49). As the pastness
of the past depends upon a historical sensibility, this can hardly begin to
operate without permanent written records. Hence, literate societies, where
records reveal the past is unlike the present, differ from oral cultures in their
attitudes to the past. The repetitive regularity of most orally transmitted
history means that most knowledge of the past is in fact shared, while in
literate societies printed historical texts are widely disseminated but most
knowledge of the past is fragmented into segments exclusive to small
clusters of specialists and the consensually shared past shrinks to a thin
media-dominated veneer (Lowenthal 1998: 238). In literary cultures, past
events, removed from living memories and xed to printed pages, lose their
vividness and immediacy. Moreover, as nobody could be expected to
remember the content of continuously expanded libraries, the past is not
entirely known. However, printed texts facilitate critical approaches and
open inquiry into the past (Ong 1983). The new awareness of historicity
came into being when it became possible to set one xed account of the
world beside another so that the contradictions within and between them
could literally be seen (Connerton 1989: 76). In contrast, oral societies
live very much in the present and only with memories which have present
relevance and which articulate inconsistent cultural inheritance.
The electronication of memory provides a new dimension to the role
memory plays in our image-fed society (Urry 1996: 63). Digital tech
nology, interactive media and information systems have greatly changed the
facets of memory practices in our time, and as a result todays memory is
composed of bits and pieces (Hervieu-Leger 2000: 129). The immediacy of
communication, information overload, the speed of changing images, the
growing hybridity of media, all further expand and problematize the status
of memory. We have unlimited access to facts, sources and information,
which we can store, freeze and replay. At the same time, visual images can
interfere with and confuse our memories. For example, computer-generated
MEMORY EXPERIENCE
25
graphics can fake the truth about the past, as they do in lms like Forrest
Gump and Zoolander). This decline of the credibility of photographic
images and other visual evidence, together with the overabundance of ick
ering and changing narratives and images, is a threat to the status of memory
as it raises the question of whose vision of the past and whose memories
should be trusted. In the same vein, just as in print culture, readers assess
ment of trust in the book underwrote the stability of knowledge and society
(Johns 1998), trust in media (in other words, institutional trust) is crucial in
making narratives of memory and identity into dominant cultural represen
tations of reality.
The importance of institutional trust means that technological change is
not the sole factor responsible for the status of memory. Both the shift in
means of communication and the changes in modes of social organization,
including changes in the practice of power, inuence the nature of mnemonic
practices. In other words, the structuring of memory in society is shaped by
technological changes in the means of communication and the transform
ation of the dominant institutions of society. Memory, as the main source of
collective identity, has always been employed by various social forces to
boost their control and standing. When the main social authority was
religious institutions, for example (as in ancient Israel), religious memory
was called upon to sustain followers allegiance; thus the biblical continuous
appeal to Zakhor (remember) that ensured that remembering was felt as
a religious imperative to an entire people (Yerushalmi 1982: 9). Similarly,
the emergence of the nation state was accompanied by inventions of new
memories to enhance national identities. Today, memory is more distant
from traditional sources of power, while at the same time it becomes increas
ingly shaped by mass media.
To sum up, this chapter, after describing different forms of memory,
dened collective memory as the representation of the past, both the past
shared by a group and the past that is collectively commemorated, that
enacts and gives substance to the groups identity, its present conditions and
its vision of the future. The following presentation of the role of main mne
monic communities and institutions of memory aimed to expand our under
standing of the social formation of memory. Discussing further the status of
memory, we noted how changes in modes of communication and social
organization inuence the structure and status of memory. Since memory
has travelled from oral expression through print literacy to todays elec
tronic means of communication, we can conclude by saying that memory
has its own history. This history, linked to a large degree to the history of
changing modes of communication and techniques of power, will be dis
cussed in the next chapter.
26
Further reading
Baddley, A. (1989) The psychology of remembering and forgetting, in T. Butler (ed.)
Memory: History, Culture and the Mind, pp. 3360. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Goody, J. (1998) Memory in oral tradition, in P. Fara and K. Patterson (eds)
Memory, pp. 7394. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Renan, E. ([1882] 1990) What is a nation?, in H.K. Bhabha (ed.) Nation and
Narration. London: Routledge.
Schudson, M. (1995) Distortion in collective memory, in D.L. Schacter (ed.) Memory
Distortion, pp. 34663. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sennett, R. (1998) Disturbing memories, in P. Fara and K. Patterson (eds) Memory,
pp. 1046. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
M E TA M O R P H O S I S O F
M E M O RY
28
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
29
involved with everyday life, for many people in these societies the past was
not a foreign country but their own (Lownethal 1998: 13). In other words,
oral tradition combines mythology, genealogy and narrative history, rather
than holding them apart (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 82). In many
such cultures oral tradition is helped by a specialist (e.g. in many African
societies, where the main practices of memorization rely on songs, a
memory-man is a lore master or praise singer) who preserves rituals,
technologies and local knowledge. Ritualistic chants are repeated from per
formance to performance, while habit and custom ensure the memorization
of practical, technical and professional knowledge without revealing the
specic nature of the habit (Ong 1983: 635; Le Goff 1992: 56; Hutton
1993: 17). This type of memory is gained through apprenticeship and is
based on a respect for custom and habit. Hence, memory in oral traditions
can be identied primarily with habit; its authority is derived from the felt
need to reiterate the wisdom bequest by the past (Hutton 1993: 17).
However, memory transmitted through custom and habit does not stand
still because it is not word-for-word memory and because the past is con
tinually updated as new realities present themselves (Levi-Strauss 1966, Le
Goff 1992; Goody 1998). The unique exibility of oral traditions is linked
to the transformative nature of their knowledge, which is stored in a way
that cannot be recalled precisely. As oral versions of events are recited in
different times and places, oral memory becomes re-worked experience
(Goody 1998: 8894). Due to the role of forgetting, human diversity and the
generative use of language and gesture, memory seems to function in these
societies in accordance with generative reconstruction rather than mechan
ical memorization. Hence every performance is also a creative act, there is
no distinct separation between performer and creator (Goody 1998: 91).
The same argument is developed by Le Goff (1992: 57), who notes that
societies without writing grant memory more freedom and creative possi
bilities. In other words, mnemonic reproduction word is characteristic of
literate societies rather than societies without writing where imagination
and memory are virtually interchangeable because each is dened by its
capacity to form images in which past, present and future are intimately
joined (Hutton 1993: 17). Therefore, since in oral cultures word-for-word
memory is impossible, the practice of memorization is not assigned an
important role and it is rarely felt to be necessary by members of this type
of society (Goody 1977: 38).
Stressing that oral cultures are in a state of continuous creation, Goody
warns against the danger of speaking about a collective memory in such
societies: An oral culture is not held in everybodys memory store. Memories
vary as does experience. Bits may be held by different people (Goody 1998:
94). However, the same warning, although for different reasons, can be
issued with regard to the nature of social memory in todays societies.
Whereas the uidity and creativity of memory in oral cultures is connected
30
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
31
without it no one could enjoy what her daughters, custodians of the arts and
sciences, produced as each sound would fade away without ever being
included in a melody, every word in a poem would disappear before the
rhyming word was heard (Draaisma 2000: 5). In Platos and Aristotles
presentations, the gift of memory, placed in the soul and thus a function
of the soul, is seen as essential for a virtuous and just life. Such mystical
divinization of memory meant that even the greatest Greek philosophers
never fully succeeded in reconciling memory and history (Le Goff 1992:
65). However, the trend towards the secularization of memory and the
discovery of the technique of improving memory induced a slow process of
transformation in this relationship.
This new technique, ars memoria, or the art of memory, is attributed to
the poet Simonides of Ceos (c.556468 bce), who discovered the import
ance of order and the sense of sight for memory. Proceeding from Aristotles
assertion that there is no thought without an image and that recollection
means perceiving something as an image, ars memoria assigned a central
role to mental images (Yates 1966: 35). The mnemotechnics involved locat
ing each element to be remembered in imaginary palaces of memory so that
it could be easily recovered in its proper place by conceptually touring
those palaces. Orators, in order to associate the texts and ideas to be
remembered with the image of a place, relied on paintings, sculptures
and buildings as aids in the process of the placement of allegorical images
within a ctive architecture. Thus, when they were mentally walking around
imaginary objects as if they were statues in a palace, gallery or theatre, their
remembering was enhanced. As philosophers, such as Cicero, focused on
the difference between articial or trained, and conventional or natural
memory, and insisted that a memory strengthened by training was an essen
tial part of the orators equipment, memory lost its mythical aspect and
became desacralized and secularized (Le Goff 1992: 65). This suited a
rising literary culture which still relied on memory for the organization of
knowledge, and hence on the art of memory, as a part of an education based
on rhetoric.
To sum up, in the largely oral culture of Greek and Roman antiquity,
where wax tablets were little more than a memory aid, most of what people
wanted to say in a speech still had to be committed to memory and therefore
they relied on a procedure to facilitate remembering that turned memory
into an imaginary space; this was the art of memory. The power of memory
was admired by many as it was assumed, following Plato, that all know
ledge is but remembrance, and that therefore memory is, as Cicero said, the
treasury and guardian of all things (quoted in Shotter 1990: 136). The high
status of the art of memory in the ancient world was also a result of the fact
that it was an lite practice, associated with orators and later with scholars
who greatly appreciated this techniques capacities for image-making and
the preservation of knowledge. In ancient Greece, memory was seen as the
32
source of all the arts and sciences, while in Roman culture memory was
placed at the heart of all teaching, learning and thought (Samuel 1994: vii):
No art was more carefully studied, or esteemed, from Plato until
Enlightenment, than the art of memory (Hacking 1995: 203).
Following antiquitys later metaphors of memory as a storage space, the
neoplatonist St Augustine (354430) saw memory as a vast, immeasurable
sanctuary, and stressed the spiritual dimensions of memory. Augustine, see
ing memory as a great eld or a spacious place, a storehouse for countless
images of all kinds, asks: Who can plumb its depths? And yet it is faculty of
my soul (McConkey 1996: 7). Memory was seen as a source of truth
because it allowed the recall of a state of blessed happiness, and this
memory of a lost happiness thus must contain an awareness of Truth
Ciceros insistance on the ethical status of memory, which he saw as the
souls highest ability was further enhanced by Albertus Magnus and
Thomas Aquinas discussion of memory as a part of Prudence (Draaisma
2000: 31). Thus, with memory seen as an essential element of virtue, the
technology of memory was continuously recommended as a vital factor in
the formation of moral character.
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
33
derived from oral tradition (Hutton 1993: 18). Generally, it can be said that
throughout most of the Middle Ages, literate lites shared with pre-literary
folk a common reliance upon oral transmission to teach most of what they
knew about the past (Eisenstein 1966: 53). As a result of both the dissemin
ation of written material and memorization, medieval culture should be seen
as characterized by the tension maintained between these two forms (Innes
1998: 3).
In the Middle Ages history was not understood as an appreciation of the
reality of change but was a unied Christian drama with no scope for or
interest in differences between past and present (Lowenthal 1985: 232).
This lack of awareness about, or denial of, the difference between the past
and the present, along with ignorance of the reality of the past meant that
medieval interest in antiquity was predicated on its relevance to present
concerns and experiences. However, the gradually increasing fascination
with classical sources and the growing authority of old manuscripts brought
about new attitudes towards the past, which was presented as being
exemplary of human practices, and towards memory, which was recon
sidered as a capacity to make the experiences of the past live again
(Lowenthal 1985: 2324). Consequently, the understanding of memory as
a repetition, carried over from oral culture, was gradually replaced by one of
memory as a resurrection (Hutton 1993: 18). The rise of Christianity
brought with it an attendant understanding of history as the unfolding of a
divine plan. Medieval thinkers believed in God as being the cause of all
historical processes, and saw humans as carrying out the will of God. The
Christian experience of history, which was associated with expectations of
salvation (Carruthers 1990: 123), meant that the past and memory were not
seen as models for understanding the present or the future but as sources of
evidence of divine intervention in history (Tosh 1991: 1112).
The new relation between memory and religion, reinforced by the nature
of Christianity and Judaism (both being religions of remembrance), by the
Bibles frequent insistence on the duty to remember and by Christian rituals
of commemoration of saints, resulted in a circular liturgical memory (Le
Goff 1992: 68). Apart from a circular liturgical memory, the second
element of collective memory in the medieval period was lay memory, which
was also shaped by the Church calendar (Le Goff 1992: 68). Being rooted in
oral transmission and commemoration practices, lay memory contained a
popular recounting of the family-centred past and memories of the dead.
There was no clear distinction between the past and the present as ordinary
people felt the past to be so much a part of their present that they perceived
no urgent need to preserve it (Duby 1988: 61920). The pattern of remem
bering characteristic of peasant societies, with their structuring of the past
through family and locality, meant that memories were local rather than
national (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 153).
The sense of the past, shaped by the interaction between written and oral
34
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
35
the issue of human immortality, with the result that spiritual theories of
memory gained in signicance (Draaisma 2000: 604). The Renaissance
applications of the art of memory aimed to contain the soul of things to
remember (Yates 1966: 140), and thus to provide a way toward initiation
into a state of spiritual enlightenment (Hutton 1993: 19).
Soon, however, the relationship between memory and knowledge changed
and this led to a gradual but systematic erosion of the value put on memory.
Although in Bacons inuential classication of knowledge, published in
The Advancement of Learning (1605), Memory, together with Imagination
and Reason, were presented as the main faculties, in the early modern period
the reliance on memory in the scientic eld was already declining (Yeo
2001: 23). The role of memory was further diminished by the evolution
of the classical mnemonic system, which transmuted from a method of
memorizing the encyclopaedia of knowledge, of reecting the world in
memory to an instrument to help in the discovery of the world (Yates 1966:
185). Even more importantly, the art of memory was seen as a method of
investigation and a method of logical investigation (Yates 1966: 185) and by
developing scholars need for the systematic organization of knowledge
may have trained them in the kind of systematic thinking, that made pos
sible the scientic revolution (Hutton 1993: 12). With the spread of printing
and the expansion of knowledge, now understood not as accepted truth but
as an open search, the elaborate mnemonic techniques began to disappear,
while scientists rejected memory because one does not require memory in all
science (Descartes, quoted in Le Goff 1992: 84). By the seventeenth century,
with the decline of the art of memory, the function of transmitting messages
from the past detached from the human voice and entrusted to books, and
with the increasing dissemination of printed historical texts, the pastness of
the past slowly came to be appreciated.
The development of print culture, which ensured the standardization, dis
semination and xity of the text, underwrote the gradually established sta
bility of the vision of the past (Eisenstein 1966). Additionally, the emergence
of this new awareness and appreciation of the past was assisted by the
Renaissance rediscovery of the classical world and the growing understand
ing of antiquity as a different realm. This new method of understanding
antiquity was developed by the Renaissance humanists, who discovered that
the clearer the image of antiquity became, the less it seemed to resemble the
present (Lowenthal 1985: 232) and insisted on the critical reading of the
pure text and the investigation of the authenticity of documents. While for
ancient or medieval authors, historical facts were atomic entities, immedi
ately perceivable and understandable and hardly in need of interpretation,
from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward a new perception of
historical facts emerged. Now, the historical fact was not in and of itself
meaningful: only its context endows a historical fact with meaning and
signicance. The context of historical facts is not at all given: it must be
36
reconstructed by the historian from other facts (Funkenstein 1993: 25). The
strengthening of this new perception of the past, which led nally to seeing
the past as a different realm, was further helped by the use of letters to
preserve memory, the establishment of archives (from the thirteenth cen
tury), libraries, the dissemination of printed books, secularism and the
increasing scrutiny of evidence (Lowenthal 1985: 233). All these trends
gradually reinforced the importance of written documents beyond the
monopoly of a small lite, therefore textualizing the past and historicizing
memory in more concrete ways. By removing ideas, personalities and events
from the milieu of oral tradition and giving them a specic time and place in
collective memory, texts enabled readers to comprehend the historicity of
the past in a more profound way: The textualization of collective memory
depended on the readers awareness of temporality, and this in turn led to
the recasting of mnemonic schemes, previously conceived spatially, onto
timelines on which historical events served as places of memory (Hutton
1993: 19). Nevertheless, the trend towards seeing the past as a different
realm was a slow process, as discrimination between the mythical and his
torical remained blurred for a full two centuries after printing (Eisenstein
1966: 51).
In the Middle Ages, memory enjoyed a high status not only because it was
valued enormously as a container of virtues and an instrument of thought,
but also because of concern about loss of knowledge. Since until the eight
eenth century even printed books were not perceived as a safe container of
knowledge (Yeo 2001: 80), medieval works sought to summarize and record
a stable body of knowledge, often by referring back to the vocal context
(Ong 1983: 31113). In the monastic tradition of the Middle Ages, the
written word was treated differently as it was assumed that what was writ
ten in books must eventually nd its way into the personal memory, and
therefore the book was not regarded as an alternative to human memory,
but as an aid to memory (Carruthers 1990). However, the spread of dic
tionaries and encyclopedias gave the public access to an enormous amount
of knowledge about the past, as well as the progress of science and phil
osophy, and as a result transformed the role and content of memory (Le
Goff 1992: 815). From the end of the Middle Ages, mnemonics were not
invested with any moral authority or stature (Hacking 1995: 203) and with
the early modern period came the realization that knowledge, even the most
important parts of it, could no longer be held in memory (Yeo 2001: 78).
During the Enlightenment, the art of memory was rejected in favour of
observation, experience, intelligence and reason, which meant the end of the
art of memory and the emergence of a clear difference between the mythical
and the historical.
Although during the Enlightenment the mnemonic technique lost its
standing, a concern with memory continued in many philosophical works.
For example, John Locke famously discussed connections between personal
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
37
38
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
39
40
was quite different from the collections of the previous century, not only
because it was the strongest, and not only in art and antiquity, but also in
natural history, but also because its intellectual rationale was rooted in
the wealthy middle-class belief in progress, knowledge and the idea of the
present as the product of the past (Pearce 1992: 1001). The creation of
museums in most cities and large towns in Britain can be seen as the mani
festation of the civic pride of the emerging middle classes, whose national
ism expressed itself in the celebration of the lives of great men and artists.
Also the National Trust, created at the end of the nineteenth century as a
bulwark of the aristocracy, soon became a middle-class heritage mass
movement (Wright 1985; Hewison 1987).
The further expansion of social movements concerned with conservation
and heritage, together with the rise of an enthusiasm for voluntary subscrip
tion for the construction of monuments commemorating national heroes,
suggests that national memory was created not just from the sense of a break
with the past. Public monuments at the beginning of the nineteenth century
were a means of expressing the emerging national and civic pride of
the British people, particularly in expanding provincial towns and cities
(Yarrington 1988: 326). In the second part of the nineteenth century, as the
public directed its attention towards monuments of men of peace, local
demands for neoclassical monuments of war heroes decreased. It can be said
that modern British memory was born from an intense awareness of the
conicting representations of the past and the effort of each group to make
its version the basis of national identity (Gillis 1994b: 8), while the wealth
of the nation created conducive conditions for a public interest in the past.
