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United Nations Complaint Exhibit October 4, 2009
United Nations Complaint Exhibit October 4, 2009
Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
CIATortureInvestigationsEITProgramSERE
and
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
TABLEOFCONTENTS
1. Smoking Gun on CIA Torture Conspiracy- Human Experimentation Central to EIT Program Sept
27, 2009
2. EXCLUSIVE CIA Experiments on U.S. Soldiers Linked to Torture Program September 9, 2009
3. CIA doctors face human experimentation claims September 18, 2009
4. CIA Sets its Technology Priorities for 2006 CIA Organizational Chart
5. David Addingtons (Cheney Staffer) Direct Involvment in Torture Memos
6. Washington Post Expose on MKULTRA August 19, 1977
7. Sen. Bond (Ranking GOP on Sentate Intelligence Committee) Pulls GOP Staff Off Torture
Investigation Sept. 25, 2009
8. Ex-CIA Chiefs Decry Holder Interrogator Probe in Letter to Obama, September 18, 2009
9. Letter by Former CIA Directors to President Obama, September 18, 2009
10. Future Technologies Inc., Home Page, October 2, 2009
11. Future Technologies Inc Directors October 2, 2009
12. Sen. Bond (Missouri Ranking GOP on Senate Intelligence Com) Pulls GOP Staff Off Torture
Investigation September 25, 2009
13. The Nature and Influence of Intuition in Law Enforcement
14. Committee on Armed Services U.S. Senate Detainee Report Final April 22 2009
15. CIA Inspector General Report Health Professionals' Ethics and Human Rights Violations May
2004
16. CIA IG Inspector General Report on MKULTRA 1963
17. CIA Technical Services Division and Assassination Plots
18. Full Version Senate Select Intelligence Joint Hearing on MKULTRA, August 8, 1977
19. Duke Street Business Center 08-13373 Preacipe to File Exhibit A-37 October 2, 2009
20. Ex-Bush officials face lawsuits over their actions September 29, 2009
21. HAARP, The United States Government, and Advanced Media Group September 23, 2009.pdf
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U.S. military and intelligence community. At this meeting, the CIA proposed particular
alternative interrogation methods, including waterboarding.
The CIAs Office of General Counsel subsequently asked OLC to prepare an opinion about
the legality of its proposed techniques. To enable OLC to review the legality of the
techniques, the CIA provided OLC with written and oral descriptions of the proposed
techniques. The CIA also provided OLC with information about any medical and
psychological effects of DoDs Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape
(SERE) School, which is a military training program during which military personnel
receive counter-interrogation training.
While the fact that the OLC accepted at face value the CIAs statements regarding the safety or the
effects of the interrogation procedures they were proposing is no surprise to anyone who has read the
torture memos and evidence of the unprofessionalism and bias of the memos authors the
degree to which the conspiracy (by CIA or OLC, or both) to withhold evidence of the real effects of the
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs) by the CIA has never been made more concrete than
now.
To my knowledge, we do not have the specific document wherein the CIA provides the medical and
psychological effects of SERE school. I have been told that this document is still classified. But it
seems possible that the CIA did pass on the details of the research that was available to it, including
the debilitating effects of SERE techniques, which sent stress hormone levels, according to one
research report, some of the greatest ever documented in humans. Another report cited
neuroendocrine changes [that] may have significant implications for subsequent responses to
stress.
One of the authors of these reports, Charles A. Morgan, III, M.D., who has identified himself in
certain settings as a Senior Research Scientist on the CIAs Behavioral Science Staff, has criticized
my coverage of CIA experiments on the psychological and physiological effects of SERE training upon
human subjects. While he could not specify what aspects of this coverage he felt were inaccurate and
misleading, he did insist:
The research conducted by our research team at the National Center for Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder is not, and never has been, conducted for any other purpose than to help
us understand the pathophysiology of stress disorders and we might better help in the
treatment of veterans.
In making his mea culpa, Dr. Morgan never mentions that some of this research was funded (over
$400,000) by the Army and the Office of Naval Research. He doesnt mention his acquaintance with
great people who do military interrogations. He also forgets to cite his book contribution, where he
states (emphasis added):
The SERE training environment affords the military services the opportunity to
collaborate with various other government agencies in exploring old and new
techniques in gathering human intelligence.
Of course, he neither confirms nor denies his affiliation with the CIA, an affiliation which I have traced
to the CIAs Science and Technology directorate, through his association (large PDF) with the
Intelligence Technology Innovation Center, which is a research organization under the CIAs
authority that answers directly to the CIAs Science and Technology directorate.
But most of all, Dr. Morgans arrows fall way short of his target, as I have never accused him of
personal involvement in the reverse-engineering of SERE techniques for use in the torture program.
What is disturbing is his seeming lack of concern over the possiblity that the research he helped
conduct was either used to further experiments upon torture victims in the CIAs clandestine prisons,
or contrariwise, was withheld from Office of Legal Counsel lawyers who relied upon CIA advice
concerning the effects of techniques derived from the SERE schools.
What is indisputable is that by virtue of his position, Dr. Morgan had access to CIA officials just at the
time that another department of the CIA, one to which he is affiliated, was, according to the CIAs
own Office of Inspector General Report (large PDF) involved in vetting the SERE techniques for use in
interrogations. The other department was the Office of Technical Services (OTS), part of the CIAs
Science and Technology Directorate. This, by the way, is the same division that was responsible for
the MKULTRA experiments of the 1950s and 1960s. From the OIG report:
CTC [CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center], with the assistance of the Office of Technical
Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to use on Abu
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Zubaydah.
CIAs OTS obtained data on the use of the proposed EITs and their potential long-term
psychological effects on detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited
from a number of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area of
psychopathology.
OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding
techniques used in its SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on
students. DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted from use of
the EITs, including the most taxing technique, the waterboard, on SERE students. The
OTS analysis was used by OGC [DoD's Office of General Counsel] in evaluating the
legality of techniques.
OTSs solicitation of information on SERE from JPRA elicited some sort of feedback from JPRA, which
supposedly told OTS that SERE training caused no long-term effects. The IG Report does not say if
this was in the form of a memo and only speaks of OTSs analysis. In any case, we should not confuse
any OTS analysis with the information provided by JPRA itself to the Office of General Counsel,
which produced a number of memorandum and attachments in late July 2003. Marcy Wheeler has
been analyzing the timing of these JPRA items, including the fact that one of these key documents is
missing.
The CIA IG Report is relating a story whose emphasis differs from that produced in the narrative of
the Senate Armed Services Committee investigation (PDF) into SERE torture. In the latter, JPRA is
the main culprit in providing cover for the supposed safety of using SERE techniques. Yet, in the OIG
account it looks like the CIA used DOD/JRRA as a cover for the safety of techniques that it knew were
in fact harmful from their own analysis of the data. Moreover, it was the OTS analysis that was used
in substantial part as the basis of the August 1, 2002 memo approving the Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques (EITs).
That legal opinion was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience
and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning whether long-term
psychological effects would result from use of the proposed techniques.
Moreover, the CIAs Office of Medical Services was frozen out of the initial analysis of the risk and
benefits of EITs, and not even provided with a copy of the OTS report given to the White House
Office of Legal Counsel. Such compartmentalization of information is indicative of a covert operation,
such as a Special Access Program (SAP). This SAP would have included personnel in CIAs CTC, OTS,
OGC, and Directorate of Operations, also portions of DOD (JPRA and Special Operations Command),
and probably the White Houses OLC, Office of the Vice President, and National Security Council.
It seems highly likely that the CIA report to the OLC on the medical and psychological effects of the
SERE school program, mentioned in the Senate Intelligence Committee narrative quote above, is in
fact the OTS report, which came from the same CIA directorate to which Dr. Morgan belongs. This
does not speak to Morgans foreknowledge of what would be used, nor to the amount of his
involvement. But it does speak to the likelihood that the government research he conducted (with
others) was available and likely used by his associates in the CIA.
To what purpose was this information used? It seems Dr. Morgan has serendipitously given us the
answer himself: exploring old and new techniques in gathering human intelligence. The CIA appears
to have used torture to conduct what Physicians for Human Rights, in a white paper (PDF) recently
published, called possible unethical human experimentation, [which] urgently needs to be thoroughly
investigated. The government should declassify the OTS report, and bring the process of
investigating the CIAs role in the torture conspiracy fully into public purview.
This report was originally published on FireDogLake.com.
Jeffrey Kaye, a psychologist living in Northern California and a regular contributor The Public Record,
has been blogging at Daily Kos since May 2005, and maintains a personal blog, Invictus. E-mail Mr.
Kaye at sfpsych at gmail dot com.
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Editors note: Click here to listen to Jeffrey Kaye discuss his groundbreaking report with radio talk
show host Peter B. Collins.
A number of new articles have been published recently that have highlighted evidence of illegal
human experimentation on U.S.-held terrorism prisoners undergoing torture. These articles
followed the release of a white paper by Physicians for Human Rights [PHR], Aiding Torture: Health
Professionals Ethics and Human Rights Violations Demonstrated in the May 2004 Inspector Generals
Report.
This report looks at those recent charges, and reveals that experiments by a CIA researcher on
human subjects undergoing SERE training went unreported in the legal memos the Bush
administration drafted to approve their torture program. It will also connect major military and
intelligence figures to the SERE experiments, and tie some of them to major science and
experimental directorates at the CIA and Special Operations Command.
An article by veteran journalist William Fisher, looking at PHRs white paper, asks, Did physicians
and psychologists help the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency develop a new research protocol to
assess and refine the use of waterboarding or other harsh interrogation techniques?
A column at Scientific American quotes PHRs medical advisor on the subject:
[PHR] also raises questions about the ethics of medical note-taking during some of the
interrogations. Medical doctors and psychologists colluded with the CIA to keep
observational records about waterboarding, which approaches unethical and unlawful
human experimentation, Scott Allen, lead study author and PHR medical advisor, said
in a prepared statement.
Finally, a story in Wednesdays UK Guardian discussed the significance of the charges of unlawful
human experimention:
Human experimentation without consent has been prohibited in any setting since 1947,
when the Nuremberg Code, which resulted from the prosecution of Nazi doctors, set
down 10 sacrosanct principles. The code states that voluntary consent of subjects is
essential and that all unnecessary physical and mental suffering should be avoided.
Advanced Media Group
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The Geneva conventions also ban medical experiments on prisoners and prisoners of
war, which they describe as grave breaches.
After describing how [h]ealth professionals in the Office of Medical Services and psychologist
contractors engaged in designing and monitoring torture, as selecting and then rationalizing the
use of various harmful interrogation techniques, the PHR report goes on to say:
By requirement, all interrogations were monitored in real-time by health professionals.
Previous reports, including the ICRC report, document allegations that a medical device
called a pulse oximeter (a device to measure oxygen saturation in a subjects blood)
was placed on the finger of a detainee to monitor the effectiveness of his respiration
during waterboarding. In this way, medical professionals were used to calibrate physical
and mental pain and suffering.
The possibility that health professionals monitored techniques to assess and improve
their effectiveness, constituting possible unethical human experimentation, urgently
needs to be thoroughly investigated.
An Experimental Battle Lab
The CIAs Office of Medical Services was supposed to be in charge of monitoring detainee health
under interrogation. However their instructions, described in an annex to the CIA Inspector General
report, exemplifies the dual nature of the monitoring, as this example from the report shows:
If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral
range, they should be monitored and the actual temperatures documented. [2 or 3
redacted lines]
At ambient temperatures below 18 [degrees]C/64 [degrees]F, detainees should be
monitored for the development of hypothermia. [Four redacted paragraphs]
Rather than make changes to ambient temperatures, to prevent harm to prisoners, medical
professionals are instructed to monitor and document the situation. The torture techniques used by
SERE are known to cause endocrine and metabolic disorders (see section on CIA research below),
prisoners tortured and subjected to cold are at higher risk of hypothermia, which for a normal person
can set in at an ambient temperature of 60 degrees F. The monitoring in this case seems to be as
much about experimentation as it is any concern for a prisoners health. (For what other possible
reason could this section be mostly redacted?) Parallels to the experiments on hypothermia by Nazi
scientists at Dachau are chilling, as is the fact that some of these scientists were later imported,
along with their data, to the United States.
Questions were raised around possible human experimentation in an article last May at Firedoglake
on The Zubaydah Torture Experiment, noting, Of the many fascinating details coming out of [the
May 2009 Senate] Judiciary hearing the references to the application of an experiment by the
ex-SERE CIA contractor, most likely James Mitchell, seemed especially important.
The experimentation was not limited to high-value CIA prisoners. Last April, another article at
Firedoglake reported how the Senate Armed Services Committee report (PDF) on prisoner abuse
described the creation of an experimental battle lab at Guantanamo, demonstrating support for the
torture program from the main Army intelligence school at Ft. Huachuca.
According to the Levin report, in August 2002, COL John P. Custer, then-assistant
commandant of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona
conducted a review of interrogations operations at Guantanamo. Custer called
Guantanamo Americas Battle Lab in the war on terror, and recommended combining
FBI and military techniques to extract information by exploiting the detainees
vulnerabilities. The Battle Lab label stuck, though some, like Colonel Britt Mallow, of
the Criminal Investigative Task Force, objected.
MG Dunlavey and later MG Miller referred to GTMO as a Battle Lab meaning that
interrogations and other procedures there were to some degree experimental, and their
lessons would benefit DOD in other places. While this was logical in terms of learning
lessons, I personally objected to the implied philosophy that interrogators should
experiment with untested methods, particularly those in which they were not trained.
Later, Dunlavey denied using the term, and Miller testified he couldnt remember.
Pre-9/11 Experiments on SERE Torture
Advanced Media Group
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The experiments on the effects of SERE-torture techniques began even earlier upon SERE trainees
themselves. An April 2009 AlterNet article reported on the history of experimentation on soldier
subjects undergoing SERE training. (SERE is a military program, the acronym standing for Survival,
Evasion, Resistance, Escape.) The article explained how the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the
CIA ignored a wealth of other published information about the effects of SERE stress inoculation,
citing a June 2000 article, Assessment of Humans Experiencing Uncontrollable Stress: The SERE
Course, in Special Warfare (PDF). Special Warfare is The Professional Bulletin of the John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (emphases added to following quote):
Results
As shown in the charts on page 7, SERE stress caused significant changes in students
hormone levels. Recorded changes in cortisol levels were some of the greatest
ever documented in humans. In some cases, the changes noted among the
trainees were greater than the changes noted in patients undergoing heart
surgery.
Changes in testosterone levels were similarly remarkable: In some cases,
testosterone dropped from normal levels to castration levels within eight
hours.
The Alternet article also quoted from a May 2000 article in Biological Psychiatry, Hormone profiles in
humans experiencing military survival training (emphasis added):
Conclusions: The stress of military survival training produced dramatic alterations in
cortisol, percent free cortisol, testosterone, and thyroid indices. Different types of
stressors had varying effects on the neuroendocrine indices. The degree of
neuroendocrine changes observed may have significant implications for
subsequent responses to stress.
Looking beyond more than physiological symptoms, other studies have looked at purely
psychological data. Consider this oft-quoted study from the August 2001 edition of the American
Journal of Psychiatry, which looked at dissociative symptoms, such as depersonalization,
derealization, psychic or emotional numbing, and general cognitive confusion, produced in military
subjects exposed to SERE torture techniques (emphasis added):
The current study was designed to assess the nature and prevalence of dissociative
symptoms in healthy humans experiencing acute, uncontrollable stress during U.S.
Army survival training. METHOD: In study 1, 94 subjects completed the ClinicianAdministered Dissociative States Scale after exposure to the stress of survival
training. In study 2, 59 subjects completed the Brief Trauma Questionnaire before
acute stress and the dissociative states scale before and after acute stress. A randomly
selected group of subjects in study 2 completed a health problems questionnaire after
acute stress. RESULTS: In study 1, 96% of subjects reported dissociative
symptoms in response to acute stress. Total scores, as well as individual item
scores, on the dissociation scale were significantly lower in Special Forces soldiers
compared to general infantry troops. In study 2, 42% of subjects reported dissociative
symptoms before stress and 96% reported them after acute stress.
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practice of torturing prisoners by partially drowning
them.
Other research results include the effects of SERE-style torture upon the immune system and other
biological markers. The findings regarding high levels of cortisol upon subjects was corroborated by a
SERE psychologist at the Navy Brunswick, Maine, SERE school, who according to an unclassified,
undated Talking Paper from the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency found empirical medical data
[of] elevated levels of cortisol in the brain stem caused by stress levels incurred during waterboarding. The Brunswick school subsequently discontinued waterboarding as part of its SERE
training, as it created a negative learning environment. The other Navy SERE school, in North
Island, California, refuses to eliminate exposure to waterboarding as part of its training program,
despite the opposition of JPRA and the other SERE schools, which believe it can induce a learned
helplessness state in students.
SERE Research and the Development of the Torture Program
One of the lead researchers in a number of these studies is Yale psychiatrist Charles A. Morgan, III.
According to one source, Over the past 10 years, Dr. Morgan has served as a Subject Matter Expert
to the US Special Operations Command. But at a June 2004 symposium on The Nature and
Influence of Intuition in Law Enforcement, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, the
Behavioral Analysis Unit of the FBI, and the American Psychological Association, Dr. Morgan is listed
as affiliated with Behavioral Science, CIA.
Additionally, in the Information Science Board (ISB) document, Educing Information which was
heavily drawn upon by President Obamas task force on interrogations, for recommendations on the
interrogations issue Dr. Morgan is identified as a member of the 11-person Government Experts
Committee, and listed as affiliated with the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center (ITIC).
According to Intelligence Online, ITIC is a research organization under the CIAs authority, which
answers directly to the CIAs Science and Technology directorate.
The Obama Interrogations Task Force recently made clear they found a lot to value in the ISB study
(emphasis added):
The Task Force concluded that the United States could improve its ability to
interrogate the most dangerous terrorists by forming a specialized interrogation group,
or High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), that would bring together the most
effective and experienced interrogators and support personnel from across the
Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense and law enforcement. The
creation of the HIG would build upon a proposal developed by the Intelligence
Science Board.
Whatever the fate of the HIG, what is noteworthy here is that the Office of Technical Services (OTS),
which was cited in the recently released 2004 CIA Inspector General report as having vetted the
aggressive SERE interrogation techniques, is, along with the ITIC, also a part of the Science and
Technology directorate. OTS, formerly the Technical Services Division (or Technical Services Staff),
was the branch of the CIA in charge of torture and assassination. It was also in charge of the
experimental mind control and interrogation program known as MKULTRA.
Dr. Morgans online profile states that between 1998 and 2002 he received over $400,000 in research
grants from the Army and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) for studies on Psychobiological
Assessment of High Intensity Military Training and Neuro endocrine assessment of Survival School
Training. A 1977 Washington Post expose those were the days of scandalous revelations
surrounding the CIAs MKULTRA program describes CIA use of ONR to funnel funds for secret
experiments in the 1950s and 1960s. The same relationship was also explored during a 1977 Senate
Intelligence Committee hearing. This is not evidence that Morgans research was paid for by the CIA,
but along with his institutional affiliation, it is suggestive of possible CIA involvement.
While it is unknown to what degree the CIA was directly involved in the SERE research (outside of Dr.
Morgans affiliation), Special Operations Command reportedly was a major supporter.
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psychologists from national security interrogations, which was being considered in a motion before
APA at that time.)
A 2007 New York Times article quotes Dr. Morgan:
Many SERE veterans were appalled at the reverse engineering of their methods, said
Charles A. Morgan III, a Yale psychiatrist who has worked closely with SERE trainers for
a decade.
How did something used as an example of what an unethical government would do
become something we do? he asked.
Dr. Morgans comments appear to put him at odds with other members of the CIAs Science and
Technology directorate, particularly those who work for OTS, as well as individuals within the
Pentagon and Special Operations Command, who have been tied to elements of the U.S. torture
program.
The Suppression of Research on SERE in the OLC Memos
What is clear is that the CIA and the Pentagon had plenty of experimental evidence from the
peer-reviewed, published research of Dr. Morgan and his associates (and possibly others), both
before and after 9/11, that SERE techniques had serious, debilitating effects on individuals subjected
to them. As this research is never cited in any of the Office of Legal Counsel memos issued to the
CIA around their torture program, it appears such research was deliberately withheld from
government attorneys as the CIA sought approval for the use of SERE-style torture. Nor was this
obscure research, but had been funded by the government at a minimum of hundreds of thousands of
dollars, and promoted by some of the Pentagons highest generals.
The frenzied search for data on waterboarding, sleep deprivation, isolation, confinement in a small
box, etc., to submit to OLC attorneys making legal determinations on whether proposed
interrogation techniques constituted torture, was a kabuki organized by the CIA. The OLC attorneys
involved John Yoo, Stephen Bradbury, Jay Bybee, and others were witting or unwitting partners
in suppression of CIA research on torture (as future investigations will disclose). Given the
participation of members of the Office of the Vice President, particularly David Addington and Vice
President Cheney himself, in the promulgation of the torture program, and the composition of the
memos, it seems likely they were also involved in the suppression of this material. As a result, the
memos produced authorizing the enhanced interrogation techniques were composed as the result of
fraud and bad faith, the result of a criminal conspiracy to implement illegal torture techniques.
The public response to the recent white paper by Physicians for Human Rights shows there is great
interest in following up on charges of human experimentation upon torture victims of the U.S.
government. The Congress and Department of Justice should move swiftly to initiate full, open
investigations and charges against those involved.
Jeffrey Kaye, a psychologist living in Northern California and a regular contributor The Public Record,
has been blogging at Daily Kos since May 2005, and maintains a personal blog, Invictus. E-mail Mr.
Kaye at sfpsych at gmail dot com.
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effectiveness, using detainees as human subjects without their consent. The report
concludes that such data gathering was "a practice that approaches unlawful
experimentation".
Human experimentation without consent has been prohibited in any setting since 1947,
when the Nuremberg Code, which resulted from the prosecution of Nazi doctors, set
down 10 sacrosanct principles. The code states that voluntary consent of subjects is
essential and that all unnecessary physical and mental suffering should be avoided.
The Geneva conventions also ban medical experiments on prisoners and prisoners of
war, which they describe as "grave breaches". Under CIA guidelines, doctors and
psychologists were required to be present during the use of so-called enhanced
interrogation techniques on detainees.
In April, a leaked report from the International Committee of the Red Cross found that
medical staff employed by the CIA had been present during waterboarding, and had
even used what appeared to be a pulse oxymeter, placed on the prisoner's finger to
monitor his oxygen saturation during the procedure. The Red Cross condemned such
activities as a "gross breach of medical ethics". PHR has based its accusation of possible
experimentation on the 2004 report of the CIA's own inspector general into the
agency's interrogation methods, which was finally published two weeks ago after
pressure from the courts.
An appendix to the report, marked "top secret", provides guidelines to employees of the
CIA's internal Office of Medical Services "supporting the detention of terrorists turned
over to the CIA for interrogation".
Medical workers are given the task of "assessing and monitoring the health of all agency
detainees" subjected to enhanced techniques. These techniques include facial slaps,
sleep deprivation, walling where their padded heads are banged against walls
confinement in boxes, and waterboarding or simulated drowning.
The guidelines instruct doctors to carry out regular medical checks of detainees. They
must ensure that prisoners receive enough food, though diet "need not be palatable",
and monitor their body temperature when placed in "uncomfortably cool environments,
ranging from hours to days".
The most controversial guideline refers to waterboarding, the technique where
prisoners are made to feel as though they are drowning by having water poured over a
cloth across their face. The guidelines stress that the method carries physical risks,
particularly "by days three to five of an aggressive programme".
PHR is calling for an official investigation into the role of doctors in the CIA's now
widely discredited programme. It wants to know exactly how many doctors
participated, what they did, what records they kept and the science that they applied.
Physicians for Human Rights is a not-for-profit group
Advanced Media Group
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Mind you, this is only proof that Addington had direct communication with Yoo and Bradbury, but not Levin. It doesn't prove that Levin was ousted to make it easier for Addington to
direct the OLC opinion writing process.
But Levin's ousting--and related ascension of Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney General--does appear to have had that effect.
Spotlight
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Reply
Boston1775 September 6th, 2009 at 4:31 pm
10
OMG
Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 4:37 pm
11
Addington is the key.
To the SAPs, to the legal opinions and the other things EW readers will be intrigued at when CIA starts to leak them.
Reply
Loo Hoo. September 6th, 2009 at 4:48 pm
12
In response to bmaz @ 7
the forum for a federal judge to say Well the court has some serious concerns and questions too and I am going to appoint a special prosecutor from the court to look into
this. It is within the courts power (as seen in the Toobz case)
Wowsers! So if Durham brings a case(s) to court, we may get a special prosecutor after all? Which court would likely hear the case? DC/Prettyman? And which judges would we hope
for?
Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 5:08 pm
13
In response to Loo Hoo. @ 12
No, I think EDVA is more likely; but do not get me wrong I am saying that will never be allowed to happen; that is my whole point.
Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 5:22 pm
14
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 11
Yeah, raised as a military brat, a foreign service degree and work experience as a lawyer for CIA, Addington has the entire tool kit necessary for Cheneys dirty work.
I think at this point were merely looking for (or waiting for) that one or two pieces of the puzzle which cause this entire thing to cascade into place.
Reply
Loo Hoo. September 6th, 2009 at 5:24 pm
15
I cling to any possible hope these days
Reply
victoria2dc September 6th, 2009 at 5:31 pm
16
EW: Im reading the link you provide to the HJC hearing and Bradburys testimony. I am hoping that you or one of our lawyer types will give this section of that testimony some
thought. Why have we not heard this from Senator Whitehouse or someone like Leahy on this? Is there something in the US Code that prohibits an agency (um. the DOJ) from
investigating itself? I think we need to talk about this:
p. 25 @ http://judiciary.house.gov/hea../40743.PDF
Mr. ELLISON. General Mukasey testified in a Senate Judiciary Committee that he would not order an investigation of waterboarding depicted on the destroyed tapes,
because the OLC had issued opinions regarding torture that were presumably relied upon by those administering the technique.
He gave two reasons. It would not be appropriate for the Justice Department to be investigating itself was one reason. The other reason is it would not be fair to prosecute
persons who relied on
OLC opinions.
As to the first reason, this is precisely the conflict situation for which the special counsel regulations of the Department call for pointing to someone outside of the Department
to conduct important investigations.
But I want to focus on the second reason, which has certain implications I would like you to focus on. At a minimum, we need to investigate whether their actions exceeded
the legal advice that
OLC gave them, or whether they would have knowthat waterboarding could not be legal.
Could that be a reason for the narrow scope of the investigation?
Reply
eCAHNomics September 6th, 2009 at 5:45 pm
17
In response to victoria2dc @ 16
From someone who is not a lawyer and not into the weeds of the torture investigation. I think the narrow scope of the investigation is a political decision by Holder. He was shocked by
what was done (blahblahblahblah, are we supposed to think he cares?), so wants to suage his conscience by doing something, but doesnt want to offend his boss, who is totally against
doing anything.
Reply
fatster September 6th, 2009 at 5:49 pm
18
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O/T. Doesnt this make you feel all warm and cozy and safe? Yeah, me neither.
Central bankers empower global supervision of finance industries
BY RAW STORY Published: September 6, 2009 Updated -2285 second ago
The worlds most powerful bankers said on Sunday they had agreed on a package of measures to strengthen on a global scale the supervision of finance industries, raising liquidity
requirements for all the G20 member nations and pushing smaller institutions to develop countercyclical cash buffers to prevent future collapses.
The measures should substantially reduce the probability and severity of economic and financial stress, a statement released by the Basel-based Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) said.
More.
Reply
WarOnError September 6th, 2009 at 5:54 pm
19
Read THE DARK SIDE.
Addington was Cheneys hand puppet. I think that man sized safe in Cheneys office may have been for housing puppets.
Reply
libbyliberal September 6th, 2009 at 5:55 pm
20
I mean, when I was told I wasnt going to stay, I voluntarily left.
Worthy of Monty Python. But they brought up the Inquisition a lot, too.
You know the line in All the Presidents Men where the accounting assistant for Hugh Sloan says, If you could get Mitchell, that would be beautiful!
Well, if you could get Addington, that would be beautiful!
Reply
eCAHNomics September 6th, 2009 at 5:56 pm
21
In response to fatster @ 18
Just wait until the financial bets on people dying crash and burn. I wouldnt be surprised if Wall St. arranges hit squads to make sure people die soon enough to make their financial
instruments profitable. We aint anywhere near plumbing the depths of financial depravity.
Reply
alinaustex September 6th, 2009 at 6:06 pm
22
skimpypenguin@ 10
Glad to see you back - So if I follow you the careerist at Langley will be leaking material evidence that Addington on behalf of Cheney was making the illegal toture legally good -and that
kept the torture chambers open in various locales. Moreover if I also follow your discussion -that this leaking is done in the context of pushback to forestall any future Sec Defense from
further poaching on traditional CIA functions and missions -particularly intelligence gathering that could lead to affirmative actions being tasked and ordered - ( IE the illegal occupation
of Irak ) . Could these leaks from the line officers at Langley also include documents -such as working email threads talking about the Team B at the OVP s office ie Cambone, Feith ,
among others talking up the EIT s as a good way to get actionable intelligence that would lash al Qaida and Saddam togather -to futher future 9-11 type attacks against CONUS ? This
is all being discussed at about the same time frame -hellbells PappaDick is still out there talking up Atta s meet and greet in Prague with Baathist intelligence operatives .
Im asking Skimpypenguin in your best assesment will there be any smoking gun documentation come out linking directly the OVP with the promulgation /promotion and actual
carrying out of torture - ?(A smoking gun email detailing how the OVP pushed Gen Miller into illegal torture at Gitmmo - boy that would be a pretty good pushback from the OGA ers !)
Just trying to keep up with this whole shebang - sure looks like the criminal conspiracy aka Cheneys OVP , gwb43 , sure are counting on a whole bunch of eletronically generated and
transmitted information remainig lost and never resurrected . BTW skimpypenguin - what is a SAP report ?
Again skimpy thank you for your service -and thanks for contributing here .
Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 6:07 pm
23
In response to libbyliberal @ 20
I repeat, again, my judgment that the most surprising moment (to me) at the Libby Trial is the way Fitz had Addington purring like a kitty. To this day I dont know how that happened.
Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 6:36 pm
24
In response to emptywheel @ 23
I dont think it was that shocking. Addington thinks he is the smartest guy in the room and he wants to let others know it too. Ask him the right questions, set up in the proper manner, and
he will blab I think. This is actually a fairly common phenomenon with lawyers suddenly on the stand answering questions instead of asking them. Fitzgerald did a very good job with
Addington in how he crafted the examination.
Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 6:50 pm
25
I compare it with HJC, which is obviously not a fair comparison.
That said, what surprised me was NOT that Fitz asked the right questions, but that Addy offered up so much totally damning answers.
Reply
BMcGarth September 6th, 2009 at 6:52 pm
26
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emptywheel,Obama is trying to look forward code for no intestinal fortitude to do the right thing.Its no surprise that Cheney & Addington were involved directly.
Thew problem is the Prez much like his AG seem ineffectual for the job of Prez,remember defending & up holding the laws of the Land ?
Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 6:54 pm
27
Dammitall, I cant figure out how I got down the rabbit hole Im in, but I think I tripped on something while poking around in all things Addington. Theres no direct line between
Addington and this stuff that I can see, just found a bunch of stuff and saw a possible pattern.
Remember the hullabaloo about John Bolton requesting NSA intercepts? It seems one of them was about Libyan stuff, and it was blown off at the time because it appeared to be under his
purview (unlike North Korea).
Apparently Bolton asked about William Burns, Asst. Secy of State for Near East Affairs. Burns was named ambassador to Russia in August 2005; he held the ambassadorship until late
spring of 2008.
Youll recall that Liz Cheney became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State For Near Eastern Affairs as of Feb. 2005 upon her return from working for Bush/Cheney 2004. She
supported C. David Welch as Asst. Secy of State for Near East Affairs; Welch was named to this position in March 2005.
Note the gap: Burns is shown as stepping down and being replaced in March 2005 by Welch, but Burns has no apparent formal role with DoS until August 2005.
Welch ultimately is responsible for the agreement signed in 2008 between Libya and the U.S. to settle past claims, allowing Libya to restore a diplomatic relationship with the U.S.
In the background, there is the case of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, who had been rendered and held as a ghost detainee until his apparent death this year in a Libyan prison. A speech by
Bush in October 2002 and Colin Powells report of Feb. 2003 to the UN were allegedly based on information from al-Libi. al-Libi had been shipped to Egypt and tortured some time in
early 2002 after hed already been interrogated with some success by the FBI in late 2001; he is shifted around, ghosted, located at some points in time in Pakistan and in Poland, until
he is identified as being moved to a black site in Mauritania in November 2005. al-Libi disappears from American control between November 2005 and September 2006, eventually
being repatriated to Libya sometime in 2006.
Keep in mind that the continent of Africa is part of the portfolio under the Asst. Secy of State of Near East Affairs.
Is all of this related, or just random circumstance?
Reply
libbyliberal September 6th, 2009 at 6:59 pm
28
In response to emptywheel @ 23
Addington was described by U.S. News & World Report as the most powerful man youve never heard of.
The omnipresent permission giver. Would have liked to have seen your Fitz wipe away that teflon smugness.
Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 7:03 pm
29
In response to emptywheel @ 25
The structure of Waltons courtroom and a pro asking tailored questions is a hell of a lot different than the bozos at HJC. For all the bad about Addington, he strikes me as a laced up guy
when it comes to real authority over him; he was disdainful to HJC, but sure as heck not with Walton sitting next to and above him and an USA/AG designate examining him. I was
always bummed NSA/CREW didnt do more to put him in the chair, even for custodian testimony, but they probably wouldnt have done much anyway I suppose.
Reply
rincewind September 6th, 2009 at 7:03 pm
30
In response to emptywheel @ 25
I remember thinking at the time that Addington reminded me of a couple of Aspergers friends they just dont seem to have any internal inhibitor on saying whatevers in their mind
(and they DO think theyre the smartest people in the room ;> ) But yeah, Fitz played him very very well.
Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 7:40 pm
31
In response to bmaz @ 29
I think it was all seeded in whatever GJ/depositions he did. And it comes down to an absolute command of the facts.
Thats the kind of authority that makes David Addington heed, I think.
Reply
emptywheel September 6th, 2009 at 7:40 pm
32
In response to rincewind @ 30
I said Aspergers at the time not really knowing what that meant. But yeahno filter, no understanding of social rules.
Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 7:49 pm
33
In response to emptywheel @ 32
Pretty sure I asked about Aspies during your live blog of his testimony; your description at the time sounded like he was absolutely compelled to dump, no inner voice telling him to stop.
Reply
fatster September 6th, 2009 at 7:56 pm
34
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In response to Rayne @ 33
I remembered that had been discussed here at some time in the past, and googled. Used addington asperger as the search item. You popped right up when I did that.
Reply
STTPinOhio September 6th, 2009 at 8:06 pm
35
Addington, aka Cheneys Cheney, directly involved in torture memos?
Nooooo you dont say!
Will wonders ever cease?
Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 8:18 pm
36
In response to fatster @ 34
Yeah, I found my query during the second session of EWs liveblogging of Addington, at comment (51).
BTW, didnt realize that SourceWatch had put together a timeline of all the liveblogging of the Libby Trial how groovy is that??
Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 8:33 pm
37
In response to alinaustex @ 22
SAP = Special Access Program
Yes, I think the field guys, not the career desk jockeys, will sink the whole OVP crowd.
Folks, this is survival of the fittest. This isnt going to end up with someone being fired or embarrassed in the 24 hour news cycle. Were talking federal indictments. CIA paramilitaries are
normal people like you and I. Set aside the partisan/ideological differences for a second. They have families, they have mortgages on nice houses in McLean and Chantilly, and they have
cars and college to pay for.
They are not going to let some CIA lawyer (Addington) and a draft-dodger (Cheney) get away with this unscathed. Many of them are ex-military and take this personally. They put their
lives, careers and freedom on the line to execute orders directly from the White House. And this is how theyre repaid?
Youre going to see so many leaks Empywheel is going to have to start a spin-off blog just to dissect it all. These people create counterinsurgencies, raise rebel armies and sneak around
the globe for a living. They arent going to let Cheney get away. And FYI: if the Obama Administration tries to block this investigation quietly (or pardon people who threaten to detail
operations that started during the Clinton years, which WILL come to light) theyll obliterate him in 2012, too.
These people do this for a living in hostile places all over the globe. Theyre not going to go down without a fight. Many of them are like me: if I got guidance from the White House directly - I wouldnt ask any questions. Neither would any of you. That kind of involvement and proximity to the Presidency/Vice Presidency is intoxicating. I met General Powell once in
Arlington, and I was speechless.
Cheney abused that power and the respect brave men and women have for the office of the Presidency and the Office of the Vice President. He manipulated the CIA to interrogate,
knowing he would hang them out to dry when the media caught on to it. But before that, he launched a parallel effort within JSOC to do all that in more, with the explicit intention of
subverting Congressional oversight.
I know the cliche is that CIA went rogue. Even JSOC and the contractors deserve a pass here. They trusted the OVP that this was legal and aboveboard. Did some of them relish operating
extra-legally? Some did.
Most did it because the Vice President asked them to. And now, they feel betrayed.
Reply
greenbird4751 September 6th, 2009 at 8:38 pm
38
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 11
again, hoping my dkos sig theft to be officially permitted by its author, wherever you are:
The Addington perpwalk is the trailhead for accountability in this wound on our national psyche.Sachem
and i use it wherever else i can.
I will be alert to your insights, sp, they are valuable.
Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 8:42 pm
39
In response to alinaustex @ 22
In all seriousnessbefore anyone guffaws, GWB also deserves a pass.
The man was a born-again recovering alcoholic who dabbled with cocaine and barely graduated from college. He failed at everything he ever did and embarrasses probably the coolest
dad ever (his dad was a Navy pilot, the CIA director and the Vice President. What the fuck?)
Cheney, on the other hand, has stated on the record he felt the Presidency was diminished after Nixons administration. No conspiracy theory needed: He was planning to be the most
powerful VP for over 30 years. He didnt want to be President. He wanted to be VP and have the intelligence and defense portfolios. Cheney (and Addington) are all about ego and
revenge, not greed and power. The power was a means to an end. They had certain ideas of how the Presidential power should be expanded, and he conned Bush into delegating all the
boring stuff to him. Happened in Iran-Contra, happens every day in the military.
Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 8:47 pm
40
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37
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You may have a message about this.
Were in territory now where we are neophytes, much as people getting orders were in new territory a few years ago. Were going to need guidance and tools.
Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 8:49 pm
41
In response to greenbird4751 @ 38
The key here is Addington. And I say that, because previously Addington, Libby, Flanigan, Cheney, Haynes and Yoo all played this really dangerous game called mutual assured
destruction.
One of them flipped, or grew a conscience, and theyd throw that person to the wolves.
The interesting thing to see is how much they all start to distance themselves from one another. Cheney may turn on Libby, Libby on Addington, or vice versa. And remember that
EVERYONE - except for Cheney - is a certified, actual lawyer. If it comes down to saving their own skin (especially Libby) they will turn on each other. Libby, Addington and Haynes
are the ones to watch, because they did the dirty work. Not even Cheney is as complicit as Addington. I was the guy that drew up plans and strategies for days on end when I started out.
Addington drafted complex four and five page legal memos in less than a day. He was driven and he was completely cognizant of the evil he was doing. And they didnt care if they
manipulated or burned CIA or the military, which is really going to bite them in the arse.
Reply
fatster September 6th, 2009 at 8:49 pm
42
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37
We the People are betrayed. The persons who tortured violated law, international agreements, the Constitution, and humanitys collective conscience (though, apparently, not their own).
I recognize the comfort of thinking it was ordered by the OVP, but that excuse didnt pass in Nuremburg and rightly so. The overriding goal is to bring to justice those who orchestrated
and implemented these horrendous things.
Reply
Loo Hoo. September 6th, 2009 at 8:55 pm
43
In response to Rayne @ 36
It was fun looking through the comments there (not to mention the Addington spill)!
Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 9:02 pm
44
In response to Rayne @ 40
Theyre smart. CIA/DIA/JSOC/SSB does this for a living.
Expect leaks after the first major Obama policy victory. That way its all over the teevee and the bloggers spread it. It wont be this week because of the health care/school noise.
Business ties, affairstheyll start with that to knock them off balance and then start getting former military at GTMO and SOUTHCOM to go on the record about GTMO being ordered
to use the same guidance the black sites fell under.
Simultaneously, there will be an intensive campaign to show no links between Iraq and Syria, and Iraq and AQ. Former Iranian sources theyve flipped, guys they were running out of
Mosul who used to work for Saddam, those types of people will come forward with their blessing and protection. The idea will be to discredit Cheney and the crew in preparation for the
big finale:
Faulty intelligence. Raids on places that dont exist, missed chances to find people in Pakistan, etc. Theyll tie it into the EIT program and show why it was ineffective. Some will stay
silent and try to angle for a pardon, others will come completely clean. Look for the logistical and operations personnel more than the paramilitaries themselves to have the best testimony.
If they were smart, they knew this day would come and kept all copies of cables, etc even if it was classified, to protect themselves. That stuff will start to come out when they know they
can blanket the airwaves with it. Think a media shock and awe, by insiders, and then open warfare at the hearings. A lot of it will closed-session but the staffers will leak most of that (the
money from WaPo, NYT, Newsweek is too good).
Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 6th, 2009 at 9:07 pm
45
In response to fatster @ 42
I have said on EW many times that it was not CIA, it was JSOC that did the truly horrible stuff. CIA stuck to the EITs (which themselves are indefensible) and contractors conducted the
waterboarding(s).
JSOC is the most guilty party. Followed by the contractors, and, finally, the least culpable and willing to go that far: college-educated, politically astute CIA paramilitaries.
Seeing as Xes indictments have dovetailed with this special prosecutor appointment, Id wager they will collide, if they havent already.
Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 9:11 pm
46
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 41
Well, you better tell your buddies to hurry up then, because a new statute of limitation expires every day; some are five year statutes, some are eight year statutes. The death cases have
no statute, but they will be the hardest to prosecute and will not be amenable to traveling up the chain to the top as you describe. The offenses and conspiracy charges that could be
extrapolated from the overt acts of the offenses are starting to fritter away.
Reply
Rayne September 6th, 2009 at 9:20 pm
47
In response to bmaz @ 46
The only other out is crimes which have not yet been discovered and recognized as such, yes? once publicized, the clock begins ticking.
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Skimpy (44) we can see JSOCs extremely large footprints readily, and I think the tough part is going to be cracking the SAPs behind which they could hide, especially if they are
under ACCMs.
Reply
fatster September 6th, 2009 at 9:27 pm
48
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 44
May you be correct! I will hold that thought.
Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 9:39 pm
49
In response to Rayne @ 47
Unlikely. Statutes of limitation are presumed applicable and are effectively jurisdictional. You would have to show active concealment or an inability to discover the conduct, and courts
do not favor this and have a high burden for establishing it. For statutes such as most conspiracy charges, which require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the statute of
limitations begins to run on the date of the last substantive overt act. As the basic fact set that these specific crimes has been known, especially to the government (after all the govt. was
committing them), it would be hard to argue that the statutes of limitation should be tolled (i.e. suspended) simply because the government refused to properly investigate. I would say the
chances of that are about zero,
Reply
Mary September 6th, 2009 at 9:54 pm
50
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37
They trusted the OVP that this was legal and aboveboard.
I dont buy that. You dont kidnap someone into torture and watch how the whole thing is hidden and how foreign govs are desparate to have their roles kept secret - you dont listent to
Bush parrot our commitment to humane treatment publically while you torture disappeared persons privatley and think it is aboveboard.
Im hoping you are right on the rest, but its hope, not belief. There has been a lot of remorselessness over the better part of a decade by now, and a lot of people who rely on the
protection of power of the offices of OVP and WH, no matter how much they may be angry over some things. And those people who need that protection have friends and colleagues
who wont want to rock the boat if it may damage them.
There may be a lot of people with mortgages and kids on the soccer team, but they are also people who grown accustomed to working with the torturers and they have had years now of
that subtle reinforcement hammering at them, that torture was patriotic and necessary and Cheney is the guy who will protect the torturers, their colleagues, themselves. Obamaco isnt
going to - they know that, theyve seen what happens with Bush whistleblowers under Obama. Its the Kappes and Brennans that Obama plays to, not the Moras and Tamms and
Tagubas.
With no real prosecutor and no real power, I really dont think anything will come of any of this and if it starts to go down a path where something may come of it, Obama will rush in
with claims of states secrets to cover things up. All someone will have to do is threaten to blow the foreign gov associations and theres no place Obama wont go to lock it down IMO.
But Ill hope Im wrong and wait to see if I can believe. I like believing and I dont get to do it much. Rachel Alexandra I believed in - Obama and his DOJ notsomuch and the concept of
a lot of good and decent people who worked in the torture cesspool for the better part of a decade just waiting to get an opportunity to expose themselves and their colleagues, I dont buy
that. I tried to buy the dominos of Goldsmith, Comey, Levin as good guys really trying to draw a line, but the more that comes out, the less you can believe any of that.
Reply
bmaz September 6th, 2009 at 10:08 pm
51
I tried to buy the dominos of Goldsmith, Comey, Levin as good guys really trying to draw a line, but the more that comes out, the less you can believe any of that.
Heh heh, I do not recall you being willing to spend much, if anything, on those unfit for use intended goods though.
Reply
readerOfTeaLeaves September 6th, 2009 at 10:31 pm
52
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37
Cheney abused that power and the respect brave men and women have for the office of the Presidency and the Office of the Vice President. He manipulated the CIA to
interrogate, knowing he would hang them out to dry when the media caught on to it. But before that, he launched a parallel effort within JSOC to do all that in more, with the
explicit intention of subverting Congressional oversight.
First, I hope youre genuinely who you claim to be.
Second, I hope youre right.
Third, if they allow themselves to get rolled by Mr Five Deferments, the Draft Dodger Extraordinaire Richard Cheney, then they should find other means of employment.
Fourth, I just want it to be legal and public. I want the law to work, because that would be the ultimate fuck you! for Cheney, Addington, Yoo, Cambone, Feith, Wolfowitz, Perle,
Gonzo, et al. Getting these bastards legally would be the ultimate payback. Heres hoping
Reply
readerOfTeaLeaves September 6th, 2009 at 10:41 pm
53
In response to rincewind @ 30
I made a complete ass of myself in one of those conversations.
But watching Addington a bit more closely, he comes across as a guy who is so certain of his own omniscience, and so scornful of others, that his insolence really is breathtaking.
Hes aggressive, and he appears to have an incredibly inflated sense of his own importance; its a toxic combo.
Reply
Auduboner September 6th, 2009 at 11:35 pm
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In response to bmaz @ 7
Ah, but this might be the Genius of Holders limited investigation, not that he knows it now.
Any tenacious defense counsel for an indicted low-level operative is going to DEMAND full discovery of the justifying documents, in order to buttress the defense that the President
authorized the (despicable) actions in question. That Discovery process will produce more damning evidence than all of the congressional hearings put together. Holders DoJ wont
jeopardize the prosecution case by limiting the Defenses access to White house documents, and can lay the blame for their disclosure at the feet of those Pesky Defense Attorneys.
Political retribution is achieved, and the present Administration can say, the Judge made us do it! Win-win.
Of course, all this assumes competent Defense Counsel is involved Can we all start contributing now to the Low Level CIA Torturer Defense Fund? Ive got the first $100
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Styve September 6th, 2009 at 11:44 pm
55
As I have said over the past week, its all in the book by Gellman, Angler! Arrest these motherfuckers!!
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readerOfTeaLeaves September 6th, 2009 at 11:52 pm
56
Mind you, this is only proof that Addington had direct communication with Yoo and Bradbury, but not Levin. It doesnt prove that Levin was ousted to make it easier for
Addington to direct the OLC opinion writing process.
From SSCI Report: Release of Declassified Narrative Describing The DoJ OLCs Opinions on the CIAs Detention and Interrogation Program [22 April 2009, Sen John D
Rockefeller, IV]:
PREFACE: an initial narrative of the history of the opinions of the DoJs OLC from 2002 to 2007, on the legality of the CIAs detention and interrogation program
p. 3: In April 2002, attys from the CIAs Office of Gen Counsel began discussions with the Legal Advisor to the NSC and OLC concerning the CIAs proposed interrogation plan for
Abu Zubaydah and legal restrictions on that interrogation. CIA records indicate that the Legal Advisor to the NSC briefed the National Security Advisor [Rice?], Deputy National Security
Advisor [Hadley], and Counsel to the Pres. [Gonzo], as well as the AG [Ashcroft] and the head of the Criminal Division of DoJ [Chertoff?].
p. 7 In the spring of 2003, the DCI asked for a reaffirmation of the policies and practices of the interrogation program. In July 2003**, according to CIA recrods, the NSC Principals
met to discuss the interrogation techniques employed in the CIA program. According to CIA records, the DCI and the CIAs General Counsel attended a meeting with the Vice
President, the National Security Advisor [Rice], the AG [Ashcroft], the Acting Asst AG for the OLC [?? Levin???], the Counsel to the President [Gonzo], and the Legal Advisor to teh
NSC to describe the CIAs interrogation techniques, including waterboarding. According to CIA records, at the conclusion of the meeting, the Principals reaffirmed that the CIA
program was lawful and reflected administration policy.
p. 8: In May 2004, after the issuance of the IG review, CIA records indicate that the CIAs General Counsel met with the Counsel to the President [Gonzo], the Counsel to the VP
[Addington], the NSC Legal Advisor, and senior DoJ officials about the CIAs program and IG review.
** the month Valerie Plame was outed by OVP.
And from the SSCI Report on Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Counducted By PCEG adn the OSP within DoD/Policy
Dec 2001: Rome meetings, in which Hadley and Wolfowitz tell Larry Franklin and Harold Rhodes to go to the meeting with Ghorbanifar and Iranians in Italy, and to tell no one,
including the CIA because the Iranians dont trust the CIA. Michael Ledeen sets up the meeting. (The Iranians are said to have distrusted the CIA, probably b/c the CIA knew they
were full of shit and it was the only way the Iranians could get away with feeding info into DoD-OVP.)
p. 6: The tasking later came back to [Rodman] through senior DoD channels as a request from NSA Hadley for the DoD to pursue the meeting with Iranians. Mr. Ledeen advised
[SSCI] that he had contacted Mr. Hadley, who he described as an old friend, and subsequently met with Mr Hadley and another NSC official to present Mr. Ghorbanifars## offer to
arrange meetings with Iranian officials.
p. 9: The US Govt officials involved in approving the Rome meeting had the authority to do so, even if it was considered an intelligence activity. Under the National Security Act of
1947, the NSC is given broad authority to identify intelligence needs, establish priorities to meet those intelligence needs, and establish policies relating to the conduct of intelligence
activities of the US
p. 9: Thus, Mr Hadley, who received concurrence from NSA Rice, had the authority to request Dep Sec Wolfowitz, who coordinated with Sec Rumsfeld, to dispatch two DoD employees
to Rome to meet with Iranians
p. 9: While the DoD had the authority to conduct the meeting in Rome, there was limited advance coordination of the activity outside the Department. Mr Hadley had advised DoD
to pursue the matter on a close-hold basis due to its unusual nature and Dep Sec Wolfowitz had reiterated that guidance [i.e., the totally cut the CIA, the FBI, the DIA, or any other
intel agency out of the meeting]
p. 14: it genuinely seemed to be Mr Franklins perception that [the info he received from the Iranians about attacks on US fighters in Afghanistan] had saved American lives. [I
include this bit because these are precisely the words Cheney uses to excuse torture.]
p. 22: Mr. Franklin recalled being approached by an official of the OVP in early 2002 requesting his opinion of Mr. Ghorbanifars plan and his judgements of its prospects for
success.
Both the SSCI report on the OCL memos, and the SSCI report on OSP (Feiths shop within DoD, set up by the neocons) have repeated references to the OVP, which brings Addington
into sharp relief drawing up the intertwining policies that led to the OLC memos and the activity in DoDs OSP office.
The OLC memos are only part of the story, but when one realizes that they were being written at the same period when Ledeen was putting together secret meetings in Italy (where DoD
employees were to meet with Iranians, but keep the meetings secret not even sharing intel with the CIA), its clear that all of this nonsense looks a bit Keystone Cops-ish, but it would
have required a legal ediface so complex that it would make baroque church organs look like simple gizmos.
## Ghorbanifar of Iran-Contra infamy.
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bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 12:17 am
57
In response to Auduboner @ 54
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I really cannot emphasize this enough, this is exactly why the preliminary review is not going to lead to anything substantive; not a sign there is some creative plan or available pathway
that it will. In fact, the odds are far, far greater that this is part of a designed limited hangout to give the slightest patina of having investigated to take away the claim by international
types that because there was no US investigation there should be international jurisdiction.
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Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 12:38 am
58
And once they get through the layer of lawyers, theres going to be a layer of management which will claim they are covered under USC Title 10 (military actions under direction of
executive without Congressional oversight) versus USC Title 50 (intel operations subject to Congressional oversight).
This is teed up early with Addington and/or Yoo wrt to powers of president as C-in-C during a time of war. But it will be the little guys who are going to argue this point, that they were
told this was a military op and therefore not subject to any additional disclosure and oversight, ollie-ollie-oxenfree and all that.
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x174 September 7th, 2009 at 1:51 am
59
thanks for staying on top of this festering heap of lies, distortions, untruths, misrepresentations, falsehoods, deceptions and, of course, crimes.
until the DOJ commences to actually DO something meaningful about the steaming heap of atrocities, i find it difficult to pay attention to all the legalistic shenanigans.
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nanute September 7th, 2009 at 3:59 am
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In response to Audoboner@53: Any good defense lawyer will demand full discovery.
Call me a cynic, but they wont produce all the relevant docs. Didnt a very prominent govt case against a Senator from Alaska just get overturned for this very same reason?
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drational September 7th, 2009 at 5:19 am
61
I suspect Levin was predisposed to standing in the way of coverup. I bet you can compile a list of people they wanted out of the way to deal with the torture issue from the Comey
Testimony on warrantless wiretapping:
James Comey, Jack Goldsmith, Patrick Philbin, Chuck Rosenberg, Daniel Levin, James Baker, David Ayres, were all listed by Comey as DOJ folks prepared to resign from the
Government if the Warrantless Surveillance program continued illegally in 2004. Besides Levin, Philbin and Comey, I am not sure who else was around to resist the torture immunity
memos in 2005.
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alinaustex September 7th, 2009 at 6:01 am
62
skimpypenguin@ 38.
Maybe you can make an agument for Dubyas not being prosecuted for war crimes - but only if the Bush family promises to go after the Cheney clan hammer & tong. Hammer & Tong
meaning telling us where all the bodies are buried , or at least giving us guidance where to go seek that information.Furthermore the Bushies would have to give the ongoing investigation
political credence too -maybe send one of the the family lawyers/mouthpieces-like former Attorney General Thornburgh out to talk on the bobblehead shows -explaining why we
needed to bring Cheney and his unitarian neocon possee to Justice ! Then and only then would I consider giving President Cod Piece any semblance of a pass..
Again skimpypenguin thank you for still posting here -and I for one have full faith and confidence you are who you say you are -because frankly your insights track favorable with some
other formers I have been blessed to get to know.
So carry on -skimpypenguin -and God Speed
And ps ..bmaz if you are reading this you might want to go read a short book Operation Hotel California to get a sense in just how pissed off the spooks at the pointy end of the spear
have become , and for what reasons,,,,
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JohnnyTable70 September 7th, 2009 at 6:17 am
63
In response to libbyliberal @ 20
Your quote makes me recall the scene in Annie Hall where Woody Allen produced Marshall McCluhan and says something like, if only life could be like this.
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bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 6:20 am
64
In response to alinaustex @ 62
Where were these heroic and patriotic spooks the last eight years? Why are they suddenly going to come out and do the right thing after it is so late? Why do they wait until statutes of
limitation are expiring? When exactly are they going to manifest and execute this grand plan? When before has the rule of law been saved by a bunch of spooks (they are pretty effective
at breaking the law and lying and dissembling about it though)? Who is going to execute on this fantastical plan - the DOJ that is still corrupted and complicit? Obama and Holder who
have been quite consistently clear they do not intend to do anything of the sort? I have not read Operation Hotel California, but I am familiar with it and have heard an NPR interview
with the author.
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SKIMPYPENGUIN September 7th, 2009 at 6:52 am
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In response to bmaz @ 64
Theyre coming out because now they might burn for someone elses arrogance.
Never underestimate self-preservation; its very powerful.
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bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 7:07 am
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66
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 65
A fair answer perhaps, and always a solid default explanation in such criminal and quasi-criminal situations. Although I have to wonder what real exposure these folks have at this point.
There are likely no more than a handful, maybe two, that have any exposure to the limited review underway, and there is no reason whatsoever to believe it will go any further than that.
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Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 7:14 am
67
In response to bmaz @ 66
Umm, dont discourage them, bmaz. We certainly cant see the future, either.
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rincewind September 7th, 2009 at 7:17 am
68
In response to bmaz @ 49
For statutes such as most conspiracy charges, which require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the last substantive overt
act.
But bushco was obstructing and lying right up until Jan 20, and hold-overs have continued till today (with ample assistance from Obama/Holder/Panetta) are those substantive overt
acts?
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behindthefall September 7th, 2009 at 7:25 am
69
Perhaps SKIMPYPENGUIN has made this clear and Ive just missed it, but what is heating up the tin roof on which these cats who might sing are sitting? Are they about to be let go? (SP
mentioned that they have everyday lives that depend on regular paychecks, not family fortunes.) But whos going to fire them? Who finds their continued employment inconvenient? Isnt
the wind just going to bend over the tops of the trees, not uproot trunks? (Sorry been following too many tropical depressions, I guess ) But isnt it very hard to change the
lower-downs in an organization? Isnt it usually the case that a few higher-ups get blown away, but little else happens, even with the best of will?
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ondelette September 7th, 2009 at 7:31 am
70
In response to Mary @ 50
Goldsmith wrote an OLC memo justifying rendition and looking for loopholes in Article 49 of the 4th Geneva Convention. He argued that a prisoner who had not been charged was not
legally a civilian prisoner under 4th Geneva yet, so they could be deported as long as they were brought back after interrogation. Daniel Levin wrote a memo on how to make
waterboarding legal under the Torture Act for James Comey. There are more, Michael J. Garcia (U.S.A. S.D.N.Y. for 3 years, prosecuting terrorists) wrote more memoes justifying
rendition with respect to Geneva. There was a whole cottage industry in circumventing Geneva by people who have gone on either to undue respectability (Goldsmith), or at least lack of
scrutiny (Garcia) while people got imprisoned, shipped, or tried and convicted using torture data.
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rincewind September 7th, 2009 at 7:33 am
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In response to readerOfTeaLeaves @ 53
What I remember was having such a sense of deja vu watching Addington, and puzzling over what it was reminding me of, and then when ?Rayne? first mentioned Aspergers the light
went on a college prof/dept head (IT), a friend of mine in the dept (whos most likely either developing neural networks or a homeless loonie, could go either way), and my dad (a
recovering lawyer and a total putz at relationships).
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Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 8:12 am
72
In response to rincewind @ 71
Hes surely without any awareness of how dickish he is; the video from the HJC committee linked above is quite good as we can see he has complete disregard for others social rank,
being focused only on his own agenda.
I can think of a manager I knew like that, an engineer by education who was completely blind to social ramifications of his assholishness. Got promoted to management for being a
technical whiz and definitely not for his people skills. (I swear to God that many of the problems with GM often the last several decades were because of placing assholes like this in
places where numbers mattered more than people.)
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readerOfTeaLeaves September 7th, 2009 at 8:36 am
73
In response to Rayne @ 72
Cluelessness, thy name is Addington.
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Mary September 7th, 2009 at 8:37 am
74
In response to ondelette @ 70
and bmaz @ 50
I did actually try, even if it seems like Ive been standing on the other side of the line for a long time. Its like when a client comes in and tells their story and they are always the hero of
every story. And you want to believe that, because it is going to make everything easier. But you have that ugly part in your job description where you have to keep asking them the next
question and the next one and the answers always change the story and it never ever finishes with, and they all lived happily everafter.
Even though Ive been anklebiting for a long time, I have hung on to bits and pieces and in particular on the actual torture front waiting to see the memos or emails or any of it where
theres a no from someone, or anyone. That no that the planted pieces in Newsweek and WaPo etc. keep seeming to promise are there, *if only* we *knew* more, knew what the
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authors of the pieces knew. And then what comes out doesnt take you where they implied, ever.
Ondelette - I completely agree and have been saying some of that for a long time, but I still was willing to buy that there was this kind of titanic struggle, even though every question
answered shows there was not. Not only did Goldsmith write that crap - but he has gone on to persistently and prominently editorialize for keeping the victims of his original, imo criminal,
opinions disappeared and to try to further legitimize disappearing innocent people into depravity as a *sound policy* to *keep us safe.*
Sitting on the knowledge of the old men on walkers sold into shackles and drugging and stripping and hooding and assaults and abuse and human experimentation, and the children stolen
from their parents and shipped out of country to someplace like GITMO or disappeared into Bagram or Camp Cropper or elsewhere - sitting on the full pictorals and videos of what
happens with the chaos of Executive whim that the has promoted - the existing results arent enough for him. He has to editorialize for more, longer, more invovled, more people
interwoven in the process; a wider torture tent; a more public embrace of torture. Thats what he finds to be a worthwhile way to spend time. Its how his interaction with torture and
power shaped him and the frightening part is that its a face he proud to show and one that an institution like Harvard is willing to put on display. And in the end what you have is
someone like Katyal being seduced by it too, giving more and more the luster of acceptablity.
Some of the rest, the Thompsons at Pepsico (amazing Canadians are ok with that), the Comeys at Lockheed, the Ashcrofts raking in millions from Christies and elsewhere as lobbyists and
consultants, the Philbins and Levins Kirklands and White & Cases - at least a lot of those have made their contribution to torture regimes then kept quiet. Goldsmith, like Yoo, cant kick
back and be satsified with what theyve already destroyed. Thats just the chum on the water that draws them. They dont want the feeding frenzy to end. They want to make torture an
academic exercise in every way - and almost no one flinches from it. Certainly not Obama, who rushed to pick an Solicitor Gen from the ranks of those charmed by, and defensive of, the
torture consultants who were architects of massive fraud on the courts.
Its why I cant really buy into what Skimpy is floating, as much as I wanted, anymore than I could buy into what Newsweek floated or Goldsmith floated etc. I do think that people will
leak from self defense, but I think with Obamaco in office, and the strength of hands held by Cheney and torturers (with Kagan, who would ultimately argue the cases before the Sup Ct a
Goldsmith fan) the best self defense for a lot of those guys is keeping quiet for even longer. Or mentioning a foreign nations interaction as a surefire way to get high level states secrets
invocations and walk away.
Anyone who was going to be a hero I think already made their effort. And what has happened is that Obamaco used their leaks and whistleblowing to get into office, but has now hung
them out to dry. Watching what has happened to the Bush whistleblowers under Obama isnt really a great motivator for anyone else to step forward. And watching Obama adopt the
same policies doesnt help build the pool either. Theres not likely to be anyone out there with the goods who begins to buy into Soufans now we arent going to do that when they
know why Obama is reserving rights to torture renditions. They know that al-Libis suiciding happened on Obamas watch because he wouldnt do anyting about it. They knew Obama
wouldnt move troops to protect Dostums mass grave site. They knew Obama wont make a real commitment to doing the right thing and theyre biding their time bc thats been the
historic way to win and Obamas not a game changer on that. IM kinda depressed and tired today opinion.
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Mary September 7th, 2009 at 8:42 am
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In response to rincewind @ 71
He actually reminded me of other lawyers and business guys Ive known who have that same style. Im kind of refreshed to hear that for a lot of people they would think someone like
Addington falls into a a severe personality disorder group instead of something they hit up against in any big deal and too often in small deals.
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bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 9:05 am
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In response to rincewind @ 68
Impossible to tell without specific facts and charges laid out in a charging document; but that said, no I do not think those will serve as proper substantive overt acts. Look at it this way as
a overly rudimentary example, if the concept is conspiracy to commit torture, you are looking for the last act of torture as your last overt act for starting the running of the statute of
limitations. Is it really that simple, no; but that kind of gives an idea.
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bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 9:12 am
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In response to Mary @ 74
Yep.
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fatster September 7th, 2009 at 9:22 am
78
Theyre ALL connected at the roots (=the root of all evil, or money).
Ring Prosecutors: Top Ashcroft Aide Helped Abramoff Client, Didnt Disclose Hoops Tix
Zachary Roth | September 7, 2009, 11:18AM
We told you on Friday that David Ayres, a close John Ashcroft ally, looks set to plead the fifth in the latest corruption trial of a Jack Abramoff underling. And over the weekend we got
fresh detail on what looks like Ayress cozy relationship with Team Abramoff.
In documents filed yesterday in the corruption trial of Abramoff aide Kevin Ring, and examined by TPMmuckraker, prosecutors asserted that Ayres who at the time was Ashcrofts
chief of staff at the Justice Department helped Ring win federal money for a prison to be built on the reservation of the Choctaw Indians, an Abramoff client. Prosecutors also asserted
that Ring then gave Ayres tickets to the 2002 NCAA basketball tournament in Washington D.C. And, they say, the following year, Ring gave Ayress wife tickets to a pro hoops game
after she had said that she wanted them as a birthday gift for her husband. Ayres didnt report any of these tickets on financial disclosure forms, say the Ring prosecutors.
More.
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Cheryl September 7th, 2009 at 9:26 am
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In response to emptywheel @ 32
How about Narcissistic personality disorder? Sounds like a pretty good match.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/N.....y_disorder
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Nell September 7th, 2009 at 10:10 am
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In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 37
The CIA and special forces have been involved with torture engaging in it and training military and paramilitary clients for decades. The agency spent millions of dollars and many
years developing and refining a program of coercive interrogation. The frequency with which the CIA has incorporated special forces in its activities makes it hard to draw a line between
the two (as you yourself pointed on on a previous thread).
The picture of heroic field operatives utterly uninvolved with torture until led astray by the evil OVP is neither convincing nor useful in tracing the torture program as it existed from 2001
to early 2009.
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Nell September 7th, 2009 at 10:12 am
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In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 39
all about ego and revenge, not greed and power
Right. The skyrocketing Halliburton stock was just a happy, accidental by-product.
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Nell September 7th, 2009 at 10:19 am
82
In response to Rayne @ 47
For the sake of 98% of those who are reading along, it would be good to avoid this becoming a milspeakfest.
What is/are ACCM?
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Rayne September 7th, 2009 at 12:39 pm
83
In response to Nell @ 82
ACCM = alternative or compensatory control measures.
See a defining comment at this link.
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Mary September 7th, 2009 at 1:23 pm
84
Sometimes running like a girl beats being Macho, again and again and again.
@77 During Ashcroftian days the acting USA for Guam, Black, who was pushing on a lot of things, was fired and a report that he and another DOJ employee (Meissner, who also got
*demoted*) prepared for Congress got deep sixed and never sent on to Congress. The Black firing seems like a trial run for the USA firings, but they managed to get an IG report done
with Gonzales at the DOJ helm in 2006. It relied pretty heavily on things Kyle Sampson told the inspectors (Hello????? NORA?!) and pretty much left out all the nifty little things that
were, oh, say, in actual freakin emails sent by Abramoff.
This older article in The Nation has some background and a dkos poster, dengre, has a lot of stuff on this in multiple posts.
So Black sees issues and his info get directed to Gonzales who is WH Counsel at the time. Meissner takes issues to his boss, this guy named McNulty, then at the ED VA. You know, the
guy whose crew got the criminal investigation referrals for torture and the guy who had such a convincing line during the USAtty firings hearings. Oddly enough, they didnt get their
backs covered much by Gonzales and McNulty and then Gonzales and McNulty go on to end up as AG and DAG. Go figure. But the real disgrace is the IG report that was coughed up by
DOJ.
It just pretended there was no such thing as Abramoffs emails, despite everything going on with them. In particular, it ignored this email:
http://www.talkingpointsmemo.c.....ultpage=2&
The other immediate (next two weeks) challenge is the Justice Department.
Last week the bad guys who still work there (the ones who got that bad letter on Murkowski issued) started a drum beat that the CNMI had to be taken over, because it was
a loophole in the federal immigration network, and that, as such, was a threat on terrorism. They have been spending a week or so telling everyone who will listen that the
CNMI, if it is not taken over, will be a major entry point for terrorists. This, of course, is patently ridiculous, actually just the opposite, and we have been working to counter
this, but they are not backing down. We had the COS of the Justice Department [that would be David Ayres] in our box at todays Redskins game and it seems that
there might be a classified document floating in the department which deals with this matter. Making it classified, if that is indeed the case, was a good idea by our
opponents, since that means we cannot get it[darnit, all they can get is a chit chat about it from Ayers - that classified thingy works real well]. Hopefully Babauta has some
connections there and can get a copy (perhaps at least on a redacted version), which he can pass on to you to draft a response. If this is at a stage where it is gaining
momentum, he will need to leak into the press that they are considering this and how it is exactly the opposite of what should be happening. This is a real potential threat. It
will require some major action from the Hill and a press attack to get this back in the bottle. He should just follow the example we have used in the past, where we get the
press out front carefully and push the Administration back.
I am supposed to see the Attorney General next week (the Thursday after Simchas Torah) and Kevin was slated to play basketball with him before then. We will
both mention this to him. The AG will be fine, but the underlings are a worrisome matter. I am not sure what to suggest on this one, other than well pass on what we get
from the COS, and you guys should do your best to hook up with as many of the Asst AGs as possible and the political folks there. There are, I believe, some former travelers
(folks who visited the CNMI during Froilans time) among them. Well hope that the higher ups will take some time to squash this on their own. If not, it could get to be a
fire fight.
emph and [] added.
