Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Bernas Vs CA
Bernas Vs CA
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Graciano Bernas is before this Court assailing the decision * of the
respondent appellate court dated 19 August 1988 in CA G.R. SP No. 14359 (CAR),
which reversed the decision ** of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18, in
Civil Case No. V-5146 entitled "Natividad Bito-on Deita, et al. vs, Graciano Bernas." As
disclosed by the records and the evidence of both parties, the facts involved in the
controversy are as follows:
Natividad Bito-on Deita is the owner of Lots Nos. 794, 801, 840 and 848 of the
Cadastral Survey of Panay, Capiz, with a total area of 5,831 square meters. Out of
liberality, Natividad entrusted the lots by way of "dugo" to her brother, Benigno Bito-on,
so that he could use the fruits thereof to defray the cost of financing his children's
schooling in Manila. Prior to April 1978, these agricultural lots had been leased by one
Anselmo Billones but following the latter's death and consequent termination of the
lease, petitioner Graciano Bernas took over and worked on the land. Benigno and
Bernas worked out a production-sharing arrangement whereby the first provided for all
the expenses and the second worked the land, and after harvest, the two (2) deducted
said expenses and divided the balance of the harvest between the two of them. The
owner, Natividad, played no part in this arrangement as she was not privy to the same.
In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister Natividad, as all his children had
by then finished their schooling. When Natividad, and her husband sought to take over
possession of the lots, Bernas refused to relinquish, claiming that he was an agricultural
leasehold lessee instituted on the land, by Benigno and, as such, he is entitled to
security of tenure under the law.
Faced with this opposition from Bernas, Natividad filed an action with the Regional Trial
Court for Recovery of Possession, Ownership and Injunction with Damages. After trial,
the court a quo held in favor of the defendant (Bernas) and dismissed the complaint,
ruling that from the record and the evidence presented, notably the testimony of the
plaintiff's own brother Benigno, Bernas was indeed a leasehold tenant under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1199 and an agricultural leasehold lessee under Republic
Act No. 3844, having been so instituted by the usufructuary of the land (Benigno). As
such, according to the trial court, his tenurial rights cannot be disturbed save for causes
provided by law.
Aggrieved, the plaintiff (Natividad) appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the
"dugo" arrangement between her and her brother Benigno was not in the nature of a
usufruct (as held by the court a quo), but actually a contract of commodatum. This being
the case, Benigno, the bailee in the commodatum, could neither lend nor lease the
properties loaned, to a third person, as such relationship (of bailor-bailee) is one of
personal character. This time, her contentions were sustained, with the respondent
appellate court, reversing the trial court's decision, ruling that having only derived his
rights from the usufructuary/bailee, Bernas had no better right to the property than the
latter who admittedly was entrusted with the property only for a limited period. Further,
according to the appellate court, there being no privity of contract between Natividad
and Bernas, the former cannot be expected to be bound by or to honor the relationship
or tie between Benigno and the latter (Bernas).
Hence, this petition by Bernas.
The issue for resolution by the Court is concisely stated by the respondent appellate
court as follows: whether the agricultural leasehold established by Benigno Bito-on in
favor of Graciano Bernas is binding upon the owner of the land, Natividad Bito-on, who
disclaims any knowledge of, or participation in the same.
In ruling for the private respondent (Natividad), the respondent appellate court held that:
Indeed, no evidence has been adduced to clarify the nature of the "dugo"
transaction between plaintiff and her brother Benigno Bito-on. What
seems apparent is that Benigno Bito-on was gratuitously allowed to utilize
the land to help him in financing the schooling of his children. Whether the
transaction is one of usufruct, which right may be leased or alienated, or
one of commodatum, which is purely personal in character, the beneficiary
has the obligation to return the property upon the expiration of the period
stipulated, or accomplishment of the purpose for, which it was constituted
(Art. 612, Art. 1946, Civil Code). Accordingly, it is believed that one who
derives his right from the usufructuary/bailee, cannot refuse to return the
property upon the expiration of the contract. In this case, Benigno Bito-on
returned the property lent to him on May 13, 1985 to the owners, the
plaintiff herein. We do not see how the defendant can have a better right
to the property than Benigno Bito-on, who admittedly possessed the land
for a limited period. There is no privity of contract between the owner of
the land and the cultivator. 1
At this point, it is appropriate to point out that, contrary to the appreciation of the
respondent appellate court, the general law on property and contracts, embodied in the
Civil Code of the Philippines, finds no principal application on the present
conflict. Generalibus specialia derogant. The environmental facts of the case at bar
indicate that this is not a mere case of recovery of ownership or possession of property.
Had this been so, then the Court would have peremptorily dismissed the present
petition. The fact, however, that cultivated agricultural land is involved suffices for the
Court to pause and review the legislation directly relevant and applicable at the time this
controversy arose.
In this regard, it would appear that Republic Act No. 1199, invoked by the trial court, had
already been rendered inoperative by the passage of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Code, for brevity).
The former, also known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines and approved
in August 1954 had sought to establish a system of agricultural tenancy relations
between the tenant and the landholder, defining two (2) systems of agricultural tenancy:
the share and the leasehold tenancy. At this point, however, further discussion of the
foregoing would appear futile, for the Code, enacted in August, 1963, had expressly
declared agricultural share tenancy to be contrary to public policy and abolished the
same. As for leasehold tenancy relations entered into prior to the effectivity of the Code,
the rights and obligations arising therefrom were deemed to continue to exist until
modified by the parties thereto in accordance with the provisions of the Code. 2 Thus, for
all intents and purposes, Republic Act No. 3844 is the governing statute in the petition at bar. The
pertinent provisions therefore state as follows:
operation of law in accordance with Section four of this Code and, in other,
cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.
Sec. 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The agricultural
leasehold relation shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same. (emphasis
supplied).