The nineteenth-century citizens civic pride was closely linked with the
growing signicance of history, which, fuelled by the ascendancy of positiv
ism, established itself as a scientic discipline. History, being hostile to
abstraction and generalization, aimed to describe the past as it actually had
been, as famously expressed by Leopold von Ranke (Tosh 1991: 1316).
National historians enjoyed the status of cultural priests and their work
was read by a wide stratum of the educated public (Funkenstein 1993: 20).
As the nation state replaced the sacred liturgical memory with the secular
liturgical memory days of remembrance, ags, and monuments, the task
of the national historian was to make the symbols concrete (Funkenstein
1993: 20). In their efforts to separate history as a secular academic practice
from a background of cultural religiosity, nineteenth-century historians
identied memories as a dubious source for the verication of historical
facts (Klein 2000: 130). This suspicion of memories led historians to reject
myth-making about the past and to rely on written documents. Yet, at the
same time, ballads, proverbs, legends and songs (e.g. the Arthurian tradition
in England) were making their way into the national history (Samuel 1994:
4423). This appeal of popular memory can be seen as a result of the states
interest in historys ability to promote a national identity as well as the
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
41
42
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
43
44
oral traditions in villages, the rise of the popular press and the extension of
compulsory education transformed the status of memory and the ways in
which memory was preserved.
This crisis of memory manifested itself in an overwhelming sense of loss,
anxiety and uncertainty, with the past being rejected on the one hand and
appreciated as a lost mentality on the other (Terdiman 1993). The increasing
tendency in this period to construct memory in physical monuments seems
to be symptomatic of an increasing anxiety about memory left to its own
unseen devices (Savage 1994: 130). Matsuda (1996) speaks likewise of a
memory discourse, which emerged in late nineteenth-century Europe as a
response to the acceleration of history. Moreover, peoples alienation from
their past grew as modernism distanced itself from the past. As the connec
tion between the past and the present grew uncertain, people tried to nd a
remedy in the vigorous and sensitive cultivation of historical understand
ing, replacing intellectual certainty by an emotional cohesion with which
all experiences of the past could coexist (Lowenthal 1985: 376).
Modernisms desire to wipe out whatever came earlier paradoxically
generated a greater dependence on the past hence modernitys indecisive
afliations with memory (de Man 1970: 38796). On the one hand, these
relations manifested themselves in modernitys preoccupation with memory,
and on the other in its orientation towards the future and its dislike of
tradition. While modern science in general liberated itself from the guardian
ship of memory, some disciplines interest in memory grew. In psycho
analysis (Freud) and in philosophy (Bergson) the most inuential works on
the topic of memory were created (see Chapters 5 and 6 for further discus
sion). For psychoanalysis, which can be seen as our cultures last Art
Memory, memory has been both the problem and the core of its solution
(Terdiman 1993: 2401). Yet memory was absent from the social sciences,
with the majority of scientists following the prejudices of the Enlightenment
and rejecting tradition. Despite the widespread discussion of memory in late
nineteenth-century culture, the classical sociological theorists hardly
mentioned it, as they believed that memory was a feature of pre-modern
societies, and that in modern society, seen as on the road to traditionless
ness, memory had no signicance. Weber (1978), for example, argued that
traditional modes of belief and conduct could not help us to stand up against
the power of rationality and to stop the inevitable process of rationalization,
and therefore were irrelevant for the modern world.
There were also opposing orientations to the role of memory in the artistic
world. On the one hand, the nineteenth century avant-garde was interested
solely in the future, invention, innovation and originality: The attack of
the avant-garde was directed mainly against the store-room of collective
memory: museums, libraries and academies (Connerton 1989: 62). The
avant-garde artists demands, most stridently expressed in the manifestos of
the futurists, called for the primacy of forgetting, and denounced museums
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
45
as cemeteries and libraries as burial chambers. On the other hand, the role
of memory was emphasized in many literary works proposing to look at
memory not in historical terms but rather as an act of imagination. The best
example here is Prousts seven-volume novel Remembrance of Things Past,
the rst volume of which was published just before World War I.
The most important changes in attitudes towards the past were brought
about by World War, I, which created the 1914 generations new ideas
and perception of temporality as well as a new memory of war (Fussell
1975; Wohl 1979). For Walter Benjamin (1968), the war experience was a
decisive moment in a longer-term trend, typied by a decline of storytelling
that left people without the possibility to tell their tales and without com
municable experiences to tell. However, the war, or shock generally as the
hallmark of modern experience, is also, according to Benjamin, a category
of awakening, as it disrupts lifes complacent conviction of its own
immortality. Thus, the experience of the Great War engendered not only
forgetfulness but also a distinctive form of memory. The wars myth, sup
plied with coherence by literary narratives, upgraded the status of national
memory. The memory of the war, by becoming the total cultural form of
our present life, established a new form of memory, where the culture of the
past was our own buried life (Fussell 1975: 335). The war inuenced the
nature of commemoration practices, forms of war memorial and types of
mourning (Winter 1995). Widespread state-sponsored commemorative
practices after the war (which, for example in France, practically left no
town without a war memorial) (Sherman 1994), were exploited by national
ist leaders to create an identication of states with mass memory. In all
countries, the We who should remember Them were mourning the loss by
erecting so-called tombs of unknown soldiers, thereby remembering every
one by remembering no one in particular (Gillis 1994b: 11). As the memory
of the Great War became materialized in a single place, individual and fam
ily memories of the dead were to be blended and given purpose by identi
cation with collective expressions presided over by the state (Gray and
Oliver 2001: 14). The interplay between private and collective memories, so
characteristic of these type of practice, contributed to the democratization of
the cult of the dead, and this further enhanced the impersonalization of
national memory (Gillis 1994a).
In the interwar period, the debate about memory entered the eld of
sociology. The publication of Maurice Halbwachs Les Cadres Socioaux de
la Memoire in 1924 established memory as an object of sociological study
and shifted the conceptualization of memory out of a biological framework
and into a cultural one (Assmann 1995). Halbwachs observation that the
advent of capitalism and technology brought about the gradual alignment
of all spheres of social life on the sphere of production, led him to suspect
that the more advanced societies become, the more collective memory
disintegrates ([1941] 1992). In other words, the development of industrial
46
Memory today
Todays societies are often seen as those in which one no longer nds a
minimal continuum of memory, or those in which life is not traditioninformed, past-oriented and memory-rich. This collapse of the comprehen
sive collective memory is, however, accompanied by a the fascination with
memory. Thus, the end of the twentieth century, in a remarkably similar
way to the end of the nineteenth, was characterized by a memory crisis. On
the one hand, the cultural demise of authoritative memory has meant that
contemporary societies have been described as terminally ill with amnesia
(Huyssen 1995: 1), amnesic (Hervieu-Leger 2000) and without a living
memory (Nora 1996a), where the anniversaries and celebrations of the past
are only media events (Collini 1999) and where there is no historical aware
ness or knowledge (Lowenthal 1998). On the other hand, they are described
as suffering from an obsession with memory and going through museumania and exhibition craze (Huyssen 1995: 7, 21) the epidemic of com
memoration and a passion for heritage. Even more importantly, the decline
of comprehensive memory is accompanied by the spread of communitybased small memories, which absorb the need for identity, and by the
emergence of extra-territorial global memories, which are facilitated by
the speed and imagery of the new global communications (Levy and
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
47
48
museum and its modes of exhibiting. As the information age offers us access
to images and more interactive ways of displaying exhibits, museums have
become less like traditional archives and more like interactive libraries,
while at the same time new archives capacities for collection and ling are
unlimited. Integrated digital systems have enriched our access to archives,
museums and libraries, and the potential for greater visual literacy has also
been expanded by the provision online exhibitions and new ways of collect
ing, storing and producing memories. The personal testimony constitutes
the favoured form of memory production in many museums, as its intensely
individuated meanings differentiate it from the monument, remembrance
day or other ofcial and collective markers of memory (Ashplant et al.
2000b: 48). Projects of generating memory are now technologically complex
and often include clips of oral testimonies and video interviews. One of the
most fully developed memory projects is the Holocaust archive a collec
tion of 3400 witness accounts organized by the Fortunoff Video Archive and
50,000 testimonies collected by Steven Spielbergs Visual History of the
Shoah Foundation.
The role of the media has also undergone change as a result of new tech
nologies, which have increased our ability to store and transmit memory,
allowing more freedom and creative possibilities. These new developments
have been preparing us for the arrival of cosmopolitan memory (Levy and
Sznaider 2002). However, although we witness the decline of the role of the
media in legitimizing the nation, it remains through its ability to create
master narratives and to make journalists into authoritative spokes
persons for the story(Zelizer 1993) the main source of images of the past.
Our growing reliance on new electronic means of communication (from TV
to the internet) for memory-keeping and memory-construction makes us
dependent on media representations of the past. Our contact with the past
increasingly takes place through the electronic media, which are based upon
a presupposition that they, unlike the press which reports and comments,
represent the world (Tester 1999: 470). Generally, the importance and the
nature of mass media have established the new role of mediated and delocal
ized traditions as a means of making sense of the world and creating a sense
of belonging.
By presenting the changes in aids to memory, from visual mnemonic tech
niques, through writing and print, to todays means of storage, transition
and construction of memory, this chapter has illustrated how cultures have
been affected by the shift in the means of communication and social organ
ization. It has shown changes in the status and meanings of memory, from
its mythical and sacred status in antiquity, through its high position in the
pre-modern period where memory was seen as source of knowledge and
truth, to the erosion of its value in modernity. The history of memory reveals
changes in the custodianship of remembering, from the religious authorities,
through the state to the media. In order to further clarify social rules of
METAMORPHOSIS OF MEMORY
49
Further reading
Hacking, I. (1995) Rewriting the Soul. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hobsbawm, E. (1983) Mass-producing traditions: Europe, 18701914, in
E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition, pp. 263308.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Le Goff, J. (1992) History and Memory, trans. S. Rendall and E. Claman. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Lowenthal, D. (1985) The Past is a Foreign Country, Ch. 5. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Matsuda, M.K. (1996) The Memory of the Modern. New York: Oxford University
Press.
THEORIZING REMEMBERING
THEORIZING REMEMBERING
51
52
group delimited in space and time (Halbwachs [1926] 1950: 84). Both time
(see Chapter 5) and space (see Chapter 1) play a crucial role in anchoring
group recollections and hence in ensuring their preservation. Halbwachs
([1941] 1992: 172) notes that time and space are imposed upon us, and that
from this comes a feeling of a reality that is, the point of departure for all
our acts of memory. A group colonizes time by ordering important dates
within a commemorative sequence. By conforming the past to its concep
tions, the groups memory conveys an illusion of timelessness and continu
ity. The preservation of recollections also rests on their anchorage in space,
which because of its relative stability gives us the illusion of permanence:
The groups image of its external milieu and its stable relationships with this
environment become paramount in the idea it forms of itself (Halbwachs
[1926] 1950: 13). Furthermore, the reason members of a group remain
united, even after the group is dispersed, is that they think of the old home
and its lay-out. In other words, the spatial image alone, by reason of its
stability, gives us an illusion of not having changed through time and of
retrieving the past in the present (Halbwachs [1926] 1950: 157).
According to Halbwachs ([1926] 1950), the persistence of memory, as the
shared image of the past, which is a part of group common consciousness,
explains the groups continuity. Halbwachs theory views collective memory
as a record of resemblance which ensures that the group remains the same
([1926] 1950: 86), while asserting that a groups identity has the central
input into the process of the reconstruction of an image of the past which is
in accord . . . with the predominant thoughts of that group ([1926] 1950:
84). Collective identity precedes memory, therefore social identity deter
mines the content of collective memory. Collective memory, being both a
shared image of a past and the reection of the social identity of the group
that framed it, views events from a single committed perspective and thus
ensures solidarity and continuity. It seems that Halbwachs concern with the
Durkheimian conception of solidarity and moral consensus leads him to
argue that a groups memory is a manifestation of their identity.
Thus, memory is not only plural and changeable but is also a crucial
condition of social order and solidarity. Halbwachs illustrates a link
between collective memory and social solidarity on a national scale by
showing that shared stories dene the nature and boundaries of entire
societies to whom the stories belong. Although he is aware that Ordinarily,
the nation is too remote from the individual for him to consider the history
of his country as anything else than a very large framework with which his
own history makes contact at only few points (Halbwachs [1926] 1950:
77), he argues that there are certain events that alter group life and there
fore that collective memory can play a solidifying role in societies ([1926]
1950: 62). So, despite the fact that between individual and nation lie many
other, more restricted groups ([1926] 1950: 77), each with its own history,
there is the possibility of a link between collective memory and social
THEORIZING REMEMBERING
53
54
[1926] 1950: 23). However, we do not need the actual presence of others to
preserve our memories:
In fact I continue to be subject to the inuence of a society even
when I have walked away from it: it is enough that I carry within
me, in my spirit, all that allows me to classify myself with
reference to its members, to reimmerse myself in their milieu and
their own particular time, and feel myself very much a part of the
group.
(Halbwachs [1926] 1950: 128)
Halbwachs rejection of the individualist perspective and his idea of col
lective memory as the conceptual schemes or social frameworks in which
individual memories come to be located and which provide the model which
constrains individual memory show him as a faithful follower of Durkheim.
Halbwachs is, however, a more conciliatory gure than Durkheim (Coser
1992: 4) and tries to introduce psychology into sociological enterprise.
While Durkheim neglects the issue of individual consciousness, Halbwachs
asserts that it is an individual who remembers, although this individual,
being located in a specic group context, draws on this social context to
remember or recreate the past. Yet, his interest in psychological explanations
is rather limited as he quickly moves on to say that people remember only as
members of social groups and thus collective memory is different from both
the historical and the autobiographical forms. Furthermore, even though
Halbwachs admits that only individual recollection exists, he nevertheless
argues that our individual memories, if not located within conceptual struc
tures that are dened by communities at large, tend to fade away, are less
accessible and more difcult to recall because they do not enjoy group sup
port. In contrast, the collective memory lasts longer since it draws strength
from its base in a coherent body of people ([1926] 1950: 48).
Halbwachs left us with a rather unclear legacy. He never really elaborated
the theoretical foundation of the concept of collective memory and did not
provide a clear denition of the notion. His idea of collective memory is
often criticized for its inconcreteness and lack of clarity (Gedi and Elam
1996). It is even described as a confusing or woolly concept which lacks
any explanatory power (Osiel 1997: 18) or as coming close to the bad old
Romantic notion of the spirit or the inner character of race or nation
(Klein 2000: 9). While Halbwachs was right to say that social groups con
struct their own images of the world by establishing an agreed version of the
past, he failed to explain how the dynamics of collective memory work. His
effort to combine personal images and social manifestations of ideas has not
resulted in a clear theory capable of explaining the way collective memory
is formed. Halbwachs belief in the power of society to shape individual
memory neglects the dialectical tensions between personal memory and the
social construction of the past. His social determinism is responsible for his
THEORIZING REMEMBERING
55
56
researchers interested in stability and order, and among writers who dene
collective memories as effective markers of social differentiation.
THEORIZING REMEMBERING
57
58
THEORIZING REMEMBERING
59
common dress code and common activities, such as in the case of the
working class, football matches (Hobsbawm 1983: 293).
The performative nature of traditions, articulated somewhere between
public and private representations, allows us to see how public representa
tions join private ones. Examinations of various peoples and groups tradi
tions provide insights into their relations to the past, and throw light on
what is actually being preserved in the popular memory of the past and what
was ofcially invented. The ofcial management of the past through the
invention of tradition aimed at concealing the balance of power and wealth
was designed to reect the dramatic changes of the period in such a way as
to ensure the continuity of mass loyalty. The erection of new monuments,
the invention of new symbols and the rewriting of history books can be seen
as the states responses to the insecurities of electoral politics.
The invention of tradition theory is applied by Hobsbawm and Ranger
(1983) to explain changes in the nature of the state brought about by the
emergence of mass politics. A question arises as to whether this theorys
explanatory power is equally impressive in relation to other periods or other
types of regime. In other words, in what kind of political cultures does the
application of tradition theory tell us something interesting about social
reality? Unfortunately, the application of this perspective to modern western
societies has become somewhat predictable and repetitive (Conno 1997:
1387). It suggests that the invention of tradition approachs relevance to
open and democratic systems is questionable. Yet, an examination of public
memories of the Nazis in postwar divided Germany shows that the presen
tist perspective still preserves some explanatory power in reference to
undemocratic systems, which not only construct and control memory from
above but also eliminate any potential challenges threatening the ofcial
version of the past. The comparison of West Germanys and East Germanys
ofcial ways of representing their Nazi past reveals not only how different
political systems manipulate public memory but also variations in regimes
abilities to freeze ofcial memory. In both countries in the rst 20 years
after World War II public memories of the Nazis were constructed and
implemented to justify the respective nations political order. East Germany
developed its own vision of the Nazi past, which marginalized the Jewish
suffering and gloried the contribution of anti-fascists and communist
resistance movements. West Germanys memory not only included the suf
fering of different groups (for example, German soldiers) and emphasized
the courage of different groups (the upper class and Christian opponents of
the Nazis), but was also marked by a recognition of Jewish suffering (as
illustrated by the agreement to pay nancial restitution to Jewish survivors),
on the one hand, and by an unwillingness to confront the Nazi past, on the
other (Herf 1997). However, in West Germany, in contrast to East Germany,
the problem of coming to terms with the past became a focal point for public
and highly controversial discussions. These debates, including voices calling
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for Germans to stop avoiding a confrontation with their Nazi past, as well as
attempts to rewrite the past, started in the 1960s and accelerated from the
mid-1980s onwards, with a series of public exchanges between prominent
German scholars arguing for and against normalizing the Nazi past (see
Chapter 6). In contrast, in East Germany, as in all non-democratic systems
where there is no counterbalance to state-party power and therefore no
alternative versions of the past, the ofcial memory remained stable and
unchallenged. It seems, therefore, that the invention of tradition perspective
preserves some relevance in reference to undemocratic systems, which tend
to freeze memories and do not permit pluralistic debates.
It is an open question as to what degree the processes of the invention of
the national consciousness and the organizing of forgetting imply nothing
more than fabrication and falsity rather than imagining and creation.
Benedict Anderson (1983: 15), when discussing Gellners (1965) observa
tion that nationalism invented the nation, points out that Gellner equates
invention with fabrication. In other words, Gellner implies that somewhere
true communities exist but that some pasts are invented. The invention of
tradition theory likewise assumes that modern societies traditions are quite
recent in origin, which suggests that older traditions are the real ones. For
Anderson, all communities are imagined, and therefore they cannot be dis
tinguished by their falsity/genuiness. However, for many historians, not
only for those aiming to describe the past as it actually had been, this
equation presents a problem, since when talking about invention (e.g. the
invention of Scotland) we overlook the problem of whether people [are]
free to invent, any nation, any group, what they want? Are there no con
straints? (Burke 1998: 202). The presentist approach fails to acknowledge
that the past endures in the present not only through self-conscious com
memoration rituals but through psychological, social, linguistic and polit
ical processes that keep the past alive without necessarily intending to do so
(Schudson 1997: 3).
