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Case Digest
Case Digest
THIRD DIVISION
ADELAIDA MENESES
(deceased), substituted
by her heir MARILYN M.
CARBONEL-GARCIA,
Petitioner,
- versus -
ROSARIO G.
VENTUROZO,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1[1] of the Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 27, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 and its Resolution
dated April 5, 2006, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals Decision reversed and set aside the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No.
D-9040, as the appellate court declared respondent Rosario G. Venturozo the
owner of the land in dispute, and ordered petitioner Adelaida Meneses to
vacate and surrender her possession thereof to respondent.
The facts are as follows:
On July 18, 1991, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 40 (trial court)
rendered a Decision in favor of defendant Adelaida Meneses. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1)
Declaring the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated June 20,
1966 (Exhibit B) and the Deed of Absolute and Definite Sale dated January
31, 1973 (Exhibit A) null and void ab initio;
2)
Declaring the defendant Adelaida Meneses as the owner of the
property in question;
3)
Ordering the plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo to execute a Deed of
Reconveyance in favor of the defendant Adelaida Meneses over the property
in question described in paragraph 2 of the complaint;
4)
Ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant P10,000.00 as
damages; and P1,000.00, as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.7[7]
The trial court found that defendant Adelaida Meneses inherited the
land in dispute from her father, Domingo Meneses; that she did not sell her
property to Basilio de Guzman in 1966; and that the signature of Adelaida
Meneses on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery. The
trial court stated that the signature of Adelaida Meneses, as appearing on
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, is very much different from
her specimen signatures and those appearing in the records of Civil Case No.
1096 in the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan. It held that since there was
no valid transfer of the property by Adelaida Meneses to Basilio de Guzman,
the conveyance of the same property in 1973 by Basilio de Guzman to his
daughter, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, was also invalid. The trial court
stated that the claim of plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, that her parents,
Spouses Basilio and Crescencia de Guzman, purchased from defendant
Adelaida Meneses the subject property in 1966, is negated by defendants
continued possession of the land and she gathered the products therefrom.
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.
7[7] Rollo, pp. 60-61.
Petitioner contends that her statement, made during the course of her
testimony in the trial court, was taken out of context by respondent to be
used merely as an argumentative point. The examining lawyer used the
words, Do you know this signature? viz.:
12[12] Citing Causapin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107432, July 4, 1994, 233 SCRA 615,
624.
13[13] Citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 387 Phil. 736, 746 (2000)..
14[14] Citing Sales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40145, July 29, 1992, 211 SCRA 858, 865.
15[15] Rollo, p. 89.
16[16] Id. at 17.
25[25] Civil Code, Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public document:
(1)
Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification
or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of real property or of an interest
therein are governed by Articles 1403, No. 2 and 1405.
26[26] Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February
10, 2006, 482 SCRA 164, 180.
27[27] Rules of Court, Rule 132.SEC. 19. Classes of documents.For purposes of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
xxxx
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; x x
xx
xxxx
SEC. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
xxxx
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved
and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgement being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument of
document involved.
28[28] Dizon v. Tuazon, G.R. No. 172167, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 487, 494.
29[29] Dela Rama v. Papa, G.R. No. 142309, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 233, 244.
30[30] Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010, 618 SCRA 702, 709.
31[31] Dela Rama v. Papa, supra note 29, at 244-245.
In this case, it should be pointed out that contrary to the finding of the
Court of Appeals, the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did not comply with
the formalities required by law, specifically Act No. 496,32[32] otherwise
known as The Land Registration Act, which took effect on January 1, 1903,
as Section 127 of the Act provides:
FORMS
Section 127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages, leases, releases,
and discharges affecting lands, whether registered under this Act or
unregistered, shall be sufficient in law when made substantially in
accordance with the following forms, and shall be as effective to
convey, encumber, lease, release, discharge, or bind the lands as though
made in accordance with the more prolix form heretofore in use: Provided,
That every such instrument shall be signed by the person or persons
executing the same, in the presence of two witnesses, who shall sign
the instrument as witnesses to the execution thereof, and shall be
acknowledged to be his or their free act and deed by the person or persons
executing the same, before the judge of a court of record or clerk of a
court of record, or a notary public, or a justice of the peace, who
shall certify to such acknowledgment x x x.33[33]
In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, the Notary Public
signed his name as one of the two witnesses to the execution of the said
deed; hence, there was actually only one witness thereto. Moreover, the
residence certificate of petitioner was issued to petitioner and then it was
given to the Notary Public the day after the execution of the deed of sale and
notarization; hence, the number of petitioners residence certificate and the
date of issuance (June 21, 1966) thereof was written on the Deed of
Absolute Sale by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966, after the execution and
notarization of the said deed on June 20, 1966. 34[34] Considering the defect
in the notarization, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 cannot
be considered a public document, but only a private document, 35[35] and the
evidentiary standard of its validity shall be based on preponderance of
evidence.