Sec. 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The Agricultural
Leasehold Relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural
lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such
leasehold relationship is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein
provided. (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold
Relation. The agricultural leasehold relation established under this
Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee in
the event of death of permanent incapacity of the lessee.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of
Period, etc. The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not
be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold
contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers
the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee
thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations
of the agricultural lessor.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) the agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a
purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) the agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as
determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) the land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is
substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated
through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) the agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the nonpayment of the rental shall be due to crop
failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous
event, the non-payment shall not be a rental due that particular crop year,
is not thereby extinguished; or
land by employing a tractor operator to commence plowing the land," this allegation was denied by
Bernas in his answer. But the main thrust of Natividad's complaint was that she had no privity with Bernas
and that the latter should vacate the land because Benigno (from whom Bernas had received his right to
possess) had himself ceased to have any rights to the land. Faced with these allegations, the court a
quo in its pre-trial order dated 9 September 1985 formulated the issues in this case, without objection
from the parties, as follows:
ISSUES
1. Is defendant an agricultural leasehold lessee of the parcels of land
described in the Complaint?
2. Whether the parties are entitled to damages claims by them in their
respective pleadings.
In short, the parties went to trial on the merits on the basis of the foregoing issues.
Private respondent did not object to the above issues as formulated; neither can it be
plausibly contended now that the first issue (i.e. whether Bernas is an agricultural
leasehold lessee) embraces the issue of whether Natividad has validly terminated the
agricultural leasehold because of a decision to cultivate the land herself, since under
sec. 36(1) of the Code (before its amendment by Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6389), the
landowner's right to take over possession of his land for personal
cultivation ASSUMES that it is under a valid and subsisting agricultural leasehold and
he must obtain an order from the court to dispossess the agricultural leasehold lessee
who otherwise is entitled to continued use and possession of the landholding. In other
words, if Natividad had really intended to raise as an issue that she had validly
terminated Bernas' agricultural leasehold, she or her counsel could have expressly
included among the issues for determination the question of whether or not she had
complied with the requirements of the law for dispossessing the agricultural leasehold
lessee because she, as landowner, had decided to personally cultivate the landholding.
But she did not.
The trial court in its decision dated 20 October 1987 (latter appealed to the Court of
Appeals) held (consistent with the formulated issues in the case) that
xxx xxx xxx
As to issues, parties presented only two (2) issues and which are:
1. Whether or not defendant is an agricultural leasehold lessee of the
parcels of land described in the complaint;
the time Bernas was so installed and, consequently entitled to security of tenure on the land. Should
grounds for the dispossession of Bernas, as an agricultural leasehold lessee, subsequently arise, then
and only then can the private respondent (land owner) initiate a separate action to dispossess the lessee,
and in that separate action, she must allege and prove compliance with Sec. 36(1) of the Code which
consist of, among others, a one year advance notice to the agricultural leasehold lessee (the land
involved being less than 5 hectares) and readiness to pay him the damages required also by the Code.
The issue of whether or not Bernas planted crops or used the land in a manner contrary
to what was agreed upon between Natividad and Benigno, and thereby constituting a
ground for terminating the leasehold relationship under Sec. 36, par. 3 of Rep. Act No.
3844 likewise cannot be passed upon by this Court since the issue was never raised
before the courts below. Furthermore, there is no showing that Natividad and Benigno
agreed that only certain types of crops could be planted on the land. What is clear is,
that the "dugo" arrangement was made so that Benigno could use the produce of the
land to provide for the schooling of his children. The alleged conversion by Bernas of
the land to riceland was made necessary for the land to produce more and thus meet
the needs of Benigno. It was consistent with the purpose of making the land more
productive that Benigno installed an agricultural lessee. It may be recalled that when
Natividad called on Benigno to testify as a witness, he stated that the produce of the
land was given to him by Bernas to defray the expenses of his children (p. 3, trial court
decision). The inevitable conclusion is therefore not that there was use of the land
different from the purpose for which it was allegedly intended by Natividad and Benigno
but rather that the installation of the agricultural lessee was made necessary so that the
land could produce more to better serve the needs of the beneficiary (Benigno).
Additionally, it can be stated that the agricultural leasehold relationship in this case was
created between Benigno as agricultural lessor-legal possessor, on the one hand, and
Bernas as agricultural leasehold lessee, on the other. The agricultural leasehold
relationship was not between Natividad and Bernas. As Sec. 6 of the Code states:
Sec. 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations. The agricultural
leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, orlegal
possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same. (emphasis
supplied)
There was, as admitted by all, no privity or tie between Natividad and Bernas.
Therefore, even if Bernas had improperly used the lots as ricelands, it was Benigno who
could have objected thereto since it was his (the legal possessor's) landholding that was
being "improperly" used. But he (Benigno) did not. It is not for Natividad (as landowner)
to now complain that Bernas used the land "for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon." Bernas had no agreement with her as to the purpose for which
the land was to be used. That they were converted into ricelands (also for agricultural
production) can only mean that the same (conversion) was approved by Benigno (the
undisputed agricultural lessor-legal possessor). It is thus clear that sec. 36, par 3 of the
Code cannot be used to eject Bernas.
The Court, must, in our view, keep in mind the policy of the State embodied in the
fundamental law and in several special statutes, of promoting economic and social
stability in the countryside by vesting the actual tillers and cultivators of the soil, with
rights to the continued use and enjoyment of their landholdings until they are validly
dispossessed in accordance with law. At this stage in the country's land reform program,
the agricultural lessee's right to security of tenure must be "firmed-up" and not negated
by inferences from facts not clearly established in the record nor litigated in the courts
below. Hand in hand with diffusion of ownership over agricultural lands, it is sound
public policy to encourage and endorse a diffusion of agricultural land use in favor of
the actual tillers and cultivators of the soil. It is one effective way in the development of
a strong and independent middle-class in society.
In confirmation we believe of the foregoing views, Section 36 of Rep. Act No. 3844 (the
Code) was expressly amended by Section 7 of Rep. Act No. 6389 which replaced
paragraph 1, Section 36 of the Code providing for personal cultivation by the landowner
as a ground for ejectment or dispossession of the agricultural leasehold lessee with the
following provision:
Sec. 7. Section 36 (1) of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvest of
his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;
While it is true that in the case of Ancheta vs. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 407, the
Court, stated that:
It is well settled that RA 6389, which removed personal cultivation as a
ground for ejectment of tenant/lessee, cannot be given retroactive effect in
the absence of statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of
the law to that effect.
however, Rep. Act No. 6389 was approved on 10 September 1971. 9 The complaint in this
case was filed on 21 June 1985 or long after the approval of Rep. Act No. 6389. By reason of the
provision therein eliminating personal cultivation by the landowner as a ground for ejectment or
dispossession of the agricultural leasehold lessee, any issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
decision should nonetheless be affirmed because the landowner had shown her intention or decided to
personally cultivate the land (assuming without admitting that the issue was properly raised before the
trial court), had in fact become moot and academic (even before it was hypothetically raised). The issued
had been resolved by legislation unmistakably against the landowner.