Ring was Ashcrofts staffer when Ashcroft was a Senator and was, with Coughlin, hired on by Abramoff for - well, for what he got. Access. Ayres chats about classified memos involving
Abramoffs clients to Abramoff, while Ayres is at a Redskins game favor of Abamoff; Abramoff sends out his emails, underlings like Black and Meissner get whacked hard on the job
front with something less than protection from Gonzales and McNulty, Ring and Abramoff are going to meet with and play hoops with Ashcroft to get the report squashed and voila not only do the authors get whacked hard but the DOJ takes it upon itself to make sure the report doesnt make it Congress. And there it sits until well after Abramoffs emails are made
public and the Congressional committee can push to get it.
All of which makes the things that are being pushed in the trials seem small potatoes and you have to wonder how many statutes vis a vis Ashcroft are being run out while DOJ changes
their game from PIG to HORSE to ELEPHANT to YELLOW THROATED EUPHONIA. But at least they are keeping Ashcroft distracted by having Christie throw money at him. Good
job guys.
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radiofreewill September 7th, 2009 at 5:37 pm
85
In response to Mary @ 84
Mary - There was a Judge, iirc, also involved in the Black/Meissner/CNMI affair - and, at about the same time that Black got fired and Meissner got demoted, again iirc, the Judge was
promoted onto a lifetime Bench seat. The Bush Administration said his promotion was the normal course of affairs at that point in the Judges career, or something like that.
Do we know who that Judge was? And, where do Judges for Territories, like CNMI, actually sit? Ever since the story dropped-off the radar, Ive wondered if the Judge was somehow
connected to Abramoff and/or Rove, or otherwise caught-up in manipulation by Noel Hillmans PIN (Public Integrity Section,) the same group that is said to have been involved in the
Judge-selection in the Seigelman Affair.
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timbo September 7th, 2009 at 5:47 pm
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bmaz and Mary,
Yeah, cynicism may be the order of the daybut it is not the best play. Rather than prepare folks for disappointment, how about continuing to cover whatever legal issues you feel might
increase the chances of legal consequences for the tortures, thugs, etc? Not questioning your credentials with that question, just making an observation that once your view has been
expressed that it does nothing to further accountability by outlining ways that Holder and Obama might take to get out of actually enforcing the laws and the Constitutionunless you
have a plan to thwart that? So, I keep my fingers crossed that there is indeed a plan. If not a plan, than at least an incling that burying justice isnt the only likely outcome of War On
Terror.
Reply
bmaz September 7th, 2009 at 6:55 pm
87
In response to timbo @ 86
I call em as I see em, for better or worse. It is not my job to be overly and patronizingly optimistic when there is no factual basis for the same. In the same vein, exposing the ways in
which this is all being shunted and gamed does, in fact, further the cause of accountability by exhibiting how the craven will try to escape it. A citizenry better informed of the avenues of
escape is a citizenry better prepared to foreclose them.
Reply
Mary September 7th, 2009 at 7:45 pm
88
In response to radiofreewill @ 85
Im not sure if I know which judge you mean (on the complicated Abramoff intersections dengre is about the best there is) but Hillman himself got put on the District Court bench after
his activities as head of Public Integrity were well received by RNC/White House/Abramoff and seemed to make Canary crew happy as well.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,182793,00.html
Anyway, when Hillman got his slot the WH tried to say it had all been in the works and appearances making it look like a payoff were coincidental and the similarity to Bybee giving
away the torture farm and then getting his judicial appointment were also coincidental.
EW did a piece on Hillman getting called in to discuss Siegelman
http://emptywheel.firedoglake......-subpoena/
Bush took a run at putting ex-Abramoff *prosecutor* Judge Hillman onto the Third Circuit, but that fizzled.
http://www.harpers.org/archive.....c-90000509
Reply
fatster September 7th, 2009 at 8:42 pm
89
In response to Mary @ 88
Thanks, Mary and radiofreewill @ 84. Despite all my frustration and anger about the Seigelman thing, I had forgotten the Hillman portion of this sorry mess. So, frustration and anger up
by many more notches now. Sigh.
Reply
Jeff Kaye September 7th, 2009 at 9:18 pm
90
In response to Nell @ 80
I also believe that SPs scenario doesnt fit all the facts. I agree with SP that JSOC is far more culpable than typically discussed. However, the interpenetration of SO and CIA is
something even less discussed. You are correct to emphasize the previous existence of a long-standing torture program. To my knowledge, it has never been totally disassembled, and
lived on within OTS at CIA, and perhaps J9 at JFCOM, if not at Ft. Huachuca. Cheney/Addington woke the tiger, and rode it, but the bureaucrats at these agencies have seen POTUSs
and Veeps come and go. They remain. They get promoted. They go into industry, or start their own companies. The military-intelligence-industrial complex does not boil down to Cheney
and Addington, no matter how you slice it. The latter may be indictable, and I certainly hope so, but we are looking at a many-headed hydra.
Reply
Garrett September 7th, 2009 at 9:43 pm
91
Im interested to see whether they prosecute the death of Asad Jaleel in Iraq.
It is the most brutal of all the deaths. It seems a very prosecutable case, without the evidence problems. He had official EPW status.
It was Special Forces and regular soldiers who beat him, at separate times.
There is a suggestion or a possibility of premeditated murder.
Two Special Forces interrogation notes before his deaths have notations like this guy is too dangerous to ever let out. He was already badly beaten, with the distinct ring of bruising
around his abdomen and some teeth knocked out, no longer able to stand, then they broke his neck and broke all his ribs and stuck a gag in his mouth.
Its very much the sort of case they say they are intending to reconsider. Clearly beyond anything like an authorization. But the Special Forces involvement raises awkward questions.
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Reply
SKIMPYPENGUIN September 7th, 2009 at 11:04 pm
92
In response to Jeff Kaye @ 90
JPRA has always been a two-headed monster:
preparing to defend against it, and studying ways to implement it regardless of which POTUS is in office.
it being torture.
Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 2:52 am
93
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 65
bmaz asked you where were all of these heroic spooks for the last eight years.
Your reply was:
Theyre coming out because now they might burn for someone elses arrogance.
Never underestimate self-preservation; its very powerful.
Kinda gives their values away, doesnt it? SELF-preservation?
This is exactly how the head of the CIA, Admiral Stansfeld Turner, handled himself in front of the MKULTRA committee in 1977 after Kennedys committee was apprised of seven
boxes of information of CIA subprojects which were not destroyed - accidentally.
Stan (he probably had a wife, kids and a mortgage) says:
Until the recent discovery, it was believed that all of the MKULTRA files dealing with behavioral modification had been destroyed in 1973 on the orders of the then retiring Chief of the
Office of Technical Service, with the authorization of the DCI, as has been previously reported. Almost all of the people who had had any connection with the aspects of the project
which interested Senate investigators in 1975 were no longer with the Agency at that time. Thus, there was little detailed knowledge of the MKULTRA subprojects available to CIA
during the Church Committee investigations. This lack of available details, moreover, was probably not wholly attributable to the
destruction of MKULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on MKULTRA by the Inspector General notes on page 14: Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and
approval of test programs.
Heres the information that WASNT intentionally destroyed - and mind you, the following acts were performed on Americans:
1. Research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:
17 subprojects probably not involving human testing;
14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers;
19 subprojects probably including tests on human volunteers. While not known, some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjects as well;
6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting subjects.
2. Research on hypnosis: 8 subprojects, including 2 involving hypnosis and drugs in combination.
3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
4. Aspects of magicians art useful in covert operations: e.g., surreptitious delivery of drug-related materials: 4 subprojects.
5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and behavioral changes during psychotherapy: 9 subprojects.
6. Library searches and attendance at seminars and international conferences on behavioral modification: 6 subprojects.
7. Motivational studies, studies of defectors, assessment, and training techniques: 23 subprojects.
8. Polygraph research: 3 subprojects.
9. Funding mechanisms for MKULTRA external research activities: 3 subprojects.
10. Research on drugs, toxins, and biologicals in human tissue; provision of exotic pathogens and the capability to incorporate them in effective delivery systems: 6 subprojects.
11. Activities whose objectives cannot be determined from available documentation: 3 subprojects.
12. Subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities connected with the Armys Special Operations Division at Fr. Detrick, Md. This activity is outline in Book I of the
Church Committee Report, pp. 388-389. (See Appendix A, pp. 68-69.) Under CIAs Project MKNAOMI, the Army Assisted CIA in developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents
and delivery systems for use against humans as well as against animals and crops. The objectives of these subprojects cannot be identified from the recovered material beyond the fact
that the money was to be used where normal funding channels would require more written or oral justification than appeared desirable for security reasons or where operational
considerations dictated short lead times for purchases. About $11,000 was involved during this period 1953-1960: 3 subprojects.
13. Single subprojects in such areas as effects of electro-shock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysis of extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four
subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.
14. One or two subprojects on each of the following:
Blood Grouping research, controlling the activity of animals, energy storage and transfer in organic systems; and
stimulus and response in biological systems.
15. Three subprojects canceled before any work was done on them having to do with laboratory drug screening, research on brain concussion, and research on biologically active
materials to be tested through the skin on human volunteers.
Now, as to how much new the recovered material adds to what has previously been reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedys Subcommittee on Health on these topics,
the answer is additional detail, for the most part: e.g., the names of previously unidentified researchers and institutions associated on either a witting or unwitting basis with MKULTRA
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activities, and the names of CIA officials who approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new substantive material is also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for
experimentation and clinical testing associated with various research projects, and a possibly improper contribution by CIA to a private institution. However, the principal types of
activities included have, for the most part, either been outlined to some extent or generally described in what was previously available to CIA in the way of documentation and was
supplied by CIA to Senate investigators. For example:
Financial disbursement records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 of the 149 numbered MKULTRA subprojects had been recovered from the Office of Finance by CIA and were made
available to the Church Committee investigators in August or September 1975.
The 1963 Inspector General report on MKULTRA made available to both the Church Committee and Senator Kennedys Subcommittee mentions electro-shock
and harassment substances (pp. 4, 16); covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens (pp. 7, 10-12); the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in universities,
pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations (pp. 7, 9); and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144
subprojects related to the control of human behavior between 1953-1963 (p. 21).
Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 3:14 am
94
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 65
Theyre coming out because now they might burn for someone elses arrogance.
Never underestimate self-preservation; its very powerful.
In 1977, while Stan Turner was testifying under oath in front of Ted Kennedys committee, he was hiding the hideous fact that children were being tortured in dissociative states and
trained to be spies and sex-slaves.
The following is from a 1995 Presidential Hearing on Radiation and Mind Control Experiments done on American Citizens.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iflBkRlpRy0
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eXDASDDrDkM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-ES8Bv0_8w
Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 3:26 am
95
Project Paperclip was organized to bring over Nazi scientists and doctors to the United States at the end of WWII.
The list of hospitals, universities, military sites, prisons and NASA facilities in which these experiments were done has been declassified. At the time of Ted Kennedys hearing, that list
was classified and Stan Turner said he would notify them privately. Hmmmm..
The way that the CIA obtained children for experimentation is told to you by the second youtube above.
You see, she was sexually abused by her family and exploited. When the CIA found the pictures or films which were spread through the pedophile rings, rather than arrest the families
and find homes for the children, the CIA allowed the children to be sold to them.
No jail time.
See how that keeps working out?
No jail time.
For a corroborating story, and interestingly, a CIA agent that actually apparently did something to save a child, Kelly is her name, read this pdf:
http://www.freedrive.com/file/.....1;c-obrien
Reply
Boston1775 September 8th, 2009 at 3:41 am
96
And if you are wondering where they got their supply of boys, google Boys Town, sexual abuse, CIA
Reply
Jeff Kaye September 8th, 2009 at 7:39 am
97
In response to SKIMPYPENGUIN @ 92
Since JPRA only goes back to 1999, do you mean the survival programs in general?
Reply
Sorry but the comments are closed on this post
What al-Nashiri and KSM Didnt Tell Us
Bad Max Provides More Details
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War and Piece
Danger Room
RawStory
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Anonymous Liberal
Secrecy News
Consumerist
Calculated Risk
The Gavel
First Draft
Balkinization
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TIMELINE COLLECTION
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Washington: CIA Sets its Technology Priorities for 2006 - Intelligence Online http://www.intelligenceonline.com/NETWORKS/FILES/516/516.asp?ru...
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Washington: China and Iran Intelligence Online n 516 - 27/01/06
Prime Targets of Bureau of
Industry and Security
London: 2006/2007:
Security Technologies
Certified by GCHQ
Armaments: The Pentagon's
Overseas Shopping List
Intelligence technologies:
Narus at Center of
Controversy over NSA
Interceptions
Washington: Debate on
Merging Domestic and
Foreign Intelligence
Washington: NGA to
Organize U.S. Geo-Space
Research
Paris: Business Intelligence
Gains Ground in Big
Companies
A research organization under the CIA's authority, the Intelligence Technology Innovation Center
(ITIC) is paying priority this year to technologies aimed at improving the sharing of intelligence.
In the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, the ITIC launched a research program on tools to analyze data called
Knowledge, Discovery and Dissemination (KDD). It allocated $8 million per year to the program that
concerns the entire American intelligence community. Starting from this year, ITIC is intent on seeing the
KDD program focus more specifically on technologies allowing for real cooperation between different
agencies through the use of shared data bases. ITIC answers directly to the CIA's Science and
Technology directorate, as does the In-Q-Tel Interface Center (QIC), a unit that dovetails investment of the
CIA's venture capital fund In-Q-Tel. However, ITIC and QIC don't operate in similar fashion. In-Q-Tel
invests mainly in companies developing information processing technologies (it answers to the CIA's Office
of Advanced Information Technologies). For its part, ITIC chiefly subsidizes university labs and government
agencies even if it sometimes pumps money into private companies such as LC Technologies (for its
computer-controlled Eyetracking system in moving cars). In addition to KDD, ITIC coordinates and finances
research in a wide range of fields: nanotechnolgies (nanobatteries, miniaturization of sensors); biometrics;
robotics, forecasting systems; fight against biological weapons; exploiting tera waves (a part of the
electromagnetic field between short waves and infrared waves that can enable a user to "look through
walls" to detect explosives and mines) and the like.
Washington: The
Intelligence Community
Invests in Video
Defense: Paris Moves to
Streamline Political and
Military Research
Washington: CIA Sets its
Technology Priorities for
2006
Biometrics: Washington
Develops Facial Recognition
Technology
Washington: DIA Seeks Out
Weaknesses in Defense
Technologies
Security: Europe in the
Forefront with World
Interception Standards
Intelligence Technologies:
Full Steam Ahead for Mass
Data Processing Market
Washington: Bush
Overhauls PFIAB but Keeps
Room for His Friends
Counter-Proliferation: Has
China the Resources to
Control its Exports?
South East Europe: Private
Security Between Political
Patronage and Organized
Crime
Washington: Energy
Independence the Latest
Battle Cry
Information Technology:
European Groups Team Up
to Create Standards
Geospatial Intelligence: NGA
Beefs Up Research on Data
Fusion
List of Terrorists Soon to be
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Seven former directors of the Central Intelligence Agency on Friday urged President Obama to reverse Attorney
General Eric Holder's decision to hold a criminal investigation of CIA interrogators who used enhanced techniques
on detainees.
The directors, whose tenures span back as far as 35 years, wrote a letter to the president saying the cases have
already been investigated by the CIA and career prosecutors, and to reconsider those decisions makes it difficult for
agents to believe they can safely follow legal guidance.
"Attorney General Holder's decision to re-open the criminal investigation creates an atmosphere of continuous
jeopardy for those whose cases the Department of Justice had previously declined to prosecute," they wrote.
"Those men and women who undertake difficult intelligence assignments in the aftermath of an attack such as
September 11 must believe there is permanence in the legal rules that govern their actions," the seven added.
The letter was signed by former directors Michael Hayden, Porter Goss, George Tenet, John Deutch, R. James
Woolsey, William Webster and James R. Schlesinger.
Last month, Holder appointed special prosecutor John Durham to examine allegations that terror suspects were
abused at the hands of their CIA interrogators. The highly controversial decision comes as the Department of
Justice released a 2004 report from the CIA's inspector general detailing allegations of harsh interrogation
practices, which Holder cited in his decision.
The report was accompanied by conclusions that the interrogations of the detainees had yielded valuable
information that had prevented further progress by terrorists.
After Holder's announcement, the White House said the president had no choice but to let the legal ramifications
play out. The CIA then said it would pay for the legal expenses of the agents should they be prosecuted.
Current CIA Director Leon Panetta responded by a spokesman saying he appreciates Obama's "strong support for
the men and women of the CIA," and suggested while he was in league with the sentiment of the directors, he is
bound to the administration.
"The director has stood up for those who followed legal guidance on interrogation, and he will continue to do so,"
said spokesman Paul Gimigliano.
"The CIA is cooperating with the official reviews now in progress, in part to see that they move as expeditiously as
possible. The goal is to ensure that current agency operations-on which the safety of our country depends-center
on protecting the nation," Gimigliano added.
But in their letter to Obama, the directors wrote that not only is there a significant personal burden put on agents
forced to defend themselves, "but this approach will seriously damage the willingness of many other intelligence
officers to take risks to protect the country."
They added that the president has the authority to decide which legal recommendations to permit for interrogation
methods, but at no time is public disclosure helpful for intelligence officers trying to protect the U.S. from further
attacks.
The directors also warned that if the investigations are opened up, they fear that the assistance given to the United
States by foreign intelligence agencies may jeopardize future cooperation.
"Foreign services are already greatly concerned about the United States' inability to maintain any secrets. They
rightly fear that, through these additional investigations and the court proceedings that could follow, terrorists may
learn how other countries came to our assistance in a time of peril," they wrote. "As a result of the zeal on the part
of some to uncover every action taken in the post-9/11 period, many countries may decide that they can no longer
safely share intelligence or cooperate with us on future counter-terrorist operations.
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George Tenet
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John Deutch
R. James Woolsey
William Webster
James R. Schlesinger
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Page 46 of 727
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When he was a police officer in Elizabeth, New Jersey, Sergeant Eddie owned the wisdom
of the street. He would say, If you have to look at something twice, something is
wrong, and things tell you things.
Stephen Band, Chief, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Training Academy.
The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos Tversky. . . .
together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and examined their
bounded rationality. Daniel Kahneman, from his Nobel Prize Lecture, December 8,
2002.
What is intuition? When we make a decision based on gut instinct, how often are we
right? Why are some people more intuitive than others? Is intuition something that we should
encourage and even, teach? These were some of the issues discussed at a one and one-half day
meeting of some 50 members of the law enforcement, intelligence, legal and academic communities last July 2004 in Arlington, Virginia.
The goal of this meeting, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the
Training Academy of the FBI, was to construct a research agenda that could be taken up by the
NIJ and other agencies or organizations for the investigation of intuition, which then could be
used to inform both practice and training of police officers, intelligence agents, border guards,
airport screeners and all the other local, state and federal workers who are tasked with detecting
people who pose a threat to the American populace. Oftentimes, these individuals have little opportunity to gain information about a person or group of people who may have the capacity to
inflict harm; often, these agents must act quickly and decisively. Their actions may determine
the life or death of a single person, as in a police chase, or hundreds or even thousands of people,
as in entry onto an airplane or into a large sports arena. What can science do to facilitate those
agents who seem to have a 6th sense about what people are likely to do, or to teach those
agents who routinely fail to notice the important details about a person that signal intent to harm?
What do we know about cognitive and emotional processing, perception and memory that can be
made useful to the next border guard who encounters a man or woman crossing into the U.S.
plotting the next terrorist attack? What do we know about implicit cognition, the use of decision
heuristics, and stereotyping that can make the next soldier smarter about interactions with a civilian populace in peace keeping operations?
Several themes repeated themselves in the discussions. There was widespread agreement
that intuition is real and that it plays a significant role in the everyday life of police officers,
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whether they are stopping a car for a search, taking in the details of a crime scene, or watching
people get in and out of cars in a restaurant parking lot. There was, at the same time, little
agreement on how to define intuition, and comparisons were made to complex pattern recognition, complex emergent processes, the sense of dread that came with some police calls and
not others, the hairs standing up on the back of your neck, and feeling the eyes of an animal
on you in the woods. Questions were raised about the reliability of the phenomenon: do we
only remember the 10% times we were right and forget the 90% times we were wrong (and can
someone have a wrong intuition?). There was concurrence that some young officers appear to
have good intuitive skills virtually from the beginning of their tenure as a police officer or intelligence agent, and others never seem to be able to even acquire an intuitive sense. Almost in
contrast to this, there was agreement as well that much of good decision-making depends on experience, and that people learn what to look out for. Participants agreed that they frequently
made use of their gut instinct about, for example, whether to stop a car, but then faced the
challenge of finding sufficient cause for that stop because I had a gut feeling about the guy
would not be considered sufficient probable cause in a court of law.
Social and cognitive scientists have been studying intuitions for at least 30 years. A great
deal is known about intuitions the thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and
without much reflection (Kahneman, 2002) that may be applicable to the needs of the agents,
officers and operatives present at the meeting, and, of course, to their coworkers, current and future. The questions raised by the men and women with experience in the streets resonated
with the programmatic research data collected largely in laboratories. The challenge ahead of us
is how to assess what we know that can be immediately translated into effective practice, how to
affect that translation from an organizational and policy point of view, and how to determine
what is still unknown and needs further scientific analysis.
A sample of the conversations is offered below. What can be seen is that the operational community has access to technical information and on-the-street experiences; the scientific community has access to controlled laboratory conditions and years of good science. The
challenge is to find a way bring these groups together, for the advancement of science and to
make our streets safer for both those who patrol them and those who walk along them.
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New Haven police took mental health practitioners in research ride-alongs, so that the
psychologists could observe directly.
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Participants
Emma Barrett, UK
Susan Brandon, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Shannon Bohrer, Range Master/Use of Force
Administrator for the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commissions
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Bryan Vila, Director, Crime Control and Prevention Research Division, National Institute of Justice
Aldert Vrij, University of Portsmouth
Drew Outten, New Castle County Police Department, New Castle, Delaware
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llOTH CONGRESS
2nd Session
COMMITTEE PRINT
REPORT
OF THE
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INVESTIGATION STAFF
(II)
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UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Contents
Note on Source Material Used in the Preparation of the Report (U)
I.
II.
ix
xii
A.
B.
Department of Defense Office of General Counsel Seeks Information from the Joint
C.
D.
E.
11
F.
12
G.
14
16
A.
16
B.
19
C.
Agency (U)
23
JPRA (U)
24
E.
31
F.
35
D.
III.
viii
1.
35
2.
37
38
38
UNCLASSIFIED
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IV.
V.
B.
Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT) Personnel Contact the U.S. Army Special
c.
.42
D.
43
E.
49
F.
50
G.
53
H.
57
B.
Techniques" (U)
61
61
63
C.
Chain of Command Considers the Requestfor Interrogation Techniques as CITF and FBI
65
D.
67
E.
Department ofDefense General Counsel Quashes Joint Staff Legal Review (U)
70
F.
72
73
A.
73
B.
74
I.
75
2.
78
3.
4.
8]
5.
84
6.
87
UNCLASSIFIED
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7.
,..88
VI.
91
VII.
Techniques (U)
'"
94
A.
94
B.
JTF-GTMO Develops Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the Use ofSERE
97
C.
103
D.
105
109
E.
VIII.
IX.
lI0
1.
110
Techniques (U)
2.
'"
CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM (U)
113
116
3.
B.
110
,
Authority (U)
118
C.
D.
E.
JPRA Briefs Members ofthe Working Group on SERE Techniques, Including Physical
F.
The Working Group Finalizes Its Report and the Secretary of Defense Issues a New
"
Interrogation Policy For GTMO (U)
128
130
132
A.
132
B.
135
1.
135
UNCLASSIFIED
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2.
3.
Interrogation Begins Before the Special Interrogation Plan Is Approved (U)....... 138
4.
Cooperation (U)
140
5.
141
6.
141
7.
8.
X.
XI.
XII.
143
a.
143
b.
144
c.
145
DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Withdraws March 14,2003 Legal Opinion Governing DoD
Interrogations (U)
146
148
A.
149
B.
151
c.
152
D.
153
E.
154
F.
156
157
158
1.
158
2.
159
UNCLASSIFIED
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B.
C.
3.
J59
4.
J62
J.
J64
2.
J 65
3.
J66
4.
J66
5.
J 67
6.
Interrogation OIC at Abu Ghraib Resubmits the Proposed Interrogation Policy for
51yh MI BN(U)
J69
J 70
1.
Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq Seeks Assistancefrom JPRA (U)
J 70
2.
J7J
3.
JPRA Provides Interrogation Support to the Special Mission Unit Task Force in Iraq
(U)
J73
4.
J 74
5.
J 76
6.
J 79
7.
J 79
8.
9.
JO.
J84
JJ.
J86
J2.
J 87
J88
J3.
UNCLASSIFIED
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D.
E.
Major General Geoffrey Miller Leads GTMO Assessment Team to Iraq (U)
1.
189
2.
190
3.
191
4.
193
5.
194
6.
7.
198
8.
199
XIII.
200
(U)
F.
189
2.
Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy Implemented at Abu Ghraib (U)....... 201
3.
202
4.
204
206
207
A.
208
B.
210
C.
211
D.
213
E.
215
F.
216
1.
216
2.
217
UNCLASSIFIED
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XIV.
XV.
3.
218
4.
218
219
A.
219
B.
221
C.
221
D.
222
A.
B.
224
(U)
c.
228
U.S. Joint Forces Command Issues Policy Guidance For JPRA "Offensive" Support (U)...230
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
Note on Source Material Used in the Preparation of the Report
(U) Over the course ofthe its inquiry into the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody, the
Committee reviewed more than 200,000 pages of classified and unclassified documents,
including detention and interrogation policies, memoranda, electronic communications, training
manuals, and the results of previous investigations into detainee abuse. The majority ofthose
documents were provided to the Committee by the Department of Defense. The Committee also
reviewed documents provided by the Department of Justice, documents in the public domain, a
small number of documents provided by individuals, and a number of published secondary
sources including books and articles in popular magazines and scholarly journals.
(U) The Committee interviewed over 70 individuals in connection with its inquiry. Most
interviews were of current or former Department of Defense employees, though the Committee
also interviewed current and/or former employees ofthe Department of Justice and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The Committee issued two subpoenas and held two hearings to take
testimony from subpoenaed witnesses. The Committee also sent written questions to more than
200 individuals. The Committee held public hearings on June 17, 2008 and September 25, 2008.
(U) Military personnel referred to in the report are identified by their rank at the time the
events in question took place.
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UNCLASSIFIED
List of Acronyms (U)
AAR
AOR
BCP
BDE
BN
BSCT
CCJ-2
CENTCOM
CFLCC
CIA
CID
CITF
CJ-2
CJ2X
CJCS
CJTF-180
CJTF-7
CONOP
CTC
DHS(DH)
DIA
DoD
DoJ
DPMO
DUC
EPW
FBI
FM34-52
G-2
GTMO (GITMO)
HUMINT
HVD
HVf
ICE
ICRC
UNCLASSIFIED
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IROE
ISG
ISN
J-2
J-2X
J-3
JAG
JFCOM
JIOC
JIG
JPRA
JSOC
JTF-160
JTF-170
JTF-GTMO
MWD
NCIS
OEF
OGA
01
OIC
OIF
OLC
OSD
OSI
OSO
OTJAG
PAD
POW
PRA
ROE
S-3
SERE
SJA
SMU
SOILIC
SOCOM
UNCLASSIFIED
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SOP
SOUTHCOM
S-V91
TF
TJAG
TTPs
UCMJ
USASOC
USDI
VTC
WMD
Task Force
The Judge Advocate General
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Uniform Code of Military Justice
U. S. Army Special Operations Command
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Video Teleconference
Weapons of Mass Destruction
UNCLASSIFIED
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Executive Summary
"What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight ... is how we behave. In
everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate that we
treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and respect. While we are
warriors, we are also all human beings. "
-- General David Petraeus
May 10,2007
(U) The collection oftimely and accurate intelligence is critical to the safety of U.S.
personnel deployed abroad and to the security ofthe American people here at home. The
methods by which we elicit intelligence information from detainees in our custody affect not
only the reliability ofthat information, but our broader efforts to win hearts and minds and attract
allies to our side.
(U) AI Qaeda and Taliban terrorists are taught to expect Americans to abuse them. They
are recruited based on false propaganda that says the United States is out to destroy Islam.
Treating detainees harshly only reinforces that distorted view, increases resistance to
cooperation, and creates new enemies. In fact, the April 2006 National Intelligence Estimate
"Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" cited "pervasive anti U.S.
sentiment among most Muslims" as an underlying factor fueling the spread ofthe global jihadist
movement. Former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee in June 2008 that "there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who maintain that the fITst
and second identifiable causes of U. S. combat deaths in Iraq - as judged by their effectiveness in
recruiting insurgent fighters into combat - are, respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo."
(U) The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of
"a few bad apples" acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States
government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to
create the appearance oftheir legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts
damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand
of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. This report is a product ofthe
Committee's inquiry into how those unfortunate results came about.
UNCLASSIFIED
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advice on using SERE methods offensively. In fact, the call from the DoD General Counsel's
office marked just the beginning of JPRA's support of U.S. government interrogation efforts.
Senior Officials Seek SERE Techniques and Discuss Detainee Interrogations (U)
(U) Beginning in the spring of 2002 and extending for the next two years, JPRA
supported U.S. government efforts to interrogate detainees. Duringthat same period, senior
government officials solicited JPRA's knowledge and its direct support for interrogations. While
much ofthe information relating to JPRA's offensive activities and the influence of SERE
techniques on interrogation policies remains classified, unclassified information provides a
window into the extent ofthose activities.
(U) JPRA's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Baumgartner testified that in late
2001 or early 2002, JPRA conducted briefings of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) personnel
on detainee resistance, techniques, and information on detainee exploitation.
(U) On April 16, 2002, Dr. Bruce Jessen, the senior SERE psychologist at JPRA,
circulated a draft exploitation plan to JPRA Commander Colonel Randy Mouhon and other
senior officials at the agency. The contents of that plan remain classified but Dr. Jessen's
initiative is indicative ofthe interest of JPRA's senior leadership in expanding the agency's role.
(U) One opportunity came in July 2002. That month, DoD Deputy General Counsel for
Intelligence Richard Shiffrin contacted JPRA seeking information on SERE physical pressures
and interrogation techniques that had been used against Americans. Mr. Shiffiin called JPRA
after discussions with William "Jim" Haynes II, the DoD General Counsel.
(U) In late July, JPRA provided the General Counsel's office with several documents,
including excerpts from SERE instructor lesson plans, a list of physical and psychological
pressures used in SERE resistance training, and a memo from a SERE psychologist assessing the
long-term psychological effects of SERE resistance training on students and the effects of
waterboarding. The list of SERE techniques included such methods as sensory deprivation,
sleep disruption, stress positions, waterboarding, and slapping. It also made reference to a
section ofthe JPRA instructor manual that discusses "coercive pressures," such as keeping the
lights on at all times, and treating a person like an animal. JPRA's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant
Colonel Daniel Baumgartner, who spoke with Mr. Shiffiin at the time, thought the General
Counsel's office was asking for the information on exploitation and physical pressures to use
them in interrogations and he said that JFCOM gave approval to provide the agency the
information. Mr. Shiffiin, the DoD Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence, confmned that a
purpose ofthe request was to "reverse engineer" the techniques. Mr. Haynes could not recall
what he did with the information provided by JPRA.
(U) Memos from Lieutenant Colonel Baumgartner to the Office of Secretary of Defense
General Counsel stated that JPRA would "continue to offer exploitation assistance to those
government organizations charged with the mission of gleaning intelligence from enemy
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
for use against detainees. Members ofthe President's Cabinet and other senior officials attended
meetings in the White House where specific interrogation techniques were discussed. Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice, who was then the National Security Advisor, said that, "in the spring
of2002, CIA sought policy approval from the National Security Council (NSC) to begin an
interrogation progTam for high-level al-Qaida terrorists." Secretary Rice said that she asked
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to briefNSC Principals on the program and asked
the Attorney General John Ashcroft "personally to review and confrrm the legal advice prepared
by the Office of Legal Counsel." She also said that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
participated in the NSC review ofthe CIA's program.
(U) Asked whether she attended meetings where SERE training was discussed, Secretary
Rice stated that she recalled being told that U.S. military personnel were subjected in training to
"certain physical and psychological interrogation techniques." National Security Council (NSC)
Legal Advisor, John Bellinger, said that he was present in meetings "at which SERE training was
discussed."
Department of Justice Redermes Torture (D)
(U) On August 1, 2002, just a week after JPRA provided the DoD General Counsel's
office the list of SERE techniques and the memo on the psychological effects of SERE training,
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued two legal opinions. The
opinions were issued after consultation with senior Administration attorneys, including then
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and then-Counsel to the Vice President David
Addington. Both memos were signed by then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal
Counsel Jay Bybee. One opinion, commonly known as the first Bybee memo, was addressed to
Judge Gonzales and provided OLe's opinion on standards of conduct in interrogation required
under the federal torture statute. That memo concluded:
[F]or an act to constitute torture as defmed in [the federal torture statute], it must
inflict pain that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be
equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely mental
pain or suffering to amount to torture under [the federal torture statute], it must
result in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for
months or even years.
(U) In his book The Terror Presidency, Jack Goldsmith, the former Assistant Attorney
General of the OLC who succeeded Mr. Bybee in that job, described the memo's conclusions:
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Violent acts aren't necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a
defense; and even if you don't have a defense, the torture law doesn't apply if you
act under the color of presidential authority.
(U) The other OLC opinion issued on August 1,2002 is known commonly as the Second
Bybee memo. That opinion, which responded to a request from the CI~ addressed the legality
of specific interrogation tactics. While the full list oftechniques remains classified, a publicly
released CIA document indicates that waterboarding was among those analyzed and approved.
CIA Director General Michael Hayden stated in public testimony before the Senate Intelligence
Committee on February 5, 2008 that waterboarding was used by the CIA And Steven Bradbury,
the current Assistant Attorney General ofthe OLC, testified before the House Judiciary
Committee on February 14,2008 that the CIA's use of waterboarding was "adapted from the
SERE training program."
(U) Before drafting the opinions, Mr. Y 00, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the
OLC, had met with Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and David Addington, Counsel
to the Vice President, to discuss the subjects he intended to address in the opinions. In testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Y00 refused to say whether or not he ever discussed
or received information about SERE techniques as the memos were being drafted. When asked
whether he had discussed SERE techniques with Judge Gonzales, Mr. Addington, Mr. Yoo, Mr.
Rizzo or other senior administration lawyers, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes testified that he
"did discuss SERE techniques with other people in the administration." NSC Legal Advisor
John Bellinger said that "some of the legal analyses of proposed interrogation techniques that
were prepared by the Department of Justice... did refer to the psychological effects ofresistance
training."
(U) In fact, Jay Bybee the Assistant Attorney General who signed the two OLC legal
opinions said that he saw an assessment of the psychological effects of military resistance
training in July 2002 in meetings in his office with John Yoo and two other OLC attorneys.
Judge Bybee said that he used that assessment to inform the August 1, 2002 OLC legal opinion
that has yet to be publicly released. Judge Bybee also recalled discussing detainee interrogations
in a meeting with Attorney General John Ashcroft and John Y 00 in late July 2002, prior to
signing the OLC opinions. Mr. Bellinger, the NSC Legal Advisor, said that "the NSC's
Principals reviewed CIA's proposed program on several occasions in 2002 and 2003" and that he
"expressed concern that the proposed CIA interrogation techniques comply with applicable U. S.
law, including our international obligations."
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senior Administration lawyers, including Mr. Haynes, Mr. Rizzo, and Mr. Addington, visited
GTMO.
(U) A week after the visit from those senior lawyers, two GTMO behavioral scientists
who had attended the JPRA-Ied training at Fort Bragg drafted a memo proposing new
interrogation techniques for use at GTMO. According to one ofthose two behavioral scientists,
by early October 2002, there was "increasing pressure to get 'tougher' with detainee
interrogations." He added that ifthe interrogation policy memo did not contain coercive
techniques, then it "wasn't going to go very far."
(U) JPRA was not the only outside organization that provided advice to GTMO on
aggressive techniques. On October 2, 2002, Jonathan Fredman, who was chief counsel to the
CIA's CounterTerrorist Center, attended a meeting ofGTMO staff. Minutes of that meeting
indicate that it was dominated by a discussion of aggressive interrogation techniques including
sleep deprivation, death threats, and waterboarding, which was discussed in relation to its use in
SERE training. Mr. Fredman's advice to GTMO on applicable legal obligations was similar to
the analysis ofthose obligations in OLC's first Bybee memo. According to the meeting minutes,
Mr. Fredman said that ''the language ofthe statutes is written vaguely ... Severe physical pain
described as anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body parts. Mental torture
[is] described as anything leading to permanent, profound damage to the senses or personality."
Mr. Fredman said simply, "It is basically subject to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing
it wrong."
(U) On October 11,2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of JTF-170
at Guantanamo Bay, sent a memo to General James Hill, the Commander of US. Southern
Command (SOUfHCOM) requesting authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques.
Several of the techniques requested were similar to techniques used by lPRA and the military
services in SERE training, including stress positions, exploitation of detainee fears (such as fear
of dogs), removal of clothing, hooding, deprivation of light and sound, and the so-called wet
towel treatment or the waterboard. Some ofthe techniques were even referred to as "those used
in US. military interrogation resistance training." Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver, GTMO's
Staff Judge Advocate, wrote an analysis justifYing the legality of the techniques, though she
expected that a broader legal review conducted at more senior levels would follow her own. On
October 25, 2002, General Hill forwarded the GTMO request from Major General Dunlavey to
General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Days later, the Joint Staff
solicited the views of the military services on the request.
(U) Plans to use aggressive interrogation techniques generated concerns by some at
GTMO. The Deputy Commander ofthe Department of Defense's Criminal Investigative Task
Force (CITF) at GTMO told the Committee that SERE techniques were "developed to better
prepare U.S. military personnel to resist interrogations and not as a means of obtaining reliable
information" and that "CITF was troubled with the rationale that techniques used to harden
resistance to interrogations would be the basis for the utilization oftechniques to obtain
information." Concerns were not limited to the effectiveness of the techniques in obtaining
reliable information; GTMO's request gave rise to significant legal concerns as well.
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Military Lawyers Raise Red Flags and Joint Staff Review Quashed (D)
(U) In early November 2002, in a series of memos responding to the Joint Staff's call for
comments on GTMO's request, the military services identified serious legal concerns about the
techniques and called for additional analysis.
(U) The Air Force cited "serious concerns regarding the legality of many ofthe proposed
techniques" and stated that "techniques described may be subject to challenge as failing to meet
the requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely..." The Air Force
also called for an in depth legal review ofthe request.
(U) CITF's Chief Legal Advisor wrote that certain techniques in GTMO's October 11,
2002 request "may subject service members to punitive articles of the [Uniform Code of Military
Justice]," called "the utility and legality of applying certain techniques" in the request
"questionable," and stated that he could not "advocate any action, interrogation or otherwise, that
is predicated upon the principle that all is well if the ends justify the means and others are not
aware of how we conduct our business."
(U) The Chief ofthe Army's International and Operational Law Division wrote that
techniques like stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and use of phobias to
induce stress "crosses the line of 'humane' treatment," would "likely be considered
maltreatment" under the UCMJ, and "may violate the torture statute." The Army labeled
GTMO's request "legally insufficient" and called for additional review.
(U) The Navy recommended a "more detailed interagency legal and policy review" of the
request. And the Marine Corps expressed strong reservations, stating that several techniques in
the request "arguably violate federal law, and would expose our service members to possible
prosecution." The Marine Corps also said the request was not "legally sufficient," and like the
other services, called for "a more thorough legal and policy review."
(U) Then-Captain (now Rear Admiral) Jane Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that her staff discussed the military services' concerns with the
DoD General Counsel's Office at the time and that the DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes was
aware ofthe services' concerns. Mr. Haynes, on the other hand, testified that he did not know
that the memos from the military services existed (a statement he later qualified by stating that he
was not sure he knew they existed). Eliana Davidson, the DoD Associate Deputy General
Counsel for International Affairs, said that she told the General Counsel that the GTMO request
needed further assessment. Mr. Haynes did not recall Ms. Davidson telling him that.
(U) Captain Dalton, who was the Chairman's Legal Counsel, said that she had her own
concerns with the GTMO request and directed her staffto initiate a thorough legal and policy
review ofthe techniques. That review, however, was cut short. Captain Dalton said that General
Myers returned from a meeting and advised her that Mr. Haynes wanted her to stop her review,
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in part because of concerns that people were going to see the GTMO request and the military
services' analysis of it. Neither General Myers nor Mr. Haynes recalled cutting short the Dalton
review, though neither has challenged Captain Dalton's recollection. Captain Dalton testified
that this occasion marked the only time she had ever been told to stop analyzing a request that
came to her for review.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld Approves Aggressive Techniques (U)
(U) With respect to GTMO's October 11, 2002 request to use aggressive interrogation
techniques, Mr. Haynes said that "there was a sense by the DoD Leadership that this decision
was taking too long" and that Secretary Rumsfeld told his senior advisors "I need a
recommendation" On November 27, 2002, the Secretary got one. Notwithstanding the serious
legal concerns raised by the military services, Mr. Haynes sent a one page memo to the
Secretary, recommending that he approve all but three ofthe eighteen techniques in the GTMO
request. Techniques such as stress positions, removal of clothing, use of phobias (such as fear of
dogs), and deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli were all recommended for approval.
(U) Mr. Haynes's memo indicated that he had discussed the issue with Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, and General
Myers and that he believed they concurred in his recommendation. When asked what he relied
on to make his recommendation that the aggressive techniques be approved, the only written
legal opinion Mr. Haynes cited was Lieutenant Colonel Beaver's legal analysis, which senior
military lawyers had considered "legally insufficient" and "woefully inadequate," and which
LTC Beaver herself had expected would be supplemented with a review by persons with greater
experience than her own.
(U) On December 2,2002, Secretary Rumsfeld signed Mr. Haynes's recommendation,
adding a handwritten note that referred to limits proposed in the memo on the use of stress
positions: "I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?"
(U) SERE school techniques are designed to simulate abusive tactics used by our
enemies. There are fundamental differences between a SERE school exercise and a real world
interrogation. At SERE school, students are subject to an extensive medical and psychological
pre-screening prior to being subjected to physical and psychological pressures. The schools
impose strict limits on the frequency, duration, and/or intensity of certain techniques.
Psychologists are present throughout SERE training to intervene should the need arise and to
help students cope with associated stress. And SERE school is voluntary; students are even
given a special phrase they can use to immediately stop the techniques from being used against
them.
(U) Neither those differences, nor the serious legal concerns that had been registered,
stopped the Secretary of Defense from approving the use of the aggressive techniques against
detainees. Moreover, Secretary Rumsfeld authorized the techniques without apparently
providing any written guidance as to how they should be administered.
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began drafting a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) specifically for the use of SERE
techniques in interrogations. The draft SOP itself stated that "The premise behind this is that the
interrogation tactics used at U.S. military SERE schools are appropriate for use in real-world
interrogations. These tactics and techniques are used at SERE school to 'break' SERE detainees.
The same tactics and techniques can be used to break real detainees during interrogation" The
draft "GTMO SERE SOP" described how to slap, strip, and place detainees in stress positions. It
also described other SERE techniques, such as "hooding," "manhandling," and "walling"
detainees.
(U) On December 30,2002, two instructors from the Navy SERE school arrived at
GTMO. The next day, in a session with approximately 24 interrogation personnel, the two
SERE instructors demonstrated how to administer stress positions, and various slapping
techniques. According to two interrogators, those who attended the training even broke off into
pairs to practice the techniques.
(U) ExemplifYing the disturbing nature and substance ofthe training, the SERE
instructors explained "Biderman's Principles" - which were based on coercive methods used by
the Chinese Communist dictatorship to elicit false confessions from U.S. POWs during the
Korean War - and left with GTMO personnel a chart ofthose coercive techniques. Three days
after they conducted the training, the SERE instructors met with GTMO's Commander, Major
General Geoffrey Miller. According to some who attended that meeting, Major General Miller
stated that he did not want his interrogators using the techniques that the Navy SERE instructors
had demonstrated. That conversation, however, took place after the training had already
occurred and not all ofthe interrogators who attended the training got the message.
(U) At about the same time, a dispute over the use of aggressive techniques was raging at
GTMO over the interrogation of Mohammed al-Khatani, a high value detainee. Personnel from
CITF and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigations (FBI) had registered strong opposition, to
interrogation techniques proposed for use on Khatani and made those concerns known to the
DoD General Counsel's office. Despite those objections, an interrogation plan that included
aggressive techniques was approved. The interrogation itself, which actually began on
November 23,2002, a week before the Secretary's December 2,2002 grant of blanket authority
for the use of aggressive techniques, continued through December and into mid-January 2003.
(U) NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that, on several occasions, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General Bruce Swartz raised concerns with him about allegations of detainee abuse at
GTMO. Mr. Bellinger said that, in tum, he raised these concerns "on several occasions with
DoD officials and was told that the allegations were being investigated by the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service." Then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that Mr.
Bellinger also advised her "on a regular basis regarding concerns and issues relating to DoD
detention policies and practices at Guantanamo." She said that as a result she convened a "series
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of meetings ofNSC Principals in 2002 and 2003 to discuss various issues and concerns relating
to detainees in the custody ofthe Department of Defense."
(U) Between mid-December 2002 and mid-January 2003, Navy General Counsel Alberto
Mora spoke with the DoD General Counsel three times to express his concerns about
interrogation techniques at GTMO, at one point telling Mr. Haynes that he thought techniques
that had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense "could rise to the level oftorture." On
January 15,2003, having received no word that the Secretary's authority would be withdrawn,
Mr. Mora went so far as to deliver a draft memo to Mr. Haynes's office memorializing his legal
concerns about the techniques. In a subsequent phone call, Mr. Mora told Mr. Haynes he would
sign his memo later that day unless he heard defmitively that the use ofthe techniques was
suspended. In a meeting that same day, Mr. Haynes told Mr. Mora that the Secretary would
rescind the techniques. Secretary Rumsfeld signed a memo rescinding authority for the
techniques on January 15,2003.
(U) That same day, GTMO suspended its use of aggressive techniques on Khatani.
While key documents relating to the interrogation remain classified, published accounts indicate
that military working dogs had been used against Khatani. He had also been deprived of
adequate sleep for weeks on end, stripped naked, subjected to loud music, and made to wear a
leash and perform dog tricks. In a June 3, 2004 press briefing, SOUTHCOM Commander
General James Hill traced the source oftechniques used on Khatani back to SERE, stating: "The
staff at Guantanamo working with behavioral scientists, having gone up to our SERE school and
developed a list of techniques which our lawyers decided and looked at, said were OK." General
Hill said "we began to use a few ofthose techniques ... on this individuaL."
(U) On May 13, 2008, the Pentagon announced in a written statement that the Convening
Authority for military commissions "dismissed without prejudice the sworn charges against
Mohamed al Khatani." The statement does not indicate the role his treatment may have played
in that decision.
DoD Working Group Ignores Military Lawyers and Relies on OLC (D)
(U) On January 15, 2003, the same day he rescinded authority for GTMO to use
aggressive techniques, Secretary Rumsfeld directed the establishment of a "Working Group" to
review interrogation techniques. For the next few months senior military and civilian lawyers
tried, without success, to have their concerns about the legality of aggressive techniques reflected
in the Working Group's report. Their arguments were rejected in favor ofa legal opinion from
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel's (OLC) John Yoo. Mr. Yoo's opinion, the
final version of which 'was dated March 14,2003, had been requested by Mr. Haynes at the
initiation ofthe Working Group process, and repeated much of what the first Bybee memo had
said six months earlier.
(U) The first Bybee memo, dated August 1, 2002, had concluded that, to violate the
federal torture statute, physical pain that resulted from an act would have to be "equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of
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bodily function, or even death." Mr. Yoo's March 14, 2003 memo stated that criminal laws,
such as the federal torture statute, would not apply to certain military interrogations, and that
interrogators could not be prosecuted by the Justice Department for using interrogation methods
that would otherwise violate the law.
(U) Though the final Working Group report does not specifically mention SERE, the list
ofinterrogation techniques it evaluated and recommended for approval suggest the influence of
SERE. Removal of clothing, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, dietary manipulation,
hooding, increasing anxiety through the use of a detainee's aversions like dogs, and face and
stomach slaps were all recommended for approval.
(U) On April 16, 2003, less than two weeks after the Working Group completed its
report, the Secretary authorized the use of24 specific interrogation techniques for use at GTMO.
While the authorization included such techniques as dietary manipulation, environmental
manipulation, and sleep adjustment, it was silent on many ofthe techniques in the Working
Group report. Secretary Rumsfeld's memo said, however, that "If, in your view, you require
additional interrogation techniques for a particular detainee, you should provide me, via the
Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, a written request describing the proposed technique,
recommended safeguards, and the rationale for applying it with an identified detainee."
(U) Just a few months later, one such request for "additional interrogation techniques"
arrived on Secretary Rumsfeld's desk. The detainee was Mohamedou QuId Slahi. While
documents relating to the interrogation plan for Slahi remain classified, a May 2008 report from
the Department of Justice Inspector General includes declassified information suggesting the
plan included hooding Slahi and subjecting him to sensory deprivation and "sleep adjustment."
The Inspector General's report says that an FBI agent who saw a draft ofthe interrogation plan
said it was similar to Khatani's interrogation plan. Secretary Rumsfeld approved the Slahi plan
on August 13, 2003.
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(U) Captain Wood submitted her proposed policy around the same time that a message
was being conveyed that interrogators should be more aggressive with detainees. In mid-August
2003, an email from staffat Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) headquarters in Iraq
requested that subordinate units provide input for a "wish list" of interrogation techniques, stated
that "the gloves are coming off," and said "we want these detainees broken." At the end of
August 2003, Major General Geoffrey Miller, the GTMO Commander, led a team to Iraq to
assess interrogation and detention operations. Colonel Thomas Pappas, the Commander ofthe
20S th Military Intelligence Brigade, who met with Major General Miller during that visit, said
that the tenor of the discussion was that "we had to get tougher with the detainees." A Chief
Warrant Officer with the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) said that during Major General Miller's tour
ofthe ISG's facility, Major General Miller said the ISG was "running a country club" for
detainees.
(U) On September 14,2003 the Commander ofCJTF-7, Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez, issued the fIrst CJTF-7 interrogation SOP. That SOP authorized interrogators in Iraq to
use stress positions, environmental manipulation, sleep management, and military working dogs
in interrogations. Lieutenant General Sanchez issued the September 14, 2003 policy with the
knowledge that there were ongoing discussions about the legality of some of the approved
techniques. Responding to legal concerns from CENTCOM lawyers about those techniques,
Lieutenant General Sanchez issued a new policy on October 12,2003, eliminating many ofthe
previously authorized aggressive techniques. The new policy, however, contained ambiguities
with respect to certain techniques, such as the use of dogs in interrogations, and led to confusion
about which techniques were permitted.
(U) In his report of his investigation into Abu Ghraib, Major General George Fay said
that interrogation techniques developed for GTMO became "confused" and were implemented at
Abu Ghraib. For example, Major General Fay said that removal of clothing, while not included
in CJTF-Ts SOP, was "imported" to Abu Ghraib, could be ''traced through Mghanistan and
GTMO," and contributed to an environment at Abu Ghraib that appeared "to condone depravity
and degradation rather than humane treatment of detainees." Major General Fay said that the
policy approved by the Secretary of Defense on December 2,2002 contributed to the use of
aggressive interrogation techniques at Abu Ghraib in late 2003.
OLC Withdraws Legal Opinion - JFCOM Issues Guidance on JPRA "Offensive" Support
(U)
(U) As the events at Abu Ghraib were unfolding, Jack Goldsmith, the new Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel was presented with a "short stack" of 0 Le opinions that
were described to him as problematic. Included in that short stack were the Bybee memos of
August 1,2002 and Mr. Yoo's memo of March 2003. After reviewing the memos, Mr.
Goldsmith decided to rescind both the so-called fIrst Bybee memo and Mr. Yoo's memo. In late
December 2003, Mr. Goldsmith notifIed Mr. Haynes that DoD could no longer rely on Mr.
Yoo's memo in determining the lawfulness of interrogation techniques. The change in OLe
guidance, however, did not keep JPRA from making plans to continue their support to
interrogation operations. In fact, it is not clear that the agency was even aware ofthe change.
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(U) In 2004, JPRA and CENTCOM took steps to send a JPRA training team to
Afghanistan to assist in detainee interrogations there. In the wake of the public disclosure of
detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, however, that trip was cancelled and JFCOM subsequently issued
policy guidance limiting JPRA's support to interrogations.
(U) On September 29, 2004 Major General James Soligan, JFCOM's Chief of StatI,
issued a memorandum referencing JPRA's support to interrogation operations. Major General
Soligan wrote:
Recent requests from [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and the Combatant
Commands have solicited JPRA support based on knowledge and information
gained through the debriefing of former U.S. POWs and detainees and their
application to U.S. Strategic debriefmg and interrogation techniques. These
requests, which can be characterized as 'offensive' support, go beyond the
chartered responsibilities of JPRA... The use of resistance to interrogation
knowledge for 'offensive' purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of
JPRA
(U) Lieutenant General Robert Wagner, the Deputy Commander of JFCOM, later called
requests for JPRA interrogation support "inconsistent with the unit's charter" and said that such
requests "might create conditions which tasked JPRA to engage in offensive operational
activities outside of JPRA's defensive mission."
(U) Interrogation policies endorsed by senior military and civilian officials authorizing
the use of harsh interrogation techniques were a major cause of the abuse of detainees in U.S.
custody. The impact ofthose abuses has been significant. In a 2007 international BBC poll,
only 29 percent of people around the world said the United States is a generally positive
influence in the world. Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo have a lot to do with that perception. The
fact that America is seen in a negative light by so many complicates our ability to attract allies to
our side, strengthens the hand of our enemies, and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that
can save lives.
(U) It is particularly troubling that senior officials approved the use of interrogation
techniques that were originally designed to simulate abusive tactics used by our enemies against
our own soldiers and that were modeled, in part, on tactics used by the Communist Chinese to
elicit false confessions from U.S. military personnel. While some argue that the brutality and
disregard for human life shown by al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists justifies us treating them
harshly, General David Petraeus explained why that view is misguided. In a May 2007 letter to
his troops, General Petraeus said "Our values and thelaws governing warfare teach us to respect
human dignity, maintain our integrity, and do what is right. Adherence to our values
distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on securing the population, which must
understand that we - not our enemies - occupy the moral high ground."
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Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and David Addington, Counsel to the Vice President, were
consulted on the development oflegal analysis of CIA interrogation techniques. Legal opinions
subsequently issued by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) interpreted
legal obligations under u.s. anti-torture laws and determined the legality of CIA interrogation
techniques. Those OLC opinions distorted the meaning and intent ofanti-torture laws,
rationalized the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced Department of Defense
determinations as to what interrogation techniques were legal for use during interrogations
conducted by u.s. military personnel. .
Conclusions on JPRA Offensive Activities
Conclusion 7: Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) efforts in support of"offensive"
interrogation operations went beyond the agency's knowledge and expertise. JPRA's support to
U.S. government interrogation efforts contributed to detainee abuse. JPRA's offensive support
also influenced the development of policies that authorized abusive interrogation techniques for
use against detainees in U.S. custody.
Conclusion 8: Detainee abuse occurred during JPRA's support to Special Mission Unit (SMU)
Task Force (TF) interrogation operations in Iraq in September 2003. JPRA Commander Colonel
Randy Moulton's authorization of SERE instructors, who had no experience in detainee
interrogations, to actively participate in Task Force interrogations using SERE resistance training
techniques was a serious failure in judgment. The Special Mission Unit Task Force
Commander's failure to order that SERE resistance training techniques not be used in detainee
interrogations was a serious failure in leadership that led to the abuse of detainees in Task Force
custody. Iraq is a Geneva Convention theater and techniques used in SERE school are
inconsistent with the obligations of U.S. personnel under the Geneva Conventions.
Conclusion 9: Combatant Command requests for JPRA "offensive" interrogation support and
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) authorization ofthat support led to JPRA operating
outside the agency's charter and beyond its expertise. Only when JFCOM's Staff Judge
Advocate became aware of and raised concerns about JPRA's support to offensive interrogation
operations in late September 2003 did JFCOM leadership begin to take steps to curtail JPRA's
"offensive" activities. It was not until September 2004, however, that JFCOM issued a formal
policy stating that support to offensive interrogation operations was outside JPRA's charter.
Conclusions on GTMO's Request for Ageressive Techniques
Conclusion 10: Interrogation techniques in Guantanamo Bay's (GTMO) October 11, 2002
request for authority submitted by Major General Michael Dunlavey, were influenced by JPRA
training for GTMO interrogation personnel and included techniques similar to those used in
SERE training to teach U.S. personnel to resist abusive enemy interrogations. GTMO Staff
Judge Advocate Lieutenant Colonel Diane Beaver's legal review justifying the October 11, 2002
GTMO request was profoundly in error and legally insufficient. Leaders at GTMO, including
Major General Dunlavey's successor, Major General Geoffrey Miller, ignored warnings from
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DoD's Criminal Investigative Task Force and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation that the
techniques were potentially unlawful and that their use would strengthen detainee resistance.
Conclusion 11: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers's decision to cut
short the legal and policy review of the October 11,2002 GTMO request initiated by his Legal
Counsel, then-Captain Jane Dalton, undermined the military's review process. Subsequent
conclusions reached by Chairman Myers and Captain Dalton regarding the legality of
interrogation techniques in the request followed a grossly deficient review and were at odds with
conclusions previously reached by the Anny, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Criminal
Investigative Task Force.
Conclusion 12: Department of Defense General Counsel William 1. Haynes II's effort to cut
short the legal and policy review of the October 11,2002 GTMO request initiated by then
Captain Jane Dahon, Legal Counsel to the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
inappropriate and undermined the military's review process. The General Counsel's subsequent
review was grossly deficient. Mr. Haynes's one page recommendation to Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld failed to address the serious legal concerns that had been previously raised by
the military services about techniques in the GTMO request. Further, Mr. Haynes's reliance on a
legal memo produced by GTMO's Staff Judge Advocate that senior military lawyers called
"legally insufficient" and "woefully inadequate" is deeply troubling.
Conclusion 13: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's authorization of aggressive
interrogation techniques for use at Guantanamo Bay was a direct cause of detainee abuse there.
Secretary Rumsfeld's December 2,2002 approval of Mr. Haynes's recommendation that most of
the techniques contained in GTMO's October 11, 2002 request be authorized, influenced and
contributed to the use of abusive techniques, including military working dogs, forced nudity, and
stress positions, in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Conclusion 14: Department of Defense General Counsel William 1. Haynes II's direction to the
Department of Defense's Detainee Working Group in early 2003 to consider a legal memo from
John Yoo ofthe Department of Justice's OLC as authoritative, blocked the Working Group from
conducting a fair and complete legal analysis and resulted in a report that, in the words ofthen
Department ofthe Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora contained "profound mistakes in its
legal analysis." Reliance on the OLC memo resulted in a final Working Group report that
recommended approval of several aggressive techniques, including removal of clothing, sleep
deprivation, and slapping, similar to those used in SERE training to teach U. S. personnel to resist
abusive interrogations.
Conclusions on Interrogations in Iraq and Afghanistan
Conclusion 15: Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) interrogation policies were
influenced by the Secretary of Defense's December 2,2002 approval of aggressive interrogation
teclmiques for use at GTMO. SMU TF interrogation policies in Iraq included the use of
aggressive interrogation techniques such as military working dogs and stress positions. SMU TF
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policies were a direct cause of detainee abuse and influenced interrogation policies at Abu
Ghraib and elsewhere in Iraq.
Conclusion 16: During his assessment visit to Iraq in August and September 2003, GTMO
Commander Major General Geoffrey Miller encouraged a view that interrogators should be more
aggressive during detainee interrogations.
Conclusion 17: Interrogation policies approved by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, which
included the use of military working dogs and stress positions, were a direct cause of detainee
abuse in Iraq. Lieutenant General Sanchez's decision to issue his September 14,2003 policy
with the knowledge that there were ongoing discussions as to the legality of some techniques in
it was a serious error in judgment The September policy was superseded on October 12,2003
as a result oflegal concerns raised by U.S. Central Command. That superseding policy,
however, contained ambiguities and contributed to confusion about whether aggressive
techniques, such as military working dogs, were authorized for use during interrogations.
Conclusion 18: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) failed to conduct proper oversight of
Special Mission Unit Task Force interrogation policies. Though aggressive interrogation
techniques were removed from Combined Joint Task Force 7 interrogation policies after
CENTCOM raised legal concerns about their inclusion in the September 14, 2003 policy issued
by Lieutenant General Sanchez, SMU TF interrogation policies authorized some ofthose same
techniques, including stress positions and military working dogs.
Conclusion 19: The abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in late 2003 was not simply the result of a
few soldiers acting on their own. Interrogation techniques such as stripping detainees oftheir
clothes, placing them in stress positions, and using military working dogs to intimidate them
appeared in Iraq only after they had been approved for use in Afghanistan and at GTMO.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's December 2,2002 authorization of aggressive
interrogation techniques and subsequent interrogation policies and plans approved by senior
military and civilian officials conveyed the message that physical pressures and degradation were
appropriate treatment for detainees in U.S. military custody. What followed was an erosion in
standards dictating that detainees be treated humanely.
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I.
(U) From the time oftheir ratification until the invasion of Mghanistan in 2001, the
United States government had accepted the terms ofthe Geneva Conventions and the U.S.
military had trained its personnel to apply the Conventions during wartime. Soon after the
launch of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), however, Administration lawyers constructed a
new legal framework that abandoned the traditional U.S. application ofthe Geneva
Conventions. 1
(U) On January 9, 2002 attorneys at the Department of Justice wrote a memorandum to
Department of Defense (DoD) General Counsel William "Jim" Haynes II, advising him that the
Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda or the Taliban in
Mghanistan. 2 The attorneys wrote the memo with the understanding that the Defense
Department had established a long-term detention site at the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba (GTMO) for al Qaeda and Taliban members captured by U.S. military forces or transferred
from U.S. allies in Mghanistan. 3
(U) On January 18,2002, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales advised the President
ofthe Department of Justice (Dol) opinion. 4 After being briefed by Judge Gonzales, the
President concluded that the Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al
Qaeda or to members of the Taliban, and that they would not receive the protections afforded to
Prisoners Of War (POWS).5
According to Jack Goldsmith, Special Counsel in the Department of Defense (2002-2003) and Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel (2003-2004): "never in the history of the United States had lawyers had such
extraordinary influence over war policies as they did after 9/11. The lawyers weren't necessarily expert on al
Qaeda, or Islamic fundamentalism, or intelligence, or international diplomacy, or even the requirements of national
security. But the lawyers---especially White House and Justice Department lawyers-seemed to 'own' issues that
had profound national security and political and diplomatic consequences." These Administration lawyers
"dominated discussions on detention, military commissions, interrogation, GlMO, and many other controversial
terrorism policies." Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the Bush Administration
(New York: W.w. Norton & Company 2(07) at 130-31 (hereinafter "Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency").
1
Memo from Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Y 00 and Special COl.D'lsel Robert Delahunty of Defense
General Counsel William 1. Haynes IL Application ofTreaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
(January 9, 2002).
2
M~mo from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision Re Application Of
The Geneva Convention on Prisoners OfWar To The Corfflict With Al Qaeda And The TaIwan (January 25, 2(02).
, In a memo to the President, White House Counsel Gonzales noted "I understand that you decided that the [Third
Geneva Convention] does not apply [to the conflicts with al Qaeda or the Taliban] and, "accordingly, that al Qaeda
and raliban detainees are not prisoners of war" under the [Third Geneva Convention]. See Memo from White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision Re Application OfThe Geneva Convention
on Prisoners OfWar To The Conflict WithAl QaedaAnd The Taliban (January 25,2002).
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Memo from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard
Myers Status.ofTaliban and Al Qaeda (January 19, 2002).
Ibid.
Cable from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers to U.S. MilitaIy Unified Commands and
Services (January 21, 2002).
Memo from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W. Bush, Decision Re Application Of
The Geneva Convention on Prisoners OfWar To The Coriflict WithAl Qaeda And The Taliban (January 25,2002).
Judge Gonzales dismissed as ''unpersuasive''legal and policy arguments that such an order would reverse
longstanding U.S. policy and practice; undermine the protections afforded to U.S. or coalition forces captured in
Afghanistan; limit prosecution of enemy forces under the War Crimes Act (which only applies if the Geneva
Conventions apply); provoke widespread international condemnation, even if the U.S. complies with the core
humanitarian principles of the treaty as a matter of policy; may encourage other countries to look for "technical
loopholes" to avoid being bound by the Geneva Conventions; may discourage allies from turning over terrorists to
the U.S. or providing legal assistance to the U.S.; may undermine U.S. militaIy culture which emphasizes
maintaining the highest standard of conduct in combat; and could introduce an element of uncertainty in the status of
adversaries. According to Gonzales, the "positive" consequences of setting aside the Third Geneva Convention
included "preserving flexibility" in the war and "substantially reduc[ing] the threat of domestic criminal prosecution
under the War Crimes Act." Memorandum from White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales to President George W.
Bush, Decision Re Application OfThe Geneva Convention on Prisoners OfWar To The Conflict With Al Qaeda And
The Taliban (January 25, 2002).
10
11 Memo from President George W. Bush, Humane Treatment ofal Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (February 7,
2002).
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shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with
military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles ofthe Geneva Conventions." 12
(U) The President's policy statement was directed at the United States Armed Forces.
The Committee is unaware ofa similar Presidential policy statement governing other agencies'
treatment of detainees. A February 2, 2002 State Department memo reflected that
Administration lawyers involved in the discussion about the application ofthe Third Geneva
Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda had "all agree[d] that the CIA is bound by the same legal
restrictions as the U.S. military.,,13 The memo also stated, however, that "CIA lawyers
believe[d] that, to the extent that the [Third Geneva Convention's] protections do not apply as a
matter of law but those protections are applied as a matter of polici" it is desirable to
circumscribe that policy so as to limit its application to the CIA,,1 According to the memo,
"other Administration lawyers involved did not disagree with or object to the CIA's view."IS
Months later, in an October 2, 2002 meeting with DoD officials at Guantanamo Bay, Chief
Counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center (CTC) Jonathan Fredman reportedly stated that the
"CIA rallied" for the Conventions not to apply.16
(U) Several military officers, including members ofthe Judge Advocate General (JAG)
Corps, have described difficulties in interpreting and implementing the President's February 7,
2002 order. A former Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) for the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
stated that he thought the President's order was a tough standard for the Department of Defense
(DoD) to apply in the field because it replaced a well-established military doctrine (legal
compliance with the Geneva Conventions) with a policy that was subject to interpretation. 17 The
President's order was not, apparently, followed by any guidance that defined the terms
"humanely" or "military necessity." As a result, those in the field were left to interpret the
President's order.
.
B.
12 Memo from President George W. Bush, Humane Treatment ofal Qaeda and TaMan Detainees (February 7,
2002).
13The State Department memo reflected the views of lawyers from the Department of Justice, Department of
Defense, Department of State, White House Counsel's office, Office of the Vice President, Joint Chiefs of StafT, and
the Central Intelligence Agency. Memorandum from State Department Legal Adviser William Taft, IV to White
House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Convention (February 2,2002).
14 Ibid.
H
Ibid.
16 Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes (undated) at 4, attached to email from Blaine Thomas to Sam
McCahon,
and Mark Fallon (October 24, 2002) (hereinafter "Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting
Minutes')
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Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for
infonnation about detainee "exploitation.,,18
.
(U) JPRA is an agency of the Department of Defense under the command authority ofthe
U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Part of JPRA's mission is to oversee military Survival
Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) training. 19 In the "resistance" phase of SERE training,
students are subject to physical and psychological pressures (SERE techniques) designed to
simulate conditions to which they might be subject if captured by an enemy that did not abide by
the Geneva Conventions. Exposing U.S. military personnel to these physical and psychological
pressures in a highly controlled environment equips them with the skills needed to increase
resistance to hostile interrogations. Among the physical and psychological pressures used at
SERE schools are stress positions, sleep deprivation, face and abdomen slaps, isolation,
degradation (such as treating the student like an animal), and "walling." Until November 2007,
waterboarding was also an approved training technique in the U.S. Navy SERE school. 20
The SERE schools employ a number of strict controls to limit the physical
or psychological impact ofthese techniques on their students. 21 For example, there are limits on
the frequency, duration, and/or intensity of certain techniques. Instructors are also required to
consider the extensive medical and/or psychological screening records of each student before
administering any technique. 22 Students are even given a phrase they can use to make the
instructor immediately cease application of all pressures. 2
21 Responses of Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28,2008); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August
3,2007) at 123.
Responses of Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28, 2008) ("Military SERE training students are
screened multiple times prior to participating in training to ensure that they are physical and psychologically healthy.
They get screened prior to entering the service to ensure that they don't have certain disorders. Students are
required to get screened by military doctors at their home bases prior to traveling for SERE training to ensure that
they meet the physical and psychological standards for participating in training. Most SERE schools also mandate
that students complete screening questionnaires after they arrive at SERE school as a ftnal safety check and for
additional help or interventions if needed, to include being restricted from experiencing particular training
procedures. Furthermore, the students arrive with their medical records in hand or available electronically to
document their entire medical history, and indications of prior psychological diagnoses since their original military
entry physicals. These procedures are used not only to screen people out of participating in training, but also for
22
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(U) SERE instructors are themselves psychologically prescreened prior to hiring, and
must submit to a nearly year-long training process, annual psychological screening, and
extensive monitoring and oversight during practical exercises. These requirements are designed
to prevent instructor behavioral drift, which ifleft unmonitored, could lead to abuse of
students. 24
(U) JPRA's expertise lies in training U.S. military personnel who are at risk for capture,
how to respond and resist interrogations (a defensive mission), not in how to conduct
interrogations (an offensive mission). 25 The difference between the two missions is of critical
importance. SERE instructors play the part of interrogators, but they are not typically trained
interrogators. SERE instructors are not selected for their roles based on language skills,
intelligence training, or expertise in eliciting infonnation. 26
_ (
The risk of using SERE physical pressures in an interrogation context,
instead of in the highly controlled SERE school environment, was highlighted by the senior
Army SERE psychologist LTC Morgan Banks in an email to personnel at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. He stated:
Because of the danger involved, very few SERE instructors are allowed to
actually use physical pressures. It is extremely easy for U.S. Army instructors,
training U. S. Army soldiers, to get out of hand, and to injure students. The
training, from the point ofthe student, appears to be chaotic and out of control. In
reality, everything that is occurring [in SERE school] is very carefully monitored
and paced; no one is acting on their own during training. Even with all these
identifying people who could be provided preventative interventions in order to increase their probab[ility] of
success in training.'')