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that before any
private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the maker.
In regard to the genuineness of petitioners signature appearing on the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966,36[36] the Court agrees with the
trial court that her signature therein is very much different from her
specimen signatures37[37] and those appearing in the pleadings38[38] of
other cases filed against her, even considering the difference of 17 years
when the specimen signatures were made. Hence, the Court rules that
petitioners signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a
forgery.
The Court agrees with petitioner that her admission was taken out of
context, considering that in her Answer39[39] to the Complaint, she stated
that the alleged Deed of Sale purportedly executed by her in favor of Basilio
de Guzman is a forgery; that she never signed the said Deed of Sale; that
she did not appear personally before the Notary Public; and that she did not
secure the residence certificate mentioned in the said Deed of Sale. She also
testified that she never sold her land to Basilio de Guzman; 40[40] that she
never met the Notary Public, Attorney Abelardo Biala,41[41] and that she did
not meet Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966.42[42] The trial court found
petitioner and her testimony to be credible, and declared the Deed of Sale
dated June 20, 1966 null and void ab initio. These circumstances negate the
said admission.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
The totality of the picture leads the Court to agree with the trial court
that the Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The
Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale,
since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23
December 1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August 1994
of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case
No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129416. November 25, 2004]
ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and
the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus
De Francia (De Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and
former Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the same. These
two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the
deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary
Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as their Exhibit No. 8, the
deed of sale (Deed of Sale)[9] purportedly executed by Bustria. The
admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it
was a false and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by
Bustria as his own; and that its existence was suspicious, considering that it
had been previously unknown, and not even presented by the Aquinos when
they opposed Tignos previous Motion for Consignation.[10]
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of
Sale in evidence.[11] A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the admission
of said exhibit was denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994.[12]
Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor
of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the
Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as
conflicting.[13] The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed
of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria;[14]
that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his
counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of
sale[15] or that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his
previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.[16] The RTC then
stressed that the previous Motion for Execution lodged by Tigno had to be
denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the
judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and executory; but the
judgment could be revived by action such as the instant complaint.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the revival of the judgment dated 7 September
1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.[17]
There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter,
as Supreme Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to
perform any act within the competency of a regular notary public provided
that certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of
any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only
when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception applies.[37]
The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge
Carios improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the
Deed of Sale. Even if one was produced, we would be hard put to accept the
veracity of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,
[38] was even then not an isolated backwater town and had its fair share of
practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who
ceased being a judge in 1986, for his improper notarial activity. Perhaps
though, formal sanction may no longer be appropriate considering Judge
Carios advanced age, assuming he is still alive.[39] However, this Decision
should again serve as an affirmation of the rule prohibiting municipal judges
from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise of their official
duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not
having been notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification
necessarily derives from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary
public does not have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so
anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may
strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in
good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the
person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely
officious the elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer
may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule, the notarization of a
document by a duly appointed notary public will have the same legal effect
as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect.
Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public
one, and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.[40] Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary,
it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized to act
as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.[41]
On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was
not notarized? True enough, from a civil law perspective, the absence of
notarization of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil Code requires that
the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real rights over
immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an
accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render
the transaction invalid. Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form
required in Article 1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of the
transaction, but required merely for convenience.[42] We have even
affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned in a public
instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the
parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or
real estate produces legal effects between the parties.[43]
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid
notarization of the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on evidence.
After all, the case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of
Appeals no longer holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a notarized
document. Its proper probative value is governed by the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 states:
Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their
presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except
last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the
enumeration of public documents; hence, it must be considered a private
document. The nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization performed by
Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the document in question from the class
of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was validly
notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it was not
properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the
requirement of proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which states:
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale
would not ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the transaction
it covers. However, since it is the authenticity of the document itself that is
disputed, then the opposing testimonies on that point by the material
witnesses properly raises questions about the due execution of the document
itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia
are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either without
denigrating the competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If
Judge Cario was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale,
then doubt can be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia.
It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of gumption, and perverse
deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under oath and with
particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his presence.
However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of
the notary public, Judge Cario, would be obviously compromised.
Assuming that Judge Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would
indeed be odd that he would not remember having written the document
himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his testimony as to
authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the
reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization
of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to
indubitably establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are important
because they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos,
presented as they were to attest to the due execution and authenticity of the
Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily
disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute
conclusive value to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cario. The
totality of the picture leads us to agree with the trial court that the Deed of
Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in execution. The Court deems as
correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale, since its due
execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to
the non-existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is
sufficient even to rebut the typical presumption of regularity arising from the
due execution of notarial documents. However, for the reasons stated
earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an unnotarized document. And the
lower court had more than sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious
document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed,
Tignos right to repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the filing of
the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC. The
Court of Appeals being in error when it concluded otherwise, the
reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.