It may of course he argued that "she (Natividad) did not authorize her brother (Benigno)
to install a tenant thereon." (TSN, 13 February 1986, p. 6).
Even if there was a lack of authorization (from Natividad) for Benigno to install a tenant,
it still follows, in our view, that Benigno as legal possessor of the landholding, could
install an agricultural lessee on the landholding. For, as defined in Section 166 (3) of the
Code, an agricultural lessor is a natural or juridical person who, either as owner, civil law
lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation and use
of his land for a price certain. Nothing in said section, it will be noted, requires that the
civil law lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor should have the prior authorization of
the landowner in order to let or grant to another the cultivation or use of the landholding.
Another question comes up; did Natividad expressly prohibit Benigno from installing a
tenant on the land? Nothing in the evidence shows that Benigno was expressly
prohibited by Natividad from installing a tenant on the landholding. And even if there
was an express prohibition on the part of Natividad (landowner) for Benigno not to
install an agricultural leasehold lessee, it is to be noted that any such arrangement
(prohibition) was solely between Natividad and Benigno. There is no evidence to show
that Bernas was aware or informed of any such arrangement between Natividad and
Benigno. Neither was such arrangement (prohibition), if any, recorded in the registry of
deeds to serve as notice to third persons (as Bernas) and to the whole world for that
matter. Consequently, if there was indeed such a prohibition (which is not borne out by
the records) imposed by Natividad on Benigno, a violation thereof may give rise to a
cause of action for Natividad against Benigno but Bernas is no less an agricultural
leasehold lessee, for the law (Section 166 (2) of the Code) defines an agricultural
lessee as a person who by himself and with the help available from within his immediate
farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another (in this case
Benigno) with the latter's consent for purposes of production for a price certain in money
or in produce or both.
Ponce vs. Guevarra, L-19629 and L-19672-92, 31 March 1954 (10 SCRA 649) provides
dramatic support to thesecurity of tenure of Bernas in the case at bar. In
the Ponce case, the owner (Ponce) had leased his agricultural land to Donato (the
lessee) for a stipulated period with a provision in the lease contract prohibiting Donato
from sub-leasing the land without the written consent of the owner (Ponce).
Notwithstanding these "express prohibition", Donato sub-leased the land without the
consent of Ponce (the owner). When the lease contract expired, Donato returned the
land to Ponce but the sub-lessees (tenants) refused to vacate, claiming security of'
tenure under the tenancy laws then enforced. One of the contentions of Ponce (the
owner) in seeking to dispossess the sub-lessees (tenants) was that these tenants
entered into possession of the land under a violation of the lease contract by Donato
(the lessee).
Over-ruling the above contention, this Court held:
It is true that the subleasing of said land to respondents herein (tenants)
without the written consent of the petitioner (owner), constituted a violation
of the original contract of lease. The breach of contract was committed,
however, by Donato (the lessee), . . . .
Of course, in the same Ponce case, the Court observed that Ponce renewed his
lease contract for another year with Donato, knowing at the time of such renewal
that the land had been sub-leased to the tenants, thereby injecting the principle
of estoppel against Ponce vis-a-vis the tenants. But, as we view it, the ratio
decidendi in the Court's decision is to the effect that the sub-lessees (tenants)
were entitled to security of tenure on the land they were cultivating,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that they became sub-lessees (tenants) of
the land as a result of a violation by the lessee (Donato) of an express provision
in the lease contract prohibiting him from sub-leasing the land.
What more in the case of Bernas whose right to security of tenure as an agricultural
leasehold lessee is conferred and protected categorically, positively and clearly by the
provisions of the Code (Republic Act. 3844)?
It is of course possible to construe Sec. 6 of the Code which provides:
SEC 6. Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations. The agricultural
leasehold relation shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same. (emphasis
supplied).
in the following manner:
second. When Bernas was instituted by Benigno as an agricultural lessee, Benigno was
a legal possessor of the landholding in question. No one can dispute this.
The dissenting opinion states that ". . . it is not correct to say that every legal possessor,
be he a usufructuary, or a bailee, is authorized as a matter of right to employ a tenant.
His possession can be limited by agreement of the parties or by operation of law." (p.
13) Even assuming arguendo that this is a correct legal statement, there is absolutely
no showing that the possession of Benigno was limited by his agreement with Natividad
(as to prohibit him from instituting a tenant) or by operation of law; and because there is
a total failure to disprove and even dispute that Benigno was a legal possessor at the
time Bernas was installed by him as an agricultural lessee, then Bernas validly became
an agricultural leasehold lessee of the land and is protected by the law from ejectment
except for causes specified therein.
Finally, in relation to the dissenting opinion, it may be wise to repeat the statement of
the Court in Jose D. Lina, Jr.vs. Isidro Cario (G.R. No. 100127, 23 April 1993) thus
The Court believes that petitioner's argument cogent though it may be
as a social and economic comment is most appropriately addressed,
not to a court which must take the law as it is actually written, but rather to
the legislative authority which can, if it wishes, change the language and
content of the law. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the language, policy and intent of the law are clear; this Court cannot
interpose its own views as to alter them. That would be judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate
court, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and that of the Regional Trial Court.
REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Puno and Vitug, JJ. took no part.
Separate Opinions
The finding of MAR was confirmed by the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA) when its President certified after an investigation that petitioner did not appear
in the Master List of tenant beneficiaries of the barangay. Even his older brother, the
barangay captain, after conducting his own investigation, refused to certify that
petitioner was a tenant of the holdings of private respondent.
Is private respondent indeed bereft of any remedy in law to recover possession of her
landholdings she who did not employ petitioner nor authorize anyone to employ him
as tenant on her land; she who is not even paid any rent by petitioner for the use of her
landholdings; she whose landholdings have been converted by petitioner from orchards
to ricelands and on which he constructed a house of strong materials, both without first
securing authority from her? Under the circumstances, we can only hope that posterity
will not condemn us for the fate of private respondent and the many others who may be
similarly situated.