23 The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques: Part I of the Committee's Inquiry Into the Treatment of
Detainees in u.s. Custody, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 110lh Congo (June 17, 2008) (hereinafter "SASC
Hearing (June 17,2008)"); FASO Detachment Brunswick Instruction 3305.C (January 1, 1998).
According to Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, the former Chief of Psychology Services at the Air Force SERE school and
current JPRA Chief Human Factors, instructors are constantly monitored by other JPRA personnel, command staff,
and SERE psychologists to minimize the potential for students to be injured. These oversight mechanisms are
designed to ensure that SERE instructors are complying with operating instructions and to check for signs that
instructors do not suffer from moral disengagement (e.g., by becoming too absorbed in their roles as interrogators
and starting to view u.s. military SERE students as prisoners or detainees). These oversight mechanisms are also
designed to watch students for "indications that they are not coping well with training tasks, provide corrective
interventions with them before they become overwhelmed, and if need be, re-motivate students who have become
overwhelmed to enable them to succeed." Responses of Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28,
2008); Committee staff interview of Jerald Ogrisseg (June 26, 2007).
24
2' Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, Review o/DoD-Directed Investigations o/Detainee
Abuse (U) (August 25, 2006) at 24 (hereinafter "DoD IG Report'').
:l6 A trained interrogator is expected to be familiar with the social, political and economic institutions and have an
understanding of the geography, history and language of "target" countries. Additionally, the more proficient an
interrogator is with languages the "better he will be able to develop rapport with his source" and "follow up on
source leads to additional information." Army Field Manual (FM) 34-52, 1-14.
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safeguards, injuries and accidents do happen. The risk with real detainees is
increased exponentially. 27
(U) Despite the differences between the simulated interrogations at SERE school and real
world interrogations of detainees, in December 2001, the DoD General Counsel's office sought
JPRA's advice on the "exploitation" of detainees. The Committee is not aware of JPRA
activities in support ofany offensive interrogation mission prior to that request from the General
Counsel's office. In response to the request, JPRA Chief of Staff Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner
sent Deputy General Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffiin a memorandum on the
"exploitation process" and a cover note offering further JPRA assistance on "exploitation and
how to resist it.,,28
_
The memorandum outlined JPRA's view on "obtaining useful intelligence
information from enemy prisoners of war" (EPWs).29
(U)
The memo provided the JPRA perspective on how their SERE school staff
would handle the "initial capture," "movement," and "detention" of prisoners. 30 It also provided
advice on interrogation and recommended various approaches, including the use ofundefined
"deprivations. ,,31
_
The memo cautioned, however, that while "[p]hysical deprivations can and
do work in ahering the prisoners' mental state to the point where they will say things they
normally would not say," use of physical deprivations has "several major downfalls.,,32 JPRA
warned that physical deprivations were "not as effective" a means of getting information as
psychological pressures, that information gained from their use was "less reliable," and that their
use "tends to increase resistance postures when deprivations are removed.',33 JPRA also warned
that the use of physical deprivations has an "intolerable public and political backlash when
discovered. ,,34
c:
_(F
In December 2001 or Janu
psychologist, Dr. James Mitchell,
asked his former
colleague, the senior SERE psychologist at JPRA, Dr. John "Bruce" Jessen, to review documents
27
28
Fax cover sheet from LTC Daniel Baumgartner to Richard Shiffrin (December 17, 2001).
29
Exploitation Process at 1, attached to fax from LTC Daniel Baumgartner to Richard Shiffrin (December 17,
2001).
31
Ibid. at 3-4.
32
Ibid. at 4.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
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describin al
_On
February 12,2002, Dr. Jessen sent the paper to JPRA Commander Colonel
John "Randy" Moulton, who in tum, emailed the paper to his chain of command at JFCOM with
a recommendation that it be forwarded to the Joint Stafffor dissemination. 36 In his email, Col
Moulton wrote:
While JPRA is not in the business of strategic debriefmg (interrogation), we do
apply the most sophisticated techniques available in order to better prepare our
[personnel] for resistance. After over 30 years of training we have become quite
proficient with both specialized resistance and the ways to defeat it. 37
_
(
Col Moulton also recommended in his email that a JPRA team travel to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to "provide instruction on basic and advanced techniques and methods"
that JPRA had found effective in countering resistance in students at SERE courses. 38 Col
Moulton suggested that JPRA create a "short course" to teach relevant U. S; personnel about
"interrogation from the resistance side" notin that JPRA had alread received an informal
request to conduct training for the
whose fersonnel were
supporting interrogation operations at Guantanamo Bay and in Mghanistan. 3 The JPRA
Commander described the potential collaboration between JPRA a n . a s a "win-win
opportunity.,,40
_
(
In a subsequent email to Brigadier General (BG) Galen Jackman, the
Operations Chief at United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Brigadier General (Brig
Gen) Thomas Moore, JFCOM's Director for Operations and Plans (13), stated that JPRA was
"prepared to support [SOUTHCOM] in any potential collaboration," but that they would not
assist without an official request from SOUTHCOM or GTMO. 41
_
The JPR~ paper and Col Moulton's recommendations were further
circulated by email from JFCOM to officers at the Joint Staff and to several Combatant
Commands, including those with responsibility for Mghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay.42
3~ Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July 11, 2007); Email from Col John R. (Randy) Moulton to MAl
Jack Holbein, BGen Thomas Moore, CAPT Darryl Fengya, and
(February 14, 2002).
36
Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (February 12, 2002).
37
Email from Col Randy Moulton to MAl Jack Holbein, BGen Thomas Moore, CAPT Darryl Fengya,
(February 14, 2002).
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.; Memo from Col Mary Moffitt (via BG Ronald Burgess) to BGen Thomas Moore (undated) at 1.
40
Email from Col Randy Moulton to MAl Jack Holbein, BGen Thomas Moore, CAPT Darryl Fengya,
(February 14, 2002).
41
Email from BGen Thomas Moore to BG Galen Jackman et al. (February 14, 2002).
Email from LTC Michael McMahon to Lt Col Steven Ruehl, COL Jim Sikes, COL Daniel Bolger, Steve Wetzel,
CAPT Bill Pokorny, COL Cos Spofford, COL Edward Short, Col Kevin Kelley (February 14, 2002).
42
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D.
_
(
In response to the request, two JPRA personnel - senior SERE
The two week class was described as an "ad hoc 'crash' course on
interrogation" for the "next crew (rotation) going to SO HCOM.,,46 The JPRA team also
participated in a s arate video teleconference with
leadership and GTMO interrogation
staffwhere issues
were discussed. 47 Dr. Jessen said
about how JPRA could assist. 48
that he and Mr. Witsch went to make a "pitch" to
~ Witsch stated that he worked with Dr. Jessen to develop a set of briefing
slides ~training.49 The Department of Defense provided the Committee with slide
presentations that appeared to have been produced b JPRA for the March 8 2002 trainin . Mr.
Witsch testified that two slide presentations (l)
Based on Recently Obtained AI Qaeda Documents" and (2) "Exploitation"
appeared to be the same as those used by JPRA in the March 8, 2002 trainin~essen told
the Committee that he did not recognize the slides as those that he presented _ _ but that the
vast majority of the slides were consistent with what he would have taught at the training
session. 51
_
The "AI Qaeda Resistance Contingency Training" presentation described methods
used by al Qaeda to resist interrogation and exploitation and
43
Memo from Col Mary Moffitt (via BG Ronald Burgess) to BGen Thomas Moore (undated).
44
Ibid.
Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (March 12, 2002); see also SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008)
(Testimony of Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner) ("DIA accepte~ [JPRA's] help ... with their deploying groups" and
JPRA instruction "centered on resistance techniques, questioning techniques, and general information on how
exploitation works.")
4'
46
Email from Jim Perna to Christopher Wirts, Bruce Jessen, and Joseph Witsch (February 20,2002).
47
Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (March 12, 2002).
48
Hearing to Receive Information Relating To The Treatment of Detainees, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
110th Congo (September 4,2(07) (Testimony of Joseph Witsch) at 20 (hereinafter "Testimony of Joseph Witsch
(September 4, 2(07)'').
49
'1
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III(
The presentation on detainee "exploitation" described phases of exploitation
and included instruction on initial capture and handling, conducting interrogations, and long
term exploitation. 5s The exploitation presentation also included slides on "isolation and
degradation," "sensory deprivation," "physiological pressures," and "psychological pressures.,,56
At SERE school, each ofthese terms has special meaning.
The.
II (
!-I
Mr. Witsch, the JPRA instructor who led the March 8, 2002 training, told the Committee that
. ~tsch could not recall what the JPRA team discussed as part of the instruction
to _
relating to degradation. 61
61 Ibid.
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II (
JPRA materials also describe "sensory deprivation" and its place in the
exploitation process. 62 In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Witsch described hooding (placing a
hood over the head of a student) and white noise (such as radio static) as sensory deprivation
methods used on students in SERE school. 63 In materials provided to Department of Defense
lawyers in July 2002, JPRA explained that "[w]hen a subject is deprived of sensory input for an
[un]interrupted period, for approximately 6-8 hours, it is not uncommon for them to experience
visual, auditory and!or tactile hallucinations. If deprived of input, the brain will make it up." 64
II
training.
the.
(U) When used in the context of simulated interrogations conducted at SERE school,
JPRA uses the term "physiological pressures" synonymously with approved physical pressures. 66
III
Mr. Witsch could not recall what the discussion of "physiological and psychological
7 He said that he provided" personnel with a ''vision of how
pressures" at
we (JPRA) prepare, train, and equip our personnel" in SERE school. 68 Mr. Witsch could not
recall if physical pressures were discussed at the training. 69 Dr. Jessen, the senior SERE
psychologist who also provided instruction t o . personnel, said that physical pressures were
not discussed at the March 8, 2002 training. 70
to_
_
(
Following the training, Dr. Jessen sent an email to JPRA Commander
personnel on
Col Randy Moulton stating that the JPRA team "provided instruction
the content of US Level "c" Resistance to Interrogation training and how this knowledge can be
used to exploit al Qaeda detainees.,,71 Level "c" training includes the physical and
psychological pressures used at SERE school. Dr. Jessen also stated, however, that the JPRA
team provided suggestions on "how to exploit al Qaeda detainees for intelligence within the
confines of the Geneva Conventions."n Dr. Jessen told the Committee, however, that he would
62
Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees.
63
64
Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees; See Section II
D, infra.
67
68
Ibid. at 44.
69
Ibid. at 25.
70
71
Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton (March 12, 2002).
72
Ibid.
10
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not have known at the time if isolation, degradation, sensory deprivation, or other topics
referenced in the slides would have been within the confmes ofthe Geneva Conventions. 73
_
Days later, Dr. Jessen sent Col Moulton another email with his thoughts about
additional training for interrogators. Dr. Jessen explained that for future training, one day would
be sufficient to "cover the basics of DOD Level 'C' Resistance training and the special
contingency information" that they addressed_ However, he said that if he added "role
play" to the curriculum, he would need at least four days. 74
_
Dr. Jessen stated: "My impression is
requires a more 'exploitation oriented' approach than the students received. [JPRA's Personnel
Recovery Academy (PRA)] instructors do this better than anyone. If JPRA provided role play it
would be manpower intensive, require more time and space (rooms) and video monitor
equipment (which PRA has).,,7s Dr. Jessen recommended that he come up with a course
curriculum with input from others, if JPRA planned to "go[] this direction.,,76
E.
trainin was not the fIrst time JPRA provided advice to GTMO
personnel. Just before
training, JPRA prepared a memo on "Prisoner Handling
Recommendations" at GTMO for Col Cooney, the Executive Officer for the Directorate of
Operations (13) at SOUTHCOM. 77 The memo had been drafted by Dr. Jessen, the senior SERE
psychologist, and Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operational Support Office (OSO).78
The memo noted that its recommendations were based on a "limited understanding ofthe
procedures and conditions that exist[ed]" at the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay. 79
_
(
The JPRA memo contained specifIc recommendations for GTMO,
including that GTMO "enforce the strictest 'base line' prison behavior policy possible within
[Rules of Engagement]" b im osin and enforcin unishment conse uences more restrictive
than base line rules and
80 JPRA also recommended that GTMO tailor punishment to maximize
cultural undesirability and tailor rewards to maximize cultural desirability.
Dr. Jessen told the Committee that, at the time, he did not know that the scope of the Geneva Conventions
protections were different for Prisoners of War than they were for al Qaeda or Taliban detainees. Committee staff
interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13, 2(07).
73
74
Email from Bruce Jessen to Col Randy Moulton et a1. (March 18, 2002).
75
Ibid.
76
Ibid.
77Memo forCol Cooney, Prisoner Handling Recommendations (February 28,2002), attached to email from Bruce
Jessen to Joseph Witsch (March 13,2002).
78 Email from Bruce Jessen to Joseph Witsch (March 13,2(02). Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen
(November 13, 2007).
79
~emo for Col Cooney, Prisoner Handling Recommendations (February 28,2002), attached to email from Bruce
Jessen to Joseph Witsch (March 13,2002).
11
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F.
(U) At the time ofthe JPRA memo, GTMO was seeking assistance from other quarters as
well. In March 2002, Commander of Joint Task Force 170 (ITF-170) Major General (MG)
Michael Dunlavey invited Colonel Stuart A. Herrington (Ret.), an experienced Army intelligence
officer, to Guantanamo Bay to conduct an assessment of operations at the facility. 81 Following
his three day assessment visit, COL Herrington submitted a formal written report on March 22,
2002 to MG Dunlavey as well as to the Command at SOUTHCOM and the Army Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence. 82
(U) At the time of COL Herrington's visit, the mission at Guantanamo was under the
control oftwo different task forces, each commanded by a different Major General: ITF-170 for
intelligence exploitation and ITF160 for detention and security operations. s3 COL Herrington
noted in his assessment that there was ''unanimity among all military and interagency
participants in TF-170 that the security mission is sometimes the tail wagging the intelligence
dog" and stated:
To effectively carry out its intelligence exploitation mission, TF 170 and its
interagency collaborators need to be in full control of the detainees' environment.
Treatment, rewards, punishment, and anything else associated with a detainee
should be centrally orchestrated by the debriefing team responsible for obtaining
information from that detainee. 84
(U) COL Herrington also expressed concern that actions (positive or negative) which
guards might take as routine, such as singling a detainee out for a shakedown or providing an
extra chaplain's visit, might impact the ability of interrogators and debriefers from setting the
tone ofthe questioning sessions. 85
(U) COL Herrington found that facilities and procedures at GTMO for handling detainees
posed serious problems. He said that design flaws at GTMO's current and planned detention
sites hampered intelligence collection, noting that the "open" facilities, for example, facilitated
communications among the detainees and discouraged detainee cooperation by permitting
detainees to support each other's resistance efforts. 86
COL Herrington had acquired experience in interrogation and debriefIng during more than thirty years of military
service. Memo from COL Stuart Herrington to MG Michael Dunlavey, Report ofVisit and Recommendations
(March 22,2002) at 8.
81
See COL Herrington, Report ofVisit and Recommendations; COL Herrington also provided an additional list of
"suggestions" for MG Dunlavey and his 12, LTC Ron Buikema. See Memo from COL Stuart Herrington to MG
Michael Dunlavey, Suggestions (March 25, 2002)
82
was established at Guantanamo Bay in the mid-l 990s to support relief and migrant processing centers for
Haitian and Cuban migrants.
83 ITF-160
84
8' Ibid. at 2.
86
Ibid. at 3.
12
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(U) COL Herrington also warned that certain security procedures in place at the time
could have a negative impact on intelligence collection, stating:
The austere nature ofthe facilities and the rigorous security movement procedures
(shackles, two MPs with hands on the detainee, etc.) reinforces to detainees that
they are in prison, and detracts from the flexibility that debriefers require to
accomplish their mission... These views have nothing to do with being "soft" on
the detainees. Nor do they challenge the pure security gains from such tight
control. The principal at work is that optimal exploitation of a detainee cannot be
done from a cell ... 87
(U) Specifically, COL Herrington recommended that MPs not be in the room during
interrogations and warned that, while shackling a detainee might make sense from a security
standpoint, it could be counterproductive to intelligence collection:
Shackling one of the detainee's feet to the floor during interrogation might make
sense from a security perspective (although, with one or two MPs present, it is
arguable overkill). However, such shackling is either a) humiliating, or b) sends a
message to the detainee that the debriefer is afraid of him, or c) reminds him of
his plight as a prisoner. 88
(U) COL Herrington observed that most of the interrogators at GTMO lacked the
requisite training in strategic elicitation or the experience required to be effective with the
detainees. 89 He said that, ofthe 26 interrogators present at the time, only one had enough Arabic
language experience to interrogate without an interpreter. 9o
87
Ibid. at 4.
COL Herrington also identified additional deficiencies in intelligence collection, which he said could be improved
by arming GTMO with the ability to translate and review relevant documents onsite and monitor interrogations
using video technology. Ibid.
88
89
Ibid. at 6.
COL Herrington's report also criticized the screening criteria in place, which may have resulted in detainees with
less intelligence value being sent to GTMO and those with more valuable detainees being set free. COL Herrington,
Report o/Visit and Recommendations at 6.
90
91
COL Mike Fox, JTF-170 Methods and Techniques Info Paper (April 22, 2002).
13
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G.
_
(
The first option was for JPRA to field, deploy, direct, and sustain an
entire interrogation team. 98 The plan recommended that JPRA not pursue this course stating,
"No - Too much ofa manpower drain and we [JPRA] are not prepared to provide this kind of
support infrastructure.,,99 A second option was for JPRA to field a "lead captivity/ exploitation
expert (JPRA Senior SERE Psychologist) to advise and support" the exploitation process and to
92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.
94
Email from Dr. Bruce Jessen to Christopher Wirts, Mike Dozier and Randy Moulton (April 16, 2002).
9~
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation Draft Plan (undated), attached to email from Bruce Jessen to Col
Randy Moulton, Christopher Wirts, and Mike Dozier (April 16, 2002) (hereinafter "JPRA, Exploitation Draft
Plan'").
96
Ibid
98
Ibid
99
Ibid.
14
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have a "sponsor" provide all other personnel and direct the process. This option was also
rejected as "ineffective," noting that if JPRA could "direct" the exploitation process, there would
bea
"good chance of [JPRA] making a real difference," but "if not," there are "too many other
responsl"b"l"
1 Ittes t 0 expend "." energy on. ,,100
_(
JPRA fields and deploys core captivity/exploitation team - This team directs the
process under the lead of the JPRA Senior SERE Psychologist and receives all
additional specified support from a sponsor - Those sponsor individuals who
directly assist in the exploitation process will receive training from the JPRA
cadre. 101
_
(
While this option was recommended as the "[b]est match of expertise
and capability," the plan cautioned that JPRA "need[ed] to be careful in establishing this
relationship" and that JPRA should retain ''the authority to direct the entire process or current
mistakes will be repeated (GTMO, lack of experience of in-theater interrogators, ineffective
captivity handling and facility routine) - [The] JPRA plan should be implemented from the start
of detention through holding, transport, and exploitation.,,102
_
Dr. Jessen's draft exploitation plan described the means by which JPRA would
implement that recommendation, and included requirements for an undisclosed exploitation
facility and the means by which detainees would be transported and held there. 103
_
(
A section of Dr. Jessen's draft exploitation plan also identified "Critical
Operational Exploitation Principles" for interrogation operations. Those principles included:
(l'he only restricting factor should be the Torture Convention), [7] Established
latitude and ocess to offer and validate information for concessions
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.
The plan also described requirements for the management of the facility identical to those included in the
"Prisoner Handling Recommendations" previously prepared by JPRA for SOUTHCOM. Ibid.; Memo for Col
Cooney, Prisoner Handling Recommendations (February 28,2002).
103
104
15
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_
(
When asked about the plan, which his email referred to as "my" plan,
Dr. Jessen said that there are elements that he did not draft. 105 For example, he told the
Committee that he did not believe that the Torture Convention was the only controlling authority
for exploitation Rules of Engagement. 106 Dr. Jessen, however, did not reject the idea of having
JPRA support the exploitation process. Dr. Jessen said that he knew how to set up training
programs, had observed numerous "interrogations" at SERE school, and thought that some JPRA
instructors could make excellent interrogators. 107 He also told the Committee that he supported
having SERE psychologists observe interrogations and provide advice and assistance to
interrogators, but that that he did not support having SERE psychologists in the interrogation
booth with interrogators and detainees.
(U) Upon receiving the plan, JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton asked Dr. Jessen to
craft a briefmg to ''take up for approval," which included "why we (USG) need it, how it falls
within our chartered responsibilities (or if not, why we should do it) and then make a
recommendation,,108 Col Moulton testified to the Committee that he did not recall any
subsequent JPRA briefmgs for U.S. Joint Forces Command on Dr. Jessen's draft exploitation
plan and did not remember whether or not the plan was implemented. 109
II.
A.
(U) Abu Zubaydah was captured by Pakistani and CIA forces on March 28, 2002.
According to former CIA Director George Tenet, once Zubaydah was in custody, the CIA "got
into holding and interrogating high-value detainees" (HVDs) "in a serious way."uo Then
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that "in the spring of2002, CIA sought policy
approval from the National Security Council to begin an interrogation program for high-level al
Qaida terrorists."lll Then-NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that he asked CIA to have the
proposed program reviewed by the Department of Justice and that he asked CIA to seek advice
not only ~om DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) but also from the Criminal Division. 112 Ms.
Rice said that she asked Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet to briefNSC Principals on
the proposed CIA program and asked Attorney General Ashcroft "personally to review the
10~ The Department of Defense confmned that the "Exploitation Draft Plan" in the Committee's possession was, in
fact, attached to Dr. Jessen's April 16,2002 email, making it the same document Dr. Jessen referred to as "my initial
draft plan."
106
107
108
Email from Col Randy Moulton to Bruce Jessen, Christopher Wirts, Mike Dozier (April 17, 2002).
109 The Authorization of Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape (SERE) Techniques for Interrogations in Iraq: Part
II of the Committee's Inquiry Into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody, Senate Committee on Armed
Services, 110 Congo (September 25,2008) (hereinafter "SASC Hearing (September 25,2008)").
110
George Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm (New York: Harper Collins Publishers 2007) at 241.
III
Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
112
John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
16
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
legality of the proposed program. ll3 She said that all ofthe meetings she attended on the CIA's
interrogation program took place at the White House and that she understood thatDoJ's legal
advice "was being coordinated by Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales.,,114
(U) According to President Bush, the agency developed an "alternative set" of ,"tough"
interrogation techniques, and put them to use on Zubaydah and other HVDs. 115 Though virtually
all ofthe techniques that were used on Zubaydah remain classified, CIA Director Michael
Hayden confirmed that waterboarding was used on Zubaydah. 116 Assistant Attorney General for
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Steven Bradbury testified before Congress that the "CIA's
use ofthe waterboarding procedure was adapted from the SERE training program.,,117 When
asked whether she was present for discussions about physical and/or psychological pressures
used in SERE training, Secretary Rice recalled "being told that U. S. military personnel were
subjected in training to certain physical and psychological interrogation techniques." 118 Mr.
Bellinger, the NSC Legal Advisor, stated that he was "present in meetings at which SERE
training was discussed.,,119
(U) Public reports have identified a retired U.S. Air Force SERE psychologist, Dr. James
Mitchell, as having participated in the CIA's interrogation ofZubaydah. 120 Dr. Mitchell, who
retired from the Air Force in 2001, agreed to speak to the Committee about his time at DoD.
113 Secretary Rice said that in 2002-2003, she 'participated in a number of discussions of specific interrogation
techniques proposed for use by the CIA" Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from
Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008). .
114
Ibid.
115 In a September 6,2006 speech, President Bush stated that since September 11, 2001, a "small number of
suspected terrorist leaders and operatives captured during the war have been held and questioned outside the United
States, in a separate program operated by the Central Intelligence Agency." The President stated that the CIA used
"an alternative set of procedures" in interrogating the detainees. According to the President, the CIA techniques
"were tough, and they were safe, and lawful, and necessary." The President identified Abu Zubaydah as one
detainee who was subject to the CIA's alternative techniques. Press Briefmg with President George W. Bush
(September 6,2(06); see also Tenet, At The Center Of The Storm at 241.
116 Current and Projected National Security Threats, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1lOth Congo (February
5,2008).
117 Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110th Congo (February 14, 2008).
118
Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
119
John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
120 Jane Mayer, The Experiment, The New Yorker (July 11-18,2005); Jane Mayer, The Black Sites, The New Yorker
(August 13, 2007) ("According to an eyewitness, one psychologist advising on the treatment of Zubaydah, James
Mitchell, argued that he needed to be reduced to a state of 'learned helplessness.' (Mitchell disputes this
characterization)."); Katherine Eban. Rorschach and Awe, Vanity Fair Online (July 17, 2007), available at
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007107Itorture200707.
121
Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2007); Letter to Senator Carl Levin (June 22,2007).
17
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) An unclassified version of a May 2008 report by the Department of Justice (Dol)
Inspector General (IG) confirmed that FBI agents "initially took the lead in interviewing
Zubaydah at the CIA facility," but that "CIA personnel assumed control over the interviews"
when they arrived at the facility. 125
122
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
123
126 Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2007); Committee staff interview of FBI Special Agent
(December 21,2007).
127
128
Ibid.
18
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) The FBI Special Agent told the DoJ Inspector General that he also "raised objections
to these techniques to the CIA and told the CIA it was 'borderline torture. ",130 According to the
unclassified DoJ Inspector General's report, a second FBI agent present did not have a "'moral
objection'" to the techniques and noted that he had "undergone comparable harsh interrogation
techniques as part ofthe U.S. Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE)
training. ,,131
(U) According to the DoJ Inspector General's report, FBI Counterterrorism Assistant
Director Pat D' Amuro gave the instruction to both FBI agents to "come home and not participate
in the CIA interrogation." The first FBI Special Agent left immediately, but the other FBI agent
remained until early June 2002. 133 The report said that around the time of Zubaydah's
interrogation, FBI Director Robert Mueller decided that FBI agents would not participate in
interrogations involving techniques the FBI did not normally use in the United States, even
though the OLC had determined such techniques were legal. 134 Then-National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice said that she had a "general recollection that FBI had decided not to
participate in the CIA interrogations" but "was not aware that FBI personnel objected to
interrogation techniques used or proposed for use with Abu Zubaydah." 135
B.
As.
130 U. S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review ofthe FBI's Involvement in and
Observations ofDetainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq (May 2008) at 68 (hereinafter
"DoJ IG Report'').
131
Ibid. at 69.
131
133 DoJ IG Report at 69; see also Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4. (Months later, in an October 2,
2002 meeting with DoD officials at Guantanamo Bay, Chief Counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center (CTC)
reportedly Jonathan Fredman conftrmed that "[w]hen the CIA has wanted to use more aggressive techniques in the
past, the FBI has pulled their personnel from theater.")
134
m Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
136 Committee staff interview of Christophe
(Janumy 4, 2007); see also JPRAlOSO,. conca
Operationsfor JPRA support to anticipate
re uirements (October 3,2002). The memo states,
has made
informal requests for JPRA support to prepar
to use exploitation/interrogation techniques ... Five
separate meetings have been conducted betwee
and JPRArepresentatives..."
19
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_ _ At some noint in the first six months of 2002, JPRA assisted with the
preparation of~sent to interrogate a high level al Qaeda operative. 137 In a June
20,2002 memo to JPRA's Commander Randy Moulton, JPRA's Deputy Commander Col John
Prior, characterized the assistance as ''training'' and noted that the psychologist had suggested
"exploitation strategies" to
officer. 138
11_ Dr. Bruce Jessen JPRA's senior SERE psychologist, told the Committee
that he had met with a
have offered the
_
JPRA also conduct~ and pre-mission preparation for a group of
~ o On June 17,2002~~entarequesttotheJoint~D
oval for
I~Memofrom Col John Prior II to JPRNCC (Col Randy Moulta1), Requestfrom"or Interrogation
Training Support (J\U1e 20, 2002).
l]8lbid.
13ll.Initially, the s~or SERE psychologist could not recall ifhe provided this assistance to the
while he was still working at JPRA or if the assistance had ~r
he left JPRA After he left JPRA in 2002.
the senior SERE psychologist began working as a contractor t
but was restricted from discussing the
nature of his work with the Committee. Committee staff interview ofBrucc Jessen (November 13, 2(07).
....3LQW. Special Activities Branch, (U) Request/or JPRA Personnel/or Training (June 17, 20(2) (hcreina~
_ _ Request/or JPRA Personnel/or Training (J\Dle 17, 2002)").
141
142
11 Fax cover sheet f r o m _ t o Christopher Wirts (via Colin Junkins) (June 18, 20(2).
lei
144
Request/or JPRA Personnel or Training (June 17, 2(02). In a draft of the request written
by JPRA's OSO Chief Christopher Wirts and sent to
14, 2002, Mr. Wirts identified the same topics
for training. Mr. Wilts explained to his point of contact a
that their ability to support the request was
hindered Py Dr. Jessen's availability, who Mr. Wilts described 88 "critical in
.:
.... .:.A
!.II' that
is requiring." Memo from Christopher Wilts ( v i a _ to
Support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (June 14,2002).
J4'
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
support requests. 147 A Joint Staff Action Processing Fonn indicated that_ _ request
was endorsed by JPRA, JFCOM, Joint Staff, and the Office ofthe Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy and approved on June 27, 2002. 148
_(
In advance ofthe training, JPRA developed a two day lesson f o r _
~overingthe "full spectrum [of] exploitation," including both explanations and
demonstrations ofphysical pressures that were approved for use at JPRA's SERE school. 149 At
the time, JPRA-approved teclmiques included body slaps, face slaps, hooding, stress positions,
walling, immersion in water, stripping, isolation, and sleep deprivation, among others. 150
_ T h e two day training took place at_headquarters on July 1_2,2002. 151
Accordin to a Jul 16 2002 after action memo re ared for Col Moulton, the trainin covered
Time was also set aside for
recently been conducting interrogations in Mghanistan to discuss their experiences. Other time
was spent covering the physical and psychological pressures used at SERE school. Dr. Gary
1 4 6 " Memo from Col John Prior II to JPRAlCC (Col Randy Moulton), Requestjrom_jor Interrogation
Training Support (June 20, 2002).
14~Memo from Col John Prior II to JPRAlCC (Col Randy Moulton), Requestjrom~orInterrogation
Training Support (June 20, 2002). Although Col John Prior told the Committee that he could not recall the June 20,
2002 memo, JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton recalled receiving it at the time. Since the Committee's
interview of Col Prior, the Department of Defense has provided the Committee with a copy of the memo that was
signed by him.
148
Joint Staff Action Processing Form, (U) JPRA Personneljor Training (June 27, 2002).
11
Ibid. at 64-69.
~~mo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation TrainingjoJ.
_ ( J u l y 16,2002).
152
Ibid.
21
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Percival, a JPRA instructor at the training, said that in their demonstration of ph~sical pressures,
JPRA instructor Joseph Witsch acted as the "beater" while he was the "beatee." 53
_
In addition to explaining and demonstrating the physical pressures used at SERE
school, the JPRA personnel also provided instruction on waterboarding. 154
(D) At the time, waterboarding was only used by the U.S. Navy SERE school and its use
was prohibited at the JPRA, Anny, and Air Force SERE schools. 155 The U.S. Navy has since
abandoned its waterboarding at its SERE schools. None ofthe JPRA personnel who provided
the assistance had ever conducted waterboarding and would not have been qualified to do so at
SERE school. 156
_
The July 16, 2002 after action memo stated that
al
157
According
to
the
memo,
personnel
personnel were also present for the training.
"requested and were granted time to present the legal limits of physiological and psychological
pressures that were acceptable at the present time." 158 The after action memo described the legal
briefing:
Their 30-40 [minute] brief was very supportive. Basically, _
were told
they could use all forms of psychological pressure discussed and all of the
physiological pressures with the exception of the 'water board.' They were
advised that should they feel the need to use the water board, they would need
prior approval. They were also briefed on the ramifications for participating in
torture, which under international law is defined as a 'capital crime' and could
result in a death sentence if convicted. An eye opener to say the least. 159
_
The JPRA instructors who conducted the training did not recall_lawyers
providing any further guidance about how to seek approval for use ofthe waterboard in an
.
.
160
mterrogallon.
(D) However, Chief Counsel to the
Jonathan
Fredman later described an approval process for the use of aggressive interrogation techniques
153
m Memo from Dr. Percival to JPRA CC (Col Moulton), Comments on Physical Pressures usedfor cae Training
IS~mo
from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, E~ploitation Training/mil
(July 16, 2002).
1S8
Ibid.
22
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
reportedly explaining that "[t]he CIA makes the call internally on most ofthe types of
techniques," but that "[s]ignificantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOJ.,,161
_
In his after action memo f r o m _ training, JPRA instructor Joseph Witsch
stated that ''the training seemed well received and beneficial for the majority ofthe personnel
present.,,162 He observed that some ofthe class participants had "little to no[ ] experience" in
interrogation and others had "recently returned from conducting actual interrogations in
Mghanistan.,,163
III
(
In his memo, Mr. Witsch also commented on JPRA's future support to
interrogations, writing:
I believe our niche lies in the fact that we can provide the ability to exploit
personnel based on how our enemies have done this type of thing over the last
five decades. Our enemies have had limited success with this methodology due to
the extreme dedication of [American] personnel and their harsh and mismanaged
application of technique. The potential exists that we could refine the process to
achieve effective manipulation/exploitation. We must have a process that goes
beyond the old paradigm of military interrogation for tactical information or
criminal investigation for legal proceedings. These methods are far too limited in
scope to deal with the new war on global terrorism.,,164
_
Mr. Witsch recommended that JPRA develop two courses for future JPRA
customers - a basic course and an advanced course to deal with "senior, hardcore, and resistance
trained detainees. ,,165 The courses, he said, will need "immediate attention and will require a
total role reversal from current methodology and our standard approaches to training. It will take
a cross section of SERE experienced personnel-SERE instructors, psychologists, MDs and
intelligence personnel to effectively develop this new approach to captive handling and
manipulation.,,166
C.
II
161
16~ Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation Trainingjo_
(July 16,2(02).
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid.
16'
Ibid.
166
Ibid.
167
23
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
this assignment, Dr. Jessen retired from the Department of Defense and began working as an
independent contractor t~ 168
(U) Dr. Jessen did tell the Committee that, in some circumstances, physically coercive
techniques are appropriate for use in detainee interrogations. He said that the use of physically
coercive techniques may be appropriate when (1) there is good reason to believe that the
individual has perishable intelligence, (2) the techniques are lawful and authorized, (3) they are
carefully controlled with medical and psychological oversight, (4) someone (who is not
otherwise involved in the interrogation) can stop the use ofthe techniques, and (5) the techniques
do not cause long-term physical or psychological harm. 170 Dr. Jessen acknowledged that
empirically, it is not possible to know the effect of a technique used on a detainee in the long
term, unless you study the effects in the long-term. However, he said that his conclusion about
the long-term effects of physically coercive techniques was based on forty years oftheir use at
SERE school. 171
(U) Subsequent to his retirement from DoD, Dr. Jessen joined Dr. Mitchell and other
former JPRA officials to form a company called Mitchell Jessen & Associates. Mitchell Jessen
& Associates is co-owned by seven individuals, six of whom either worked for JPRA or one of
the service SERE schools as employees and/or contractors. I72 As of July 2007, the company had
between 55 and 60 employees, several of whom were former JPRA employees. 173
D.
(U) Just weeks after the JPRA provided assistance to the OGA, DoD Deputy General
Counsel for Intelligence Richard Shiffrin contacted JPRA Chief of Staff Daniel Baumgartner
seeking a list of exploitation and interrogation techniques that had been effective against
Americans. 174 In testimony to the DoD Inspector General (IG), Mr. Shiffrin stated that he made
168
Ibid.
169
Iii) Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (November 13, 2007). Lawyers for Dr. Mitchell informed the
Committee that he shares the same view as his colleague, Dr. Jessen.
171
172 Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2007); Committee staff interview of Bruce Jessen (July II,
2007).
173 Committee staff interview of James Mitchell (July 10, 2(07); Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts
(January 4, 2008).
174
Email from Lt Col Dan Baumgartner to Col Randy Moulton et al. (July 25, 2002).
24
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
the request after several conversations with General Counsel Jim Haynes. 175 Mr. Shiffiin later
said that everything he asked for from JPRA was to respond to requests from Mr. Haynes. 176 Mr.
Haynes testified to the Committee that he could not remember "specifically" asking Mr. Shiffiin
for infonnation on SERE techniques, but that he "asked generally" about that subject sometime
in the summer of2002. He also said that he remembered being "interested" in that infonnation,
and that ifhe had requested it, he would have requested it through Mr. Shiffrin. 177 Although Mr.
Haynes did not say why he was interested in this infonnation, when asked whether he had
discussed "SERE techniques with [] Messrs. Gonzales, Addington, Rizzo, Y 00, or any ofthe
other senior lawyers" he met with "regularly," Mr. Haynes testified to the Committee that he
"did discuss SERE techniques with other people in the administration. ,,178
(U) JPRA Chief of Staff Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner said that when the request from the
General Counsel's office came in, he called Col Moulton and Brig Gen Thomas Moore, the
JFCOM Director for Operations (13), and received pennission to provide the requested
infonnation to the General Counsel's office. 179 JPRA initially responded to the General
Counsel's inquiry on July 25,2002 with a memorandum signed by Lt Col Baumgartner. 180
II
(
The JPRA memorandum stated that "JPRA has arguably developed into the
DoD's experts on exploitation." It continued:
Recognizing the typical training for strategic debriefers in the intelligence
community did not include either SERE training (as a student) or grounding in
exploitation strategy and associated interrogation techniques, JPRA offered
assistance to intelli ence or anizations char ed with interviewin
detainees. JPRA
will brief the Criminal Investigative Task
Force (CITF) next Tuesday to determine their requirements. 181
(U) JPRA attached several lesson plans on exploitation and interrogation to the memo. 182
173
176
177
178
Ibid.
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Daniel Baumgartner (August 8, 2007); see also email from Col Moulton to
(June 30, 2006) ("We [JPRA] initially received a call from OSD General Counscil (sic) requesting
information about resistance techniques used against U.S. POWs. I believe this was early on in Operation Enduring
Freedom. We were requested to provide that information within hours and were authorized by JFCOM to forward it
to OSD.... Once we understood what OSD/GC was looking for, we provided an list of techniques.")
179
180 Memo from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Exploitation
(July 25, 2002).
181
Ibid. at 1.
182
Ibid. at 2-3.
25
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Ibid. at 2; see also email from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Col Randy Moulton et al. (July 25, 2002) (Thanking
''the 'exploitation answer stuckee' team" for "an outstanding job answering IJ Mr. Hanes (sic) and Mr. Schiffren
(sic) (OSD Dep GC for Intel) on their question 'what exploitation techniques have worked against Americans?")
183
184 Email from Lt Col Daniel Baumgartner to Col Randy Moulton et aI., copying Darrell Venture (JFCOM
Directorate of Operations) (July 25,2002).
IS'
186
187
Ibid.
188
189 Memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel, Exploitation and
Physical Pressures (July 26, 2002) at 1.
26
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
(
In the memo, JPRA informed the General Counsel's office that it had
already "assist[ed] in the training of interrogator/exploiters from other governmental agencies
charged with OEF exploitation of enemy detainees.,,190 The memo also stated:
Within JPRA's evolving curriculum to train interrogators/exploiters many
interrogation approaches are taught along with corresponding options for physical
pressures to enhance the psychological setting for detainee interrogation. Several
of the techniques highlighted (Atch 1) as training tools in JPRA courses, used by
other SERE schools, and used historically may be very effective in inducing
learned helplessness and 'breaking' the OEF detainees' will to resist.,,191
(
The ftrst attachment to the July 26,2002 memo was'''Physical Pressures used in
Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees.,,192 That attachment
included a list oftechniques used to train students at SERE school to resist interrogation. The
list included techniques such as the facial slap, walling, the abdomen slap, use of water, the
attention grasp, and stress positions. 193 The ftrst attachment also listed techniques used by some
ofthe service SERE schools, such as use of smoke, shaking and manhandling, cramped
conftnement, immersion in water or wetting down, and waterboarding.
(
JPRA's description ofthe waterboarding technique provided in that ftrst
attachment was inconsistent in key respects from the U.S. Navy SERE school's description of
waterboarding. According to the Navy SERE school's operating instructions, for example, while
administering the technique, the Navy limited the amount of water poured on a student's face to
two pints. However, the JPRA attachment said that "up to 1.5 gallons of water" may be poured
onto a "subject's face." While the Navy's operating instructions dictated that "[n]o effort will be
made to direct the stream of water into the student's nostrils or mouth," the description provided
by JPRA contained no such limitation for subjects ofthe technique. While the Navy limited the
use ofthe cloth on a student's face to twenty seconds, the JPRA's description said only that the
cloth should remain in place for a "short period oftime." And while the Navy restricted anyone
from placing pressure on the chest or stomach during the administration ofthis technique,
JPRA's description included no such limitation for sQbjects ofthe technique. 194
(
Attachment one also listed tactics derived from JPRA SERE school lesson plans
that were designed to "induce control, dependency, complia[n]ce, and cooperation," including
isolation or solitary conftnement, induced physical weakness and exhaustion, degradation,
190
Ibid.
191 Memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense Geneml Counsel, Exploitation and
Physical Pressures (July 26, 2002) at 1.
192 JPRA, Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees, attached
to memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel (July 26,2(02).
193
Ibid.
Compare FASO Detachment Brunswick Instruction 3305.C (January 1, 1998) at E-5 with Physical Pressures
Used In Resistance Training and'Against American Prisoners and Detainees at 3-4.
194
27
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
conditioning, sensory deprivation, sensory overload, disruption of sleep and biorhythms, and
. IatIon
0 fdIe.
t 195
manlpu
(U) DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes told the Committee that although he could not
recall ifhe had seen the specific list of SERE physical pressures sent to his office on July 26,
2002, he knew that he had seen a list of physical pressures used in JPRA resistance training. 196
II Mr. Haynes also recalled that he may have been "asked that information be given to
the Justice Department for something they were working on," which he said related to a program
he was not free to discuss with the Committee, even in a classified setting. 197
(U) A second attachment to the July 26, 2002 JPRA memo to the General Counsel's
office was entitled "Operational Issues Pertaining to the use of Physical/Psychological Coercion
in Interrogation.,,198 In attachment two, JPRA stated that the memo did not purport to address
the "myriad legal, ethical, or moral implications oftorture; rather, [the memo focused onJ the key
operational considerations relative to the use of physical and psychological pressures.,,19
(U) Attachment two described operational risks associated with using "physical and/or
psychological duress" (a phrase that JPRA used interchangeably with ''torture'' throughout most
of attachment two) in interrogations. 20o The attachment said that one risk was that the use of
these methods would increase the "prisoner's level of resolve to resist cooperating.,,201 JPRA
explained that "[0 ]nce any means of duress has been purposefully applied to the prisoner, the
formerly cooperative relationship cannot be reestablished. In addition, the prisoner's level of
resolve to resist cooperating with the interrogator will likely be increased as a result of harsh or
brutal treatment. ,,202
(U) According to attachment two, another risk to using techniques that increase physical
and psychological duress was that it created doubts about the reliability and accuracy of
information obtained. 203 JPRA explained in attachment two that "[i]f an interrogator produces
information that resulted from the application of physical and psychological duress, the
reliability and accuracy ofthis information is in doubt. In other words, a subject in extreme pain
may provide an answer, any answer, or many answers in order to get the pain to stop." 204
195
Physical Pressures Used In Resistance Training and Against American Prisoners and Detainees.
196
197
Ibid. at 88.
198 JPRA, Operational Issues Pertaining to the Use ofPhysicallPsychological Coercion in Interrogation (undated),
attached to memo from Lt Col Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel (July 26, 2002).
199
Ibid.
200
Ibid.
201
Ibid.
202
Ibid.
203
Ibid.
204
Ibid.
28
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) A third operational risk was the potential impact that the physical and psychological
duress could have on treatment of US. personnel. 205 JPRA explained in attachment two that:
Another important aspect of the debate over the use of torture is the consideration
of its potential impact on the safety of US. personnel captured by current and
future adversaries. The unintended consequence of a US. policy that provides for
the torture of prisoners is that it could be used by our adversaries as justification
for the torture of captured US. personnel. While this would have little impact on
those regimes or organizations that already employ torture as a standard means of
operating, it could serve as the critical impetus for those that are currently
weighing the potential gains and risks associated with the torture of US. persons
to accept torture as an acceptable option. 206
(U) The third attachment to JPRA's July 26, 2002 memo was a memo from the Chief of
Psychology Services at the Air Force SERE school, Jerald Ogrisseg, on the "Psychological
Effects of Resistance Training.,,207 That memorandum, which was generated in response to a
specific request from the General Counsel's office, described available evidence on the long
term psychological effects of Air Force SERE training on US. personnel and commented from a
psychological perspective on the effects ofusing the waterboard.
(U) JPRA Chief of Staff Daniel Baumgartner said that when the General Counsel's office
requested a memo on the psychological effects ofresistance training, he called Dr. Ogrisseg at
the Department ofthe Air Force's Air Education and Training Command. 208 Dr. Ogrisseg said
that Lt Col Baumgartner asked his opinion during the phone call about his thoughts on
waterboarding the enemy.209 Dr. Ogrisseg recalled asking, "wouldn't that be illegal?,,210
According to Dr. Ogrisseg, Lt Col Baumgartner replied that people were asking "from above"
about using waterboarding in real world interrogations. 211 Dr. Ogrisseg recalled telling Lt Col
Baumgartner, "aside from being illegal, it was a completely different arena that we in the
Survival School didn't know anything about." 212
(U) Subsequent to that call, Dr. Ogrisseg reviewed the data on the effects of Air Force
SERE resistance training on students and produced his memo, concluding that "ifthere are any
long-term psychological effects of [US. Air Force Resistance Training], they are certainly
20'
Ibid.
206
Ibid.
Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, Psychological Effects ofResistance Training (July 24, 2002), attached to memo from Lt Col
Daniel Baumgartner to Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel (July 26,2002) (hereinafter
"Psychological Effects ofResistance Training''').
'lIY1
Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, the Chief of Psychology Services at the Department of the Air Force's Air Education and
Training Command, told the Committee that he had accepted a position at JPRA prior to writing the memo but had
yet to officially change jobs. Committee staff interview of Jerald Ogrisseg (June 26, 2007).
208
209
210
Ibid.
2ll
Ibid.
212
Ibid.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
minimal." 213 The memo attributed this conclusion to efforts the Air Force SERE program
undertook to minimize the risk oftemporary psychological effects ofresistance training
becoming long-term effects. 214 The Air Force minimized the risk by, among other things,
performing three extensive debriefings during training. Dr. Ogrisseg said that "affording
students these opportunities to discuss their training experiences in open group environments
mitigates the risk ofturning a 'dramatic' experience into a 'traumatic' experience." 215 He told
the Committee that there are numerous controls in place at SERE school to ensure that the
training does not become "traumatic" for its students. 216
(U) Dr. Ogrisseg said that Lt Col Baumgartner also asked him "to comment on both the
physical and psychological effects of the waterboard," which he described in his memo as an
"intense physical and psychological stressor" used at the U.S. Navy SERE school. 217 Although
Dr. Ogrisseg had not used the waterboard himself, he had observed its use in a visit to the Navy
SERE School. He stated that, based on that visit, he did not believe that the ''waterIJ board
posed a real and serious physical danger to the students" who experienced it at the SERE school,
stating that the "Navy had highly qualified medical personnel immediately available to intervene,
and their students had all been medically screened prior to training. Psychologically, however,
the water[] board broke the students' will to resist providing information and induced
helplessness." 218
.
(U) Dr. Ogrisseg said that he was surprised when he found out later that Lt Col
Baumgartner had forwarded his memo to the General Counsel's office along with a list ofthe
physical and psychological techniques used in SERE school. 219 Dr. Ogrisseg said that his
analysis was produced with students in mind, not detainees. He stated that the conclusions in his
memo were not applicable to the offensive use of SERE techniques against real world detainees
and he would not stand by the conclusions in his memo if they were applied to the use of SERE
resistance training techniques on detainees.
(U) In a written response to a question posed by Senator Carl Levin after the
Committee's June 17,2008 hearing, Dr. Ogrisseg elaborated on that point noting several
"important differences between SERE school and real world interrogations that would limit [the]
2lJ
214
m Ibid.
30
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
conclusions [in his memo] to the SERE school training population." 220 Among those differences
Dr. Ogrisseg identified were (1) the extensive physical and psychological pre-screening
processes for SERE school students that are not feasible for detainees, (2) the variance in injuries
between a SERE school student who enters training and a detainee who arrives at an
interrogation facility after capture, (3) the limited risk of SERE instructors mistreating their own
personnel, especially with extensive oversight mechanisms in place, compared to the risk of
interrogators mistreating non-country personnel, (4) the voluntary nature of SERE training,
which can be terminated by a student at any time, compared to the involuntary nature of being a
detainee, (6) the limited duration of SERE training, which has a known starting and ending point,
compared to the often lengthy, and unknown, period of detention for a detainee, and (7) the
underlying goals of SERE school (to help students learn from and benefit from their training)
and the mechanisms in place to ensure that students reach those goals compared to the goal of
interrogation (to elicit information).
(U) In addition, Dr. Ogrisseg also stated that, since writing his memo in July 2002, he had
reviewed studies about the effects of near death experiences, and that he had become concerned
about the use of waterboarding even as a training tool. 221 The U.S. Navy SERE school
abandoned its use ofthe waterboard in November 2007.
(U) Lt Col Baumgartner testified to the Committee that, subsequent to sending his two
memos and their attachments - including the list of SERE techniques - to the General Counsel's
office, another government agency asked for the same information. Lt Col Baumgartner said
that he provided that information to the OGA. 222
IIIn his interview with the Committee, Lt Col Baumgartner said that. personnel had
contacted him requesting a copy ofthe same information that had been sent to the DoD General
Counsel. Lt Col Baumgartner recalled speaking to ~ d a psychologist a t _
about the request and sending the information to the - - . 2 2 3
E.
(U) On August 1,2002, less than a week after JPRA sent the DoD General Counsel's
Office its memoranda and attachments, the Department of Justice issued two legal opinions
signed by then-Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) Jay Bybee.
(U) Before drafting the August 1,2002 opinions, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
the OLC John Y 00 had met with Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales and Counsel to the
Vice-President David Addington to discuss the subjects that he intended to address. 224 Then
Dr. Ogrisseg also explained that "[w]hile long-term psychological harm can occur from relatively brief
distressing experiences, the likelihood of psychological harm is generally increased by more lengthy and uncertain
detentions." Responses of Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg to Questions for the Record (July 28, 2008).
220
221
222
223
224 According to Mr. Addington, he met "regularly" with a group of lawyers that included DoD General Counsel Jim
Haynes, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, and the CIA General Counsel John Rizzo. This group that met
31
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that she understood that the Department of
Justice's legal advice to the CIA "was being coordinated by Counsel to the President Alberto
Gonzales.,,225
(U) The first ofthe two August 1,2002 OLC memoranda, known to many as the "First
Bybee" memo, presented OLC's narrow interpretation of what constituted torture under U.S.
law. The memo stated that the federal anti-torture statute of 1994 prohibited "only extreme acts"
and that in order to constitute torture, physical pain would have to be equivalent in intensity to
that accompanying "serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily
functions or even death.,,226 For mental pain to rise to the level oftorture, according to the
memo, it would have to result in "si~flcant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g.,
lasting for months or even years.,,22 The First Bybee memo also found that the federal anti
torture statute may not be applicable to interrogations ordered by the President ifhe acted
pursuant to his Constitutional commander-in-chief powers. Further, the memo argued that even
if the federal anti-torture statute could be construed to apply to such interrogations, the defenses
of necessity and self-defense could potentially eliminate criminal liability under the statute. 228
(U) The First Bybee memo also effectively dispensed with the "specific intent"
requirement of the federal anti-torture statute by narrowly defining that requirement. The federal
anti-torture statute states that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be "specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.,,229 The First Bybee memo stated that in
order "for a defendant to have acted with specific intent, he must expressly intend to achieve the
forbidden act.,,230 Under that interpretation, to violate the law, a person must expressly intend to
commit torture and the memo stated that "knowledge alone that a particular result is certain to
occur does not constitute specific intent."
regularly - which Mr. Addington said was referred to as the "War COWlcil" by Mr. Haynes - also included OLC
lawyers John Yoo and Tim Flanigan. According to Mr. Addington, the group of lawyers met about a "range of
issues," including interrogation of enemy combatants in the war on terror. When Mr. Haynes was asked whether he
had discussed "SERE techniques with [] Messrs. Gonzales, Addington, Rizzo, Y00, or any of the other senior
lawyers" he met with "regularly," Mr. Haynes testified to the Committee that he "did discuss SERE techniques with
other people in the administration." These conversations occurred prior to the Decem her 2, 2002 approval of
aggressive interrogation techniques, including those derived from SERE, by the Secretary of Defense. See From the
Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules, Part
III, House Committee on the JudiciaI)', Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 11 Oth
Congo (JWle 26, 2008) (Testimony of David Addington); SASC Hearing (JWle 17, 2008) (Testimony of William 1.
Haynes II); The Terror Presidency at 22.
125
Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
The memo was leaked to the press in JWle 2004 and was rescinded by the OLC later that month. Memo from
Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Standards o/Conduct/or
Interrogation under 18 U.S.c. 2340-2340A (August I, 2002).
226
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid.
229
230 Memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Standards 0/
Conduct/or Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (August I, 2002).
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Jack Goldsmith, who succeeded Jay Bybee as Assistant Attorney General of the OLC
in 2003, described the First Bybee memo's conclusions and their effect:
[V]iolent acts aren't necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a
defense; and even if you don't have a defense, the torture law doesn't apply if you
act under color of presidential authority. CIA interrogators and their supervisors,
under pressure to get information about the next attack, viewed the opinion as a
'golden shield,' as one CIA official later called it, that provided enormous
comfort. 231
(U) The second August 1,2002 OLC legal opinion was also signed by Assistant Attorney
General Jay Bybee. 232 According to a declaration made to the United States District Court for
the Southern District ofNew York. by the Information Review Officer for the CIA, the so-called
"Second Bybee" memo is an I8-page legal memorandum from the OLC to the Office of General
Counsel ofthe CIA containing "information relating to the CIA's terrorist detention and
interrogation program" and "advice to' the CIA regarding potential interrogation methods." 233
According to the filing, the CIA requested the legal guidance from the Department of Justice. 234
A February 1, 2005 letter from the Justice Department to Senator Arlen Specter, then-Chairman
ofthe Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that the Second Bybee memo gave the CIA "specific
advice concerning specific interrogation practices, concluding that they are lawful." 235 And the
unclassified report of the Department ofJustice Inspector General explained that the opinion
analyzed "specific techniques approved for use on Zubaydah includ[ing] waterboarding ... ,,236
-"
-----
- -
---
- - - -
231 Former Assistant Attorney General for the OLC Jack Goldsmith, who rescinded the memo, criticized the First
Bybee memo as legally flawed, redundant and one-sided, tendentious in tone, unnecessarily narrow in its defInition
of torture, and widely broader than necessary in its assessment of Presidential authorities. The Terror Presidency at
143-51.
232
The Second Bybee memo has been withheld from the Committee.
Sixth Dec!. of Marilyn A Dorn, ~ 56, American Civil Liberties Union, et aL v. Department ofDefense, et aL, No.
04-Civ. 4151 (January 5, 2007).
233
Sixth Dec!. of Marilyn A Dorn, ~ 62, American Civil Liberties Union, et aL v. Department ofDefense, et aL, No.
04-Civ. 4151 (January 5, 2007).
234
Letter from Assistant Attorney General William E. Moschella to Chairman of the Senate judiciary Committee
Arlen Specter (February 1, 2005); see also The Terror Presidency at 150-151 (According to Jack Goldsmith, the
First Bybee memo "analyzed the torture statute in the abstract, untied to any concrete practices" and then the Second
Bybee Memo, "applied this abstract analysis to approve particular" interrogation techniques.)
23'
236 DoJ IG Report at 101, fn. 73; see also From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration
Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules, Part IIL House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110lh Congo (June 26, 2008) (prepared testimony of John Y00)
("OLC was asked to evaluate the legality of interrogation methods proposed for use with Zubaydah.")
237
DoJ IG Report.
33
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
that he "expressed concern that the proposed CIA interrogation techniques comply with
applicable u.s. law, including our international obligations. 238
(U) The Committee has been denied the Second Bybee memo and does not know which
specific interrogation practices, other than waterboarding, were analyzed in the memo. A
heavily redacted version ofthe Second Bybee memo, released on July 24, 2008, provides no
further details about the specific interrogation practices that were analyzed by the OLC. 239 The
unredacted sections only make clear that the OLC applied its analysis in the First Bybee memo to
240
a set of (redacted) facts at issue in the Second Bybee memo.
And while public sources have
suggested that the OLC's analysis applied to Zubaydah, then-Deputy Assistant Attorney General
John Yoo suggested in recent testimony that it "perhaps" applied to others "similarly situated.,,241
(U) According to Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo, the techniques that the OLC
analyzed in the Second Bybee memo were provided by his office. In his testimony before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Rizzo stated that his office was "the vehicle" for
getting the interrogation practices analyzed in the Second Bybee memo to the Department of
Justice.,,242
IILt Col Baumgartner, the JPRA Chief of Staff, recalled sending a copy ofthe same
to.
information that he had sent to the DoD General Counsel - including the list of SERE techniques
and Dr. Ogrisseg's memo on the pS1.;chological effects of Air Force SERE training and on
waterboarding attorney. 43 Mr. Haynes, the DoD General Counsel, recalled that in the
context of reviewing the list of SERE techniques provided to his office, that he may have been
"asked that information be given to the Justice Department for something they were working
on.,,244
(U) With respect to the issues addressed in Dr. Ogrisseg's memo relating to the
psychological effects of resistance training, Mr. Haynes said that he knew that there was a
238
John Bellinger answers to July 31,2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
239
The remainder of the Second Bybee memo has not been released publicly.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the OLC John Y00, who participated in the drafting of the Second Bybee
memo, added that in the context of the Zubaydah interrogation, application of the federal anti-torture statute to the
facts "depend[ed] not just on the particular interrogation method, but on the subject's physical and mental
condition." From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration
Interrogation Rules, Part llI, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights,
and Civil Liberties, 110th Congo (June 26, 2008).
240
From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation
Rules, Part III, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties, 11 Oth Congo (June 26, 2008).
141
Nomination of John Rizzo to be CIA General Counsel, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 110th Congo
(June 19, 2007).
141
143
144
34
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
government interest in that subject, but that he did not know if that information was used as
support in any OLC legal analysis, and ifhe did know, he did not recall. 245
(U) Then-NSC Legal Advisor John Bellinger said that some ofthe legal analysis of
proposed interrogation techniques prepared by the DeEartment of Justice referred to ''the
psychological effects of military resistance training." 46 In fact, Jay Bybee, the Assistant
Attorney General who signed the two August 1,2002 opinions, said that he saw an assessment of
the psychological effects of military resistance training in July 2002 in meetings in his office
with John Y 00 and two other OLC attorneys. Judge Bybee said the assessment - which to the
best of his recollection had been provided by the CIA - informed the August 1, 2002 OLC legal
opinion that has not been released publicly.247 In his June 26, 2008 testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee, John Y00 refused to say whether or not he ever discussed or received
information about SERE techniques as the August 1, 2002 memos were being drafted. 248
(U) While Judge Bybee said that he did not recall "any written advice provided to any
governmental agency prior to August 1, 2002, on the meaning of the standards of conduct
required for interrogation under the federal anti-torture statute or on specific interrogation
methods," the August 1,2002 memos were not the only occasion on which DOJ provided legal
advice on the CIA's interrogation program. 249 John Bellinger, the NSC Legal Advisor, said that
he understood that in 2002 and 2003, the OLC provided "ongoing advice to CIA regarding CIA's
interrogation program.,,250 And then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said that she
was present at "several" meetings in the White House at which Mr. Yoo provided legal advice. 251
Ms. Rice said that she asked Attorney General John Ashcroft "personally to review and confIrm"
DoJ's legal guidance. 252
F.
On Au t 12,2002, a week and a half after the OLC issued its two legal
opinions, the
sent JPRA Chief of Staff Lt Col
Baumgartner and JPRA OSO Chief Christopher Wirts a draft memorandum outlining t h e _
Ibid. at 104, 106; see also Redacted version of Memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, Interrogation
of[redacted} (August 1,2002) (In the unredacted sections of the Second Bybee memo, the memo states: "Your
review of the litemture uncovered no empirical data on the use of these procedures, with the exception [redacted].")
145
246
John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
147
Jay Bybee answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (October 14, 2008).
From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administmtion Lawyers and Administmtion Interrogation
Rules, Part ill, House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil
148
149
Jay Bybee answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (October 14, 2008).
250
John Bellinger answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
252 Ibid.
251
35
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
[I]nformation that your organization has already provided, coupled with our
officers' experience confIrms our opinion that JPRA assets are more than capable
of rovidin the necess
trainin that we need to start our initiatives. Basically,
consisting
of academic training and practical exercises aimed at learning both interrogation
and resistance to interrogation techniques. 255
_
(
_
draft described four areas of"trainin
(1) "Academic Training," including legal perspectives,'
(2)
'Resistance Training," including academic lessons in interrogation and resistance to
interrogation techniques, such as psychological or physiological pressures; (3) "Practice
InterrogationslResistance to [I]nterrogations/[F]eedback," including practice on "[p]hysical
pressures techniques and training"; and (4) "Review and Training of Resistance Training
Operating Instructions. ,,256
m_
Memo from_to Chief of Staff, JPRA (Lt Col Daniel Baumgartn~hief, Mission Support
(Christopher Wirts), Requestfor Training Support (August 12, 2002) (hereinafter _ t o JPRA, Requestfor
Training Support (August 12, 2002)").
254
255
Ibid.
JPRA, Requestfor Training Support (August 12, 20~ did not have the
training,
_ _ indicated that JPRA would not be expected to teach that topic. Committee staff interview of Christopher
Wirts (January 4, 2008).
2 5 6 _ to
~o teach "legal perspectives" and in his discussions w i t h " - " ' - about the
2 5 7 _ to
258
Ibid.
259
Ibid.
260
Ibid.
261
Ibid.
262
Ibid.
36
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) The Operating Instruction used to implement DOD directive 1300.7 are those
2.
_
(
Also o~st 12,2002, a meeting was held at JPRA headquarters "to
discuss future JPRA sUPE0rt t o . actions to obtain actionable intelligence from Detained
Col Randy Moulton describing
Unlawful Combatants." 66 A memo from JPRA's Co
that meeting reported that the JPRA training performed
to date had been well-received
and that "information and training that JPRA has provided
coupled with feedback from
t
tha
bl f
.d' .:. th
th
nfi
d that JPRA
.
~
. .
..
_
(
Col Moulton directed his team to develop a Concept of Operations
(CONOP) for continued support, stating that the JPRA CONOP would be staffed through the
Joint Staffand Office ofthe Secretary of Defense "to ensure proper oversight and approval prior
to execution ofthe plan." 269 A draft ofthat CONOP, circulated later in the year, described how
JPRA planned to f u l f i l l _ requirement for training, including how they would facilitate
the practice int~tion sessions - i.e., with JPRA members "portray[ing] resisters of different
skill levels" and_interrogators "demonstrat[ing] the ability to use exploitation methods and
concepts taught ... as well as us[ing] authorized physical pressures." 270 Among the risks
26.l
Ibid.
164
26~
Ibid.
266
2002) at 1.
267
Ibid.
268
Ibid.
269
Ibid.
270
3,2002).
37
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
described in that CONOP was "injury [to JPRA personnel] as a result of physical pressures
administered by
during the training.,,271
(U) At the August 12, 2002 meeting, JPRA created a special program which it called
Project 22B, to "limit JPRA distribution of sensitive activities in support ofliliiiil,,272
_
In his memo, Col Moulton wrote that protecting information associated with these
activities was "of paramount concern" t o _ and noted that~anticipatesa
congressional investigation into this activity at some time in the future."
III.
(U) Just weeks after the JPRA training at Fort Bragg, two GTMO personnel who attended
the Fort Bragg training drafted a memo proposing the use of physical and psychological
pressures in interrogations at GTMO, including some pressures used at SERE schools to teach
U.S. soldiers how to resist interrogation by enemies that do not follow the Geneva Conventions.
(U) On October 11,2002, Major General Michael Dunlavey, Commander ofGTMO's
Joint Task Force 170 (JTF-170), submitted a modified version ofthat memo for approval by his
A.
(U) In June 2002, members ofthe Army's 85 th Medical Detachment's Combat Stress
Control Team deployed to Guantanamo Bay. ~ee members ofthe team
psychiatrist Major Paul Burney, psychologist _
and a psychiatric technician
were informed that MG Michael Dunlavey, the Commander of JTF-170, had assigned them to
support interrogation operations as part of a newly created Behavioral Science Consultation
Team (BSCT) at the JTF. This assignment came as a surprise to MAl Burney a n d _
because, when they were deployed, the two understood that their mission would be to care for
271
Ibid.
Memo from JPRNCC (Col Randy Moulton) to JPRA J3/J7IPRA,.SuPPOrl t o . Project 22B (August 13,
2002) at 1.
272
273
Ibid.
38
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
of June and did not know who initiated the creation of the ITF-170 BSCT. 276
(U) Prior to their arrival at GTMO, neither MAJ Burney n~ had any training
to support interrogations and there was no standard operating procedure in place for the team at
GTMO. 277 MAJ Burney told the Committee that the team was "very aware of how little we
knew about the whole spectrum of detention and interrogation, we decided we needed help.278
B.
(U) Shortly after arriving at GTMO, the BSCT contacted the Chief ofthe Psychological
Applications Directorate (PAD) at the U.S. Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC),
LTC Louie "Morgan" Banks. 279 At the time LTC Banks was also the senior Army SERE
Psychologist. The BSCT psychologist.iiiiiilliliil had met LTC Banks prior to deploying to
GTMO but told the Committee that he was unaware at the time ofthe connections LTC Banks
had with the Army's SERE School.
Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview of
(September 12, 2007).
174
175
176
177.
A standard operating procedure was drafted in November 2002, several months after the BSCT was
established. It described BSCT tasks including: consulting on interrogation approach techniques, conducting
detainee file reviews to construct personality profiles and provide recommendations for interrogation strategies;
observing interrogations and providing feedback to interrogators on detainee behavior, flow of the interrogation
process, translator and cultural issues and possible strategies for further interrogation; and providing
consultation/training on specific behavioral science interviewing and observational techniques that promote
productive interrogation. The November SOP also stated that the BSCT "does not conduct medical evaluation or
treatment of detainees and does not participate in determining medical treatment protocols for detainees." While the
Committee does not know whether the SOP was ever approved, it comports with what BSCT members told the
Committee about their activities. J1F GTMO-BSCT Memoran~ord,BSCT Standard Operating
Procedures (November 11, 2002); Committee staff interview o~ (September 12, 2(07); Committee staff
interview of Paul Burney (August 21,2007).
178
179
39
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
II LTC Banks told the Committee that it was apparent to him that the BSCT28olacked the
LTC
proper training for the mission and that, when asked to help, he felt obliged to assist.
Banks contacted the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) for assistance in organizing
training for the BSCT. 281 After speaking to Col Moulton, the JPRA Commander, LTC Banks
informed the BSCT that JPRA was willing to modify its prior
interrogation
282
training sessions to suit the BSCT's needs.
(U) BSCT members told the Committee that they sought the training to better understand
the interrogation process. 283 They also told the Committee, however, that GTMO's Director for
Intelligence (J-2), LTC Jerald Phifer, approved their trip with the expectation that the BSCT
would learn about and bring back interrogation techniques that could be considered for use in
interrogations at GTMO; a point that the LTC Phifer confirmed in his testimony to the
Department ofthe Army Inspector General (Army IG).284 The Staff Judge Advocate at GTMO,
LTC Diane Beaver, confmned LTC Phifer's account, but said that MG Dunlavey told staffhe
had been considering a request for authority to use additional interrogation techniques and that
MG Dunlavey'S purpose in sending the staffto the training was to "fmd out what could be
used.,,28s
(U) MAJ Burney said that he a n d _ made LTC Banks "aware that there was
interest within JTF-170 to see if we could use' SERE tactics' to try to elicit information from
detainees.,,286 _ t o l d the Committee that he believed that the two discussed the GTMO
command's interest in obtaining a list ofresistance training techniques with LTC Banks. 287 The
JPRA Operational Support Office Chief Christopher Wirts, told the Committee that he believed
that he and LTC Banks also talked about the need to demonstrate physical pressures used in
SERE schools at the Fort Bragg training. 288 LTC Banks, however, told the Committee that he
did not recall a discussion of physical pressures at the training and that he was surprised when he
later learned that the BSCT had expected to become familiar with resistance training techniques
used in SERE school while at the training session. 289
280
281
Ibid.
282
Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAJ Paul Burney (July 15, 2002).
284 Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16,2006) at 8; Army IG, Interview ofMAJPaul Burney (April
28,2006) at 14.
285
286
287 Committee staff interview o~ (September 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of MAJ Paul
Burney (August 21, 2007).