Moreover, it is not always possible, particularly in democratic countries,
to impose on people totally invented or fabricated traditions. As numerous
examples from many countries show, people tend to reject any vision of the
past which contradicts their recollection and sense of truth. Some past
events can be of such importance to people that they feel compelled to tell
their stories, therefore a collective memory is not so easy to undermine or
totally distort (Schudson 1997: 5). Even more importantly, if a central
power denies the reality of any groups memory and experience, it often
discredits itself (Osiel 1997: 113). The invention of tradition approach also
avoids the very interesting question of why some traditions but not others
become popular and enjoy social support. What is remarkable about tradi
tions is not that they are invented, as almost all of them, at least to some
degree, are, but why so many of them work and are accepted as real.
By treating memory and commemoration as sources of support for the
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despite his pointing to the importance of links between memory and polit
ical struggle, Foucault undervalues the ability of popular memories to resist
dominant control. His lack of interest in human agents and the fact that he
delocalizes discourses results in his failure to analyse the actual con
sequences of popular memories (Friedland and Boden 1994: 257). Many
writers have criticized Foucaults inability to account for the dialectic
relationships between the popular memory and the dominant discourse
(Bommes and Wright 1982; Harper 1997; Pearson 1999; Weissberg 1999).
Foucaults notion of popular memory is blamed for assuming that popular
memory is a wholly unied and coherent construction as if it was entirely
laid from above (Bommes and Wright 1982: 256). Pearson (1999) rejects
Foucaults assumption that mass media reprogrammes memory by repre
senting the values of the dominant social formations. Harper (1997: 164)
calls for a more historically and socially rooted analysis of collective mem
ory because a fuzzy concept of popular memory has become far too
attached to a particular orthodoxy, which is usually fuelled by a sense of
political disappointment. This criticism translates itself into studies which
attempt to analyse the content and precise location of alternative memories
that exist beneath the dominant discourse, or into studies which illuminate
the complexity of the connection between the hegemonic order and histor
ical representations.
The rst type of investigation has been developed since the early 1980s
by the Popular Memory Group at the Centre for Contemporary Studies in
Birmingham, while the second type often invokes Foucaults (1977) notion
of counter-memory. The Popular Memory Groups studies have emerged as
a result of the growing criticism of the presentist approach and as an
attempt to further enhance the appeal of the popular memory approach.
Research initiated by the Group adopted theories about narratives from
literary criticism and its members, many of whom were particularly inter
ested in the British memory of World War II, studied various forms in
which people articulate their memories. The Popular Memory Group com
bined its criticism of oral historians failure to account for many layers of
individual memory and the plurality of versions of the past with its
re-evaluation of Foucaults notion of popular memory. In its major book,
Making Histories (1982), the Group outlined its position on the signi
cance of the past and expressed its interest in the investigation of the
construction of public histories and the interaction between private and
public senses of the past.
The Popular Memory Group provided further negative reviews of the
presentist approach as its members were critical of the invented tradition
argument that memory is created solely from the top down. The Group did
not conceive of a dominant political order as monolithic, singular or total
izing, but rather as a dynamic, conictual, uid and unstable site of contest
ation between the dominant social formations in the ruling power bloc and
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However, even this moderate version of the dominant ideology has not
avoided voices of criticism pointing to several weaknesses in this approach.
First, critics suggest that the popular memory approach still conceptualizes
the past as a political fact, made and remade in the service of new power
arrangements (Schwartz 2000: 16). Second, it is pointed out that historical
facts do not support many conclusions formulated by this type of research.
For example, Schwartz (2000) notes, while referring to Bodnars (1992)
investigation, that it was not the ofcial national lite that taught various
majority groups patriotism and used their wealth and privileges to make
heroes in their own image, as the popular memory approach claims, but that
those groups patriotism was often a result of their own ethnic and religious
leaders efforts and visions. Furthermore, the popular memory approach not
only avoids the reductionism and the predictability of the presentist perspec
tive, but also fails to explain why some symbols, events and heroes, but not
others, are incorporated into public memory. Finally, it does not have any
thing to say about cases where popular memory invokes not manipulated
and conictual sentiments but rather shared symbols. Since the popular
memory perspective assumes that conict is the natural state of society, it
dismisses the possibility that the politics of memory can be consensual and
conictual. It is therefore unable to explain how it happened that, for
example, some memories constituted common models for acting for the
whole nation and as such embodied a universal cultural presence (Schwartz
2000: 255).
In the light of the growing recognition of the assumption that the content
of memory cannot be seen as only manipulated, and that ofcial recollection
and social experience are vital elements of memory, the popular memory
approach has been modied. The acceptance that memory is always partly a
given, that it is never purely a construction and that every community
should be seen as partly a community of fate and partly a community of
will (Booth 1999) are the starting points of the dynamics of memory
approach, which will be our next subject of investigation.
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THEORIZING REMEMBERING
69
taking into account that groups can choose only from the available past and
that the available past is limited, it can be asked: are they free to choose as
they want? According to Schudson (1989: 109), they are not: Far from it.
There are a variety of ways in which the freedom to choose is constrained.
Among the many factors constraining peoples choices are traumatic events
that make the past part of us as their impact and importance commit us to
remember them.
The dynamics of memory approach also tries to correct the Durkheimian
insistence on the persistence of what is remembered by pointing to the fact
that permanent and changing visions of the past are part of one another
(Schwartz 2000: 302). Likewise, this approach differs from Halbwachs per
spective because it argues for the need to historicize identities and meaning
systems and tries to comprehend not only how people use the past but also
how the past endures in the present. Although the dynamics of memory
approach argues along the collective memory approachs line that collective
memory is a record of resemblance, it does not assume that the group
remains the same, and therefore can accommodate changes in the groups
memory and account for its incoherence. Halbwachs, on the other hand,
asserts the stability of a social groups memory because he assumes that the
groups identity, which determines the content of collective memory, is
stable and hitherto well established. In contrast, the dynamics of memory
approach recognizes the temporal dimension of identities and argues for the
need to analyse them in terms of constitutive and transforming moments.
Seeing collective identities as historically constructed enables this perspec
tive to account for changes in groups identities and their aspirations for
themselves and others. In other words, memory, as conceptualized by the
dynamics of memory approach, is never solely manipulated or durable;
instead, the role of agency and the temporal dimension of memory as well as
the historicity of social identities are stressed and analysed.
While both the invention of tradition and the Halbwachs approach
emphasize the impact of the present upon the past, they do not attempt to
explain the use of historical knowledge in interpreting the present and
do not see that the past endures in the present in ways other than invented
acts of commemoration. In contrast, the dynamics of memory approach is
interested in non-commemorative memory, which is distinct from recollec
tion. Although commemoration and recollection are often intertwined, they
nonetheless direct research attention to opposite areas: the recollection
orientation aims to develop an interest in narrative representation of the
past, and the commemoration orientation enhances an interest in performa
tivity, which further focuses attention on habits and therefore on bodily
automatisms (Connerton 1989: 5). Until recently, the majority of studies of
collective memory have focused on the activity of commemoration as serv
ing the need of a community to resist change in its self-conceptions (Hutton
1988: 315). Connertons conceptualization of political commemorative
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Further reading
Bodnar, J. (1994) Public memory in an American city: commemoration in Cleveland,
in J.R. Gillis (ed.) Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, pp. 74104.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Coser, L.A. (ed.) (1992) Introduction, in Maurice Halbwachs: On Collective
Memory, pp. 136. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Halbwachs, M. ([1926] 1950) The Collective Memory, trans. F.J. Ditter and
V.Y. Ditter, London: Harper Colophon Books.
Hobsbawm, E. (1983) Introduction: inventing traditions, in E. Hobsbawm and
T. Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition, pp. 114. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Popular Memory Group (1982) Popular memory: theory, politics and method, in
R. Johnson, G. Mclennan, B. Schwartz and D. Sutton (eds) Making Histories:
Studies in History Making and Politics, pp. 20552. London: Hutchinson.
Schudson, M. (1989) The present in the past versus the past in the present,
Communication, 11: 10513.
Schwartz, B., Zerubavel, Y. and Barnett, B. (1986) The recovery of Masada: A study
in collective memory, Sociological Quarterly, 127(2): 16474.
The previous chapter established that the four main sociological theories of
remembering, while rightly insisting that memory and temporality cannot be
detached from each other, do not sufciently address the issue of the nature
of remembering. In order to explore the remembering process it is not
enough to explore collective memory as simply publicly available symbols
and meaning systems not reducible to what is in peoples heads (Olick in
Schuman and Corning 2000: 914). There is also a need to consider how
collective consensus is connected with the actual thought processes of any
particular person and how feeling states and bodily desires, inherited from
the past but prevailing in the present, can rewrite the past in the service of
the present (Prager 1998: 83). Thus, in the rst part of this chapter we
discuss the embodiedness and embeddedness of memory. In order to further
account for what makes an individual memory social, the following sections
of the chapter will look at the role of generational memory and the signi
cance of traditions in shaping processes of remembering.
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allows us to learn new skills, to repressed memory, make inquiries into this
subject a challenging task.
Most traditional laboratory-based memory research has attempted to
understand memory as a context-free, isolated psychological process. In
their effort to objectify and externalize memory, current clinical memory
studies focus mainly on the brain, separated from the remembering mind,
and on the past, distinct from an interpreting present. These studies can be
seen as the continuation of the three sciences of memory from the nineteenth
century, although technological advancement has changed their nature (e.g.
neurological studies, which used to focus predominately on the brain, are
now able to work at the level of cell biology). Moreover, new technologies
are responsible for the emergence of a new branch of the science of memory
computer modelling of memory in articial intelligence (Hacking 1995:
199). Experimental psychologists have been concerned to understand the
phenomena of remembering and forgetting in order to gain a fundamental
understanding of the brain and sensory apparatus, viewed as a system
capable of selecting, organizing, storing and retrieving information. Modern
cognitive psychology tries to construct a scientic understanding of
memorys underlying mechanisms and researchers have constructed many
empirical generalizations about short-term memory, ashbulb memory and
recalling. However, despite the rapidly expanding accumulation of know
ledge about memory, and despite the growing consensus about the extent
and importance of memory distortions (Tulving and Craik 2000), scientists
dealing with memory from the perspective of experimental, developmental,
cognitive and neuropsychology have not yet produced a new, interesting
theory: In short, the results of a hundred years of the psychological study of
memory are somewhat discouraging (Neisser 1982: 11).
An individual remembering is a very complicated act, but even more
importantly the relationship between public and personal memories is not a
simple one. For example, there is an enormous difference between appropri
ated memories and personally acquired memories (Mannheim 1972: 296)
while, at the same time, much of what we seem to remember and what we
assume to be our personal memories we have not actually experienced
personally. For instance, many of our childhood memories are actually
recollections of stories told by our parents. Furthermore, while the avail
ability of personal information depends on the content of the remembered
event, people experience these events not only in the context of public narra
tives but also within the compass of their own activities (Brown et al. 1988:
13957). What we know of what happens in remembering is that we relive
an earlier perception which is, as in every conscious perception, an act of
recognition, a pairing in which an object (or an event, an act, an emotion) is
identied by placing it against the background of an appropriate symbol
(Geertz 1973: 215). Thus, memory is produced by an individual but is
always produced in relation to the larger interpersonal and cultural world in
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which that individual lives for example, one remembers ones childhood as
a part of a family. However, while recognizing that the cognitive process of
remembering contains much that is social in origin, and thus also the
importance of studying social contexts in which even the most personal
memories are embedded, we want to avoid, as we have already mentioned in
Chapter 1, an oversocialized conception of man. In other words, we attempt
to overcome the valid criticism of Halbwachs approach as neglecting the
question of how individual consciousness might relate to those of the col
lectivities those individuals actually made up (Fentress and Wickham 1992:
ix). A very interesting example of how this can be achieved comes from
Jeffrey Pragers study of false memory syndrome.
Prager (1998) shows the complexity of the process of remembering by
discussing the case of his psychoanalytical patient, Ms A, who developed a
belief that she had been sexually abused as a child. Analysing her false
memories over the course of numerous sessions, Prager suggests that major
current discourses are the essential factor in producing memory. Ms As
misremembering of her childhood, argues Prager, needs to be placed within
the context of the American national preoccupation with the themes of
childhood abuse and victimization, fuelled by the popularity of the
Recovered Memory Movement (see Chapter 6): The atmosphere was such
that few people would not wonder whether they themselves, as children, had
suffered abuse by an adult. The cultural milieu, I believe, was contributing to
Ms. A.s memories (Prager 1998: 76). Arguing that memory is always
embedded, Prager illustrates the intersubjectivity of memory by showing
how the larger interpersonal and cultural worlds in which individuals live
constitute their memories. Even more importantly, he asserts that not only is
the reconstruction of the past always dependent on frames of meaning and
contexts of signicance generated in the present, but that it is also shaped by
our emotional experiences.
The recovery of the past rests upon both memorys embeddedness, which
encourages us to pay attention to the inuence of the present on the recovery
of the past, and its embodiedness, which alerts us to the ways in which our
feelings and bodily sensations, generated in the past, help to interpret that
past. When considering both, we cannot avoid, Prager argues, noting their
connection with the notion of self. Memory is embedded because the self is
a socially constructed or socially constituted entity (1998: 71), while
being embodied in a particular person, a person actively engaged in forging
selfhood (p. 81). Thus, Prager concludes that the conception of memory as
both embedded and embodied does not explain the whole mystery of the
human process of remembering, which can only be fully grasped if we take
the role of the self into consideration. In short, for Prager, remembering
is an active, interpretive process of a conscious mind situated in the world
(p. 215).
Arguing that the sociological focus on collective rituals, rites and
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only one xed point of reference the site provided by our own bodies
(Antze and Lambek 1996b: xiv). The body is the main container of habit
ual memory, according to Connerton (1989), because the past is passed on
to us in practices of the body or in the ways of doing and being. The non
verbal articulation of memory can be seen as a practice of representation
that enacts and gives substance to the discourse of collective memory. If
there is such a thing as social memory . . . we are likely to nd it in com
memorative ceremonies because commemorative rituals are a means of
transmitting social memory (Connerton 1989: 4). While examining the simi
larities and differences between commemorative rituals and other rituals
(e.g. religious ones), Connerton discovered that commemorative ceremonies
function effectively as mnemonic devices because of their formalism and
performativity, two features that they share with all other rituals. Moreover,
commemorative ceremonies are of cardinal importance for communal
memory because of their ritual re-enactment of persons or events from the
past (1989: 5167). If, therefore, commemorative ceremonies prove to be
commemorative only in so far as they are performative, we should examine
bodily automatism and habitual enacting: the performativeness of rituals,
seen as encoded in set postures, gestures and movements, send a simple and
clear message (1989: 58); One kneels or one does not kneel, and to kneel in
subordination is not to state subordination, nor is it just to communicate a
message of submission. To kneel in subordination is to display it through the
visible, present substance of the body (1989: 59). Bodily practices of a
culturally specic kind entail a combination of cognitive and habit memory,
which is re-enacted through acts of performance that remind performers of
a set of rules and principles of classication and distinction (1989: 88). So,
we preserve versions of the past not only by representing it to ourselves in
words or through storing and retrieving information, but also through
commemorative ceremonies, in which we re-enact an image of the past
through memorized culturally specic postures, gestures and practices.
The importance of bodies is reinforced further by the argument about the
role of emotions in the process of remembering. Emotions play an essential
role in any recollection because memories not tagged by ongoing social
emotions tend to fade out, and because emotions are always in part about
the past (Nussbaum 2001: 177). Seeing memory as the child of both satis
faction and frustration (Lowewald in Prager 1998: 187) places emotions at
the core of memory, which in turn makes the body an important site of
memory, because experiencing intense emotions (both negative and positive)
blurs the Cartesian mind-body distinction (Prager 1998: 1837; Brison
1999: 42). Such strong sensations help to overcome memory distanciation
and make the recalled memories vivid and somatic. The body as an import
ant site of memory is frequently discussed in studies of trauma (see Chapter
6). Emotional responses, as important affective states that screen out certain
memories and allow for other memories to surface, are inscribed in the
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The claim that individual memories are constructed from cultural forms
leads Prager to argue that remembering is achieved not monologically but
dialogically (1998: 218). Because the way we remember is determined
through a supra-individual cultural construction and because the act of
remembering is itself interactive, promoted by cultural artefacts and cues
employed for social purposes, and even enacted by cooperative activity,
collective memory can be seen as a shared social framework of individual
recollections. One of the rst demonstrations of the reconstructive nature of
our memories, and the rst proof that remembering is shaped by our expect
ations and general knowledge regarding what should have happened as
much as by the content of a specic event, was provided by Frederic Bartlett
(1932). Bartlett conducted an experiment in which white American students
read a Native American legend entitled The War of the Ghosts and were
then asked to recall the story as accurately as possible. He found that the
resulting recollections seldom reected the original story, as subjects tended
to forget pieces of the narrative that didnt t their cultural expectations.
Bartlett concluded that we remember and think about the past through
shared frames of understanding, which gives a persistent framework into
which all delayed recall must t and it very powerfully inuences both the
manner and matter of recall (1932: 296). Frames of meaning, or ways in
which we view the past, are generated in the present and usually match the
groups common map of the world. Thus they usually change following
major social shifts that affect entire mnemonic communities. We rely on
them to supply us with what we should remember and what is taboo, and
therefore must be forgotten. Such a conceptualization of frames of remem
bering as providing us with a menu of what to recall suggests the possibility
of the employment of Goffmans (1974) concept of frame as a means of
advancing our understanding of memorys embeddedness. Goffmans
notion is of enormous help here because it enables us to do justice to the
collective side of memory without reducing the individual to a passive
follower of an internalized collective order.
Framing, writes Goffman, is a result of our desire to organize our experi
ences into meaningful activities. Following the ancient Greek saying that the
man who sees everything is blind, it can be claimed that frames, by directing
our focus, make us notice what is important, therefore ensuring clarity and
simplicity in the denition of a situation. Frames, as an element out of which
denitions are built up, permeate all levels of ordinary social actions and as
such provide a background understanding for events. In Frame Analysis
Goffman argues that an agreement concerning the identity of a particular
event is reached by implying one or more frameworks or schemata of inter
pretation, which renders what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of
the scene into something that is meaningful (1974: 21).