My conscience prompts me to dissent from the majority opinion and to vote for the
affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals, not necessarily on the basis of its
rationale, but mainly because I do not subscribe to the view that a usufructuary or legal
possessor under Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, as amended, is automatically authorized to employ
a tenant without the consent of the landowner. For, the right to hire a tenant is basically
a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But, certainly
nowhere in Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 does it say that a legal possessor of a landholding is
automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon.
Natividad Bito-on Deita owns Lots 794, 801, 840 and 848 of the Cadastral Survey of
Panay, Capiz. Lots 794 and 801, with areas of 943 square meters (Exh. "C") and 855
square meters (Exh. "B"'), respectively, are coconut Lands; Lot 840, with an area of
1,000 square meters (Exh. "D"), is planted to bananas, while Lot 848, with an area of
1,146 square meters (Exh. "A"), is riceland. Lot 840 was the owner's homelot on which
stood before the family home. Although the trial court found that the total area of the
four (4) lots, which are not contiguous, was 5,831 square meters, a closer examination
of their tax declarations (Exhs. "A" to "D") reveals that their total productive area is only
3,844 square meters, which can be smaller than a residential lot in a plush village in
Metro Manila.
After Natividad recovered these lots from a former tenant in April 1978, she entrusted
them to her brother, Benigno Bito-on, so that the latter may be able to support the
education of his children in Manila. 2 She did not authorize her brother to install a tenant
thereon. 3 After successfully retrieving a landholding from a tenant at that time, no landowner in his right
mind would give his land in tenancy again to avoid the operation of P.D. 27, then at its peak and dreaded
by landowners as an unjust deprivation of property rights.
Thereafter, without the knowledge, much less consent, of Natividad, Benigno entered
into some arrangement with his brother-in-law, Graciano Bernas, to work the lands. But
Natividad was unaware of this arrangement as she was staying in Manila where her
husband was then employed. It was not until the latter's retirement and the return of the
family to Panay, Capiz, that she learned that Graciano was already working the lands,
converting Lots 794, 801 and 840 into ricelands, and constructing on Lot 840 a house of
concrete hollow blocks.
It bears emphasizing that, the transfer of possession between Natividad and Benigno
was not coupled with any consideration; rather, it was pure magnanimity on the part of
Natividad on account of her "dugo" or blood relation with Benigno, which Atty. Herminio
R. Pelobello, Trial Attorney II and MAR Investigating Officer, explains
A "DUGO" system is a personal grant of privilege and a privilege
personally granted cannot be delegated or extended to someone else but
(is) personal (in) nature. Once the "DUGO" grantee or trustee returns the
subject matter of "DUGO", the relationship is terminated . . . . In this
required under P.D. 1508. If Graciano was indeed a tenant of the landholdings, his older
brother could have easily issued the required certification.
Consequently, the certification had to be issued by Sulpicio Bering, ARBA President,
Panay Chapter, 6 dated 27 May 1985, at Barangay Calitan, Panay, Capiz, which confirmed the factual
findings of the MAR Investigating Officer
lease the property loaned to him to a third person since the relationship between the
bailor and bailee is personal in character. She also established with her evidence that
Graciano converted without her authority three (3) of her parcels of land, particularly
those planted to coconut and banana, to ricelands, which is a ground to terminate a
tenant, assuming that Graciano was.
The contention of Natividad was sustained by the Court of Appeals, which ordered the
ejectment of Graciano. The Court of Appeals ruled that having merely derived his right
over the property from the bailee, Graciano could have no better right than bailee
Benigno who possessed the landholdings only for a special purpose and for a limited
period of time. The spring cannot rise higher than its source
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by Graciano seeking reversal of the
decision 8 of the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether he is an agricultural lessee of the landholdings
entitled to security of tenure.
The resolution of this issue hinges on the proper interpretation of Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844,
as amended, otherwise known as "The Agricultural Land Reform Code," which provides:
Sec. 6 Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations. The agricultural
leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary,
orlegal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same.
(emphasis ours).
Those who hold that Graciano is a leasehold tenant anchor their proposition on the
above provision of Sec. 6 as they find Benigno a "legal possessor" of the lands and so
could legally install a tenant thereon.
I strongly disagree. When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall
be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it
assumes that there is an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i. e., a tenant or
agricultural lessee already works the land. As may be gleaned from the epigraph of
Section 6, it merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations," which
means that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land. But this is precisely what we
are still asked to determine in these proceedings.
To better understand Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, let us refer to its precursor, Sec. 8, R.A. 1199,
as amended, which provides:
It may be relevant to consider, for a better appreciation of the facts, the actual condition
of the landholdings. As already adverted to, Lots 794 and 801 are coconut lands with an
area of 943 square meters (Exh. "C") and 855 square meters (Exh. "B"), respectively, or
a total area of 1,798 square meters. With this meager area for the two (2) coconut
lands, there is indeed no reason to have them tenanted. The coconut lands need not be
cultivated when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Benigno only had to ensure
that the fruits thereof were not stolen.
Lot 840 has an area of 1,000 square meters (Exh. "D") and is planted to bananas. Like
the coconut lands, no tenant is needed to cultivate it and Benigno only has to keep
watch over it against stray animals and protect his harvests. If we take away from this
area of 1,000 square meters the homelot reserved for the owner, the remaining portion
for production cannot be more than 800 square meters. It can be less, depending on the
size of the homelot.
Before Graciano converted Lots 714, 801 and 840 into ricelands, the only riceland then
was Lot 848, with an area of 1,146 square meters (Exh. "A"). This is too small for an
economic family-size farm to sustain Benigno and his family even if he works it himself.
Considering the size of the landholdings, which have a total productive area of only
3,844 square meters per their tax declarations, there may not be enough produce to pay
for the educational expenses of his children if Benigno to hire another person to
cultivate the land and share the produce thereof. As a matter of fact, to minimize
expenses, the children of Benigno and Monica stayed with Natividad while schooling in
Manila.
Since lots 714, 801 and 840 are planted to coconut and banana trees, they are
classified as lands planted to permanent crops. Consequently, in order for a person to
be considered a tenant of these lands, he must have planted the crops himself before
they became fruit-bearing. But, in the case before us, the coconut and banana trees
were already fruit-bearing at the time Graciano commenced to work on the lands,
hence, he cannot be considered a tenant of these lands.