288
289
40
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(D) At the time, there was a view by some at GTMO that interrogation operations had not
yielded the anticipated intelligence,29O MAl Burney testified to the Army IG regarding
interrogations:
[T]his is my opinion, even though they were giving information and some of it was
useful, while we were there a large part ofthe time we were focused on trying to establish
a link between AI Qaeda and Iraq and we were not being successful in establishing a link
between AI Qaeda and Iraq. The more frustrated people got in not being able to establish
this link .. , there was more and more pressure to resort to measures that might produce
.
d'late resu Its. 291
more Imme
_The
GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief, David Becker told the
Committee that at one oint interro ation personnel were required to question
but that he was unaware ofthe source of that
requirement. 292 Others involved in IfF -170 interrogation operations agreed that there was
pressure on interrogation personnel to produce intelligence, but did not recall pressure to identify
links between Iraq and al Qaeda. 293
(
Mr. Becker told the Committee that during the summer of 2002, the IfF -170
Commander, MG Dunlavey, and his Director for Intelligence (J-2), LTC Phifer, had urged him
to be more aggressive in interrogations. 294 Mr. Becker also told the Committee that MG
Dunlavey and LTC Phifer repeatedly asked him during this period why he was not using stress
positions in interrogations, even though the August 2002 Standard Operating Procedure for IfF
170 expressly prohibited the use ofthe technique. 295 MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he
did not recall asking his staff why they were not using stress positions or telling them that they
should be more aggressive. 296
II
Mr. Becker also told the Committee that, on several occasions, MG Dunlavey had
advised him that the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had called to express
concerns about the insufficient intelligence production at GTMO. 297 Mr. Becker recalled MG
Dunlavey telling him after one ofthese calls, that the Deputy Secretary himself said that GTMO
Army IG, Interview of MAl Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 6; Committee staff interview o~
(September 12, 2007).
290
291
The ICE Chief told the Committee that interrogators identified only "a couple of nebulous links." Committee
staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007).
292
293 Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview o~
(September 12, 2007).
294
295 .JTF-170J2 Interrogation Section Standard Operating Procedures (August 20, 2(02) (emphasis in original)
(Detainees being interrogated will "remain seated and secured to the floor. DETAINEES WILL NOT BE PLACED
IN STRESS POSITIONS"); see also Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17,2007).
296
2Y1
41
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
should use more aggressive interrogation techniques. 298 MG Dunlavey told the Committee that
he could not recall ever having a phone call with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz or his staff 299
c.
II Just as the JTF-170 BSCT was reaching out to LTC Banks for assistance,
SOUTHCOM was looking for advice to improve GTMO operations. In June 2002, Major
General Gary Speer, the Acting Commander of SOUTHCOM, requested that the Joint Staff
conduct an external review of intelligence collection operations at Guantanamo Bay.300 In
response, the Joint Staff directed COL John P. Custer, then-assistant commandant of the U.S.
Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, to lead a review team.
COL Custer's team visited GTMO in August and submitted its findings to the Joint
Staff on September 10,2002. 301 Like COL Herrington's assessment six months earlier, the
Cst"
"d ffi d
b
f'
ha
. ~ GTMO" t 11' .:.
11 ct'
Ibid.
299
COL John Custer,. CJCS Extemal Review ofGuantanamo Bay Intelligence Operations (U) (September
2002) (hereinafter "Custer Report"); see also BriefIng Slides, GTMO Review: Joint StaffExtemal Review of
Intelligence Operations at Guantanamo Bay. Cuba (September 10, 2002).
300 _
Custer's team included subject matter experts from Fort Huachuca, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
301
302 With respect to personnel, Custer cited a dearth of linguists, noted a lack of cultural training among interrogators,
and called the entire mission "woefully undermanned." Custer Report at 2.
303
Ibid. at I I.
304
Ibid. at I 2.
30'
Ibid. I I-12.
42
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
II
In his report, COL Custer referred to GTMO as "America's 'Battle Lab'" in the
global war on terror, observing that "our nation faces an entirely new threat framework," which
must be met by an investment of both human capital and infrastructure. 306
(U) Several witnesses expressed concerns to the Committee about using the term "Battle
Lab" to describe operations at GTMO. 307 In written answers to questionnaires from Senator Carl
Levin, COL Britt Mallow, the Commander of the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF),
stated:
D.
(U) On September 16,2002, less than a week after COL Custer submitted his report to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, seven personnel from JTF -170 at GTMO, including three members of
the BSCT and four interrogators, arrived at Fort Bragg for training organized by LTC Banks and
JPRA They were joined by a CIA psychologist and several Army personnel. 313 Joint Forces
306
Ibid. at 2.
Committee staff interviews ofMAJ Sam McCahon (June 15, 2007); COL Britt Mallow (May 7, 2007); Timothy
307
Responses of COL Britt Mallow to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006). Two other
witnesses also told the Committee that the term "Battle Lab" was used by Major General Dunlavey to describe
GTMO operations. Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of
Tim James (May 18, 2007).
308
309
Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (November 15, 2006).
310
Ibid.
3ll
312
313
Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton, Col John Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner and Christopher Wirts,
43
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Command (JFCOM) was formally notified on September 5, 2002 that JPRA intended to provide
training support to Army psychologists, but did not mention Guantanamo Bay or interrogation. 314
(U) JPRA sent senior SERE psychologist Gary Percival, who had recently assumed that
position after Dr. Jessen's departure, and two instructors to conduct the training at Fort Bragg.
II Dr. Percival and one ofthe two trainers, Joseph Witsch, had been instructors at the
exploitation training f o r . in July, where they had discussed and demonstrated physical
pressures. 315 In testimony before the Committee, the other JPRA trainer, Terrence Russell,
stated that the team had designed the training to provide attendees a "familiarization with the
academic or the theoretical application of exploitation from a SERE perspective.,,316 A
contemporaneous email from JPRA Operational Support Office (OSO) Chief Christopher Wirts,
who was involved in planning the training, explained that it was intended to be "similar in nature
to what we did for OGA on the last iteration." 317 None ofthe three instructors sent by JPRA to
Fort Bragg was a trained interrogator. 318
_
According to a JPRA plan of instruction dated August 28, 2002, the fIrst day of
training included instruction on the stages 0
The next three da s oftrainin in the
_(
including one called
A slide from that presentation stated that ''the
exploitation process is fairly simple but needs to be adhered to [to] be successful ifthe goal is to
increase the likelihood of obtaining useful intelligence information from enemy prisoners... ,,320
The esentation listed a number of"Critical 0 erational Ex loitation Princi les" includin
The "Principles" listed in the Fort Bragg training presentation
(OEF) (September 24, 2002) (hereinafter "USASOC Requirement to Pravide Exploitation Instruction (September
24, 2002)").
314
~ Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Randy Moulton and Christopher Wirts, Exploitation Trainingfo'"
III(Ojjfcers (July 16, 2(02); Committee staff interview of Dr. Gary-Percival (July 25,2(07).
316
317
318
Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2(07) at 14; Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 25.
319
Memorandum from Joseph Witsch to JPRNCC, JPRNCD, JPRNCOS, JPRNOSO, Plan ofInstruction (POI)
320"
Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Exploitation ofCaptive, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort
321
Ibid. at 4.
44
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
were substantially the same as those described in the Exploitation Draft Plan, circulated by Dr.
Jessen in April, which described a JPRA-directed exploitation process. 322
_
Though GTMO was a facility that dealt with detainees after they had been
removed from the battlefield, the presentation also included information on "Tactical
estionin "statin that tactical interro ators should
,,323 Mr. Witsch, the JPRA instructor
who acted as Team Chief for the training, testified to the Committee:
Rough handling is you would pull the person up to their feet, you would move
them rapidly in the direction that you were going to take them... basically, they
have no control. They would feel like the person that has them is in total control
ofthem. That's what we mean by rough handling. 324
_
Presentation slides used for the trainin also listed a number of other
recommendations for handling detainees including
,,325 Mr. Witsch testified to the Committee that he did not
know what was meant by those statements and he could not recall any discussion about what
punishments might be culturally undesirable for Arab or Islamic detainees. 326
_
(
The presentation stated that "all daily activities should be on random
schedules" and should, among other things "disrupt prisoner sleep cycles.,,327 Mr. Witsch said
that denying detainees the ability to predict and determine their schedules "keeps them somewhat
off guard and guessing.,,328
_
(
A second JPRA presentation delivered at Fort Bragg described methods
to deal with detainees who were trained to resist interrogation. 329 The presentation, entitled
"Counter Measures to Defeat al Qaeda Resistance Contingency Training Based on Recently
Obtained AL-QA'IDA Documents" listed several countermeasures to deal with resistant
detainees including "invasion of personal space by female.,,33o Mr. Witsch explained that "[i]n a
lot of cases, it's uncomfortable for a male to have a female in their space. It could also be looked
at as uncomfortable having a female in front of an Arab... What this is is a form of pressure in
32l
323
Hearing to Receive Information Relating To The Treatment of Detainees, Senate Committee on Armed Services,
110th Congo (September 6,2(07) (Testimony of Joseph Witsch) at 12, 34 (hereinafter "Testimony of Joseph Witsch
(September 6, 2(07)").
324
326
321
328
329
Ibid. at 25.
JPRA, Counter Measures to Defeat al-Qa 'ida Resistance, presentation to GTMO personnel at Fort Bragg
(September 2(02) (hereinafter "JPRA, Counter A-!easures to Defeat al-Qa 'ida Resistance").
330
45
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
that situation.,,331 He testified that lPRA might have become aware that the invasion of the
personal space by a female might make an Arab detainee uncomfortable while conducting
preparatIon
. lor
J!:
.. 332
research m
t h e trammg.
_
(
The presentation on countenneasures to defeat al Qaeda resistance also
explained that "[i]fthe prisoner believes that Americans are immoral barbarians and what he sees
counters those beliefs then his core beliefs have been shaken and he is more likely to cooperate..
. . If his core beliefs are reinforced by his treatment he is more likely to stick to his resistance.,,333
Mr. Witsch told the Committee that it was "hard to say" what the effect 0
would have on a detainee's resistance - whether it would make the detainee more or
less likely to cooperate. 334
(U) In his testimony to the Army IG, MAl Burney, the GTMO BSCT psychiatrist who
attended the training, stated that JPRA personnel at Fort Bragg, "described some of the stuffthat
they would do in SERE school as far as keeping people in some sort of solitary confinement for a
period of time" or "finding out what their fears were before they came so that they would try and
use those against them, whether it was fear of spiders, of the dark or whatever...,,335 An
interrogator from GTMO who attended the training also recalled a discussion about the use of
phobias. 336
II (
Members ofthe GTMO BSCT who attended the Fort Bragg training
recalled discussions with the JPRA instructors about how they administered physical
pressures. 337 MAl Burney told the Committee that instructors talked about techniques the SERE
schools used to teach resistance to interrogation, such as walling, and exposing students to cold
until they shiver. 338 _ t o l d the Committee that hooding and hitting in a way that was not
injurious were both mentioned at Fort Bragg. 339 An interrogator from JTF-170 who attended the
training also recalled a discussion about the use of physical pressures. 340
(U) That same interrogator said that the instructors spoke about using existing procedures
at GTMO to enhance interrogations. 341 For example, the interrogator told the Committee that
there was a discussion with lPRA personnel that military working dogs, already present at
331
332
Ibid. at 27.
333
334
m Army IG, Interview of MAl Paul Burney (April 28, 2(06) at 14.
336
337
338
339
340
341
Ibid.
46
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
GTMO for security, could enhance detainee exploitation. Similarly, the interrogator said that the
instructors pointed out that hoods, goggles, and ear muffs were already in use with detainees at
GTMO for security purposes, and that existing processes utilizing those techniques could also be
used to enhance interrogations. The interrogator also recalled requesting additional JPRA
training for GTMO personnel on the use of physical pressures.
(U) Neither LTC Banks nor any ofthe JPRA instructors from the Fort Bragg training
could recall if there were discussions of physical pressures. 342 LTC Banks told the Committee
that using physical pressures desiFed for students at SERE school in actual interrogations would
almost always be unproductive. 34 For example, he told the Committee that slapping a person
would harden their resistance.
(U) Despite the apparent instruction on physical pressures, MAJ Burney told the Army
IG that instructors at Fort Bragg believed that the techniques used in SERE training should not
be brought back for use at GTMO and that "interrogation tactics that rely on physical pressures
or torture, while they do get you information, do not tend to get you accurate information or
reliable information.,,344 In a written statement provided to the Committee, MAJ Burney
reiterated that point, stating that "[i]t was stressed time and time again that psychological
investigations have proven that harsh interrogations do not work. At best it will get you
information that a prisoner thinks you want to hear to make the interrogation stop, but that
information is strongly likely to be false.,,34s
II (
During the Fort Bragg training, the GTMO personnel also discussed
conditions at GTMO that they felt were hampering intelligence collection efforts. In his after
action report summarizing the training, JPRA instructor and trainin Team Chief Jos h Witsch
described some of those conditions statin for exa Ie that
,346 Mr. Witsch also stated in his after action report that "[a] lot of interrogation
techniques used in the past are no longer effective against the individual detainees because they
have developed an awareness and countermeasures to deal with them.,,347 Mr. Witsch added that
some ofthe interrogators had become "frustrated over the controls placed on their ability to
extract actionable information," such as restrictions on bringing detainees together in a room to
confront inconsistencies or on interrogating detainees for "12-15-20 hours at a time.,,348 While
Mr. Witsch noted that rapport building had proved to be the most effective interrogation
technique in eliciting information and that the positive treatment of detainees at GTMO was
LTC Banks added that he was not present for all of the training sessions. Committee staff interview of LTC
Morgan Banks (June 15,2007); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3,2007) at 79; Testimony of Joseph Witsch
(September 4,2007) at 99.
342
343
344
345
Memo from Joseph Witsch to Col Moulton, Col Atkins, Lt Col Baumgartner, Mr. Wirts, U.s. Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC), Requirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002).
346
347
Ibid.
348
Ibid.
47
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
having some effect, he stated that the positive effect appeared limited to the "younger,
inexperienced" detainees. ,,349
.
II
(
In his after action report, Mr. Witsch expressed concerns about JPRA
involvement in GTMO operations, writing:
I highly recommend we continue to remain in an advisory role and not get directly
involved in the actual operations - GITMO in particular. We have no actual
experience in real world prisoner handling. The concepts we are most familiar
with relate to our past enemies and we have developed our Code of Conduct
procedures based on those experiences. Without actual experience with current
[Designated Unlawful Combatants] we are making the assumption that
procedures we use to exploit our personnel will be effective against the current
detainees. 350
(
A week later, Mr. Witsch prepared a follow up memo for Mr. Wirts, JPRA's
OSO chief, expressing concern about lPRA's involvement with detainee exploitation, stating:
What do we bring to the table? We are Code of Conduct instructors with a vast
amount of experience training highly intelligent, disciplined, and motivated DoD
personnel to resist captivity... We base our role-play laboratories on what we
know our fonner enemies have done to our personnel in captivity. It is based on
illegal exploitation (under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) of prisoners over the last 50
years...
_(
I believe the techniques and tactics that we use in training have applicability.
What I am wrestling with is the implications of using these tactics as it relates to
current legal constraints, the totally different motivations of the detainees, and the
lack of direction of senior leadership within the [U.S. Government] on how to
unifonnly treat detainees.
I think we are well within our sphere of influence if we stick to providing
methods to counter resistance trained [Designated Unlawful Combatants]. We are
out of our sphere when we begin to profess the proper ways to exploit these
detainees. We are now attempting to educate lower level personnel in DoD and
OGAs with concepts and principles that are somewhat foreign to them and while
it all sounds good they are not in a position nor do they have the depth of
knowledge in these matters to effect change and do it in reasonable safety.
The handling of [Designated Unlawful Combatants] is a screwed up mess and
everyone is scrambling to unscrew the mess ... If we want a more profound role in
this effort we need to sell our capabilities to the top level people in the USG and
349
Ibid.
3'0
Ibid.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
not spend our time trying to motivate the operators at the lower levels to sway
their bosses. This is running the train backwards and that is a slow method to get
somewhere. There are a lot of people in the USG intelligence community that
still believe in the old paradigm and wonder just what we're doing in their
business. 351
_ T h e memo concluded with the warning, "[w]e don't have an established track
record in this type of activity and we would present an easy target for someone to point at as the
problem. The stakes are much higher for this than what you and I have done in any activity
before.,,352
E.
(U) On September 25, 2002, less than a week after GTMO personnel returned from the
training at Fort Bragg, Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the Vice President
David Addington, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, Acting CIA General Counsel John Rizzo,
Assistant Attorney General ofthe Criminal Division Michael Chertoff, and other senior
administration officials travelled to Guantanamo Bay and were briefed on future plans for
detention facilities as well as on intelligence successes, failures, and problems at the JTF. 353
II(
According to a trip report prepared by a Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at
SOOUTHCOM, MG Dunlavey held private conversations with Mr. Haynes and a few others and
briefed the entire group on a number of issues including "policy constraints" affecting
interrogations at the JTF. 354 For example, MG Dunlavey told the group that JTF-170 would
"like to take Koran away from some detainees - hold it as incentive" but that the issue was
355
undergoing a policy determination by SOUTHCOM.
The trip report noted that Mr. Haynes
"opined that JTF-170 should have the authority in place to make those calls, per POTUS order,"
adding that he "[t]hought JTF-170 would have more freedom to command.,,356 MG Dunlavey
told the Committee that he may have told the group during their visit that JTF-170 was working
357
on a request for authority to use additional interrogation techniques.
Mr. Haynes said he did
not recall discussing specific interrogation techniques or GTMO's work on a request for
authority to use additional interrogation techniques. 358
m_Memo from Joseph Witsch to Christopher Wirts, (U) Concerns withJPRA Involvement in Operation
Enduring Freedom Exploitation o/Detained Unlawful Combatants (October 1, 2002).
mIbid.
3~3 JTF-GTMO Distinguished
Visitors Roster (September 27, 2002). Col Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD
General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27, 2002). While the September 27, 2002 trip report states that the
visit occurred on September 25 th, Jack Goldsmith, another senior official on the trip, recounts that the visit took
place on September 26, 2002. Goldsmith notes that Patrick Philbin. then-Chertoff Chief of Staff Alice Fisher, and
"several Pentagon lawyers" also went on the trip. The Terror Presiden2)' at 99-100.
3~4
Col. Terrence Farrell, Trip Report - DoD General Counsel Visit to GTMO (September 27,2002).
m Ibid.
356
Ibid.
49
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
F.
(U) According to the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) at GTMO, LTC Diane Beaver, there
was discussion among senior staff at GTMO as to whether or not the JTF required explicit
authorization to use interrogation approaches that had not been taught to interrogators at the U.S.
Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. While some felt that JTF-170 already had
the authority to use additional interrogation techniques, MG Dunlavey directed his staff to draft a
request for new authorities to submit to SOUTHCOM for approval. 359
(U) The JTF-170 Director for Intelligence, LTC Jerald Phifer, told the Committee that
MG Dunlavey wanted to get new techniques on the table and that MG Dunlavey pressured him
to draft a memo requesting additional techniques. 36o LTC Phifer asked the BSCT to draft an
interrogation policy that could be formally submitted up the chain of command for review. 361
According to MAJ Burney, the BSCT psychiatrist, "by early October there was increasing
pressure to get 'tougher' with detainee interrogations but nobody was quite willing to define
what 'tougher' meant.,,362 MAJ Burney added that there was "a lot ofpressure to use more
coercive techniques" and that if the interrogation policy memo that LTC Phifer had asked him to
write did not contain coercive techniques, then it "wasn't going to go very far.,,363
(U) According to MAJ Burney, he and~wrote a memo of suggested detention
MAJ Burney told the Committee that
and interrogation policies in the course of an evening.
some of the interrogation approaches identified in the memo came from their JPRA training in
the BSCT
Fort Bragg and other approaches were simply made up by the BSCT. 365 _
psychologist, also told the Committee that the BSCT used information from the JPRA training at
Fort Bragg to draft the memo. 366
3'9
360
361
362
Ibid.
363
Army IG, Interview ofMAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11.
364
Ibid.
Committee staff interview ofMN Paul Burney (August 21, 2007). However, in testimony to the Army IG, MAJ
Burney said he did not know whether the memo incorpomted tactics from the Fort Bragg training. Army!G,
Interview of MAJ Paul Burney (April 28, 2006) at 11.
36'
366
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
The memo identified a number of conditions at GTMO that the BSCT judged to
be hindering intelligence collection and stated:
_
The October 2, 2002 memo proposed three categories of interrogation techniques
''for use in the interrogation booth to develop rapport, promote cooperation, and counter
resistance.,,369 Category I techniques included incentives and "mildly adverse approaches" such
as telling a detainee that he was going to be at GTMO forever unless he cooperated. 370 The
memorandum stated that an interrogator should be able to ascertain whether a detainee is being
cooperative by the end ofthe initial interrogation and said that if Category I approaches failed to
induce cooperation, the interrogator could request approval for Category II approaches. 371
_
Category II techniques were designed for 'lligh priority" detainees, defined in the
memo as "any detainee suspected of having significant information relative to the security ofthe
United States.,,372 Category II techniques included stress positions; the use of isolation for up to
30 days (with the possibility of additional 30 day periods, if authorized by the Chief
Interrogator); depriving a detainee of food for up to 12 hours (or as long as the interrogator goes
without food during an interrogation); the use of back-to-back 20 hour interrogations once per
week; removal of all comfort items including religious items; forced groominfi; handcuffmg a
detainee; and placing a hood on a detainee during questioning or movement. 3
Ibid. at 2.
369
Ibid.
370
Ibid.
371
Ibid.
312
Ibid.
Ibid. at 2-3. There is evidence that stress positions were used at GTMO prior to the BSCT memo. Lt. Col.
Ronald Buikema, who served at Guantanamo from January 2001 until Jme 2001 as the ITF-170 J2 and
Commanding Officer of the Joint Interagency Interrogation Facility (JIIF) indicated in his response ~o a Navy IG
questionnaire that stress positions were used in some interrogations at GTMO. Email from Lt. Col. Ron Buikema to
Victoria Gnibus (July 21,2004).
.
373
51
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
The memo reserved Category III techniques "ONLY for detainees that have
evidenced advanced resistance and are suspected of having significant infonnation pertinent to
national security.,,374 Category III techniques included the daily use of20 hour interrogations;
the use of strict isolation without the right of visitation by treating medical professionals or the
International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC); the use of food restriction for 24 hours once a
week; the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee he might experience a painful or
fatal outcome; non-injurious physical consequences; removal of clothing; and exposure to cold
weather or water until such time as the detainee began to shiver. 375
_
In addition to suggesting interrogation techniques, the BSCT memo made
recommendations for the treatment of detainees in the cell blocks. Specifically, it proposed that
resistant detainees might be limited to four hours of sleep a day; that they be deprived of comfort
items such as sheets, blankets, mattresses, washcloths; and that interrogators control access to all
detainees' Korans. 376 The BSCT memo described using fans and generators to create white
noise as a fonn of psychological pressure and advocated that "all aspects ofthe [detention]
environment should enhance capture shock, dislocate expectations, foster dependence, and
support exploitation to the fullest extent possible.,,377
II
(
MAl Burney a n d _ t o l d the Committee that they were not
comfortable with the memo they were asked to produce, and therefore included a statement in
the memo reflecting their concerns about the techniques, including concerns about the "long term
physical and/or mental impact ofthe techniques.,,378 They wrote:
Experts in the field of interrogation indicate the most effective interrogation
strategy is a rapport-building approach. Interrogation techniques that rely on
physical or adverse consequences are likely to garner inaccurate information and
create an increased level of resistance...There is no evidence that the level offear
or discomfort evoked by a given technique has any consistent correlation to the
volume or quality of information obtained. . .The interrogation tools outlined
could affect the short term and/or long term physical and/or mental health of the
detainee. Physical and/or emotional hann from the above techniques may emerge
months or even years after their use. It is impossible to determine if a particular
strategy will cause irreversible hann if employed. . .Individuals employing
Category II or Category III interrogation techniques must be thoroughly trained ..
. carefully selected, to include a mental health screening (such screenings are SOP
for SERE and other Special Operations personnel). 379
374
m Ibid.
376
Ibid. at 4.
J77
Ibid. at 4-5.
Committee staff interview of MAl Paul Burney (August 21, 2007); Committee staff interview o~
(September 13, 2007).
378
379
52
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) The BSCT provided a copy oftheir memo to LTC Banks at U.S. Anny Special
Operations Command (USASOC), who had helped organize their JPRA training. Upon
reviewing the memo, LTC Banks praised the BSCT for their "great job" on the memo, but also
raised concerns about the suggested use of physical pressures in interrogation, noting that
physical pressures are used with students in SERE school to increase their resistance to
interrogation, not break. it down. 380
(U) LTC Banks wrote:
II (
II (
(U) My strong recommendation is that you do not use physical pressures ...[If
GTMO does decide to use them] you are taking a substantial risk, with very
limited potential benefit. 381
G.
(U) On October 2, 2002, the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC Diane Beaver convened a
meeting to discuss the BSCT memo. Minutes from that meeting reflect the attendance of ITF
170 personnel and the then-chief counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center Jonathan
Fredman. 382
380
Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAl Paul Burney an~(October 2, 2002).
381
Ibid.
382
Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 2. The meeting minutes stated that questions and comments
53
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Mr. Fredman's visit took place just a week after the acting CIA General Counsel
John Rizzo and DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes's September 25,2002 visit to GTMO. Mr.
Haynes did not recall discussing with Mr. Rizzo during their visit the possibility of having a CIA
lawyer travel to GTMO to talk to DoD personnel there. 383 Mr. Haynes said he later found out in
a discussion with Mr. Rizzo that a CIA lawyer had gone to GTMO and discussed legal
authorities applicable to interrogations, but said he could not recall when he ftrst learned ofthat
CIA lawyer's visit.
(U) While LTC Beaver could not recall what she or others said, the minutes ofthe
October 2, 2002 meeting indicate that it began with a brieftng by the BSCT on the JPRA training
at Fort Bragg. 384 The BSCT briefer told the group that rapport building and the "friendly
approach" were proven methods to overcome resistance, while "fear based approaches" were
''unreliable'' and "ineffective in ahnost all cases.,,385 According to the meeting minutes,
however, the BSCT did report that psychological stressors such as sleep deprivation, withholding
food, isolation, and loss oftime were "extremely effective." 386 The BSCT also identified "camp
wide, environmental strategies designed to disrupt cohesion and communication among
detainees" as potentially helpful to improve the effectiveness of interroations and explained that
the detention "environment should foster dependence and compliance." 87
(U) Despite the BSCT comment on the effectiveness of rapport building, the meeting
minutes reflect little discussion ofthat approach. In fact, according to the meeting minutes, the
GTMO Director for Intelligence LTC Jerald Phifer questioned the BSCT assessment, stating that
"harsh tec~d on our service members have worked and will work on some, what about
those?,,388 _ _ responded that force was "risky, and may be ineffective.,,389
Nevertheless, the remainder ofthe meeting appears to have revolved around a discussion of
aggressive interrogation techniques and how to obtain the approval to use them.
(U) Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief David Becker noted at the meeting that
there were many reports about sleep deprivation used at Bagram in Afghanistan. 390 According to
the meeting minutes, LTC Beaver agreed but stated that "officially it is not happening.,,391
Nevertheless, LTC Beaver suggested that sleep deprivation could be used on GTMO detainees
''with approval.,,392 The group also discussed ways to manage the detainees' sleep cycles, i.e., by
383
384
38'
386
Ibid.
387
Ibid.
388
Ibid.
389
Ibid. at 2.
390
Ibid
391 Ibid. at 3. It is unclear how and when JTF-170 personnel became aware of the use of sleep deprivation at
Bagram, though LIC Beaver told the Committee that she had seen a version of a standard operating procedure for
interrogations in use at Bagram on a classified DoD internet system.
392
Ibid.
54
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
letting the detainee rest ''just long enough to fall asleep and wake him up about every thirty
minutes and tell him it's time to pray again.,,393
(U) According to the meeting minutes, LTC Beaver suggested that the IfF might "need
to curb the harsher operations while [the International Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC;~ is
around," and that it would be "better not to expose them to any controversial techniques."
LTC Beaver explained that "[t]he ICRC is a serious concern. They will be in and out,
scrutinizing our operations, unless they are displeased and decide to protest and leave. This
would draw a lot of negative attention.,,395 The minutes reflect that the CIA lawyer added his
view:
In the past when the ICRC has made a big deal about certain detainees, the DOD
has 'moved' them away from the attention of the ICRC. Upon questioning from
the ICRC about their whereabouts, the DOD's response has repeatedly been that
the detainee merited no status under the Geneva Convention. 396
(U) At the meeting, the minutes reflect that CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman also discussed
whether or not the techniques in the BSCT memo complied with applicable legal standards. Mr.
Fredman explained:
Under the Torture Convention, torture has been prohibited by intemationallaw,
but the language of the statutes is written vaguely. Severe mental and physical
pain is prohibited. The mental part is explained as poorly as the physical. Severe
physical pain [is] described as anything causing permanent damage to major
organs or body parts. Mental torture [is] described as anything leading to
permanent, profound damage to the senses or personality. It is basically subject
to perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong. So far the techniques
we have addressed have not proven to produce these types of results, which in a
way challenges what the BSCT paper says about not being able to prove whether
these techniques will lead to permanent damage. Everything in the BSCT
[memo] is legal from a civilian standpoint. 397
(U) According to the minutes, when the participants of the meeting discussed whether or
not to videotape the "aggressive sessions or interro&ations," Mr. Fredman said that videotaping
of "even totally legal techniques will look 'ugly. ,,,3 8 Mr. Becker, who agreed with the CIA
lawyer's assessment, added that "videotapes are subject to too much scrutiny in court." 399
393
Ibid. at 5.
394
Ibid. at 3.
395
Ibid.
396
Ibid.
According to the meeting minutes, the CIA lawyer added "The Torture Convention prohibits torture and cruel,
inhumane and degrading treatment. The US did not sign up to the second part, because of the 8th amendment ..
.That gives us more license to use more controversial techniques." Ibid.
397
398
Ibid. at 5.
399
Ibid. at 3.
55
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) When an attendee at the meeting mentioned that law enforcement agents (presumably
referring to CITF and FBI) had concerns about the use of aggressive tactics, the minutes reflect
that Mr. Fredman responded that "[w]hen CIA has wanted to use more aggressive techniques in
the past, the FBI has pulled their personnel from theatre. In those rare instances, aggressive
techniques have proven very helpful.,,4O LTC Beaver added that there was no legal reason why
law enforcement personnel could not participate in those operations. 401
(U) While LTC Beaver testified in 2008 that she was aware that SERE training was not
designed for offensive use with detainees, the minutes of the October 2,2002 meeting reflect that
she nevertheless asked about use ofthe "wet towel" technique in SERE school. 402 The CIA
lawyer replied:
If a well-trained individual is used to perfonn this technique it can feel like you're
drowning. The lymphatic system will react as if you're suffocating, but your
body will not cease to function. It is very effective to identify phobias and use
them (i.e., insects, snakes, claustrophobia). The level of resistance is directly
related to person's experience. 403
(U) According to the meeting minutes, ICE Chief David Becker asked whether GTMO
could get blanket approval for the use of techniques or whether techniques would be approved on
a case-by-case basis. 404 Mr. Fredman responded that the "CIA makes the call internally on most
ofthe techniques found in the BSCT" memo and referenced in their meeting, but that
"significantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOl,,405 As to whether Geneva
Conventions would apply, Mr. Fredman noted that the "CIA rallied for it not to.,,406
(U) The meeting minutes also reflect Mr. Fredman thoughts on other interrogation
techniques, such as threats of death. Mr. Fredman noted that such threats "should be handled on
a case by case basis. Mock executions don't work as well as friendly ~proaches, like letting
someone write a letter home, or providing them with an extra book.,;40
400
Ibid.
401
Ibid.
402
403
11
Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 4. LTC Beaver said that she had learned about the wet towel
technique from a Navy doctor who had been assigned to the Hospital at Guantanamo and who described to her its
use at the Navy SERE school. It is unclear, however, to whom LTC Beaver is referring. The Committee
interviewed a Navy Lieutenant Commander who was deployed to GTMO and who had previously worked at the
Navy SERE school at the Naval Air Station in Brunswick, Maine. The Lieutenant Commander told the Committee
that he discussed with ITF-GTMO staff physical pressures used to teach students at SERE school how to resist
interrogations. However, the Lieutenant Commander was not deployed to GTMO until November 2002.
Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October II, 2007); see Committee staff interview of
Travel voucher.
(August 22, 2007);
404
40'
Ibid.
406
Ibid.
407
Ibid. at 3.
56
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Weeks later, CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon wrote an email to CITF's Chief
Legal Counsel Major Sam McCahon regarding the meeting minutes:
Quotes from LTC Beaver regarding things that are not being reported give the
appearance of impropriety. Other comments like "It is basically subject to
perception. If the detainee dies you're doing it wrong" and "Any of the
teclmiques that lie on the harshest end of the spectrum must be performed by a
highly trained individual. Medical personnel should be present to treat any
possible accidents." Seem to stretch beyond the bounds of legal propriety. Talk.
of "wet towel treatment" which results in the lymphatic gland reacting as if you
are suffocating, would in my opinion; shock the conscience of any legal body
looking at using the results of the interrogations or possibly even the
interrogators. Someone needs to be considering how history will look back at
thiS. 408
II
The October 2, 2002 meeting minutes indicated that the group discussed Mohammed
al Khatani, a high value detainee suspected of being connected to the September 11, 2001
attacks. A week before the meeting, JTF-170 had assumed the lead on Khatani's
interrogation. 409 By the October 2, 2002 meeting, JTF-170 had already developed an aggressive
interrogation plan for Khatani.
.
IITwo days after the meeting, BSCT psychiatrist MAl Paul Burney sent an email to
LTC Banks, stating that "persons here at this operation are still interested in pursuing the
potential use of more aversive interrogation teclmiques ... Were more aversive teclmiques
approved for use in the future by appropriate people, the operation would like to have a few task
force personnel specifically trained in various techniques.,,410 MAl Burney asked whether LTC
Banks knew "where task force personnel could go to receive such training" and whether he knew
of"any consultants who could assist ifany ofthese measures are eventually approved.,,411
_ LTC Banks replied "I do not envy you. I suspect I know where this is coming from.
The answer is no, I do not know of anyone who could provide that training... The training that
SERE instructors receive is designed to simulate that of a foreign power, and to do so in a
manner that encourages resistance among the students. I do not believe that traininf
interrogators to use what SERE instructors use would be particularly productive.,,41
H.
_
According to the Department of Defense, Pakistani authorities captured
Mohammed al Khatani along the Pakistani-Afghanistan border on December 15, 2001 and
408
Email from Mark Fallon to MAl Sam McCahon et aI. (October 28, 2002).
LTG Joseph Jnge, DEPSECDEF Inquiry Regarding Location o/Inte"ogation Plan/or ISN 063 (August
24, 2006) at 5 (hereinafter "Jnge Report'').
409 _
410
Email from MAl Paul Burney to LTC Morgan Banks (October 4, 2002).
411
Ibid.
412
Email from LTC Morgan Banks to MAl Paul Burney (October 4, 2002).
57
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
413
turned him over to U.S. forces on December 26, 2001.
He was transferred to Guantanamo
Bay on February 13,2002, where he was initially interrogated by JTF170, CITF and FBI
personnel at Camp X-Ray.
In the summer of2002, Khatani was identified as a possible "twentieth
_
(
414
hijacker" ofthe September 11 attacks.
From July 27,2002 until September 19,2002, Khatani
415
During this period, Khatani was held at the recently built Camp
was questioned by the FBI.
Delta until August 8,2002 when he was transferred to the Naval Brig at Guantanamo Bay.416
While he was in FBI custody, JTF-170 began drafting an interrogation plan for Khatani.
(U) On September 23, 2002, the CITF Special Agent in Charge sent a memorandum to
CITF's Deputy Commander raising concerns about JTF-170's proposed interrogation plan for
Khatani. The memo stated:
DoD Intelligence personnel contacted FBI [Supervisory Special Agent] in order to
conduct an interview of a detainee assigned to the FBI. The DoD personnel
indicated that they intend to employ the following interrogation techniques: drive
the hooded detainee around the island to disorient him, disrobe him to his
underwear, have an interrogator with an Egyptian accent (it is known among the
detainees that Egyptians are aggressive interrogators and commonly use coercion,
to include maiming) ...
As a law enforcement agency, CITF is clearly prohibited from participating in
these techniques and we also do not want to tum a deaf ear when we learn of
these issues...417
Memo from COL John Redis (ITF-GlMO Chief ofStafl) to SOUTRCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005),
attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24,2006).
413
Khatani was identified as a possible twentieth highjacker after it was determined that he had tried to enter the
U.S. in August 2001 but was detained at the Orlando, Florida airport and later deported. When Khatani arrived at
the Orlando airport. Mohammed .Atta was waiting. JTF-GlMO, Analyst Support Summary (March 18, 2003),
attached as Tab 22 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006).
414
415
Inge Report at 5.
Memo from COL John Redis (ITF-GlMO Chief of Stafl) to SOUTRCOM Chief of Staff (March 14, 2005),
attached as Tab 1 to Inge Report (August 24, 2006); Inge Report at 5.
416
417 Memo from J.K. Sieber (CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD
Interrogation Techniques Issue (September 23, 2002).
418
58
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) While MG Dunlavey's memo stated that the request had "been reviewed by my Staff
Judge Advocate and determined to be legally sufficient," the SJA, LTC Diane Beaver, told the
Committee that she had not been consulted on the interrogation plan and did not recall reviewing
the memo or providing the Commander with guidance regarding the legal sufficiency of the
request. 42S Major General Dunlavey said that he did not recall whether or not he personally
consulted with LTC Beaver, that the letter would likely have been drafted by his Director for
Intelligence, LTC Jerald Phifer, and that it was possible that the statement in the letter that LTC
Beaver had been consulted was based on a representation by his staff. 426
The memo was provided to the Committee as an appendix to the AR-15-6 Report completed by Lieutenant
General Randall Schmidt and Brigadier General John T. Furlow into FBI allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay
(hereinafter "Schmidt-Furlow Report''). The memo is unsigned but contains a handwritten notation "/I//signed on 1
Oct 02////." Committee staff requested the Department of Defense provide a signed copy or advise the Committee of
any reason why the Committee should not rely on the document. The Department provided neither.
419
Memo from MG Michael Dunlavey to ITF-160 Commander, Inte"ogation Plan for ISN 063 (October 1, 2002),
attached as exhibit 40 to Schmidt-Furlow Report.
421 Ibid.
420
422
Ibid.
423
Ibid.
424
Ibid.
Ibid.; Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (October 11, 2007); see also Memo from lK. Sieber
(CITF SAC) to CITF Deputy Commander, CITF Operations Officer, CITF SJA, DOD Interrogation Techniques
Issue (September 23, 2002) ("the JTF 170 SJA had not been briefed on the plan prior to her contact with the FBI
SSA When she learned of the plan, she sought guidance from up her chain of command and also sought guidance
from DOD legal and other intelligence agencies. She wants to ensure that even if these techniques are not legally
objectionable, her chain of command is aware that these types of techniques are being utilized and that the personnel
on the ground are properly trained to conduct these techniques.")
42'
426
59
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
II Mr. Becker told the Committee that he had authorized dogs entering the interrogation
room on two occasions and that the dog barked but was not pennitted to place its paws on
Khatani. 430 ~lr. Becker also told the Committee that LTC Phifer provided verbal authority for
the dogs to be used in this manner. LTC Phifer recalled discussing dogs with Mr. Becker as a
teclmique because Arabs "saw dogs as a dirty animal and they didn't like them," not because
they should be "used as a fear factor.,,431 LTC Phifer told the Army IG, however, that Mr.
Becker never told him that he had approved the use of a dog during the Khatani interrogation.
However, in written answers to questions posed by Vice Admiral Church, LTC Phifer stated that
dogs were used in the Khatani interrogation and that "[w]e would bring the dog around to within
10 feet [of Khatani] and he would be somewhat Ulmerved by it. We did it to keep him off
balance as well as to enhance security.'.432 Major General Dunlavey said that he did not recall
being aware that a dog was used in the interrogation of Khatani. 433
II(
In an October 8,2002 email to his colleague, an FBI agent described ITF
170's interrogation of Khatani, stating that DoD had tried "sleep deprivation," "loud music,
bright lights, and 'body placement discomfort,' all with negative results" and that DoD
interrogators planned to stop the interrogation. 434 Mr. Becker told the Committee that the
interrogation plan did not work and that ITF-170 ceased the interrogation after approximately a
week and moved Khatani back to the Navy brig. 435
Summarized witness statement of David Becker (March 3, 2005), exhibit 21 to Schmidt-Furlow Report~
summarized witness statement of ENS Mary Travers (February 23,2005), exhibit 33 to Schmidt-Furlow Report;
summarized witness statement of Agent Robert Morton (January 20, 2005), exhibit 36 to Schmidt-Furlow Report;
summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20,2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow Report.
427
428 Summarized witness statement of Agent Charles Dorsey (January 20,2005), exhibit 41 to Schmidt-Furlow
Report.
429
430
431
Army IG, Interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (March 16, 2006) at 13.
Responses of LTC Jerald Phifer to questionnaire of VADM Church (July 16, 2004). It is not clear from those
written answers whether LTC Phifer was referring to the use of dogs in ITF-170's October 2002 interrogation of
Khatani or in the subsequent interrogation of Khat ani that began in late November.
432
433
Committee staff interview of Major General Michael Dunlavey (November 30, 2007).
434
Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2002).
60
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Another FBI agent reflected upon the failed interrogation in his own email of October
8, 2002, observing that "I think we should consider leaving him alone, let him get healthy again
and do something 'different. ",436
IV.
A.
(U) On October 11, 2002, just days after the JTF-170 moved Khatani back to the Navy
Brig and shortly after meeting with the ChiefCounsel ofthe CIA's CounterTerrorist Center
Jonathan Fredman, LTC Phifer submitted a memorandum to JTF-170 Commander MG Dunlavey
requesting approval to use "counter-resistance" interrogation techniques. 437 LTC Phifer's
memo was largely drawn from the October 2, 2002 memorandum that the GTMO Behavioral
Science Consultation Team (BSCT) had written upon their return from the JPRA training at Fort
Bragg. 438 The memo requested approval for three categories of progressively more aggressive
interrogation techniques, many of which were similar to techniques used at SERE schools to
increase U.S. soldiers' resistance to illegal enemy interrogation. 439
(U) Ofthe three categories of proposed techniques, those in Category I were the least
aggressive. Category I proposed yelling at the detainee and using certain "techniques of
deception," such as using multiple interrogators or having an interrogator "identifY himself as a
citizen of a foreign nation or as an interrogator from a country with a reputation for harsh
treatment of detainees. ,,4040
(U) The proposed Category II techniques were more aggressive and included several
techniques similar to those used in SERE schools, such as stress positions, isolation, deprivation
oflight and auditory stimuli, using a hood during transport and questioning, removal of clothing,
and using detainees' individual phobias to induce stress. 441
II
An August 19,2002 email from LTC Beaver reflected discussions among JTF-170
staff about stress positions, which she said resulted in an agreed upon policy of "no stress
436
Email from FBI Special Agent to FBI Special Agent (October 8, 2(02).
Memo from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Requestfor Approval ofCounter-Resistance Strategies
(October II, 2(02) (hereinafter LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, Requestfor Approval ofCounter-Resistance
Strategies').
437
MAl Burney told the Army IG that the October II, 2002 memo "wasn't the exact same document that we had
written but the general structure and overall organization-a lot of the things did remain intact from our original
brainstorm to what was eventually requested." Army IG, Interview of MAl Paul Burney (August 21, 2(07) at 11.
438
The October 11 memo also stated that "current guidelines for interrogation procedures at GTMO limit the ability
of interrogators to counter advanced resistance." LTC Phifer to MG Michael Dunlavey, RequestforApproval of
Counter-Resistance Strategies".
439
440
Ibid
Additional Category II techniques included use of falsified documents or reports, interrogating the detainee in an
environment other than the standard interrogation booth, use of 20 hour interrogations, removal of all comfort items
(including religious items), switching the detainee from hot rations to MREs, and forced grooming. Ibid
441
61
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
positions" at GTMO. 442 When asked how stress positions came to be included in LTC Phifer's
memo, given the agreement referenced in her earlier email, LTC Beaver said that she did not
know, but added that LTC Phifer later advocated for their use. 443 LTC Beaver said that she
relied on Mr. Becker and LTC Phifer to decide which techniques to put in the memo and that she
never commented or changed their drafts. 444
(U) The proposed Category III techniques in the October 11, 2002 request were the most
aggressive and included the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or
severely painful consequences were imminent for him and/or his family; exposure to cold
weather or water; the use ofa wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of
suffocation; and the use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the
chest with the fmger, and light pushing. 44S According to the October 11,2002 memo, Category
III techniques "and other aversive techniques, such as those used in u.s. military resistance
training or by other U.S. government agencies" would be utilized to interrogate "exceptionally
resistant detainees," which LTC Phifer estimated as "less than 3%" of the detainees held at
GTMO. 446
(U) Two ofthe Category III techniques in LTC Phifer's memo - the use of phobias and
the use ofthe wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation - were not
derived from the October 2,2002 BSCT memo. 447 CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman, however, had
reportedly discussed both ofthese techniques during his October 2, 2002 meeting with GTMO
personnel, noting that the use ofphobias was "very effective" and that the use ofthe "wet towel
technique" makes a body react as is if it's suffocating. 448 Mr. Becker told the Committee that he
(the ICE Chief) may have recommended adding those two techniques to the request for
authority. 449
(U) LTC Phifer said that he drafted his memo with Mr. Becker.
4So
442
Ibid.
44'
446
Ibid.
447 The use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of drowning appears to describe
waterboarding. The Navy is the only service that used waterboarding in SERE training. which it ceased in
November 2007.
Counter Resistance Strategy Meeting Minutes at 5 (The CTC Chief Counsel explained that if a "well-trained
individual is used to perform" the "wet-towel technique," it can "feel like you're drowning. The lymphatic system
will react as if you're suffocating but your body will not cease to function.")
448
449
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
he thought the techniques memo was "stupid," though he did not share his view with LTC Phifer
at the time. 451 LTC Phifer told the Committee that he was uncomfortable with the idea of using
some ofthe techniques in his memo but that MG Dunlavey pressured him to fmish the request. 452
B.
(U) The October 11, 2002 techniques memo was accompanied by a cover memo and
legal briefwritten by GTMO's Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) LTC Diane Beaver. The cover
memo stated simply that ''the proposed strategies do not violate applicable federal law.,,453
(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she drafted the legal brief with her staff over the
course of the 2002 Columbus Day weekend. 454 She told the Committee that she had not seen
either ofthe legal memoranda produced by the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel on
August 1, 2002 and that she did not receive input on the legal brief from anyone outside of
GTMO. The minutes ofthe October 2, 2002 meeting with CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman,
however, reflect that LTC Beaver was present when he discussed the Torture Convention (and
the federal law implementing the treaty). In that discussion, Mr. Fredman described "severe
physical pain" as "anything causing permanent damage to major organs or body partS.,,455 The
idea that "severe physical pain" constituting torture had to rise to the level of "organ failure,
irnpainnent of bodily functions or even death" had been discussed in the OLC legal memo of
August 1 2002, known as the First Bybee memo. 456
(U) LTC Beaver began her analysis ofthe "aggressive" techniques by stating that the
"detainees currently held at Guantanamo Bay ... are not protected by the Geneva
Conventions.'.457 LTC Beaver stated that the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense "had not
adopted specific guidelines regarding interrogation techniques for detainee operations at GTMO"
and she dismissed the longstanding guidance on interrogation of detainees contained in the Army
Field Manual (FM) 34-52 as not binding. 458
Memo from LTC Diane Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Review ofAggressive Interrogation
Techniques (October 11, 2002).
453
454
Memo from Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, Standards of
Conductfor Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (August 1, 2002).
456
457 Memo from LTC Diane Beaver for Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter
Resistance Strategies (October II, 2002) (hereinafter" LTC Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance
Strategies").
The SJA concluded that because the techniques in the Army FM 34-52 are "constrained by, and conform to the
Geneva Conventions and applicable intemationallaw," and that the Geneva Conventions do not apply as a matter of
law, the Field Manual was "not binding." See LTC Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies
at 1.
458
63
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) In her memo, LTC Beaver stated that U. S. obligations under the Convention Against
Torture restricted only those cruel, inhuman, or degrading acts that were also prohibited by the
"current standard articulated in the Eighth Amendment" against "cruel and unusual
punishment. ,,459 The memo concluded that the proposed interrogation techniques would be
consistent with the Eighth Amendment standard so long as any force used could "plausibly have
been thought necessary ... to achieve a legitimate governmental objective and it was applied in a
good faith effort and not maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.,,460
(U) LTC Beaver also concluded that the proposed interrogation techniques would not
violate the federal anti-torture statute so long as they were not specifically intended to cause
severe physical pain or suffering or prolonged mental harm. LTC Beaver conducted her analysis
with the "assum[ption] that severe physical pain [would not be] inflicted" and "absent any
evidence that any ofthese strategies [would] in fact cause prolonged and long lasting mental
harm.,,461 LTC Beaver told the Committee that she did not conduct any research to determine
whether the use of the techniques described in the accompanying request for authority would, in
fact, result in long-term mental harm. 462
II (
The October 2, 2002 BSCT memo, however, had specifically cautioned that
the techniques "could affect the short term and/or long term physical and/or mental health ofthe
detainee ... [and that] physical and/or emotional harm from the ... techniques may emerge
months or even years after their use.,,463
(U) LTC Beaver also found that some ofthe proposed tactics would constitute a "per se
violation" ofthe Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) Article that prohibits military
personnel from committing assault, and could violate the Article that prohibits military personnel
from communicating a threat.464 As a result, LTC Beaver said it would be "advisable to have
permission or immunity in advance from the convening authority for military members utilizing
these methods.,,465 In a November 4,2002 letter to the Joint StaffJ-5, the Marine Corps
commented on the SJA's recommendation to convey "permission or immunity in advance,"
noting that "[w]e are unaware of any authority that would allow a convening authority to give
'permission or immunity' in advance to commit a criminal violation.,,466 Likewise, military
lawyers from the Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School later said that LTC
Beaver's "proposal to immunize interrogators, given that a number ofthe proposed techniques in
459
460
Ibid. at 5.
461
Ibid.
462
463
464
465
Ibid.
466 Memo from Marine Corps Service Plarmer to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques
(November 4, 2002) see also Section IV D, infra.
64
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
issue constituted violations of the UCMJ, was not only unprecedented, but lacked any basis in
law.,,467
(U) Based on her legal review, LTC Beaver recommended that the "proposed methods of
interrogation be approved," but that interrogators be trained to use the methods and that
"interrogations involving category II and III methods" undergo a legal, medical, behavioral
science, and intelligence review prior to commencement.468
(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she called the SOUTHCOM Staff Judge
Advocate COL Manny Supervielle, like?, on Sunday, October 10, 2002 and sent SOUTHCOM a
draft of the legal memo that same day.46 She said that she told COL Supervielle that she "really
needed some help" but that she received no comments from SOUTHCOM prior to submitting the
final memo the next day. 470 LTC Beaver said that she also talked to the Legal Counsel to the
Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CAPT Jane Dalton and asked for her help, but was told that
she should talk to COL Supervielle. 471 CAPT Dalton said that she did not recall that
conversation with LTC Beaver.472 LTC Beaver also told the Committee that MG Dunlavey did
not comment on drafts of the memo and that she did not discuss it with him after it was
completed. 473
C
(U) On October 11, 2002, MG Dunlavey submitted LTC Phifer's memo and LTC
Beaver's legal analysis to General James Hill, the Commander ofthe United States Southern
Command (SOUfHCOM). He also sent his own memo requesting approval to use the
interrogation techniques. 474 MG Dunlavey wrote:
Lt Col Kantwill et al., Improving the Fighting Position, A Practitioner's Guide to Operational Law Support to
the Interrogation Process, 2005 Army Lawyer (July 2(05) at 12, 14.
467
468
469
4'71l
SASC Hearing (June 17, 2(08); Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9,2007).
471
471
Ibid.
473
Memo from MG Michael Dunlavey to USSOUTHCOM Commander GEN James Hill, Counter-Resistance
Strategies (October 11, 2002) (hereinafter "MG Dunlavey to GEN Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies. '')
474
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
u.s.
or international
(U) On October 25,2002, GEN Hill forwarded the JTF-170 request to Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Richard Myers, with a memorandum stating that "despite our best
efforts, some detainees have tenaciously resisted our current interrogation methods.,,476 He
continued: "[0]ur respective staffs, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Joint Task Force
170 have been trying to identify counter-resistant techniques that we can lawfully employ.'.477
When later asked, GEN Hill could not recall whether SOUTHCOM ~roduced a written opinion
analyzing the GTMO request separate from LTC Beaver's opinion. 4 8
(U) As to techniques in the GTMO request for interrogation techniques, GEN Hill said
that he "did discuss the topic of SERE training in a general manner with MG Dunlavey.,,479
Years later, in a June 3, 2004 press briefing, GEN Hill noted the influence ofthe Fort Bragg trip
and SERE school techniques on the request, stating:
The staff at Guantanamo working with behavioral scientists, having gone up to
our SERE school and developed a list of techniques which our lawyers decided
and looked at, said were OK. I sent that list oftechniques up to the Secretary and
said, in order for us to get at some of these very high-profile, high-value targets
who are resistant to techniques, I may need greater flexibility. But I want a legal
review of it and you to tell me that, policy-wise, it's the right way to do
business.480
(U) In his October 25, 2002 memo, GEN Hill stated that, although he believed Categories
I and II techniques were "legal and humane," he was uncertain about techniques in Category III
and was "particularly troubled by the use of implied or expressed threats of death ofthe detainee
or his family.'.481 Nevertheless, GEN Hill said that he "desire[d] to have as many options as
possible at [his] disposal" and asked that Departments of Defense and Justice attorneys review
the Category III techniques. 482
Counter-Resistance Strategies.
Memo from GEN James Hill to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffGEN Richard Myers, Counter-Resistance
Techniques, (October 25,2002) (hereinafter "GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques. 'J
476
477
47ll
GEN James 1. Hill answers to July 31,2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (August 20,2008).
479
Ibid.
480
481
GEN Hill to CJCS, Counter-Resistance Techniques; In testimony to the Army IG, the SOUTHCOM Commander
said that he thought the request "was important enough to where there ought to be a high level look at it... There
ought to be a major policy discussion of this and everybody ought to be involved." Army IG, Interview of GEN
James T. Hill (October 7, 2005), at 7.
482
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) One SOUTHCOM Assistant Staff Judge Advocate LTC Mark Gingras testified to the
Army IG that lawyers for SOUTHCOM had concerns about Category II and Category III
techniques. 483 Regarding the GTMO request for techniques, LTC Gingras told the Anny IG:
As lawyers we're talking about adherence to the rule of law being important, and
that's what we're trying to tell everybody as we travel around the world to these
other countries. That's paramount to democracy. And so suddenly we look like
we're brushing this aside or we're twisting the law. The feeling was that decision
makers within the Pentagon didn't much care about that. They cared about
winning the War on Terrorism. And ifthat meant you had to pull out fmgernails
you'd pull out fmgernails, figuratively speaking.484
D.
(U) On October 30,2002, after receiving Gen Hill's memo and the GTMO request, the
Joint Staff J-5 requested that the military services comment on the request. 485
(U) On November 1,2002, the Air Force responded, expressing "serious concerns
regarding the legality of many ofthe proposed techniques" and stating that "some ofthese
techniques could be construed as 'torture,' as that crime is defmed by 18 U.S.C. 2340.'.486 The
Air Force memorandum added that, with respect to potential prosecutions, the use ofCatego~
III techniques would "almost certainly" result in any statements obtained being inadmissible. 87
The memorandum stated that admissibility of evidence obtained using Categories I and II
techniques, the latter of which included stress positions, the use of dogs, removal of clothing, and
deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli, among other techniques, would be "fact specific, but
the same concerns remain. ,,488 The Air Force memo continued: "Additionally, the techniques
described may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the requirements outlined in the military
order to treat detainees humanely... Implementation of the proposed techniques would require a
change in Presidential policy.,,489 The memo stated that the Air Force "concurs in the need to
conduct an in-depth legal and policy assessment, as recommended by [the SOUTHCOM
Commander], prior to implementation of the proposed counter-resistance interrogation
techniques.,,490
(U) On November 4, 2002, the Navy responded to the Joint Staff's request for comment,
stating that it "concur[red] with developing a range of advanced counter-resistance techniques,"
483
Army IG, Interview of LIe Mark Gingras (October 11, 2005) at 20.
484
Ibid.
Department of the Air Force Memo for UN and Multilateral Affair Division (1-5), Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance
Techniques (November 1, 2002).
486
487 Ibid.
at 1.
488
Ibid.
489
Ibid. at 2.
490
Ibid. at 1.
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but recommending "a more detailed interagency legal and policy review be conducted on the ...
proposed techniques.,,491
(U) That same day, the Marine Corps submitted its written comments, which concluded
that "several ofthe Category II and III techniques arguably violate federal law, and would
expose our service members to possible prosecution.,,492 The Marine Corps memo stated that the
use ofthe techniques would also create "exposure to criminal prosecution under the UCMJ.,,493
Again, Category III techniques included the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee
that death or severely painful consequences were imminent for him or his family, exposure to
cold weather or water, use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of
suffocation, and non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking and light pushing. 494
Category II included such techniques as stress positions, deprivation oflight and auditory
stimuli, the use of a hood during questioning, 20 hour interrogations, removal of clothing, and
the use of detainee phobias, such as dogs, to induce stress. The memo also stated the Marine
Corps "disagree[d] with the position that the proposed plan is legally sufficient.,,495
(U) A few days later, the Army submitted comments from both the Office of the Judge
Advocate General (OTJAG) and the CITF. 496 The Army's cover memo stated that "Army
interposes significant legal, policy and practical concerns regarding most of the Category II and
all ofthe Category III techniques proposed" and that the Army "concurs in the recommendation
for a comprehensive legal review ofthis proposal in its entirety by the Department of Defense
and the Department of Justice.,,491 The OTJAG's memorandum, which was attached, stated that
Category III techniques "violate the President's order [on humane treatment] and various UCMJ
articles" and that the use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely
painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family and the use of a wet towel and
dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation "appear to be clear violations ofthe
federal torture statute.,,498 The OTJAG memorandum also stated that Category II techniques of
stress positions, deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli, and using individual phobias to induce
stress "crosses the line of 'humane' treatment, would likely be considered maltreatment under
491
Department of the Navy Memo for the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (1-5) Joint Staff, Navy
Ibid.
494
m Memo from Marine Corps Service Planner to Director, J-5, The Joint Staff, Counter-Resistance Techniques
(November 4, 2002).
Memo from the Army Deputy to the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (Joint Affairs) to
the Joint Staff, J-51UNMA [UN and Multilateral Affairs Division], SJS 02-06697 (November 7,2002); Memo from
Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate (International and Operational Law) to The Office of the
Army General Counsel, Review-Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques (undated) (hereinafter "DAJA(IO)
Memo for Army General Counsel. Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques.")
496
497
498
Ibid.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Article 93 of the [Uniform Code of Military Justice], and may violate the Federal torture
statute.,,499 The memo continued that that removal of clothing and forced grooming "may be
considered inhumane" if done only for interrogation pu~oses and stated "if we mistreat
detainees, we will quickly lose the moral high ground." 0 The Army concurred with GEN
Hill's request for a legal review before techniques were adopted. 501
(U) Military lawyers were not the only personnel to object to GTMO's request for
aggressive techniques. CITF Deputy Commander Mark Fallon told the Committee that it was
CITF's view that the techniques proposed by JTF-170 would actually strengthen, rather than
weaken, detainee resistance. He explained:
Our view was that employing techniques that validated [the detainees] prior
training and adverse views would serve to harden resistance and reinforce what
they had been told to expect... We pointed out that SERE school tactics were
developed to better prepare U.S. military personnel to resist interrogations and not
as a means of obtaining reliable information. CITF was troubled with the
rationale that techniques used to harden resistance to interrogations would be the
basis for the utilization oftechniques to obtain information. 502
(U) CITF's legal view was reflected in a November 4,2002 memo from CITF Chief
Legal Advisor MAJ Sam McCahon, which was also attached to the Army's response to the Joint
Staff. MAJ McCahon wrote:
[Category] III and certain [Category] II techniques may subject service members
to punitive articles of the UCMJ... CITF personnel who are aware of the use or
abuse of certain techniques may be exposed to liability under the UCMJ for
failing to intercede or report incidents, if an inquiry later determines the conduct
to be in violation of either the Eighth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, the
Uniform Code of Military Justice or 18 U.S.C. 2340. 503
(U) MAJ McCahon also raised concerns about the impact ofthe techniques on
evidentiary proceedings:
One detainee subjected to these techniques could taint the voluntary nature of all
other confessions and information derived from detainees not subjected to the
aggressive techniques. 504
499
Ibid.
500
Ibid.
501
Ibid.
502
Responses of Mr. Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006) at 7.
503 Memo from CITF Chief Legal Advisor MAl Sam McCahon to CITF Commander, Assessment of.TFF-170
Counter-Resistance Strategies and the Potential Impact on CrrF Mission and Personnel (November 4, 2002)
(hereinafter "McCahon to CDR CITF, Assessment of.TFF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies.'j
504
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) MAl McCahon added that "[b]oth the utility and legality ofapplying certain
techniques" in the October 11, 2002 memo are "questionable," and recommended that CITF
personnel not participate in or even observe the use of aggressive techniques. 505 MAl McCahon
concluded:
E.
(U) When the October 11,2002 GTMO request arrived at the Joint Staff, CAPT Jane
Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chainnan ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, said it was "obvious to
[her] that there were some legal issues" with the request. 510 She said that techniques in Category
II ofthe request "needed to be looked at closely" and that Category III techniques "had
significant, significant concerns." 511 CAPT Dalton found LTC Beaver's legal analysis
''woefully inadequate" and said it relied on a methodology and conclusions that were "very
strained.,,512 Rather than simply deny the request, however, CAPT Dalton said that "she owed it
to the combatant commander to do a full and complete review.,,513 She subsequently directed her
staffto set up a secure video teleconference with representatives from the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the Army's intelligence school at Fort Huachuca, U.S. Southern Command
(SOUTHCOM), and GTMO to find out more infonnation about the techniques in the request and
to "begin discussing the legal issues to see if we could do ... our own independent legal
analysis.,,514
505
Ibid.
506
Ibid.
507
508
509
510
Committee staff interview ofRADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2(08) at 33.
m Ibid. at 45.
m Ibid. at 41.
m Ibid. at 33.
514
Ibid. at 34.
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(U) CAPT Dalton recalled making Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard
Myers aware of the concerns expressed by the military services. 515 The Chairman said, however,
that he did "not specifically recall the objections ofthe Services being raised" to his attention at
that time. 516
(U) CAPT Dalton also recalled that her staff briefed the DoD General Counsel's office
about the concerns submitted by the military services and that the General Counsel himself "was
aware ofthe concerns.,,517 In a February 2008 interview, DoD Associate Deputy General
Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson recalled that the service comments were made
available to the General Counsel's office. 518 DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes stated, however,
that he "did not recall seeing" the memos at that time and "didn't know they existed.,,519 He
stated that he did not recall being infonned by anyone that the military services had concerns
about the legality of Category II techniques in the request and that he did not have a "specific
recollection" of CAPT Dalton making him aware that there were concerns about the legality of
techniques in the GTMO request. 520
(U) According to CAPT Dalton, after she and her staff initiated their analysis, CJCS GEN
Myers directed her to stop that review. CAPT Dalton said that GEN Myers returned from a
meeting and "advised me that [DoD General Counsel] Mr. Haynes wanted me ... to cancel the
video teleconference and to stop" conducting the review because of concerns that "people were
going to see" the GTMO request and the military services' ana1~sis of it. 521 According to CAPT
Dalton, Mr. Haynes "wanted to keep it much more close hold." 22 When CAPT Dalton "learned
that [the DoD General Counsel] did not want that broad based legal and policy r.eview to take
place," she and her staff stopped their review. 523 This was the only time that CAPT Dalton had
ever been asked to stop analyzing a request that came to her for her review. 524
_
CAPT Dalton recalled that prior to bein~ directed to stop the review, her staffhad
begun writing draft comments on the GTMO request. 52 An undated draft of a memorandum
from GEN Myers to SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill, analyzing the October 11, 2002
Responses of General Richard Myers to written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30, 2008).
520
m Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 34.
522
Ibid. at 35.
523
524
Ibid.
m Committee staff interview ofRADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 37.
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GTMO request, stated "We do not believe the proposed plan is legally sufficient.,,526 The draft
memo stated that "several ofthe Category III techniques arguably violate federal law, and could
expose interrogators to possible prosecution" under the federal anti-torture laws. 527 The draft
stated that techniques in the request "may be subject to challenge as failing to meet the
requirements outlined in the military order to treat detainees humanely" and recommended an
"in-depth technical, policy, and legal assessment" ofthe techniques prior to their
implementation. 528
(U) GEN Myers said that he had "no specific recollection" of discussing with CAPT
Dalton her efforts to conduct an analysis of the October 11, 2002 GTMO request. 529 He said
that while he "did not dispute" asking her to stop working on her analysis and acknowledged that
Joint Staffrecords indicated that she did stop work on her analysis, he had "no recollection or
doing so" and did "not recall anyone suggesting" to him that she stop her review. 530 DoD
General Counsel Jim Haynes said that while it was "possible" that the issue could have come up
in a conversation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he did not "recall that specific
conversation" or expressing any opinion ofany kind with respect to CAPT Dalton's review. 531
F.
_ While GTMO's request for approval to use aggressive interrogation techniques was
pending, JPRA staff was developing an agenda for possible follow-up training for interrogation
personnel at GTMO.
(FODO) David Becker, the GTMO ICE Chief, told the Committee that once they
received authority to use the techniques in the October 11, 2002 memo, GTMO interrogators
would need training on the techniques. 534 A draft message order circulated between GTMO and
JPRA staff in late October requested "mission critical training support" for "approximatelyll
'26 Draft memo from CJCS Richard Myers to Commander, United States Southern Command, Counter-Resistance
Techniques (undated).
mIbid.
,:zs Ibid.
'29 Responses of GEN (Ret.) Richard Myers to April 16, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30,
2008).
'30
Ibid.
See Section III D, supra; Plan ofInstruction (pOI)for TF-170 Training Support (October 16, 2002).
'34
72
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
personnel" at GTMO. 535 The draft message order stated that the training would "provide the
necessary tools ITF-GTMO interrogators require to accomplish their mission critical tasks. 536
_(
A November 15,2002 staffmemo to the Joint Staff J-2 stated that ITF
GTMO had requested training on the SERE school techniques and that the trainers were
expected to arrive in the ftrst week of December.537 The JPRA Operational Support Office
(OSO) Chief Christopher Wirts told the Committee that the requirement for JPRA to provide the
training was never approved and that his agency never conducted the training. 538 However, in
January 2003, two instructors from the Navy SERE school, John Rankin and Christopher Ross,
travelled to GTMO to train interrogators on the use of physical pressures, including slapping,
walling, and stress positions. 539
v.
A.
(U) In November 2002 a new Commander, MG Geoffrey Miller, took command of ITF
GTMO. At the time, MG Miller had no ftrst-hand experience with detainees or
interrogations.540
(U) MG Miller told the Committee that prior to taking command, he met with
SOUTHCOM Commander GEN Hill and his staff. 541 During those meetings, MG Miller got the
impression that MG Dunlavey, the previous Commander, had bypassed the chain of command
by raising issues directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense staff. MG
Miller told the Committee that GEN Hill authorized him to speak directly with the Joint Staff
and the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense, but that he told SOUTHCOM he would keep
SOUTHCOM informed ofthose communications.542
(U) MG Miller said that, while he was in Command at GTMO, he had direct discussions
with the DoD General Counsel's office and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC).543 MG Miller also testifted to the
Army IG that he and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz ''talked once a week when I
m Email from Chris Wirts to
, Richard Driggers, Joseph Witsch,
(October 29,2002) (hereinafter ..Email from Chris Wirts (October 29,2002).")
536
m ITF-170 and ITF-l60 were combined to form JIF-GTMO in October 2002; Memo from
[Joint Stafl], GTMO Detainee
(November 15, 2002).
to
541
542
Ibid.
543
Ibid.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
was in Guantanamo.,,544 Lt Col Ted Moss, the ITF-GTMO ICE Chiefwho began his tour of
duty at GTMO in December 2002, said that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was in phone contact
with MG Miller "a 101.,,545 However, MG Miller told the Committee that he misspoke when he
testified to the Army IG and that, to the best of his knowledge, he did not speak to Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz on the phone while he was at GTMO, but only briefed him quarterly, in
person, on GTMO operations.546
(U) Shortly after MG Miller arrived at GTMO, the Director for Intelligence (J-2) LTC
Phifer informed him ofthe October 11,2002 request 547 Although he later approved an
interrogation plan that included reference to Category III techniques, MG Miller told the Army
IG that he believed that the techniques in Category III and some techniques in Category II were
"overly aggressive" and that he had not intended to use them. 548 MG Miller said he had concerns
with stress positions, removal of clothing, and use of dogs, among other techniques.
Nevertheless, there is evidence that those techniques were used at GTMO while he was in
command. MG Miller told the Committee that he thought he discussed his concerns about the
techniques with LTC Beaver in early November before the Secretary approved their use, but that
he did not raise it with SOUfHCOM because he wanted to see which techniques would be
approved.549
(U) MG Miller told the Army IG that when he arrived at GTMO, there was significant
tension between JTF-GTMO, CITF, and FBI and that he sought to get all three organizations to
work in concert. 550 Despite MG Miller's stated intent, his decision to approve an interrogation
plan for Mohammed al Khatani that was opposed by the CITF and FBI, drove a deeper wedge
between his organization and both CITF and FBI.
B.