Goffman stresses that the authorship of a denition of a situation does not
ordinarily belong to the people in that situation but that social organization
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and social structure are responsible for framing peoples experience. At the
same time he claims that constructionist views fail to notice the multi
dimensional and layered nature of situations: It is not just that different
people might have different denitions of the same situations, but that each
participant can be in several complex layers of situational denition at the
same time (Collins 1988: 58). Goffmans avoidance of complete relativism
(as seen in his recognition of the primary importance of the physical and
social worlds, and his interest in analysing the organization of experience)
parallels the dynamics of memory approachs insistence on the reality of the
past while, at the same time, adding to it the assertion that people do indeed
interpret the past (Schudson 1997: 15). Since people continuously project
their expectations and perceptions, or frames of reference, into the past, and
since they continuously build frames upon frames, the past is reconstructed
in a more complicated way than the simple assertion that the present
inuences the past would suggest.
According to Goffman (1959: 247), the reality and sincerity of frames is
protected by the use of various procedures that anchor frame activity and
induce in us a belief that what appears to be real is real; yet it is the material
world that is the ultimate grounding, while all transformations of it are
secondary. His approach allows us to view forgetting as the result of the
disappearance or change of frameworks due to shifts in social conventions.
The fact that there can be many frames and that they are constructed upon
each other, with primary frameworks at the beginning of the process, results
in the multiple nature of reality. While engaging in the process of framing,
people prove themselves to be capable of dealing with many frames without
any problems. They are also capable of adjusting frames to t the actual
occurrence itself in such a way that the denition of the event, as provided
by the framework of shared memory, becomes conrmed. Such a construc
tion of the social world ensures our conventional conduct, which in turn is
understandable only in terms of the frame. When the t is imperfect the past
is at once an idealization and critique of the present world (Schwartz 2000:
253). In other words, in order for collective memory to inspire and mobilize,
the t must be imperfect, leaving enough discrepancy to allow for the evalu
ation of the present. The workings of primary frameworks become most
visible when discussing generational memories and groups traditions.
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idea are interesting because they tend to transcend the arbitrary limits of
conventional academic disciplines. For example, Marias (1970) formula
tion of the concept of generation, while relying on historical method and
tracing the theory back to Ibn Khalduns fourteenth-century writings,
incorporates philosophical, literary and sociological insights. Seeing gener
ation as the concrete unit of authentic historical chronology, Marias
emphasizes that it requires more than merely biological or biographical
information, since we must also know the structure of the world at that
time (p. 101). Following Ortegas idea of generation as the visual organ
with which historical reality can be seen in its real and vibrant authenticity,
Marias denes generation as systems of prevailing conventions and there
fore as a fundamental ingredient of each of us (1970: 102, 101, 83). He
points out that afnity between members of a given generation does not
arise so much from themselves as from being obliged to live in a world of a
certain and unique form (p. 104). Since to live is something that happens in
the form of coexistence (p. 79) and since generation is our historical world,
it is from this generational basis that we face reality in order to mould our
lives.
Such assumptions about the importance of generation and a spirit of the
times, which leaves its imprint on the collective memory of a given gener
ation, have energized various perspectives, from ideas of generation as a way
to explain the feeling of destiny among a specic group of people, to per
spectives arguing that generation alone could help to compose a dynamic
portrait of a society(Renouard in Nora 1996b: 505). The majority of these
theories seem to stress the uniqueness of each generation and their mutual
distance, yet in reality generations have much in common and tend to
resemble each other (de Tocqueville 1968). In the same vein, Halbwachs
([1926] 1950) argues that there is a living link between generations which
ensures that the past is handed on via parents and grandparents and goes
beyond the limits of individual experience. While the generational gap is
perceived as providing a basis for changing the present, generational con
tinuity is regarded as a source of stability and legitimacy. In other words, as
generation follows generation, each receives an inheritance from its
predecessor, and this intergenerational transmission, or tradition, is a foun
dation of societal continuity.
It was Mannheim who injected a more sociological perspective into the
notion of generation. His classic essay on The Problem of Generation,
originally published in 1928, is still the main point of reference for all the
more recent contributions. By insisting that in order to share generational
location in a sociologically meaningful sense an individual must be born
within the same historical and cultural context and be exposed to experi
ences that occur during their formative adult years, Mannhein endorsed the
conceptualization of generations as something more than merely collections
of age cohorts. His description of links between the generations as a social
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hence it can be said that the generation is the daughter of democracy and
the acceleration of history (Nora 1996b: 508). Furthermore, in this era of
electronic communication, globalization of popular culture and the import
ance of mass media, it is predicted that generations will exist more easily
across social space because they will be able to share more easily a collective
culture (Eyerman and Turner 1998: 97). Emerging generational links and
solidarities simultaneously simplify and complicate the network of social
allegiances, as recent developments impose new limits and enhance new
types of connection. These new trends have shifted attention from previous
studies of generations as a variable which can help to predict future
behaviour, to current investigations of generation as a collectivity consti
tuted by the historical dimensions of the social processes predominant in
that generations youth. This recent interest in generational memory has
helped to clarify some uncertainties connected with attempts to identify a
concrete generation.
New investigations of the collective memories of generations has solved
the problem of how to dene a generational cohort, as this type of research
assumes that memories will be structured along the age dimension in ways
that allow us to identify various generations. Unlike the traditional
approach, new research starts with memories and works backwards rather
than forward from generations (Schuman and Corning 2000: 915). The
importance of links between generation and memory, so prominent in the
new studies, can be seen as a result of researchers realization that, in order
to assume that members of a cohort in terms of age adopt a certain line
of action, there is a need to identify what earlier experiences are carried
forward in memory by that cohort.
Several studies examine the existence of generational differences in
memory by comparing the meaning of adolescent memories with those that
occur in other periods of life (e.g. Schuman and Scott 1989; Schuman
and Corning 2000). In order to verify hypotheses extrapolated from
Mannheims theory, this type of research investigates intergenerational
effects, seen as the result of the intersection of personal and national history,
examines the role of various stages in individual lives for memory encoding,
and analyses whether adolescence and early childhood are the primary
sources of political and social memories. In one such study, following
Mannheims suggestions that adolescence and early adulthood are stages of
life uniquely open to gaining knowledge about the wider world and that
those from an older generation are likely to interpret events in terms of their
previously well developed view of the world, Schuman and Scott (1989)
asked a cross section of Americans to identify any two especially important
national or world events or changes. Their research results show that
memories are structured by generational divisions and that attributions of
importance to national and world events of the past half century tend to be a
function of an individual having experienced an event during adolescence or
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tend to share their emotionally loaded experiences with others, we can say
that it is the sharing of memories among young people which ensures the
persistence of memories from the period of adolescence and early adult
hood. At the same time, young peoples sociability and their sharing of
experiences produces an affective basis to their generational identity. Gener
ational memory allows people to have a certain social identication, both on
an individual and a societal level. As people remember sharing memories
and remembering together, a generational identity is constructed. In other
words, a generational identity is produced through collective practices,
established in response to traumatic or formative events which demand the
sharing of memories: Generational memory grows out of social interactions
that are in the rst place historical and collective and later internalised in a
deeply visceral and unconscious way so as to dictate vital choices and con
trol reexes of loyalty (Nora 1996b: 526).
The most important moments for a generation tend to be unusual histor
ical events since the more an event generates emotions, the more it elicits
social sharing and is hence better remembered. A generation is a product of
memory because of the formative role of memories of historical events from
adolescence and early adulthood in the creation of a generational culture.
Memory of the past is always intersubjective, a recollection of a past time
lived in relation to other people. However, generational memory is historical
not only because it consists of remembrances of historical moments: It is
historical above all because it is rst imposed from without, then violently
internalised (Nora 1996b: 523). People remember special emotional experi
ences from when they were young adults because, in order to make sense
and reect on these experiences, they talk about them with others. In turn,
this mnemonic socialization, through which we learn what we should
remember and what we can forget, provides bases for generational culture
and identity. Generations, while being products of memory, are at the same
time the main relationship in the production of history. This argument
comes from Davis (1989) reection on Lision-Tolosanas ethnographic
account of generational relations in a small town in Spain in the period
190061. By demonstrating how each new generation takes its inheritance
from its predecessor, reacts against it, and in response to the particular
historical situation creates a new environment that again is the object of
reaction, Lision-Tolosana establishes that each generation had substantial
autonomy to remake history.
Generational identications are constructed out of generational cultures
that provide a set of embodied practices, tastes, attitudes, preferences and
dispositions, which are sustained by collective memories and enforced by
control, through rituals of exclusion, of access to collective resources (Eyer
man and Turner 1998). Such a perspective, emphasizing the importance of
collective cultural experiences, allows for the adoption of Pierre Bourdieus
notion of habitus to express the uniqueness of a given generational memory.
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Using this concept, Eyerman and Turner modify Mannheims original con
ceptualization and dene a generation as a cohort of persons passing
through time who come to share a common habitus. Sharing a collective
culture and habitus provides members of a generation with collective
memory that serves to integrate the cohort over a nite period of time
(1998: 91). Habitus is a system of durable dispositions to act which are
produced by objective structures and conditions but are also capable of
producing and reproducing those structures (Bourdieu 1977: 72). Habitus
comprises strategies and practices through which social order accomplishes
itself and makes itself self-evident and meaningful (Bourdieu and
Wacquant 1992: 1278), as the dispositions to act are incorporated in social
interaction within a historically formed social context. Being made up of
the cognitive structures which social agents implement in their practical
knowledge of the social world (Bourdieu 1984: 468), habitus organizes the
way in which individuals see the world and act in it. As such, it is at the heart
of the dialectic between the objective and the subjective, because disposi
tions and frames of perception are at once historical, social and individual.
Although people internalize the immanent law of the structure in the form
of habitus (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 140), they are still capable of
creativity within the limits of the structure. In a similar vein, Marias (1970:
92) argues that prevailing conventions, which dene generations, are
imposed on us but our reactions to them are not. Recent studies of gener
ational memory also suggest that people increasingly develop greater
independence and sophistication in their thinking, frequently acquiring
knowledge beyond ofcially available information, and this places limits
on the kind of lite manipulation of collective memory visualized by the
presentist approach (Schuman and Corning 2000).
The concept of habitus, as a past which survives in the present and
tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices
structured according to its principles (Bourdieu 1977: 82), also allows us to
identify the importance of collective memory in creating a generational
culture. Being a principle of continuity and regularity (1977: 82), habitus is
a system of practice-generating schemes which expresses identities and
memories constituted by structural differences. Bourdieus main focus is
on the role of class location in the structuring of habitus. However, while
examining the construction of collective identity and memory in con
temporary societies we should emphasize the structuring role of generation
as a mode of distinction based on age differentiation. Other dimensions
of classication, such as class, gender or ethnicity, are also important as
structuring forces and, moreover, all four of them often overlap. Neverthe
less, in modern society, as Eyerman and Turner (1998) observe, there is a
shift in favour of generation. From the perspective of generational habitus,
all signicant social, political and cultural events that a given generation
experiences at rst hand can be perceived as part of the social space in which
90
that generation denes its collective identity. Within this space the marks
of generational distinction are realized and generational memory is con
structed. Of course, while the main events provide a space for selfproduction of a generational identity, the commercial mass media amplied
and, at the same time, commodied it (Eyerman and Turner 1998: 103).
Thus, generational identity can be conceptualized as a social identity
linked to cultural differentiation, based on age distinction. Generational
habitus, which is the foundation of generational memory, and therefore
identity, can be seen as a system of practice-generating schemes rooted in the
uniqueness of the sociohistorical location of a particular generation. Gener
ational memory is to some degree a question of understanding human vari
ations by means of history since, as Nora (1996b: 528) notes, generation is
the spontaneous horizon of individual historical objectication. While any
classication of those generational variations needs to start with habitus,
it should be followed by attempts to grasp the nature of the secondary
variation or vital sensitivity of a given generation (Ortega in Marias 1970:
93). As generations with greater or lesser activity, originality and energy
constantly fashion their world they apply their unique sensitivity, rooted in
and carried forward by their habitus, to interpret and make sense of later
developments (Mannheim 1972: 300). The uniqueness of generational
memories and differences expresses itself through a given generations
choice of meaning from the past to interpret the present.
However, despite unquestionable distinctiveness, no generation creates its
own beliefs, norms and perspectives. Moreover, some events are so import
ant that no single generational cohort develops greater knowledge of them
than another, while, on the other hand, some occurrences stick in the mem
ories of people of different ages but who are related by other social charac
teristics, such as race, gender, social status or occupation. The study by
Schuman et al. (1997), while conrming that early adulthood is a stage of
life uniquely open to gaining knowledge about the wider world and that
knowledge of a past event decreases with cohort distance from that event,
also discovered that some social characteristics interfere with demographic
division in terms of what is remembered. For example, African Americans in
all age groups tend to know more about the historical events signicant in
the history of race relations, while women of all ages attach more import
ance to memories of events related to womens rights movements. World
War II is now not only widely recalled, but the generational effect is less
sharp and less visible due to the saturation of popular culture with various
recollections of the war and the emergence of many memories of the
Holocaust (Schuman et al. 1997: 71).
Such wider national remembering as well as cases of more narrowly
dened intergenerational communication focus our attention on the essence
of the notion of tradition, understood as a process of handing down
from one generation to the next a set of practices, beliefs and institutions.
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92
93
the present without searching for what is beneath it and without asking
whether such memories are authentic. Apart from the invention of tradition
approach, the theories of tradition do not see it as a project of social engin
eering but as a tradium that is, anything which is transmitted or handed
down from the past to the present (Shils 1981: 12). Arguing in opposition to
Hobsbawm and Rangers (1983) view of traditions as nothing more than
fabrications of the ruling lite, the majority of researchers tend to assert that,
in order to create a convincing representation of the nation, a worthy and
distinctive past must be rediscovered and appropriated (Smith 1997). Yet
these writers admit that traditions, authentic or not, are frequently used as a
sufcient reason for accepting a specic identity or perspective. In this
respect, Halbwachs argues that everything is tradition, while Giddens
(1999: 2) notes that all traditions, to various degrees, are invented.
Finally, the sixth assumption is that none of the main theories of tradition
limits itself to a narrow understanding of the concept, as they all seem to
view tradition as being a broad notion, comprising many aspects. Although
some theories shed more light on traditions normative aspect, others are
more interested in its hermeneutic aspect or its legitimation aspect, while yet
others focus on its identity aspect. However, all these orientations acknow
ledge that tradition cannot be comprehended without accounting for its
other aspects as well. All four aspects are essential for our understanding of
the role of tradition in society, but due to changes in todays society the
importance of some aspects has increased while the signicance of others
has declined. For example, today, as the Scottish Nationalist movement in
the UK, the Catalan independence movement in Spain and calls for a free
Quebec in Canada illustrate, the identity aspect of tradition is growing in
importance. This can be seen as a result of the process of globalization,
which creates new opportunities for regenerating local identities, as well as a
result of the increase in migration, both processes contributing to the quest
for roots (Thompson 1996: 104).
The identity aspect of tradition seems to be gaining in importance as
traditions are re-employed as a way of creating a sense of belonging and
strengthening group identities. It was Halbwachs assertion that even quite
small groups dene themselves partly in relation to the memories they share
which established the connection between collective memory and tradition
on the one hand, and the formation of identity on the other. For Halbwachs,
whose notion of collective memory comes close to meaning the tradition of
more narrowly dened groups, talking about tradition should start with
family traditions and be followed by an examination of different classes
traditions. According to him, social classes differ from each other not only
because each performs a different function, but because each has different
traditions which serve to legitimatize their position in the social hierarchy.
After calling the totality of traditions belonging to social class collective
memory, Halbwachs concludes that there are at least as many collective
94
memories as social classes. These memories are formed through the simple
play of the professional activity and are transmitted from generation
to generation within class boundaries (Halbwachs [1941] 1992: 141).
Halbwachs argues that for different classes, tradition has different, unequal
meanings and signicance for society. He writes that the aristocracy, due to
the fact that through generations there continues a totality of well-linked
traditions and remembrance (1992: 138), was for a very long time the main
supporter and transmitter of national traditions. Because noblemens status
was not dened by their function but rooted in the pastness of their titles,
their tradition preserved its depth and scope (Halbwachs [1941] 1992:
129).
The normative aspect of tradition refers to sets of assumptions, norms and
models of action handed down from the past that can serve as a normative
guide for actions and beliefs in the present (Thompson 1996: 91). It is
especially emphasized in the Durkheimian approach which views traditions
routinized practices as providing a set of beliefs and patterns of action. In
this vein, tradition, as the morality of remembering and forgetting, is seen to
be securing a normative justication for practices and beliefs and providing
people with some kind of direction when they are aimless, offering them
some kind of anchor when they are adrift (Schudson 1992: 213). In the
case of modern societies, where tradition is often explicitly factual or
descriptive, religious memory is the main example of the normative aspect
of tradition. Hervieu-Leger (2000), in her book Religion as a Chain of
Memory, places tradition, seen as an authorized memory, at the heart of
religious belief. The essentially normative character of religious memory is
reinforced by the fact of the group dening itself, objectively and subject
ively, as a lineage of belief (Hervieu-Leger 2000: 125). Religious traditions,
seen as binding members of a believing community to one another and to the
past generations, are entirely oriented towards the past. All religious groups
strive to achieve a unied religious memory which they claim to be xed
once and for all. However, in reality religious traditions are neither coherent,
united or free of tensions. Moreover, detraditionalization erodes the strength
of belonging to a particular chain of belief, while enhancing small surrogate
memories. In the condition of the decline of common sacred identity, efforts
to reinvent memory chains appears inconsequential (Hervieu-Leger 2000:
141).
According to Shils (1981: 15), there is an inherently normative element in
any tradition of belief which is presented for acceptance. Most traditions are
normative in this sense, in that they are intended to inuence the conduct of
the audience to which they are addressed. For Shils, who sees tradition as a
guarantor of order and civilization (1981: 15), tradition is more than the
statistically frequent recurrence over a succession of generations of similar
beliefs, practices, institutions and works. He points to the normative con
sequences of the presentation and acceptance of tradition in the name of the
95
necessary continuity between the past and the present: It is this normative
transmission which links the generations of the dead with the generations of
the living in the constitution of a society (Shils 1981: 24). Thus, tradition
ensures the identity of a society through time and this continuation is
achieved due to a consensus between living generations and generations of
the dead. Shils, however, does not assume that the content of this consensus
is static, nor that each generation creates its own system of beliefs, patterns
of conduct and institutions. The consensus changes through interpretation
by a new generation, whose reinterpretation, actions and beliefs, in order to
become a tradition, must enter into memory, here seen as the vessel which
retains in the present the record of the experiences undergone in the past
and of knowledge gained through the recorded and remembered experiences
of others, living or dead (Shils 1981: 50). Thus, memory is more than an act
of recollection, it leaves an objective deposit in tradition (1981: 167). The
consensus is maintained through the reinterpretation of what earlier gener
ations believed, and is carried forward by a continuing chain of transmis
sions: It is this chain of memory and of the tradition which assimilates it
that enables societies to go on reproducing themselves while also changing
(Shils 1981: 167).