Consequently, the transfer of possession of the landholding from Natividad to Benigno
should be strictly viewed as one for the cultivation alone of Benigno, himself a farm
worker, who was not authorized by Natividad to employ a tenant. Benigno's possession
was limited only to the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, subject to the will of landowner
Natividad. Benigno was not empowered to install a tenant. 14
Benigno therefore possessed the land as a mere possessor-cultivator. As such, he was
required to personally till or cultivate the land and use the produce thereof to defray the
cost of education of his children. Natividad, who entrusted her landholdings to Benigno,
was still the agricultural owner-cultivator, who is "any person who, providing capital and
management, personally cultivates his own land with the aid of his immediate family and
household." 15 It must then be held that the cultivation of Benigno was also the cultivation of Natividad.
Indeed, the fact that the lands were free of tenants when Natividad entrusted them to Benigno was
indicative of her intention to maintain that condition of the landholdings and have them tended personally
by Benigno himself.
Accordingly, neither Benigno nor Graciano can be a lessee-tenant who enjoys security
of tenure. Benigno could only be an encargado of his sister Natividad, merely enjoying
the produce thereof for the intended beneficiaries, his children studying in Manila.
Our attention may be invited to settled jurisprudence that the existence of an agricultural
leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes of ownership in case of sale, or
transfer of legal possession as in lease. 16 But, again, this assumes that a tenancy has already
been established. In the instant case, no such relationship was ever created between Natividad and
Graciano, the former having simply given her land to Benigno without any authority to install a tenant
thereon, 17 and only for a limited duration as it was coterminous with the schooling of Benigno's children in
Manila.
As may be gleaned from all these seven (7) cases, the landowner himself had a hand in
either installing the tenant, or confirming the tenancy relation by extending it, or
negotiating directly with the tenant for the better terms upon expiration of the civil lease.
For, indeed, the right to install a tenant is a personal right that belongs to the
landowner, 25 except perhaps in civil lease when the lessee is authorized to sublease the leased
premises unless expressly prohibited by agreement of the parties.
26
Thus, the agricultural leasehold relations were preserved in these cases because the
"legal possessors: therein were clearly clothed with legal authority or capacity to install
tenants. But even assuming that they were not so authorized as in the Ponce case
where the civil law lessee was expressly barred from installing a tenant under their
contract of lease, the subsequent actions of the landowners in extending the lifetime of
the lease, or in negotiating for better terms with the tenants, placed the landowners in
estoppel from contesting the agricultural leasehold relations. Consequently, the tenants
in those cases may be categorized as tenants de jure enjoying tenurial security
guaranteed by the Agricultural tenancy Law, 27 now by the Agricultural Land Reform Code, as
amended. This is not the case before us.
In an attempt to bolster his theory that he was tenant of the landholding, Graciano
presented no less than the wife of Benigno, Monica Bernales-Bito-on, who testified that
she was the civil law lessee who installed Graciano as tenant. Interestingly, Monica is
the sister of Adela Bernales, wife of Graciano. But why should Monica be the civil law
lessee and not her husband Benigno who is the brother of landowner Natividad? It is
highly improbable that instead of Natividad constituting her brother Benigno as the
possessor of the lands, it was Monica who was entrusted with them. That is contrary to
common practice an experience. Even The trial court itself found the version of
Graciano incredible when it held that Benigno was the legal possessor in the concept of
usufructuary. Yet, it ignored this discrepancy which could have destroyed the
credibility of Graciano when in fact it could have totally negated or disregarded
Graciano's assertion of tenancy derived from Monica as civil law lessee. The conclusion
is not farfetched that Benigno and Monica were just entrusted with the four (4) lots,
three (3) of which were orchards until their unauthorized conversion to ricelands by
Graciano, so that the former could avail of the produce thereof for the purpose already
stated.
Moreover, the claim of Graciano that he was the duly appointed tenant is belied by a
certification issued by the President of the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA), Panay Chapter, stating that, as of 27 May 1985, Graciano Bernas was neither
enrolled in the Master List of tenant beneficiaries nor registered as a leasehold tenant of
Natividad in Barangay Calitan. 28 If he was truly a tenant, he should been vigilant enough to protect
his rights and thus have his name registered. After all, at that time, his older brother was the barangay
captain of Calitan where the property is situated.
When Natividad invoked Sec. 2, P.D. 316, by referring her ejectment case to the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform for preliminary determination, MAR accordingly certified that
it was proper for trial, an indication that there was no tenancy relationship between the
parties. Such factual finding, unless found to be baseless, binds the court because the
law gives exclusive authority to MAR to determine preliminary the issue of tenancy
relationship between the contending parties before the court may assume jurisdiction
over an agrarian dispute or controversy.29
Indeed, the Investigating Officer of MAR correctly found that no tenancy relation existed
between Natividad and Graciano. 30 Such factual finding by an administrative agency as the MAR is
entitled to the greatest respect and is binding and conclusive upon this court, except when it is patently
arbitrary or capricious, or is not supported by substantial evidence. 31 Regrettably, these vital informations
established in the trial court were simply ignored, to the great prejudice of respondent Natividad who,
under the majority opinion, will find herself helplessly without a remedy and all because she upheld the
true Filipino tradition of family solidarity by providing succor to a blood brother who needed assistance for
the educational advancement of his children.
It may be worth to emphasize that neither the decision of the Court of Appeals nor the
discussions in this case mention the unauthorized conversion by Graciano of Lots 794,
801 and 840 into ricelands, thereby impairing the original nature and value of the lands.
If for this reason alone, assuming that he was lawfully installed as tenant, Graciano's
tenancy should be terminated under Sec. 36, par. (3), for planting crops or using the
landholdings for a purpose other than for which they were dedicated.
While this may not have been expressly raised as an issue, it is nevertheless related or
incidental to the issues presented by the parties for which evidence was adduced in the
trial court by private respondent without objection from petitioner. We should not
disregard the evidence if only to arrive at a fair and just conclusion.
