G.R.No.181097.June25,2008.

NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSIONONELECTIONSandMALIKBOBBYT.
ALINGAN,respondents.
Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; The withdrawal of a
certificate of candidacy does not necessarily render the certificate
void ab initioonce filed, the permanent legal effects produced
thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently
withdrawn.The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the
permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the
certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn. Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881, as
amended) provides: Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy.No
personshallbeeligibleforanyelectivepublicofficeunlesshefilesa
sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A
person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to
the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office
concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall
beeligibleformorethanoneofficetobefilledinthesameelection,
and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office,
he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expirationoftheperiodforthefilingofcertificateofcandidacy,the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may
declareunderoaththeofficeforwhichhedesirestobeeligibleand
cancelthecertificateofcandidacyfortheotherofficeoroffices.The
filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities
which a candidate may have incurred. (Emphasissupplied)
Same; Same; The fact that a persons certificate of candidacy as
a substitute candidate is given due course by the COMELEC does
not bar the COMELEC from deciding on her qualifications to run
as a candidate.Thefactthatpetitionerscertificateofcandidacyas
asubstitutecandidatewasgivenduecoursebytheComelecdidnot
bartheComelecfromdecidingonherqualificationstorunasmu

_______________
*ENBANC.

392

392

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

nicipal mayor. As correctly found by the Comelec: Said resolution

(Comelec Resolution No. 8255) discloses only the following: a)
movant is given the green lights to be the substitute candidate for
her husband who was disqualified; b) her certificate of candidacy
wasdulyaccomplishedinformandsubstanceandc)thecertificate
ofcandidacywillnotcauseconfusionamongthevoters.Clearly,no
issueofdisqualificationwaspasseduponbytheCommissioninthe
said resolution. Movant may have been given the impression that
the Commissions act of giving due course to her substitute
certificateofcandidacyconstitutesapronouncementthatsheisnot
disqualified. It must be pointed out, however, that the bases for
giving due course to a certificate of candidacy are totally different
from those for enunciating that the candidate is not disqualified.
xxx
Same; Same; Residence; Domicile; Words and Phrases; The term
residence as used in the election law is synonymous with
domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention; For purposes of election law, the
question of residence is mainly one of intention.The Comelec
correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the oneyear
residencyrequirement.Thetermresidenceasusedintheelection
lawissynonymouswithdomicile,whichimportsnotonlyintention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a
strangerornewcomer,unacquaintedwiththeconditionsandneeds
of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective
office to serve that community. For purposes of election law, the
question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is no hard
andfastrulebywhichtodeterminewhereapersonactuallyresides.
Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must
have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where once

establisheditremainsuntilanewoneisacquired;andthird,aman
canhavebutonedomicileatatime.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Choice; Change of
Domicile; Requisites.In order to acquire a domicile by choice,
there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. A persons domicile once established is
consideredto
393

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

393

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

continueandwillnotbedeemedlostuntilanewoneisestablished.
Tosuccessfullyeffectachangeofdomicileonemustdemonstratean
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishinganewone,anddefiniteactswhichcorrespondwiththe
purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi
coupledwithanimus non revertendi.Thepurposetoremaininorat
the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
placechosenforthenewdomicilemustbeactual.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Family Code;
Where there is failure to show that a wife maintained a separate
residence from her husband, and where there is no evidence to prove
otherwise, reliance on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code is
proper and is in consonance with human experience.We note the
findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is
Maguing,LanaodelNorte,whichisalsoherplaceofbirth;andthat
herdomicilebyoperationoflaw(byvirtueofmarriage)isRapasun,
Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners
husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar,
Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed
thatthehusbandandwifelivetogetherinonelegalresidence,then
itfollowsthatpetitionereffectedthechangeofherdomicilealsoon
November11,2006.Articles68and69oftheFamilyCodeprovide:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
andsupport.Art.69.The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The
court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if

the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such
exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarityofthefamily.(Emphasisours)Consideringthatpetitioner
failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her
husband,andasthereisnoevidencetoproveotherwise,relianceon
these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance
withhumanexperience.
Same; Local Government Code; Succession to Office; Where
there is a permanent vacancy arising from the failure of a mayor to
qualify or arising from her removal from office, the ViceMayor
shall
393