However, in modern, fragmented, pluralistic societies which are no longer
governed by reference to tradition, where change is valued for itself, and
where the principle of continuity is no longer commonly accepted, one can
not, as Shils does, make tradition encompass the whole body of traditia of
a society or group (Hervieu-Leger 2000: 87). As the modern differentiation
of social elds and institutions produces a differentiation of total social
memory into a plurality of specialized circles of memory, the normative
aspect of a societal tradition can no longer be taken for granted.
The last element of tradition, its hermeneutic aspect, brings to our atten
tion the fact that tradition also presupposes a set of taken for granted
assumptions which provide a framework for the interpretation of the world:
For, as hermeneutic philosophers such as Heidegger and Gadamer have
emphasized, all understanding is based on presuppositions, on some set of
assumptions which we take for granted and which form part of tradition to
which we belong (Thompson 1996: 91). In this respect, tradition is an
interpretive scheme transmitted from one generation to the next. Such an
understanding of tradition emphasizes its knowledge-like quality as it is
dened as a kind of truth (Giddens 1992) or tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1958;
Shils 1981; Calhoun 1983). Here traditions are seen as being the tacit com
ponent of rational, moral and cognitive actions (Shils 1981: 33), or as tacit
knowledge which underlines interactions and essentially orders peoples
actions (Calhoun 1983: 896). Polanyi, who argues for the importance of
tacit knowledge in general, views tradition as the tacit knowledge which,
due to its characteristics (such as its exibility and openness for interpret
ation) can be reshaped to t the present situation. While arguing that we
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know more than we can tell, Polanyi (1967: 4) points out that tacit knowing
provides coherence and integrity to our observations and that this act of
integration lends meaning to our knowledge and controls its uses.
Seeing tradition as tacit knowledge that provides presuppositions that we
take for granted and helps us to understand and interpret the world comes
close to Goffmans concept of the key. The notion of the key refers to the set
of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of
some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on but
independent of it (Goffman 1974: 44). It can be understood here as an
invocation of the past that presupposes an afnity between the past and the
present. Keying, when discussed in relation to a group tradition, can be seen
as the articulation of social, political or spiritual boundaries and conicts,
which at the same time opens up possible channels of communication
among members of the group. Keying transforms the meaning of the activ
ities understood in terms of one event by comparing them with activities
understood in terms of another (Schwartz 2000: 226). If tradition is, as
Nora (1996b) claims, memory that becomes historically aware of itself,
keying can be seen as traditions expression of this awareness. Thus, keying
is more than a groups sensitivity or mentality, not only because it adds
layers of reality over ordinary activities and provides them with meaning,
but also because it transforms memory into a cultural system (Goffman
1974: 434). Keying, argues Schwartz (2000: 226), arranges cultural sym
bols into a publicly visible discourse that ows through the organizations
and institutions of the social world. Keying plays a very important role in
facilitating our understanding of the world because it transforms memory
into cultural standards, which, as the established sources of representa
tions, shape our conduct and role performances. Keying, by bringing
together symbolic models of the past with the experience of the present
(Schwartz 2000: 26), expresses the uniqueness of a given groups or nations
memory.
Studying tradition during a national emergency shows how keying works
because it demonstrates how tradition makes dramatic events comprehen
sible by making tangible the values for which resources and armies are
mobilized (Schwartz 2000: 26). Keyings function of meaning-making
expresses itself by connecting events of separate periods in such a way that
the events of one period are appropriated as a means of interpreting the
events of the other. For example, Protestant-inspired moralism has always
determined the way Americans go to war: To endorse a war and call on
people to kill others and die for their country, Americans must dene their
role in a conict as being on Gods side against Satan for morality against
evil (Lipset 1996: 20). The invocation of this type of moralism is clearly
seen in President Bushs rhetoric after 11 September 2001: Our responsibil
ity to history is already clear to answer these attacks and rid the world of
evil . . . The freedom-loving nations of the world stand by our side. This will
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be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail. In parts
of the Islamic world, the United States is the Great Satan or American snake
(quoted in Alcorn 2002: 6). The presidents speech illustrates the workings
of keying and shows how it presupposes the resemblance of the events it
brings together. Americans now, as in the past, as freedom is threatened
once again, albeit by a different Evil Empire from the Soviet Union, are
on the side of good against evil. President Bushs keying of the attack on
11 September as the war against evil has provided a symbolic framework
enabling the nation to make sense of the attacks and the war. Connecting
the present to past events, invoking the American moralist tradition, point
ing out that our enemies would be a threat to every nation and eventually
civilization itself provides a unifying framework of meaning through which
society comprehends recent events and prepares itself to face a new
situation. In this respect, keying, is a cultural programme that orients our
intentions and enables us to to adapt to social change. In other words,
tradition can be a very important part of the process of change. Society does
not proceed from one organizational structure to another by abandoning
all of its old institutions and traditions because, as Halbwachs convincingly
argues, when society becomes too different from what it had been in the
past and from the conditions in which these traditions had arisen, it will
no longer nd within itself the elements necessary to reconstruct, consoli
date, and repair these traditions ([1941] 1992: 160). It is only within the
framework of the old notions and under the pretext of traditional ideas that
a new order of values is slowly elaborated.
Although the past is no longer the exclusive source of the present, trad
ition in some respects retains its signicance in the modern world. It is still
an important means of making sense of the world, a crucial way of creating
a sense of belonging as well as a valid source of rethinking the present.
However, with the process of transmission increasingly detached from
social interaction in a shared locale, the growing importance of the media
and the advancement of individualization and globalization, traditions
normative and legitimation aspects have declined in signicance. While all
these changes do not necessarily spell the demise of tradition or render
traditions inauthentic, they suggest that in todays society it is impossible to
assume either purely tradition-informed or purely autonomous modes of
being (Heelas 1996). The complexity and diversity of our contemporary
approach to tradition can be seen as a result of a number of factors: the
uprooting of traditions from the social locale of everyday life, the decline in
orally transmitted tradition, the increased role of the media, the deritualiza
tion of tradition and the growing contact between various traditions
through the media and through the movements of migrant populations
(Thompson 1996: 1034). In order to understand this new cultural
landscape we need to analyse the shift in the nature and role of the past in
our lives.
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Further reading
Connerton, P. (1989) How Societies Remember. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Mannheim, K. (1952) Ideology and Utopia. New York: Harvest HBJ.
Neisser, U. (1982) Memory: what are the important questions?, in U. Neisser (ed.)
Memory Observed. Remembering in Natural Context, pp. 319. San Francisco:
W.H. Freman & Co.
Prager, J. (1998) Presenting the Past: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of
Misremembering. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Shils, E. (1981) Tradition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
C O N T E S T E D B O U N DA R I E S
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CONTESTED BOUNDARIES
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102
history, as connected with the fact that memory permits social groups to
become aware of their identity through time while history stresses dis
continuities and is situated outside and above groups, has initiated a long
debate about the nature of this relationship. Today, Halbwachs oldfashioned positivist concept of history is abandoned, with many critics
rejecting his narrow denition of history as nave and pointing out that
history cannot literally construct the past (Schwartz 1982: 3876), while
a historical narrative may itself become an integral part of the collective
memory (Hutton 1993: 129). Others criticize Halbwachs for undermining
the notion of historical continuity by detaching it from history and for over
looking the fact that the relationship between memory and history is as
underlined by conict as it is by interdependence (Zerubavel 1997: 5). Even
Halbwachs contemporaries, as the example of the French Annales schools
interest in collective mentalities illustrates, adopted a more conciliatory view
of the relationship between memory and history than his demarcation of
history and memory.
Prior to and following World War II, less traditional historians rejected
the focus on the history of events and slowly shifted the study of history
towards the examination of past rituals, practices and ways of thinking.
Their interest in the history of civilizations and cultural histories, which can
be seen as an equivalent to collective memory, gradually undermined the
distinction between historical and memory studies. This new uidity in the
relationship between history and memory created conditions for the develop
ment of memory studies (Zelizer 1995). One of the rst studies of popular
memory initiated by social historians and historical anthropologists was
linked to a Marxist-inspired focus on class and dissident voices (Fentress
and Wickham 1992). The 1960s saw the development of oral history, which
was marked by ideas of the social movements of the time and was connected
with history from the bottom up. However, the professional practitioners
of oral history, who left their ivory tower, mingled with people and dem
ocratized the practice of their trade have been faced with questions about
the objectivity of such scientic discourse, its political bias and its attempt
to integrate all cultural differences into a single institutionalized discourse
(Debouzy 1986: 2624). Such doubts about the truthfulness of oral
accounts and the validity of a reliance of on oral records, have encouraged a
rethinking of how representations of the past should be constructed and
reproduced (Tonkin 1992).
The traditional perspective was further undermined by the crisis of his
toricism, which was contemporaneous with growing critical self-reection
in academic history and the development of a new interest in memory. The
criticism of history, as developed by Whyte (1978) and Foucault (1977),
pointed to the hidden ideological biases built into any model of representa
tion. It presented historical narratives as irrevocably tainted with the lan
guage of power and control, and demonstrated that history privileged the
CONTESTED BOUNDARIES
103
104
CONTESTED BOUNDARIES
105
past, history was holy because the nation was holy (1996a: 5) and histor
ians, as pillars of national continuity, provided legitimization to the nation.
However, with the state divorced from the nation, memory as a living
presence vanished and history gave way to the legitimization of society in
terms of the future. In other words, today we live with memory constantly
on our lips but in societies without living memory. While historians critical
self-awareness and self-reection destroyed all assumptions about the truth
in their presentation of the past, remembering becomes a matter of
reconstruction of memory and the responsibility for remembering is passed
to the archives: Now that historians have abandoned the cult of the docu
ment, society as a whole has acquired the religion of preservation and
archivalisation (Nora 1996a: 8). The scale of collecting expands in inverse
proportion to our depth perception, so as the importance attached to
articial and symbolic substitutes for memory increases, historians have less
and less to say about more and more (Nora 1996a: 13).
Prior to the nineteenth century, memory was such a pervasive part of life
that people were hardly aware of its existence. Now, as the consequence of
the expulsion of rituals from modern life, memory is no longer authentic
ally lived and specic places of memory do not simply arise out of lived
experience instead they have to be created. Hence, history can claim a
victory as we collect, exhibit and catalogue the form but not the substance
of memory: The trace negates the sacred but retains its aura (Nora 1996a:
9). This transition from the rst immediate form of memory, which was
in less rapidly changing societies taken for granted, to indirect, archival
memory, leaves us with realms of memory which, as moments of history
are no longer alive but not yet entirely dead, like shells left on the shore
when the sea of living memory has receded (1996a: 7). Memory has become
a matter of explicit signs, not of implicit meanings; in this sense, it is
more a matter of associations, allusions and symbols. Nora distinguishes
four types of realm or site of memory: symbolic sites (commemorations,
pilgrimages, anniversaries, emblems); functional (manuals, autobiogra
phies, associations); monumental (cemeteries, buildings); and topographic
(archives, libraries, museums). These realms are the last remaining places
where we can still read our own past and history. Their exploration helps
to rell our depleted fund of collective memory; however, they invoke
not so much a sense of identity with those remembered, but rather a sense
that we should remember them precisely so as not to be like them (Nora
1996a: 20).
Noras contribution to the debates over modes of inquiry into the past is
connected with his reformulation of Maurice Halbwachs distinction
between memory and history in the context of modern conditions, where
history is no more than the ofcial memory a society chooses to honor
(Hutton 1993: 9). Stressing the inuence of place and time on the direction
of historical pursuit, he argues that now, as society has lost its anchoring in
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the past and as the state has lost its control over national memory, history
can only study yesterdays places of memory as the remaining points of
intersection between memory and history. In Noras study of the historical
present memory is an essential medium and an object of study for its own
sake (Carrier 2000: 434). Memory, seen as plural, mediated and uid, is
an instrument of both construction and deconstruction of symbols and their
meanings. However, such an examination of the evolution of the representa
tion of events and cultural traditions reduces memory to a history of the
pasts images (Hutton 1993: 22).
Some critics have strongly objected to Noras concept of history as highly
nostalgic and have rejected his idea that memory and history are different
and that the latter is superior to the former (Tonkin 1992; Sturken 1997).
Nora is perceived as a cultural conservative because his analysis is under
stood to be a backward-looking lament over the diminution of our com
mitment to the past (Schwartz 2000: 313). His idea of memory is rejected as
solely consisting of an inventory of ofcial places of memory, and thus as
being an expression of coercive national memory (Samuel 1994: 11). Noras
argument is also criticized for not having relevance beyond France, while the
Frenchness of his position is seen as responsible for his cultural pessimism
(Winter and Sivan 1999b: 2). Moreover, Noras presentation of the French
symbiotic relationship between memory and the countrys most funda
mental social cleavages can be criticized for reducing the explanation of the
uniqueness of Frances lack of excitement over memory to one factor: the
decline of the importance of sectarian divisions in this nations politics
(Collini 1999).
With much evidence that rituals, which Nora sees as vanished from mod
ern societies, are still alive, critics insist on the continuity and signicance of
collective memory in contemporary nations (Noyes and Abrahams 1999).
Arguing that difculties faced by migrants trying to enter the French culture
can be seen as an indication of the continuous importance of a popular
memory, Winter and Sivan (1999b: 2) suggest that collective memorys
obituary, as written by Nora, is premature and misleading. Also, the scope
of various recent celebrations and initiatives seems to be indicative of the
continuity of interest in memory. The bicentenary of the Revolution in
1989, after all, was a highly charged and politically contested event. More
over, with the French government spending more on museums and cultural
activities per capita than does any other western country (Winter and Sivan
1999b: 2), it seems that France continues to be engaged with the celebration
of the past. So, Noras anxiety over the fate of living memory, resulting from
his devotion to the national culture, is a classic case of Minerva taking ight
at dusk.
Noras work has inspired many new studies of memory. Dramatic growth
in this area over the two last decades has also been enhanced by the accept
ance and inclusion of particularistic memories into history narrative, due to
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108
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110
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intuition and contemplation that can unravel the riddles of human exist
ence (Coser 1992: 7). His concept of spontaneous memory, which brings to
our attention the importance of feelings, emotions, intuition and peoples
ability to unify duration, has been very inuential in modern philosophy,
with Sartre and Heidegger, for example, arguing that time expresses the very
nature of human subjectivity and that the past is not existentially nished,
while the future is already existentially present. Bergsons ideas have also
found their way into literature, with Prousts famous novel Remembrance of
Things Past [1922] 1989) being the prime example.
Proust, like Bergson, privileges memory as the means for transcending
subjectivity and perceives time as consisting of a series of moments. He, like
Bergson, also believed that our memory preserves the past. As each day of
our past has remained deposited in us (Proust [1922] 1989, Part 1: 844), we
cannot escape involuntary remembering, which is famously illustrated by
the narrators memory of childhood that comes to him with the taste of a
madeleine (a cookie) dipped in hot tea. When he unconsciously recognizes
the taste of the madeleine, the past is reborn and lived again. Thus, he
becomes an extra-temporal being and therefore unalarmed by the vicissi
tudes of the future, and even anxiety on the subject of his death ceases (Part
3: 904). With this escape from the present, at moments when the past is
reborn in him, the narrator is able to rediscover days that were long past,
the Time that was Lost (Part 3: 904).
Bergson and Proust also shared the idea of the unreliability of the data
provided by consciousness as they both distrusted the overt content of
mental representations. They both saw remembrance as an unpredictable
adventure and both were suspicious of consciousness because its practical
orientations, interests and workings of habit can conceal the nature of
reality and lead to self-deception (Terdiman 1993: 2009). When speaking
of the reality of life which the hero of his novel Jean Santeuil is unable to
perceive, Proust explains: we cannot experience [reality] while we are living
its moments, because we subordinate them to a self-interested purpose, but
these sudden returns of disinterested memory [make] us oat between the
present and the past in their common essence (quoted in Terdiman 1993:
209).
However, Prousts involuntary memory, although it cannot be delib
erately sought, is not experienced on the level of unconsciousness since we
can only emotionally experience the past when the power of present sensa
tions to call up memories is followed by the deliberate recollection of the
past. What was given to the narrator through an involuntary association
generated by the taste of a madeleine was not a feeling of the past but rather
a feeling of the authenticity of reality: something that, common both to the
past and the present, is more essential than either both of them (Proust
[1922] 1989, Part 3: 905). Thus, according to Proust, the meaning of our
experience materializes in memory and what we call reality is a certain
112
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114
group needs and that the kind of past events most invaluable in a given stage
of a groups life are those able to enhance a groups survival (Schwartz et al.
1986). The example of Masada, which is both a complex of uncontested
historical facts and a powerful component of modern Israels national
mythology, illustrates that its mythological function does not in the least
invalidate its historicity, nor would its demythicization enlarge our historical
knowledge (Assmann 1997: 14). In other words, the validity of a given
perception of the past is not a result of its utility and has nothing to do with
its truth values, but is rather a result of the fact that the past matches and
articulates present feelings.
Another important point developed by Meads dialectic approach is his
suggestion that the reconstruction of the past occurs when people realize,
through self-reection and awareness, the inadequacy of the old presenta
tion of the past. New pasts are most likely to emerge during periods of rapid
change. In the context of change, conditions of insecurity and destabiliza
tion can be routinized by the reconstruction of the past in such a way as to
assimilate it into a meaningful ow of events: The past which we construct
for the standpoint of the new problems of today is based upon continuity
which we discover in that which has arisen and it serves us until the rising
novelty of tomorrow necessitates a new history (Mead 1929: 235). Meads
theory can be interpreted as the conceptualization of memory, if not as a
motor of change, as Baert (1992: 141) suggests, then at least as an instru
ment of normalization, as a means of reconstructing a disturbed societal
pattern of living into its normal condition.
Mead was a constructive pragmatist who believed that the past arose in
such a way as to enable intelligent conduct to proceed against situational
problems (Mead 1932: xiii, 29). Baert (1992: 86) summarizes the role that
the past plays in Meads theory by pointing out that the presentation of the
past can be either a past-in-now or a past-for-now. The former, past-in-now,
refer to the use of the past in the present, when people adopt passive
attitudes towards the past which experiences its power through practical
consciousness and tacit knowledge. The latter, past-for-now, refers to the
symbolic reconstruction of the past in the present, when people are active in
respect of their past as they reect upon underlying structures.
The sociology of time has recently become a distinct eld of research
illuminating its social construction, the temporal aspects of societies and the
present specicity and transformation of time (Zerubavel 1981; Adam
1990; Baert 1992). Following Heideggers and Schutzs focus on the prob
lem of being and becoming, many writers analyse ways in which body,
action and space merge across a time horizon. Researchers from a wide
range of disciplines suggest that there are various senses of time and point to
the changing role of time in culture and society, and changing attitudes to
time, including changes in our relationships to the past. Overall, new studies
of time show that contemporary societies question the neutrality of time and
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its linearity, while proclaiming the death of time, the end of the future and
the globalization of time (Young 1988; Hassard 1990; Novotny 1994;
Adam 1998).