Some may have apprehensions that should Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 be construed as not to
vest the legal possessor with automatic authority to install tenants, it would in effect
open the floodgates to their ejectment on the mere pretext that the legal possessor was
not so authorized by the landowner. This is a more imagined than real. The landowner
has the burden of proving that the legal possessor was not authorized to install tenants
and, more often than not, the legal possessor is so empowered. In civil law, lease, for
the instance, where there is consideration, the general rule is that the lessee can
sublease the leased holding unless there is an express prohibition against subletting in
the contract itself. 32 Thus, in order for the lessee to be barred from subletting, the contract of lease
must expressly stipulate to that effect." In this case, the transaction between brother and sister was not for
any material consideration nor was it intended to defeat any purpose of law. There is not even any
insinuation that Benigno was only being used by Natividad to oust Graciano from the lands.
In any event, should the majority still hold that Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 authorizes the
persons therein enumerated to institute a tenant automatically, although I strongly
disagree, it should at most be made to apply only to transfers of legal possession where
there is material consideration, and not where such transfers are absolutely gratuitous
or purely out of benevolence because of personal or blood relationship. Unfortunately
for Natividad, her benevolence does not seem to evoke reciprocal benevolence from
this Court.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, I have to dissent from the majority
opinion and reiterate my vote to AFFIRM the judgment under review.
Meanwhile, I can only hope that, in the end, the real meaning of justice in this case is
attained.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J., dissenting:
This may be a faint echo in the wilderness but it is the quaint voice of a woman yearning
for justice from this court of last resort. The majority opinion would leave her alone
where she is, to wallow in her own misery, and despite her long and winding travails
all for the love of a brother in need there is no light at the end of the tunnel. There is
no relief in sight for her plight. Her only fault was to lend her four (4) small parcels of
land to her brother so that the latter could use the fruits thereof for the education of his
children in Manila. Now, she cannot get them back because her brother allowed his
brother-in-law, who now claims security of tenure as tenant, to work the lands.
Worse, the brother-in-law continues to cultivate the landholdings, even converting the
orchards into ricelands as though they were his own and constructing a house of a
strong materials thereon, without paying any rent!
Before seeking judicial relief, private respondent went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
(MAR) as required by law, 1 and obtained a favorable finding that there was no tenancy relationship
between her and her brother's brother-in-law. But the courts below disregarded this important piece of
evidence which speaks eloquently of the merit of her cause. MAR certified that petitioner was not a tenant
of private respondent, hence, the case was proper for trial.
The finding of MAR was confirmed by the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA) when its President certified after an investigation that petitioner did not appear
in the Master List of tenant beneficiaries of the barangay. Even his older brother, the
barangay captain, after conducting his own investigation, refused to certify that
petitioner was a tenant of the holdings of private respondent.
Is private respondent indeed bereft of any remedy in law to recover possession of her
landholdings she who did not employ petitioner nor authorize anyone to employ him
as tenant on her land; she who is not even paid any rent by petitioner for the use of her
landholdings; she whose landholdings have been converted by petitioner from orchards
to ricelands and on which he constructed a house of strong materials, both without first
securing authority from her? Under the circumstances, we can only hope that posterity
will not condemn us for the fate of private respondent and the many others who may be
similarly situated.
My conscience prompts me to dissent from the majority opinion and to vote for the
affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals, not necessarily on the basis of its
rationale, but mainly because I do not subscribe to the view that a usufructuary or legal
possessor under Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, as amended, is automatically authorized to employ
a tenant without the consent of the landowner. For, the right to hire a tenant is basically
a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But, certainly
nowhere in Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 does it say that a legal possessor of a landholding is
automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon.
Natividad Bito-on Deita owns Lots 794, 801, 840 and 848 of the Cadastral Survey of
Panay, Capiz. Lots 794 and 801, with areas of 943 square meters (Exh. "C") and 855
square meters (Exh. "B"'), respectively, are coconut Lands; Lot 840, with an area of
1,000 square meters (Exh. "D"), is planted to bananas, while Lot 848, with an area of
1,146 square meters (Exh. "A"), is riceland. Lot 840 was the owner's homelot on which
stood before the family home. Although the trial court found that the total area of the
four (4) lots, which are not contiguous, was 5,831 square meters, a closer examination
of their tax declarations (Exhs. "A" to "D") reveals that their total productive area is only
3,844 square meters, which can be smaller than a residential lot in a plush village in
Metro Manila.
After Natividad recovered these lots from a former tenant in April 1978, she entrusted
them to her brother, Benigno Bito-on, so that the latter may be able to support the
education of his children in Manila. 2 She did not authorize her brother to install a tenant
thereon. 3 After successfully retrieving a landholding from a tenant at that time, no landowner in his right
mind would give his land in tenancy again to avoid the operation of P.D. 27, then at its peak and dreaded
by landowners as an unjust deprivation of property rights.
Thereafter, without the knowledge, much less consent, of Natividad, Benigno entered
into some arrangement with his brother-in-law, Graciano Bernas, to work the lands. But
Natividad was unaware of this arrangement as she was staying in Manila where her
husband was then employed. It was not until the latter's retirement and the return of the
family to Panay, Capiz, that she learned that Graciano was already working the lands,
converting Lots 794, 801 and 840 into ricelands, and constructing on Lot 840 a house of
concrete hollow blocks.
It bears emphasizing that, the transfer of possession between Natividad and Benigno
was not coupled with any consideration; rather, it was pure magnanimity on the part of
Natividad on account of her "dugo" or blood relation with Benigno, which Atty. Herminio
R. Pelobello, Trial Attorney II and MAR Investigating Officer, explains
On 24 May 1985, a mediation conference between Natividad and Graciano was held at
the residence of Brgy. Captain Felipe Bernas, older brother of Graciano, but it also
proved fruitless as Graciano continued to refuse to vacate subject landholdings. To top it
all, Brgy. Captain Bernas sided with Graciano and refused to issue a certification as
required under P.D. 1508. If Graciano was indeed a tenant of the landholdings, his older
brother could have easily issued the required certification.