(U) After their unsuccessful interrogation of Khatani in October 2002, JTF-GTMO staff
spent several weeks drafting an extensive new interrogation plan. The plan was the first "Special
Interrogation Plan" at GTMO and it would encounter strong resistance from both CITF and the
FBI. One FBI Special Agent told the Committee that he thought Khatani's interrogation would
defme the conduct of future interrogations at GTMO and therefore they "had to get it right.,,551
II
545
546
547
548
Ibid.
549
"0
74
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
to have been finalized on November 22, 2002. Both drafts are discussed here because each
provides insight on the range of interrogation techniques considered by senior officials at
GTMO. In addition, there is evidence that both draft plans were approved by MG Miller.
Finally, there is evidence that techniques which were included in the "draft" circulated on
November 12,2002 but removed from the purported "final" plan, were nevertheless used during
Khatani's interrogation.
1.
Email from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 12, 2002).
m Email from David Becker to [Interrogation Control Element Staff Sergeant] (November 13, 2002). Both the
plan attached to those emails and the subsequent plan identified by the ITF-GTMO Commander as the "fmal" plan
contained the ITF-GTMO Commander's [Miller] signature block. However, the Committee has not seen any
version of the plan that contained the ITF-GTMO Commander's signature.
556
H7 Committee staff interview of David Becker (September 17, 2007). One FBI agent who was a member of the
FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit told the Committee that multiple versions of the plan were actually circulated at
GTMO during this period. Committee Staff interview of FBI Special Agent (November 8, 2007).
558
559
Inge Report.
560
75
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II (
The November 12,2002 email from the Director for Intelligence LTC Phifer
to MG Miller stated, "[h]ere is the Interrogation Plan for ISN: 063 as approved by you.
Request you fwd to Gen Hill, info J2/J3/COS. We will begin at 0001 15 Nov per your
gUldance. 561
II The November 13,2002 email from the GTMO ICE Chief David Becker referred to
the November 12,2002 plan, which was attached to his email, as the "[l]atest approved
by MG Miller.,,562
_
A November 14,2002 email from the GTMO Staff Judge Advocate LTC
Diane Beaver to CITF lawyer
stated, "[c]oncerning 63
[Khatani] my understanding is that NSC has weighed in and stated that intel on
this guy is utmost matter of national security... We are drivin forward with
support ofSOUTHCOM. Not sure anything else needs to be said." 64
_
A November 15,2002 staff memorandum for the J-2 ofthe Joint Staff stated that
"interrogators were preparing to interrogate [Khatani] beginning at 15 0001 November
2002 .. .'.565
.(
According to the November 12, 2002 plan, the purpose ofthe interrogation
was to "break the detainee and establish his role in the attacks ofSept[ember] 11,2001.,.566 The
interrogation would be conducted for "20-hour sessions" and at the completion of each session,
Khatani would be permitted four hours of rest, and then "another 20 hour interrogation session
[would] begin.,,567
'61 Email from LTC Jerald Phifer to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 12, 2002) (emphasis added), attached as
exhibit 7 to the Inge Report.
'62
Email from David Becker to [Interrogation Control Element Staff Sergeant] (November 13, 2002).
'63 Notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plans/or Detainee #063, entry at "1111212002"
(emphasis added).
(emphasis added).
'66
'67
Ibid.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Prior to the fIrst interrogation, we would like to have the detainee's head and
beard shaved. This is to be done for both s cholo .cal and h iene purposes.
During the
interrogations the detainee will at times be placed in stress positions and
blindfolded. If necessary the detainee may have his mouth taped shut in order to
keep him from talking. Written approval for the tape and for the presence of dogs
will be submitted and obtained prior to implementation.569
II
The November 12, 2002 plan went on to describe four phases for the interrogation.570
During Phase I, interrogators would increase the pressure on Khatani while not permitting him to
speak, with the expectation that Khatani, when later presented with the opportunity to speak to
an interrogator, would "provide his whole story.,,571
II
Phase II of the plan was to lace a coo erative detainee or a native lin
X-Ra in full view of Khatani. 572
ist at Cam
II Phase III of the plan, which was entitled "Level III techniques," was to utilize
techniques based on those used at SERE school. The plan slated:
The third phase of the plan to exploit 063 requires OSD approval for the SERE
interrogation technique training and approval of the level three counter
interrogation resistance training submitted by JTF-GTMO. Once the approvals
are in place, those interro ation techni ues will be im lemented to encoura e 063
to coo erate.
'68
Ibid.
'69 Ibid. A third draft of the plan which appears to have been produced after November 12 stated that "written
approval for use of gauze and for the presence of dogs have been approved by [MG Miller]" and was sent from an
attorney in the DoD General Counsel's office to an attorney at the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
in May 2003. January 31, 2008 SASC staff notes on Vaughn declaration documents.
'70
m Ibid.
mIbid.
m Ibid.
77
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
II The plan's final phase, Phase IV, was entitled "Coalition Exploitation" and stated
that:
The fourth phase ofthe plan to exploit 063 requires that he be sent off island either
temporarily or permanently to either [two specified third countries], or another country to
allow those countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable them to obtain
the requisite information. 57
2.
(U) On November 14,2002, CITF Commander COL Britt Mallow sent an email to MG
Miller raising concerns about both the Khatani interrogation and the October 11, 2002 request
for authority to use aggressive interrogation techniques. 575 He stated:
I strongly disagree with the use of many of the proposed [Category] 3 and some
[Category] 2 techniques. I feel they will be largely ineffective, and that they will
have serious negative material and legal effects on our investigations. I also am
extremely concerned that the use of many of these techniques will open any
military members up for potential criminal charges, and that my agents, as well as
other [military personnel] will face both legal and ethical problems if they become
aware oftheir use. 576
(U) COL Mallow told the Committee that in addition to his email, he raised concerns
about the Khatani interrogation in conversations with MG Miller and in "several meetings with
the DoD [General Counse1].,,577 COL Mallow said that MG Miller told him in a meeting that "if
[CITF] did not want to participate in interrogations with the intelligence community because of
our objections to methods, that [CITF] would not have the benefit of information resulting from
any ofthose interrogations.,,578
.
(U) MG Miller told the Committee that, while he did not recall the CITF Commander's
November 14, 2002 email specifically, he did recall communications from COL Mallow to that
effect. 579 DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes stated that he did not recall seeing a copy of the
Khatani interrogation plan at that time and did not "specifically" recall his staff advising him that
CITF and FBI had concerns with interrogation techniques in the Khatani interrogation plan. 580
"6 Ibid.
m Responses of COL (Ret.) Britt Mallow to questiomaire of Senator Carl Levin (September IS, 2006).
578
Ibid.
78
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
said that "the reliability of any information gained from aggressive techniques will be
highly questionable" and objected to all "physical stresses intended for use" in Phase III ofthe
interrogation plan. 581
also objected to Phase IV ofthe plan, stating that it implied
"that third country nationals with harsher interrogation standards could be used to convey threats
to persons of family or inflict harm contrary to the Convention Against Torture.,,582
3.
'81
Memo from
'82 Ibid.
'83
Memo from
'86
Email from COL Britt Mallow to MG Geoffrey Miller (November 14, 2002).
'87
Ibid.
79
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
.On
November 21,2002, MG Miller, LTC Phifer, and representatives from the FBI,
CITF, SOUTHCOM, and the DoD General Counsel's office all participated in a video
teleconference (VTC) to discuss the Khatani interrogation. 591
II LTC Phifer told the Committee that he and MG Miller briefed the group on the
Khatani plan and that during the VTC, DoD Associate Deputy General Counsel for International
Affairs Eliana Davidson stated that the Department was comfortable with what ITF-GTMO had
planned. 592 MG Miller told the Committee that he did not recall the VTC. 593 Ms. Davidson said
that she recalled participating in VTCs where the Khatani interrogation was discussed, but she
did not recall if she had a copy of the interrogation plan itself and did not recall saying that the
~ fDefense was comfortable with what ITF-GTMO proposed for the interrogation. 594
- - - . the psychiatrist with the GTMO Behavioral Science Consultation Team, said that
in the context ofthe Khatani interrogation, ''we were routinely told that the interrogation strategy
was approved up to [the Secretary of Defense] level.,,595
(U) Subsequent to the VTC, the FBI sent a memo to MG Miller alerting him to FBI
"misgivings about the overall coercive nature and possible illegality" ofthe Khatani
interrogation plan and informing him that the FBI had presented ITF-GTMO staffwith "an
alternative interrogation approach based on long-term rapport building.,,596 A draft ofthat
alternative approach, which was the product of both the FBI and CITF, stated that Khatani's
negative interactions with interrogators "only reinforces Al-Qaeda stereotypes about evil
Americans and validates their expectation of harsh treatment and potential torture.,,597
(U) On November 22, 2002, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Chief
Psychologist Michael Gelles drafted a formal review of a ITF-GTMO draft plan. 598 Dr. Gelles
concluded that the interrogation plan "lack[ed] substantive and thoughtful consideration.,,599
Among other concerns, Dr. Gelles stated:
m Notes of FBI Special Agent, Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plansfor Detainee #063, entry at "11/21/2002."
m.Committee staff interview of LTC Jerry Phifer (June 27, 2007). Notes taken by an FBI Special Agent who
participated in the VIC indicate that, in briefIng the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) plan, LTC Phifer
"portray[ed] the DHS Interrogation Plan to SOUTHCOM and the General Counsel at the Pentagon as a unifIed
FBIIDHS Interrogation Plan." The FBI Special Agent's notes state that the LTC Phifer characterization was "in
direct contradiction" to what the Special Agent had told Phifer the previous day. See notes of FBI Special Agent,
Timeline Regarding Interrogation Plansfor Detainee #063, entry at "11/21/2002."
'93 Committee staff interview ofMG Geoffrey Miller (December 6,2007).
'94
'98
Memo from Michael G. Gelles, Psy.D. to Marie Fallon, Review offI'F-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063,
(November 22, 2002) (hereinafter "Review offI'F-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002)").
'99 Review offI'F-GTMO Interrogation Plan Detainee 063 (November 22, 2002).
80
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Strategies articulated in the later phases reflect techniques used to train US forces
in resisting interrogation by foreign enemies... [These techniques] would prove
not only to be ineffective but also border on techniques and strategies deemed
unacceptable by law enforcement professionals... 600
(U) Dr. Gelles noted that '"the choice to use force with this adversary in an interrogation
may only reinforce his resistance" and stated that ifthe plan were implemented he would "have
trouble not finding myself from a professional perspective, being forced into an adversary
position through cross examination in a military tribunal as an expert in interrogation.,,601
(U) Notwithstanding the CITF and FBI concerns, MG Miller authorized interrogators to
4.
II
(
MG Miller identified a version ofthe Khatani plan that had been written on
November 22, 2002 as the "final" plan that he authorized to be implemented on November 23,
2002. 602 While similar to the plan circulated on November 12,2002, the November 22,2002
plan contained notable differences from the earlier version that contemporaneous documents
indicated had also been approved.
_
(
Although there is evidence that both stress positions and dogs were
used in the Khatani interrogation, the November 22,2002 plan does not mention either ofthese
two techniques. 603 MG Miller said the stress positions and use of dogs were removed from the
plan at his direction. 604
III(
With respect to dogs, MG Miller said that neither LTC Phifer, nor LTC
Beaver objected to the use of dogs and that his ICE Chief, Mr. Becker, actually favored the use
of dogs in interrogations. 605 MG Miller said, however, that he only approved the use of dogs for
security around the perimeter of Camp X-Ray, where the interrogation was to take place, and
that he made that view absolutely clear to Mr. Becker. CAPT Jane Dalton, the Legal Counsel to
the Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff said, however, that she met with MG Miller in early
November and discussed the use of dogs for interrogation purposes. 606 She said that the "theory
was that certain individuals are afraid of dogs" and that, while MG Miller talked about dogs
600
Ibid.
601
Ibid.
601
Inge RePort at 9.
603
604
605
Ibid.
606
Committee staff interview of RADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2008) at 84.
81
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
being outside the interrogation room, they discussed the purpose of the dogs' presence during
interrogations was that it "exploits [the detainee's] fear.,,607
II
(
Mr. Becker told the Committee that MG Miller told him to remove dogs
from the plan.
Nevertheless, a document describing interrogation techniques used in the
Khatani interrogation and a witness account (both discussed below) suggest that dogs were used
during the interrogation to shock and agitate Khatani. 609
II(
With respect to stress positions, Mr. Becker told the Committee that,
notwithstanding the fact that they were included in the earlier plan, there was never an intent to
use stress positions with Khatani. 610 A document that appears to have been produced during the
Khatani interrogation, however, stated that stress positions would "be employed.,,611 In addition,
a 2005 memo from the ITF-GTMO Chief of Staff referencing the 2002 interrogation stated that
Khatani had "slight abrasions caused by stress positions and shackle restraints.,,612
II (
The November 22, 2002 plan identified by MG Miller as the final plan
described five phases to the interrogation. 613 Phase I, which was added after November 12,
called for the interrogators to "Induce and exploit Stockholm Syndrome" by establishing "an
isolated, austere environment where the detainee becomes completely dependent on the
interrogators and the interrogator presents himself as a 'caretaker' of the detainee.,,614 Dr. Gelles
.said that the idea of inducing the Stockholm syndrome implied that '<the subject feels that he is to
be killed and the infonnation provided may in fact be distorted.,,61s
II(
Phase II ofthe November 22, 2002 plan (which is largely the same as Phase
I of the earlier plan) stated that prior to the start of the first Phase II interrogation session,
Khatani's head and beard would be shaved for "safety, hygiene and psychological purposes.,,616
In addition, the plan stated that MG Miller had approved the use of hospital gauze to restrain the
detainee's mouth to prevent him from becoming argumentative and verbally abusive.
6111
Ibid.
608
~,MethodsEmployed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63(S) (January 17,2003). Army IG, Interview of
_ ( A p r i l 28, 2006).
610
611
612 Memo from COL John ~f Staff, USSOUTHCOM, Executive Summary on Information
Concerning Detainee ISN:~(Ilj (March 14, 2005).
613
Khatani interrogation plan (November 22, 2002). The Stockholm Syndrome refers to a psychological event
where hostages begin to identify with and grow sympathetic to their captors. The syndrome draws its name from a
bank robbery and hostage situation in Stockholm, Sweden in 1973.
614
615
616
82
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Phase III ofthe November 22,2002 plan was largely the same as Phase II of
the earlier plan and proposed having a native linguist translator play the role of a detainee to
elicit information from Khatani. 617
Phase IV ofthe November 22,2002 plan - which described the use of
interrogation techniques based on those used in SERE school to increase u.S. personnel's
resistance to illegal enemy interrogations - was virtually identical to the earlier plan and stated:
The fourth phase of the plan to exploit 063 [Khatani] requires [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] approval for the SERE interrogation technique training and
approval of the level three counter interrogation resistance training submitted by
ITF-GTMO. Once the approvals are in place, those interrogation techniques will
be implemented to encourage 063 to cooperate. The intent of raising the stakes to
this level is to convince 063 that it is futile to resist. Success of Phase III is when
his sense of futility is raised to a high enough level that source gives in and
provides the necessary information. Phase III ends with success or a standstill,
after the exhaustion of all tools ITF GTMO has to offer. 618
II Despite having approved the plan, MG Miller testified to the Army IG that he knew
"little about SERE" and "wasn't comfortable" with SERE techniques. 619 However, MG Miller
acknowledged to the Committee that these techniques were included in the approved plan and
that, if the fIrst three phases of the Khatani plan were unsuccessful, that he was willing to
consider the use of SERE techniques. 620
liThe
plan's final phase, Phase V, maintained the same title "Coalition Exploitation" as
Phase IV ofthe earlier plan but did not explicitly state an intention to render Khatani to a third
country, as did the earlier plan. 621 Instead, under "Coalition Exploitation" the November 22,
2002 plan stated that:
The fifth phase of the plan to exploit 063 will be determined at the national,
interagency level where the future disposition of 063 will be determined. 622
617
618
619
620
621
621
Ibid.
623
:<
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
5.
(U) On November 22, 2002 the FBI sent MG Miller a memo that outlined FBI's
continuing concerns about ITF-GTMO interrogation techniques. The FBI also requested a
624
Ibid.
625
626
627
628 FBI Memorandum to JTF-170 Commander MG Geoffrey Miller (November 22, 2002). Despite the heading on
the memorandum, JTF-GTMO had replaced JTF-170 by the time this memo was written.
629
Ibid.
630
Ibid.
631
632
84
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
General Counsel. DoD General Counsel Jim Ha;res said that he did not recall being aware that
the FBI had contacted his office with concerns. 63
(U) On December 2, 2002, an FBI Special Agent, who was also an attorney, sent his own
legal analysis of the October 11,2002 GTMO request to another Special Agent for forwarding to
Mr. Bowman. 634 The FBI Special Agent referred to several techniques - such as all the Category
III techniques and several Category II techniques, including stress positions, hooding, removal of
clothing, 20 hour interrogations, and use of individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce
stress - as "coercive interrogation techniques which are not permitted by the U.S.
Constitution.,,635 The Special Agent's analysis also identified several techniques - including all
Category III techniques and two Category II techniques, Le. hooding and use of phobias - as
"examples of coercive interrogation techniques which may violate 18 U.S.C. 2340, (Torture
Statute)" and warned that "it is possible that those who employ these techniques may be indicted,
prosecuted, and possibly convicted if the trier of fact determines that the user had the requisite
intent.,,636
(U) The following day, Mr. Bowman sent an email to another FBI Special Agent, stating
"[i]t is irrelevant whether these detainees are considered prisoners of war, they are still entitled to
minimal conditions of treatment - many ofthe techniques addressed appear to move well beyond
the minimal requirements ... I concur that we can't control what the military is doing, but we
need to stand well clear of it and get as much information as possible to D' Amuro, Gebhart, and
Mueller as soon as possible.,,637 Director Mueller said that he was not aware of the FBI's
concerns with DoD interrogation techniques at GTMO until May 2004. 638
633
634
635
FBI Memo, Legal IssuesRe Interrogation Techniques, attached to Email from FBI Special ABent (December 2,
2002).
636
Ibid.
637
638
Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
639
640
85
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
rendering Khatani to a third country but that CITF "considered it possibly unlawful" and
opposed the proposal. 649 He said CITF staff made Mr. Cobb aware oftheir concerns and that
Mr. Cobb supported the CITF position.
641
642
64J
644
Ibid.
64~
Ibid.
646
Ibid.
647
648
649
Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15, 2006).
86
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) The same day the VTC took place, FBI's on-site supervisor and two Special Agents
met with MG Miller where they again raised their concerns about JTF-GTMO interrogation
techniques. 650 One FBI Special Agent told the Committee that MG Miller thanked the FBI
personnel for their views, but told them that JTF-GTMO staffknew what they were doing. 651
(U) On December 9, 2002, another FBI Special Agent who attended the meeting sent an
email stating, "when I return to D.C., I will bring a copy ofthe military's interview plan [for
Khatani] ... You won't believe it!,,652 Several months later he characterized the December 5,
2002 meeting with MG Miller:
6.
(U) On November 23, 2002, ITF-GTMO personnel took Khatani to Camp X-Ray to
begin Phase I ofthe interrogation. 655 Two days later, CITF attorney
sent the
GTMO Staff Judge Advocate, LTC Diane Beaver, an email indicating that "CITF is not on board
with aggressive techniques including 20 hour [plus] interrogations. Therefore, according to our
policy, we will 'stand clear' and not offer participation, advisements, support or
recommendations as to its implementation,,656 CITF later drafted formal guidance for its agents
stating that "Detainees will be treated humanely. Physical torture, corporal punishment and
mental torture are not acceptable interrogation tactics and are not allowed under any
circumstances... CITF personnel will not participate in any interrogation that employs tactics
inconsistent with or in direct violation ofthis pOlicy.,,657
6jO
6jl
653
Electronic Communication from FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) (May 30, 2003).
6j4
Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report: Investigation Into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse At Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba Detention Facility, prepared by Lt. Gen. Randall Schmidt and Brig. Gen. John Furlow (hereinafter "Schmidt
Furlow Report'').
6jj
6j6
Email from
m DoD CITF Memo for All Personnel.Assigned to the DoD Criminal Investigation Task Force, ALCITF
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
7.
(U) According to
Ibid.
660
661
662
663 Transcript of Media Availability with Commander U.S Southern Command General James Hill (June 3,2004)
(emphasis added). Despite General Hill's acknowledgement in 2004, in comments submitted to the DoD IG's
August 25,2006 report, the DoD General Counsel's office stated that "there is no evidence that SERE techniques
were ever adopted at Guantanamo or anywhere else." See DoD Office of General Counsel, Legal Review ofDRAFT
SECRETINOFORN DoD IG Report, "Review ofDoD-Directed Investigations ofDetainee Abuse (Project No.
D2004-DINTOI-0174) (U)" (June 8, 2006) at 8.
Memo, Methods Employed X-Ray Interrogation ISN 63 (January 17, ~of the memo is unknown
but a copy of the memo was sent by the JTF-GTMO BSCT p s y c h i a t r i s t , _ to LTC Morgan Banks,
664
88
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_(
These techniques are similar to techniques used in SERE school. In fact,
JPRA training slides, identified by a JPRA instructor as those presented to interrogation
personnel deploying for GTMO, identified "religious disgrace" and "invasion of personal space
by a female" as methods to defeat resistance. 665 Likewise, JPRA materials identified
"degradation" as a method to defeat resistance, which was understood to include such methods
as stripping the individual, having the guards address the individual as ifthat person were an
"animal" or of "very low status," and controlling use ofthe latrine. 666
_(
The January 17,2003 memo stated that "[s]earch/strip search" was
used on Khatani "for security and to assert control. ,,667 A second document that appears to have
been produced while the Khatani interrogation was ongoing stated that "removal of clothing"
would "be employed" as part of Khatani's interrogation. 668 Despite the contemporaneous
documents suggesting that removal of clothing was used during the interrogation, several senior
JTF-GTMO personnel have said they were unaware of its use as an interrogation technique.
II (
MG Miller told the Committee that he informed his Director for Intelligence,
LTC Phifer, that he opposed the forced removal of clothing as an interrogation technique
and in a 2004 sworn statement stated that "to the best of my knowledge JTF-GTMO
never used [removal of clothing]" during the six week period in late 2002 early 2003
when it was authorized. 669
LTC Phifer and his replacement, COL Richard Sanders (who was given the title of Joint
Intelligence Group (JIG) Commander) told the Committee that they were not aware that
Khatani was strip searched. 670
Both Mr. Becker, the ICE Chief present for the development ofthe Khatani plan, and his
successor Lt Col Ted Moss, who assumed the position when the interrogation was
already underway, told the Committee that they were unaware of Khatani being stripped
at the direction or suggestion of interrogation personnel. 671
the Chief of the Psychological Applications Directorate (pAD) at the u.s. Army's Special Operations Command
(USASOC).
665
Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 4, 2007) at '22; Level C Peacetime Governmental Detention Survival
JPRA Instructor Guide, Exploitation: Threats and Pressures, Module 6.0, Lesson 6.1, para 5.3.3 (Version GOl.l).
666
667
668
Committee staff interview ofMG Geoffrey Miller (December 6,2007); Sworn Statement ofMG Geoffrey Miller
669
Committee staff interview of LTC Jerald Phifer (June 27, 2007); Committee staff interview of COL Richard
Sanders (August 10, 2007).
670
671 Committee staff interview ofLt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007); Committee staff interview of David Becker
(September 17, 2007).
89
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
(
The January 17,2003 memo stated that Khatani's head and beard
were shaved "for hygienic purposes and to assert control over the detainee," that Khatani's hands
were shackled to a chair to prevent him from praying, and that pra~er was denied in
circumstances where prayer was ''used as a resistance technique." 72 The memo stated that up to
eight ounces of water was poured over Khatani's head as a "method of asserting control" when
Khatani exhibited ''undesired behavior.,,673 And it said Khatani was forced to "sit, stand, lay
down, walk or other non-stress position activities by guards to enforce the control ofthe
interrogator.,,674 MAJ Burney said that Khatani was "made to stand for several hours at a time or
sit on a hard chair for several hours at a time. 675 The January 17, 2003 memo also stated that
Khatani was ridiculed and berated ''to elicit an adversarial response.,,676
_
The memorandum listed several techniques used to increase Khatani's stress
level including using of a female interrogator who "touch[ed] [Khatani] in close proximi
instructin Khatani ''to ra to idol shrine to test reli ious tern erance and incur,'
_
The memo stated that "K-9 units [were] present during interrogation but
outside of booth to provide barking in order to agitate the detainee and provide shock value. ,,678
One interrogator who participated in the Khatani interrogation told the Committee
that he understood that dogs could be used in a manner consistent with the description in the
January 17, 2003 memo, i.e. they could be present during interrogation but outside the booth in
order to agitate Khatani and provide shock value. 679 The interrogator told the Committee that
during one of his shifts interrogating Khatani, an MP brought a dog to the outside ofthe room in
which the interrogation was taking place and that the MP got the dog to bark. 680 The interrogator
said that he did not ask the MP to do so and told the MP not to do it again.
(U) MAJ Burney, who was present for portions ofthe interrogation, testified to the Army
IG that a dog was brought into the Khatani interrogation during late November or early
December an estimated "half dozen times.,,681 MAJ Burney testified:
672
6iJ
Ibid.
674
Ibid.
677
Ibid.
678
Ibid.
679
Committee staff interview of ITF-GTMO Interrogator (January 9, 2008); Methods EmployedX-Ray Inte"ogation
681
90
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
[The] dog was never allowed to bite the detainee but would be ordered to bark
loudly close to the detainee, to sort of sniff or muzzle the detainee, to put paws up
on the detainee. 682
(U) MAl Burney said that interrogators stopped using the dog "not because anybody had
necessarily objected to [the use ofthe dog]," but because ''the initial shock value had worn off"
and "it just wasn't felt to be effective anymore.,,683 None ofthe other witnesses interviewed by
the Committee stated that they were aware of a dog being brought into the interrogation booth.
who was present for portions of the interrogation, stated that at one point
during an in~, either a guard or an interrogator suggested that a dog be used to scare
Khatani. 684 _ s a i d that he informed Mr. Becker, who intervened before the dogs were
used. 685
(U) As discussed above, MG Miller told the Committee that dogs were present at Camp
X-Ray solely for securing the perimeter and that he was absolutely clear with ICE Chief David
Becker that dogs were not to be used in interrogations. 686 He testified to the Army IG that he
"rejected [using dogs in interrogations] as an acceptable technique" and that dogs "were not to be
used during active interrogation. ,,687 In written answers to questions posed by Vice Admiral
Church, however, the Director for Intelligence, LTC Phifer stated that dogs were used in the
Khatani interrogation and that "We would bring the dog around to within 10 feet [of Khatani]
and he would be somewhat unnerved by it. We did it to keep him off balance as well as to
enhance security.,,688 Despite the testimony ofthe BSCT psychiatrist and LTC Phifer, Mr.
Becker stated that the Commander "refused to allow dogs" in interrogations while he was in
command of ITF-GTMO and told the Committee that dogs were not at the Khatani
interrogation. 689
VI.
682
Ibid.
683
Ibid.
684
68~
Ibid.
686
(K1
LTC Jerry Phifer written answers to Church Report Questionnaire (July 16, 2004). It is not clear from those
written answers whether the Director for Intelligence [Phifer] was referring to the use of dogs in the interrogation of
Khatani that began in November or the interrogation that took place in October 2003. See section B supra.
688
689
690
Email from Christopher Wirts to Joe Witsch, Gary Percival, and Terry Russell (November 12, 2002).
91
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
III(
A Joint Staff Action Processing Form shows that_request was
endorsed by JPRA, JFCOM, Joint Staff, and the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy's office
and approved on November 12, 2002. 693 The Chief of JPRA's Operational Support Office
(OSO) Christopher Wirts "received the approved requirement [for training] from JFCOM DSSO
[Defense Sensitive Support Office] and [Joint Staff] DSSO" and subsequently informed three
JPRA personnel that the requirement for training included a lesson in "physical pressures,
techniques used in DoD [SERE] training" and "practical exercise[s] in interrogation and physical
pressures.,,694
692
Ibid.
693
694
Email from Christopher Wirts to Joe Witsch, Gary Percival, and Terry Russell (November 12,2002).
69'
696
Ibid.
697
698
699
Ibid.
700
701
92
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
1112
703
Ibid. at 129.
704
705
706
707
Ibid. at 109.
Committee staff interview of Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2008); Testimony of Joseph Witsch (September 6,
2001) at 113-14
708
709
(
FASO Detachment Bnmswick Instruction 3305.C, p. E-5 (January I, 1998) (emphasis in original)
("Water Board
The student is subjected to interrogation while strapped to a specially rigged, flat, wooded
surface about four by seven feet with quick release bindings which will neither chafe nor cut when the student is
strapped to the board. Two canteen cups (one pint each) of water may be slowly poured directly onto the student's
face from a height of about twelve inches throughout the interrogation. No attempt will be made to direct the stream
of water into the student's nostrils or mouth. NO CHEST OR STOMACH pressure may be used to compel the
student to breath in any water. If a cloth is placed over the student's face, it will remain in place for a maximum
time of TWENTY seconds, with a hospital corpsman instructor holding 1he face cloth in place. The cloth may
be applied only twice in this manner to any given student. A student may be threatened at a later time with the water
board and may even be strapped to the board again but under no circumstances may water actually be applied. The
Watch Officer and a designated 9505 hospital corpsman shall be present whenever the water board is being used.
The water board demonstrates omnipotence of the captor. Once the tactic is used on a student, it may be used as a
credible threat.")
710
93
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
was em~hasized in bold and in all capital letters in the Navy SERE school's instruction
manual. 11
_
(
After Mr. Witsch described how to waterboard,_ interrogators
proceeded to perform the technique on each other. 712 Another JPRA trainer, Terrence Russell,
said that it was a requirement t h a t _ interrogators experience the sensation of
waterboarding and that
staffran "ev bod throu a small e erience with the
waterboar in that the were
,,713 According to Mr. Russell,
endured the waterboard for "very long."
The experience was "purely voluntary," and
interrogators "stayed there five seconds, ten seconds, thirty seconds," but not longer
than that. 715 Mr. Russell said that ifthe interroiitors''wanted to get off, they hopped off. But
they had to experience the sensation. That was
requirement.,,716
VII.
A.
(U) On November 27, 2002, Mr. Haynes sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld recommending that the Secretary authorize the Commander of SOUTHCOM to
employ, at his discretion, all Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique (''use
of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and
light pushing") in the JTF-GTMO October 11,2002 request. 717
(U) Mr. Haynes's memo stated that he had discussed the issue with Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Doug Feith, and Chairman ofthe
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Richard Myers and that they concurred with his
recommendation 718 According to Mr. Haynes, his recommendation came after the Secretary of
Defense expressed "some exasperation that he didn't have a recommendation" on the October
11,2002 GTMO request and told his senior advisors "I need a recommendation.,,719
711
Ibid.
71l
713
Ibid.
714
Ibid.
m Ibid.
716
Ibid.
717
718
719
Committee interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 193; SASC Hearing (June 17,2(08).
94
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Mr. Haynes's memo concluded that while "all Category III techniques may be legally
available, we believe that a blanket approval of Category III techniques is not warranted at this
time.,,720 While the CJCS, General Myers, said that he "did not recall seeing the November 27,
2002 memo before it was presented to the Secretary," his Legal Counsel, CAPT Dalton, said that
she and the Chairman were "satisfied with" the techniques that were recommended to the
Secretary for approval. 721 CAPT Dalton also said, however, that she did not think the statement
in the DoD General Counsel's memo that "all Category III techniques may be legally available"
''was an appropriate legal analysis.,,722 She did not raise that concern with the Chairman. 723
(U) Mr. Haynes stated that he "probably" read LTC Beaver's legal analysis ofthe request
prior to making his recommendation but that he could not recall his opinion of it. 724 He could
not recall whether he asked anyone on his staffto review or comment on the analysis or whether
his office conducted its own legal review. 725
(U) As discussed above, General HilI, the SOUTHCOM Commander, had requested in
his October 25,2002 memorandum that Department of Justice and Department of Defense
lawyers review Category III techniques included in the October 11, 2002 GTMO request. 726
While the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLe) had issued an opinion on
August 1,2002 evaluating standards of conduct for interrogations required under the anti-torture
statute, Mr. Haynes testified in July 2006 that he "did not have a copy" ofthat opinion and that
the OLC "had not expressed a view [to him] at that time. 727 In April 2008, however, Mr. Haynes
stated that it was "very, very likely" that he had read the OLC opinion prior to making his
recommendation to the Secretary and recalled it being "very permissive.,,728 Two months later,
in June 2008, Mr. Haynes testified that he did not "remember when he ftrst read" the OLC
memo. 729 The General Counsel said that he did not know whether anyone in his office consulted
the Department of Justice about the October 11, 2002 GTMO request and he did not believe OOJ
reviewed the techniques "in the context of [the GTMO] request." 730
(U) Other than his November 27, 2002 memo to Secretary Rumsfeld recommending that
the techniques be approved, Mr. Haynes said that he "did not write anything down" to support
71JJ
Responses of General Richard Myers to April 16, 2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (April 30,
2008); SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).
nI
7'l2
723
Ibid
714
n'Ibid. .
726
m ConfIrmation Hearing of William James Haynes II to be Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, Senate Committee
on Judiciary, 1091h Congo (July II, 2006).
72lI
Committee staff interview of William J. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 175-177, 190.
729
7JO
Committee staff interview ofWilliarn 1. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 175-177, 186.
95
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
his legal analysis. 731 GTMO Staff Judge Advocate Diane Beaver stated that she "fully expected"
that her legal review would be 'carefully reviewed by legal and policy experts at the highest
levels before a decision was reached" and was "shocked" that her opinion became the opinion
upon which the Department of Defense relied. 732 LTC Beaver stated that she did not expect that
her opinion "would become the final word on interrogation policies and practices within the
Department of Defense" and that for her "such a result was simply not foreseeable." 733 She
stated that she "did not expect to be the only lawyer issuing a written opinion on this
monumentally important issue" and that in hindsight, could not "help but conclude that others
chose not to write on this issue to avoid being linked to it.,,734
(U) Despite the fact that his memo recommended the Secretary of Defense authorize the
use of aggressive interrogation techniques including stress positions, deprivation of light and
auditory stimuli, hooding, removal of clothing, the use of dogs to induce stress, and pushing and
poking detainees, Mr. Haynes stated that he was not recommending blanket approval of other
aggressive techniques in the GTMO request (like the use of a wet towel and dripping water to
induce the misperception of drowning) because "Our Anned Forces are trained to a standard of
interrogation that reflects a tradition of restraint."735
(U) While several techniques included in the request were similar to techniques used in
SERE training and provided by JPRA to the General Counsel's office in the July 26,2002
memo, Mr. Haynes said that he did not "specifically recall" making a connection between the
request and SERE. 736 In comments submitted to the DoD IG's August 25,2006 report, the DoD
General Counsel's office even stated that "There is no evidence that SERE techniques were ever
adopted at Guantanamo or anywhere else.,,737 Those comments were submitted two years after
the SOUfHCOM Commander, General Hill, had said that ''the staff at Guantanamo" had
traveled to "SERE school," where they "developed a list of techniques ..." and despite the fact
that some ofthe techniques in the October 11,2002 GTMO request were specifically identified
as ''those used in U.S. military interrogation resistance training.,,738
(U) Mr. Haynes said that he raised legal concerns about the October 11, 2002 GTMO
request with the Secretary prior to making his recommendation. 739 On December 2, 2002,
however, Secretary Rumsfeld approved Mr. Haynes's recommendation that SOUfHCOM be
731
Ibid. at 177.
Ibid.
734
Ibid.
731 Comment matrix, Legal Review ofDraft SECRETI/NOFORN DoD IG Report, 'Review ofDoD-Directed
Investigations ofDetainee Abuse (Project No. D2004-DINT01-0174) (U). (June 8,2006) at 8.
738 Media Availability with GEN Hill (June 3, 2004); MG Dunlavey to GEN Hill, Counter-Resistance Strategies
(October II, 2(02).
739
96
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
given authority to use all Categories I and II techniques and one Category III technique in
interrogations at GTMO. 740 In approving the techniques, the Secretary added a handwritten note
at the bottom of the memo that questioned one of the limitations in the ITF-GTMO request, 741
In reference to ''the use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four hours," the
Secretary wrote: "However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?,,742
Despite having previously approved the Khatani plan, which included a phase to
employ Category III techniques, MG Geoffrey Miller told the Committee that shortly after the
authorization was issued, he told the SOUTHCOM Commander that he did not intend to use the
Category III techniques at GTMO. 743
(U) However, following the Secretary of Defense's December 2,2002 authorization,
ITF-GTMO senior staffbegan developing standard operating procedures to implement stress
positions, stripping detainees, and non-injurious physical contact, such as pushing and poking
detainees, all of which were authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The CITF Special Agent in
Charge at GTMO, Timothy James, said that when he saw the Secretary's authorization, he was
"in shock" and that it "told us we had lost the battle.,,744
B.
III (
II
(
The Department of Defense provided the Committee with two versions of
the draft SERE SOP, one dated December 18, 2002 and another earlier undated draft. The draft
SOPs were based on the Navy SERE school manual. 747
(U) Under "purpose" both drafts of the SOP stated:
740
741
Ibid.
742
Ibid.
743
744
74'
746
747 JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure (undated) (hereinafter "JTF-GTMO SERE
SOP (undated)"); JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure (December 18, 2002);
(hereinafter "JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002)'').
97
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(
Regarding the shoulder slap, John Rankin, a Navy SERE Training Specialist
who reviewed the draft SOPs at the time, noted that the SOPs' description of the shoulder slap
differed from the technique as applied at the Navy SERE school. 752 The Navy instruction
,,753
manual described the shoulder slap
However, the draft GTMO SOPs described the shoulder slap as
,754
(
The draft SOPs described how to administer "insult slap[s]" and "stomach
slap[s]" to "shock and intimidate the detainee."m The draft SOPs explained that the use of
"stripping" involved the "forceful removal of detainees' c1othing.,,756 The drafts also stated that
748
JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated); JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).
749
750
754
JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated); JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).
755
JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (undated); JTF-GTMO SERE SOP (December 18, 2002).
756
Ibid.
98
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
"[i]n addition to degradation of the detainee, stripping can be used to demonstrate the
omnipotence of the captor or to debilitate the detainee.,,757
l1li
(
Under "Physical Debilitation Tactics" th~ draft SOPs described various
stress positions and said the purpose of using them was to" unish detainees."758 Among the
stress ositions listed was the "kneelin osition,'
Ibid.
7'8
Ibid.
7'9
Ibid.
760
Ibid.
761
Ibid.
762
Ibid.
763
Ibid.
764
76~ Email from LTC Diane Beaver to Lt Col Ted Moss and LTC Jerald Phifer (December 14, 2002).
766
Ibid.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) LTC Beaver later testified to the Committee that she might have recalled seeing a
SERE SOP at the time but that she "had nothing to do" with drafting the December 18, 2002
version of the SOP and did not participate at all in drafting it. 767
_As
to the utility ofthe SERE resistance techniques, MAJ Burney also stated that "[i]t
is quite possible that employing these techniques exactly as employed in SERE school may
actually strengthen a detainee's ability to resist interrogation rather than overcome it."772 MAJ
Burney stated that he was "not suggesting that the use of physical pressures should be totally
abandoned," but recommended that they should bring an experienced senior SERE trainer to
GTMO to discuss the issue stating "the interrogation element feels these tools will greatly assist
the interrogations process. It would be very interesting to me to know if senior SERE trainers...
agree with this assessment or not."773 MAJ Burney also recommended that, if IfF-GTMO
determined the techniques might be effective, then they should institute the same screening
processes that SERE schools use and that SERE school instructors be "sent to GTMO to help
with the interrogation process.,,774
767
768
Email from MAl Paul Burney to LTC Diane Beaver (December 16, 2002).
76')
Ibid.
770
Ibid.
771
Ibid.
7nIbid.
m Ibid.
774
Ibid.
100
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Mr. Becker, the ICE Chiefwho left GTMO in December 2002, told the Committee
that prior to his departure he had begun drafting the SOP and had discussed it with LTC
Phifer. 775
(U) As discussed above, contemporaneous documents suggest that LTC Phifer gave a
copy ofthe draft SERE SOP to Timothy James, the CITF Special Agent in Charge, and briefed
the draft to a JTF-GTMO staff meeting. 776 LTC Phifer was also a recipient ofthe December 14,
2002 email from LTC Beaver that proposed changes to the draft SERE SOP.777 However, LTC
Phifer testified to the Army IG that he had "never heard of [the SOP] or saw [the SOP]."778 He
later told the Committee that he did not recall the SOP or the December 14, 2002 staff meeting
and said that he would not have been comfortable briefing the SOP. 779
(U) LTC Phifer was replaced on or about December 17, 2002 by COL Richard Sanders,
who was given the title of Joint Intelligence Group (nG) Commander. 780 COL Sanders, whose
signature block was included on the December 18, 2002 draft SERE SOP, did not recall seeing
the SOP, but said he vaguely recalled discussions about it. 781 Lt Col Moss, the new ICE Chief
whose signature block was also on the draft SERE SOP, told the Committee that he recalled the
draft SOP but that he never signed it. 782
(U) LTC Beaver told the Committee that she did not know who directed the development
ofthe SOP and could not recall whether she discussed it with MG Miller. 783 MAJ Burney told
the Committee that he recalled being provided a copy ofthe Navy SERE school's SOP but did
not recall seeing a document drafted by GTMO personnel. 784
IIDespite having approved an interrogation plan that included SERE techniques and
telling the Committee that, in the context ofthe Khatani interrogation, he was "willing to
consider" SERE tactics, MG Miller testified to the Army IG that the techniques in the SOP
''were too aggressive and not appropriate for use [at GTMO].,,785
(U) While a contemporaneous document suggests that LTC Phifer briefed MG Miller on
the SOP, MG Miller told the Army IG that the SOP was never brought to his attention and that
m Committee staff interview of David Becker (October 17, 2007).
716
Email from Timothy James to Mark Fallon et a!. (December 17, 2002).
TrTEmail from LTC Diane Beaver to Lt Col Ted Moss and LTC Jerald Phifer (December 14, 2002).
7llO
Ibid.
781
782
783
784
Army !G, Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (March 28, 2006); Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller
(December 5,2007).
785
101
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
he had no knowledge of it. 786 MG Miller later told the Committee that he did not recall being
briefed on the draft SOP. 787 As noted above, he also told the Committee that he opposed stress
positions, removal of clothing, and the use of non-injurious physical contact - all techniques
described in the draft SERE SOP - and that he had made his opposition clear to his staff prior to
the time that the SOPs were drafted. 788
(U) In response to LTC Phifer's request for comments on the draft SERE SOP, CITF
raised concerns about the SOP verbally to LTC Phifer and drafted written comments about the
SOP. 789 A draft ofCITF's written comments (which they coordinated with FBI) was addressed
to LTC Phifer and stated:
[There is a] fundamental difference between the military and [CITF and FBI]
regarding which style of interrogation should be used... the military model is
based on SERE tactics ...This school teaches coercion and aggressive
interrogation techniques as a way to "break" soldiers who are being trained in
methods to resist interrogation by a foreign power... [CITF and FBI~ believe
these techniques discourage, rather than encourage, detainee cooperation. 90
(U) CITF and FBI also argued that the use ofthe methods "only serves to reinforce" the
negative perception ofthe detainees toward Americans and would create "real potential for
mistreatment" of detainees. 791 CITF and FBI called the SERE techniques "unsuitable" and
"ineffective" and said there were "serious concerns about the legal implications ofthe
techniques.,,792
(U) On December 18, 2002, CITF Special Agent in Charge Timothy James sent an email
to Mr. Fallon stating "at this moment the ITF-GTMO staff is working the SOP issue, and [MG
Miller] will most likely make a decision in the next day or SO.,,793
(U) Individuals interviewed by the Committee stated that the SOP was never signed or
implemented at GTMO. 794 Less than two weeks after the December 18, 2002 draft SERE SOP
Email from CITF Special Agent in Charge (December 18, 2002); Army IG, Interview ofMG Geoffrey Miller
(March 28, 2006).
186
787
788
Ibid.
789
Draft Memo from Timothy James to JTF-GTMO/J2, JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation SOP DTD 10 Dec 02
(December 17, 2002). CITF Special Agent in Charge Timothy James told the Committee that he was sure he shared
CITF's concerns with LTC Phifer verbally and thought he gave LTC Phifer a memo documenting those concerns.
Committee staff interview of Timothy James (May 18, 2007).
?90
Draft Memo from Timothy James to JTF-GTMO/J2, JTF-GTMO "SERE" Interrogation SOP DTD 10 Dec 02
(December 17, 2002).
191
792
Ibid.
79:l
Email from Timothy James to Mark Fallon et al. (December 18, 2002).
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007); Committee staff interview ofMG Geoffrey
Miller (December 6, 2007).
194
102
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
was written, however, two instructors from the Navy SERE school traveled to GTMO to train
interrogators on how to perform some ofthe physical pressures authorized by the Secretary of
Defense and contained in the draft SERE SOPs.
c.
(U) On December 30, 2002, a SERE Training Specialist, John Rankin, and a SERE
Coordinator, Christopher Ross from the Navy SERE school in Brunswick, Maine arrived at
GTMOto "provide [ITF-GTMO Interrogation Control Element] personnel with the theory and
application ofthe physical pressures utilized during [Navy SERE school] training evolutions.,,795
U Col Moss told the Committee that his predecessor, Mr. Becker, had invited the SERE school
trainers to GTMo. 796 MG Miller told the Committee that he was aware ofthe visit. 797
(U) The trainers arrived on December 30, 2002 and met with Lt Col Moss and the ICE
Operations Officer. 798 Lt Col Moss told them that "a high level directive had initiated [their]
subsequent trip for the purpose of providing 'physical pressures' training." According to the
SERE Training Specialist, John Rankin, that directive was a letter from the Secretary of Defense
799
which was shown to him by Lt Col Moss.
Lt Col Moss also ~ave the two Navy SERE school
personnel a copy ofthe December 18,2002 draft SERE SOP. 80
(U) The next day, the two Navy SERE school instructors led training for GTMO
interrogators and other ICE personnel at Camp Delta.801 The training included instruction on
"Biderman's Principles," including lessons from a chart that was originally included in a 1957
article about how communists elicited false confessions. 802
(U) The training also consisted of both lectures and instruction on the application of
physical pressures. 803 The SERE Training Specialist John Rankin told the Committee that the
instructors showed interrogators how to administer the insult slap, the shoulder slap, the stomach
slap and demonstrated at least one stress position. 804 Mr. Rankin also said that they discussed the
'195 Memorandum from John Rankin and Christopher Ross to Officer in Charge, FASOTRAGRULANr Det
Bnmswic/c, AfterAction Report Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JI'F-GTMO) Training Evolution (January IS,
2003) (hereinafter "AAR JI'F-GTMO Training Evolution (January IS, 2003)").
?96
797
798
799
800
Ibid
801
Ibid; Intelligence Science Board, Phase I Report: Educing Information: Interrogation: Science and Art
(December 2(06) at 316.
802
The Navy SERE instructors fIrst provided a lecture on "Biderman's Chart of Coercion," which described the
effects of various physical and psychological pressures on individuals in captivity. See AAR JI'F-GTMO Training
Evolution (January IS, 2003); Committee staff interviews of JTF-GTMO interrogators (July 12, 2007), (November
6, 2007), and (January 9, 2008).
803
804
103
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
walling technique but did not demonstrate it because the facility lacked the specially constructed
wall used at SERE school. 805 Two IfF-GTMO interrogators who attended the training stated
that, following the demonstration, the interrogators broke off into pairs and practiced slapping
each other. 806
(U) Two interrogators who attended the training said that they understood that the
techniques were available for interrogators to put in their ''toolbox.,,807 One ofthose
interrogators recalled being told that if interrogators wanted to use the techniques, they would
need to notifY their interrogation team chief. 808 A third interrogator who attended the training
told the Committee that he believed Lt Col Moss said the techniques could not be used while
they were pending approval.809
(U) The JIG Commander, COL Sanders, testified to the Army IG that he attended the
initial portion ofthe training and "made it quite clear, at least I believe I made it quite clear [to
the interrogators] ... the use of physical measures was not one ofthe things that we should
consider was appropriate and would not be ~ermitted. ,,810 COL Sanders also testified that he
expressed the same concerns to MG Miller. 11 Those statements are inconsistent with the
recollections of others.
(U) Ofthe three interrogators interviewed by the Committee who attended the training,
none recalled COL Sanders making such a statement. 812 Lt Col Moss, the ICE Chief at the time,
did not recall COL Sanders being present at the training. 813 MG Miller told the Committee that
no one on his staff expressed concern to him about the training. 814
(U) On the morning of January 2,2003 the Navy SERE school personnel presented
additional instruction on interrogation fundamentals and resistance to interrogation. 815 Later that
day the instructors "presented an abbreviated theoretical physical pressures and peacetime
guidance (government and hostage) to Marine IfF-GTMO personnel and two IfF-GTMO Staff
805
Ibid.
806
Committee staff interviews of JTF-GTMO interrogators (July 12, 2007) and (January 9, 2008).
807
Ibid.
808
809
810
811
Ibid. at 6.
Committee staff interviews of JTF-GTMO interrogators (July 12,2007), (November 6,2007), and (January 9,
2008).
812
813
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2007).
814
8H
104
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Judge Advocate (SJA) officials.,,816 LTC Beaver told the Committee that she was not aware the
SERE instructors were coming to GTMO and did not attend any ofthe sessions. 817
(U) In the weeks following the Secretary of Defense's December 2,2002 authorization of
the interrogation techniques, word had spread that serious concerns were emerging about the
techniques. In mid-to-Iate December, prior to the SERE trainers' arrival at GTMO, General Hill,
the SOUTHCOM Commander, alerted MG Miller that a debate had ensued regarding the
Secretary's decision to authorize the techniques. 818
(U) Prior to their departure on January 3, 2003, the two Navy SERE instructors met with
MG Miller. 819 The GTMO Commander told the Committee that he informed the SERE
instructors, in the presence of his staff, that he did not want the techniques they had demonstrated
used in interrogations at GTMO. 820 Others who attended the meeting confIrmed the
Commander's account. 821 Mr. Rankin told the Committee that MG Miller said that he did not
want interrogators using techniques that might "bite them" later on. 822
. (
Before leaving, Mr. Rankin provided a memo for the ICE Operations Chief
on the use ofphysical and psychological pressures during interrogations. The memo stated:
[The] use of physical and psychological pressures during interrogations, if
deemed appropriate, are tools that can be applied in order to establish and
reinforce [Biderman's] principles... these principles and associated pressures
allow the interrogation system to establish and maintain control of the
exploitation process... The application of physical pressures is only part of the
overall captive management process. They are initially used to shock and
intimidate by setting the stage and establishing control. There must be a
statement made by demonstrating there are rewards and punishments for
compliant and combative or resistive behavior.823
D.
(U) CITF had been established as a joint military organization composed of personnel
from the Anny Criminal Investigative Division (CID), the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
816
Ibid.
817
818
819
820
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Ted Moss (October 17,2007); Committee staff interview of John Rankin
(September 24, 2007); Committee staff interview of Christopher Ross (September 24, 2007).
821
822
Memorandum from John Rankin to Captain Weis, Physical and Psychological Pressures During Interrogations
(January 3, 2003).
823
105
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(NCIS), and Air Force Office of Special Investigations. While CITF's Commander COL Britt
Mallow was an Army Colonel assigned to CITF from CID, Deputy Commander Mark Fallon
was an NCIS civilian employee on detail to the CITF. While COL Mallow reported concerns
about ITF-GTMO interrogation techniques through his Army chain of command, Mr. Fallon also
brought the concerns to NCIS leadership. 824
(U) On December 17, 2002, two weeks after the Secretary authorized the interrogation
techniques for use at GTMO and with the Khatani interrogation underway, David Brant, the
NCIS Director informed Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora about recent objections raised by
CITF. 825 The next day, Mr. Mora met with NCIS Chief Psychologist Dr. Michael Gelles, who
had been to GTMO and was familiar with the interrogation techniques in use there. Dr. Gelles
provided Mr. Mora excerpts of interrogation logs reflecting detainee mistreatment. Dismayed by
what he read and heard, Mr. Mora met with Steven Morello, the Army General Counsel, and for
the first time had the opportunity to review the October 11,2002 GTMO request, LTC Beaver's
legal analysis, and the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization of interrogation
techniques for use in GTMO interrogations, which included stress positions, removal of clothing,
dogs, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, 20 hour interrogations, forced grooming, and
grabbing, pushi~ and poking detainees. 826 Mr. Mora testified to the Committee: "[W]hen I saw
the December 2 Rumsfeld memo, and then reviewed Lieutenant Colonel Beaver's legal
memorandum, when I saw that the memorandum was completely unbounded concerning the
limit of abuse that could be applied to the detainees, I knew instantaneously ... that this was a
flawed policy based upon inadequate legal analysis.,,827
(U) The following day, Mr. Mora briefed Navy Secretary Gordon England on the NCIS
report of detainee mistreatment and received authorization to meet with DoD General Counsel
Jim Haynes. 828 That afternoon, Mr. Mora met with Mr. Haynes and advised him that in his view
"some ofthe authorized techniques could rise to the level oftorture.,,829 He recalled urging the
DoD General Counsel to "think. about the techniques more closely" questioning him "What did
'deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli' mean? Could a detainee be locked in a completely
dark cell? And for how long? A month? Longer? What precisely did the authority to exploit
phobias pennit? Could a detainee be held in a coffm? Could phobias be applied until madness
set in?,,8~O
814
Memo from Alberto 1. Mora to the Inspector General, Department of the Navy, Statementfor the Record: Office
ofGeneral Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues (July 7,2004) at 2-3 (hereinafter "Mora, Statementfor the
Record'').
825
The Army General Counsel also "demonstrated great concern with [the Secretary's] decision to authorize the
interrogation techniques." Army lawyers explained to the Navy General Counsel that they had "tried to stop" the
authorization "without success, and had been advised not to question the settled decision further." Mora, Statement
for the Record at 5-6.
826
827
828
829
Ibid.
830
Ibid. at 7.
106
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Mr. Mora also urged Mr. Haynes not to rely on LTC Beaver's legal analysis,
characterizing it as "an incompetent product oflegal analysis.',s31 Mr. Mora left the meeting
feeling confident that the Secretary's authorization for interrogation techniques would be
suspended. 832
(U) More than two weeks later, on January 6,2003, the NCIS Director informed Mr.
Mora that the Secretary's December 2,2002 memo had not been suspended and that detainee
mistreatment was continuing at GTMO. 833 Two days later, Mr. Mora met with a Special
Assistant to both the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and informed
him ofthe concerns. On January 9,2003, Mr. Mora met again with DoD General Counsel Jim
Haynes, warning him that the "interrogation policies could threaten Secretary Rumsfeld's tenure
and could even damage the presidency.',834 The Navy General Counsel also left Mr. Haynes
with a draft copy of a memo written by a Navy JAG Corps Commander, Stephen Gallotta. 835
II
In that memo, CDR Gallotta summarized and attached comments that the military
Services had submitted in November 2002 in response to the Joint Staff request. 836 CDR
Gallotta's memo also assessed the legality ofthe techniques, concluding that several ofthe
techniques "may violate the President's policy for the treatment of detainees," may violate
international legal standards, and may violate the federal anti-torture statute (18 U.S.C. 2340)
and various articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).837
Ibid.
832
Ibid. at 8.
833
Ibid. at 9.
834 A series of meetings followed between Mr. Mora and senior officials, where Mr. Mora reiterated his concerns.
Mr. Mora met with the Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CAPT Jane Dalton, the Service
General Counsels and senior Judge Advocates General, Army General Counsel Steven MoreUo, Air Force General
Counsel Mary Walker, and the DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel Daniel DeU'Orto. Ibid. at 13- 14.
83'
Ibid. at 10.
Memo by CDR Stephen Gallotta, Counter-Resistance Techniques (January 9, 2003). The Services ~ised legal
concerns about many of the Categories II and ill techniques and called for further legal review of the proposal. See
Section IV D, supra.
836
837
107
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
level where they could be detennined to be torture. Thus, additional analysis with
specific guidance for implementation is recommended. 838
(U) On January 15,2003, "uncertain whether there would be any change to the
interrogation policy," Mr. Mora delivered a draft memorandum to Mr. Haynes stating that "the
majority of the proposed category II and all ofthe proposed category III techniques were
violative of domestic and international legal norms in that they constituted, at a minimum, cruel
and unusual treatment and, at worst, torture.,,839 In a phone call that same day, Mr. Mora told the
DoD General Counsel that he intended to sign the memo that afternoon ifhe had not heard that
the Secretary's December 2, 2002 memo for interrogation techniques had been or was being
suspended. 84o According to Mr. Mora, Mr. Haynes indicated during their conversations that
"Secretary Rumsfeld was 'considerin~' rescinding the interrogation techniques he had previously
authorized for use in Guantanamo.,,84 In light of Mr. Mora's draft memo, Mr. Haynes also
indicated that he would inquire further about the "Secretary's promise to 'consider' the
withdrawal ofthe interrogation techniques.,,842 Mr. Haynes called Mr. Mora later that day to tell
him the Secretary had suspended his authorization for interrogation techniques. 843
(U) On January 15,2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum for GEN Hill,
the SOUTHCOM Commander, rescinding blanket authority for one Category III and all
Category II techniques at GTMO. 844 GEN Hill said that Secretary Rumsfeld had called him days
before fonnally rescinding authority for the techniques on January 15,2003 and asked whether
the interrogation should continue. GEN Hill said that he told the Secretary that he "would
discuss the question with MG Miller, did so that day and reported back to [Secretary Rumsfeld]
recommending we continue the interrogation.,,845 According to GEN Hill, Secretary Rumsfeld
agreed at that time that the interrogation should continue but subsequently called him back and
directed that it be stopped. 846
(U) Just days after the Secretary of Defense rescinded authority for ITF-GTMO to use the
interrogation techniques he had authorized in December, CITF's Deputy Commander Mark
Fallon and NCIS Chief Psychologist Michael Gelles met with MG Miller to discuss their
concerns about interrogation approaches. Mr. Fallon said MG Miller was "dismissive" oftheir
838
Ibid.
839
840
Ibid. at 15.
841
Mora responses to questions for the record from SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).
842
Ibid.
Mora, Statementfor the Record at 15; see also Mora responses to questions for the record from SASC Hearing
(June 17, 2008) ("At no time did Mr. Haynes give me any indication that the techniques had been previous
rescinded. Had his been the case, Mr. Haynes could have simply informed me of the fact upon our f1!St conversation
that day.").
843
Memo from the Secretary of Defense to Commander USSOUTHCOM, Counter-Resistance Techniques (January
15,2003) (hereinafter "SECDEF memo to CDR SOUTHCOM (January 15,2003)").
844
84'
GEN James Hill answers to July 31,2008 written questions (August 20, 2008).
846
Ibid.
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
concerns and reported that the GTMO Commander said "'you have got to put on the same jersey
if you want to be on the team. ",847
_Following the Secretary's rescission, Khatani was moved out of Camp X_Ray.848
Beginning on January 15,2003 only Category I techniques were used in his interrogation.
Category I techniques included yelling and techniques of deception. An April 19, 2003 memo
from MG Miller the GTMO Commander said that on A ril 9 2003
" interrogators and analysts attributed his cooperation to his failing a polygraph test,
his being told that his information was becoming less important because other members of al
Qaeda were cooperating, and interro~ators informing Khatani that release or repatriation to Saudi
Arabia depended on his truthfulness. 50
(U) Secretary Rice confirmed Mr. Bellinger's account, stating that he advised her "on a
regular basis" regarding concerns and issues relating to Department of Defense detention policies
and practices at Guantanamo. 855 She said that, as a result she "convened a series of meetings of
847
Responses of Mark Fallon to questionnaire of Senator Carl Levin (September 15,2006) at 16.
Memo from Major General Geoffrey Miller to Commander, U.S. Southern Command., Techniques Used on ISN
63 Since 15 January 2003 (S) (April 19, 2003).
848
849
Ibid.
8~O
Ibid.
8~1 Letter from John Bellinger, III to Glenn Fine (June 9, 2008).
m John Bellinger answers to July 31,2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12, 2008).
8~3
Ibid.
8~4
Ibid.
8~~ Condoleezza Rice answers to July 31,2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 12,2008).
109
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
NSC Principals in 2002 and 2003 to discuss various issues and concerns relating to detainees in
the custody ofthe Department ofDefense.,,856
A.
1.
(U) The Working Group's principals and their action officers met for the frrst time on
January 23,2003. 861 At that meeting, the Working Group received a briefIng from the DIA
856
Ibid.
857 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Detainee
Interrogations (January 15, 2003). In this memo, the Secretary also directed the Working Group to address the
"[l]egal considerations raised by interrogation of detainees held by US. Armed Forces;" "[p]olicy considerations
with respect to the choice of interrogation techniques, including contribution to intelligence collection, effect on
treatment of captured US. military personnel, effect on detainee prosecutions, [and] historical role of US. armed
forces in conducting interrogations;" and "[r]ecommendations for employment of particular interrogation techniques
by DoD interrogators."
858
Memorandum from Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes to Air Force General Counsel
Mary Walker, Working Group to Assess Legat Policy, and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of
859 Department of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment ofLegat Historicat Policy, and Operational Considerations (April 4, 2003); Memorandum from the
Secretary of Defense for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Detainee Interrogations (January 15,
2003).
860
861
110
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
about specific interrogation techniques. 862 A proposed agenda for the first Working Group
meeting tasked David Becker with providing an overview of interrogation techniques to the
Group. 863
_Mr.
Becker, the former JTF-GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief, had
recently returned from GTMO to a civilian job at DIA Mr. Becker told the Committee that he
discussed interrogation operations as well as particular interrogation techniques with the
Working Group's senior JAG officers and their civilian counterparts. 864 He told the Committee
that he was asked about aggressive techniques and was encouraged to talk about techniques that
inflict pain. 865 He also said that he advised the Working Group to consider SERE resistance
training techniques. 866
_The
Working Group tasked DIA with providing a list of interrogation techniques and
their effectiveness so that the Group could assess their legality.867 DIA relied on Mr. Becker to
produce that list. 868
Mr. Becker compiled a list of36 techniques for the Working GrOUp.869 The list
included techniques from Army Field Manual 34-52; techniques from Category II ofthe October
11, 2002 GTMO request, including stress positions, isolation, deprivation of light and auditory
stimuli, hooding, 20 hour interrogations, forced grooming, and use ofphobias, such as dogs; and
862
863
864
865
Ibid.
Ibid. The proposed agenda for the Working Group meeting (dated Janwuy 23,2003) includes handwritten
comments that reflect a discussion about "All [service] SEER [sic] guidelines" and "techniques." Since this
document was produced to the Committee as a part of the source materials collected by VADM Church for his
report, the Committee cannot determine whether these handwritten comments are those of a Working Group
participant or VADM Church's team. Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meeting (Janwuy 23, 2(03).
866
867.
Proposed Agenda, Working Group Meetii(Janwuy 23, 2003); (U) Proposed Detainee Interrogation
Working Group Responsibilities (Initial) (Undated)
DIA's role was described in the memo as, "List, describe
and assess the effectiveness of all interrogation techniques that may be effective in obtaining useful information
from detainees in the war on terrorism. Suggest relevant policy considerations affecting each."
868
869 . . Committee
staff interview of David Becker (September 17,2007). The 36 techniques included Direct,
Incentive, Emotional Love, Emotional Hate, Fear Up Harsh, Fear Up Mild, Decreased Fear, Pride and Ego Up, Pride
and Ego Down, Futility, We Know All, Establish Your Identity, Repetition Approach, File and Dossier, Mutt and
Jeff, Rapid Fire, Silence, Change of Scenery, Use of Stress Positions, Use of Falsified Documents and Reports, Use
of Isolation Facility, Interrogating Detainees in an Environment other than the Standard Interrogation Booth,
Deprivation of Light and Auditory Stimuli, Hooding, Use of 20-Hour Interrogations, Switching the Detainee from
Hot Rations to MREs, Removal of All Comfort Items, Forced Grooming, Use of Detainee Phobias, Use of Scenarios
Designed to Convince the Detainees that Death or Severely Painful Consequences are Imminent, Exposure to Cold
Weather or Water, Use of a Wet Towel and Dripping Water, Use of Mild, Non-Injurious Physical Contact, Use of
Drugs, Use of Female Interrogators, and Sleep Deprivation. Defense Intelligence Agency memo, List, describe and
assess the effectiveness ofaU interrogation techniques that may be effective in obtaining useful informationfrom
detainees in the war on terrorism. Suggest relevant policy considerations affecting each (undated) (hereinafter "List
of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA.")
111
Page 194
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all four techniques from Category III ofthe GTMO request, i.e., use of scenarios to convince the
detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent, exposure to cold weather or
water, use of a wet towel and dripping water, and the use of mild, non-injurious physical
contact. 870 Mr. Becker also listed three "less common techniques" for the Working Group's
consideration, i.e., use of drugs, use of female interrogators, and sleep deprivation. ,,871 Mr.
Becker's memo identified each technique, assessed its effectiveness, and in some instances, also
assessed legal and policy considerations. 872
_
(
Mr. Becker's memo stated that the Category III techniques from the
October 11,2002 GTMO request were '"the most aggressive and controversial" techniques. 873
Mr. Becker stated that the techniques were "currently used against U.S. soldiers in SERE
schools, with their consent," but that they would "not comport with the Geneva Conventions" if
applied to Prisoners of War (POWs). 874 His memo recommended that the Working Group
conduct a policy review on the "reciprocity oftreatment of captured U.S. personnel" before
implementing any ofthe Category III techniques. 87s Mr. Becker said that attorneys who
consulted with him on the memo added this recommendation. 876
_
(
Mr. Becker's memo state~may have already been using the
Catego~ III techniques and stated t h a t _ h a d apparently obtained assistance from
JPRA 8 He wrote:
These [Category III] techniques may be employed b Y . against the
detainees they have in custody overseas. We understand
office of the
General Counsel did a legal review and established a fmdin similar to the Ie al
review of the GTMO SJA.
The U.S.
military uses standardized SOPs and training in their SERE schools. The SOPs
establish the necessary checks and oversight that make SERE training both safe
and effective. If adopted, those same standards should be applied when
List of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA. In describing one technique - use of mild, non
injurious physical contact - the ICE Chief explained that "[i]ssues such as grabbing and poking have very minimal
policy issues and playa part in the interrogator's efforts to be sincere. Other non-injurious contact such as a face
slap or stomach slap are effective in gaining compliance and are used at SERE school. UCMJ policy issues should
be resolved. "
870 _
871
871
Ibid.
87J
Ibid. at 3.
874
Ibid.
87S
Ibid.
876
877
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
interrogating detainees in the GWOT. The SERE SOPs should resolve most of
the policy issues regarding the use of the Category [III] counter-resistance
techniques. 878
_
In describing one Category III technique - ''use of a wet towel and
dripping water" - Mr. Becker's memo stated that the technique is "very effective," but that there
are "wide ranging policy issues. ,,879 According to the memo, "[t]his particular method is no
longer in use at SERE schools, but a similar method, called the waterboard, is v~ive and
it is understood that the waterboard is one ofthe techniques used with effect b~
.
,,880
mterrogators.
As to the three "less common techniques" in his memo - use of drugs,
_
use of female interrogators, and sleep deprivation - Mr. Becker stated that "interrogation
approaches are limited only by the imagination of interrogators" and that it would be "impossible
to list every possible interrogation approach. ,,881 His memo stated that "drugs such as sodium
pentothal and demerol may be used with some effectiveness," that female interrogators could be
used to make the detainee feel ''unclean,'' and that "sleep deprivation" can be effective. 882 Mr.
Becker told the Committee that he based his statement about the effectiveness ofthe use of drugs
on a rumor that _
had used drugs in their interrogation program. 883
2.
_
In addition to asking DIA for a list of interrogation techniques, the Working
Group also requested that the Joint Staff provide a list oftechniques "currently in effect or
previously employed in CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM, techniques the combatant commanders
have found to be effective, and techniques the combatant commanders desire to implement with
. rationa
. I e. ,,884
accompanymg
_
SOUTHCOM relied on the ITF-GTMO Commander to respond to the
Joint Stafftasking. MG Miller sent SOUTHCOM Commander General Hill a memo on January
878
Ibid.
879
Ibid.
880
Ibid.
882.
881
Ibid. at 4.
(
"[1] Use of Drugs: Drugs such as sodium pentothal and demero1 may be used with some
effectiveness. Significant policy issues must be resolved. [2] Use of Female Interrogators: One al-Qaida resistance
method is to pray during interrogations. Prayer is only allowed if the detainee is clean.' Having a woman rub
scented oil on the detainee's arms and face makes the detainee perceive that he is unclean and he cannot pray until
he cleans himself, which he is unable to do until he returns to his cell. The use of female interrogators to put oil on a
detainee does not exceed limits already established by DoD policy or the Geneva Conventions. [3] Sleep
Deprivation: This can be effective; however there are obvious policy considerations. Guidelines as to the use of
sleep deprivation would have to be established." List of interrogation techniques compiled by DIA at 4.
883
Proposed Detainee Interrogation Working Group Responsibilities (Initial) (undated) at 1; Proposed Agenda,
Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003).
884
113
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
21, 2003 on the effectiveness oftechniques that had been rescinded by the Secretary of Defense
earlier that month. 885 In his memo, MG Miller stated that "[t]he command must have the ability
to conduct interrogations using a wide variety oftechniques" and listed nine techniques as
"essential to mission success." Those nine included use of an isolation facility; interrogating the
detainee in an environment other than the standard interrogation room at Camp Delta such as
Camp X-Ray; varying levels of deprivation of light and auditory stimuli to include the use ofa
white room for up to three days; the use of up to 20-hour interrogations; the use of a hood during
transportation and movement; removal of all comfort items (including religious items); serving
of meals ready to eat (MREs) instead of hot rations; forced grooming, to include shaving of
facial hair and head; and the use of false documents and reports. 886
_
MG Miller's January 21, 2003 memo stated that he believed that those nine
techniques were lawful and stated:
These techniques are not intended to cause gratuitous, severe, physical pain or
suffering or prolonged mental harm, but are instead intended to induce
cooperation over a period of time by weakening the detainee's mental and
physical ability to resist. 887
_MG
Miller attached another memo to his January 21,2003 memo for General
Hill. That attached memo, also dated January 21, 2003 and entitled "Methods Employed X-Ray
Interrogation ofISN 63," bore the same title as a memo dated January 17,2003. (The earlier
memo is described in detail above). Despite describing the same events and being written just
days apart, the January 21, 2003 and the January 17,2003 memos contain substantive
differences.