The breakdown of the previous temporal order into an extended present
came rst with the discovery of a global simultaneity, which can be dated to
the Titanic catastrophe of 1912, of which thanks to new means of com
munication people in various countries could read in the morning news
papers. It was followed by the arrival of the timeless global culture of the
computer era. With the collapse of the old temporal order, as the past and
the future are replaced by an extended present, where instantaneous time
replaces linear time, memory seems to be unimportant. The acceleration of
change, with constant changes in work, life situations, social and material
conditions, makes memory of the previous generation irrelevant for younger
people. As more people participate simultaneously in more events, and as
more experience a faster pace and uidity of time, peoples need for their
own private time and their desire to regain control over their time is also
growing. The consequences of constant change, striving for innovation, the
increasing pressure and speed of time lead to a call for the development of
new mechanisms of balance between novelty, repetition and the past.
This new paradoxical situation creates new challenges for sociology,
which now needs to reect upon time in such a way as to see how nature,
society and individuals are embedded in each other and are interdependent
(Ellias 1992: 16). These challenges can be addressed by the conceptualiza
tion of people as not only living in time, but also as having an awareness of
the passing time which is incorporated in the nature of their social institu
tions (Giddens 1981: 36), by placing them in relation to their representation
of the past and by seeing the self as articulated in time. It is here that collect
ive memory proves most useful as it allows us to conceptualize the link
between groups and time in a fruitful way.
116
artists, and many of them express it explicitly. From the poet Simonides,
who is credited with the invention of the art of memory, to contemporary
writers of memoirs, this association between memory and imagination has
been perceived as central to telling a story. In an earlier form of memoirnovel, such as Defoes Robinson Crusoe or Moll Flanders, the conceit was
that the story told is true. Balzac and Flaubert still believed that they were
writing history, but by the late nineteenth century such conceit had become
convention and the genre of the novel proclaimed memorys ctional nature.
Thus memorys relationship to the notion of truth or factual evidence had
become complex. Proust was interested in memory, not history, as he
assumed that memory gives reality to the past and that we construct the past
through an act of imagination. Another great twentieth-century master of
memory, Nabokov, asserted that it is an act of will and that writing true
stories is the product of a fascinating struggle between imagination and
evidence (quoted in Modejska 2000: 6). C. Letty Fox, in her novel Her Luck
(1946), plays with the blurred line between memory and imagination:
I dont know what imagination is, if not an unpruned tangled kind of
memory (quoted in Parks 2001: 90).
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Virginia Woolf still warned that
fact and ction cant go together (quoted in Modejska 2000: 5), but since
then the relationship between imagination and memory has become closer,
although less clear-cut. With new forms of writing blurring the lines between
memories and facts, between the clearly autobiographical and the strictly
ctional, memory and imagination seem to be intimately bound together. In
recent years it has become fashionable to blur the distinction between
novels and history by emphasizing the ctional element in both of them
(Ginzburg 1994: 388). Of particular relevance here are novels by Toni
Morrison (1990), who compares memory and ction, and the work of A.S.
Byatt who concludes her exploration of the differences and similarities
between memory and ction by saying: We need to make images to try to
understand the relation of our images to our lives and death. That is where
art comes from (1998: 71). Historians adopting this approach (e.g. Natalie
Zemon Davis in her book Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their
Tellers in Sixteenth Century France (1987) combine literature and history.
Davis script for the lm The Return of Martin Guerre is even closer to
ction. On the other hand, some ction is closer to history. For instance,
novelist Thomas Keneally, after historical research, wrote a piece of non
ction which gets a prize for ction (Burke 1998: 229) and which was made
into the lm Schindlers List.
This lack of separation between memory and imagination and history and
ction is of course nothing new Thucydides invented all the speeches in his
History of the Peloponnesian War, while Walter Scotts great novels made
people wonder whether they were reading history or ction. What is prob
ably new today is the postmodernist writers claim that we cannot know the
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past and therefore we may as well invent it (Byatt 2001). At the beginning of
the twenty-rst century, with history gone, there is a view that writers
should explore the past using their imagination which can possess the past
even if we cant know the truth about it, even if the past did not exist except
in the form we choose to make it (Bayley 2001: 16). Moreover, now, when
readers are seen to be sophisticated enough to hold several layers of reading
at once, and to enjoy the interplay between conceit, the ction and the
authorial stake in the story told, a new form of writing is emerging which
further clouds the distinction between ction and non-ction (Modejska
2000: 26).
There is also no shortage of evidence for the connection between imagin
ation and memory outside of literature. Philosophers for example,
Spinoza, Montaigne and Pascal have always been interested in the powers
of these two phenomena, and they often thought of memory in terms of
images. Hobbes thought that memory and imagination were the same in
essence, since both dealt with the absent or unreal, except for the fact that
memory supposeth time past, as fancy does not (quoted in Warnock 1987:
18). Hume, who recognized this difference, pointed out that ideas presented
by memory are much more lively and stronger than those presented by
imagination. Imagination, according to him, offers a great deal more free
play than memory because in memory our ideas are bound to occur to us
in the temporal and spatial order in which we actually experienced them
(Warnock 1987).
The argument that memory is the same as imagination was brought for
ward by Giambattista Vico, a seventeenth-century scholar and teacher of
rhetoric. He argued that memory is virtually synonymous with imagination
because memory originates in the ontological act of creating images in order
to give meaning to the phenomena of the world (Hutton 1993: 34). Accord
ing to Vico, memory has three different aspects: memoria (memory, when it
remembers things), fantasia (imagination, when it alters or imitates them),
and ingegno (invention, when it gives them a new turn or puts them into a
proper arrangement and relationship) (Price 1999: 1316). Vicos denition
of the threefold nature of memory suggests that a creative memory makes
the truth of the past by interpreting, altering and producing a coherent
version of events. Thus, Vicos theory of memory, as an act of interpretation
that enables us to establish connections between the familiar images of the
present and the unfamiliar ones of the past anticipated the modern science
of hermeneutics (Hutton 1993: 34).
In modern times, viewing historical interpretation as a task of reconstruct
ing the collective mentalities of the past was carried further by Dilthey and
Heidegger. The most inuential contemporary representative of this strand,
Gadamer, also shares Vicos view of history as based on imaginative
reconstruction of the past. For Gadamer (1975) there is no uninterpreted
mode of experience, while life acquires its signicance in so far as it is
118
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119
else remembers too suggests that it is not imagination but rather con
ventional schematas that organize our remembering.
The importance of the process of rationalization rather than imagination
in our thinking about the past is particularly true in the case of collective
memory, whose higher level of articulation, necessary for its transmission,
makes it more schematized, conceptualized, simplied and conventional
ized. While any individuals memory also includes unarticulated experi
ences, and is therefore highly complex, collective memory is more schematic
as images can be transmitted socially only if they are conventionalized and
simplied; conventionalized, because the image has to be meaningful for
an entire group; simplied, because in order to be generally meaningful
and capable of transmission, the complexity of the image must be reduced
(Fentress and Wickham 1992: 49). Yet, imagination is important because
the powers of memory and imagination are impossible to separate (as shown
by the systematic errors in our remembering which are evidence of memorys
imaginative reconstruction) (Bartlett 1932: 213), and because there is
nothing in remembered images themselves that allows us to tell if they refer
to something real or imaginary (Fentress and Wickham 1992: 49).
Memory is the experience of the past mediated by representation, so it is
the construction of images that puts memories before our eyes and which
reveals what experience means. Although imagination is perhaps not essen
tial to all types of memory (e.g. habitual memory, which incorporates
practical and usable knowledge of the world and does not rely on the
deployment of images), exploring something imaginatively requires mem
ory (Warnock 1987: 76). Memory and imagination are interconnected
through their respective roles in assigning and reading meanings, as
memory is crucial to our ability to sustain a continuity of experience, and
this sense of continuity is essential for understanding the world, while our
imaginative thinking is based on our ability to make the world intelligible
and meaningful. It was Oretga y Gasset ([1926] 1960) who claimed that
modern people are empty because of their lack of memory, and since with
out memory they cannot understand the present, they lack imagination
and an inner desire to excel. Also, Bauman (1982), who denes historical
memory as an acquired set of narratives embedded in everyday conscious
ness, stresses that such historical narratives serve to make sense of the
present world. Thus, we need to cultivate both memory and imagination
because memory is central in the process of assigning meaning, which, in
turn, is necessary if we are to cope with todays overabundance of images
and information.
Memory and imagination are also brought together in testimony because
the witness says I was a part of the story, I was there, while at the same time
they use their imagination to retell the story (Ricoeur 1999: 16). In testi
mony, memory is recalled in such a way that others can imagine being there
this imaginative narratization helps them to imagine a true experience.
120
However, when imagination reveals meanings of the past and makes the past
visible as if it were present, it sometimes resembles ction more than histor
ical narrative. Thus, in the nal analysis, in our search for the truth or what
really happened, we rely on trust: When I testify to something, I am asking
the others to trust what I am saying is true. To share testimony is to
exchange trust. Beyond this we cannot go. Most institutions rely funda
mentally on the trust they place in the word of the other (Ricoeur 1999: 16).
Thus, while aiming to achieve a balance between imagination and an object
ive and critical recall, we depend in the last instance on the trustworthiness
of others.
When discussing memory and imagination, therefore, we need to realize
not only that it is very difcult to separate them but also that we tend to
accept various shapes of their relationship in different genres and in different
contexts. Fact, ction, memory and imagination, speculation and invention
are all parts of telling the story of the past, and this story will carry us
forward, will become the crucial condition of social harmonious coexist
ence, only if it does not undermine social trust. The extension of trust in any
particular setting depends in part on the actors reinterpreting their collect
ive past in such a way that trusting cooperation comes to be a natural feature
of their common heritage (Sabel 1993: 107). Therefore, in order to ensure
such trust and avoid conicts, there is a need for a critical evaluation of ones
traditions, which can only be achieved if we fully understand the contested
nature of the past.
Contested memories
Because memory is a eld of the articulation of public and private interests,
values and aspirations, it is also the site where contradictions of identities
are often contested. As memory discourse has established itself as the lan
guage through which modern societies express their dilemmas and contro
versies, battles over memory are not uncommon. Such controversies indicate
that past events have not yet passed to history (Hartman 1986: 1) and
that memory is open, uid and contestable. Arguments over memory are
frequently strengthened by reference to numerous remarks about the power
of remembrance which are abstract and ambiguous enough to become
rhetorical weapons. One of the most famous quotations is Orwells saying,
Whoever controls the past controls the future. Whoever controls the
present controls the past. A quote from Santayana, which says that those
who refuse to learn from history are bound to repeat it, and the words of an
eighteenth-century Hasidic rabbi, Ball Shem Tov, The secret of redemption
is remembrance, are often mentioned. The use of rhetorical arguments in
battles over memory is important because they tend to sharpen our know
ledge of what should be remembered and acted upon, while at the same time
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121
covering up the fact that memory is often lost to interests, politics and
emotions.
As monuments replace the real site of memory (Nora 1996a), they increas
ingly provoke discussions which are interesting examples of contested mem
ories. There is a restrictive relation between monuments and memory.
Monuments seeking to honour collective memory can be forgetful of some
elements of the past (Young 2000). Whose vision of the past is put into a
monument can be the result of protracted struggle and often has lasting
political implications. For example, one of the most publicized controversies
was a conict over the form and content of Washingtons Vietnam War
memorial. Conict arose when the ofcial state authorities vision of the
monument, as a symbol of patriotism and glory of the nation, did not match
with ordinary peoples desire to commemorate pain, grief and suffering. The
clash of these two interests shows that the shaping of a past worthy of
public monuments and commemoration is contested and involves a struggle
for supremacy between advocates of various political ideas and sentiments
(Bodnar 1992: 9)
Memory is also contested when different groups of people declare equally
passionate attachments to the same place, city, or site. Recently the con
troversy between Poles and Jews over Auschwitzs site provoked strong
reactions because Auschwitz, the Nazi concentration camp located in
Poland, is a sacred place for both involved groups. This controversy has also
attracted international attention because of its very sensitive nature and
moral implications. The site of Auschwitz camp, where German Nazis
murdered 1.6 million people, the vast majority being Jews (1.35 million)
from across Europe, has been the subject of continuous contention since the
mid-1980s. The controversy was sparked when a Carmelite convent
appropriated a camp building in 1984 and was further fueled by the erection
of more than 100 crosses on the site in the mid-1990s (although the rst one
was placed at the site earlier, in 1979 to commemorate Pope John Pauls visit
to Auschwitz). The Polish presentation of the sites history has until
relatively recently tended to marginalize Jews for example, the 1986
guidebook to the Auschwitz-Birekanu museum had nothing to say about
Jews at all! Thus, for Poles, Auschwitz has become a symbol of its nations
martyrdom, yet, as the largest Jewish cemetery, for Jews it is the most prom
inent symbol of the Holocaust (Bartoszewski 1991). Consequently, the Poles
saw the nuns decision to locate convent near the martyrdom site as a means
of extending prayers for Poles killed at the camp, while the Jews saw it as a
sign of the Polish Catholic Churchs aspiration to impose its own symbols on
the site.
The rst phase of the conict involved numerous charges and counter
charges, and the involvement of both religious and political organizations
(including the Polish and Israeli governments) was only resolved by the
intervention of the Vatican, causing the nuns to leave the site (Rittner and
122
Roth 1993). The end of communism, which unfreezed Polish memory and
opened it to new voices and pressures, initially reignited the conict over
how to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust. The unauthorized con
struction of crosses by nationalistic and radical Catholics in an adjoining
eld added fresh fuel to the controversy, as Jewish groups objected to them
and to the Churchs role as the guardian of the spirituality of the victims. As
the international demands for the protection of Auschwitz made the contro
versy into a diplomatic incident, the Polish authorities again became
involved. Although in 1998 the Polish government lost its legal challenge to
take over the property where the crosses stood, they were all removed apart
from the original one. The debate about the Papal Cross still continues, but
the conciliatory solution to this long-lasting controversy is now, due to the
more open and democratic nature of the Polish system, closer to a resolution
than ever before.
The convent controversy can be described as a conict over who should
commemorate the victims of Auschwitz, and in what way. An example of a
battle over what actually happened in Auschwitz is the court confrontation
between David Irving and Deborah Lipstadt. Irvings libel suit against
Penguin Books accused Lipstadts book, Denying the Holocaust (1993) of
falsely labelling him as a Holocaust denier, or revisionist. The suit was tried
in the British High Court in London from 1996 to 2000, where Irving
argued that his reputation as a historian had been harmed by the alleged
libellous words in Lipstadts book, which brands him as one of the most
dangerous spokespersons for Holocaust denial and as somebody for whom
the problem with the gas chambers in Auschwitz was that they were a myth
that would not die easily(Lipstadt 1993: 181, 179).
In Denying the Holocaust, Lipstadt examines deliberate misrepresenta
tion and manipulation of historical evidence about Nazi crimes and argues
that, while Holocaust denial is not a new phenomenon, it has increased in
scope and intensity since the mid-1970s, and that one of the most essential
claims the deniers make is about the evidence of Auschwitz as a death camp.
Because Auschwitz has become central to Holocaust denial and since
Lipstadt had to prove the accuracy of the statements in her book, the
Auschwitz question played a central role in the court proceedings. An expert
witness analysed the historical evidence for the gas chambers at Auschwitz
and refuted revisionist claims to the contrary. The demolition of the argu
ments of Holocaust deniers against Auschwitz resulted in a judgment that
destroyed Irvings reputation as a historian and discredited Holocaust
revisionism. Lipstadt remarks in her book that if Holocaust denial has
demonstrated anything, it is the fragility of memory, truth and history
(p. 216), yet her victory in court shows the importance of vital historical
documents. If there is a lesson for memory from the trial, it is that it cannot
be validated as a historical source without being checked against objective
evidence (Assmann 1997: 9).
CONTESTED BOUNDARIES
123
124
Jewry to deect criticism of Israel and its own morally indefensible polices
(2000: 6, 149).
Opposition to the process of memory commercialization, trivialization
and banalization is behind the third type of contested memories. Following
again our Holocaust case study, we can illustrate this type of contested
memories with attempts to rescue the Holocaust memory from being com
mercially and emotionally exploited by media and business. Fights against
publishers trivialization and exploitation of the topic in all possible con
texts are instigated in order to preserve the integrity of the historical record.
Todays overabundance of information about the Holocaust, it is argued,
can lead to the banalization of the Holocaust rather than to a more pro
found understanding of it (Silverman 1999: 38). The Holocaust industry,
the marketization of the Holocaust and the Americanization of the Holo
caust, are seen as a danger, as these trends can condition the way we receive
any account of the destruction of European Jewry (Bartov 2000).
Yet, it is worth emphasizing that collective memory is not necessarily
manipulated and can be a source of historical truth. Even more importantly,
we should note that when memory functions as myth its evaluation from the
point of view of the historical truth is irrelevant. Thus, to understand why
contestations over memory take place and how such battles function in
national cultures, memory needs to be seen as being located in a contested
terrain on which mythical and rational images of the past sometimes work
together and sometimes do battle, but these images always shape identity
and its transformation (Olick and Levy 1997: 934). This, in turn, can only
be developed, as this chapter has argued, if we comprehend the complexity
of the relationships between memory and history, memory and time and
memory and imagination.
To sum up, the discussion of the relationships between memory and his
tory, memory and time, and memory and imagination showed the trans
formation of these realtionships and their new-found openness, exibility
and dynamic nature. Today, rather than insisting on an opposition between
memory and history, we are inclined to accept an interrelationship between
the two, and to rely upon both their methods of inquiry. At the same time,
we stress that our remembering of the past will not be confused with our
historical understanding of it. In addition, the acceleration of change, as
more and more people participate simultaneously in more and more events
and experience a faster pace of life, leads to an apparent increase in the speed
of time, which in turn reorganizes the relationship between time and
memory.
Because memory involves the construction of mental images to place the
past before our eyes, the interconnection between memory and imagination
was also discussed by looking at their respective roles in assigning and read
ing meaning. It was argued that in order to achieve a balance between
imagination and objective, critical recall, we depend on the trustworthiness
CONTESTED BOUNDARIES
125
of others. In the nal analysis, the result is the frequently contested nature of
the past.
Further reading
Adam, B. (1990) Time and Social Theory. Oxford: Polity Press.
Burke, P. (1989) History as social memory, in T. Butler (ed.) Memory: Culture and
the Mind, pp. 132. Cambridge: Blackwell.
Hutton, P. (1993) History as an Art of Memory. Hanover, VT: University Press of
New England.
Klein, K. (2000) On the emergence of memory in historical discourse, Representa
tions, Winter: 12753.
Lowenthal, D. (1985) The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Nora, P. (1989) Between memory and history, Representations, 26 (Spring): 725.
S T U DY I N G M E M O RY
STUDYING MEMORY
127
128
1999b: 9). Within this third approach to the study of commemoration and
war memory, commemoration is analysed as an attempt at mourning and an
effort to repair the psychological and physical damage of war.
