Professional Documents
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League of Provinces vs. Denr (FULL TEXT)
League of Provinces vs. Denr (FULL TEXT)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175368
measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees; 18 and exercise
such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare
of the provinces.19
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it
bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to
be valid.20 This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. 21 This Court, however,
may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution,22 leaving no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23
In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify the Small-Scale
Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the
PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes:
(1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small Scale
Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. 24 The
pertinent provisions of law sought to be declared as unconstitutional by petitioner are as follows:
R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of
forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and
other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; x x x 25
R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is hereby created under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the
implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to
review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
this Act.26
Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR Administrative Order No. 9640 (the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did not explicitly confer upon respondents DENR
and the DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, or cancel the permits issued by the
Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the PMRB. The statutes are also silent as
to the power of respondent DENR Secretary to substitute his own judgment over that of the Provincial
Governor and the PMRB.
Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section
24 of R.A. No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are
unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Executive Departments and her alteregos) has the power of supervision only, not control, over acts of the local government units, and grants the
local government units autonomy, thus:
The 1987 Constitution:
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.27
Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited constitutional provision is mirrored in the Local
Government Code, which states:
SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - (a) Consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure that their
acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and
independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities; and
through the city and municipality with respect to barangays. 28
Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991
show that the relationship between the President and the Provinces or respondent DENR, as the alter ego of
the President, and the Province of Bulacan is one of executive supervision, not one of executive control. The
term "control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter, while the term "supervision" is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be
implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.
Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of the Local
Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means no more than seeing to
it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law.34
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2
refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority.35 It does not make local governments sovereign within the State.36
Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national
policies or standards,37 and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local
governments and the allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local
government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress 38 under
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different
local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units."
In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of the Local
Government Code provides:
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR, enforcement of
forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-scale mining law, and
other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects for local purposes; 39
Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to
the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR,
which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources. 40
Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the People's
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,41 which established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be
implemented by the Secretary of the DENR, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared of the State to promote, develop, protect and rationalize
viable small-scale mining activities in order to generate more employment opportunities and provide an
equitable sharing of the nation's wealth and natural resources, giving due regard to existing rights as herein
provided.
xxxx
Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the purpose of carrying out the declared policy provided
in Section 2 hereof, there is hereby established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented
by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, hereinafter called the
Department, in coordination with other concerned government agencies, designed to achieve an orderly,
systematic and rational scheme for the small-scale development and utilization of mineral resources in
certain mineral areas in order to address the social, economic, technical, and environmental problems
connected with small-scale mining activities.
xxxx
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the Board, which shall be the
implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to
review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples
small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and
objectives of this Act.42
DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992, containing the Rules and Regulations to implement R.A.
No. 7076, provides:
SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. The following DENR
officials shall exercise the following supervisory functions in the implementation of the Program:
21.1 DENR Secretrary direct supervision and control over the program and activities
the said permits.49 On August 10, 2005, the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining
Permits to Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz based on the legal opinion of
the Provincial Legal Officer and the Resolutions of the PMRB of Bulacan.
Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR Secretary, appealing from Letter-Resolution No. 051317 and Resolution Nos. 05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all dated August 8, 2005, of the PMRB of Bulacan,
which resolutions gave due course and granted, on August 10, 2005, Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo
D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz involving parcels of mineral land situated at
Camachin, Doa Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan.
The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an administrative body, created under R.A. No. 7076,
which cannot be equated with the court wherein a full-blown hearing could be conducted, but it is enough that
the parties were given the opportunity to present evidence. It asserted that the questioned resolutions it
issued were in accordance with the mining laws and that the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted were
registered ahead of AMTC's Application for Exploration Permit. Further, the Board stated that the Governor of
Bulacan had the power to approve the Small-Scale Mining Permits under R.A. No. 7160.
The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and resolved these pivotal issues: (1) when is the subject
mining area open for mining location by other applicants; and (2) who among the applicants have valid
applications. The pertinent portion of the decision of the DENR Secretary reads:
1wphi1
We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the area is open only to mining location on August 11,
2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the subject Order of
July 16, 2004. The filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the finality of the Order of Denial
issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the Resolution thereof on July 16, 2004.
1wphi1
Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in accordance with the procedures of the PMRB,
however, the AQPs were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area is still closed to mining location.
Consequently, the SSMPs granted by the PMRB and the Governor are null and void making thereby AEP No.
III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it having been filed when the area is already open to other mining applicants.
