Limbona vs. COMELEC
Limbona vs. COMELEC
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*ENBANC.
392
392
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections
establisheditremainsuntilanewoneisacquired;andthird,aman
canhavebutonedomicileatatime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Choice; Change of
Domicile; Requisites.In order to acquire a domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. A persons domicile once established is
consideredto
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the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarityofthefamily.(Emphasisours)Consideringthatpetitioner
failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her
husband,andasthereisnoevidencetoproveotherwise,relianceon
these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance
withhumanexperience.
Same; Local Government Code; Succession to Office; Where
there is a permanent vacancy arising from the failure of a mayor to
qualify or arising from her removal from office, the ViceMayor
shall
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections
Meanwhile,theFirstDivisionofComelecissuedonMay
24, 2007 a Resolution7 in SPA No. 07188 granting the
petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from
runningasmunicipalmayorofPantar,LanaodelNortefor
failingtosatisfytheoneyearresidencyrequirementandfor
notbeingaregisteredvoterofthesaidplace,thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Respondent Mohammad Exchan G. Limbona is
TheMay24,2007Resolutionbecamefinalandexecutory
onJune2,2007.8
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7Annex1ofComment.PerCommissionersResurreccionZ.Borra
andRomeoA.Brawner.
8 Per Order of the COMELEC En Banc dated July 19, 2007. See
Annex2totheComment.
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candidateandaccordinglytookheroathandassumedoffice.
However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of
ComelecinSPANo.07611disqualifiedNorlainieonthree
grounds: lack of the oneyear residency requirement; not
beingaregisteredvoterofthemunicipality;and,nullityof
hercertificateofcandidacyforhavingbeenfiledataplace
otherthantheOfficeoftheElectionOfficer.
NorlainiefiledanOmnibusMotiontodeclarethepetition
inSPANo.07611mootand/orforreconsideration,arguing
thattheComelecen banc had approved the withdrawal of
her
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9Rollo,pp.152154.
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398
SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections
firstcertificateofcandidacyandhadgivenduecoursetoher
new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for
Mohammad.Malikopposedtheomnibusmotion.
Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No.
07621,promulgatedonNovember23,2007aResolution10
disqualifying Norlainie from running as mayor of Pantar,
LanaodelNorte.Itheldthus:
Asregardstheresidencyrequirement,Weruleforpetitioner.
Asborneoutfromtherecord,respondentsdomicileoforiginwas
inMaguing,LanaodelNorte,whichisherplaceofbirth.Whenshe
got married, she became a resident of Marawi City, specifically, in
Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as Barangay
ChairmanuntilNovember2006.Thisisherdomicilebyoperationof
law pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the case of
Larrazabal v. Comelec,(G.R. No. 100739, September 3, 1991).
What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she
has changed her aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao
delNorte.xxx
Inthepresentcase,theevidenceadducedbyrespondent,which
consists merely of selfserving affidavits cannot persuade Us that
shehasabandonedherdomicileoforiginorherdomicileinMarawi
City. It is alleged that respondent has been staying, sleeping and
doing business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower
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399
OnJanuary9,2008,theComelecen bancinSPANo.07
611deniedNorlainiesmotionforreconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the
petition in SPA No. 07611 despite the approval of
petitionerswithdrawalofcertificateofcandidacy.12
On January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a
temporaryrestrainingordereffectiveimmediatelyenjoining
respondentsfromenforcingandimplementingtheComelec
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for
mayorinPantar,LanaodelNorte.13
Thepetitionlacksmerit.
The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarilyrenderthecertificatevoidab initio. Once filed,
thepermanentlegaleffectsproducedtherebyremainevenif
the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.14 Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P.
Blg.881,asamended)provides:
Sec.73.Certificate of candidacy.No person shall be
eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person
who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the
election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office
concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall
beeligibleformorethanoneofficetobefilledinthesameelection,
and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office,
he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expirationoftheperiodforthefilingofcertificateofcandidacy,the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may
declareunderoaththeofficeforwhichhedesirestobeeligibleand
cancelthecertificateofcandidacyfortheotherofficeoroffices.The
filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil,
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12Rollo,p.5.
13Id.,atp.211.
14Monroy v. Court of Appeals,127Phil.1,6;20SCRA620,625(1967).
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections
Thus,whenpetitionerfiledhercertificateofcandidacyon
March 29, 2007, such act produced legal effects, and the
withdrawal of the same, despite the approval of the
Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal
proceedingsithadsetinmotion.Assuch,theComelecdid
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the
meritsofthepetitiondespitethewithdrawalofpetitioners
certificate of candidacy. The Comelec correctly held that a
case only becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversybetweenthepartiesornousefulpurposecanbe
served in passing upon the merits.15 In the instant case,
although petitioner withdrew her first certificate of
candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband
required that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate. The second filing of a certificate of
candidacy thus once again put her qualifications in issue.
Hence,arulinguponthesameisnecessary.
The fact that petitioners certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate was given due course by the Comelec
didnotbartheComelecfromdecidingonherqualifications
to run as municipal mayor. As correctly found by the
Comelec:
Saidresolution(ComelecResolutionNo.8255)disclosesonlythe
following: a) movant is given the green lights to be the substitute
candidateforherhusbandwhowasdisqualified;b)hercertificateof
candidacywasdulyaccomplishedinformandsubstanceandc)the
certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the voters.
Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed upon by the
Commissioninthesaidresolution.
Movant may have been given the impression that the
Commissionsactofgivingduecoursetohersubstitutecertificateof
candidacyconstitutesapronouncementthatsheisnotdisqualified.
It must be pointed out, however, that the bases for giving due
courseto
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15Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,G.R.No.132986,May19,2004,428
SCRA472,477.
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401
Assuch,theComelecdidnoterrwhenitcontinuedwith
thetrialandhearingofthepetitionfordisqualification.
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to
satisfy the oneyear residency requirement. The term
residenceasusedintheelectionlawissynonymouswith
domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixedplacebutalsopersonalpresenceinthatplace,coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.18 The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditionsandneedsofacommunityandnotidentifiedwith
thelatter,fromanelectiveofficetoservethatcommunity.19
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16Rollo,p.41.
17 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 568; 257
SCRA727,765(1996).
18Gallego v. Verra,73Phil.453,456(1941).
19Id.,atp.458.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections
Forpurposesofelectionlaw,thequestionofresidenceis
mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by
whichtodeterminewhereapersonactuallyresides.20Three
rulesare,however,wellestablished:first,thatamanmust
havearesidenceordomicilesomewhere;second,thatwhere
onceestablisheditremainsuntilanewoneisacquired;and
third,amancanhavebutonedomicileatatime.21
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must
concur(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile.22 A persons domicile once
establishedisconsideredtocontinueandwillnotbedeemed
lostuntilanewoneisestablished.23
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
placeofresidenceandestablishinganewone,anddefinite
acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi.Thepurposetoremaininoratthe
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residenceattheplacechosenforthenewdomicilemustbe
actual.24
Petitioners claim that she has been physically present
andactuallyresidinginPantarforalmost20monthsprior
to the elections,25 is selfserving and unsubstantiated. As
correctlyobservedbytheComelec:
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20 Alcantara v. Secretary of Interior,61Phil.459,465(1935).
21Id.
22Gallego v. Verra, supra.
23Domino v. Commission on Elections,369Phil.798,819;310SCRA
546,568(1999).
24Id.
25Rollo,p.18.
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SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections
ForpurposesofthisChapter,apermanentvacancyariseswhen
an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
dischargethefunctionsofhisoffice.
xxxx(Emphasisours)
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