Many recent works try to overcome the polarization between these three
theoretical perspectives, not least because it has had a deleterious effect on
the study of war remembrance (Ashplant et al. 2000b: 9). They propose to
eliminate this division by recognizing the complexity of the relationships
between the various agencies, namely between those of individual memory,
remembrance in civil society and national commemorative practices organ
ized by the state (Ashplant et al. 2000b: 10). Instead of being preoccupied
with unmasking the ways in which ideas and symbols of national identity
represent ideological forms designed to shore up the position of the domin
ant class, social scientists contribution to the study of memory is now more
exible and sensitive. Communities of memories are not seen as being
exclusively based on national principles, as rituals of commemoration for
AIDS victims, for example, illustrate (Sturken 1997). The ability to differen
tiate between the memory of various groups (e.g. national memory, class
memory, individual memory) brings Halbwachs theories back into the main
stream of sociological debate. Such new investigations of memory, sup
plemented with analyses of individual mourning and personal memory, have
been further enhanced by inspirations coming from the work of Noras team
which shows the plurality of meanings and uses involved. This groups
argument, that specic places of memory do not simply arise out of lived
experience but instead have to be created, has been tested in investigations of
how various nations resort to commemorative practices in order to give
symbolic meaning to their past.
Studies of war have been contributing to our understanding of the
traumas of military conicts for a long time. This type of inquiry provides us
with well documented evidence that the public memory of war has under
gone signicant modication in the last two centuries. From the pioneering
work of Paul Fussels The Great War and Modern Memory (1975), Mosses
Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (1990), Jay
Winters Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (1995), through War and
Memory in the Twentieth Century (1997) edited by Martin Evans and Ken
Lunn, to European Memories of the Second World War (1999) edited by
Peitsch, Burdett and Gorrara, many writers have analysed how wars have
been inscribed in their respective societies memory and culture. They
explore the ways in which the search for a language of mourning went on
during and after both world wars and how the imagery of war entered art,
lm, literature and poetry. They show how nations, due to massive losses in
the two world wars, not only resorted to erecting so-called tombs of
unknown soldiers, but also focused on mass mortality and mass suffering in
their art. We learn from such studies that war, even in victorious states, was
not represented in glorious terms. Memory of this terrible period was
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as a political instrument. For liberals, who contend that political life does
not need to be rooted in a shared past and common experience, only a
narrow band of continuity and shared common memory is needed. Consti
tutional patriotism, which occupies a middle position, seeks a reconciliation
between the universalist demands of liberal principles and the need for a
robust political identity, including a shared history (Habermas 1996).
The relationship between memory and identity is historical, with groups
identities and their memories being social and political constructs. At earlier
historical moments, identity was not so much an issue; when societies were
more stable, identity was to a great extent assigned, rather than selected or
adopted. However, recently the nature of the links between identity and
memory has become more problematized with the decline in theoretical and
practical importance of theological and religious assumptions as stable
sources of identity (Taylor 1989). Now, identity is seen as the product of
multiple and competing discourses, and is thus unstable, multiple, uctuat
ing and fragmentary. The postmodern conception of identities as uid,
multidimensional and personalized constructions, together with the politics
of identity, seen as a central aspect of postmodern politics and communities
in which the legitimization of a unitary identity or an overarching sense of
self has diminished, has highlighted the links between memory and identity.
When groups based on the previously private identities of citizens (race,
ethnicity, sexual preferences) compete for public recognition and legitimiza
tion, their claims are rooted in their common memory of suffering, victim
ization or exclusion. The dilemma of a post-national, post-traditional
political identity is connected with the tension between the vision of a
rational identity centred around universal norms and an identity laden
with the responsibility of remembrance, the legacy of the past. This friction
between openness and diversity (an imperative placed on the agenda by
immigration) on the one hand and the ethics of remembering and responsi
bility on the other is indicative of the most important dynamic of modernity.
As the emphasis on individual choice and cultural identities grows, the
tension between the particularism of realms of memory and the openness
of the universal democratic has become the focus of much new research.
This type of research illustrates that the openness of modern identity to
critical revision, coupled with increased pluralism and the separation
of national identity and political membership, means that particularistic
differences and pluralistic memories have gained in importance. On the
other hand, these investigations also show that, as the contemporary world
evolves in the direction of greater homogeneity and uniformity (with the
new role of media and globalization), this evolution not only strikes a blow
at traditional identities but also increases the need for some kind of belong
ing. In other words, modern trends have both problematized identity and
created a desire, as well as a space, for a new search for identity (Touriane
2000).
The conjunction of these two conditions the need for collective identity
and the destruction of traditional identities is an additional factor respon
sible in part for the new cult of memory. Thus, the memory craze and
uncertainty concerning identity go together (Megill 1999: 43). We witness
the growing plurality of memory seen as a stabilizer of and justication for
the self-designation that people claim (Terdiman 1993). The statement I am
an A is now supplemented with: I have always been an A. Here the mem
ory of having always been an A serves as a support for identity that might
otherwise be seen as insufciently justied (Megill 1999). This new link
between memory and identity, seen as a sacred object, an ultimate con
cern, worth ghting and even dying for (Gillis 1994b: 4), has granted a
new status to memory. Additionally, the increasing diversication and
fragmentation of social interests in contemporary societies, together with
globalization, migrations and demographic shifts, have provided the basis
for a new politics of identity. The growing importance of the politics of
identity, both as a defensive reaction against globalization and a prolonga
tion of communal resistance (Castells 1997), has further enhanced the status
of memory, now seen as an authentic mode of discourse among people of
color (Klein 2000: 138). As struggles for minority rights are organized
around questions of memory, debates over the notion of identity, often
employing the language of memory become increasingly politicized
(Huyssen 1995: 45).
Today, despite the fact that the past seems to be lending dignity to the
identity of many groups, a common past is more about the duty to remem
ber rather than real memories. For example, being Jewish increasingly
means only to remember being Jewish (Nora 1996a: 12). With the decline
of living memory, identity ceases to be based on a shared experience of past
events and is, instead rooted in a common heritage which distills the past
into icons of identity, bonding us with procurers and progenitors, with our
own earlier selves, and with our promised successors (Lowenthal 1994: 43).
In the shift from memory to heritage, certain aspects of the group past will
be prioritized over others, sometimes leading to a sanitized or romanticized
vision of the past (Noakes 1997: 93). The self-congratulatory nature of the
relationship between identity and heritage is often criticized for bland
emptiness and escapist nostalgia. Since the further one moves from the past,
the less one recalls its power dimension (Halbwachs [1941] 1992), heritage
often offers sentimentalized and romanticized sources of identity. Yet heri
tage is closely connected with our need for a sense of the past, belonging and
identity, and therefore can also be seen as a creative act, one in which we
learn from each others efforts and experiences (Lowenthal 1994: 43).
There are many important case studies concerning the connection
between memory and particular national identities (e.g. Maier 1988; Russo
1991). One of the most interesting is Lyn Spillmans (1997) comparative
study of the celebrations of national centennials and bicentennials in
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Australia and the USA. Illustrating the process of creating national identities
in both countries in the late nineteenth century and 100 years later, Spillman
examines how the USA and Australia adapted to changes in their political
situations. She argues, following Benedict Anderson, that a sense of shared
experience through time is an important dimension of national identity and
that this sense of past, progress and future is an important feature of
imagined national community: When people in both countries imagined
shared qualities which bound their communities, they also thought fre
quently of their political values and institutions and prosperity (1997: 82).
Moving away from the dominant ideology thesis, Spillman assumes that
there are many possible alternatives for a version of the past and a vision of
the future which people develop to represent the nation and its unity. While
demonstrating that contemporary Australians and Americans articulate
their identities through symbols of egalitarian democracy, she suggests that
behind the different possibilities in which a nation might be imagined lies a
cultural process of great complexity, contingency and specicity (1997:
150). Spillmans analysis reveals that the process of identity formation is
illuminated if we examine symbolic repertoires, cultural production in the
dynamics of centre/periphery relations, and the discursive eld within which
national identities are constructed.
The issue of the link between memory and particular national identities
has been further problematized by the emergence of new postcommunist
states. Wanner, in her book Burden of Dreams (1998), asks how, given the
hybrid forms of identity created by the Soviet regime, does a new postcom
munist Ukraine forge a sense of nationality? She looks at the representation
of historical events as embedded in a process of identity reformation where
power relations and the ability of various groups to advance their interest is
revealed (Wanner 1998: 32). One of the most powerful legacies of the past
is the memory of the Chernobyl accident as it symbolizes the exploitative
nature of the system and the victimization of Ukraine under the Soviet
regime. As the Chernobyl memory reveals contestation and competing cul
tural claims, and thus actualizes the past in the present, Wanner asserts that
the present acquires meaning only in terms of a ruptured and tragic past.
Studies of ethnic memories have been even more popular, which can be
explained by the wide acceptance of memory as a means of the legitimiza
tion of group identity, by the growing problematization and fragmentation
of national identities as well as by the acknowledgment that respect for the
Other implies acceptance of difference of memory (Ricoeur 1999: 1216).
Many contemporary studies of ethnic identities cast ethnicity as uid and
ethnic boundaries as continually changing. The issue of race and ethnicity is
also frequently discussed through the examination of collective memory,
which often becomes a form of mourning and a paradoxical sign of loss
(Weissberg 1999: 22). In one such study, Comaroff and Stern (1994) argue
that ethnic consciousness can be viewed as a universal potentiality that is
memory and politics means that a notion of identity which is often shaped
by defensiveness or victimology, clashes with the conviction that identities,
national or otherwise, are always heterogeneous and in need of such hetero
geneity to remain viable politically and existentially (Huyssen 1995: 5). In
other words, the preoccupation with memory as a basis for collective iden
tity could lead to dangerous consequences, as the bloody conicts between
different groups across Europe attest. The ethical burden brought by the
acceptance of the past in political identity results in many ambiguities and in
difculties of weighing claims that cannot be objectively balanced. Recent
developments, such as conicts in the former Yugoslavia, suggest that there
is a short passage from the passions of identity politics to vengeance
and vindictiveness (Melling 1997). According to Umberto Eco (quoted in
Melling 1997: 259), ghosts of particularism in a new invigorated cult of
tradition that sprang up as a source of hope for ethnic and national com
munities in the 1990s may now bring new conicts. Groups that turn
towards their past in order to glorify specic aspects of it use memory to
foster pride in some of their communal traditions and to demand a recogni
tion of suffering. When memory becomes the basis of the collective narcis
sism of minor differences (Block 1998: 33), defenders of such groups
uniqueness almost inevitably develop hostile attitudes towards each other,
and this can run a danger of allowing memory to be used as a political
instrument that legitimizes nationalist myths and propaganda. Thus, some
writers have warned that remembrance which is not accompanied by know
ledge and thought is emptied of all responsibility and may endanger others
(Megill 1999).
Even more importantly, todays fascination with memory may undermine
liberal universalism because the reliance on memory to legitimate collective
identity can question the universalistic principle. In addition, as argued by
Maier (1993), it can act as an obstacle to democracy because focusing such
group memories on narrow ethnicity may result in groups competing for the
recognition of suffering, thus undermining the democratic spirit of co
operation. Such conicts can, likewise, harm the advancement of a par
ticular groups interest because the systematic neglect of causes of group
disadvantage other than distinctive memory may result in a group suffering
material deprivation, lack of education opportunities or discrimination
(Barry 2001: 5, 305).
To sum up, while until recently it was assumed that it is history which
provides groups with their identity, just as memory does for an individual
(Arnold 2000: 118), today various groups rely on their collective memory to
claim their group identity. The current popularity of memory studies, and
their acceptance into the history project, is based on the assumption that to
rob us of memory is to destroy a part of us, something essential to who we
are, something arguably as crucial to our identity as our physical person
(Booth 1999: 258). In other words, memory has established itself as a
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140
1996;Young 1996). However, the most signicant role in the history of the
conceptualization of trauma has been played by psychoanalysis, which was
developed by Freud as a way of curing troubled minds by recovering
suppressed memories. His notion of the unconscious as a repository of
repressed memories has shaped trauma studies by introducing the idea that
it is precisely what cannot be remembered that is decisive for the subject
(Hacking 1995). Freud, by dening sickness as a particular kind of failure of
memory, made memory a clue to the human condition. However, for him
memory is not a passive receiver whose performance can be measured quan
titatively; it embodies a moral choice, a sequence of acceptance and rejec
tion (Rieff 1979: 38). Arguing that much of a persons traumatic past is
shielded by amnesia, Freud suggests that such repression involves active
forgetting of threatening memories by pushing them into the unconscious.
Moreover, repressed memories, unlike forgotten ones, can acquire danger
ous power over the personality, as partial leakage of painful memories can
lead to neurosis.
Freud asserts that the events of a persons life are all recorded somewhere
in the mind, ready to be accessed if only the memories can be released from
repression. The observation of connections between hysterical symptoms
and various cases of repressed memory related to childhood traumas led
Freud to formulate the therapeutic aim of the science of psychoanalysis as
the interpretation of memory, seen as constituting the essential link between
two realms of psyche: its unconscious and conscious side. Memories are to
be analysed for their associations, seen as displacements or defences
constructed by the unconscious mind which performs the function of the
guardian of memory. However, even memory fragments transmitted to the
conscious mind are not transparent representations of past realities: They
always surface in disguise. Revised and distorted by the psyches conicting
needs, they are consciously rendered as a composite of truth and ction
(Hutton 1993: 64). Screen memories block access to more disturbing
memories, and since they are not recollections of actual events, but
reconstructions of those memories through the grid of contemporary feel
ings (Isbister 1985: 130) the operation of our memories does not depend
exclusively on past events, but also on present interpretations of those
events.
Because of its attempts to cure traumatized people, psychoanalysis is
essentially a technique of retrieving lost memories through memory and
mourning which work together in the ght for the acceptance of memories
and reconciliation (Ricoeur 1999: 1214). According to this psychoanalytic
approach, the work of memory should not be separated from that of grief. If
psychoanalysis is an art of memory, as both Terdiman (1993) and Hutton
(1993) argue, it reveals a reverse mnemonic since it is concerned with forget
ting rather than remembering, and with the unconscious mind rather than
conscious psychical intent. In other words, screen memories, as mnemonic
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never the repetition of the same, but always another return (Weigl 1996:
153).
Trauma changes the nature of remembering as it makes such memories
particularly vivid, intrusive, uncontrollable, persistent and somatic. Trau
matic bodily experiences are a powerful exception to the usual diminishing
intensity of memory with the passage of time (Schudson 1995: 351). For
Nietzsche, memory is a bodily phenomenon which operates on the principle
that if something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in (1969: 61).
He saw experience of pain as the most powerful aid to mnemonics and
argued that whenever mankind has found it necessary to make memory for
itself, it has never come off without blood, torment and sacrices (Nietzsche
1980: 802).
Culbertson (1995) and Brison (1999) assert that traumatic memory is a
kind of somatic memory, as the nature and frequency of sensory, emo
tional and physiological ashbacks is determined by past trauma. Fre
quent involuntary renewals of traumatic memories, as they are more
dependent on sensory representations than narrative memories, overcome
emotional and psychological distanciation and assert the moral character
of the self and memory: Traumatic memory blurs the Cartesian mindbody distinction that continues to inform our cultural narrative about the
nature of the self (Brison 1999: 42). The assumption that memory recol
lection is helped by the body is accepted in investigations of the traumatic
subjective experiences of major personal disasters, such as abuse, rape or
incest. Traumatic memories are also seen as factors that not only shape the
destiny of individuals but also that of human civilization. Experience of
trauma has, however, only recently become an essential element of public
memory.
In the nineteenth and the rst part of the twentieth century, memories of
trauma, painful experiences and past wrongdoings were banished to the
private realm and only ofcial history was made public. With nation states
rarely confessing to their past wrongdoings, and with some governments (as,
for example, the Nazi one) engaged in a war against memory (Levi 1988:
31), it was not until the second part of the twentieth century, that people
were given space to retrieve traumatic memories and allowed to prevent
painful pasts from fading into the oblivion of history. With a general recog
nition of the emotional and social value of memories of the Holocaust and
Nazi atrocities, a public space for trauma was created. This public space
provides a consensual reality and collective memory through which the
fragments of personal memory can be assembled, reconstructed, and dis
played with a tacit assumption of validity (Kirmayer 1996: 195). From the
1980s, personal narratives of the Holocaust brought issues of memory to
public attention. The growing realization that the Nazi past is too massive
to be forgotten and too repellent to be integrated into the normal narra
tive of history (Friendlander 1993: 2) has established memory as the
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belated response to the great trauma of modernity (Klein 2000: 140), while
speaking the unspeakable (as the subtitle of Leak and Paizis 1999 book
expresses it) has become a source of insights into the Shoah (the Hebrew
name for the Holocaust).
The rediscovery of Holocaust memories is therefore seen not so much as a
question of the return of the repressed but rather as being indicative of the
crisis of western modernity. Historians interest in the Holocaust is viewed
as a result of the fact that our epoch has been uniquely structured by
trauma (Klein 2000: 138). It was Adornos remark that in the concentra
tion camps it was no longer the individual who died, but the specimen
(1973: 362) that transformed the Holocaust into a metaphor for the end of
modernity. For Lyotard (1988), Auschwitz also symbolizes the end of uni
versalism, the beginning of small narratives and the end of the Enlighten
ment idea of progress. Lyotard argues that the Shoah signies the end of
history, as it demands that the distinctions between history and memory
be overcome in order to narrate what cannot be presented within the
traditional historical perspective. In other words, the Holocaust requires
historians to be both a scientist and an artist at one and the same time
(Vidal-Naquet 1992: 208). With witnesses faith in the adequacy of lan
guage and the reliability of memory eroded, the issue of how to explore the
Holocaust, the founding moment in the contemporary crisis of testimony,
becomes central to academic work.
The recovery of Holocaust memories has also had a massive impact on
historiography, the humanities and social sciences because it has introduced
these disciplines to the psychoanalytical approach and its effort to confront
and work through the memories of catastrophe and trauma. Researchers
exploring memories of trauma, by adopting Freudian methods, study the
testimony of survivors of Nazi atrocities for whom the past is not a problem
of working back but working through. They try to answer questions about
the degree to which deep memories can be recovered, and how the past can
be represented in a way that the truth of its deep memory will not be
forgotten for posterity (Hutton 1993: 712). As academics realize that a
history of the Nazi crime which did not integrate memory or rather, diverse
memories and which failed to account for the transformation of memories
would be a poor history indeed (Vidial-Naquet 1992: xxiii), testimonies
of survivors enter into history narratives. The appreciation of testimonies of
traumatic memories as a valuable resource has not only undermined
the distinction between truth and the oral testimony but has also stressed the
urgency of the task because, as a prisoner of Buchenwald says, One day
soon, no one will any longer have the real memory of that smell . . . the smell
of the crematorium: at, sickening . . . the smell of burnt esh (Semprun
quoted in Gordon 1999: 140,134). When there are no longer survivors left
to testify, when memories are no longer guaranteed and anchored by a body
that lived through the Holocaust, a body that is marked by it with a
144
tattooed number being the most literal evidence of this it must be asked
How does one remember? (Wiesel quoted in Landsberg 1997: 64). Without
the sensory and mechanical memories which haunt the survivors, the trans
mission of the Holocaust memory becomes problematic as we cannot really
understand and explore its atrocity.