Records also show that the AQPs were converted into SSMPs. These are two (2) different applications. The
questioned SSMPs were issued in violation of Section 4 of RA 7076 and beyond the authority of the
Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed as "People's
Small-Scale Mining Program." Moreover, iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading Corp. is
declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-B-002-05 of
Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto S. Cruz and SSMP-B005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the said permits are hereby
CANCELLED.50
The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power of
review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in Section 24 of
R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. 52 It is noted that although AMTC
filed a protest with the PMRB regarding its superior and prior Application for Exploration Permit over the
Applications for Quarry Permit, which were converted to Small-Scale Mining Permits, the PMRB did not
resolve the same, but issued Resolution Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on August 8, 2005, resolving to submit to the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado,
Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting of the said permits. After the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits on August 10, 2005, AMTC appealed the
Resolutions of the PMRB giving due course to the granting of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor.
Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of AMTC
was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No.
7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's power to review and, therefore,
decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-judicial function, which involves the
determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective
rights.53 The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting
claims. This quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of
judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of
the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the
law.
In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of R.A.
No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by Beltran v. The Secretary of Health, 54 which held:
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a
statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear
and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. 55
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section
17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the
constitutionality of the said provisions of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
10
11
12
13
14
Rollo, p. 53.
15
16
Id. at 8-9.
17
18
19
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
47, 62; 503 Phil. 43, 53 (2005).
20
21
22
23
Id.; id.
25
Emphasis supplied.
26
Emphasis supplied.
27
Emphasis supplied.
28
Emphasis supplied.
Citing National Liga Ng Mga Barangay v. Paredes, G.R. Nos. 130775 and 131939,
September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 130; 482 Phil. 331 (2004).
29
Citing Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154; 343 Phil. 670
(1997).
30
The Constitution, Article XII, Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for
not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by
law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
31
xxxx
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. (Emphases supplied.)
32
33
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary, Vol. II,
1988, p. 379, citing III RECORD 451-452.
34
Cordillera Board Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990, 181
SCRA 495.
35
Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991,
197 SCRA 52.
36
37
Jose N. Nolledo, The Local Government Code of 1991 Annotated, 2004 edition, p. 10.
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.., The Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary, Vol. II,
1988, supra note 34, at 377.
38
39
Emphases supplied.
The Administrative Code of 1987, Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Chapter
1, Section 2 (2).
40
41
R.A. No. 7076 was approved on June 27, 1991 and took effect on July 19, 1991.
42
Emphases supplied.
43
Emphases supplied.
DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, SEC. 123. General Provisions. Small-scale
mining applications shall be filed with, processed and evaluated by the Provincial/City Mining
Regulatory Board concerned and the corresponding permits to be issued by the
Provincial/City Mayor concerned except small-scale mining applications within the mineral
reservations which shall be filed, processed and evaluated by the Bureau and the
corresponding permit to be issued by the Director.
44
x x x The implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7076, insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of these implementing rules and regulations, shall
continue to govern small-scale mining operations. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 23. Composition of the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Board shall be
composed of the following:
45
47
48
49
50
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. There is hereby created under the
direct supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board,
herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall
exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
51
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a peoples
small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining area; and x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board created under R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject
to review by the Secretary:
52
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90)
days upon filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may
appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final
resolution otherwise the same is considered final and executory; x x x
53
Doran v. Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 151344, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 106.
54
GR. Nos. 133640, 133661, and 139147, November 25,2005,476 SCRA 168.
55
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
I concur in the result. However, there appears to be a need to address the issue of whether petitioner League
of Provinces of the Philippines has legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the subject laws.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code. It claims that it is composed of 81 local governments,
including the province of Bulacan. It further claims that the instant case is a collective action of all provinces in that, a favorable ruling will not only benefit the province of Bulacan, but also all the other provinces and
local governments.
The ponencia upheld petitioner's legal standing to file this petition because the latter is tasked, under Section
504 of the Local Government Code, to promote local autonomy at the provincial level, adopt measures for the
promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees, and exercise such other powers and
perform such duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.
I concur that the League has legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the subject laws.
A divergent position had been advanced by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen. He says that, "in case of a citizen's
suit, the 'interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He
must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way."1 He further claims that, "As an organization that represents all provinces, it did not suffer an
actual injury or an injury n fact, resulting from the implementation of the subject provisions." 2 He, therefore,
concludes that the League has no standing to assail the constitutionality of the subject laws.