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

393

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

succeed as mayor, not the second placer in the election.Forfailure
to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified
torunfortheofficeofmayorofPantar,LanaodelNorte.However,
petitionersdisqualificationwouldnotresultinMaliksproclamation
who came in second during the special election. The rules on
succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to wit:
SECTION44.PermanentVacanciesintheOfficesoftheGovernor,
ViceGovernor, Mayor, and ViceMayor.If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the x x x mayor, the x x x vicemayor
concernedshallbecomethexxxmayor.xxxxForpurposesofthis
Chapter,apermanentvacancyariseswhenanelectivelocalofficial
fillsahighervacantoffice,refusestoassumeoffice,fails to qualify
or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanentlyincapacitatedtodischargethefunctionsofhisoffice.x
xxx(Emphasisours)Consideringthedisqualificationofpetitioner
to run as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the proclaimed Vice
Mayorshallthensucceedasmayor.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
Dimnatang T. Saro forpetitioner.
Tingcap T. Mortaba forprivaterespondent.
YNARESSANTIAGO,J.:

This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a

temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction seeks to reverse and nullify the September 4,
2007Resolution1oftheCommissiononElections(Comelec)
in SPA Case No. 07611 disqualifying petitioner to run as
mayor of the municipality of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, as
wellasthe
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3036; penned by Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento and concurred in by Commissioners Florentino
A.Tuason,Jr.andNicodemoT.Ferrer.
395

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

395

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

January 9, 2008 Resolution2 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her
husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and
respondent Malik Bobby T. Alingan (Malik) were
mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during
the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
Mohammad and Norlainie filed their certificates of
candidacywithActingElectionOfficer,AlauyaS.Tago,on
January 22, 2007 and March 29, 2007, respectively; while
MalikfiledhiscertificateofcandidacywiththeOfficeofthe
ElectionOfficeronMarch26,2007.
On April 2, 2007, Malik filed a petition to disqualify
Mohammad for failure to comply with the residency
requirement.ThepetitionwasdocketedasSPANo.07188.
Subsequently, or on April 12, 2007, Malik filed another
petitiontodisqualifyNorlainiealsoonthegroundoflackof
the oneyear residency requirement. The petition was
docketedasSPANo.07611.3
On April 21, 2007, Norlainie filed an Affidavit of
Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy.4 Thereafter, or on
May 2, 2007, she filed before the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor a Motion to Dismiss5 the petition for
disqualification in SPA No. 07611 on the ground that the
petitionhadbecomemootinviewofthewithdrawalofher
certificateofcandidacy.

The Comelec en banc granted the withdrawal of

NorlainiescertificateofcandidacyinResolutionNo.79496
dated May 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
_______________
2Id.,atpp.3943;signedbyActingChairmanResurreccionZ.Borra
and Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner,
Rene V. Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer, and Moslemen T.
Macarambon.
3 Id.,atpp.106115.
4Id.,atp.157.
5Id.,atpp.155156.
6Id.,atpp.198200.
396

396

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to

approve the foregoing recommendations of the Law Department,
as concurred in by Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., as
follows:
1.ToGIVEduecoursetotheAffidavitsofWithdrawalof
CertificatesofCandidacyofthefollowingcandidates:
xxxx
NorlaineM.LimbonaMayorPantar,LanaodelNorte
xxxx
2.To direct the Election Officers concerned to DELETE
the aforementioned names of candidates from the Certified
ListofCandidates.
LettheLawDepartmentimplementthisresolutionwithdispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Meanwhile,theFirstDivisionofComelecissuedonMay
24, 2007 a Resolution7 in SPA No. 07188 granting the
petition filed by Malik and disqualifying Mohammad from
runningasmunicipalmayorofPantar,LanaodelNortefor
failingtosatisfytheoneyearresidencyrequirementandfor
notbeingaregisteredvoterofthesaidplace,thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Respondent Mohammad Exchan G. Limbona is

hereby disqualified. Accordingly, his name is ordered deleted from

the official list of candidates for the position of mayor of the
municipalityofPantar,LanaodelNorte.
SOORDERED.