Consequently, the certification had to be issued by Sulpicio Bering, ARBA President,
Panay Chapter, 6 dated 27 May 1985, at Barangay Calitan, Panay, Capiz, which confirmed the factual
findings of the MAR Investigating Officer
Natividad elevated her cause to the Court of Appeals contending that the transaction
between her and her brother Benigno was not in the nature of usufruct but rather one
of commodatum. As such, Benigno, as bailee incommodatum, could neither lend nor
lease the property loaned to him to a third person since the relationship between the
bailor and bailee is personal in character. She also established with her evidence that
Graciano converted without her authority three (3) of her parcels of land, particularly
those planted to coconut and banana, to ricelands, which is a ground to terminate a
tenant, assuming that Graciano was.
The contention of Natividad was sustained by the Court of Appeals, which ordered the
ejectment of Graciano. The Court of Appeals ruled that having merely derived his right
over the property from the bailee, Graciano could have no better right than bailee
Benigno who possessed the landholdings only for a special purpose and for a limited
period of time. The spring cannot rise higher than its source
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by Graciano seeking reversal of the
decision 8 of the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether he is an agricultural lessee of the landholdings
entitled to security of tenure.
The resolution of this issue hinges on the proper interpretation of Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844,
as amended, otherwise known as "The Agricultural Land Reform Code," which provides:
Sec. 6 Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations. The agricultural
leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the
landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary,
orlegal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same.
(emphasis ours).
Those who hold that Graciano is a leasehold tenant anchor their proposition on the
above provision of Sec. 6 as they find Benigno a "legal possessor" of the lands and so
could legally install a tenant thereon.
I strongly disagree. When Sec. 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall
be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it
assumes that there is an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i. e., a tenant or
agricultural lessee already works the land. As may be gleaned from the epigraph of
Section 6, it merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations," which
means that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land. But this is precisely what we
are still asked to determine in these proceedings.
To better understand Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, let us refer to its precursor, Sec. 8, R.A. 1199,
as amended, which provides:
Sec. 8. Limitation of Relation. The relation of landholder and tenant
shall be limited to the person who furnishes land, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the
land himself with the aid of labor available from within his immediate farm
household.
Again, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1199 assumes the existence of a tenancy relation. But, as its
epigraph states, it is a "Limitation of Relation," and the purpose is merely to limit the
tenancy "to the person who furnishes land, either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of
labor available from within his immediate farm household." Otherwise stated, once the
tenancy relation is established, the parties to that relation are limited to the persons
therein stated. But, obviously, inherent in their right to install a tenant is their authority to
do so; otherwise, without such authority, they cannot install a tenant on the landholding.
But, definitely, neither Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 nor Sec. 8 of R.A. 1199 automatically
authorizes the persons named therein to employ a tenant on the landholding.
According to Santos and Macalino, considered authorities on the land reform, the
reasons Sec. 6, R.A. 3844, and 8, R.A. 1199, in limiting the relationship to the lessee
and the lessor is "to discourage absenteeism on the part of the lessor and the custom,
of co-tenancy" under which "the tenant (lessee) employs another to do the farm work for
him, although it is he with whom the landholder (lessor) deals directly. Thus, under this
custom, the one who actually works the land gets the short end of the bargain, for the
nominal or 'capitalist' lessee hugs for himself a major portion of the harvest." 9 This custom
has bred exploitation, discontent and confusion . . . . The 'kasugpong,' 'kasapi,' or 'katulong' also works at
the pleasure of the nominal tenant." 10 When the new law, therefore, limited tenancy relation to the
landholder and the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available from within
his immediate farm household, it eliminated the nominal tenant or middle man from the picture. 11
It may be relevant to consider, for a better appreciation of the facts, the actual condition
of the landholdings. As already adverted to, Lots 794 and 801 are coconut lands with an
area of 943 square meters (Exh. "C") and 855 square meters (Exh. "B"), respectively, or
a total area of 1,798 square meters. With this meager area for the two (2) coconut
lands, there is indeed no reason to have them tenanted. The coconut lands need not be
cultivated when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Benigno only had to ensure
that the fruits thereof were not stolen.
Lot 840 has an area of 1,000 square meters (Exh. "D") and is planted to bananas. Like
the coconut lands, no tenant is needed to cultivate it and Benigno only has to keep
watch over it against stray animals and protect his harvests. If we take away from this
area of 1,000 square meters the homelot reserved for the owner, the remaining portion
for production cannot be more than 800 square meters. It can be less, depending on the
size of the homelot.
Before Graciano converted Lots 714, 801 and 840 into ricelands, the only riceland then
was Lot 848, with an area of 1,146 square meters (Exh. "A"). This is too small for an
economic family-size farm to sustain Benigno and his family even if he works it himself.
Considering the size of the landholdings, which have a total productive area of only
3,844 square meters per their tax declarations, there may not be enough produce to pay
for the educational expenses of his children if Benigno to hire another person to
cultivate the land and share the produce thereof. As a matter of fact, to minimize
expenses, the children of Benigno and Monica stayed with Natividad while schooling in
Manila.
Since lots 714, 801 and 840 are planted to coconut and banana trees, they are
classified as lands planted to permanent crops. Consequently, in order for a person to
be considered a tenant of these lands, he must have planted the crops himself before
they became fruit-bearing. But, in the case before us, the coconut and banana trees
were already fruit-bearing at the time Graciano commenced to work on the lands,
hence, he cannot be considered a tenant of these lands.
Consequently, the transfer of possession of the landholding from Natividad to Benigno
should be strictly viewed as one for the cultivation alone of Benigno, himself a farm
worker, who was not authorized by Natividad to employ a tenant. Benigno's possession
was limited only to the enjoyment of the fruits thereof, subject to the will of landowner
Natividad. Benigno was not empowered to install a tenant. 14
Benigno therefore possessed the land as a mere possessor-cultivator. As such, he was
required to personally till or cultivate the land and use the produce thereof to defray the
cost of education of his children. Natividad, who entrusted her landholdings to Benigno,
was still the agricultural owner-cultivator, who is "any person who, providing capital and
management, personally cultivates his own land with the aid of his immediate family and
household." 15 It must then be held that the cultivation of Benigno was also the cultivation of Natividad.
Indeed, the fact that the lands were free of tenants when Natividad entrusted them to Benigno was
indicative of her intention to maintain that condition of the landholdings and have them tended personally
by Benigno himself.
Accordingly, neither Benigno nor Graciano can be a lessee-tenant who enjoys security
of tenure. Benigno could only be an encargado of his sister Natividad, merely enjoying
the produce thereof for the intended beneficiaries, his children studying in Manila.