A public action is a suit brought to vindicate a right belonging to the public qua public. Based on present
jurisprudence, except in cases involving issues of transcendental importance, 3 it can only be brought by the
proper representative of the public one who has standing. Generally, the one who has standing is the one
who suffered or immediately stands to suffer actual injury or injury in fact. 4 Injury in fact means damage that is
distinct from those suffered by the public.5 This is different from legal injury or injury in law, which results from
a violation of a right belonging to a person.6
The divergent position appears to confuse the general requirement for standing with standing in citizens
suits. The latter normally presupposes that there is no one who suffered injury in fact. Therefore, any citizen
is allowed to bring the suit to vindicate the publics right. Instructive are the pronouncements of this Court in
the seminal case of Severino v. Governor-General:7
It is true, as we have stated, that the right which he seeks, to enforce is not greater or different from that of
any other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in
case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different from that of the other electors; but he
is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a private right. The real party in interest is the public,
or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same right and would suffer the same
injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with reference to maintaining a petition to determine whether or
not the relief sought by the relator should be granted.
xxx
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule
in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason "that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error."
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent.
The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the
relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the
duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
(Emphasis supplied)
Also, the divergent position appears to confuse public actions with class suits (a species of private action)
when it stated that "[p]rovinces do not have a common or general interest on matters related to mining that
the League of Provinces can represent." Under Section 12 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "common or
general interest" is a requirement in class suits. It is not a requirement for standing in public actions.
Finally, the divergent position also appears to confuse the general requirement for standing and standing in
citizens suits, with organizational or associational standing. The latter does not require an association to
suffer injury in fact. The question is whether such organization can bring a suit on behalf of its members who
have suffered the injury in fact. In short, can the representatives of the public be themselves represented in a
suit.
In this jurisdiction, we have acknowledged the standing of associations to sue on behalf of their members. In
Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals,8 we held that:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses
the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing to file suit for its
workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization has
standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
1wphi1
Thus, based on jurisprudence, the League has legal standing to question the constitutionality of the subject
laws, not only in behalf of the province of Bulacan, but also its other members.
Apart from jurisprudence, the League is also vested with statutory standing. The League of Provinces
primary purpose is clear from the provisions of the Local Government Code, viz:
SEC. 502. Purpose of Organization. - There shall be an organization of all provinces to be known as the
League of Provinces for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision government administration, and securing, through proper and
legal means, solutions thereto. For this purpose, the Metropolitan Manila Area and any metropolitan political
subdivision shall be considered as separate provincial units of the league. (Emphasis supplied)
This purpose is further amplified by the grant to it of certain powers, functions and duties, which are, viz:
SEC. 504. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Provinces. - The league of provinces shall:
(a) Assist the national government in the formulation and implementation of the policies,
programs and projects affecting provinces as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the provincial level;
(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and
employees;
(d) Encourage peoples participation in local government administration in order to promote
united and concerted action for the attainment of countrywide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the national government in creating opportunities for gainful
Footnotes
1
Emphases supplied.
Emphases supplied.
David v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424, 03
May 2006 citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-No.
40004, 31 January 1975, 62 SCRA 275; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250,
09 July 2002, 384 SCRA 152; Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570,
138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, 10 October 2000, 342 SCRA 449; Lim v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, 11 April 2002, 380 SCRA 739.
3
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, 05 May
1994.
5
BPI Express Card Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120639, 25 September 1998.
G.R. No. 131719, 25 May 2004. See also Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, G.R.
No. 115381, 23 December 1994; Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor, G.R. No.
163980, 03 August 2006.
8
10
11
12
13
Article 701.
14
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result.
This is a case of overlapping claims, which involve the application of the Mining Act, and the Small-Scale
Mining Act. It is specific to the facts of this case, which are:
The Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Regional Office No. III (MGB R-Ill) denied Golden Falcon Mineral
Exploration Corporation's (Golden Falcon) application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) on April29, 1998 for failure to secure the required clearances.1
Golden Falcon appealed the denial-with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (Central Office). 2
The appeal was denied only on July 16, 2004 or six years after Golden Falconappealed. 3
On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the Central Office, certain persons filed with the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office "(PENRO) of Bulacan their applications for quarry
permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application.4
On September 13, 2004, after the Central Office denied Golden Falcons appeal, Atlantic Mines and Trading
Corporation (AMTC) filed an application for exploration permit covering the same subject area with the
PENRO of Bulacan.5
Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for quarry
permits. The main question was when did the subject area become open for small scale mining applications.
At that time, the provincial government did not question whether it had concurrent or more superior
jurisdiction vis-a-vis the national government.
It was upon query by MGB R-III Director Arnulfo Cabantog that DENR-MGB Director Horacio Ramos stated
that the denial of Golden Falcons application became final fifteen days after the denial of its appeal to the
Central Office or on August 11, 2004.6 Hence, the area of Golden Falcons application became open to permit
applications only on that date.