TheMay24,2007Resolutionbecamefinalandexecutory
onJune2,2007.8
_______________
7Annex1ofComment.PerCommissionersResurreccionZ.Borra
andRomeoA.Brawner.
8 Per Order of the COMELEC En Banc dated July 19, 2007. See
Annex2totheComment.
397

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

397

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of
candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad which
was given due course by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution No. 82559 dated July 23, 2007, the dispositive
portionofwhichstates:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
approve the foregoing recommendations of the Law Department,
asfollows:
1.To GIVE due course to the Certificate of Candidacy
and Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance of Norlainie
LaiExchan Mitmug Limbona as substitute candidate
forMohammad Exchan G. LimbonaforMayor,Pantar,
LanaodelNorte;and
2.To direct the Election Officer of Pantar, Lanao del
Norte to DELETE the name of Mohammad Exchan G.
Limbona from the Certified List of Candidates for Mayor,
Pantar,LanaodelNorteandtoINCLUDE thereinthename
ofNorlainie LaiExchan Mitmug Limbona.
Let the Law Department implement this resolution with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Thus, Malik filed a second petition for disqualification

againstNorlainiedocketedasSPANo.07621.
After the elections, Norlainie emerged as the winning

candidateandaccordinglytookheroathandassumedoffice.
However, on September 4, 2007, the Second Division of
ComelecinSPANo.07611disqualifiedNorlainieonthree
grounds: lack of the oneyear residency requirement; not
beingaregisteredvoterofthemunicipality;and,nullityof
hercertificateofcandidacyforhavingbeenfiledataplace
otherthantheOfficeoftheElectionOfficer.
NorlainiefiledanOmnibusMotiontodeclarethepetition
inSPANo.07611mootand/orforreconsideration,arguing
thattheComelecen banc had approved the withdrawal of
her
_______________
9Rollo,pp.152154.
398

398

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

firstcertificateofcandidacyandhadgivenduecoursetoher
new certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for
Mohammad.Malikopposedtheomnibusmotion.
Meanwhile, the Second Division of Comelec in SPA No.
07621,promulgatedonNovember23,2007aResolution10
disqualifying Norlainie from running as mayor of Pantar,
LanaodelNorte.Itheldthus:
Asregardstheresidencyrequirement,Weruleforpetitioner.
Asborneoutfromtherecord,respondentsdomicileoforiginwas
inMaguing,LanaodelNorte,whichisherplaceofbirth.Whenshe
got married, she became a resident of Marawi City, specifically, in
Barangay Rapasun where her husband served as Barangay
ChairmanuntilNovember2006.Thisisherdomicilebyoperationof
law pursuant to the Family Code as applied in the case of
Larrazabal v. Comelec,(G.R. No. 100739, September 3, 1991).
What respondent now is trying to impress upon Us is that she
has changed her aforesaid domicile and resided in Pantar, Lanao
delNorte.xxx
Inthepresentcase,theevidenceadducedbyrespondent,which
consists merely of selfserving affidavits cannot persuade Us that
shehasabandonedherdomicileoforiginorherdomicileinMarawi
City. It is alleged that respondent has been staying, sleeping and
doing business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower

Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent

evidencethatwouldcorroboratesuchstatement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents
intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The
filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is
not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new
residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07611,
thisCommissionhasevenfoundthatsheisnotaregisteredvoterin
the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate.11
_______________
10Annex4ofComment.
11Annex4Dto4EofComment.
399

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

399

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

OnJanuary9,2008,theComelecen bancinSPANo.07
611deniedNorlainiesmotionforreconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion in proceeding to resolve the
petition in SPA No. 07611 despite the approval of
petitionerswithdrawalofcertificateofcandidacy.12
On January 29, 2008, the Court resolved to issue a
temporaryrestrainingordereffectiveimmediatelyenjoining
respondentsfromenforcingandimplementingtheComelec
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner as a candidate for
mayorinPantar,LanaodelNorte.13
Thepetitionlacksmerit.
The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not
necessarilyrenderthecertificatevoidab initio. Once filed,
thepermanentlegaleffectsproducedtherebyremainevenif
the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn.14 Section
73 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P.
Blg.881,asamended)provides:
Sec.73.Certificate of candidacy.No person shall be
eligible for any elective public office unless he files a sworn
certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. A person
who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the
election, withdraw the same by submitting to the office
concerned a written declaration under oath. No person shall

beeligibleformorethanoneofficetobefilledinthesameelection,
and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office,
he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
expirationoftheperiodforthefilingofcertificateofcandidacy,the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may
declareunderoaththeofficeforwhichhedesirestobeeligibleand
cancelthecertificateofcandidacyfortheotherofficeoroffices.The
filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil,
_______________
12Rollo,p.5.
13Id.,atp.211.
14Monroy v. Court of Appeals,127Phil.1,6;20SCRA620,625(1967).
400