_(
Several interrogation techniques that the January 17,2003 memo
identified as techniques used in the Khatani interrogation were omitted from the January 21,
2003 version. Among the techniques left out ofthe latter memo were "fhysical posturing,"
"search/strip search," and the presence of"K-9 military police" dogs. 88 In addition, the
description of certain techniques differed in the two versions ofthe memo. For example, in the
latter version, "denial of prayer" was removed and replaced with "postponement of prayer" and
88' Memo from MG Geoffrey Miller for Commander, u.s. Southern Command, Effectiveness ofthe Use ofCertain
Category n COWJter-Resistance Strategies (January 21,2003) (hereinafter "MG Miller memo, Effectiveness of
Certain Category II Strategies (January 21,2(03)").
886.MG Miller, Effectiveness ofCertain Category II Strategies (January 21,2003). Although MG Miller
identified only nine "essential" techniques on January 21,2003, a subsequent memo sent by the SOUfHCOM
Commander GEN Hill called all the Category II and the one Category ill technique (non-injurious physical contact
such as poking and pushing) that the Secretary had authorized in December "critical to maximizing our ability to
accomplish the mission, now and in the future." See Church Report at 135 and Section VIII D, infra.
887
888 Methods EmployedX-Ray Inte"ogation ISN 63. (January 17, 2003); Methods EmployedX-Ray Inte"ogation
ISN 63 (S) (January 23, 2003), attached to MG Milr;-'memo, Effectiveness ofCertain Category II Strategies
114
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
reference to the
was omitted.889
III CENTCOM sent the Working Group's request for a list oftechniques to CITF-180, in
Afghanistan. In response, LTC Robert Cotell, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA)
produced a memo on January 24, 2003 describing "current and past" interrogation techniques
used by CJTF-180 interrogators. 89o LTC Cotell's memo was sent to the Working Group and to
the Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense. 891
_ (
LTC Cotell's January 24,2003 memo stated that "[p]rior to their rescission,
CJTF-180 used selected techniques contained in SOlITHCOM's [Category] II and III
techniques. ,,892 He identified interrogation techniques used by CJTF-180, including up to 96
hours of isolation; the use of female interrogators to create "discomfort" and gain more
information; sleep adjustment, defined as "four hours of sleep every 24 hours, not necessarily
consecutive;" use of individual fears; removal of comfort items; use of safety positions;
isolation; deprivation of li~t and sound in living areas; the use of a hood during interrogation;
and mild physical contact. 3 Several ofthese techniques were similar to those approved by the
Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO in December 2002. CITF-180 had obtained a list ofthose
GTMO techniques prior to the time that LTC Cotell had drafted his January 24, 2003 memo. 894
_
(
The January 24, 2003 memo also recommended use of five additional
techniques, including "deprivation of clothing" to put detainees in a "shameful, uncomfortable
situation;" "food deprivation;" "sensory overload -loud music or temperature regulation;"
"controlled fear through the use of muzzled, trained, military working dogs;" and ''use of light
and noise deprivation,,895
(U) LTG John Abizaid, the Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command,
stated that the January 24, 2003 memorandum "was thoroughly reviewed" by the Working
Group. 896
889
Ibid.
Church Report at 1g"/; Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques
(January 24, 2003) at 1.
890
891US Central Command Action Processing Form, Approvalfor the Use ofCertain Inte"ogation Techniques in
CJTF-180's AOR (April 4, 2003); Memorandum from GEN John P. Abizaid to VADM Church, Responses to
Requestfor Informotionfrom VADM Church (August 6,2004).
892
Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1.
m Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 8.
The Church Report called the distinction between stress positions and safety positions at the Bagram Collection
Point "largely academic." Church Report at 200.
Secretary of Defense Approval ofC01mter-Resistance Techniques (December 2,2002); Memo from LTC Robert
Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 1.
894
89' Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24,2003) at I,
4-5, and 9.
Memorandum from GEN John Abizaid to VADM Church, Responses to Requestfor 1nformationfrom VADM
Church (August 6, 2004).
896
115
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
3.
(U) The Working Group also sought information on interrogation techniques from the
SERE community. On January 30, 2003, MAJ Nick Lovelace, an action officer at the Joint Staff
Directorate for Intelligence (J2), contacted JPRA on behalf ofthe Working GroUp.897
_
MAJ Lovelace called Mr. Joseph Witsch, the JPRA instructor who had previously
conducted training for
and had served as Team Chief at the September 2002
training for GTMO interrogators and behavioral science personnel at Fort Bragg. 898
_
MAJ Lovelace requested material from JPRA "identifYing interrogation
techniques and methodologies used by the SERE community.,,899 According to Mr. Witsch,
MAJ Lovelace had already received information from the Army SERE school, but he described
the information provided as "insufficient for his tasking.,,900
_ M r . Witsch advised MAJ Lovelace that information on interrogation techniques
had already been provided to the Department of Defense General Counsel and to the DIA and he
suggested that the Joint Staffaction officer coordinate with them. 901 MAJ Lovelace indicated,
however, that he was familiar with those materials but that he was looking for "more detail on
exact procedures, techniques, and constraints" than had already been provided. 902
_
MAJ Lovelace's request on behalf ofthe Working Group prompted a discussion
at JPRA about the advisability of providing "SERE school methodology in support ofthe
GWOT" to the Working Group and other organizations. 903 In an email to JPRA Chief of Staff
Daniel Baum~artner, Mr. Witsch expressed four "serious concerns" about sharing the requested
information. 904
_
(
First among his concerns was the potential effect that sharing SERE
school techniques could have on the training of American personnel. Mr. Witsch wrote:
Open source intel and media is flooded with what the USG/OGAs and DOD are
currently doing with [Designated Unlawful Combatants (DUCs)]. How long will
it take before we see some discussion on SERE school methods and techniques
being used to interrogate DUCs. I'll take bets that it will occur in days and weeks
897
Email from Joseph Witsch to Lt Col Dan Baumgartner (January 30, 2003).
898
Ibid.
The Joint Staff action officer stated that they needed the infonnation immediately, since the" blue ribbon panel'
organized by the AF General Counsel" intended to "work through the weekend to meet this immediate
requirement." Email from Joseph Witsch to Dan Baumgartner (January 30, 2003).
899
900
Ibid.
901
Ibid.
902
Ibid.
90J
Ibid.
904
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
versus months! It ain't healthy for our operators to expose how we prepare them
to deal with interrogation and captivity in open source media. 905
_
(
Second, Mr. Witsch stated that the SERE techniques violated national
and international laws. He wrote:
Our training is based on simulating our captors' passed [sic] performance while
tapering the physical/psychological severity and harm to our students. The
physical and psychological pressures we apply in training violate national and
international laws. We are only allowed to do these things based on permission
from DOD management and intense oversight by numerous organizations within
DOD. I hope someone is explaining this to all these folks asking for our
techniques and methodology! 906
_(
His third concern was that a lack of proper oversight could give rise to
significant drift, which, in tum, could pose a risk of investigation and exposure ofthe
organization. Mr. Witsch asked:
What do you think is more than likely to happen when one of these organizations
gets exposed and because of significant 'drift' and a lack of oversight they go
beyond what we do in the SERE schools? The first question will be 'Where did
you get your guidance?' Then we get investigated and exposed []. 907
_
(
Mr. Witsch's fourth concern was that JPRA would have no control over
how the information would be used. He asked:
What's been handed out in hard copy and electronically from [] us and the SERE
community to meet numerous requests from everybody? We use [sic] to have
some general idea when we were dealing with primarily the SERE community.
Now it's anybody's ~ess where the JTTP has gone and how it's being
incOq>orated and used. 9 8
_
I know this is cool stuff and may provide some utility when dealing with DUCs.
I'm not saying that we should totally remove ourselves from this endeavor. We
must get a handle on all these people seeking information on our stuff within the
USG and DOD and control the amount [of] exposure our SERE
community/programs are getting. This is getting out of control! ,909
905
Ibid.
906
Ibid.
907
Ibid.
908
Ibid.
909
Ibid.
117
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
Lt Col Baumgartner recalled that he managed to delay providing information to
the Working Group, but that JPRA later briefed The Judge Advocate General ofthe Air Force,
who was a member of the Working Group, on SERE techniques, including physical pressures. 910
B.
(U) At the initial meeting ofthe Working Group, in addition to a briefing from the DIA,
participants also received a briefing from the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC).911 Despite the Secretary's guidance 'that the Working Group assess the legal issues
relating to the interrogations of detainees, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, who knew that the
OLC "had already done some work" on the issues, re~uested that the OLC produce a legal
opinion to guide the Working Group's deliberations. 9 2
(U) In the early stages ofthe Working Group's deliberations, Working Group members
had set out to develop their own legal analysis and utilize that analysis in the evaluation of
interrogation techniques. 913 A draft ofthat analysis, dated January 25, 2003, was shared with the
DoD General Counsel's office and the OLC. 914
_
The draft reviewed U.S. obligations under international law and concluded that
"obligations under the Torture Convention ... apply to the interrogation of Operation Enduring
Freedom detainees ... ,,915 The draft analysis also included a review of articles ofthe UCMJ and
other U.S. legal standards that were potentially applicable to U.S. interrogators. For example,
the analysis found that unlawful force used against a detainee could constitute an offense under
Article 128 (assault) ofthe UCMJ, and stated that assault:
May be interpreted to include unreasonably offensive poking, slapping, hitting,
prodding, or pushing. Hooding not likely included if used for security reasons.
Offensive touching would also include more severe techniques (e.g., wet towels,
hand cuffing) if not inherent and necessary to custodial conduct. 916
_ T h e draft analysis also assessed the legality ofthe techniques that had been
requested for approval by GTMO in October 2002, including some ofthose that the Secretary of
Defense had approved for use at GTMO in December 2002. In its draft, the Working Group
910 Committee staff interview ofLt Col Dan Baumgartner (August 8,2007); See Section vm F, infra.
911 Church Report at 124; ProposedAgenda, Working Group Meeting (January 23, 2003).
912 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense for the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Detainee
Interrogations (January 15, 2003); Committee staff interview of William 1. Haynes IT (April 25, 2008) at 250;
Hearing on the Nomination of William James Haynes IT to be US. Circuit Judge for the Fourth Circuit, US. Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (July 11, 2006) at 14.
118
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
adopted the conclusion that Navy JAG Corps CDR Stephen Gallotta had reached in his January
9, 2003 memo, writing that:
Category III techniques that threaten death to the detainee or his family (#1) or
which create the misapprehension of suffocation (#3) would likely be judged to
constitute torture under the statute and customary international law. They reflect
conduct specifically defmed as torture in [18 U.S.C.] 2340 and recognized as
torture in international law. Category III, technique #4, mild, non-injurious
grabbing and poking, is an assault under the UCMJ. Absent lawful purpose, these
techniques may be per se unlawful.
Category II techniques [] could also, depending in their implementation, i.e.,
frequency of use, degree of pain inflicted, or combinations oftechniques, rise to a
level where they could be determined to be torture. Thus, additional analysis with
specific guidance for implementation is recommended. 917
_The
917
Ibid. at 20.
918
Ibid.
919
Ibid.
In comments to the Air Force General COWlSel Mary Walker about a March 6,2003 draft of the Working Group
report, the Navy TJAG RADM Michael Lohr encouraged the Working Group to incorporate a reference to the OLC
opinion into its report, noting that the draft report "contain[ed] large segments of DoJ work product, rather than
being 'informed' by DOl" Memo from RADM Michael Lohr to Mary Walker, Comments on the 6 March 2003
Detainee Interrogation Working Group Report (March 13, 2(02) at 1.
920
Mora, Statementfor the Record at 16; Hearing on the Nomination of William Haynes II to be u.s. Circuit Judge
for the Fourth Circuit, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 11, 2(06) at 14.
921
922
923
Ibid.
119
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
924
925
926
Ibid. at 165.
Mora, Statementfor the Record at 17. Other participants of the Working Group conftrmed that "in drafting the
subject report and recommendations, the legal opinions of the [OLC] were relied on almost exclusively." Memo
from Air Force Deputy JAG Jack Rives to Air Force General Counsel, Final Report and Recommendations ofthe
921
Working Group to Assess the LegaL Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation ofDetainees Held by
the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (February 5,2003).
928
Memorandum from John Yoo to William 1. Haynes II, Re: Military Interrogations ofAlien Unlawful
Combatants Held Outside the United States (March 14, 2003) at 34-47 (hereinafter "Yoo Memo (March 14,2003)").
929
Those canons included "the avoidance of constitutional difficulties, inapplicability of general criminal statutes to
the conduct of the military during war, inapplicability of general statutes to the sovereign, and the speciftc governs
the general." Yoo Memo (March 14, 2003) at 11-19.
930
Yoo Memo (March 14, 2003) at 11-19. Despite concluding that such statutes are inapplicable to the military
during the conduct of a war, the OLC memo nonetheless considered whether use of certain speciftc techniques by an
931
120
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) The OLC's conclusion was based, in part, on its analysis ofthe President's
Commander in Chief authority. In the First Bybee memo, the OLe had asserted that "any effort
by Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield detainees would violate the Constitution's
sole vesting of the Commander-in-Chiefauthority in the President.,,932 In keeping with that
finding, the March 14, 2003 fmal OLC memo held that the power to detain and interrogate
enemy combatants arose out ofthe President's constitutional authority as Commander in
Chief. 933 "In wartime," according to the memo, "it is for the president alone to decide what
methods to use to best prevail against the enemy.,,934
(U) In the March 14, 2003 final opinion, the OLC used its broad reading ofthe
Commander-in-Chiefauthority to conclude that "even if' federal criminal statutes "were
misconstrued to apply" to interrogations, the "Department of Justice could not enforce this law
or any ofthe other [applicable] criminal statutes.,,935 According to the OLC, "[e]ven if an
interrogation method arguably were to violate a criminal statute; the Justice Department could
not bring alrosecution because the statute would be unconstitutional as applied in this
context.,,93
(U) The First Bybee memo and the March 14,2003 final OLe memo were withdrawn in
June 2004 and December 2003, respectively.937 According to Assistant Attorney General for
OLe Jack Goldsmith, the memos were "legally flawed, tendentious in substance and tone, and
,,938
overbroad ...
(U) The Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora called the OLC memo relied on by the
Working Group in 2003 "profoundly in error" and a "travesty ofthe applicable law.,,939
interrogator would constitute an offense under those laws. For example, the OLC memo considered whether
slapping (or attempting to slap) a detainee would constitute assault or run afoul of U.S. constitutional standards. See
Y00 Memo (March 14, 2(03) at 25, 28, 62, 68.
According to Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith, who withdrew both the
First Bybee memo and the March 14,2003 fInal OLC memo, "this extreme conclusion has no foundation in prior
OLC opinions, or injudicial decisions, or in any other source of law." Goldsmith continued: "And the conclusion's
signifIcance sweeps far beyond the interrogation opinion or the torture statute. It implies that many other federal
laws that limit interrogation-anti-assault laws, the 1996 War Crimes Act, and the Uniform Code of MilitaJy
Justice-are also unconstitutional, a conclusion that would have surprised the many prior presidents who signed or
ratifIed those laws, or complied with them during wartime." The conclusion was even more "inappropriate,"
according to Goldsmith because "it rested on cursory and one-sided legal arguments that failed to consider
Congress's competing wartime constitutional authorities, or the many Supreme Court decisions potentially in
tension with the conclusion." Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 148-149.
932
933
934
Ibid. at 5.
m Ibid. at 18.
936
Ibid.
Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 159; In December 2003, Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith
advised the Department of Defense General Counsel William 1. Haynes not to rely on the March 14, 2003 fInal OLC
memo. Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4,2008).
937
938
939
Mora, Statementfor the Record at 17; SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008).
121
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
According to Mr. Mora, the "OLC memo proved a vastly more sophisticated version ofthe
Beaver Legal Brief, but it was a much more dangerous document because of the statutory
requirement that OLC opinions are binding provided much more weight to its virtually
equivalent conclusions.,,940 He stated that it became evident to those on the Working Group that
the "report being assembled would contain profound mistakes in its legal analysis, in large
measure because of its reliance on the flawed OLC Memo." 941 CAPT Dalton likewise said that
"to the extent that [the Working Group report] relied on the OLC memo, it did not include what I
considered to be a fair and complete legal analysis ofthe issues involved.,,942 She added that
being told what their le~al opinion had to be "severely constrained [the Working Group's] ability
to do an adequate job." 3 The report, she said, had been "geared toward a ewarticular
conclusion[]" and the legal analysis was written to support that conclusion.
C.
(U) When the Secretary of Defense directed the DoD General Counsel to set up the
Working Group, the Secretary instructed him to complete the work within 15 daYS.945 Although
that goal was not met, the Working Group produced several drafts during that time frame and
circulated a draft "Final Report" on February 4, 2003. 946
_
According to VADM Church's report, the General Counsel ofthe Department of
Defense, Jim Haynes, "participated in several meetings" from the "initiation ofthe Working
Group until the report was finalized" at which "the Working Group progress and
recommendations were discussed.,,947
_
Drafts oftheir report from this time period reflect the influence that SERE had on
the Working Group's consideration of interrogation techniques. In a draft ofthe Working Group
report, dated January 27, 2003, the report identified two categories of "interrogation techniques
proven to be effective" - (1) those techniques that were "currently used by trained interrogators
in accordance with U.S. Military Doctrine and policy" and (2) "additional techniques" deemed
"acceptable for use in accordance with ancillary military training processes such as SERE
schools.,,948
940 Mora, Statement/or the Record at 17. Legal COWlSel to the Joint Chiefs then-CAPT Jane Dalton also noted that
the March 14, 2003 fInal OLC opinion was "similar to the Beaver analysis" in "approaches and methodology."
Committee staff interview ofRADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2(08) at 171.
941
942
Committee staff interview ofRADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2(08) at 173.
943
Committee staff interview ofRADM Jane Dalton (April 10, 2(08) at 167.
944
Ibid. at 171.
94~ Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to Department of Defense General COWlSel William
947
Ibid.
948
122
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
The first category ofteclmiques, which the January 27, 2003 draft report
identified as those already in use and "proven to be effective," included techniques not listed in
Army Field Manual 34-52, such as isolation, hooding, use of prolonged interrogations, mild
physical contact, removal of clothing, forced grooming. dietary manipulation, use of phobias to
increase levels of stress, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, environmental manipulation,
sleep adjustment, prolonged standing, and deception. 949 In describing one of these techniques
deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli - the draft report noted (in an apparent reference to
SERE resistance training) that it was an "effective technique used in military training.,,95o
(
The second category oftechniques in the January 27, 2003 draft
Working Group report identified as "proven to be effective" were those in use "with ancillary
military training processes such as SERE schools.,,951 The draft report noted that this second
category ofteclmiques "should only be applied for detainees who are extremely resistant" to the
first category ofteclmiques and "who the interrogators strongly believe have vital
information.,,952 The teclmiques include use of stress positions, sleep deprivation, enforced
physical training. face slap/stomach slap, water immersion, walling, use of wet towel on face or
the "waterboard," use of smoke pipe, and use of drugs. 953 In describing these techniques, the
Working Group draft made repeated reference to use of the techniques at SERE schools - e.g.,
"selected stress positions are used in U.S. Military Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape
(SERE) schools," the "face slap/stomach slap ... is used in SERE training," "water immersion .
. . . is effectively used in SERE courses," ''use of a wet towel on face or the 'waterboard' ... is
the most severe technique used at U.S. Military SERE schools," ''use of smoke pipe ... is also
used at the SERE School.,,9S4
(
According to JPRA's operating instructions, the purpose of subjecting students
to physical pressures in SERE school is not to obtain information, but ''to project the student's
focus into the resistance scenario and realistically simulate conditions associated with captivity
and resistance efforts.,,955 The JPRA operating instructions state that ''the application of physical
pressure is necessary to produce the correct emotional and physiological projection a student
. fcor stress mocu
.
lanon
' . .. ,,956
requITes
_While the draft report described the two lists oftechniques as "proven to be
effectiv~d not discuss the purpose for which the techniques were proven effective.
_
As Working Group participants made revisions to the draft report, the list of
interrogation techniques in the report remained largely unchanged. A February 2, 2003 draft
949
Ibid. at 26-28.
9'0
Ibid. at 27.
951
Ibid. at 28.
952
Ibid.
9'3
Ibid.
9'4
Ibid.
9'5
JPRA, OL-FA JSSA Instructor Guide, Section 5.1 (September 21, 1994) (emphasis added)
9'6
Ibid.
123
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
report shows virtually the same list of interrogation techniques as the earlier draft. 957 However,
unlike the earlier draft, the February 2,2003 draft excluded almost all references to "SERE
schools" or to techniques used in "military training." 958 For example, the entire category of
techniques previously identified as techniques in use "with ancillary military training processes
such as SERE schools" were instead described in the February 2,2003 draft as techniques
"considered effective by interrogators and for which USSOUTHCOM and USCENTCOM have
requested approval.,,959
By the time the Working Group issued its draft "Final Report" on February 4,
2003, ~ made no reference to SERE schools or techniques used in "military training,,,96o
despite the fact that most ofthe SERE techniques remained in the report. 961
_
The February 4, 2003 draft "Final Report" recommended approval of36
interrogation techniques for use with unlawful combatants outside the United States. 962
(U) The report also listed, but did not recommend approval of, three additional
techniques that the Working Group said it lacked sufficient information to evaluate fully - use of
stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and water immersion/wetting down. 963
Two ofthe three techniques that the Working Group lacked enough information to make a
judgment on, i.e., stress positions and deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, were among
those recommended for approval by Mr. Haynes and approved by the Secretary of Defense two
months earlier, on December 2, 2002.
Ibid.
9~9 In the February 2, 2003 draft, the technique known as "deprivation of light and auditory stimuli," which was
identified in the earlier draft as an "effective technique used in military training" was moved into this category.
DoD Working Group draft report (January 27, 2003) at 28; DoD Working Group draft report (February 2,2003).
960
961
Ibid. at 60-64.
962
963
964
96~ _According to the Church Report, "The first 19 of the techniques were identical to the 17 specifically
enumerated in FM 34-52, except that the draft added one technique ('Mutt and Jeff,' which the draft described as 'a
124
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
use with certain limitations. 966 The 10 "exceptional" techniques included isolation, prolonged
interrogations, forced grooming, prolonged standing, sleep deprivation, physical training, face
slap/stomach slap, removal of clothing, increasing anxiety by use of aversions, and the
waterboard. 967
(U) Many ofthe 10 "exceptional" techniques in the report, were similar to techniques
identified in earlier versions ofthe report as either having originated in SERE school or among
those previously approved for use at GTMO and identified by Mr. Becker, the former GTMO
ICE Chief, in his list for the Working Group.
(U) Each of the 36 recommended techniques was included in a color-coded matrix or a
"stoplight" chart and designated as either "green," "yellow," or "red" to signify the Working
Group's assessment of legal and policy considerations. 968
966"
127.
The report stated that use of techniques listed in the report would be subject to conditions, i.e., "Limited
to specified interrogation centers; There is a good basis to believe that the detainee possesses critical intelligence;
The detainee is medically and operationally evaluated as suitable (considering all techniques in combination);
Interrogators are specifically trained for the technique(s); Subject to a special interrogation plan (including
reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, tennination criteria and the presence or
availability of qualified medical personnel); Appropriate supervision; and Appropriate specified senior level
approval for use with any specific detainee (after considering the foregoing and receiving legal advice)." Working
Group draft report (February 4, 2003) at 60-64, 70.
Church Report at 1 3 0 ; . Working Group Report at 60-64, 70 (February 4,2003) "Increasing anxiety by use
of aversions" replaced a technique referred to as "use of phobias to increase levels of stress" in previous versions of
the report. Despite their differing names, the techniques were described similarly and included use of dogs as
examples of the technique.
967
Green indicated "no significant constraint on use raised by the respective" law or policy under consideration,
assuming adequate procedural safeguards; Yellow indicated that the law or policy under consideration did "not
preclude use," but that there were "problematic aspects that cannot be eliminated by procedural safeguards; and
"Red" indicated a "major issue" in the law or policy under consideration "that cannot be eliminated." Working
Group draft report (February 4,2003).
968
969
Thid.
971"
970
The Working Group also rated the waterboard as yellow under the prohibition against torture in the
Torture Convention. Working Group draft report (February 4, 2003).
125
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
partner nation reviews. In addition, the report indicated that the technique could have an effect
on the treatment of captured U.S. forces, could potentially affect detainee prosecutions; was
"inconsistent with modern U.S. military perceptions in decency in dealing with prisoners" and
was "a significant departure from contemporary American military approach to the laws of
war.,,972 The February 4, 2003 Working Group Report gave the waterboard its only overall red
rating and recommended that the approval authority for the technique be "no lower than the
J:'
973
[Secretary ofDelense]."
(U) The Working Group's assessment ofthe techniques on the stoplight chart was
governed by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo. The result, according to then-CAPT
(now RADM) Dalton, was that drafts ofthe stoplight chart were "absolutely wrong legally.,,974
According to RADM Dalton:
[T]here was a column originally . . . in the stoplight chart, that was labeled
"Customary International Law." So one ofthe things we were supposed to assess
was whether or not the techniques were consistent with customary international
law.
The stoplight chart had all 36 techniques green under customary
international law because the OLC opinion and thus the Working Group report
maintained that customary international law did not impose any constraints on the
actions . . . That green column was absolutely wrong legally . . . it was
embarrassing to have it in there, and one of my comments to the report was ...
You need to delete that column entire?, because it's embarrassing to have it in
there and it's not reflective ofthe law. 97
(D) In addition to concerns raised by then-CAPT Dalton, almost immediately, the
February 4, 2003 draft final report and its recommended techniques generated objections from
top military lawyers. Within days of receiving the report and continuing over the next month,
the Deputy Judge Advocate General (JAG) ofthe Air Force Jack Rives, the Navy JAG Michael
Lohr, the Army JAG Thomas Romig, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant ofthe
Marine Corps Kevin SandkuWer submitted memoranda expressing serious concerns about the
report and the techniques it recommended.
(U) The senior military lawyers raised the following concerns:
(U) The OLC opinion, which was relied on almost exclusively by the Working
Group, was "notably silent" on the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the
military justice system applicable to U.S. personnel conducting interrogations. 976
974
973
Ibid. at 175-176.
976 Memo from Maj Gen Jack Rives to Mary Walker, Final Report and Recommendations ofthe Working Group to
Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation ofDetainees Held by the U.S. Armed
Forces in the War on Terrorism (February 5,2003) (hereinafter "Rives to Walker (February 5,2003)"); Memo from
Brig Gen Kevin Sandkuhler to Mary Walker, Working Group Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations
(February 27,2003) (hereinafter Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27,2(03)"); Memo from U.S. Navy Judge
126
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) US. servicemembers may be at risk for criminal prosecution or civil liability in
foreign domestic courts and international fora. 979
(U) Authorization ofthe exceptional techniques will negatively impact US. and
international public support and respect ofthe US. Armed Forces and could have a
negative impact on the public perception ofthe US. military.982
Advocate General RADM Michael Lohr to Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker, Wor/cing Group
Recommendations Relating to Interrogation ofDetainees (February 6,2003) (hereinafter "Lohr to Walker (February
6, 2003)'').
Rives to Walker (February 5,2003); Memo from Air Force Deputy Judge Advocate General MG Jack Rives to
Air Force General Counsel Mary Walker, Comments on Draft Reporl and Recommendations ofthe Wor/cing Group
to Assess the Lega~ Policy and Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation ofDetainees Held by the u.s. Armed
Forces in the War on Terrorism (February 6,2003) (hereinafter "Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003)").
9T1
Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27,
2003); Memo from MG Thomas Romig to Mary Walker, Draft Reporl andRecommendations ofthe Wor/cing Group
to Access I sicJ the Lega~ Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation ofDetainees Held by the U.S.
Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (March 3, 2003) (hereinafter "Romig to Walker (March 3, 2003)").
978
Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (Feb 27, 2003);
Romig to Walker (March 3, 2003).
9'l9
Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6, 2003); Lohr to Walker (February 6, 2003);
Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27, 2003).
980
981
Rives to Walker (February 5, 2003); Rives to Walker (February 6,2003); Sandkuhler to Walker (February 27,
2003).
982
98J
127
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) According to DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, the Secretary of Defense met with
participants of the Working Group and was aware of concerns reflected in the comments made
by the senior military lawyers. 984
(U) On March 6, 2003, the Working Group circulated another version of its report
entitled "Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy and Operational Considerations."
_
According to the Church Report, when circulated, the March 6, 2003 version was
considered final, but at some point, it was later re-characterized as a draft. 985 Over the objections
ofthe military lawyers, all 36 techniques from the February 4,2003 draft report remained a part
ofthe Working Group's recommendations and were included in the March 6, 2003 report. 986
The three techniques that the Working Group could not evaluate fully also remained in the
March 6, 2003 report, but were not recommended for approval. 987 By March 6, 2003, the
Working Group still "had not received adequate information" regarding these three techniques,
including two that had been approved by the Secretary in December 2002, to conduct a "legal or
policyanalysis.,,988
(U) Upon receiving the March 6, 2003 version, senior military lawyers continued to raise
concerns that the recommendations were based on a flawed OLC legal analysis. One JAG noted
that the draft report's introduction, which said it was '''informed' by [the] OLC opinion ...
create[d] an incorrect impression" since "[m]ost (if not all) working group members and TJAGs
disagree[d] with significant portions of [the] OLe opinion, but were forced to accept it.,,989 The
military lawyers also continued to express the view that the recommended techniques would
expose American soldiers to potential prosecution; would invite reciprocal treatment of captured
U.S. personnel; could affect the admissibility of detainee statements in criminal prosecutions,
including military commissions; and were not proven to result in obtaining reliable information
from those being interrogated. 990
D.
_
As the various Working Group drafts were being discussed, JTF-GTMO and
SOUTHCOM pressed for authority to use additional interrogation techniques at GTMO. On
February 12,2003, in advance ofa planned briefing by MG Miller to Deputy Secretary of
Defense Wolfowitz, LTC Beaver sent an email to the Department of Defense's Associate Deputy
984
986_
985
Church Report at 5.
"An additional caution was incorporated into the March 6, 2003 recommendations regarding technique
36~terboard: 'As a matter of policy, technique 36 should be used only in instances of extreme necessity.
Some members of the working group believed that it should not be used by U. S. Armed Forces personnel.'" Church
Report at 34; Working Group draft report (March 6, 2003) at 68-69.
987
988
Ibid.
989
990
128
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
General Counsel for International Affairs Eliana Davidson stating that "we must have
interrogation technique approval immediately and will speak to Mr. Wolfowitz about this. The
hallmark is isolation and up to 20 hour interrogation. Without that we can't be successful in the
community environment. We need commitment from the senior leadership to let us do this
mission. ,,991
_
Three days later, LTC Beaver followed up with the General Counsel's office,
stating that MG Miller "was informed by DEPSECDEF that we would have interrogation
techniques (isolation and up to 20 hours) approved by Wednesday [February 19,2003]. We
hope this happens.,,992
IIA
_
On March 21, 2003, GEN Hill sent a memorandum to Gen Myers regarding the
interrogation techniques that had been rescinded in January. While MG Miller's January 21,
2003 letter to General Hill had listed only nine Category II techniques as "essential," General
Hill's March 21, 2003 memo stated that both he and MG Miller felt that approval of all ofthe
previously authorized techniques (in Categories I, II and III) was "essential.,,998 General Hill
stated that"both Geoff Miller and I believe that we need as many appropriate tools as possible"
and called Category II and the one previously authorized Category III technique "critical to
maximizing our ability to accomplish the mission, now and in the future.,,999 The "critical"
techniques referred to by General Hill included stress positions, deprivation oflight and auditory
991
Email from LTC Diane Beaver to Eliana Davidson (February 12, 2003).
m Ibid.
993
Email from COL Terrence Farrell to LTC Diane Beaver (March 12, 2003).
994
Ibid.
99'
Ibid.
996
997
Email from Eliana Davidson to LTC Diane Beaver (March 13, 2003).
Memo from GEN Hill to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information on Interrogation Techniques (March
21,2003).
998
999
Ibid.
129
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
stimuli, removal of clothing, use of detainee phobias such as dogs, and the one Category III
technique the Secretary had authorized, which included grabbing, poking, and light pushing.
E.
_
Prior to issuing a final report on April 4, 2003, members ofthe Working Group
again sought infonnation from JPRA on SERE techniques. The JAG of the Air Force, Maj Gen
Thomas Fiscus, and two other military officers, visited JPRA and were briefed on SERE physical
pressures. IOOO At the briefing, JPRA described its previous support to "high value target"
interrogations, discussed the processes and procedures used in SERE training, and reviewed the
"application of physical pressures in an operational environment. ,,1001 JPRA Chief of Staff
Daniel Baumgartner told Maj Gen Fiscus that JPRA had previously provided information on
techniques used in SERE schools to DoD Deputy General Counsel Richard Shiffrin. 1oo2
F.
The Working Group Finalizes Its Report and the Secretary ofDefense Issues a
New Interrogation Policy For GTMO (U)
II On March 28, 2003, the Secretary of Defense met with a number of senior advisors
including Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, DoD General Counsel Jim Haynes, and Chairman
ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Richard Myers, to discuss the interrogation techniques being
considered by the Working Group. 1003 After that meeting, the Secretary decided to expressly
authorize 24 interrogation techniques, including five that were not listed in the Army Field
Manual (one ofthese five was classified as an "exceptional" technique). 1004
The Joint Chiefs of Staff met on March 31,2003, and were briefed about Secretary
Rumsfeld's decision. According to CAPT Dalton, the Legal Counsel to the Chairman ofthe
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the "Chiefs recognized that the approved strategies would not hamper the
combatant commander in the accomplishment of his mission, because the door was o~en to
request additional strategies on a case-by-case basis if needed in compelling cases.,,10 S
_
The last and final version ofthe Working Group report was issued on April 4,
2003. The report was similar to the March 6, 2003 version, except that it did not recommend
waterboarding or list the three other exceptional techniques that the Working Group could not
evaluate fully - stress positions, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, and water
1000
1001
1002
1003.
"According to the Secretary's daily schedule, the advisors at the meeting included Mr. Haynes, Gen Myers,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, Stephen
Cambone, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Marshall Billingslea, and CAPT Dalton." Church
Report at 136. By the time the Secretary met with his advisors, the Working Group had removed waterboarding
from consideration. Ibid. at 135-6.
1004
Ibid. at 136.
loo~ Memo from RADM Jane Dalton to VADM Church, Requestfor Information (August 10,2004) at 5.
130
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
immersion/wetting down. 1006 At the direction ofthe DoD Principal Deputy General Counsel
Daniel Dell'Orto, the April 4, 2003 report was not circulated to the participants of the Working
Group. 1007
(U) In fact, when it came to finalizing the report, some participants of the Working Group
who had raised objections to the report were excluded from the process and did not even know
that the report had been completed. 1008 According to Alberto Mora, the Navy General Counsel,
"Neither I, [the Navy Office ofthe General Counsel], nor - to my knowledge - anyone else in
the [Department of Navy] ever received a completed version ofthe Working Group report. It
was never circulated for clearance. Over time, I would come to assume that the report had never
been fmalized.,,1009 Mr. Mora said that he only learned ofthe final report nearly a year later
while watching a "televised congressional hearing on the Abu Ghraib scandal."lOlO
On April 5, 2003, Gen Myers forwarded a memo proposing that the Secretary of
process. 1011 In response, Marshall Billingslea, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations/ Low-Intensity Conflict sent a memo to the Secretary of Defense
raising concerns about the omission of certain techniques and recommending that the Secretary
approve all 35 techniques "endorsed by the Working GrOUp.,,1012 Mr. Billingslea's memo stated:
The current memo omits some interrogation techniques that are not controversial
from either a legal, or policy standpoint. For instance, blindfolding ('hooding'),
lightly touching a detainee, and threatening transfer to a 3rd country all seem
reasonable techniques to approve.
The draft memo also omits some techniques which the Working Group found to
be legally-permissible, but which should 'be done only with appropriate oversight.
While the Working Group felt that the Combatant Commander could approve
these measures, we recommend requiring that you be notified prior to their use.
The measures in question include using prolonged interrogations, prolonged
standing in non-stress positions, forced grooming, requiring physical exercise,
face/stomach slaps to cause surprise but not pain or injury, etc.
1006
Department of Defense, Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism:
Historica~ Policy, and Operational Considerations (April 4, 2003).
Assessment ofLega~
1007
SASC Hearing (JWle 17,2008) (Testimony of Alberto Mora); Military Justice and Detention Policy in the
Global War on Terrorism, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Personnel, 109lh Congo (July 14,
2005) (Testimony ofMG Thomas Romig).
1008
1009
1010
Ibid
lOll
IOU
Memo from Marshall Billingslea to Secretary Rumsfeld, Interrogation Methodsfor GTMO (April 10, 2003).
131
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
IX.
A.
liAs the final Working Group report was being generated, and on the heels of
SOUTHCOM and GTMO's press for additional interrogation authorities, a Commander's
inquiry was initiated at GTMO following allegations that, between March and April 2003,
interrogation personnel and military police had forced detainees to engage in physical
training. 1019
1013
Ibid.
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to GEN James T. Hill, Counter-Resistance
Techniques in the War on Terrorism (April 16, 2003) (hereinafter "Secretary Rumsfeld to GEN Hill (April 16,
1014
2003)").
101'
1016
Ibid
1017
1018
Memo from RADM Jane Dalton to VADM Church, Requestfor Information (August 10, 2004) at 5.
1019
Memo for Record from ACS Contractor, Possible Inappropriate Activities (undated).
132
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
II On May 2, 2003, MG Miller directed the Director ofthe Joint Intelligence Group
(JIG), John Antonitis, to "cease ofthe use of the 'Fear-Up Harsh' interrogation technique," and
said the inquiry had identified a need for re-training and corrective action to "ensure
[interrogators1 understand the approved interrogation techniques and practices and their
+~t
" 1d2S
'
Itmll410ns.
(U) A subsequent memorandum called "Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation
Techniques Used at GTMO" criticized the Commander's inquiry. 1026
II The memo said the inquiry was too limited and found that the disciplinary action "did
not address the command failures that allowed such activity to take place, despite apparent
command sanctionin ofthe incidents.,,1027 In fa the Commander's in ui failed to
Nor did the inquiry
review an allegation that, on April 17, 2003, a female GTMO interrogator sat on a detainee's lap
lOll
Ibid
1023
Ibid
1024
Ibid at 2.
ll)z~ Memo from MG Geoffre Miller for Commander USSOUTHCOM, Commander's Inquiry, Allegation of
Inhumane Treatment 0
(May 3, 2(03).
1026 Memo, Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques Used at GTMO (undated) (hereinafter
"Historic Look at Inappropriate Interrogation Techniques ").
1027 Ibid.
An April 2003 Memorandum for Record drafted by a contractor at GTMO alleged the technique was used on
several occasions, including in late March 2003 as well as on April 7, 2003, and April 17, 2003. Memo for Record
from ACS Contractor, Possible Inappropriate Activities (undated).
1028
133
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
"making sexual affiliated movements with her chest and pelvis while again speaking sexually
oriented sentences.,,1029
(U) The second incident involved a female military interrogator who wiped what she told
the detainee was menstrual blood on a detainee's face and forehead. l033
II
II
The same memo concluded that ''the incidents occurring during the Spring of 2003
signif[ied] a consistent problem at GTMO. ,,1035 It stated that it was "clear" that interrogators
"may use several ifnot all ofthe techniques that require SECDEF notification.,,1036 The memo
also concluded that "interpretation ofthe SECDEF approved techniques has resulted in
variations on how techniques are applied (i.e., is yelling, loud music and strobe lights
environmental manipulation?)" and "[d]espite these revelations by interrogators, the supervisory
chain of command reports that these techniques are not used.,,1037 An FBI Special Agent serving
at GTMO stated that ''there was a time period where the interrogations were obtrusive enough
that the interview rooms for an entire trailer were not available if one ofthese techniques were
t'l'
liZ ed .,,1038
bemgu
Other contemporaneous documents indicate that in addition to the use of strobe lights
and loud music, techniques such as forced shaving, sensory deprivation and even implied threats
1029
Ibid
1030
1031
Ibid
1032 Ibid.
1033
Ibid
1034
Ibid.
103~
Ibid
1036 Ibid
1037
Ibid. at 3.
1038
134
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
of death were either used or planned for use in specific ITF-GTMO interrogations even after MG
B.
(U) Despite their repeated objections, law enforcement had been unable to stop ITF
GTMO from proceeding with its aggressive interrogation of Mohammed al Khatani in November
2002. An FBI Special Agent told the Committee that law enforcement believed at the time that
the Khatani interrogation would defme the conduct of future interrogations at GTMO. 1039
Documents relating to ITF-GTMO's plans for interrogating other high value GTMO detainees
substantiated the belief of the FBI Special Agent
1.
_
A memo dated on January 16, 2003 - the day after the Secretary of Defense
rescinded interrogation techniques he had previously authorized for GTMO - described a plan
for the interrogation ofMohamadou Walid Slahi. While Slahi's interrogation does not appear to
have begun until July 2003, the January 16,2003 memo described specific techniques ITF
GTMO intended to use in his interrogation, many of which mirrored those used in the Khatani
interrogation. For example, the memo stated that interrogations would be conducted for up to 20
hours per day on Slahi, just as they had been for Khatani. 1040 The memo said that interrogators
could pour water on Slahi's head to "enforce control" and "keep [him] awake.,,1041 Interrogators
had also poured water over Khatani's head as a "method of asserting control.,,1042
The January 16,2003 memo stated that "K-9 dogs can be present and made
to bark to agitate [Slahi].,,1043 Similarly, military workingdogs had been used in Khatani's
interrogation ''to agitate the detainee and provide shock value."1044 The presence of dogs in the
Slahi memo is notable as MG Miller said that, months earlier, he had "rejected [using dogs in
interrogations] as an acceptable technique" and that dogs "were not to be used during active
interrogation" 1045
The January 16, 2003 memo also described techniques directed at breaking
down Slahi's ego, including ridiculing him, making him wear a mask and signs labeling him a
"liar," a "coward," or a "dog."1046 The memo stated that interrogators would also instruct Slahi
1039
1040 Memo, Methods and Approaches to Employ (U): Special Interrogation Operation ofISN 7 6 0 _
(January 16, 2003) (hereinafter "Interrogation ofISN 760 (January 16, 2(03)'').
1041
1041
1043
1044
Ibid.
135
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
to bark and perfmm dog tricks "to reduce the detainee's ego and establish control."1047 Khatani
had also been forced to wear a dog collar and perform dog tricks, and interrogators had placed
signs on him such as "liar," "coward," and "dog.,,1048
The January 16,2003 memo described shaving Slahi's head and beard,
making him wear a burka, and subjecting him to strip search ''to reduce [his] ego by assaulting
his modesty.,,1049 Likewise, ITF-GTMO interrogators had shaved Khatani's head and beard and
he had also been strip searched. 1050
The memo stated that Slahi would be denied the opportunity to pray and
described techniques to exploit "religious taboos," such as using a female interrogator in "close
physical contact."IOSl The memo also stated that interrogators would play music to "stress
[Slahi] because he believes music is forbidden" and that light in Slahi's interrogation booth
would be filtered "with red plastic to produce a stressful environment.,,10S2 Khatani had also
been denied ~rayer and a female interrogator touched him during his interrogation to increase his
stress level." 053 Khatani too had been isolated, a red filter was placed over the light in his
interrogation booth, and music was used in his interrogation to create stress. 1054
_
The January 16, 2003 memo indicated that ITF-GTMO interrogators planned
to make use ofa completely white room during Slahi's interrogation "to reduce outside stimuli
and present an austere environment," that interrogators would use a strobe light in his
interrogation booth to "disorient [Slahi] and add to [his] stress level," and that a hood would be
placed on Slahi in the booth" ''to isolate him and increase feelings of futility. ,,1055
2.
_
In July 2003, six months after the above-described memo was produced and
three months after the Secretary'issued new interrogation authorities for GTMO, MG Miller
submitted to SOUTHCOM a formal request for approval ofa special interrogation plan for
Slahi. IOS6 In seeming contradiction to his May 2, 2003 order that the fear up harsh approach not
be used in interrogations, the plan included many of the techniques described in the January 16,
1047 Interrogation
1048 Methods
EmployedX-Ray Interrogation ISN 63. (January 17, 2003); Interrogation ofISN 760 (January 16,
2003).
1049
1050 Methods
1051
1052
1053 Methods
1054
Ibid
1055
Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Joint Interrogation Group, ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July I, 2003)
(hereinafter "ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1, 2(03)").
1056
136
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
2003 memo and stated that ''the single most important aspect ofthese techniques is the initial
shock ofthe treatment... [the] detainee will have the perception that his situation has changed
drastically and that life can still become worse than what he is experiencing. ,,1057
_
The first three to five days of interrogation were planned for Camp Delta. 1058 If
Slahi was not cooperative, the plan proposed that military police in full riot gear take him from
his cell, place him on a watercraft, and drive him around to make him think he had been taken
off ofthe island. In reality, Slahi would be taken to Camp Echo where the interrogation was to
continue. A memo describing that part of the plan said that military police working dogs would
be used during his movement to "assist developing the atmosphere that something major is
happening and add to the tension level ofthe detainee.,,1059
_
Interrogating Slahi at Camp Echo was intended to emotionall~and
psychologically weaken him through "drastic changes in his environment.,,1
Mirroring the
Khatani interrogation plan, the Slahi plan included efforts to "re~licate and exploit the
'Stockholm Syndrome' between detainee and his interrogators," 061 In his evaluation ofthe
Khatani plan more than seven months earlier, the NCIS psychologist assigned to the CITF, Dr.
Michael Gelles, had said that the idea of inducing the Stockholm syndrome implied that "the
subject feels that he is to be killed and the information provided may in fact be distorted.,,1062
_The
GTMO plan stated that, while in the interrogation room at Camp Echo,
Slahi would sit in a basic chair and "be shackled to the floor and left in the room for up to four
hours while sound is playing continually.,,1063 His time in the room was intended to "disorient
him and establish fear ofthe unknown" and emphasize to Slahi that '''the rules have changed'
and nobody knows he is there."I064 The practice of shackling him to the floor and subjecting
him to loud music was to be repeated over several days, interrupted by actual interrogations.
Slahi was to be permitted four hours of sleep every sixteen hours. 1065
_
The plan stated that an interrogation room would be "modified in such a way
as to reduce as much outside stimuli as possible. The doors will be sealed to a point that allows
no light to enter the room. The walls may be covered with white paint or paper to further
1m ISN 760 Inte"ogation Plan (July 1, 2003).
10'8
Ibid
10'9
Memo from LT Richard Zuley, Objective: Transport ISN 760from Camp Delta to Camp Echo (tmdated).
1060
1061
Ibid
1062
Memo from Michael Gelles, Psy.D., Review ofJI'F-GTMO Inte"ogation Plan Detainee 063 dtd November 21,
1064
Ibid
106' On April 12, 2003 MG Miller sent GEN Hill an email requesting that SOUTHCOM provide a defInition of sleep
deprivation. On Jtme 2, 2003, GEN Hill sent MG Miller a letter defIning sleep deprivation as "keeping a detainee
awake for more than 16 hours or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to
exceed four days in succession" MG Geoffrey Miller email to GEN James Hill (April 12, 2003).
137
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
eliminate objects the detainee may concentrate on. The room will contain an eyebolt in the floor
and speakers for sound.,,1066 The plan said that the "interrogation team will make detainee feel
psychologically uncomfortable, emotionally uncomfortable, assert superiority over detainee,
escalate stress, play loud music, and continue to condition detainee to menial tasks.,,1067
_On
II On July 24, 2003, Marshall Billingslea, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations / Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), forwarded a memo notifYing
the Secretary of Defense that JTF-GTMO intended to isolate Slahi and recommending that he
approve the use of "sleep deprivation" and "sound modulation at decibel levels not harmful to
hearing.,,1070 A handwritten note on the memo stated that "OGC concurs that this is legal. We
don't see any policy issues with these interrogation techniques. Recommend you authorize.,,1071
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approved the memo on July 28,2003 and
forwarded it to Secretary Rumsfeld, who added his approval on August 13, 2003. 1072
~ The Slahi plan stated that it would "not be implemented until approved by
higher authority." 073 Despite that statement, memoranda for the record suggest techniques for
which JTF-GTMO sought authority were used at least a month before the Secretary's written
approval.
3.
IISeveral memoranda for the record documenting Slahi's interrogation were written by
JTF-GTMO personnel in July and August 2003. These memoranda indicate that at least one
technique for which JTF-GTMO sought authority to use with Slahi, i.e., sound modulation, was
used before written authority was actually granted by the Secretary of Defense. 1074 The
1066 ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July I, 2003) at 8.
1067ISN 760 Interrogation Plan (July 1,2003).
1068. Memo from GEN James Hi~efense Donald Rumsfeld, Interrogation Plan (IP) for Detainee
Mohamadou Walid Slahi, ISN~ (July 18,2003).
1069 Ibid
1070
(July
24,2003).
1071
Ibid
1072
Ibid
1073
1074
138
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
memoranda also suggest the use of some techniques, such as forcing Slahi to stand for prolonged
periods, for which no re~uest for authority from SOUTHCOM or OSD appears to have been
made by ITF_GTMO. 107 In addition, while MG Miller had, more than two months earlier, said
that interrogators were not to use the fear up harsh approach, the memoranda indicate that
increasing Slahi's level offear was an integral part of his interrogation and that one interrogator
even implied to Slahi that he could be tortured or killed.
III The memoranda indicate that, on several occasions from July 8 through July 17, Slahi
was interrogated by a masked interrogator called "Mr. x." On July 8, 2003 Slahi was
interrogated by Mr. X and was "exposed to variable lighting patterns and rock music, to the tune
of Drowning Pool's 'Let the Bodies Hit [the] Floor'. ,,1076 On July 10, 2003 Slahi was placed in
an interrogation room handcuffed and standing while the air conditioning was turned off until the
room became "quite warm.,,1077 The next day, Slahi was brought into the interrogation booth
and again remained standing and handcuffed while the air conditioning was again turned off. 1078
After allowing Slahi to sit, the interrogator later ''took [Slahi's] chair and left him standing for
several hours." 1079 According to the memo, Slahi was ''visibly uncomfortable and showed signs
of fatigue. lbis was 401 day of long duration interrogations.,,1080
(U) On July 17, 2003, the masked interrogator told Slahi about a dream he had had where
he saw "four detainees that were chained together at the feet. They dug a hole that was six feet
long, six feet deep, and four feet wide. Then he observed the detainees throw a plain, unpainted,
pine casket with the number 760 [Slahi's internment serial number (lSN)] painted on it in orange
on the ground.,,1081
_
On August 2, 2003 an interrogator told Slahi ''to use his imagination and think up
the worst possible thing that could happen to him" and asked him "what scares him more than
anything else.,,1082
(U) That same day, the interrogator told Slahi that to ''use his imagination to think up the
worst possible scenario he could end up in.,,1083 The interrogator told Slahi that "beatings and
physical pain are not the worst thing in the world. After all being beaten for a while, humans
tend to disconnect the mind from the body and make it through. However, there are worse things
-than physical pain.,,1084 The interrogator told Slahi that he would ''very soon disappear down a
G1MO-0598~OUH.AU4DOO
107'
1076
1077
1078
111'79
1080
Ibid.
1081
1082
1083
1084
Page 222139
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
very dark hole. His very existence will become erased ... no one will know what happened to
him and, eventually, no one will care.,,1085
(U) At one point in his interrogation, Slahi was also shown a fictitious letter that had been
drafted by the Interrogation Team Chief stating that his mother had been detained, would be
interrogated, and if she were uncooperative she might be transferred to GTMO. 1086 The letter
pointed out that she would be the only female detained at '"this previously all-male prison
environment.,,1087
~on August 7, 2003, Slahi informed an interrogator that he had made a decision to
cooperate. 088 After questioning Slahi, his interrogator "congratulated [him] on his decision to
tell the whole truth.,,1089
4.
II Five days after interrogators congratulated Slahi for his decision to '"tell the whole
truth," the Secretary of Defense approved ITF-GTMO's Special Interrogation Plan.
Notwithstanding Slahi's apparent decision on August 7,2003 to cooperate with interrogators, an
August 21, 2003 email described preparations made to implement the Special Interrogation
Plan. 109o The email described sealing Slahi's cell at Camp Echo to "prevent light from shining"
in and covering the entire exterior of his cell with tarp to "prevent him from making visual
contact with guards. ,,1091
_
2003 indicated that Slahi "continue[d] to be cooperative.,,1092 Despite that apparent cooperation,
those same weekly reports stated that that the interrogations were continuing in accordance with
the approved interrogation plan. A contemporaneous document suggested that the interrogation
may have begun affecting Slahi's mental state. 1093
_An
lOS'
Ibid
1086
DoJ IG report.
1087 Ibid
1088
1089
Ibid.
1090
Email from JTF-G1MO IS2 to LT Richard Zuley and Capt Sean Wilson (August 21, 2003).
1091
Ibid
1092
JTF-G1MO Weekly Thematic Focus: September 29-0ctober 5,2003 and October 6-12 2003.
1093 JTF-G1MO Weekly Thematic Focus: September 29-0ctober 5,2003; October 6-12 2003; October 20-26, 2003;
and November 3-9. 2003.
140
Page 223
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
human interaction etc???? Seems a little creepy."I094 LTC Zierhoffer responded "sensory
deprivation can cause hallucinations, usually visual rather than auditory, but you never know ...
In the dark you create things out of what little you have ...,,1095
.
5.
liThe view that the use ofthe aggressive techniques could affect Slahi's potential
prosecution turned out to be accurate. LtCol Stuart Couch, a military prosecutor assigned to the
Slahi case wrote in March 2004 that "prosecutors in our office are very concerned about the
allegations of detainee abuse at GTMO and Afghanistan, and we have individually taken steps to
address this issue. The techniques employed by the intelligence community in obtaining
information is a policy decision that obviously affects our prosecution efforts, yet we are
powerless to influence such activities."lloo After becoming aware ofinterrogations techniques to
which Slahi had been subject, LtCol Couch refused to participate in the prosecution. HOI
6.
1094
Email from JTF-GTMO Interrogator to LTC Diane Zierhoffer (October 17, 2003).
109'
Ibid
1096
1097 Ibid
1098 Ibid
Memo from LtCol Stuart Couch to Brigadier General Scott Black, Office o/Military Commissions Prosecution
Operational Assessment (March 18, 2004).
1100
1101
Page 224141
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Wolfowitz. 1102 MG Miller said that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was interested in the reports
and his office would occasionally call GTMO to inquire about particular detainees.
On July 13,2003, the GTMO Conunander sent an email, accompanied by his
_
Weekly Update rep~t GTMO had "finalized_ plans." 11 03 According to the
email, the objective,,-was to "fracture_detainee resistance to cooperation and to
induce detainees to be forthcoming during interrogations."ll04 The email stated that the U.S.
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Psychological Applications Directorate Chief
LTC Morgan Banks, who had hosted the JPR~ for GTMO interrogation personnel at
Fort Bragg in September 2002, "conducted a _ _ assessment visit" and had provided
"very valuable insights."llos The email stated that LTC Banks planned to return for a "follow
. . m
. 60 days. ,,1106
up VISit
_
(
In November 2003, several months after
Miller submitted two requests for authority to use sound modulation in interrogations
suggesting that MG Miller felt he needed authorization to use that
technique in interrogations. 1108 The Committee is not aware, however, of a similar request for
authority to use strobe lights, loud music, and 15 hour interrogations in connection with_
According to the Church report, some interrogators considered strobe lights and loud music
a form of environmental manipulation which had been authorized by the Secretary of Defense in
~G Miller's written requests for authority to use sound modulation in the
_
interrogations are at odds with that understanding.
1102
1100
1104
Ibid
1105
Ibid
1106
Ibid
142
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
7.
(D) In October 2003, with the Slahi Special Interrogation Plan underway, the Criminal
Investigative Task Force again issued guidance to its agents to stand clear of interrogations using
aggressive techniques. The guidance mirrored that issued by CITF in December 2002, stating
that "detainees will be treated humanely" and that "physical torture, corporal punishment and
mental torture are not acceptable interrogation tactics and are not allowed under any
circumstances.,,1l10 The October 2003 guidance stated:
[CITF personnel will] not participate in any interrogation that violates this policy.
When CITF personnel are conducting a joint interrogation with another U.S.
government organization, and a member of that other organization employs
tactics that are, or appear to the investigator to be, inhumane or cruel and unusual,
the CITF personnel will immediately disengage from the interrogation, report the
incident to their CITF chain of command, and document the incident in a
memorandum for record. 1111
8.
_
On November 13, 2003, MG Miller sent two memoranda to GEN Hill at
SOUfHCOM requesting approval of special interrogation plans for detainees
_
1112 Consistent with the Secretary of Defense's April authorization, MG Miller
notified GEN Hill of ITF-GTMO's intent to isolate the detainees. In addition, MG Miller
requested approval to conduct interrogations up to 16 hours and use various types of sound. The
plans also implied the use of other techniques, such as sensory deprivation, that were not
authorized by the Secretary in April. Both memos indicated that the techniques in the plans had
been previously used in the Slahi interrogation. In many ways, the techniques proposed in the
two new special interrogation plans mirrored techniques used in both the Slahi and Khatani
interrogations.
a.
IllO
DoD CITF', Memo for All Personnel Assigned to the DoD Criminal Investigative Task Force, Inte"ogation
Ibid.
,. MG Miller, Requestfor Approval ofIP for ISN
at 2.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
b.
1114
Ibid at 4.
1115
Ibid.
1116
Ibid at 2.
1117
Ibid at 5.
1118
Ibid at 6.
1119
Ibid. at 7.
1120
Ibid at 11.
1121
at 2.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
c.
_
On November 19,2003, General Hill sent the
interrogation plans to the Secretary of Defense. 1130 In memoranda accompanying the plans,
1122
Ibid at 8.
1123
Ibid. at 1.
1124
Ibid. at 7.
112~
Ibid.
1126
Ibid. at 9.
1127
Ibid. at 10.
1128
Ibid. at 9.
1129
Ibid. at 10.
145
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
II
Tom O'Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations / Low
Intensity Conflict (SOLIC), attached a cover memo to the SOUTHCOM Commander's request,
recommending to the Secretary of Defense that he approve the plans. 1132 A coordination sheet
attached to that memo indicated that Daniel Dell '0110, the Principal Deputy DoD General
Counsel, had approved the plan on December 31, 2003 and Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen Myers had approved the plan on January 2, 2004. The date ofthe Chairman's approval (and
possibly that ofthe Deputy DoD General Counsel) occurred after the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLe) at the Department of Justice withdrew its March 14, 2003 legal memo upon which DoD
had been relying for interrogation techniques. 1133 The OLC's notification to DoD General
Counsel Jim Haynes ofthat withdrawal occurred between December 25 and December 31,
2003. 1134 Mr. Haynes told the Committee that "the fact that the Department didn't have that
opinion to rely on... didn't mean that Mr. Dell'Orto or somebody ... could not [have] concluded
that something was legal in the absence ofthat memo. ,,1135
x.
DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Withdraws March 14,2003 Legal Opinion Governing
DoD Interrogations (U)
(U) In the final week of2003, the OLC notified the Department of Defense that the
March 14, 2003 OLC legal opinion, upon which DoD had been relying for interrogations, was
being withdrawn. 1136 According to the then-Assistant Attorney General for the OLe Jack
Goldsmith, the March 2003 memo was one ofa "short stack" of OLe opinions that his OLe
colleague Patrick Philbin had identified, shortly after Mr. Goldsmith arrived at DoJ, as
problematic and possibly containing "serious errors."ll37 Also included in that "short stack"
were the two August 1,2002 "Bybee" memos - the "First Bybee" memo, which presented
OLe's narrow interpretation of what constituted torture under U.S. law and the "Second Bybee"
memo, which included OLC's "advice to the CIA regarding potential interrogation methods. ,,1138
1131
Ibid .
1134 Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith stated that he called the DoD General Counsel between Christmas and
113~ Committee staff interview of William 1. Haynes II (April 25, 2008) at 295.
1136
1137
1138 Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February 4, 2008); Sixth Decl. of Marilyn A. Dom, ~ 56,
American CiviLLiberties Union, et aL v. Department ofDefense, et aL, No. 04~Civ. 4151 (January 5,2007).
146
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) After reviewing the opinions, Mr. Goldsmith identified two that he ultimately
rescinded, the March 14,2003 "oo Memo" (withdrawn in December 2003) and the August 1,
2002 "First Bybee" memo (withdrawn in June 2004).1139
(U) Mr. Goldsmith told the Committee that he called Jim Haynes in December 2003 and
told him the March 14,2003 OLC opinion was under review and could not be relied on by the
Department. 1140 That opinion had been presented to the Working Group as the controlling
authority for all questions of domestic and international law and was the legal foundation for the
Secretary's April 2003 authorization oftechniques for GTMO. Mr. Goldsmith told the
Committee that he informed Mr. Haynes in December 2003 that he had detennined that only 20
ofthe 24 techniques authorized b(' Secretary Rumsfeld were lawful, and that the remaining four
techniques were under review. 114 Mr. Goldsmith also advised Mr. Haynes in December that the
Department should come back to OLC for additional legal guidance before approving any
technique not among those 24 specifically identified in the Secretary's April 2003 memo. 1142
Mr. Goldsmith told the Committee that Mr. Haynes did not inquire about the use of additional
techniques during his tenure at OLC, which ended in June 2004. 1143
II
Notwithstanding the late December direction from the head of the OLC that DoD
could not rely on the March 14 2003 OLe memo a March 26 2004 memorandum for the record
su e ed that
1139 Assistant Attorney General Goldsmith said that his personal standard for rescinding prior OLC memos was to
rescind opinions only after he determined they were legally flawed and he could affumatively provide guidance on
"precisely what interrogation practices were legally available under a proper analysis." Goldsmith reiterated the
second part of this standard when asked ifhe considered withdrawing the third "problematic" opinion. known as the
"Second Bybee" memo. He told the Committee that he had not completed his analysis of the Second Bybee memo
by the time he submitted his resignation and left the Department. Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith
(February 4,2008); Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency at 152.
1140 In his book, Goldsmith stated that he placed the call between Christmas and New Years 2003. Goldsmith, The
Terror Presidency at 153.
In his interview with Committee staff, Mr. Goldsmith said he eventually determined that all 24 were lawful.
That account differs slightly from Goldsmith's account in his book, in which he said that he told Mr. Haynes in
December that all 24 techniques were lawful. Ibid. at 154; Committee staff interview of Jack Goldsmith (February
4,2008).
1141
1142
1143
Ibid.
1144
1145
Memo for Record, Continuous Cell Transfer (Frequent Flyer Program) (March 26, 2004).
147
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III
Continuous cell transfer was discussed at least as early as August 2003. An August 3,
2003 email from GTMO's ICE Operations Officer described interrogating a detainee for 15
hours, allowing him 5 hours of uninterrupted rest in his cell and then moving the detainee to a
new cell every half hour until the 24 hour period expired whereby, according to the Operations
Officer the cycle would restart and "the fun begins again.,,1146
(U) According to an FBI agent who was on assignment to GTMO in fall 2003, the agent
received a briefing "that non cooperative detainees could be placed on a list for a specific
interrogation technique involving interruption of sleep pattern, called the 'frequent flyer
program.",1147 The agent stated that detainees were moved with all oftheir personal belongings
and that the duration ofthe program for detainees "seemed to depend on the cooperativeness of
the detainee.,,1148 In fact, an investigation by the Department of Justice Inspector General found
that "many FBI agents described a program of sleep disruption employed by the military as
designed to disorient detainees and thereby obtain their cooperation, which was known as the
'frequent flyer program.,,1149
(U) Keeping detainees awake except for a period of four-hours of uninterrupted sleep
using "Continuous cell transfer" or other means was not on the list of24 techniques OLC
advised the DoD General Counsel were permitted. The Committee is unaware of a request from
DoD to OLC for legal guidance on whether that technique comported with techniques on that list
of24 approved by the Secretary.
XI.
(U) Prior to that point, SMU personnel had observed interrogations conducted by
Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CITF-180), which had assumed control of U.S. and coalition
1146
Email from Maj. James Rogers to COL Jack Farr (August 3, 2003).
1147 FBI
1148
Electronic Communication from Administrative Services (SAAPU) to Inspection Division (July 15, 2004).
Ibid.
1130"
1149
Department of Defense, Interrogation Special Focus Team Report on Special Mission Unit Interrogation
Practices in Operation EndUring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (October 28, 2004) at 3 (hereinafter
"Church Special Focus Team Report"). As part of his investigation of detention operations and detainee
interrogation techniques, Vice Admiral Albert Church examined interrogation techniques used by SMU in the
USCENTCOM area of responsibility. VADM Church's main report, released in March 2005, did not discuss the
SMUs. Rather an Interrogation Special Focus Team, Wlder the auspices of VADM Church's review, issued a
separate, classified annex that discussed SMU interrogation practices in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Though
completed in October, 2004, the SMU annex was not provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee Wltil July
26,2006.
148
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
forces in Mghanistan at the end of May 2002. 1151 In addition to tactical questioning and
screening on the battlefield, CITF-180 personnel conducted more thorough interrogations at
detention facilities at Kandahar and Bagram. Between October 2001 and January 2003, the only
written guidance for interrogators operating in Mghanistan appears to have been Army Field
Manual 34-52. There were no Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), however, to guide the
implementation ofthe doctrine outlined in the Field Manual.
In fall 2002 the SMU conducted assessments of interrogation operations at
GTMO an
at Bagram Airfield. Those assessments
generated discussion about whether the SMU TF should conduct its own interrogations, separate
and apart from CITF-180, and which interrogation techniques should be permitted.
A.
_
(
From October 8 through October 10, 2002, an SMU TF assessment team
from Mghanistan visited ITF-170 at Guantanamo Bay. 1152 The visit occurred just as ITF-170
personnel at GTMO were finalizing a request, submitted to SOUTHCOM on October 11,2002,
to use interrogation techniques including stress positions, removal of clothing, deprivation of
light and auditory stimuli, hooding, use of detainee phobias such as dogs, exposure to cold
weather or water, and non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking and pushing. 1153
_(
A trip report prepared by the SMU TF assessment team, dated October
11, 2002, summarized the visit to GTMO. The report stated that the SMU TF team met with
members ofthe ITF-170 Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT).1154 Members of the
BSCT had recently attended training conducted by SERE instructors from JPRA and in the week
prior to the SMU TFteam's visit, two ofthem had written the first draft ofGTMO's request for
new interrogation authorities. 1155
_
(
According to the SMU TF assessment team's trip report, GTMO
"interrogation team psychologists" discussed interrogation approaches, including use of
"religious oriented superstitions, varied schedules, shame, various disruptions of daily routines,
and using ethnic interrogators.,,1156 The SMU team's trip report also suggested that the team
discussed with the ITF-170 Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief David Becker, the need
1152
Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002)
1153
1154
Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002).
1m USASOC ReqUirement to Provide Exploitation Instruction (September 24, 2002); BSCT, Counter-resistance
Strategies.
1156
Memo for the Record, GITMO Assessment Visit (October 11, 2002)
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
for interrogators to have "SERE instructors' training for legal aspects of prisoner handling" and
stated that a "JPRA [Mobile Training Team] appears to be the best option" for the training. 1157
_
anista
(
On October 26, 2002, after the SMU TF assessment team returned to
a ro osal was briefed to the SMU Commander. 1158
1H7 Ibid. LTC Beaver, the GTMO SJA, specifically recommended in her review of the October II, 2002 techniques
memo submitted by ITF-170 (GTMO) to SOUTHCOM, that "the interrogators be properly trained in the use of the
approved methods of interrogation," which included techniques similar to those used in SERE programs. LTe
Beaver, Legal Briefon Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies at 5.
lU8
Ibid at 4.
1161
Ibid at 5.
1162
116.1
1164
Ibid.
116'
Ibid. at 1-2.
1166
Ibid. at 2.
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
The October 27,2002 memo also outlined a rationale for the SMU to conduct
its own interrogations.
1167 The memo recommended the "imaginative but legal use
ofnon-lethal psychological techniques (i.e., battlefield noises/chaos, barking dogs, etc.)" as well
as stress techniques such as "sensory deprivation (hoods, silence, flex cuffs), sensory overload
(shouting, gun shots, white noise, machinery noise) and manipulation ofthe environment (hot,
cold, wet. windy, hard surfaces).,,1168
B.
Ibid. at 3.
U69.
1168
1170 Ibid. at 5. It is not clear from the slides whether any of the interrogation training was formal or informal
training. There is no indication that any of the SMU personnel available for the mission had any formal DoD
interrogation or debriefmg training.
1171.
Ibid.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
policy at Bagram, Army investigators concluded that the use of stress positions and sleep
deprivation combined with other mistreatment at the hands ofBagram personnel, caused or were
direct contributing factors in the two homicides. 1174 In the wake ofthe deaths of Habibullah and
Dilawar, CITF-180 and the SMU TF began developing written standard operating procedures
(SOPs) for interrogations.
_On
C.
November 1, 2002, a month before the two detainee deaths at Bagram, the
SMU TF Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) analyzed legal authorities and constraints relevant to SMU
TF personnel's participation in interrogations
1175 The
SJA's analysis is reflected in a memo which was provided to the Committee in redacted fonn.