After the MGB Director issued the statement, however, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan, Atty. Eugenio
F. Ressureccion issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that the subject area became open for new
applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998. 7
On the basis of the Provincial Legal Officers opinion, Director Cabantog of MGB R-III endorsed the
applications for quarry permit, now converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of
Bulacan.8 Later on, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits.9
Upon appeal by the AMTC, the DENR Secretary declared as null the small-scale mining permits issued by
the Governor on the ground that they have been issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond
the authority of the Governor.10 According to the DENR Secretary, the area was never proclaimed to be under
the small-scale mining program.11 Iron ores also cannot be considered as a quarry resource.12
The question in this case is whether or not the provincial governor had the power to issue the subject permits.
The fact that the application for small-scale mining permit was initially filed as applications for quarry permits
is not contested.
Quarry permits, however, may only be issued "on privately-owned lands and/or public lands for building and
construction materials such as marble, basalt, andesite, conglomerate, tuff, adobe, granite, gabbro,
serpentine, inset filling materials, clay for ceramic tiles and building bricks, pumice, perlite and other similar
materials..."13 It may not be issued on "...resources that contain metals or metallic constituents and/or other
valuable materials in economic quantities."14
Not only do iron ores fall outside the classification of any of the enumerated materials in Section 43 of the
Mining Act, but iron is also a metal. It may not be classified as a quarry resource, hence, the provincial
governor had no authority to issue the quarry permits in the first place. Probably realizing this error, the
applications for quarry permit were converted to applications for small-scale mining permit.
Even so, the issuance of the small-scale mining permit was still beyond the authority of the provincial
governor. Small-scale mining areas must first be declared and set aside as such before they can be made
subject of small-scale mining rights.15 The applications for small-scale mining permit, in this case, involved
covered areas, which were never declared as peoples small-scale mining areas. This is enough reason to
deny an application for small-scale mining permit. Permits issued in disregard of this fact are void for having
been issued beyond the authority of the issuing officer.
Therefore, there was no issue of local autonomy. The provincial governor did not have the competence to
and the provisions on its powers may not be easily amended or superseded by a simple act of the Congress.
Moreover, autonomous regions have powers, e.g. over their administrative organization, sources of
revenues, ancestral domain, natural resources, personal, family and property relations, regional planning
development, economic, social and tourism development, educational policies, cultural heritage and other
matters.25
On the other hand, the creation of territorial and political subdivisions is subject to the local government code
enacted by the Congress without a plebiscite requirement. 26 While this does not disallow the inclusion of
provisions requiring plebiscites in the creation of provinces, cities, and municipalities, the local government
code may be amended or superseded by another legislative act that removes such requirement. Their
government structure, powers, and responsibilities, therefore, are always subject to amendment by legislative
acts.
The territorial and political subdivisions and autonomous regions are granted autonomy under the
Constitution.27 The constitutional distinctions between them imply a clear distinction between the kinds of
autonomy that they exercise.
The oft-cited case of Limbona v. Mangelin28 penned by Justice Sarmiento distinguishes between two types of
autonomy:
autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more
responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
xxx
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X sec. 15.] is
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government)
I agree that autonomy, as phrased in Section 2 of Article X of the Constitution, which pertains to provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, refers only to administrative autonomy.
In granting autonomy, the national government does not totally relinquish its powers. 29 The grant of autonomy
does not make territorial and political subdivisions sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio". 30
The aggrupation of local government units and the creation of regional development councils in Sections 13
and 14 of Article X of the Constitution do not contemplate grant of discretion to create larger units with a
recognized distinct political power that is parallel to the state. It merely facilitates coordination and exchange
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id. at 55-56.
Id. at 56.
10
Id. at 58.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Republic Act. No. 7492, Sec. 43; See also Sec. 3(at). Mining Act.
14
15
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160, 216 (2006) citing Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th
Ed. p. 941 (1991).
16
17
Galicto v. Aquino III, G..R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170.
Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 130, 142, citing
Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987.
18
G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 337 (This case was cited by Justice Mendoza
in his separate opinion in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, et al.
[G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 336 SCRA 81] wherein he referred to actual or
threatened injury as "injury in fact" of an actual or imminent nature. Expounding, he said that
"the 'injury in fact' test requires more than injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
party seeking review be himself among those injured.").
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
See Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 201 for discussion
on the extent of local autonomy.
29
30
Basco, et al., v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
31
CONSTITUTION., Art. X, Sec. 14 provides: "The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional
heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from nongovernmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization
to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social
growth and development of the units in the region."
32