400

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may

have incurred. (Emphasissupplied)

Thus,whenpetitionerfiledhercertificateofcandidacyon
March 29, 2007, such act produced legal effects, and the
withdrawal of the same, despite the approval of the
Comelec, did not bar or render nugatory the legal
proceedingsithadsetinmotion.Assuch,theComelecdid
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it ruled on the
meritsofthepetitiondespitethewithdrawalofpetitioners
certificate of candidacy. The Comelec correctly held that a
case only becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversybetweenthepartiesornousefulpurposecanbe
served in passing upon the merits.15 In the instant case,
although petitioner withdrew her first certificate of
candidacy, the subsequent disqualification of her husband
required that she file a new certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate. The second filing of a certificate of
candidacy thus once again put her qualifications in issue.
Hence,arulinguponthesameisnecessary.
The fact that petitioners certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate was given due course by the Comelec
didnotbartheComelecfromdecidingonherqualifications
to run as municipal mayor. As correctly found by the
Comelec:

Saidresolution(ComelecResolutionNo.8255)disclosesonlythe
following: a) movant is given the green lights to be the substitute
candidateforherhusbandwhowasdisqualified;b)hercertificateof
candidacywasdulyaccomplishedinformandsubstanceandc)the
certificate of candidacy will not cause confusion among the voters.
Clearly, no issue of disqualification was passed upon by the
Commissioninthesaidresolution.
Movant may have been given the impression that the
Commissionsactofgivingduecoursetohersubstitutecertificateof
candidacyconstitutesapronouncementthatsheisnotdisqualified.
It must be pointed out, however, that the bases for giving due
courseto
_______________
15Enrile v. Senate Electoral Tribunal,G.R.No.132986,May19,2004,428
SCRA472,477.
401

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

401

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those for
enunciatingthatthecandidateisnotdisqualified.xxx16

Moreover, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No.

6646) authorizes the Commission (Comelec) to try and
decide petitions for disqualifications even after the
elections,17thus:
SEC.6.Effect of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who
hasbeendeclaredbyfinaljudgmenttobedisqualifiedshallnotbe
votedfor,andthevotescastforhimshallnotbecounted.If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of
the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenevertheevidenceofhisguiltisstrong.(Emphasisours)

Assuch,theComelecdidnoterrwhenitcontinuedwith
thetrialandhearingofthepetitionfordisqualification.
The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to
satisfy the oneyear residency requirement. The term

residenceasusedintheelectionlawissynonymouswith
domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixedplacebutalsopersonalpresenceinthatplace,coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.18 The manifest
intent of the law in fixing a residence qualification is to
exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the
conditionsandneedsofacommunityandnotidentifiedwith
thelatter,fromanelectiveofficetoservethatcommunity.19
_______________
16Rollo,p.41.
17 Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 327 Phil. 521, 568; 257
SCRA727,765(1996).
18Gallego v. Verra,73Phil.453,456(1941).
19Id.,atp.458.
402

402

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

Forpurposesofelectionlaw,thequestionofresidenceis
mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by
whichtodeterminewhereapersonactuallyresides.20Three
rulesare,however,wellestablished:first,thatamanmust
havearesidenceordomicilesomewhere;second,thatwhere
onceestablisheditremainsuntilanewoneisacquired;and
third,amancanhavebutonedomicileatatime.21
In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must
concur(1)residenceorbodilypresenceinthenewlocality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile.22 A persons domicile once
establishedisconsideredtocontinueandwillnotbedeemed
lostuntilanewoneisestablished.23
To successfully effect a change of domicile one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
placeofresidenceandestablishinganewone,anddefinite
acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendi.Thepurposetoremaininoratthe
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residenceattheplacechosenforthenewdomicilemustbe

actual.24
Petitioners claim that she has been physically present
andactuallyresidinginPantarforalmost20monthsprior
to the elections,25 is selfserving and unsubstantiated. As
correctlyobservedbytheComelec:
_______________
20 Alcantara v. Secretary of Interior,61Phil.459,465(1935).
21Id.
22Gallego v. Verra, supra.
23Domino v. Commission on Elections,369Phil.798,819;310SCRA
546,568(1999).
24Id.
25Rollo,p.18.
403