Although the particular interrogation techniques in use
were redacted from the
version ofthe memo shared with the Committee, unredacted portions ofthat memo discuss the
SMU TF's concerns about those techniques. 1176
_Although the memo stated that while, in the author's opinion, "none ofthe
interrogation techniques used or observed by ~redacted] personnel constitutes 'torture,'" it also
stated that "another observer might disagree." 177 In addition, the memo stated that one ofthe
[redacted]. techniques "could rise to the level oftorture ifapplied in such a way and for such
a period of time that it rises to the level of severe physical pain or suffering. ,,1178 It also said that
"although the interrogation techniques may not constitute 'torture' they may rise to the level of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment proscribed by international law.,,1179
humane treatment of detainees and noted that although they might not apply to _ _
1174
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Bagram Branch Office Memo, CID Report ofInvestigation
1175 Memorandum for [Redacted], Legal Analysis of[Redacted] Personnel Participating in Interrogation _ _
Detention Facility [Redacted] (November 1, 2(02) at 1 (hereinafter "Personnel Participating in Interrogation at
Detention Facility").
1176
1177
Ibid at 4.
1178
Ibid. at 5.
1179
Ibid. at 2.
1180 Ibid.
1181
at 1.
Ibid. at 4.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
to the memo, '"these requirements arguably extend to military personnel even if 'detailed'
to_,1182
_
The memo warned that "we are at risk as we get more 'creative' and stray from
standard interrogation techniques and procedures taught at DoD and DA schools and detailed in
_
~une 18, 2004 memorandum to the Naval Inspector General,
_ s a i d that after the SMU TF SJA _ m m a n d e r of the SMU
TF "restricted personnel from further i n v o l v e m e n t _ except for information
sharing.,,1184
D.
_(
On January 10, 2003 the SMU Task Force Commander in Mghanistan
approved the fIrst interrogation standard operating procedure (SOP) for the SMU Task Force. 1185
In addition to identifYing approaches from the Army Field Manual 34-52, the SOP approved four
additional interrogation '"techniques" for use by SMU interrogators: isolation, multiple
interrogators, stress positions, and sleep deprivation. 1186 Three ofthe four techniques approved
by the SMU TF - isolation, stress positions, and multiple interrogators - were among those
authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO on December 2,2002. 1187 The fourth
technique - sleep deprivation (defmed by the SMU TF as no less than 4 hours sleep in a 24
hour period") - was, in effect, authorized by the Secretary on December' 2, 2002, when he
authorized the use of 20 hour interrogations. 1188
_(
According to a summary of his statement to Church Report investigators,
the SMU interrogator who drafted the SMU SOP reviewed GTMO's list of requested counter
resistance techniques prior to draftin~ the SOP and discussed incorporating some of those
techniques into the SMU's policy. 118 While the interrogator told Church Report investigators
that the interrogation techniques in use at GTMO "did not influence" the technique selection for
1182
Ibid.
1183
Ibid at 6.
1184 Memo from USSOCOM Staff Judge Advocate for the Naval Inspector General, Response to Questionsfor the
Record (U) (June 18, 2004).
1185
Two of those techniques - stress positions and sleep deprivation - were already in use by cm -180
interrogators prior to the approval of the SMU TF SOP. Church Special Focus Team Report and Committee staff
interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 8,2008).
1186
1187
l1SS Church Special Focus Team Report, SecretaIy of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques
(December 2, 2002).
Summary of Statement of SMU Member with Church Special Focus Team Report Investigator (September 15,
2004).
1189
153
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
the SMU SOP, an investigation completed by the Department of Defense Inspector General in
2006 concluded that the SMU SOP "was influenced by the counter-resistance memorandum that
the Secretary of Defense approved on December 2,2002.,,1190
In addition, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served in Afghanistan from
_
(
late November 2002 until early January 2003 Gust before the SMU TF SOP was issued) said that
the Secretary of Defense's December 2, 2002 authorization ftenerated discussion at the SMU TF
and influenced his thinking about interrogation techniques. 1 91 A legal review ofthe SMU TF's
January 10, 2003 interrogation SOP, conducted by the SMU Legal Advisor who took over that
job in early January, supports the DoD Inspector General's conclusion that the SOP was
influenced by the Secretary's December 2, 2002 authorization. 1192 In his legal review, the SMU
TF Legal Advisor referred to the techniques authorized by the Secretary of Defense for GTMO,
including stress positions, isolation, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, 20 hour
interrogations, removal of clothing, and the use of dogs to induce stress, and stated:
E.
_Following his January 15,2003 rescission of authority for GTMO to use the
interrogation techniques he had previously authorized in December 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld
1190
1191
1192 Memo from. Legal Advisor for COMITF-5, Legal Review o.Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT
SOP (January 11, 2(03) at 11 (hereinafter "Legal Review o~Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP
(January 11, 2003)").
1193
Legal Review o.Battlefield Interrogation Team & BIT SOP (January 11, 2003) at II.
11!14
Ibid
119' Ibid. at 16. The SMU TF Legal Advisor also stated presciently that, "we are at risk as we get more 'creative' and
stray from standard interrogation techniques and procedures taught at DoD and Service schools and detailed in
official interrogation manuals."
154
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
directed the establishment ofthe DoD Working Group on Interrogations. 1196 As discussed
above, the Working Group requested that the Joint Staff provide a list of interrogation techniques
"currently in effect or previously employed in CENTCOM and SOUfHCOM, techniques the
combatant commanders have found to be effective, and techniques the combatant commanders
desire to implement with accompanying rationale.,,1197 CENTCOM sent the Working Group's
request to CITF-180 and, in response, the CITF-180 Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) LTC
Robert Cotell produced a January 24, 2003 memo describing "current and past" interrogation
techniques used byCITF-180 interrogatorsy98 LTC Cotell's memo was sent to the Working
Group and to the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense. 1199
_
In his January 24, 2003 memo, LTC Cotell identified interrogation techniques
used by CITF-180, including up to 96 hours of isolation; the use of female interrogators to create
"discomfort" and gain more information; sleep adjustment, defmed as "four hours of sleep every
24 hours, not necessarily consecutive;" use of individual fears; removal of comfort items; use of
safety positions; isolation; deprivation oflirt and sound in living areas; the use of a hood during
interrogation; and mild physical contact. 120
_ L T C Cotell's January 24,2003 memo also recommended use of five additional
techniques, including "deprivation of clothing" to put detainees in a "shameful, uncomfortable
situation;" "food deprivation;" "sensory overload - loud music or temperature regulation;"
"controlled fear through the use of muzzled, trained, military working dogs;" and ''use of light
and noise deprivation,,1201
(U) LTC Cotell's memo included techniques that were among those Secretary Rumsfeld
had authorized for use at GTMO in December 2002. CITF-180 had obtained a list ofthose
techniques prior to LTC Cotell drafting his January 24,2003 memo. 1202
(U) ITF-GTMO's Interrogation Control Element (ICE) ChiefLt Col Ted Moss stated that
sometime in January 2003, CPT Carolyn Wood, the Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Intelligence
Section at the Bagram Collection Point asked ITF-GTMO about their "parameters" for
interrogation. 1203 According to Lt Col Moss, the GTMO Operations Officer faxed the Secretary
of Defense's December 2,2002 memo authorizing interrogation techniques to CITF-180. CPT
11!16 See section VITI.
1197.Memo, Proposed Detainee Inte"ogation Working Group Responsibilities (Initial) (undated) at I.
1198 Church Report at 197; Memorandum from CJTF-I 80-0PS LAW for CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation
Techniques (January 24, 2(03) at I (hereinafter "CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24, 2(03)").
1199tJs Central Command Action Processing Form, Approvalfor the Use ofCertain Interrogation Techniques in
CJTF-180 's AOR (April 4, 2003). Memo from Deputy Commander (Forward) U. S. Central Command, Responses
to Requestfor Information from VADM Church (August 6, 2004).
1200 CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at 8. The Church Report called the distinction between
stress positions and safety positions at the Bagram Collection Point "largely academic." Church Report at 200.
1201
Secretary of Defense Approval of Counter-Resistance Techniques (December 2, 2002); CJTF 180 Inte"ogation
Techniques (January 24, 2003).
1202
1203
155
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Wood said that, in early January, she saw a "secret power point presentation" containing the
techniques authorized for use at GTMO but did not recall where she had obtained the power
point presentation. 1204 Lt Col Moss did not know if JTF-GTMO had also sent CJTF-180 the
Secretary's letter that rescinded the use ofthose techniques. 1205
II In his January 24, 2003 memorandum, LTC Cotell, the CJTF-180 Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate acknowledged that the Secretary of Defense had rescinded authority to use similar
interrogation techniques at GTMO, stating that "[p]rior to their rescission, CJTF-180 used
selected techniques contained in SOUTHCOM's Cat II & III techniques ...,,1206
Notwithstanding that knowledge, however, the Church Report concluded that "in the absence of
any contrary guidance from CENTCOM, JCS, or OSD," CJTF-180 "considered the techniques in
their [January 24,2003] memo as available for use.,,1207 A summary of an interview with the
Deputy SJA at CENTCOM stated that ''the methodologies approved for GTMO... would appear
to me to be legal interrogation processes. [The Secretary of Defense] had approved them. The
General Counsel had approved them... I believe it is fair to say the procedures approved for
Guantanamo were legal for Mghanistan.,,1208
(U) In 2004, the Deputy Commander (Forward) U.S. Central Command LTG (later GEN)
John Abizaid stated that the January 24, 2003 memorandum had been '"thoroughly reviewed" by
the Working Group. 1209
III
Within three weeks ofthe January 24, 2003 memo, the SMU TF in Mghanistan
added the use of dogs to its interrogation policy.1210 Just over two months after the Secretary had
authorized dogs for use in interrogations at JTF-GTMO, the technique had become part of
interrogation SOPs for both the conventional forces and the SMU TF in Mghanistan.
F.
_
A week after the DoD Working Group on interrogations completed its report and
just five days before the Secretary issued his April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM, Deputy
Commander of U.S. Central Command Lt Gen Michael DeLong sent a memorandum to the Vice
Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, requesting assistance in obtaining the
Secretary of Defense's a~R~oval of interrogation techniques requested by CJTF-180 in their
January 24, 2003 memo.
1204 Army!G, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (August 15, 2006) at 15; Committee stafTinterview of CPT Carolyn
Wood (Febroary 11, 2008).
1205
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Ted Moss (October 17, 2(07).
1206
1207 Church Special Focus Team Report, see also Church Report at 6 for an unclassified accounting of the January
24, 2003 CJTF -180 memorandum for CENTCOM and the Joint Staff.
1208
Summary of Church Report interview of CENTCOM Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (July 15, 2004).
1209 Memorandum from Deputy Commander (Forward) u.s. Central Command, Responses toRequestfor
Informationfrom VADM Church (August 6, 2004).
1210
1211
Memo for the Vice Chairman Joint Chief of Staff (April 11, 2003).
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
.The request came shortly after CAPT Jane Dalton, Legal Counsel for the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed Barry Hammill, CENTCOM's Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA), that the Secretary of Defense's guidance on interrogation techniques would
likely apply only to GTMO. 1212 CAPT Dalton had been informed by DoD General Counsel Jim
Haynes that he would only concur in providing the techniques to SOUTHCOM, not to
CENTCOM. 1213 CAPT Dalton recalled that CENTCOM had requested techniques in their
January 24,2003 memo and told CENTCOM's lawyers that she could ask the Chairman to
engage with the Secretary of Defense on their behalf, ifthey were interested in using the
techniques authorized for GTMO. 1214
_
In his memorandum to Gen Pace, dated April 11, 2003, LTG DeLong said that
CENTCOM understood that "OSD may be close to making a decision that would be unfavorable
to the use ofthe requested interrogation techniques at the [Bagram Collection Point]" and was
concerned that disapproval ofthe techniques requested by CITF-180 would "lead to mission
degradation."l2lS The memo noted that the Commander of ITF-180, LTG McNeill, had
"specifically endorsed" the CITF-180 request to use aggressive techniques, including individual
fears, black out goggles, deprivation of light and sound, sleep adjustment, threat oftransfer to
another agency or country, and safety positions. 1216 Lt Gen DeLong requested the assistance of
VCJCS Gen Pace "in ensuring OSD approval" for the requested techniques. 1217
XII.
_
On March 20, 2003, a month before Lt Gen DeLong's request, the United
States and its coalition partners had launched Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). During the initial
stages ofOIF, conventional ground forces were directed by the Coalition Forces Land
Component Command (CFLCC). Combined Joint Task Force 7 CITF-7 r laced CFLCC in
the summer of 2003. As had been the case in Afghanistan,
deployed a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) to Iraq to
1218
(U) As previously described, for more than a year after the onset ofthe war in
Afghanistan, the only written guidance for interrogators appears to have been Army Field
Manual 34-52 (FM 34-52). When written policies were fmally established for interrogators in
Afghanistan in January 2003, those policies included some interrogation techniques that were not
listed in the Field Manual but had been previously authorized for use at Guantanamo Bay.
1212 Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to William Hammill, CAPT Shelley Young, William Gade (April 2, 2003).
1213 Memo from CAPT Jane Dalton to VADM Church, Requestfor Information (August 10,2004) at 5.
1214
Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to William Hammill, CAPT Shelley Young, William Gade (April 2, 2003).
1m Ibid.
1216 Ibid.
1217 Ibid
121S_Memorandum for A l I _ Personnel, Policy No. 1- Battlefield Interrogation Team and Facility
(BITIF) Policy (July 15, 2003) (hereinafter "BITIF Policy (July 15,2003)").
157
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) By comparison, the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task. Force (TF) in Iraq had an
interrogation policy in place before the beginning ofOIF. This policy was identical to the
February 2002 policy in use at the SMU Task Force in Mghanistan and reflected the influence of
techniques authorized for use at GTMO. 1219 The first policy to guide interrogations conducted
by conventional forces in Iraq, however, was not established until September 2003, more than
five months after that war began. That September 2003 policy was also influenced by techniques
authorized for use at GTMO.
A.
(U) According to a review completed by the DoD Inspector General in August 2006, the
SMU TF based its first interrogation policy on the SOP used by the SMU TF in Mghanistan.
The DoD Inspector General stated:
At the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the special mission unit forces
used a January 2003 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) which had been
developed for operations in Mghanistan. The Mghanistan SOP was influenced
by the counter-resistance memorandum that the Secretary of Defense approved on
December 2, 2002. . . and incorporated techniques designed for detainees who
were identified as 'unlawful combatants. 01223
_
Specifically, in February 2003, prior to the invasion of Iraq in March, the SMU
Task Force designated for operations in Iraq obtained a copy ofthe interrogation SOP in use by
the SMU personnel in Mghanistan, changed the letterhead, and adopted the SOP verbatim. 1224
This SOP, which included stress positions, sleep deprivation, and the use of dogs, governed
differences between the legal status of detainees held in Iraq and those in Afghanistan, the
SMU IF used the same interrogation approaches in both theaters. In addition, the cm -7 interrogation policies
included techniques that had been authorized for use at GTMO. By September 2003, interrogation approaches
initially authorized for a war in which the President had determined that the protections of the Geneva Conventions
did not apply, would be authorized for all U.S. forces in Iraq.
1219 Notwithstanding
1DO
1221
1m DoD IG, Interview ofMG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2oo5)~eml Officer Questionnaire for
1223
158
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
SMU interrogations in Ira~ from the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003 until it was
replaced later that year. 122
2.
_ I n May 2003, CAPT Dalton, Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, sent an email to CENTCOM lawyers stating that CIA General Counsel Scott Muller had
called Jim Haynes and told him that the techniques used by military interrogators at the SMU TF
facility in Iraq were "more aggressive" than techniques used by CIA to interrogate the same
detainees. 1226
_ T h e email requested that CENTCOM provide a list of interrogation techniques in
use at Ba am in Af: anistan and at the SMU Task Force facility in Iraq. On June 8, 2003, the
Legal Advisor provided CENTCOM with a list of
interrogation techniques in use by the SMU TF in Iraq and Afghanistan. 1227 lbat list included
the presence of military working dogs, stress positions (called comfort positions in the memo),
sleep management, loud music and light control, and 20 hour interrogations. 1228 _
Legal Advisor did not recall receiving any feedback about the list of interrogation techniques
submitted to CENTCOM. 1229 Despite the presence ofaggressive techniques in the JSOC Legal
Advisor's June 8 memo, on June 10,2003 CENTCOM Deputy Commander, LTG Delong, sent a
message to the Director ofthe Joint Staff LTG George Casey stating that "I have confmned that
the military interrogations at both [the SMU TF facility in Iraq] and Bagrarn are conducted using
doctrinally appropriate techniques in accordance with [Army Field Manual] 34-52 and SECDEF
direction.,,12!O
3.
.(
A July 15,2003 SMU interrogation SOP apgears to have been the fIrst
interrogation policy drafted specifIcally by the SMU TF in Iraq. 231 The list of interrogation
techniques in that SOP included "vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone);
122~ . .Although the Church Special Focus Team Report concluded that the SOP the SMU IF had acquired
from its sister unit in Afghanistan before the invasion of Iraq remained in effect for the SMU IF in Iraq until it was
replaced on October 25, 2003, the Committee was advised that an unsigned July 15, 2003 SOP was in effect for the
SMU IF in Iraq. Church Special Focus Team Report at 12. Committee staff interview of SMU Legal Advisor 1
(May 29,2008).
1226 Email from CAPT Jane Dalton to CAPT Shelley Young and Mr. William Hammill (April 2, 2003).
1227_Memo from the"Legal Advisor to Staff Judge Advocate, USCENTCOM, Joint Task Forces"
Battlefield Interrogation Techniques (June 8, 2003); Church Special Focus Team Report at 12.
1128~Memo
from the_Legal Advisor to Staff Judge Advocate, USCENTCOM, Joint Task Forces
159
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
presence of mili~ working dogs; 20-hour interrogations; isolation; and yelling, loud music,
and light control. 12 2
(U) While the SOP described some techniques as having a "foundation" in Army Field
Manual 34-52, Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General George Fay, who
conducted an investigation into the 205th MI Brigade at Abu Ghraib, described techniques in the
July 15, 2003 SMU SOP as "inconsistent with Army doctrine on detainee treatment or
.
.
. ,,1233
mterrogation tactics.
II(
The SMU Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence officer (J2X) who
served at the SMU facility told the Committee that a list of authorized interrogations approaches
1232 Ibid.
at 5.
BITIF Policy (July 15, 2(03) at 5; Review of Department of Defense Detention and Interrogation Operations,
Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Cong., S. Hrg. 108-868 (May 7, 11, 19; July 22; September 9,2004) at
1294.
1233
15, 2(03) at 3.
123!
1236
Ibid
1237
1238
The SMU IF Legal Advisor added that he would be surprised if the Committee found anything wi~
signature on it. Committee staff interview of SMU IF Legal Advisor 2 (March 12, 2008).
_
1239
(October 11,2(07).
Ibid
1240 Ibid
160
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
was posted on a wall at the SMU TF facility.1241 He specifically recalled stress positions, loud
music, light control, isolation, allowing a minimum amount of time for sleep, and military
working dogs as techniques authorized for use in interrogations. He stated that, although
military working dogs were not typically present at the SMU TF facility, he recalled making a
phone call to arrange for a military working dog to be present for an interrogation.
_(
While neither the January 10,2003 nor the July IS, 2003 SMU policies
included "removal of clothin " there is evidence that it was used as an interrogation technique at
the SMU TF.
who took command at the SMU TF in October 2003,
stated that when he arrived on site he "discovered that some ofthe detainees were not allowed
clothes" as an interrogation technique ''to gain control over the detainee.,,1242
stated that he did not know where the technique came from and that he was u~
stripping detainees even though "arguably, it was an effective technique.,,1243 _
said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004. 1244
_
However, the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the SMU T~ from
December 2003 until February 2004 stated that he attended a meeting called by _ _
_
in December 2003 or January 2004 to discuss the use of stripping prisoners as part of
interrogations. 1245 The Legal Advisor stated that stripping detainees gave him pause but said that
the technique was 'widespread" at that time. 1246 He said that he advised the Commander that, if
stripping were to be authorized, it should be limited to males only and that naked detainees
should not be paraded through the Task Force facility. The Le~thattwo SMU
TF behavioral scientists who also attended the meeting advised...__not to pennit
interrogators to strip detainees because of the implications of nudity in Arab culture. The Legal
Advisor stated that the Commander nevertheless decided at the meeting that the SMU TF would
continu~an interrogation techni~ Advisor stated that he
t h o u g h t _ m a y have said that he~ould have to approve its
use.
lIIsoth LTG Ricardo Sanchez, the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF
7), and COL Thomas Pappas, the Commander of the 20S th Military Intelligence Brigade (20S th
MI BDE) in Iraq told the Committee that they were unaware of what interrogation techniques
were authorized for use at the SMU TF facility.1247 Interrogators from the 20Sth MI BDE,
however, served at the SMU TF in support of interrogation operations there. In mid-June 2003,
at the request ofthe SMU TF, CJTF-7 assigned two Arabic-speaking interrogators to the
1141
1142
1143
Ibid
1144
Ibid
114'
1246
Ibid
1147 Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007); Committee staff interview of LTG
Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2(07).
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
SMU. 1248 COL Pappas recalled sending a second set of approximately two to four interrogators
from the 20S th MI BDE to the SMU TF around November 2003 to replace the 20S th MI BDE
personnel already serving at the SMU. 1249
(U) According to LTG Sanchez, CITF-7 would have retained UCMJ authority over the
interrogators and the interrogators would have been re~uired to conduct interrogations under the
CITF-7 authorities rather than those at the SMU TF. 12S COL Pappas, however, believed that
once his interrogators were sent to the SMU TF, they were that they were bound by the rules of
the SMU TF and not CITF-7 interrogation guidance. 12S1
4.
(U) The Iraq Survey Group was established in June 2003. According to its fIrSt
Commander MG Keith Dayton, the ISG's mission was to find weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) or evidence ofWMD and to provide support to the CIA special advisor on WMD. 12S2
MG Dayton reported directly to the CENTCOM Commander, GEN John Abizaid. As part of its
effort to gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG debriefed and interrogated high value detainees,
such as former members of Saddam Hussein's regime. Some of those detainees had been
captured and interrogated by the SMU TF and other operational units before being handed over
to the ISG. From the onset, ISG personnel had concerns about the SMU TF's treatment of
detainees.
(U) MG Dayton told the DoD Inspector General that "as our interrogators started getting
into the swing of things at Camp Crogper... some ofthe prisoners were alleging that they had
been roughed up" by the SMU T ~ o nstated that his Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) Chie~haddescribed the situation as "a disaster
waiting to happen" and believed that ISG needed to "slam some rules on this place right away to
basically ke~ ourselves from getting in trouble and make sure these people are treated
properly. ,,12
(U)
said that he first became aware of allegations of detainee mistreatment
while at the ISO facilities in the first week in June 2003. 12SS At that time, a Chief Warrant Officer
1148 USCENTCOM to CDR CJTF7, CFC FRAGO 09-278 Arabic Linguist Interrogator SupportlDTG 141543Z
ruN 03 (June 14, 2003).
Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2007). An interrogator with the haq Survey
Group (ISG) who visited the Task Force facilities regularly recalled that at some point after June 2003 he saw
interrogators from the 323 n1 MI BN (which was also providing interrogators to Abu Ghraib) whom he knew as he
had trained some of them in Kuwait prior to the war. Committee staff interview of CWO Brian Searcy (June 4,
2007).
1249
1150
1151
1151
DoD IG. Interview ofMG Keith Dayton (May 25,2(05) at 10, 12, 19,30,52.
1153
1154
Ibid. at 19.
1155
Statement of
(August 9, 2(04).
162
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
told him that a detainee she was interrogating ha~ical abuse during his capture and
subsequent interrogation by SMU TF personnel. _
stated that "by mid-June 2003. a
pattern ofreports ofabuse of prisoners (abuse primarily attributed to [the SMU TF] during their
capture and interrogation of [high value targets] and other detainees, was coming to me...,,1256
liMO Dayton described what he called a "notorious case" ofalleged detainee abuse, in
which a badly burned detainee was brought to the ISO facility.1257 MG Dayton stated that
according to the "special forces guys," the detainee had been captured on a very hot day. was
thrown down on the metal floor on the Humvee, and during the long drive back from the
operation, the detainee had "burned himself lying on the floor ofthe Humvee.,,125S
(U) Throughout the summer and autumn of 2003, ISO personnel continued to be
concerned about the treatment of detainees by SMU TF personnel.
stated that,
during the last week in June 2003, a British interrogator reported to him that a detainee who had
been captured and interrogated by the SMU TF 6'was beaten so severely, that he had the MPs at
Camp Cropper note the [detainee's] condition.,,1259 _
said he was told that the
detainee's "back was almost broken, his nose was probably broken, and he had two black eyes,
plus multiple contusions on his face.',1260
II According to the SMU TF Legal Advisor who served at the facility in July and
~ g one
12!6
Ibid. at 9.
1151
DoD 10, Interview orMO Keith Dayton (May 25, 2(05) at 20.
12J8
Ibid at 2I.
11511
Statement of
(August 9, 2004) at 9.
1uoIbid.
1~1 Committee staff int.crview of SMU TF Legal Advisor I (May 29, 2008).
1262
1161
Ibid. at 29.
163
Advanced Media Group
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
B.
(U) In May 2003, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) began preparations to take over
from CFLCC as the operational headquarters for all conventional ground units in the Iraqi
theater. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, stated that during summer 2003, the general
belief was that the number offorces in Iraq had to shrink as quickly as possible and that,
accordingly, CENTCOM and CFLCC reduced troop levels "very, very rapidly.,,1266 LTG
Sanchez said that the drawdown left insufficient personnel behind for CITF-7 to fulfill its
mission as well as inadequate command structures, planning capacities, and intelligence
capabilities. He said that during the handover "there were no intelligence structures that were
transferred to [CJTF-7] from CFLCC" and, as a result, the remaining intelligence structure did
not enable CITF-7 to address the requirements ofa Combined Joint Task Force operating at a
"strategic, operational, and tacticallevel.,,1267
(U) LTO Sanchez stated that by July 2003, it was evident "that CJTF-7 was engaged in a
counterinsurgency operation that would be difficult if not impossible to win without significant
1264
Email from
126'
Email from
1266
Army IG, Interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 26, 2004) at 2-3.
1267 Ibid.
at 10.
164
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
improvements in the intelligence capabilities of [CJTF_7].,,1268 LTG Sanchez said that he was
particularly concerned about his HUMINT capabilities, including the level of interrogation
expertise within CJTF-7, and that he "seriously questioned the training and experience of our
interrogators. 1269
(U) LTG Sanchez said he posed a challenge to his staff: "How do we ensure that we have
the right mechanisms in place that allow our interrogators to push the limit of our authorities yet
prevent a violation ofthe Geneva Convention and our duty to treat detainees humanely?,,127o He
said that "references to the [Field Manuals] and doctrine were common responses but the issues
being faced were beyond the scope ofthe Army's limited doctrine.,,1271 LTG Sanchez added that
there was frustration about the ability to get a handle on the insurgency and that he put a
tremendous amount of pressure on his intelligence officers. 1272
(U) The Commander of the 205 th Military Intelligence Brigade, COL Pappas, said that
soon after arriving in theater in July 2003, CJTF-7's Chief ofStaffBG Daniel Hahn directed him
1273
to attend a meeting to brief LTG Sanchez on interrogation operations.
COL Pappas told the
Committee that he learned at that meeting that LTG Sanchez was concerned that interrogations
1274
had not generated the expected intelligence infonnation.
COL Pappas said that LTG Sanchez
"believed that ifthe brigade improved its interrogation tactics, techniques, and procedures, that
we would get the information necessary to stop the insurgency.,,127S COL Pappas agreed and
told LTG Sanchez that his interrogators would need the authority to use additional interrogation
techniques to accomplish that goal. 1276
2.
(U) In mid-Summer 2003, the 205 th MI BDE began preparing for Operation Victory
Bounty, an undertaking designed to track down remaining elements ofthe Fedayeen Saddam, a
paramilitary organization loyal to Saddam Hussein. 1277 In late July 2003, ten to twelve members
ofthe 519t1i MI Battalion went to Abu Ghraib to establish interrogation operations in anticipation
ofreceiving individuals captured during Victory Bounty.1278 On August 4,2003, CPT Carolyn
Wood, the 519th MI Battalion Assistant Operations Officer, assumed duties as the Interrogation
1168
Ibid at 5.
1269
Ibid at 6.
1210 Ibid
at 7.
1171
Ibid.
1272
1273 The cm -7 Commander, his senior staff, and division Commanders attended the meeting. Committee staff
interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2001).
1274
Ibid.
127~ Army IG, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (August 24, 2006) at 6.
1276
1277
1278
165
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Officer in Charge (OIC) at the facility.1279 In late 2002, she had served as the Interrogation
Operations Officer at the Bagram detention facility in Mghanistan.
(U) According to CPT Wood, no SOP was in place for interrogations when she took
command, but interrogations were conducted "within the approved ~proaches within the Field
Manual 34-52 only, with the possible addition of stress positions.,,12 0 CPT Wood stated that
interrogators had used sleep deprivation and stress positions in Mghanistan and that she
"perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the same operational environment as
Mghanistan,,1281 She said that she used her "best judgment and concluded [the techniques]
would be effective tools for interrogations at [Abu Ghraib].,,1282 She also said that she later put
together a request for additional interrogation options because "the winds of war were changing"
and there was "mounting pressure from higher for 'actionable intelligence' from interrogation
operations.,,1283 CPT Wood said that she did not want to repeat her experience in Mghanistan,
where interrogators lacked written guidance. 1284
3.
(U) CPT Wood said that guidance for interrogators about the rules for interrogations was
th
important because the interrogators in the 519 Battalion had come to Abu Ghraib with a range
of different experiences:
A lot of the interrogators and analysts also served in Guantanamo Bay and
Mghanistan where some other techniques were approved for use ... I understood
the Mghanistan rules were a little different because the detainees were not
classified as EPWs. It was, ''use techniques in the spirit of the Geneva
convention," not, ''you will apply the Geneva Convention." In order to use those
similar techniques from GTMO and Mghanistan in Iraq, we sought approval from
the higher command. 1285
(U) COL Pappas, CPT Wood's superior officer, said he knew that CPT Wood believed
she needed additional techniques and told her to submit a request. 1286
4.
12'19
Ibid at 3.
1280 Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004); Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn
Wood (February 11, 2008).
1281
1282
Ibid
1283
Ibid
1284
Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (December 17, 2004) at 3. Additionally, cm -7 Commander LTG
Sanchez said a key pwpose of his eventually issuing an interrogation policy was to regulate approach techniques
believed derived, in part, from techniques used in Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan. Statement by LTG Ricardo
Sanchez to the Department of the Army Inspector General (October 2004) at 7.
128'
1286
166
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) On July 26, 2003, CPT Wood submitted a proposed interrogation policy to her chain
of command. The proposed policy was based on the interrogation policy in use at the SMU TF
facility in Iraq. 1287 CPT Wood said that she and her staff simply "cleaned up some ofthe
grammar, changed the headin~ and signature block, and sent it up" to CJTF-7 as a proposed
policy for the 519 th MI BDE. 1 88
II
Mirroring the SMU TF policies, CPT Wood's proposed policy included sleep
management, ''vary comfort positions" (sitting, standing, kneeling, prone), presence of military
working dogs, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light control. 1289
The proposed policy stated that "EPWs that refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or
exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.,,1290 The prohibition against
threats, insults and exposure to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment, however, was limited to
EPWs and CPT W cod stated that, to her knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. 1291
(U) CPT Wood stated that submitting the proposed interrogation policy seemed a "natural
progression" to her as she understood the teclmiques were already approved for use at the SMU
TF in Iraq, and the policy was "similar to that ofa document that was drafted in Afghanistan for
the [Bagram Collection Point] as well as ... GTMO.,,1292 CPT Wood did not hear back from
CJTF-7 at that time. 1293 Just a few weeks later CJTF-7 itself solicited a "wish list" of
interrogation techniques.
5.
(U) On August 14, 2003, CPT William Ponce, the Battle Captain in the CJTF-7
HUMINT and Counterintelligence office (CJ2X), sent out an email to subordinate intelligence
elements (including the 205th MI BDE and the 519 th MI BN) requesting that they submit their
"interrogation teclmiques wish list[s]. ,,1294 CPT Ponce wrote:
Immediately seek input from interrogation elements (Division / Corps)
concerning what their special interrogation knowledge base is and more
1287 Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8,2006) at 10. The Interrogation orc had received the policy
from one of her Chief Warrant Officers who had, in turn, received the policy from the LTC Robert Whelan,
Commander of the 519tb Ml BN.
1288 Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8,2006) at 4; Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn
Wood (February 11, 2008). CPT Wood explained that even though the memorandum was dated July 26,2003,
which was before she took over the position at Abu Ghraib, she thought that one of her Chief Warrant Officers
might have sent it up the chain knowing that she would be on board shortly.
1289 Memo from CPT Carolyn Wood to C2X, cm -7 (IRAQ) ABU GHURA. YB, Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation
Facility (SFIF) Detainee Interrogation Policy (July 26, 2003) (hereinafter "SFIF Interrogation Policy (July 26,
2003)"); see also BfflF Policy (July 15, 2003) at 3.
1291
1292
1293
1294
Email from CPT (P) William Ponce Jr. to CS 165MI, HECC (August 14, 2003).
167
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
importantly, what techniques would they feel would be effective techniques that
SJA could review (basically provide a list). 1295
CPT Ponce added:
...The gloves are coming off gentleman regarding these detainees. Col. Boltz has
made it clear that we want these individuals broken. Casuahies are mounting and
we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further
attacks. 1296
(U) The Commander ofthe 205 th MI BDE, COL Pappas, said he thought that CPT
Ponce's email soliciting "interrogation techniques wish lists" was the result ofthe
meeting he attended with LTG Sanchez shortly after arriving in theater. 1297 He called the
Battle Captain's use ofthe ~hrase ''the gloves are coming off' a "dumb" thing to say and
a "poor choice of words.,,1 8 LTG Sanchez told the Committee that he expected his
intelligence staff to send out the request for interrogation techniques, but stated that the
use ofthe phrase ''the gloves are coming off' was "not good.,,1299 LTG Sanchez believed
that the email reflected frustration on the part of intelligence personnel at not being able
to meet his intelligence requirements.
(U) Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Lewis Welshofer, who was with the 3rd Annored
Cavalry Regiment responded to CPT Ponce's email with his own assessment ofthe interrogation
situation:
1295
Ibid.
1296
Ibid.
1297
1298
1299
Email from CPT (P) William Ponce Jr. to CSI65MI, HECC (August 14, 2003). CWO Lewis Welshoferwas
later tried and convicted of negligent homicide and negligent dereliction of duty in connection with the November
26, 2003 killing of an Iraq detainee.
1300
168
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
As for "the gloves need to come off... " we need to take a deep breath and
remember who we are. Those gloves are most defmitely NOT based on Cold War
or WWII enemies-they are based on clearly established standards of
international law to which we are signatories and in part the originators. Those in
tum derive from practices commonly accepted as morally correct, the so-called
"usages of war." It comes down to standards of right and wrong -something we
cannot just put aside when we find it inconvenient, any more than we can declare
that we will "take no prisoners" and therefore shoot those who surrender to us
simply because we find prisoners inconvenient.
"The casualties are mounting... " we have taken casualties in every war we have
ever fought-that is part of the very nature of war. We also inflict casualties,
generally more than we take. That in no way justifies letting go of our
standards. We have NEVER considered our enemies justified in doing such
things to us. Casualties are part of war-if you cannot take casualties then you
cannot engage in war. Period. BOTTOM LINE: We are American soldiers, heirs
ofa long tradition of staying on the high ground. We need to stay there. 1301
6.
(U) On August 27,2003, CPT Wood re-submitted the proposed interrogation policy that
she had previously sent in July. She said she thought the issue came up because CJTF-7
headquarters "want[ed] these guys broken" and said her August submission may have been a
response to CPT P once , s emal'1 . 1302
_
Though largely the same as the proposed policy submitted on July 26, 2003, the
August 27, 2003 proposed policy included one additional interrogation technique - "sensory
deprivation," which the ro osed olic described as a "combination use of isolation and sleep
management
.. 1303 The proposed interrogation
policy also inserted the term "stress positions" in place of "vary comfort positions" and limited
use of sleep deprivation to 72 hours. 304
(U) CPT Wood said that two days after she submitted the proposed policy, two lawyers
from cm-7 visited Abu Ghraib with a copy of her memo. 130S According to CPT Wood, the
1301
Email from 4ID 104 MI ICE to various recipients (August 14, 2003) (emphasis in original).
1302
1303 Memo from CPT Carolyn Wood to C2X, CJTF-7 (IRAQ), ABU GHURAYB, Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation
Facility (SF/F) Detainee Interrogation Policy (August 27, 2003) at 4.
1304 Ibid
Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 8, 2006) at 4; Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn
Wood (February II, 2007).
1305
169
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
two attorneys said that "they did not see anything wrong with it and that they would add their
approval and forward it higher to CITF-7 for consideration and review.,,1306
(U) Techniques in CPT Wood's proposed policy can be traced back though the SMU TF
in Iraq to Mghanistan and, ultimately, to techniques authorized for use at GTMO by Secretary
Rumsfeld in December 2002. The GTMO techniques were, in tum, influenced by techniques
used by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency and the military service SERE schools to train
U.S. personnel to resist illegal enemy interrogations. In the summer of2003, as CPT Wood was
seeking approval for her proposed policy, the SMU TF in Iraq was soliciting JPRA's advice on
interrogations.
C.
_
In the summer of 2003 the Commander of the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task
Force (TF) in Iraq,
called the Commander of JPRA, Col Randy Moulton,
to request assistance with Task Force interrogations. 1307
_
On Aumst 25, 2003, the SMU Task Force in Iraq formally requested a JPRA
"interrogation team." 08 The request asked that JPRA send two or more individuals to the TF
for three weeks to "provide assistance to current interro ation efforts ofke
. value
1ar~1309 On August 27, 2003,
_request for support, forwarded it to JFCOM, and asked that JFCOM task JPRA to
support the request. l3lO That same day, the JFCOM Operations Directorate (J-3) authorized
JPRA to provide the requested support to the SMU TF.
_
Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operations Support Office (OSO)
subsequently selected three JPRA personnel for the mission. As Team Chie~ Mr. Wirts chose U
Col Steven Kleinman, a reserve officer who happened to be a trained interrogator. Mr. Wirts
also chose Terrence Russell, JPRA's manager for research and development who was also a
SERE specialist. Though Mr. Russell had no formal i~ining or experience, he had
previously conducted interrogation-related training f o r " , - ITF-GTMO personnel. To
1306
Ibid.
1307 Memo from Lt Col Arlene McCue for the Force Judge Advocate, Results ofTelephordc Interview With Colonel
Randy Moulton, (USA Ret), former Commanding Officer, JPRA (Septem~fter "McCue,
Results!!Ilnterview with Colonel Moulton'''); Committee staff interview o f _ _ . _ ( O c t o b e r 10,
2007). The Chief of the Operational Support Office (OSO) at JPRA told the Committee that in the process of
ovi' defensive SERE trajping to Special Mission Units, JPRA personnel who had conducted offensive training
also consulted with the Special Mission Units to determine how they could be
helpful in training. Committee staff interview of Chris Wirts (January 4, 2007).
Priority Message, Request JPRA Assistance in Interrogation Support, Date
1308
Time Group (DTG) 252059Z AUG 03 (August 25, 2003).
1309
Ibid
~ t oHQ JPRA, Interrogator Support, DTG 272054Z AUG 03 (August 27, 2003); HQ
_ t o CDR USJFCOM, Requestfor Interrogator Support, DTG 271004Z AUG 03 (August 27,2(03).
170
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
complete the team, Mr. Wirts chose Lenny Miller, a contract SERE instructor who also lacked
interrogation experience but who the SMU TF had specifically requested. The team's
deployment date was set for September 1,2003. 1311
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that, before being deployed, he thought he was being sent to
Iraq to identify problems in the TF interrogation program. 1312 More than a year earlier, Lt Col
Kleinman had drafted a paper identifying challenges faced by interrogators at GTMO. 1313 In the
draft paper, Lt Col Kleinman identified "fundamental systemic problems" at GTMO that
undermined operational effectiveness. 1314
._
Chiefamong the problems identified in the draft paper was the lack oftrained
personnel with experience in strategic interrogations. 131S Lt Col Kleinman recommended a
number of options in his draftRaper to enhance DoD's ability to conduct strategic interrogation,
including additional training. 1 16 He recommended having experienced "survival, intelligence,
and human factors specialists" conduct an "in-depth assessment" of operations at GTMO and
provide a "comprehensive reR0rt that would set forth concrete steps to improve operational
effectiveness and security.,,1 17 Lt Col Kleinman's paper did not recommend teaching
interrogators at GTMO how to use SERE techniques in interrogations and he said that he did not
believe that was the purpose ofthe Iraq trip. 1318
.
2.
_
JPRA received written approval from JFCOM to support the SMU TF request. 1319
JPRA Commander Col Randy Moulton told the Committee that he was pretty sure he also
conducted a briefmg for the JFCOM Director for Operations (J-3) about JPRA's support to
interrogation efforts at the SMU TF, although he could not recall when that briefing occurred. 1320
The JFCOM J-3, BG Thomas Moore, who was involved in coordinating at least one of JPRA's
1311 Details of the three-week JPRA trip to Iraq are reflected in trip reports that Lt Col Kleinman and Mr. Russell
submitted ><upon their return from Iraq in late September 2003." Lt Col Kleinman's trip report is annotated with the
comments of Mr. Russell. See DoD IG Memorandum for the Record, 4 January 2005 Meeting with Mr. Lt Col
Steve Kleinman ~005) at 4; Memorandum from Mr. Terry Russell for Lt. Col. Reichert, Mr. Wirts,
JPRA Support to,--(undated) (hereinafter "Russell Trip Report"); Memorandum from Lt Col Steven
Kleinman, Trip Report - TDY to CENfCOMAOR. 1-24 Sep 03 (undated) (hereinafter "Kleinman Trip Report").
1312
1313
Maj Steven Kleinman, Support to DoD Interrogation Operations (May 17, 2002).
1314
Ibid
131'
Ibid
1316
Ibid at 4-6.
1317 Ibid
at 1-2.
at 5.
1318
1319
(SIFP) CDR USJFCOM to HQ JPRA, Interrogator Support, DIG 272054Z AUG 03 (August 27, 2003).
1320
171
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
previous "offensive" training sessions completed his assignment as the J3 at JFCOM in early to
mid-August and was replaced by RADM John Bird. 1321
(U) On September 4, 2003, just as the JPRA team was arriving in Iraq, Col Mouhon
emailed a JPRA "Weekly Report" to the JFCOM Command Group and others stating:
[Those conducting interrogations] have already demonstrated the need for our
understanding and knowledge of captivity environment and psychology. We are
also well aware of the problems associated with crossing the Rubicon into intel
collection (or anything close). There may be a compromise position (my gut
choice) whereby we could provide/assist in oversight, training, analysis, research,
and [tactics, techniques, and procedures] development, while leavin~ the actual
debriefmglinterrogation to those already assigned the responsibility. 132
(U) In a subsequent email to RADM Bird, Col Moulton stated that while he was
concerned about "mission creep" and departing too far from JPRA's traditional role, it was his
view that "no DoD entity has a firm grasp on any comprehensive approach to strategic
debriefmglinterrogation.,,1326 Col Moulton wrote:
1321
Email from JPRA J2 to weekly report distribution list., JPRA Weekly Report (September 4, 2003). The JPRA
Commander also updated JFCOM in JPRA's subsequent weekly reports. See September II, 2003 Weekly Report
(the JPRA team "deployed to Baghdad continues to support [redacted] with strategic debriefmg.") September 25,
2003 Weekly Report (the JPRA team "deployed to Baghdad to support [redacted] with strategic debriefmg" returned
on September 24,2003.)
1322
1323
1324
132' Ibid.
1326
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Our subject matter experts (and certain Service SERE psychologist[sD currently
have the most knowledge and depth within DoD on the captivity environment and
exploitation. I think that JPRAlJFCOM needs to keep involved for reasons of
TTP development and information sharing. Weare NOT looking to expand our
involvement to active participation. The current support was intended to be
limited to advice, assistance, and observation. Our potential participation is
predicated solely on the request ofthe Combatant Commander. 1327
(U) Col Moulton testified to the Committee that before he sent the JPRA team to Iraq he
talked to the SMU Task Force commander and was told that SMU TF detainees "were detained
unlawful combatants and not covered under the Geneva Conventions." 1328 Col Moulton later
said, referring to a subsequent call with the SMU TF Commander, that he did not know ifthe
SMU TF Commander had "specifically" told him that. 1329
3.
_
On September 5, 2003, after their arrival in Iraq, the three-member JPRA team
met with SMU TF personnel at the TF facility. 1331 According to U Col Kleinman, the JPRA
Team Chief, the team was told that interrogators were having trouble gaining actionable
intelligence information from detainees in TF custody.1332 Lt Col Kleinman felt that the SMU
TF's lack of success was a resuh ofa poor screening process, which resulted in the TF holding
some detainees with no information. 1333
~errence Russell the team also met that day with the SMU TF
C o m m _ and discussed
expectations for the JPRA
1334
team.
Mr. Russell said that
"expected [the JPRA team] to become fully
engaged in interrogation operations" and "encouraged [the team] to receive modified" rules of
engagement (ROEs) from JPRA, since their ROEs at that time permitted the team to "advise and
assist" but not to "engage in direct interrogations.,,133S
1327
1328
1329
Ibid
1330 To the extent possible, the Committee relied on contemporaneous documents, including Lt Col Kleinman's and
Mr. Russell's written trip reports, to establish the timeline of events during the JPRA team's visit to the SMUTaslc
Force.
1331
1332
1333 Ibid During his interview with Committee staff, Lt Col Kleinman described the interrogation of an Iraqi man
who had been detained by U.S. forces because interrogators believed he had useful intelligence because he knew
about "bridges." Lt Col Kleinman said that it later became clear that the man was a dental technician.
1334 Russell
1m
Trip Report at 2.
Ibid at 1.
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_
Over the next week, Lt Col Kleinman spoke by phone with Col Moulton at least
twice. While accounts by the three JPRA team members of those calls differed in some respects,
all agree that the calls resulted in Col Moulton (1) authorizing the team to participate in SMU
Task Force interrogations and (2) authorizing the team to use the full range of SERE school
physical pressures in those interrogations. Col Moulton confIrmed that the team's understanding
of his guidance was correct. 1336
4.
_
According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton on September 5,
2003 to discuss the team's ROEs and, the following day, Col Moulton gave the team permission
to "become fully engaged in all BIF operations.,,1337 That account is consistent with Col
Moulton's recollection, which was that Lt Col Kleinman called him after arriving in Iraq to
discuss a request from the SMU TF that team members actually participate in interrogations. 1338
_ _ _ _ _ Col Moulton said that, after getting the call from Lt Col Kleinman, he called.
~ o confIrm and inquire about the new request.,,1339 In s ~ sand
communications, Col Moulton has consistently stated that he relayedllllllllllllll.request
to JFCOM and got JFCOM's authorization to permit the JPRA team to participate in
interrogations. Col Moulton's recollection of who at JFCOM provided that authority, however,
has varied.
(U) According to a memorandum of a September 2005 interview with the JPRA
Commander, Col Moulton "relayed the request to the [JFCOM] J3 and got the verbal OK to
allow active participation, but only for one or two demonstrations and then the team was to go
(U) In a 2006 email to the DoD IG, however, Col Moulton could not recall exactly whom
at JFCOM he had spoken with, stating:
During the deployment I received a call from the Task Force commander
requesting that our personnel participate in the debriefIng. I notifIed JFCOM
leadership of the request (either BG Moore or LTG Wagner I can't remember, but
think it was [LTG] Wagner since this was late on a weekend night) and was told
that they could support, but that any activities had to be approved through the task
forces legal rep (we were chopped to them). 1341
1336
1337
Committee staff interview of Randy Moulton (June 19, 2007); Committee staff interview of Randy Moulton
1338
1339
McCue, Results o/Interview with Colonel Moulton at 1. According to the DoD IG report, the JPRA Commander
confl1lI1ed that the U.S. Joint Forces Command J-3 and the SMU TF Commander "gave a verbal approval for the
SERE team to actively participate in 'one or two demonstration' interrogations." DoD IG Report at 28.
1340
1341
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_
In interviews with Committee staff in 2007, Col Moulton said that he had tried
but had been unable to reach BGen Moore, so instead he called LTG Wagner whom he reached
at home. 1342 According to that account, LTG Wagner told Col Moulton that he needed aEproval
from his boss, JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani, to approve the JPRA re~est. 13 3
According to Col Moulton, LTG Wagner called him back and gave his approval. 1 44
_
BGen Moore, whom Col Moulton referenced in his September 2005 interview,
was no longer assigned to JFCOM in September 2003. 1345 RADM Bird, who replaced BGen
Moore, stated that he did not recall receiving a call from the JPRA Commander. RADM Bird
said that he thought it unlikely he would have received the call on the weekend as it would have
had to have occurred over a secure line and he did not have that capability at home. LTG
Wagner told the Committee that he could not recall if he received a call from Col Moulton. 1346
_
According to Terrence Russell, one ofthe JPRA team in Iraq, the JPRA team
received permission from Col Moulton "to become fully engaged in all BIF operations.,,1347 The
next day, team members met with the SMU TF staff and "outlined the exploitation cycle and
how [the staff] could incorporate [SERE Training, Tactics, and Procedures] to support their
current interrogation operations.,,1348
While it is not known when it occurred, the Chief ofHuman Intelligence and
Counterintelligence (J-2X) for the SMU stated that members ofthe JPRA team demonstrated
interrogation techniques, including the "attention slap," which he said was described as an open
handed slap to focus the detainee on the interrogation, and walling, which was described as a
push up against the wall. 1349 The J-2X could not recall if all members ofthe JPRA team were
present during that lesson. 1350 Lt Col Kleinman said that he was not aware of such a lesson. 1351
1342 Committee staff interview of Col Randy Moulton (JlD'le 19, 2007); Committee staff interview of Col Randy
Moulton (November 26, 2007). LTG Wagner, however, to which the JPRA Commander referred had already left
JFCOM in August 2003, well before the JPRA team deployed to Iraq. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee, Col Moulton said that he was unable to reach RADM Bird or Maj Gen Soligan so he "went up the chain
and spoke with General Wagner." SASC hearing (September 25, 2008).
1343
1344
Ibid
134'
1346
1347
1348
1349 With the walling technique, the J-2X stated that instructions were given to use a wood wall and to pick a spot on
the wall in between any metal braces. Committee staff interview of SMU TF J2X (February 5, 2008).
13'0
13'1
175
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II The J-2X stated that he was unsure if techniques taught to the staff were pennitted
under SMU TF policy and that, after the JPRA demonstration, he raised this matter with the
1352
SMU TF J2, which at the time was
5.
_
On September 6, 2003, JPRA team members were present in the interrofiation
booth when a SMU TF interrogator used "selected physical pressures" on a detainee. 13
According to Terrence Russell, the SMU TF interrogator "put the detainee on his knees and later
began to use insult slaps every 3-4 seconds for an extended period of time." 1354
(U) Lt Col (now Colonel) Kleinman described that same interrogation in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Lt Col Kleinman said:
I walked into the interrogation room, all painted in black with [a] spotlight on the
detainee. Behind the detainee was a military guard... with a[n] iron bar...
slapping it in his hand. The interrogator was sitting in a chair. The interpreter
was - was to his left... and the detainee was on his knees ... A question was asked
by the interrogator, interpreted, the response came back and, upon interpretation,
the detainee would be slapped across the face... And that continued with every
question and every response. I asked my colleagues how long this had been going
on, specifically the slapping, they said approximately 30 minutes. 1355
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that his two JPRA colleagues, who were present during
the interrogation, "didn't seem to think there [was] a problem, because in SERE
training... there's a facial slap, but it's conducted in very specific ways ... This was not
conducted in that fashion.,,1356 In fact, Lt Col Kleinman described the environment at the
Task Force facility as ''uncontrolled.,,1357
_
Members ofthe JPRA team had differing views on the appropriate response to the
interrogator's use ofthose techniques. Mr. Russell stated that he and Mr. Miller "saw nothing
wrong with" the interrogator forcing the detainee to kneel or his slapping the detainee during the
interrogation. 1358 Lt Col Kleinman had a different reaction.
_
Lt Col Kleinman considered forcing the detainee to kneel and repeatedly slapping
him to be "direct violations ofthe Geneva Conventions and [actions that] could constitute a war
crime." 1359 Upon witnessing the abusive conduct, Lt Col Kleinman sought out the SMU TF J
mz Committee staff interview of SMU TF J2X (February 5, 2008).
1353
1354
1355
1356
Ibid
1357 Ibid.
176
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
2X 1360 Lt Col Kleinman told the J-2X what he had witnessed and recommended ''that the
session be halted immediately.,,1361 Lt Col Kleinman said the J-2X told him "[y]our judgment is
my judgment. Do what you think. is right.,,1362
_
Following his conversation with the J-2X, Lt Col Kleinman asked the two
members of his team to step out ofthe interrogation booth. According to Mr. Russell:
In the hallway [Lt Col] Kleinman asked us our impression of the use of the
kneeling and slaps. We both indicated that we saw nothing wrong with what was
going on. He asked us our opinion of the slapping and we said they were only
insult slaps and were not inflicting any pain to the detainee. [Lt Col] Kleinman
indicated his disagreement and that both the slaps and kneeling were direct
violations of the Geneva Conventions and could constitute a war crime. He
further indicated that he wanted to intervene and stop the interrogation at that
point. 1363
_
Over the objections of the other two members ofJPRA team. Lt Col Kleinman
then asked the SMU TF interrogator to step out ofthe booth. He explained to the interrogator
"how and why [the interrogator's] methods were a violation ofthe Geneva Convention and TF
[POlicy].,,1364 According to Lt Col Kleinman, "[the interrogator] accepted my direction without
reservation.,,1365
.
I think the clear violation of the TF policy was of a minor nature - that being a
10-minute extension of the kneeling policy. The use of insult slaps was, in the
opinion of [Lt Col] Kleinman, serious enough to stop the interrogation - an action
I did not then or now feel warranted his direct intervention. 1366
II In subsequent testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell claimed that the use ofthe
"insult slap" was consistent with the facility's operating instructions:
Under their operating instructions at that BIF, at that time and place, we did not
see anything wrong with [the use of physical pressures]. It may not have been
13CiO
1361
Ibid.
1362
Ibid.
1363 Russell Trip Report at 5. Mr. Russell also felt that Lt Col Kleinman should have used the interrogator's chain of
command at the Task Force to stop the interrogation. Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3,2007) at 105.
1364
136'
Ibid
13~ Kleinman Trip Report at 3. In his own trip report, Mr. Russell also noted that the use of kneeling was an
authorized SMU IF technique. See Russell Trip Report at 3-4.
177
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applied the way we would have done it, but we didn't see anythin wrong with it.
We advised [Lt Col] Kleinman ofthe same. He disagreed with us. 367
_
SMU TF SOPs reviewed by the Committee do not include slapping as an
authorized technique and the SMU TF J-2X told the Committee that he was unaware of any
operating instructions that would have permitted an interrogator to repeatedly slap a detainee. 1368
III Despite Mr. Russell's previous statement that he "saw nothing wrong with what was
going on," he testified to the Committee that he found the SMU TF interrogator's repeated use of
the insult slap to be "odd" and "in excess" of what would be used in resistance training at
JPRA 1369 Mr. Russell also testified that the technique, as applied by the TF interrogator, was
ineffective:
[The] insult slap is just that, it's an insult. After you do it two or three times it
loses its effectiveness because the [sic], in our world, the student is anticipating
the slap. It loses its effectiveness if you do it more than two or three or four
times. 1370
_(
While he did not raise any objection to their use in the interrogation, Mr.
Russell stated that the techniques used at the SERE school, such as the insult slap, were not
designed to elicit information from individuals but rather to "guide the student" to an appropriate
resistance posture. 1371 According to his testimony, "history has shown us that physical pressures
are not effective for compelling an individual to give information or to do something" and are
not useful in gaining accurate, actionable intelligence. 1372 There is no indication in Mr.
Russell's trip report, however, that he told anyone on the J-2X staffthat the SMU TF's use of
repeated slaps would be ineffective or that use of other SERE physical pressures, such as
''walling'', which were reportedly described for the J-2X staff, would be ineffective.
Mr. Russell stated that when physical pressures are applied in the resistance phase of
SERE training, medical and psychological personnel are present to observe interrogations and
protect SERE school students,1373 Mr. Russell testified that there were no medical or
psychological personnel present during the interrogations he witnessed while at the SMU TF
Co
'l'ty . 1374
laCll
1367
1368
1369
1370
Ibid at 104.
1371
Ibid at 111-12.
1372
Ibid at 126-27.
1373
Ibid. at 123.
1374
Ibid.
178
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
6.
(U) At some point shortly after he intervened to stop the interrogation where the detainee
was placed on his knees and slappe~ Lt Col Kleinman called Col Moulton. 137S Lt Col Kleinman
testified before the Committee that he told Col Moulton that the JPRA team was "being asked to
use the full range of SERE methods in the interrogation of detainees.,,1376 Lt Col Kleinman
testified that he also told Col Mouhon that he had intervened to stop interrogations at the Task
Force and that the use of SERE techniques "were violations ofthe Geneva Convention, they
weren't authorized, and we should not do them.,,1377
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he also told the SMU TF Commander that the use of SERE
techniques in interrogations was ''unlawful'' and "a violation ofthe Geneva Convention.,,1378 He
said that the SMU TF Commander agreed with him but there were "no orders ever issued" by the
Commander not to use the techniques. 1379
_
(
According to Lt Col Kleinman's trip report, after~l
Moulton, Col Moulton subsequently spoke to the SMU TF Commander,
and
then called him back to tell him that the JPRA team was "cleared hot" to use ''the full range of
JPRA methods" on detainees, specifically including "walling, sleep deprivation, isolation,
physical pressures (to include various stress positions, facial and stomach slaps, and finger pokes
to the chest), space/time disorientation, [and] white noise.,,1380
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that Col Moulton told him that the
JPRA team was "cleared hot to use SERE methods" in interrogations. 1381 Lt Col Kleinman
testified that he told Col Moulton that he considered this instruction to be an illegal order and
that he would not carry it out. Col Moulton said that Lt Col Kleinman "was adamant about that
he thought it was against the Geneva Convention.,,1382
7.
1376
1377 Ibid.
13'711 Ibid.
1379 Ibid
13~ Kleinman Trip Report at 3; Russell Trip Report at 2 ("The JPRA Commander had cleared Lenny Miller and
me to use our normal and usual range of physical pressures while interrogating detainees''); Committee staff
interview of Steven Kleinman (February 14, 2007); Testimony of Terrence Russell (August 3,2007) at 99.
1381
1382
Ibid.
1383
179
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
JPRA Commander's order that they could use ''the normal and usual range of physical rsressures"
during interrogations and to alert them of his concerns about the legality ofthat order. 1 84 Mr.
Russell wrote in his trip report:
[Lt Col] Kleinman indicated that he felt [it was] ' ... an illegal order' and we were
exposing ourselves to possible future difficulties if we used any pressure
inconsistent with the Geneva Conventions. 1385
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also testified to the Committee that he relayed his conversation with
Col Moulton to his two lPRA colleagues, informing them that he told Col Moulton that the
authority to use SERE techniques "was an unlawful order" and that he "wasn't going to have any
involvement with it, and [he] didn't think that they should either.,,1386
_
Both Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller, the JPRA contractor, disagreed with Lt Col
Kleinman's assessment. 1387 According to Mr. Russell, the two "indicated that the use of these
moderate physical pressures, when used appropriately, were consistent with proper handling and
interrogation.,,1388 In testimony to the Committee, Mr. Russell added that he understood that the
individuals held by the Task Force were considered "detained unlawful combatants" and "not
automatically provided the protections ofthe Geneva Conventions," though he could not recall
who told him this. 1389
_(
Shortly after Col Moulton told Lt Col Kleinman that the team was
"cleared hot" to employ the full range of JPRA methods, Lt Col Kleinman recommended that the
TF Legal Advisor arrange a formal briefing with the SMU TF interrogation staff and the lPRA
team 1390 In that meeting, Lt Col Kleinman reported that the TF Legal Advisor "set forth legal
limitations that essentially excluded most ofthe [JPRA methods] (with the use of certain stress
positions, such as kneeling on a hard floor for up to 30 minutes, cited as an acceptable
method).,,1391
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that although the SMU TF lawyer agreed
with him that it was unlawful to use SERE techniques in interrogations, when the lawyer later
briefed interrogators on the techniques, there was no longer "any clarity" about whether or not
they were illegal. 1392
_ M r . Russell also described the TF Legal Advisor's briefing in his trip report:
Russell Trip Report at 2.
1385 Ibid
1384
1386
1387
1388
Ibid.
1389
1390
1391
1392
180
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
The [TF Legal Advisor] discussed the [TF Commander's] expectations versus the
methods of exploitation and physical pressures he had heard were being used in
the BIF - including those prior to his recent arrival (2-3 weeks on site). He also
discussed the status of the detainees and the fact that the BIF's detainees were not
identified to the ICRC. He discussed the assumption of risk being taken by the
[SMU] command if BIF personnel engaged in 'beat down' tactics or while
..
,1393
,
engagmg 10 torture.
_
The TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that the SMU TF did not make status
determinations for detainees, but that he advised in his briefing that the protections of Common
Article 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions applied to those detainees under the control ofthe SMU
TFY94
8.
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that after he told his two JPRA
colleagues that Col Moulton had "cleared hot" their use of SERE techniques in interrogations,
his colleagues decided to "demonstrate the way you handle an interrogation.,,139S
_
(
Around the time that Lt Col Kleinman met with the SMU TF Legal
Advisor, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller met separately with the SMU TF Director ofIntelli1ence (J
2), COL Brian Keller, and his J-2X and participated in interrogations with J-2X staff. 139 In one
instance, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller took the lead in the interrogation of a detainee. 1397 The
interrogation began with the simulated release of the detainee - the detainee was permitted to
clean up, leave the facility, and was escorted to a bus stop, when he was "captured" again. 1398
When the detainee was brought back to the SMU TF facility, Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller took
physical control ofthe detainee and led him into a holdin cell. 1399 Once in the holding cell, one
or both ofthe men forcibl stri ed the detainee naked. 14 0
,,1401 He told the Committee: "we [had] done this 100 times, 1000 times with
our [SERE school] studentS.,,1402
1393
1394
1m
1396
1397 Kleinman
Trip Report at 3.
1398
1399
Ibid at 115.
1400 SASC Hearing (September 25,2008). Mr. Russell testified that both he and Mr. Miller removed the detainee's
clothing, but Mr. Miller told the Committee that only Mr. Russell removed the detainee's clothing. Testimony of
Terrence Russell (August 3, 2007) at 116; Committee staff interview of Lenny Miller (July 24, 2007).
1401
1402
Ibid
181
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Lt Col Kleinman also described that interrogation intestimony to the Senate Armed
Services Committee. He said the detainee was driven away from the Task Force's interrogation
facility to make him think he was being released and then brought back to a "bunker that was
about a story ... into the ground - cement, cold, dark.,,1403 He said:
[The detainee] was literally carried by two of the guards into the bunker
struggling against them. He was taken down there. My two JPRA colleagues
took over from that point. .. [T]hey ripped his Abaya off - not cut - they ripped it
off... ripped off his underwear, took his shoes, they'd hooded him already, then
they - they had shackled him by the wrist and ankles - being screamed at the
entire time in his ear in English about essentially... what a poor specimen of
human that he was ... And then the orders were given that he was to stand in that
position for 12 hours no matter how much he asked for help, no matter how much
he pleaded, unless he passed out, the guards were not to respond to any requests
for help. 1404
(U) Lt Col Kleinman said that he told his colleagues that what they did was
''unlawful'' and he stopped the interrogation. l40s
Mr. Russell testified to the Committee that the detainee was naked only for "however
long it took to have his clothes taken offand put the new dish-dash on again.,,1406
_
In his trip report, Lt Col Kleinman reported that he told the two other JPRA team
members that he disagreed with their approach. 1407 Mr. Russell stated that the exploitation
scenario was conducted after coordination with the J-2X staff and that the techniques, including
isolation and sleep deprivation, were "employed in accordance with existing TF guidance and
pOlicy.,,1408 While Col Kleinman testified that he intervened to stop the interrogation, Mr.
Russell said that Lt Col Kleinman never raised an objection to the interrogation. 1409
9.
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified to the Committee that he intervened to stop another
interrogation being conducted by SMU TF personnel. 1410 Lt Col Kleinman said that "a plan was
laid out on butcher paper for another detainee that involved extensive stress positions, followed
by interrogation, followed by short periods of sleep.,,1411 Lt Col Kleinman photographed the
1403
1404
Ibid
1405
Ibid
1406
1407 Kleinman
Trip Report at 3.
1408
Ibid at 3-4.
1409
SASC hearing (September 25,2008); Testimony ofTerrence Russell (August 3,2007) at 119.
1410
1411
Ibid.
182
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
plan which had been posted in plain view and described a schedule for keeping the detainee
awake and placing him in stress positions. 1412 The plan listed the following schedule:
*1830 -2130
Awake
*2130-2230
Sleep
*2230-2300
On Knees
*2300-2330
Sitting Down
*2330-0030
Sit Up
*0030-0100
Sit Down
*0100-0130/0200
On Knees
*0200 -0300
Sl eep 1413
(U) Another photograph showed the same detainee in his cell and hooded. His hands
appear handcuffed behind his back. 1414 Lt Col Kleinman said that his photograph did not reflect
the fact that the detainee also had his ankles shackled. 1415
_
(
Mr. Russell's trip report appears to confmn Lt Col Kleinman's account.
It stated that Lt Col Kleinman intervened in an SMU TF "interrogator's plan for imposing a
regime of sleep deprivation and physical pressures.,,1416 According to Mr. Russell, the proposed
interrogation re .men "included an 18-hour Ian to im ose slee de rivation and physical
activities
" as well as "the
use oftwo separate 30-minute kneeling sessions separated by 3 hours of standing or restin~.,,1417
According to Mr. Russell, Lt Col Kleinman reportedly objected to the use of "kneeling.,,14 8 Mr.
Russell said that he and Mr. Miller felt that "the regime proposal was apjropriate and well within
[the SMU TF] current [Rules of Engagement] for detainee handling.,,141
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Steven Kleinman (February 14,2007); Committee staff interview ofLt Col
Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008). Lt Col Kleinman told the Committee that the IF Commander gave him
permission to take photographs.
1412
1413
1414
Ibid
141'
1416 In his trip report, Terrence Russell wrote that he had learned about Lt Col Kleinman's intervention from the 12
X. Russell Trip Report at 3.
1417 Ibid
1418
Ibid. at 4.
1419
Ibid.
183
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
10.
_
While the team was in Iraq,
requested that JPRA develop a
formal Concept of Operations (CONOP) for detainee exploitation. 142o Col Moulton tasked
members ofthe team with developing the CONOp. 1421 Mr. Russell's trip report stated that he
drafted the CONOP in Iraq and that Mr. Miller and Lt Col Kleinman reviewed it and offered
suggestions. 1422 He later testified to the Committee that he drafted a "skeleton of a CONOP"
with Mr. Miller and that Lt Col Kleinman was aware that they were working on it. 1423 Lt Col
Kleinman said that he knew that his team members were working on a CONOP, but that he did
not see sections of it. 1424
(U) Lt Col Kleinman testified that he told Mr. Russell that he would not participate in
drafting the CONOP because he "absolutely disagreed with that type of expansion ofthe use of.
SERE methods," and that his "contribution would be nothing but contrary.,,1425
_
While the JPRA team was still in Iraq, the draft was shared with and edited by
JPRA eersonnel in the U.S., including Christopher Wirts, JPRA's Operations Support Office
Chief. 426 The CONOP, called "Concept of Operations for HVT exploitation," provided JPRA's
"recommendations and guidance to USG forces conducting exploitation operations. 1427
_
The September 2003 CONOP was similar to the April 2002 "Exploitation Draft
Plan" that Dr. Bruce Jessen, JPRA's former senior SERE psycholo~st, had drafted shortly
before JPRA's support t o _ the DoD General Counsel. 14 8 As had the April 2002
exploitation draft plan, the CONOP described a JPRA-directed exploitation process and included
recommendations for exploitation and captivity operations, such as "tailoring detainee
punishment consequences to maximize cultural undesirability.,,1429
_
The September 2003 CONOP also identified "critical operational exploitation
principles," including:
1420 _
Con~perations
Support _
1428
_Exploitation Draft Plan (Undated); Concept ofOperations For HVF Exploitation - Version 1
1419 Similar recommendations had also been listed in the February 28,2003 JPRA memorandum on "prisoner
handling recommendations" that JPRA had provided to SOUTHCOM in February 2002.
184
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
Those exploitation principles were similar to those that had been included in the
exploitation draft plan nearly a year and a half earlier. In addition, the September 2003 JPRA
CONOP listed specific interrogation techniques and incorporated portions ofthe March 6, 2003
DoD Interrogation Working Group draft report. JPRA ~ersonnel considered the Working Group
report authoritative guidance on U.S. policy and law. 143
1 4 3 0 . Concept
1431 Ibid. (noting that "HVT exploitation operations will be conducted within the intent of U.S. policy and law, [in
accordance with] U.S. interpretation as identified" in the March 6,2003 Working Group report.)
1432_
1433
Ibid
1434
143~ Following their trip, JPRA personnel also completed an "Executive Summary" of their support to the SMU
IF that described the visit and summarized observations and recommendations provided to the SMU IF
Commander. . . Executive Summary of JPRA Support_ (undated).
185
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
11.