The issue, however, is not to recall and reconstruct feelings but to give
evidence to truth in order to preserve the moral order: The moral order
requires memory and memory in turn demands certain narrative forms
(Kugelmass 1996: 195). Therefore, the enormity of the Holocaust cannot be
forgotten and the forms in which it is given expression are important histor
ical phenomena in their own right. The dominant rhetoric of Primo Levis
testimonial writing supports this argument. His phrase the duty to remem
ber means that remembering the Holocaust is an ethico-political problem
because it has to do with the construction of the future: the duty to remem
ber consists not only in having a deep concern for the past but in transmit
ting the meaning of the past events to the next generation (Ricouer 1999: 9).
The duty to remember is a duty to keep alive the memory of suffering by the
persistent pursuit of an ethical response to the Holocaust experience. Levi, a
prisoner of Auschwitz, tries to understand not only what we are prepared to
admit to our imaginations, but also that which we cannot erase from them
(Gordon 1999: 133). In other words, the ethical dimension of his work
is more important than the historical one, as the involuntary memory of
the prisoner and the survivor blurs the boundary between the past and the
present, the subconscious and the conscious. The moral duty to remember
and to assign to the memory of the Holocaust an ethical value underlines
Levis turn from memories as historical testimony to memories as an ethics
of testimony. Yet after this ethical turn, after the loss of testimonial, Levi
reinvents the historical consciousness of the Holocaust because he under
stands the importance of clear distinctions between truth and falsehood, as
he knows that there can be no good use of memory if there are no truth
claims. So, in this sense history returns as itself prone to trauma and loss, to
fading along with memory (Gordon 1999: 140).
With the memory of traumas and catastrophes now constituting a major
eld of intellectual inquiry, debates about the past in the public sphere are
currently dominated by discussions of the meaning of traumatic events
(Gray and Oliver 2001: 10). Studies of disruptive events, such as Neals
(1998) investigation of wars, depressions and political assassinations in
National Traumas and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American
Century, demonstrate how traumas become a part of the national narrative,
as well as their importance in restoring a sense of moral community. The
memory of the destruction of European Jewry, as a particularly compelling
example of a more general point about history and memory, also calls into
question the validity of memory and its use as testimony in relation to the
judicial process as well as the desirability of retrospective punishment.
Today, with many newly democratized societies trying to solve their past
traumas by quasi-legal procedures, studying the memory of trauma has
gained a new signicance and has become an important focus of research
about collective memory. Hence, the issues of retrospective justice and the
problems connected with attempts to dispose of painful memories will be
our next topic.
146
keeps alive the memory of suffering over against the general tendency of
history to celebrate victors (1999: 9).
While for Ricoeur both memory and forgetting contribute in their respect
ive ways to the continuation of societies, for liberals, from Hobbes to Rawls,
social amnesia has been the foundation of society as it allows it to start
afresh without inherited resentments. To accomplish political and legal
equality, through contract or convenant, the individual has to forget past
injustices and the social categories that were the marks of inequality (Wolin
1989: 38). This trade-off is rejected by Habermas (1997), who is aware of
the limits to what an ethics of forgetting can achieve and emphasizes a
communtys responsibility for a shared history and its moral accountability
for its past. While liberalism is relatively uninterested in the link between
memory and justice, Habermas (1997) emphasizes the responsibility for a
shared history, although within the limits of the past of the constitutional
order. According to him, we must accept the presence of the past as a
burden on moral accountability; the Holocaust must never be forgotten or
normalized.
The main reason for the recent increase in awareness of, and attempts to
deal with, past wrongdoings is connected with the changed experiences of
modern societies. Following Meads argument that no society would go to
the trouble of reconstructing its past had not some signicant problems
disrupted its normal patterns of living (see Chapter 5), it can be argued that
todays interest in retrospective justice is a result of the new challenges faced
by modern nations. We assume that it is healthier for a society to remember
its collective wrongs because on the one hand we are not afraid that national
unity is threatened by the experience of injustice recollected, and on the
other hand due to the processes of globalization (particularly the globaliza
tion of the language of human rights) and democratization (including the
democratization of history) every group of people strives to rehabilitate
its past as a part of, and an afrmation of, its identity (Misztal 2001;
Nora 2001). The growing importance of many nations attempts to address
their respective past wrongdoings is, thus on the one hand a result of a
global spread of the language of human rights and on the other a conse
quence of the growing valorization of memory as the essential element of
collective identity. In other words, the growing recognition that nations
need to undertake the difcult task of working through their past path
ologies is seen as an indispensable element of peaceful coexistence in the
interconnected world.
The last decade of the twentieth century provided us with much evidence
of attempts to address past injustices and, by the same token, to improve
mutual understanding and relations between countries. There have also
been numerous efforts at retroactive justice, which deals with the issues of
how and why democratic regimes settle wrongs that were committed during
an authoritarian era by the state and its agents (Elster 1998). We have
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were more involved than others in the process of denial of their war past
experience constant reinterpretation of their historical past.
After World War II, the Holocaust was a source of taboo and prohibition
in West and East Germany. However, while East Germany marginalized
Jewish suffering, and therefore rejected the relationship between memory
and justice, West German political culture was constrained by shifts in the
dominant interpretations of the Nazi era (Olick and Levy 1997). In the early
postwar period West German democracy did not foster either memory
and justice or democracy (Herf 1997: 79), yet in the following years
the inherent tension between memory and justice on the one hand and
democracy on the other was one of the central themes of the countrys
postwar history. The initial period in which the government was reluctant
to embrace the example of Allied tribunals at Nuremberg, the courts were
slow to prosecute Nazi war criminals, the process of de-Nazication was
undermined and important public positions were taken by former National
Socialist ofcials was characterized by social amnesia and a weakening of
memory. The policy and practice of the rst West German chancellor was
based on the assumption that for the transition of West Germany to a stable
democracy it was a political necessity to adopt silence about the crimes of
the past: Memory and justice might produce, it was argued, a right-wing
revolt that would undermine a still fragile democracy (Herf 1997: 7).
However, even during the initial period of reconstruction not everybody
accepted this strategy. Despite the dominant practice of the defusing the
past (Habermas 1996: 45) and putting the past behind, there were calls for
recall and reection on the Nazi past. The political impact of such leaders as
Heuss (who used his presidency to increase Germans awareness of Nazi
crimes and to criticize the delay and denial of justice) and Brandt (who fell to
his knees before the Warsaw Ghetto memorial during a visit in the 1970s)
slowly helped to establish more space for discussion and a new understand
ing that a policy of memory and justice does not have to lead to conict
(Herf 1997: 79).
The Holocaust received more attention in the 1970s (for instance, the
screening of the television series Holocaust sparked the rst public discus
sion of the past), and in the 1980s. Yet, generally it can be said that the Cold
War era brought more democracy at a price of less justice and self-serving
feeble memory (Herf 1997: 400). The period was, moreover, not free from
attempts to rewrite history. The most famous was an episode in 1985, when
Chancellor Kohl invited President Regan to participate in a wreath-laying
ceremony at a German military cemetery at Bitburg in a spirit of reconcili
ation. Regans gesture, understood commonly as an attempt to suggest that
the fallen German soldiers and the murdered Jews were both victims of
Nazi oppression (Hartman 1986: 6) was widely criticized as an attempt to
consolidate the move away from any destabilizing effort to achieve mastery
of the past (Habermas 1996: 44). It also had unintended consequences as it
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less by default (Elster 1998: 18). Polands long and protracted history of
legislative attempts to introduce lustration law started with the rst Polish
postcommunist government trying to let bygones be bygones in the name
of reconciliation and transformation. This forward-looking approach, aim
ing to smooth and stabilize the transformation process (Los 1995; Misztal
1999), very quickly attracted criticism for preserving intact the identity of
the former communists. Ten years later, in 1999, due to continuous calls to
address the past, Poland passed a lustration law which imposed a forced
compromise, the importance of which was reduced by conicts over pre
vious misred lustration bills. A decade-long controversy over how to
address the communist past, which convinced Poles that the way justice is
dened and the decision of whose vision of the past is adopted depends
wholly on who holds political power, illustrates that justice is more polit
ical in transitional situations than under normal circumstances (Elster
1989: 16).
Studies of the many fragile democracies in Latin America examine how
post-authoritarian societies cope with the legal, moral and practical difcul
ties connected with the choice between truth and justice, forgiving and
forgetting (Weschler 1990; Huntington 1991; Huyse 1995; Kritz 1995; Linz
and Stepan 1997; Osiel 1997). Although they show that securing justice
for past wrongdoings has always been an extremely awed exercise, these
investigations argue that by allowing victims to tell their stories and
by undermining the previous ofcial version of history such approaches
are necessary and justied. As all post-liberated or post-authoritarian
societies, despite the pain and the cost induced, continue to search for
truth, it becomes clear that a new institutional order cannot avoid confront
ing peoples long memories and desire for justice. Countries as diverse as
Chile, Argentina and Honduras have found ways to hold former ofcials
accountable for offences.
Of all the new democracies that struggled with the issue of retrospective
justice in the 1990s, the operations of the South Africa Truth and Recon
ciliation Commission (TRC), which between 19948 investigated gross
violations of human rights, seem to be the most comprehensive attempt at
confronting the past and coming to terms with it (Nuttall and Coetzee
1998). The people responsible for the TRCs success understood the import
ance of justice and truth, and knew that the policy of trading justice for truth
entails a moral sacrice (Gutmann 1999; Jeffery 1999; Johnson 1999).
The TRC may not have managed to ensure total justice, but as Richard
Goldstone, a South African constitutional court judge, remarked making
public the truth is itself a form of justice (quoted in Ash 1997: 20). All
the truth commissions that were set up around the world to investigate
certain aspects of human rights violations under authoritarian rule (see e.g.
Ensalaco 1994; Hayner 1994; Huyse 1995; Wilson 2000), tried to revitalize
citizens respect for the rule of law and promote a new culture of human
STUDYING MEMORY
153
154
Further reading
Adorno, T.W. (1986) What does coming to terms with the past mean?, trans. T. Bahti
and G. Hartman, in G. Hartman (ed.) Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective,
pp. 11429. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
Ashplant, T.G., Dawson, G. and Roper, M. (2000) The politics of war memory and
commemoration: contexts, structures and dynamics, in T.G. Ashplant, G. Dawson
and M. Roper (eds) The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, pp. 187.
London: Routledge.
Booth, W.J. (1999) Communities of memory: on identity, memory, and debt,
American Political Science Review, 93(2): 24968.
Gillis, J.R. (1994) Introduction: memory and identity, in J.R. Gillis (ed.)
Commemorations. The Politics of National Identity, pp. 326. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Elster, J. (1998) Coming to terms with the past, European Journal of Sociology,
XXXIX(1): 748.
Winter, J. and Sivan, E. (eds) (1999) War and Remembrance in the Twentieth
Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
G L O S S A RY
GLOSSARY 159
therefore creates and sustains sets of beliefs and ideas that claim objectivity
and thus inveigle subordinate classes and minority groups into accepting their
disadvantaged condition.
embodied: refers to the signicance of bodies in conferring identities based on age,
physical characteristics, sex and skin colour.
ashbulb memories: memories that are distinctly vivid, precise, concrete, long-lasting
recollections of the personal circumstances surrounding peoples experience of
unusual events.
frame: an element out of which denitions of situations are built up. Framing was
Goffmans (1974) notion to describe our ways of organizing experiences into
meaningful activities, and ensures the clarity and simplicity of the denition of a
situation.
generation: a cohort of people who are more or less the same age and who, by virtue
of undergoing similar experiences, perceive historical events from more or less a
similar perspective.
generational memory: the memory shared by people born at about the same time
who have grown up in the same historical period, which shapes their views.
habit-memory: memory that allows us to recall the signs and skills we use in everyday
life as well as to reproduce routine activities and ritual performances.
habitus: the system of durable thoughts, behaviours and tastes produced by objective
structures and conditions but which are also capable of producing and repro
ducing those structures (Bourdieu 1977: 72). Habitus organizes the way in which
individuals see the world and act in it.
hegemony: the all-embracing cultural and social dominance of a ruling group that
legitimates its leadership by creating and sustaining an ideology presenting its
dominance as fair and in the best interests of society as a whole.
hermeneutic: a theory of interpretation and understanding of texts and works of art
that studies the problem of how to give meaning to cultural products.
heritage industry: the marketing of the past, closely connected with peoples need
for a sense of the past, belonging and identity as well for entertainment; associ
ated with the development of forms of tourism that promote historic places,
such as old towns, villages and museums, and with preserving or re-enacting the
past.
historiography: the art of writing history and the study of historical writings. To
study historiography is to study the methodological questions formulated in
historical accounts of the past.
identity: a relatively stable set of perceptions by which we dene ourselves and which
allow us to project ourselves into the future.
ideology: a coherent set of ideas and beliefs that shapes a groups view of the world,
and which provides the basis for the justication of that groups social status and
political action.
invented traditions: traditions, which, in according to the presentist approach, were
manipulated by the dominant sectors of society through public commemorations,
education systems, mass media, ofcial records and chronologies. Traditions are
invented in the sense of being deliberately designed and produced with a view
to creating new political realities, dening nations and sustaining national
communities (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).
keying: refers to Goffmans (1974) concept of the key the set of conventions by
160
GLOSSARY 161
lective life and therefore underline the importance of inquiry into the manner in
which whatever passes as natural reality is in fact socially constructed.
sociology of memory: a study of the content and social formation of collective
memory by way of exploring its conditions and factors, (e.g. language, rituals,
physical objects) that make remembering in common possible. Based on the
argument that memory is intersubjectively constituted, the sociology of memory is
interested in the ways in which social and cultural dimensions are woven together
to create collectively signicant representations of the past (Funkestein 1993;
Schudson 1997; Zerubavel 1997; Prager 1998; Sherman 1999).
totalitarianism: an undemocratic political system in which power is concentrated in
the hands of a dictator and in which the dominance of one ideology, the role of a
secret police and lack of freedom of the mass media ensure the subordination of
the masses.
tradition: a set of long-established social practices or beliefs that are handed down
from one generation to the next.
trauma: initially referring to the physical effects of accidents, trauma came to be
associated with an unforgettable shock causing a deep psychological wound.
traumatic memory: memory that has its origin in some terrible experience and
which is particularly vivid, intrusive, uncontrollable, persistent and somatic.
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180
INDEX
Africa
African-Americans
Albertus Magnus, 3, 32
amnesia
structural, 30
analogies of memory, 3
ancient Greece
appropriated memories, 76
345
Augustine, St, 32
144
Australia
910, 789, 87
1415
Bacon, Francis, 38
35
182
Bodnar, J., 67
Bouchard, D.F., 65
research, 76
Britain
formation, 137
change
memory and the process of, 1567
see also technological change
Chernobyl memory, 136
China, 18
Ages, 334
cinematography, 43
1617
civic anniversaries, 2
cognitive psychology
Cold War, 2
conceptualization of, 4
contested, 1205
dening, 7
approach, 678
506
colonialism
decolonisation, 107
4, 6, 8, 12632
in Britain, 39
commemorative symbols, 4
communist countries
communities), 1519
467
1214
creative writing, 34
INDEX
cultural memory, 2, 1213, 62, 1302
memory approach, 74
Darwin, Charles, 41
Dean, John, 79
DeCook, P.A., 79
democracy
156
Deutsch, Karl, 14
DiMaggio, P., 3
Draaisma, D., 3
Durkheim, E., 4, 7
approach, 69, 73
memory, 501, 54
approach, 56
94
on time, 112
183
electronic diaries, 3
778, 98
emblems of remembrance, 3
generational memory, 88
and history, 99
encyclopaedias, 378
143
90
explanatory pluralism, 2
Eyerman, R., 89
forgetting, 156
identities, 1718
Foucault, M.
64
184
France
justice, 1489
106
Funkenstein, A., 5
futurists, 445
Gandhi, M., 58
Gellner, E., 60
90
Germany
1501
Giddens, A., 5, 93
globalization
Goffman, E.
group memories, 47
tradition in, 98
8890, 98
153
128
on generational memory, 84
104, 105
506, 77
Hamlet (Shakespeare), 3
Harper, S., 63
Herodotus, 100
of Memory, 94
356
and literacy, 24
1001
INDEX
and retrospective justice, 153
116
Hobsbawm, E., 58
139
Auschwitz, 1212
memory, 16
human rights
1329, 1556
1389
generational memory, 88
52, 55
104
1367
ideology
185
memories, 11819
India, 58
individual memories
51, 525
tradition in, 98
studies, 78
internet, 3, 48
1011
approach, 678, 73
16
186
Judaism
keying, 967, 98
language, 3
memories, 81
152
201
Holocaust, 1223
literacy
manuscript, 323
and oral traditions of memory,
234
literature, and imagination and memory,
11517
Matsuda, M.K., 44
media
melancholia, 141
memory aids, 3, 7
memory distortions, 76
12632
metaphors of memory, 3
Milosz, C., 9
mind-body distinction, 80
INDEX
modernity
and tradition, 91
monuments, 127
in Britain, 3940
memory approach, 70
1718
memory and, 52
106
state, 389, 41
post-colonial, 68
Neisser, U., 79
change
Nixon, Richard, 79
187
Nussbaum, M.C., 2
2730
Memory, 64
the past
approach, 6774
1078
and the intersubjectivist approach to
memory, 6, 1112
and literacy, 24
and Romanticism, 41
Pearson, R., 63
910, 789, 87
11516
188
Poland
Auschwitz, 1212
partition of, 16
politicization of memory, 47
1512
power
667
and tradition, 92
778
procedural memory, 9, 75
111
psychoanalysis, 44
religion
memory as a surrogate, 47
4, 45, 111
Renan, Ernst, 17
memory, 31, 32
Romantic movement, 41
Rubin, D.C., 79
Russia
post-communist, 1512
Schuman, H., 86
science
35
Scott, J., 86
shared memory, 83
Simonides of Ceos, 31
INDEX
social class
sociology
and tradition, 91
Socrates, 301
Soviet Union
Spielberg, Steven, 48
5661
structural amnesia, 30
subjectivity
memory
technological change
423
Terdiman, R., 1
testimony
11920
189
Thucydides, 116
Tibet, 18
over, 79
115
tradition, 918
(presentist approach)
tradition-building, and collective
memory, 45
trauma memories, 8, 68, 80, 13945
Turner, B., 89
190
1234
memories of Lincoln, 62
139
121, 130
utopianism, 91
Century, 129
Weber, M., 4, 44
128, 131
World War II
72
Group, 63
150
and Yugoslavia, 20