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

403

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

Inthepresentcase,theevidenceadducedbyrespondent,which
consists merely of selfserving affidavits cannot persuade Us that
shehasabandonedherdomicileoforiginorherdomicileinMarawi
City. It is alleged that respondent has been staying, sleeping and
doing business in her house for more than 20 months in Lower
Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent
evidencethatwouldcorroboratesuchstatement.
Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents
intention to stay in Pantar for an indefinite period of time. The
filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is
not sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new
residence. We also take notice of the fact that in SPA No. 07611,
thisCommissionhasevenfoundthatsheisnotaregisteredvoterin
the said municipality warranting her disqualification as a
candidate.26

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners

domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte,27 which is
alsoherplaceofbirth;andthatherdomicilebyoperationof
law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The
Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioners husband,
effectedthechangeofhisdomicileinfavorofPantar,Lanao
delNorteonlyonNovember11,2006.Sinceitispresumed
that the husband and wife live together in one legal

residence,28 then it follows that petitioner effected the

changeofherdomicilealsoonNovember11,2006.Articles
68and69oftheFamilyCodeprovide:
Art.68.The husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutualhelpandsupport.
Art.69.The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The
court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if
the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
_______________
26Annex4EofComment.
27ShouldbeLanaodelSur.
28 Abella v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 100710 & 100739,
September3,1991,201SCRA259,264.
404

404

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such

exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarityofthefamily.(Emphasisours)

Considering that petitioner failed to show that she

maintainedaseparateresidencefromherhusband,andas
there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these
provisionsoftheFamilyCodeisproperandisinconsonance
withhumanexperience.29
Thus, for failure to comply with the residency
requirement,petitionerisdisqualifiedtorunfortheofficeof
mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioners
disqualification would not result in Maliks proclamation
whocameinsecondduringthespecialelection.
The rules on succession under the Local Government
Codeshallapply,towit:
SECTION44.Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, ViceGovernor, Mayor, and ViceMayor.If a permanent
vacancyoccursintheofficeofthexxxmayor,thexxxvicemayor
concernedshallbecomethexxxmayor.
xxxx

ForpurposesofthisChapter,apermanentvacancyariseswhen
an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to
assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
dischargethefunctionsofhisoffice.
xxxx(Emphasisours)

Considering the disqualification of petitioner to run as

mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the proclaimed Vice
Mayorshallthensucceedasmayor.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionforcertiorariisDISMISSED.
The September 4, 2007 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections in SPA Case No. 07611 disqualifying petitioner
Nor
_______________
29Id.,atp.262.
405

VOL.555,JUNE25,2008

405

Limbona vs. Commission on Elections

lainieMitmugLimbonafromrunningforofficeoftheMayor
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.InviewofthepermanentvacancyintheOffice
of the Mayor, the proclaimed ViceMayor shall SUCCEED
as Mayor. The temporary restraining order issued on
January29,2008isorderedLIFTED.
SOORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Carpio, AustriaMartinez,
Corona, CarpioMorales, Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario,
Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, LeonardoDe Castro and Brion,
JJ., concur.
Petition dismissed, Comelec resolutions dated September
4, 2007 and January 9, 2008 affirmed.
Notes.It is immaterial if a candidate personally
receivedthetelegramafterthedateofpromulgationofthe
COMELECsdecisiononapetitionfordisqualificationforas
longasthetelegramwassentanddeliveredbeforethedate
ofpromulgationatthecandidatesresidenceindicatedinhis

Certificate of Candidacy. (Cayat vs. Commission on

Elections,522SCRA23[2007])
Whilethetermresidenceisequatedwithdomicileas
far as election law is concerned, for purposes of venue, the
less technical definition of residence is adoptedit is
under
stood to mean as the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode;
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an
inhabitantinagivenplace,whiledomicilerequiresbodily
presenceinthatplaceandalsoanintentiontomakeitones
domicile.(Ang Kek Chen vs. Calasan,528SCRA124[2007])
o0o

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