Our attention may be invited to settled jurisprudence that the existence of an agricultural
leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes of ownership in case of sale, or
transfer of legal possession as in lease. 16 But, again, this assumes that a tenancy has already
been established. In the instant case, no such relationship was ever created between Natividad and
Graciano, the former having simply given her land to Benigno without any authority to install a tenant
thereon, 17 and only for a limited duration as it was coterminous with the schooling of Benigno's children in
Manila.
As may be gleaned from all these seven (7) cases, the landowner himself had a hand in
either installing the tenant, or confirming the tenancy relation by extending it, or
negotiating directly with the tenant for the better terms upon expiration of the civil lease.
For, indeed, the right to install a tenant is a personal right that belongs to the
landowner, 25 except perhaps in civil lease when the lessee is authorized to sublease the leased
premises unless expressly prohibited by agreement of the parties.
26
Thus, the agricultural leasehold relations were preserved in these cases because the
"legal possessors: therein were clearly clothed with legal authority or capacity to install
tenants. But even assuming that they were not so authorized as in the Ponce case
where the civil law lessee was expressly barred from installing a tenant under their
contract of lease, the subsequent actions of the landowners in extending the lifetime of
the lease, or in negotiating for better terms with the tenants, placed the landowners in
estoppel from contesting the agricultural leasehold relations. Consequently, the tenants
in those cases may be categorized as tenants de jure enjoying tenurial security
guaranteed by the Agricultural tenancy Law, 27 now by the Agricultural Land Reform Code, as
amended. This is not the case before us.
In an attempt to bolster his theory that he was tenant of the landholding, Graciano
presented no less than the wife of Benigno, Monica Bernales-Bito-on, who testified that
she was the civil law lessee who installed Graciano as tenant. Interestingly, Monica is
the sister of Adela Bernales, wife of Graciano. But why should Monica be the civil law
lessee and not her husband Benigno who is the brother of landowner Natividad? It is
highly improbable that instead of Natividad constituting her brother Benigno as the
possessor of the lands, it was Monica who was entrusted with them. That is contrary to
common practice an experience. Even The trial court itself found the version of
Graciano incredible when it held that Benigno was the legal possessor in the concept of
usufructuary. Yet, it ignored this discrepancy which could have destroyed the
credibility of Graciano when in fact it could have totally negated or disregarded
Graciano's assertion of tenancy derived from Monica as civil law lessee. The conclusion
is not farfetched that Benigno and Monica were just entrusted with the four (4) lots,
three (3) of which were orchards until their unauthorized conversion to ricelands by
Graciano, so that the former could avail of the produce thereof for the purpose already
stated.
Moreover, the claim of Graciano that he was the duly appointed tenant is belied by a
certification issued by the President of the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA), Panay Chapter, stating that, as of 27 May 1985, Graciano Bernas was neither
enrolled in the Master List of tenant beneficiaries nor registered as a leasehold tenant of
Natividad in Barangay Calitan. 28 If he was truly a tenant, he should been vigilant enough to protect
his rights and thus have his name registered. After all, at that time, his older brother was the barangay
captain of Calitan where the property is situated.
When Natividad invoked Sec. 2, P.D. 316, by referring her ejectment case to the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform for preliminary determination, MAR accordingly certified that
it was proper for trial, an indication that there was no tenancy relationship between the
parties. Such factual finding, unless found to be baseless, binds the court because the
law gives exclusive authority to MAR to determine preliminary the issue of tenancy
relationship between the contending parties before the court may assume jurisdiction
over an agrarian dispute or controversy.29
Indeed, the Investigating Officer of MAR correctly found that no tenancy relation existed
between Natividad and Graciano. 30 Such factual finding by an administrative agency as the MAR is
entitled to the greatest respect and is binding and conclusive upon this court, except when it is patently
arbitrary or capricious, or is not supported by substantial evidence. 31 Regrettably, these vital informations
established in the trial court were simply ignored, to the great prejudice of respondent Natividad who,
under the majority opinion, will find herself helplessly without a remedy and all because she upheld the
true Filipino tradition of family solidarity by providing succor to a blood brother who needed assistance for
the educational advancement of his children.
It may be worth to emphasize that neither the decision of the Court of Appeals nor the
discussions in this case mention the unauthorized conversion by Graciano of Lots 794,
801 and 840 into ricelands, thereby impairing the original nature and value of the lands.
If for this reason alone, assuming that he was lawfully installed as tenant, Graciano's
tenancy should be terminated under Sec. 36, par. (3), for planting crops or using the
landholdings for a purpose other than for which they were dedicated.
While this may not have been expressly raised as an issue, it is nevertheless related or
incidental to the issues presented by the parties for which evidence was adduced in the
trial court by private respondent without objection from petitioner. We should not
disregard the evidence if only to arrive at a fair and just conclusion.
Some may have apprehensions that should Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 be construed as not to
vest the legal possessor with automatic authority to install tenants, it would in effect
open the floodgates to their ejectment on the mere pretext that the legal possessor was
not so authorized by the landowner. This is a more imagined than real. The landowner
has the burden of proving that the legal possessor was not authorized to install tenants
and, more often than not, the legal possessor is so empowered. In civil law, lease, for
the instance, where there is consideration, the general rule is that the lessee can
sublease the leased holding unless there is an express prohibition against subletting in
the contract itself. 32 Thus, in order for the lessee to be barred from subletting, the contract of lease
must expressly stipulate to that effect." In this case, the transaction between brother and sister was not for
any material consideration nor was it intended to defeat any purpose of law. There is not even any
insinuation that Benigno was only being used by Natividad to oust Graciano from the lands.
In any event, should the majority still hold that Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844 authorizes the
persons therein enumerated to institute a tenant automatically, although I strongly
disagree, it should at most be made to apply only to transfers of legal possession where
there is material consideration, and not where such transfers are absolutely gratuitous
or purely out of benevolence because of personal or blood relationship. Unfortunately
for Natividad, her benevolence does not seem to evoke reciprocal benevolence from
this Court.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, I have to dissent from the majority
opinion and reiterate my vote to AFFIRM the judgment under review.
Meanwhile, I can only hope that, in the end, the real meaning of justice in this case is
attained.
Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Melo, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
* Penned by Mme. Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes and concurred in
by Jus