(U) According to the DoD Inspector General's August 2006 report, when it "became
apparent that friction was developing" between the SMU TF and the JPRA team, ''the decision
was made to pull the team out [ofIraq] before more damage was done to the relationship
between the two organizations.,,1436 Lt Col Kleinman referred to the DoD IG report's statement
that "friction was developing" as an understatement and said that he felt his life was being
threatened at the SMU TF. 1437 He recalled one instance (after he stopped what he believed to be
in violation ofthe Geneva Conventions) in which an SMU TF member told him, while
sharpening a knife, to "sleep lightly," noting that they did not "coddl[e] terrorists" at the SMU
TF. 1438
_The SMU TF Legal Advisor told the Committee that JPRA had no business at the
SMU TF facility either assisting in or conducing interrogations and that he sought to have the
the SMU TF
team removed 1439 The Legal Advisor said that he met with
Commander, and told him that SERE training was not meant for detainees and that JPRA's
presence had the potential to lead to abuse. He also recalled telling the Commander that JPRA
was not qualified or trained to perform interrogations. The Legal Advisor said that_
_
did not act on his concerns.
_
Mr. Russell wrote in his trip report that the SMU TF Operations Officer (J-3) also
recommended to
that the JPRA team should leave the facility, noting that the J
3 ''was particularly concerned over the [JPRA] CONOP having been sent [to JPRA headquarters]
without his staff's security review.,,1440 On September 22, 2003, the JPRA Commander directed
Lt Col Kleinman and Mr. Miller to return to the U.S., but told Mr. Russell to remain in place for
''the possible arrival of a follow-up team.,,1441 On September 23, 2003, the team's original
1436
1437
Committee staff interview ofLt Col Steven Kleinman (March 14, 2008).
1438
Ibid
1439
1440 Russell
Trip Report at 4.
1441 Ibid. _
The initial decision to keep Mr. Russell in theater may be relevant to discussions Col Moulton was
having with CENTCOM about the possibility of sending another three-man team to Iraq. Shortly after the original
team left for Iraq, Col Moulton began discussions about sending a JPRA team to assist CENTCOM. On September
3,2003, Col Moulton contacted the JPRArepresentative at CENTCOM and explained the genesis of their SMU TF
mission and how he thought such support might be expanded to other missions and organizations throughout the
CENTCOM AOR. Col Moulton wrote:
186
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
scheduled departure date, JPRA infonned the team that all three team members should leave
Iraq. 1442
12.
(U) The same day the JPRA team returned home from Iraq, a copy of the JPRA HVT
exploitation CONOP was sent to CAPT Donovan, the JFCOM SJA 1443 CAPT Donovan
commented on the CONOP in a September 26, 2003 email to Col Moulton, JPRA Deputy
Commander John Atkins, OSO Chief Christopher Wirts and others, and circulated a version of
the CONOP with his edits and comments.
(U) In his email, CAPT Donovan stated that JPRA should not rely on the March 6, 2003
Working Group report as "authoritative DoD guidance." He wrote that, although the Secretary
had approved certain counter-resistance techniques during interrogations of unlawful combatants
at GTMO, not all ofthe techniques listed in the Working Group report had been approved for
use. l444 CAPT Donovan also raised serious concerns about the legality ofthe interrogation
techniques in the CONOP emphasizing that, unlike in Mghanistan and at GTMO, the Geneva
Conventions applied in Iraq. He wrote:
Col Moulton also stated that he had pitched the idea to JFCOM:
I can
Having said that, I think the request needs to come from CENTCOM, not just _
support, and have already presented the concept to JFCOM. We just need the invite. Long-term
is to identify the need for an OSD OPR [Office of Primary Responsibility] for strategic
debrieftng/interrogation. To put it into football terms, we (JPRA) are the quarterback for
defensive resistance operations - there is no quarte~iveresistance opemtions.
Where that responsibility would ultimately fall (JP~ is not the issue, but mther
that someone has to take the lead.
1442
Russell Trip Report at 6; see also email from Mike Lampe to David Ayres (August 28, 2003).
1443
Email from CAPT Donovan to Col Moulton, Col Atkins, Mr. Wirts, and Mr. Jagielski (September 26, 2(03).
1444
Ibid
1445
Ibid
187
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
report, but also noted that even those techniques approved by the Secretary of Defense for use at
GTMO might not be lawful for use on detainees in Iraq. 1446
_
CAPT Donovan also substantially revised JPRA's "critical operational
exploitation principles" by, for example, adding that detainee treatment must be "in accordance
with the approved [Rules of Engagement]" and clarifying that Rules of Engagement must be .
within U.S. law and policy including - but not simply limited to -the Torture Convention. 1447
CAPT Donovan struck JPRA's reference to "constant sensory deprivation" completely, noting
that the technique was neither approved by the March 6, 2003 Working Group report nor by the
Secretary of Defense in his April 16, 2003 guidance for SOlITHCOM. 1448
_
Days later, CAPT Donovan raised his concerns about the CONOP to LTG
Wagner, JFCOM's Deputy Commander, and Maj Gen James Soligan, JFCOM's Chief of Staff,
in anticipation of a scheduled visit by the two to JPRA 1449 CAPT Donovan stated that while it
made "a certain amount of sense to seek JPRA's advice regarding interrogation techniques that
[had] been successfully used against us by our enemies," he was concerned that the SMU TF
"may have gone a bit further by asking JPRA to develop a CONOP for "more effective"
interrogations [by the SMU] ofHVTs captured in Iraq.,,14S0 He expressed particular concerns
with the "interrogation techniques" included in the CONOP:
A number of the 'interrogation techniques' suggested by JPRA in their draft
CONOP are highly aggressive (such as the 'water board') and it probably goes
without saying that if JPRA is to include such techniques in a CONOP they
prepare for an operational unit in another [Area of Responsibilityl, they need to be
damn sure they're appropriate in both a legal and a policy sense. 1 S1
13.
(U) In May 2004, the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General (lG) initiated a
review of DoD directed reports of detainee abuse. 14S2 As part ofthat review, the DoD IG looked
into JPRA's "offensive" interrogation support. In response to questions from the DoD IG, CAPT
Alan Kaufman, the JFCOM SJA, initiated an inquiry into JPRA's September 2003 support to the
SMU TF in Iraq. According to CAPT Kaufman, the scope of the JFCOM inquiry was narrow,
focusing only on whether or not the incidents described in Lt Col Kleinman's trip report had
1448
Ibid.
1449
Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to LTG Wagner, Maj Gen Soligan (September 29, 2003).
1450
Ibid
14'1
Ibid.
14'2
DoD IG Report.
188
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
been reported up the chain of command to JFCOM. 1453 On September 23, 2005, after JFCOM
concluded its inquiry, JFCOM's Deputy Commander LTG Wagner sent a memo to the DoD IG
stating:
This command looked into the information flow between the requesting unit, Joint
Personnel Recovery Agency, (JPRA) and the chain of command at USJFCOM
with regard to JPRA's participation in the two subject missions to assist in the
global war on terror. While most requests and decisions were verbal, I concluded
that information did flow up the chain of command to the appropriate authority.
Action was taken based on JPRA Commanding Officer's (CO) judgment and.
input from the chain of command ... 1454
(U) The memo continued:
The actions Lt Col Kleinman witnessed did occur. However, all others involved,
including the JPRA [Commanding Officer] and the [Commanding Officer] of the
task force believed them to be authorized actions under the existing decisions by
DoD General Counsel. The [Commanding Officer] conveyed this to Lt Col
Kleinman both during and after the deployment. Lt Col Kleinman did not seek
any other response or relief, nor take any issue up his chain of command. 1455
D.
Major General Geoffrey MilJer Leads GTMO Assessment Team to Iraq (U)
1.
(U) During the summer of2003 Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) ass~ed control
of coalition forces in Iraq from its predecessor, the Combined Forces Land Component
Command (CFLCC). The Commander of CJTF-7, LTG Sanchez, said that when he took over
from CFLCC he identified deficiencies with existing intelligence operations. 1456 LTG Sanchez
said that he participated in regular video teleconferences and phone calls with CENTCOM and
the Office ofthe Secretary of Defense (OSD) during which he shared his concerns about his
command's intelligence capabilities and asked for assistance. LTG Sanchez stated:
I was very concerned about our ability to really push the envelope to the limits of
our authority in interrogations. I went back to Washington and said "You've got
to send us some help because this is a problem that is way beyond an~hing we
could imagine and it's a problem that hasn't been faced by our Army.,,14 7
1453
1454 The ''two'' missions refer to the September 2003 trip to Iraq and the September 2002 JPRA training at Fort
Bragg. Memo from LTG Robert Wagner, Follow up response to June 2003 USJFCOM IG Meeting on DoD 10
Inquiry to USJFCOM of27 May 2005 (September 23,2005)
1455
Ibid
1456
1457
189
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Even before the CITF-7 Commander sought assistance, however, discussions had
apparently taken place about whether to send MG Geoffrey Miller, the GTMO Commander, to
Iraq to assess operations there. In May 2003, before CITF-7 took command in Iraq from
CFLCC, LTG Ronald Burgess, the Director for Intelligence (J-2) at the Joint Stafftold MG
Miller that a request would be forthcoming for him to lead an assessment trip to Iraq. 1458
According to an investigation conducted by MG George Fay and LTG Anthony Jones, the Joint
Stafflater requested that SOUTHCOM send a team to assist CENTCOM and the Iraq Survey
Group "with advice on facilities and operations specific to screening, interrogations, HUMINT
collection, and interagency integration in the short and long term.,,1459
(U) The.Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI) Stephen Cambone said that
MG Miller was asked to go to Iraq "at my encouragement, to take a look at the situation as it
existed there.,,1460 LTG William Boykin, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
and Warfighter Support said that the decision to send MG Miller to Iraq was made in a meeting
that included USDI Cambone and the Secretary ofDefense. 1461
2.
_
From August 31 to September 10, 2003, MG Miller led a team to assess
intelligence operations in Iraq. 1462 The ITF-GTMO Commander was accompanied by several
ITF-GTMO and former ITF-GTMO staff, including LTC Diane Beaver, the former SJA, and
David Becker, the former Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief. Additionally, MG Miller
brought representatives from the CIA and the DoD Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF).
MG Miller said that the purpose of his trip was to "make an assessment for the chain of
command," about the ability of U.S. forces in Iraq to conduct "strategic interrogation and
intelligence development and detention operations in theater.,,1463
(U) The day after arriving in Iraq, MG Miller met with LTG Sanchez and described the
purpose ofthe assistance visit, 1464 MG Miller said that his team was aware that the Geneva
Conventions applied in Iraq and told LTG Sanchez that he would have to decide what
recommendations were applicable to his command. MG Miller also met with MG Barbara Fast,
the CITF-7 Director of Intelligence, and gave her the same briefing.
14~ Anny IG, Interview ofMG Geoffrey Miller (October 20,2005) at 65; AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib
Detention Facility and 205 tb Military Intelligence Brigade (August 24, 2004) at 57 (hereinafter "Fay Report").
1459
Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Senate Committee on Anned Services, 108th Congress, S. Hrg.
1460
1461
1462 MG Geoffrey Miller, Assessment ofDoD Counterterrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq (U)
1463
1464
190
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
3.
(U) Following an initial visit to the Corps Holding Area at Camp Cropper, MG Miller's
assessment team visited the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) facilities. 1465 The ISG was established in
June 2003 with the mission to fmd weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or evidence of weapons
ofmass destruction and to provide support to the CIA special advisor. 1466 As part of its effort to
gather intelligence on WMD, the ISG interrogated and debriefed high value detainees, such as
former members of Saddam Hussein's regime. 1467 When MG Miller's team arrived at the
facility, the~ received a briefing from ISG personnel, toured the facilities, and observed ongoing
operations. 468
(U) Chief Warrant Officer Brian Searcy, who was Chief ofInterrogation at the ISG
accompanied MG Miller and his team on the tour. CWO Searcy told the Committee that during
the tour, MG Miller remarked that the ISG was "running a country club" and suggested that they
were too lenient with detainees. 1469 He said that MG Miller recommended the ISG shackle
detainees and make them walk on gravel rather than on concrete pathways to show the detainees
who was in control. CWO Searcy also recalled that the IfF-GTMO Commander suggested that
the ISG "GTMO-ize" their facility. 1470
Several members of the assessment team recalled the conditions at the Corps Holding Area. LTC Beaver
described the facility as "grotesque" and recalled telling lawyers at cm -7 about "stagnant water, maggots, feces
approximately 6 inches tall on the toilets and running down the sides of the toilets." She told the Committee that she
saw senior non-commissioned officers who were oblivious to their surroundings and that she recalled one guard tell
the visiting team "I don't give an. [expletive] if [the Iraqi prisoners] die."
146'
MG Miller said he was "dismayed and shocked at the operations" at Camp Cropper, referring to them as
"inappropriate, unprofessional, and not humane." MG Miller also called it "shocking'" that "the guards didn't even
know the rules of engagement for use ofdeadly force." MG Miller said that he told LTG Sanchez: "you have a
major problem at Camp Cropper and you need to take action now." According to MG Miller, LTG Sanchez asked
him to share his assessment with the 800th MP BDE Commander BG Janis Karpinski and direct that "corrections be
made in the next 48 hours." MG Miller said that, in a subsequent meeting with BG Karpinski, he met with
"significant pushback." He recalled his reaction in that meeting. "[I] kind of cleared the room and told General
Karpinski, 1said these are the fmdings, if you don't agree with them, let's you and 1go see General Sanchez because
he has directed that you take action to have corrective action be taken and in place within 48-hours. And so she
called the staff back in and started to go forward with it."
MG Miller told the Committee that BG Karpinski accepted the guidance, but not willingly. According to LTC
Beaver, the Corps Holding Area at Camp Cropper was closed shortly after the team left Iraq. Sworn Statement of
LTC Diane Beaver (December 10, 2004) at 1; Committee staff interview of LTC Diane Beaver (November 9, 2(07);
Army!G, Interview ofMG Geoffrey Miller (June 28, 2(05) at 68.
1466
1467
Ibid. at 52.
1468
1469
Ibid
14'70
Ibid.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) MG Miller did not recall referring to the ISG as a "country club" and said that, as far
as he knew, he "never used the word GTMO_ize.,,1471 However, he did recall telling ISG
personnel that he was troubled that the ISG were treating detainees with too much respect, which
was not, in his opinion, how prisoners ought to be treated. 1472
(U) Mike Kamin, the ISG's Collection Manager said that LtCol Ken Rapuano, the ISG's
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIOC) Chief, was "energized" after meeting with MG
Miller and said that the GTMO Commander had told him about techniques like temperature
manipulation and sleep deprivation. 1473 Ac~Mr. Kamin, ISG JIDC personnel balked at
an ISG strategic debriefer said that he
the idea of implementing such techniques. _
wrote a letter to his chain of command stating that he would resign ifthe techniques were
. Iemented 1474
unp
(U) LtCol Rapuano said that he met with MG Miller and members of his team in a
meeting with MG Keith Dayton, the ISG Commander, and other members ofISG's leadership.
UCol Rapuano said that he did not recall a discussion of specific interrogation techniques but
did recall "some discussion of procedures for air conditioning cells.,,147S LtCol Rapuano said did
not recall any discussions of sleep deprivation as an interrogation technique.
(U) At the end of the visit, MG Miller met with MG Dayton and members of his staff.
MG Dayton said that MG Miller told him that the ISG was "not getting much out ofthese
people" and was "not getting the maximum.,,1476 MG Dayton said he asked what was meant by
that and was told "you haven't broken [the detainees]" psychologically. 1477 MG Dayton said that
MG Miller told him that he would "get back to you with some ideas of how you can Rerhaps deal
with these people where you can actually break them, some techniques you can use." 478 The
ISG Commander stated:
I remember very clearly saying, "Geoff, slow down. We're not changing anything right
now. You know, we think we're within the rules. If you want me to change something,
1471 Committee staff interview of MG Geoffrey Miller (December 6, 2007); Interview of MG Geoffrey Miller for
Javal Davis trial (August 21,2004). The former JTF-GlMO ICE Chief David Becker, who was present during the
ISG visit did not recall the MG Miller using the term UG lMO-ize." Committee staff interview of David Becker
(September 17, 2007).
1472
1473
1474
147~ LtCol Rapuano said that "the issue discussed, without decision, was if it was appropriate that detainees were
being provided cooler living conditions than most Coalition personnel had in their living quarters and work areas,
and whether only the cooperative detainees should be rewarded with cooler cells." Kenneth Rapuano answers to
September 3,2008 written questions from Senator Carl Levin (September 16, 2008).
1476
1477
Ibid.
1478
Ibid
192
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
you give me something in writing that you think needs to be changed. I'll have my
lawyers look at it. 1479
(U) Although MG Miller recalled saying that he was troubled that detainees at the ISG
were being treated with too much respect, he did not recall using the term "break.,,1480 As to
techniques to get more information from detainees, MG Miller said he only recalled discussing
the possibility ofISG interrogating detainees more frequently. According to MG Dayton, MG
Miller never followed up with him after the trip. 1481
4.
II
Following the visit to the ISG, MG Miller, John Antonitis, the former Director ofthe
Joint Interrogation Group at ITF-GTMO, and the Superintendent o~F-GTMO,
visited the Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) facility. _
the SMU
TF Commander, said he had contacted MG Miller at ITF-GTMO to request assistance with his
detention and interrogation operations. 1482 MG Miller, however, said that~did
not request the visit and th~U TF was not even on his initial itinerary.
In
fact, MG Miller described _
as not "open" to a visit and said that when his staff
called the SMU TF to schedule the visit, they initially said "no" to the visit.
II MG Miller said that he and two other members of his team met with~
and a few of his operators for about 45 minutes to an hour at the SMU TF facility.
The ITF
GTMO Commander did not see an SOP for SMU TF interrogations and recalled that the SMU
TF Commander told him the SMU TF was using operators as interrogators. MG Miller said that
he told
that he needed to establish interrogation authorities and obtain qualified
interrogators. For several month~ing with MG Miller, SMU TF Legal Advisors
to sign an interrogation policy for the facility
had tried, without success, to get _
under his command. 1485
While she did not accompany the ITF-GTMO Commander on his visit to the SMU
TF, LTC Beaver, the former ITF-GTMO SJA, said that a Legal Advisor for the SMU TF
contacted her and arranged to meet with her at Camp Victory. 1486 According to LTC Beaver, the
SMU TF Legal Advisor raised concerns with her about physical violence being used b SMU TF
personnel during interrogations, including punching, choking, and beating detainees. 14 7 He told
1419
Ibid at 34.
1480
1481 DoD IG, Interview of MG Keith Dayton (May 25, 2005) at 34~ Committee staff interview of LTG Keith Dayton
(June I, 2007).
1482
1483
1484
Ibid
1485
1486
1487
193
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
her that he was "risking his life" by talking to her about these issues. 1488 LTC Beaver told the
Committee that the S M U ~ i dhe had also raised these issues with the Commander
ofthe SMU TF, but that
was not receptive to his concerns.
II
LTC Beaver told the Committee that she infonned both COL Marc Warren (the
CITF-7 SJA) and MG Miller about her conversation with the SMU TF Legal Advisor. 1489
When he met with the Committee, MG Miller did not recall LTC Beaver bringing those concerns
to his attention. 1490 A slide presentation summarizing the GTMO assessment team's visit to
Iraq, however, stated that there were "concerns about [SMU TF] interrogation practices such as
physical contact and choking.,,1491 The same presentation noted that other governmental
agencies "won't interrogate at [the SMU TF] facility because of current treatment concerns.,,1492
5.
(U) During their assessment visit, the ITF-GTMO Commander's team held several
meetings with CJTF-7 interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib and Camp Victory. According to
COL Thomas Pappas, the 20S th MI BDE Commander, conversations with MG Miller focused on
the range of intelligence capabilities that would enable effective interrogations. 1493 COL Pa.r~as
stated that the "tenor ofthe discussions was that we had to get tougher with the detainees.,,1
(U) CPT Wood, the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC) at Abu Ghraib said her
conversations with the ITF-GTMO Commander "centered on renovations and improvements of
facilities, challenges of interrogation operations, and the need for increased [Military
Police/Military Intelligence] cooperation.,,1495 CPT Wood believed that MG Miller and his team
wanted to build a "miniature Guantanamo Bay.,,1496 In her view, however, the GTMO concept
was not applicable to Abu Ghraib. She stated:
... Abu Ghraib wasn't GTMO. The prison was an austere environment; it was not
conducive to interrogation operations like GMTO. That was actually built and
designed to facilitate interrogation operations. We didn't have the MP force that
was necessary for such a high population and we were frequent targets of small
arms and mortar attacks. We worked in a hundred and thirty degree weather
1488
Ibid
1489
Ibid
14llO
1491
1492
Ibid
COL Pappas stated that the discussions were broad but focused on the understanding that "interrogation is what
drives the train," as well as developing a "singular unified purpose that was to extract information" from detainees.
Army IG,lnterview of COL Thomas Pappas (April 12, 2006) at 10, 12, 15.
1493
1494
Ibid at 10.
149~
1496
194
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
without air conditioning and we went throu~ the winter without heat. Most of
the detainees were not of intelligence value. 1 97
(U) MG Miller said that he spent parts ofthree days at Abu Ghraib with COL Pappas and
CPT Wood discussing how to improve operations. 1498 LTG Sanchez recalled that the team
"recommended the creation of a command policy" on interrogations and the team provided
CITF-7 with electronic copies of SOPs and a copy ofa Joint Staffpolicy memorandum entitled
"Interrogation Techniques in the War on Terrorism,,1499 According to MG Miller, members of
his assessment team also discussed interrogation authorities and techniques during their meetings
with CITF-7 personnel. 1500
(U) CPT Wood said that members ofthe GTMO assessment team had, in their
possession, copies ofthe proposed interrogation policy she had copied from the SMU Task
Force's interrogationpolicy and submitted to her chain of command prior to the assessment
team's visit. 1501 That proposed policy included presence of military working dogs, stress
positions, sleep management, 20-hour interrogations, isolation, and yelling, loud music, and light
control. 1502 CPT Wood said that a member ofthe GTMO assessment team referred to her
proposal as a "good start," but told her that CITF-7 "should consider something along the lines
of what's approved for use in [GTMO].,,1503 LTC Beaver recalled reviewing CPT Wood's
proposed SOP. LTC Beaver said that she was concerned about the SOP because she knew that,
"in a Geneva setting, it was potentially a problem," that she brought it to the attention of COL
Marc Warren, the CITF-7 SJA and recommended that he review it 1504
(U) David Becker, the former ITF-GTMO ICE Chief, recalled discussing stress positions,
dogs, and nudity with COL Pappas during the visit. Mr. Becker said:
[W]hat I told Pappas was, look I understand they're doing all kinds of different
approaches out there. And I talked about the memo that was approved for
Guantanamo at one point. I said look, when you use stress positions; when you
use dogs; when you use - I mean when you use stress positions, dogs, nakedness .
. . the concept ofthe conversation was as you develop these techniques, talk to the
interrogators. Figure out what they want to use and put it in writing. And you
have to establish left and right lanes in the road for the conduct of interrogations.
And you've got to do it in writing. And then you've got to build the interrogation
1497 Army
1498
1499
1'00
1'01
Sworn Statement of CPT Carolyn Wood (May 21,2004) at 6; see Section XII B, supra.
1'02
UOJ
1~ SASC Hearing (June 17, 2008); Committee staff interview of LTC Beaver (October 11, 2007).
195
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
plan and you've got the interrogators to stick to it. And that's what I said. And
the "use of dogs" came up in that conversation. 1505
(U) COL Pappas recalled discussions with the GTMO assessment team about do~s being
"effective in doing interrogations with Arabs" and talk of"Arabs being fearful of dogs." 506
COL Pappas said that while no one from MG Miller's team said "okay, use the dogs while
you're doing an interrogation" there was discussion "about 'setting conditions for
interrogations. ",1507 COL Pappas later authorized the use of dogs in interrogations at Abu
Ghraib. 1508
(U) COL Pappas also recalled discussing dogs with MG Miller during the visit. In a
February 2004 interview, COL Pappas said that the use of dogs had been "a technique that [he]
had discussed with Miller" during the IfF-GTMO assistance visit to Iraq.1509 COL Pappas
stated that MG Miller "said that they used military working dogs, and that they were effective in
setting the atmosphere for which ... you could get information.,,1510 In a later interview, COL
Pappas again described his discussions with MG Miller:
There was never any discussion [with the IfF-GTMO Commander] of the
execution of how the dogs would be used Now he did say that dogs were an
effective technique to use with the detainees. He did say we want to make sure
we control the detainee at all times. The I-bolts in the floor came from MG
Miller's team ... He did meet with some of the interrogators and told them to be
more aggressive, but he never told them how. His overtone was to be more
aggressive, but I never heard him say take dogs into the booths or anything like
that. 15H
(U) MAT David DiNenna, the Operations Officer (8-3) ofthe 320 th MP BN also recalled
a discussion with MG Miller about dogs. According to MAT DiNenna, during a meeting at Abu
Ghraib, MG Miller asked him whether or not they had military working dogs. 1512 MAT DiNenna
1505
Anny IG, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (April 12, 2006) at 10. In a 2007 interview with Committee staff,
COL Pappas recalled having discussions with former JTF -GTMO ICE Chief David Becker, but did not recall if the
use of dogs came up in those discussions. Committee staff interview of COL Thomas Pappas (October 12, 2(07).
1506
1507
Anny IG, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (April 12, 2006) at 10.
Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas to LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to c.rrF-7 Interrogation and
Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003).
1508
1509
Anny 15-6 Investigation, Interview of COL Thomas Pappas (February 12,2004) at 28.
1510
Ibid. at 29.
196
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
told MG Miller that they did not, but that he had "requested them when [he] first arrived at Abu
[Ghraib], and since that time, had made numerous requests.,,1513 MAJ DiNenna said:
MG Miller then looked at COL Pappas and stated that dogs have been extremely
useful at GITMO. He stated, "These people are scared to death of dogs, and the
dogs have a tremendous affect.,,1514
(U) MAJ DiNenna said that he was "concerned that [MG Miller] was implying MI would
receive the dogs at Abu [Ghraib], yet I desperately needed them as a force multiplier for the
facilities. ,,1515
(U) MGMiller maintained that he and COL Pappas "never discussed using dogs in
interrogations.,,1516 He stated that his discussions about dogs with COL Pappas were "in the
context of security operations and force protection.,,1517 MG Miller said, however, that he did
not discuss the use of dogs at all with BG Janis Karpinski, the Commander of the 800th MP BDE
or anyone else in her unit, which was responsible for security operations and force protection at
the prison. ISIS
6.
(U) During his assessment visit, the JTF-GTMO Commander provided an "interim
update" to LTG Sanchez and recommended that CJTF -7 "establish interrogation authorities so
the interrogators understand what their limits are.,,1519 MG Miller stated that he also directed
LTC Beaver to "let [CJTF-7] see what we use at Guantanamo as a template," referring to the
Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 guidance for SOUTHCOM. 1520 MG Miller stated that,
with respect to GTMO's guidance from the Secretary, he told LTG Sanchez:
[T]he first caveat was that the Geneva Convention applied here. You must use
only Geneva Convention authorities. You may not use anything other unless you
get approval from SecDef to go about doing that. And so if you're going to ask
for any of those, you got to go through the CENTCOM Commander and up to
JCS and OSD to get approval from there. 1521
1m
Ibid
1514
Ibid
ljlj
Ibid at 21.
1516
1m Ibid
1'18
Ibid at 73.
lH9
Ibid at 69.
mOIbid
all
Ibid
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) LTG Sanchez said that he instructed his SJA to develop an interrogation policy, the
"key purpose" of which was to "unequivocally establish as policy adherence to the Geneva
Convention and to regulate approach techniques that we believed were derived from multiple
sources" including the Army Field Manual, and techniques used in Guantanamo Bay and
Afghanistan. 1S22
(U) LTC Beaver said that she left the April 16, 2003 memo from Secretary Rumsfeld
with the CITF-71egal staff She also said that she told COL Marc Warren, the CITF-7 SJA, and
other lawyers on the CITF-7 staffthat while the policy had worked at Guantanamo, that CITF-7
"would need to evaluate what was permissible in Iraq and what the command thought would
i'
"IS23
. th
work 10
s enVlfonment.
(U) According to COL Pappas, CITF-7 be~an drafting an interrogation policy while MG
Miller and his assessment team were still in Iraq.l 24 He said that LTC Beaver, and several
CITF-7lawyers worked on a memo at Camp Victory. MG Miller said that, while he did not
know who actually drafted the memo, LTC Beaver told him that she worked on the issue with
COL Warren and his staff. 1S2S LTC Beaver did not recall working on an interrogation policy
during the assessment visit. IS26
7.
At the conclusion of the assessment trip, MG Miller produced a trip report that
described the team's fmdings. 1S27 The trip report echoed what the ITF-GTMO Commander had
_
told LTG Sanchez and MG Fast with regard to interrogation guidelines. The report stated "the
team observed that the Task Force [CITF-7] did not have authorities and procedures in place to
affect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in
Iraq. "IS28 While the report did not discuss specific interrogation approaches or techniques, it did
recommend ways in which the CITF could improve the interrogation process:
Interrogations are [being] conducted without a clear strategy for implementing a
long-term approach strategy and clearly defined interrogation policies and
authorities. To achieve rapid exploitation of internees it is necessary to integrate
detention operations, interrogation operations, and collection management under
one command authority.1S29
ms Ibid at 2.
m9Ibid at 4.
198
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) Subsequent to the assessment trip, six GTMO personnel- three interrogators and
three analysts - were sent to Abu Ghraib to assist in implementing the GTMO recommendations
and in establishing a Joint Intelligence and Debriefmg Center. 1530
8.
(U) MG Miller presented his trip report to SOUTHCOM and was subsequently told that it
was forwarded to the Joint Staff and OSD. 1531 He was subsequently directed to brief senior
Department of Defense officials on his assessment visit and the report. MG Miller told the Army
Inspector General (IG) that the briefing took place in October and was attended by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary ofDefense for Intelligence Steven
Cambone, as well as senior military officers including LTG Ronald Burgess, the Director for
Intelligence at the Joint Staff. According to MG Miller, his briefing covered "the ability ofthe
CITF-7 to be able to execute the strategic interrogation mission to develop intelligence, actual
intelligence and an assessment of CITF-7's ability to detain civilian detainees in accordance with
the Geneva Convention and ARI90_8.,,1532 Following the briefing, the GTMO Commander met
privately with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone. 1533
(U) While MG Miller said that Under Secretary Cambone attended the briefing, Under
Secretary Cambone testified on May 11, 2004 before the Senate Armed Services Committee that
he was, in fact "not briefed" by the GTMO Commander on the trip report. 1534 In his written
answer to a question for the record following his testimony, Under Secretary Cambone stated
that, in fact, he "was never officially briefed on MG Miller's report."m5 Just over a week after
Under Secretary Cambone's testimony, MG Miller testified before the Committee that he had
"no direct discussions" with Under Secretary Cambone following his visit to Iraq. 1536
(U) In August 2004, however, MG Miller told Army Investigators that, followinf his
return from Iraq he "gave an outbriefto both Dr. Wolfowitz and Secretary Cambone.,,15 7 The
GTMO Commander went on to state ''the meeting that I had with Secretary Cambone had
occurred after I returned... The discussion generally was about how we could improve the flow
of intelligence from Iraq through and in interrogations."m8
59.
1'31
in2
Ibid at 4.
in3
Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Congress, S. Hrg.
108-868 (May 11, 2004) at 339.
13:J4
B3'
Ibid at 371.
Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Congress, S. Hrg.
108-868 (May 19, 2004) at 594.
1'36
in7 Interview
in8
Ibid.
199
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) More than a year later, in October 2005, the Army IG asked MG Miller about his
testimony to the Committee that he had not had "direct discussions" with Under Secretary
Cambone. Despite previously describing a "discussion" with Under Secretary Cambone, MG
Miller told the IG that when asked at [the Senate Armed Services Committee] about discussions
with Under Secretary Cambone after his trip, "I said no because I didn't have discussions with
Cambone.,,1539 MG Miller also told the Army IG that he didn't even know that the person
attending the meeting was Dr. Cambone until Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz used his name.,,1540
The Army IG also asked MG Miller about the smaller meeting that he attended with Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary Cambone immediately following his briefing. MG
Miller said that the reason for the smaller meeting was so that he could give the ''unvarnished
truth" about his visit and said that he told Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Under Secretary
Cambone during that smaller meeting that CJTF-7 was at risk for "mission failure. ,,1541
(U) Under Secretary Cambone stated in December 2006 that his records indicated that he
"did attend MG Miller's briefing to Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz," but that he did "not remember
participating in any substantive discussions." Under Secretary Cambone said that he had "no
personal recollection" ofthe smaller meeting that took place subsequent to MG Miller's
briefing. 1542
(U) During his December 20, 2007 interview with Committee staff, MG Miller said that
he did not learn that Under Secretary Cambone was in attendance at the briefing until someone
referred to him by name either during or after his briefmg. 1543 He stated that, when he was asked
at the May 2004 Committee hearing about discussions with Under Secretary Cambone, he had
forgotten that Under Secretary Cambone had actually attended the briefing. MG Miller said his
use ofthe word "discussion" in his August 2004 testimony to describe his interaction with
Undersecretary Cambone was an imprecise use of words. MG Miller stated that, in the smaller
meeting he attended following his briefing with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and Undersecretary
Cambone, that Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz simply thanked him for his work.
E.
(U) On September 14,2003, less than a week after MG Miller's team left Iraq, LTG
Sanchez issued the first CJTF-7 "Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy." The September
14,2003 policy stated that the Geneva Conventions were applicable in
and that Coalition
Forces "will continue to treat all persons under their control humanely.,,15 LTG Sanchez stated
1ra:J
1~39 Army
1~40
Ibid
1~41
Ibid. at 82.
1~42
Letter from Under Secretary Stephen Cambone to Senator John Warner (December 19, 2006).
B43
B44
200
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
that he issued the policy because FM 34-52 left the "universe of approaches to the imagination of
the interrogator" and demanded additional structure. 1545
(U) According to LTG Sanchez, the September 14,2003 policy "drew heavily" on the
Secretary of Defense's April 16, 2003 guidance for GTMO. I546 Indeed, the September 14,2003
policy included all 24 interrogation techniques that were in that guidance, as well as techniques
that CPT Wood had copied from the SMU TF in Iraq's interrogation policy and submitted for
approval. The latter included the presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sleep
management, loud music, and light control. 1547 The techniques CPT Wood had copied from the
SMU TF policy had, in tum, been based on techniques included in the interrogation policy used
by the SMU TF in Afghanistan. That policy was influenced, in turn, by the Secretary of
Defense's December 2,2002 approval of aggressive interrogation techniques for use at
GTMO. 1548
(U) Although some ofthe techniques authorized by the September 14, 2003 CITF-7
policy required the CITF-7 Commander's approval before they could be used on Enemy
Prisoners of War (EPWs), LTG Sanchez stated that "with few exceptions, persons captured after
May 1, 2003 were not entitled to EPW status as a matter oflaw.,,1549 CPT Wood said that, to her
knowledge, there were no EPWs held at Abu Ghraib. 1550
(U) LTG Sanchez stated that CITF-7 forwarded the September 14, 2003 policy to
CENTCOM with a cover memorandum stating that the policy was based on that used at
Guantanamo Bay, but "modified for applicability to a theater of war in which the Geneva
Conventions apply.,,1551 LTG Sanchez stated that his intent, unless otherwise directed, was to
"immediately implement the policy outlined in the memo.,,1552
2.
(U) The September 14, 2003 policy went into effect for interrogators at Abu Ghraib as
soon as it was issued. CPT Wood stated that she briefed the new policy for all ofthe [number
1~4~ Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2004) at 9, 12.
1546
Ibid at 8.
1547 The September 14, 2003 CITF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy did not include sensory
deprivation, which was also included in CPT Wood's August 27,2003 policy proposal. CITF-7 Interrogation and
Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003); Alpha Company, 519ib MI BN SFIF Interrogation TTPS (August
27,2003).
1~48 The September 14, 2003 policy also included "Mutt and leff," which was part of the 1987 version of Army FM
34-52, but not the 1992 version of the Army Field Manual 34-52. CITF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance
Policy (September 14,2003).
CJTF_7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003); Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez
(October 2004) at 8.
1549
Ibid
201
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
of] interrogators and analysts working for her. She stated that during the briefin~, "the
interrogators took turns reading [the September 14 policy] line by line aloud." 15 3 She stated
that each interrogator present signed a document noting that he or she had received training on
the policy. CPT Wood said that personnel who arrived at Abu Ghraib after CITF-7 issued the
policy were briefed on it during in-processing.
(U) CPT Wood also developed a Memorandum for Record on CITF-7 Interrogation
Rules of Engagement (IROE) to be signed by all personnel at Abu Ghraib in contact with
detainees. 1554 The IROE stated that the interrogation approaches specified in Army FM 34-52, as
well as yelling, light control, loud music, deception, and false flag were "approved for all
detainees, regardless of status (security detainees, civilian internees, or EPWs).,,1555 Use of other
approaches authorized by the September 14,2003 CITF-7 memorandum, including stress
positions, presence of dogs, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment,
and sleep management, were to be approved by the interrogation officer in charge or the non
commissioned officer in charge.
(U) At least one version ofthe IROE used a September 10, 2003 CJTF-7 draft policy as
its basis, rather than the September 14 approved policy. 1556 That IROE also listed sensory
deprivation as "approved in accordance with the CITF-7 policy.',1557 While CPT Wood had
requested sensory deprivation and the technique had been included in a September 10, 2003 draft
policy, it was not among those listed in the September 14,2003 policy approved by CJTF-7.
CPT Wood acknowledged that she may have used the wrong policy as a basis for her IROE. 1558
3.
(U) LTG Sanchez said that when he issued the September 14, 2003 policy, there was
agreement in the CITF-71egal community that the techniques in the policy were lawful. He said
that that consensus was developed in the absence of guidance from CENTCOM, who he said
believed the issue was too contentious and would not give CITF-7 legal guidance. 1559 LTG
Sanchez said that ''time was of the essence" so he "decided to publish the September
memorandum knowing that discussions were ongoing as to the legality of some ofthe
approaches included in the memorandum. ,,1560
1m Ibid
1556
ms Committee staff interview of CPT Carolyn Wood (February 11,2008); CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter
Resistance Policy (September 10, 2003).
m9 Committee staff interview of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (December 20, 2007).
1560
202
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
LTG Sanchez stated that when the September 14, 2003 policy reached .
CENTCOM, it "energized the legal community there and that COL Fred Pribble [the
CENTCOM SJA] had concerns.,,1561 LTG Sanchez said that CENTCOM lawyers thought some
techniques in the September 14 policy came too close to the boundary.1562 COL Marc Warren,
the CJTF-7 SJA, stated that the CENTCOM SJA "raised concerns to us that the policy was
objectionable in that aspects ofthe approved approaches were impermissibly coercive.,,1563
II On September 15,2003, the day after the policy was issued, COL Warren sent a copy
to COL Pribble and William "Barry" Hammill, CENTCOM's Deputy SJA, stating "this is pretty
tame stuff, largely a direct lift from the Army Interrogation FM. The genesis of this product was
the visit by MG Miller's GITMO team.,,1564 The next day, Mr. Hammill asked Major Carrie
Ricci, the Chief of International Law at CENTCOM to review the policy. 1565 That same day,
MAJ Ricci responded in an email stating that "Many of the techniques appear to violate [Geneva
Convention] III and IV and should not be used on [enemy prisoners of war] or [civilian
internees]. The [Geneva Conventions] prohibits all coercive interrogation techniques.,,1566
.On
September 17,2003, COL Pribble sent a copy ofMAJ Ricci's email to COL
Warren who responded that "almost all ofthese techniques are right out of the Field Manual and
are in use now.,,1567 That same day, MAJ Ricci responded:
Gentlemen, it's the techniques that are not in the field manual that concern me.
Techniques such as dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep
adjustment, sleep management, yelling, loud music, light control, stress positions,
etc. many of these techniques appear to violate [Geneva Convention] III, Article
17: ''No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion may be
inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind
whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted,
or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."
... My recommendation is that the interrogation policy be kept in conformity
with the [Field Manual] ... I would hesitate to put in writing how we are directing
interrogations beyond what is in the [Field Manual]. If CJTF-7 wants to take
advantage of the additional measures used at Guantanamo, this should be limited
to detainees who are not entitled to [Geneva Convention] protections or else I
1'61
COL Mark Warren, Judge Advocate Interview Questions (June 25, 2004).
1'64
Email from COL Marc Warren to COL Fred Pribble and William Hammill (September 15, 2003).
1'6'
Email from William Hammill to MAl Carrie Ricci (September 16, 2003).
1'66
Email from MAJ Carrie Ricci to William Hammill (September 16, 2003).
I'67 Email from COL Marc Warren to COL Fred Pribble, MAl Carrie Ricc~ and William Hammill (September 17,
2003).
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
believe we should still seek SECDEF approval- and I am doubtful some of these
techniques will be approved. The policy as written is troublesome. 1568
_Later that day, MAl Ricci spoke with COL Warren by phone. 1569 In a subsequent
email to Mr. Hammill she said that COL Warren was "going to try and re-work the policy. He
is understandably unhappy that the policy was already signed by the [Commanding General] and
now the SJA has the regrettable task oftellin~ the [Commanding General] the policy has
problems - but that's what we get paid for."l 70
In a September 22,2003 email to MAl Ricci, CENTCOM SJA COL Fred Pribble
said "During my sitdown with COL Warren in Baghdad, he was pretty quick to admit that we
(read you) had made the right call and that they would scrub the policy."l571
_ L T G Sanchez said that after CJTF-7 and CENTCOM lawyers began to debate the
policy that he and COL Warren again reviewed the memo. LTG Sanchez stated that COL
Warren told him:
"Yes, they are legal. There is some dissent and different opinions within the legal
community. Some of these may be harsher than others, and in order for us to
eliminate debate and get consensus, we probably ought to put some ofthese aside,
and oh, by the way, they probably wouldn't get us too much anyway if we
implemented them." I said "Okay, fine let's get consensus. Go ahead and
constrain it (the September policy). ,,1572
4.
(U) On October 12,2003, nearly a month after MAl Ricci's concerns were brought to
COL Warren's attention, LTG Sanchez issued a revised interrogation policy, eliminating all
techniques not listed in either the 1987 or 1992 versions ofthe Army Field manual. Techniques
removed from the list of authorized techniques included dietary manipulation, environmental
manipulation, sleep adjustment, false flag, presence of military working dogs, sleep
management, stress positions, and yelling, loud music, and light control. 1573 CJTF-7 also
removed isolation and added "segregation" to the new policy. The October 12,2003 policy
Email from MN Carrie Ricci to COL Marc Warren, COL Fred Pribble, and William Hammill (September 16,
2(03).
1568
1569
m'OIbid
1m Email from COL Fred Pribble to MAJ Carrie Ricci and William Hammill (September 22, 2003).
1m Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23,2004) at 4.
The October 12, 2003 policy also eliminated two Army FM techniques - change of scenery up and change of
scenery down. CJTF-7 Memorandum for C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, C3, Combined Joint Task Force
Seven, Commander, 205 tb Military Intelligence Brigade, c.rrF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy
(October 12, 2(03) (hereinafter "c.rrF-7 Interrogation and Counur-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003)").
1573
204
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
stated that the CITF-7 Commanding General had to approve se~egation in all cases exceeding
"30 days in duration, whether consecutive or nonconsecutive.,,1 74
(U) CITF-7 removed ''the presence of military dogs" from the list of interrogation
techniques in the October 12,2003 policy, but added a line in the "General Safeguards" section
ofthe policy stating that "Should working dogs be present during interro~ations, they will be
muzzled and under the control of a handler at all times to ensure safety." 575 Despite references
to dogs in both the September 14,2003 interrogation policy and the October 12,2003
interrogation policy, LTG Sanchez said that the "intent for the use of dogs was always focused
on the security contributions they make in a detention facility" and that there was "no explicit
direction, guidance, or condoning ofthe use of unmuzzled dogs in the conduct of
interrogations.,,1576 LTG Sanchez acknowledged that placement of "presence of military
working dogs" in the interrogation techniques section ofthe September 14 policy was
"confusing.,,1577 He said that he removed the "presence of military working dogs" from the list
of interrogation techniques in the October policy and put it in the general safeguards section to
make it "clear that using dogs for the deliberate purpose of frightening a detainee was not
pennitted.,,1578
(U) LTG Sanchez stated that "It is certainly clear under the October 2003 policy that the
use of military working dogs in interrogations would require an exception to policy granted by
me.,,1579 COL Pappas stated, however, that he believed that the October 12,2003 interrogation
policy "delegated to me the authority to approve the use of muzzled dogs. ,,1580
(U) The October 12,2003 policy also stated that requests to use interrogation approaches
not listed in the policy "will be submitted to [the CITF-7 Commander] through CITF-7 [Director
for Intelligence] and will include a description ofthe proposed approach and recommended
safeguards." 1581
(U) CPT Wood at Abu Ghraib said that when the October 12,2003 policy was issued, her
interrogators signed a new Interrogation Rules of Engagement Memorandum (IROE).1582 The
new IROE listed all ofthe techniques identified in the October 12, 2003 policy and stated that
they were "approved for all detainees, regardless of status."1583 The IROE also listed approaches
m4 CJTF-7Inte"ogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2(03).
1m Ibid
m6 Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (October 2(04) at 21; Statement of LTG Ricardo Sanchez (November 23,
2004) at 3 (emphasis added).
1377
1378
Ibid
15'79
1!80
1381
1382
1'83
Memorandum for Record CJTF-7 Inte"ogation Rules ofEngagement (October 16, 2003).
205
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
not explicitly approved in the October 12, 2003 policy, but which had to be requested through
the Interrogation Officer in Charge to the CJTF-7 Commanding General. The IROE listed nine
examples of such techniques, presence of military working dogs, stress positions, sensory
deprivation, dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment, isolation, sleep
management, and change of scenery down. 1584
F.
B84
Ibid.
1 5 8 5 _estionnaire
The Department of Defense produced two documents to the Committee in response to the request for the
October SOP. Neither of those two documents is dated and one appears to be a draft written sometime after
December 18 2003. See Department of Defense Headquarters, Joint Task Force_Baghdad Airbase,
Iraq,_Battlefield Inte~tyrreamStanding Oper~dures; Department of Defense
Headquarters, Joint Task Force _ _ Baghdad Airbase, Iraq, _ _ Battiefield Interrogation Team and
temporary Facility Standing Operating Procedures. The Department stated in a March 10, 2008 letter that the
documents provided in response to the Committee's request for the October 25,2003 SOP were "reasonably close to
the time frame and location requested." Letter from ASD Robert Wilkie to Chairman Carl Levin (March 10, 2008).
The Department has also informed the Committee that after "multiple searches we were unable to locate an SOP
with the exact October 25, 2003 date." Email from Thomas Alexander to Committee staff (April 9, 2008).
1586.
1587
B88.
Although the Church Special Focus Team Report identified "repeat and control" as a technique that went
beyond the Army FM, it could also arguably be classified as a Field Manual technique.
1589
CJTF-Ts September 14, 2003 SOP included "sleep management" and "sleep adjustment." See SectionXll E,
supra.
206
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
There is evidence that at least one te~not in the SOP - removal of
clothing - was in use at the SMU TF in late 2003. _ s t a t e d that when he took
command in October 2003, he "discovered that some ofthe detainees were not allowed clothes"
,1591 He said that he did not
as an interrogation technique
know where the technique came from.
Weeks prior to his October 2003 arrival, however,
JPRA instructors had striEfed a detainee during their assistance visit to the SMU TF facility as
part ofan interrogation. 1 9 Terrence Russell, the JPRA training manager wh~
JPRA team of instructors at the SMU TF, said that the detainee was stripped _
,15!14 Mr. Russell stated that
''we've done this 100 times, 1000 times with our [SERE school] students. ,,1595
stated that he was ''uncomfortable'' with stripping detainees and
that "stripping a detainee just didn't seem right to [him] even though arguably, it was an
effective technique.,,1596 He said he terminated the practice in December 2003 or January 2004.
1'_
H91
1'92
1'93
l'I)4.Ibid
1'9'
Ibid.
1'96
1'97 MG
Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation ofthe 80rf' Military Police Brigade (hereinafter "Taguba
Report'') at 16.
1'98
207
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
methods as "isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of clothing and humiliation, [and] the
use of dogs as an interrogation tool to induce fear, and physical abuse. ,,1599
A.
(U) The use of military working dogs to exploit detainee fears was authorized on
December 2,2002 by the Secretary of Defense for use at Guantanamo Bay. 1601 Weeks later, the
technique appeared in a January 24,2003 memorandum from CITF-180's Deputy Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA) and was subsequently considered available for use in Mghanistan. 1602 The use
of dogs was also among those techniques authorized for use at the SMU TF in Iraq. 1603
_Following MG Miller's assistance visit to Iraq in August and September 2003,
CITF-7 had submitted a request for three military police dog teams "to provide an increased
security posture" to support detention and interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. l604
(U) The dog teams arrived at Abu Ghraib on November 20,2003. 1605 According to MG
Fay's report, "abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived"
with the first incident occurring on November 24,2003. 1606 Major General Fay's report
documented seven other times over the next six weeks when dogs were used, including three
occasions in which they were used in interrogations, one occasion the report referred to as "an
7.
1600
Ibid at 8.
1601
1603
1604
See Deployment Order 231, referencing U.S. CENTCOM October 9,2003 request for forces.
160'
1606
Ibid
208
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
apparent [Military Intelligence] directed use of dogs in detainee abuse," and one incident
described as dogs being used likely as a '''softening up' technique for future interrogations.,,1607
th
1607 Ibid
1608
at 85-87.
1609 Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas for LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to CJl'F-7 Interrogation and
Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003).
1610
1611
1611
1613
1614
161'
Memo from COL Foster P Payne II for Joint Interrogation and Debriefmg Center, Suspension o/Use o/Military
Working Dogs (February 19, 2004).
1616
209
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
B.
(U) Stress positions were authorized for use in interrogations at GTMO by the Secretary
of Defense on December 2, 2002. 1617 The technique was used in interrogations in Afghanistan in
2002 and 2003. 1618 Stress positions were also authorized for use at the SMU TF in Iraq. 1619
(U) CPT Wood at Abu Ghraib said that stress positions and forced exercise regimens
(also called compulsory physical training) were used in interrogations and the September 14,
2003 CITF-7 policy explicitly authorized the use of stress positions. 1620 CPT Wood's October 9,
2003 Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) for interrogators listed stress positions as an
approved technique. 1621 While the October 12,2003 CITF-7 policy removed stress positions
from the list of authorized interrogation techniques, a subsequent IROE for interrogators
continued to list the technique, with the caveat that its use "must be approved by the
[Commanding General], CITF-7 prior to employment.,,1622
(U) MG Fay's report stated that "What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and
physical training (exercise) carried over into sexual and physical assaults... ,,1623 The report
described one incident where a detainee was ''forced to stand while handcuffed in such a way to
dislocate his shoulder" and described a photograph of an interrogation 1?eing conducted while
another detainee was squatting on a chair which MG Fay called "an unauthorized stress
position.,,1624
(U) One MP said he "saw MI use stress positions" at Abu Ghraib. 1625 Similarly, the
warden of the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib stated that military intelligence made detainees engage in
physical training and he saw "detainees holding buckets, arms out, and other drillS.,,1626 An MP
Platoon leader stated that he also "observed [military intelligence personnel] making detainees
do physical training.,,1627
1617
1618 U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Bagram Branch Office Memo, CID Report ojInvestigation
FINAL -0134-02-CID36923533 (October 8, 2004).
1619
1620 CITF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (September 14, 2003); Army IG, Interview of CPT Carolyn
Wood (August 15, 2(06) at 30.
1621
1622 CITF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (October 12, 2003); Cn'F-7 Interrogation Rules oj
Engagement (October 16, 2003).
1623
1624
162'
1626
1627
210
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) When asked whether he had ever been directed by MI or another government agency
(OGA) to "soften up" a prisoner, one MP said "Yes, I would have them do physical training to
tire them out.,,1628 Another MP stated that military intelligence personnel insinuated that MP
soldiers should abuse detainees telling them to "'Loosen this guy up for us.' 'Make sure he has a
bad night.' 'Make sure he gets the treatment. ",1629
(U) One interrogator confIrmed the practice of having MPs "soften up" detainees, stating
that the "MPs did prepare prisoners prior to interrogations by having them do physical exercises
and yelling at them. The interrogators would verbally discuss, with an MP, a detainee and his
cooperativeness and various methods to deal with a detainee such as physical exercise at random
hours ofthe night and yelling.,,1630 Other MI soldiers confmned the use of stress positions by
interrogators at Abu Ghraib. One interrogation analyst stated that he witnessed the use of a
stress position where a detainee was "handcuffed to the floor." 1631 The same soldier referred to
that use ofthe stress position as "in following with the interrogation Elan.,,1632 An interrogator
likewise stated that she "did use a stress position" in interrogations. 1 33 Another interrogator who
was deployed from GTMO to Abu Ghraib following the MG Miller assistance visit said that
"stress positions were authorized" when he first got to Abu Ghraib in October 2003 and that he
.
d use 0 f t he techni que. 1634
wltnesse
C
(U) Removal of clothing was authorized by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO
on December 2, 2002. 1635 The technique was also recommended as an effective technique in a
January 24, 2003 memo written b~ the CJTF -180 Deputy SJA and was subsequently considered
approved policy in Afghanistan. 1 36
II
The Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force (TF) in Iraq also used "removal of
clothing" as an interrogation technique in the fall of 2003, just as the Abu Ghraib abuses were
takin lace. While not included in the SMU TF interrogation SOP, the SMU TF Commander
stated that when he took command in October 2003 he "discovered
that some ofthe detainees were not allowed clothes" as an interrogation technique_
1628
1629
1630
1631
1632
Ibid
1633
1634
1635
1636
211
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
1638
(U) Though it never appeared in CITF-Ts interrogation policy, MG Fay stated in his
report that removal of clothing was "imported" to Abu Ghraib and could be "traced through
Mghanistan and GTMO.,,1639 MG Fay's report stated that removal of clothing was "used to
humiliate detainees" and said the practice "contributed to an environment that would appear to
condone dePravity and degradation rather than the humane treatment of detainees.,,1640 His
report identified several specific incidents of detainees being stripped or partially stripped at the
direction of interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib.
(U) Statements by military police and military intelligence personnel who served at Abu
Ghraib indicated that removal of clothing was widely used for interrogations. COL Jerry
Philabaum, the Commander ofthe 320th MP BN at the facility, recalled seeing "between 12-15
detainees naked in their own individual cells.,,1641 He said that when he raised the issue with the
JIDC Commander, LTC Steven Jordan, he was told it "was nonnal practice for detainees to be
naked in their cells, but that usually they didn't have that many naked and that it was a technique
[military intelligence] used.,,1642 CPT Donald Reese, the Commander ofthe 37200 MP Company,
stated that LTC Jordan also told him that stripping detainees was "an interrogation method that
we use.,,1643 CPT Reese said the fact that detainees were naked as an interrogation method was
"known by everybody" and stated that it was "common practice to walk the tier and see
detainees without clothing and bedding."I644
(U) Similarly, an intelligence analyst at Abu Ghraib stated that it was "common that the
detainees on [military intelligence] hold in the hard site were initially kept naked and given
clothing as an incentive to cooperate with US.,,1645 One interrogator stated that "it was practice,
especially for [military intelligence] holds to take their clothes in a possible attempt to renew the
'capture shock' of detainees who had been in custody for an extended period oftime or were
transferred from other facilities. ,,1646 Another interrogator said that "it was common to see
1637
1638
Ibid
1639
1640
Ibid at 70.
1641
1642
Ibid
1643 Statement of 372"" MP Company Commander (May 3, 2004); Interview of 372"" MP Company Commander
(February 10, 2004) at 48.
Interview of372"" MP Company Commander (February 10, 2004) at 48-49; Statement of 372Dd MP Company
Commander (February 21,2004); Statement of 372"" MP Company Commander (January 18, 2(04) at 1-2.
1644
164'
1646
212
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
detainees in cells without clothes or naked" and said that it was "one of our approaches.,,1647 The
interrogator said that "any officer who would walk the area at night should have seen the
detainees naked.,,1648
(U) One military police (MP) soldier stated that MI "would tell us to take away [the
detainees'! mattresses, sheets, and clothes" and that ''the detainees would sleep in their cells
naked."I64 Another MP stated that MI used "clothing removal as an interrogation technique in
Tier lA,,1650 Major Michael Sheridan, who was Executive Officer ofthe 320th MP Battalion at
Abu Ghraib, said that he stopped permitting MPs to escort detainees to interrogations after an
incident where a male detainee "was being interrogated naked and then my MPs had to escort
him back to his cell in 45 degree temps with nothing but a bag over his head, and one ofthe MPs
was female.,,1651
(U) One Abu Ghraib interrogator stated that another interrogator who was deployed from
GTMO to Abu Ghraib, told him that he "was Ptermitted as the interrogator to strip a detainee
completely naked in the interrogation booth." 652 Another GTMO interrogator deplored to Abu
Ghraib said that he oversaw the interrogation of a detainee who had been stripped. 165 The
interrogator said that the technique was approved by a superior officer. 1654 A third interrogator
who had previously served at GTMO recalled asking an MP at Abu Ghraib ''to strip [a detainee]
naked for us for the interrogation.,,1655
D.
(U) On December 2,2002, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of20 hour
interrogations at GTMO. 1656
IIA
January 24,2003 memo from the CITF-180 Deputy SJA stated that "sleep
adjustment," which the memo described as "generally 4 hours of sleep per every 24 hours," was
used as an interrogation technique in Afghanistan. 1657 The SMU TF interrogation policy for Iraq
listed "sleep management" as an authorized technique and described the technique as "four hours
1647 Unsigned interrogator statement (May 13. 2004). The statement was contained in a memorandum for the record
which the interrogator declined to sign based on advice from cOW1Sel.
1648
Ibid
1649
Taguba Report at 19; Article 32 Transcript U.S. v Davis (April 7. 2004) at 11.
16~
1651
1652
1653
1654
Ibid
1655
1656
1657
Memo from LTC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at
4.9.
213
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
of sleep during [a] 24 hour period" - the same way that CITP -180 had described "sleep
,,'In Afi'nl.
ad~ustment
O',amstan. 1658
(U) The September 14, 2003 CITP-7 policy authorized both sleep management and sleep
adjustment for interrogations, defining the former as "adjusting the sleep times of a detainee"
and the latter as "4 hours of sleep per 24 hour period,,1659 CPT Wood's October 9,2003 IROE
also listed both "sleep adjustment" and "sleep management" as approved techniques. 1660 CITP
7's October 12, 2003 policy did not include either sleep adjustment or sleep management as
authorized interrogation techniques. 1661 However, an October 16, 2003 IROE written by CPT
Wood continued to list both techniques, saying that their use "must be approved by the
[Commanding General], CITP-7 prior to employment.,,1662
(U) MG Pay's report stated that the "'sleep adjustment' technique was used by [military
intelligence] as soon as the Tier 1A block opened" at Abu Ghraib. 1663 Interviews of MI and MP
soldiers, however, indicated a lack of clarity among MI and MP as to what "sleep adjustment,"
"sleep management," and "sleep deprivation" actually meant. In any case, MPs were integral to
carrying out each of those techniques for MI personnel.
(U) One contract interrogator stated that "During a typical SMMP [sleep and meal
management program], the MPs are responsible for administering the written program provided
by the interrogator... In addition, the MPs are advised that during the awake time period of an
approved SMMS program, the MPs are allowed to do what is necessary to keep the detainee
awake in the allotted period oftime as long as it adheres to approved rules of engagement and
proper treatment of detainee.,,1664 An MI non-commissioned officer stated that he provided sleep
adjustment schedules included in interrogation plans written by interrogators he was supervising
. to the MP Sergeant ofthe Guard. 1665 Similarly, an intelligence analyst said that the process for
using sleep management was "for the interrogator to request it in writing and submit the request
with the interrogation plan... Once it was approved, a memo was given to the MPs showing the
schedule."I666
(U) COL Jerry Philabaum, the Commander ofthe 320lh MP BN, said that "When
[military intelligence] wanted a detainee on sleep deprivation, they would tell the MP guard that
prisoner 'X' was on sleep deprivation. They would give instructions that the detainee was to
16'8 _Memorandum for a l l _ Personnel, SUBJECT: Policy No. 1 - Battlefield Interrogation Team and
16'9
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
166'
1666
214
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
sleep four hours within a 24 hour period... I don't believe MPs were given specific instructions
on how to keep the detainees awake. It was left to the MPS.,,1667 Another MP Officer stated that:
When Ml needed our assistance with detainees, they did their request through
memorandums. The memorandums would dictate what Ml wanted. The
memorandums were signed by COL Pappas and given to the NCOlC [Non
Commissioned Officer in Charge] of the wing. The memorandums would give
instructions on diet patterns, sleep patterns, music playing, and various other
techniques that MI requested the MPs to carry out. 1668
An MP non-commissioned officer stated that "there was no SOP for sleep
management.,,1669 MG Fay stated that techniques used by MPs to keep detainees awake included
stripping them and giving them cold showers.,,1670
(U) CPT Wood said that "sleep management was approved by the [Commanding
General] about a dozen times" during her time at Abu Ghraib. 1671 She stated that she
"personally remember[ed] seeing LTG Sanchez's signature on some approvals for sleep
management.,,1672 COL Pappas said that he believed the October 12,2003 CJTF-7 policy gave
him the authority to authorize sleep management. 1673
IIA December 14,2003 memo for LTG Sanchez signed by COL Pappas approved
"sleep management" for three detainees captured in conjunction with Saddam Hussein. 1674 COL
Pappas stated that he "couldn't say for sure" whether he actually sent the memo to LTG Sanchez
but that he "signed it with the intent ofit going to him.,,1675 LTG Sanchez said that, other than
requests to approve segregation in excess of30 days, he did "not recall signing any other
memos" approving other interrogation techniques. 1676
E.
(U) "Deprivation oflight and auditory stimuli" was authorized by the Secretary of
Defense for use at GTMO on December 2, 2002. 1677
1667
1668
1669
1670
1672
167J
1671
1674 Memorandum from COL Thomas Pappas for LTG Ricardo Sanchez, Exception to ClTF-7 Inte"ogation and
Counter Resistance Policy (December 14, 2003).
1677
215
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_
A January 24,2003 memo from the CITF-180 Deputy SJA stated that
"deprivation oflight and sound in the living areas" had been utilized and recommended that ''use
of light and noise deprivation" (not limited to living areas) be approved for im~lementation.1678
The technique was subsequently considered available for use in Mghanistan. l 79
(U) Sensory deprivation was never listed in CITF-7 policy as an approved technique. It
was listed, however, as an approved technique in an October 9, 2003 interrogation rules of
engagement (IROE) document for interrogators at Abu Ghraib. 1680 A subsequent IROE also
listed the technique but said its use "must be approved by the [Commanding General], CITF-7
prior to employment.,,1681
(U) Major General Fay's report identified several specific instances where detainees at
Abu Ghraib were placed in a small room in Tier lA of Abu Ghraib that was referred to as "the
hole" and where they were subject to total isolation and light deprivation. 1682 The report said
that conditions for isolating detainees "sometimes included being kept naked in very hot or very
cold, small rooms, and/or completely darkened rooms, clearly in violation ofthe Geneva
Conventions.,,1683
(U) MG Fay stated that the "environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the
occurrence" of detainee abuse there. 1684 But MG Fay was not the first to note the environment at
Abu Ghraib as problematic. An assessment of Abu Ghraib by a retired Army Colonel Stuart
Herrington in late 2003 had referred to Abu Ghraib as a "pressure cooker" and cited an urgent
need to improve conditions at the facility. 1685
F.
(U/
In November 2003, Terry Ford, the Army Assistant Chief of Stafffor
Intelligence (G-2) and BG Barbara Fast, the CITF-7 Director for Intelligence, commissioned
1678
Memo from LIC Robert Cotell to CENTCOM SJA, CJTF 180 Inte"ogation Techniques (January 24, 2003) at
4,9.
1679
Church Report at 7.
1680
1681
Ibid at 28.
1684
Ibid at 9.
94.
168~ Herririgton to Fast, Report ofCI/HUMlNT Evaluation Visit (December 12, 2003) at 2.
216
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
retired Army Colonel Stuart Herrington to assess U.S. intelligence operations in Iraq.I686 COL
Herrington had also assessed intelligence operations at Guantanamo Bay in March 2002. 1687
Shortly before leaving for Iraq, COL Herrington received a call f r o m _
the fonner Chief ofthe Iraq Survey Group's Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC).
told COL Herrington of his concern that detainees had been ''tortured an'd
beat~cy guys" and SMU TF personnel in Iraq. 1688 COL Herrington decided to look
into _
claims during his assessment visit.
2.
(U) After arriving in Iraq, COL Herrington and his team visited the interrogation facility
at Abu Ghraib. While the team did not see evidence that detainees were being "illegally or
improperly treated" at the facility, they did note several serious deficiencies. 1689
(U) In his written report of the visit, COL Herrington cited an urgent need to improve
conditions at Abu Ghraib. 1690 He cited overpopulation ofthe facility as a problem that could
lead to further rioting and danger to U.S. personnel. He commented that the leadership at Abu
Ghraib felt the facility was a "pressure cooker" and that it was "only a matter oftime before
prisoners staged an uRrising" and that "bad things" such as "death, injury, or hostage situations"
were likely to occur. 691 COL Herrington also assessed that shortages of interro~ators and
equipment had resulted in a failure to interrogate detainees of intelligence value. 692 He
concluded that Abu Ghraib was simply ''unsuitable for the exploitation of high value
detainees.,,1693
(U) COL Herrington also expressed concern with the practice of not assigning Internment
Serial Numbers (ISNs) to certain detainees. He wrote in his assessment report that the creation
of"ghost" detainees who were not in the accounting system carried certain risks "not the least of
which is that it may be technically illegal.,,1694
(U) On December 9,2003, COL Herrington met with MG Barbara Fast, CJTF-7's
Director for Intelligence (CJ_2).1695 He later described her as "astonished" by his observations of
1686 Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Detainee Abuse Evaluation Memorandum for the Record,
October 20, 2004 meeting with Col (Ret) Stuart A. Herrington (undated) at 1 (hereinafter DoD!G, Herrington
Interview).
1687
1688
1689
1690
Ibid
1691
Ibid
1692
Ibid at 8.
1693
Ibid at 2-3.
1694
Ibid at 4.
1695
Army !G, Interview of COL (Ret) Stuart Herrington (November 3, 2004) at 17; DoD !G, Herrington Interview.
217
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Abu Ghraib. 1696 He said that "in a couple of cases she said, 'I was unaware ofthat. I didn't
know that' or 'I thought we fixed that. ",1697 COL Herrington added that, "It was very evident to
me that she was not being well informed" by her staff. 1698
3.
(U) While visiting the Iraq Survey Group facility, COL Herrington learned from ISG
medical personnel that prisoners arriving at the ISG who had been captured by the SMU TF
showed signs of"having been beaten" by t ~The report was consistent with what
the former ISG JIDC Chief, prior to
the retired Army Colonel had been told by _
his visit. When, during his visit, COL Herrington asked the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) ofthe JIDC
whether these problems had been reported to higher authority, the OIC advised him that
"everyone knows about it.,,1700
(U) COL Herrington wrote in his report that an OGA representative told him that OGA
personnel had been instructed not to have any involvement with interrogation operations at the
SMU TF as the "practices there were in contravention to his Agency's guidance on what was and
what was not permissible in interrogating detainees.,,1701 He added that he had been told by his
CITF-7 escort that it would be "difficult, ifnot impossible" to visit the SMU TF facilities. His
written report stated that:
Based on 1) What my s o u r c e _ told me' before I deployed about what he
observed concerning mistreatment; 2) The statement of the ISG-JIDC OIC on the
same subject; and 3) the OGA representative's statement, it seems clear that [the
SMU TF] needs to be reined in with respect to its treatment of detainees. 1702
4.
(U) When COL Herrington returned to the U. S. and briefed LTG Keith Alexander, the
Army G2, and his deputy Terry Ford, he reiterated the concerns about what he had seen in Iraq
and stated, "when it becomes known, everybody who touched it will be in trouble.,,1703 COL
Herrington later told the DoD IG that the two were "very supportive and expressed confidence in
his assessment, but no official'follow-ups were discussed or scheduled at that time.,,1704
1696
Army IG, Interview of COL (Ret) Stuart Herrington (November 3, 2004) at 17.
1697
Ibid
1698
Ibid at 16.
1699
1700
1701
Ibid.
1702
Ibid
1703
1704
Ibid. at 4.
218
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
(U) COL Herrington told the DoD IGthat he expected that CITF-7 and the Army G2
would investigate the issues he raised. 1705 However, he said they never contacted him and he
was notified by CITF-7 in April of2004 that there had been "insufficient evidence to
substantiate" what he had heard from the former ISG nDC Chief about detainee mistreatment in
Iraq.1706 The Office ofthe Staff Judge Advocate at CITF-7 stated in an April 7, 2004 letter to
COL Herrington that the investigating officer had not been able to "recreate those conversations
upon which [COL Herrington'sJ report was based" and that it had been difficult to "pin down
timelines and events in time.,,17 7
(U) The allegations raised by COL Herrington were the subject of an investigation
conducted by CITF-7 in early 2004. In what VADM Church described as an "extremely brief,
three-page report," the CITF-7 investigating officer found no proofto substantiate the allegations
1708
VADM Church criticized the CITF-7 r~ort as "extremely brief and
against the SMU TF.
cursory" with "obvious gaps in the investigation methodology.,,17o VADM Church called the
failure to more thoroughly investwate the allegations a "lost opportunity to address potential
detainee abuse in Iraq early on.,,1 0
XIV.
_
While CENTCOM legal concerns had led to CITF-Ts removal of most ofthe
aggressive interrogation techniques from its interrogation policy in October 2003, interrogation
policies issued by Task Forces under CENTCOM Command, inchidingthe Combined Joint
Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP), CJTF-180 (the conventional
forces in Afghanistan), and the Special Mission Units in Iraq and Afghanistan continued to
include aggressive interrogation techniques well into 2004.
A.
_
The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF
AP) operated under the tactical command ofCITF-7. CJSOTF-AP contained units from the 5th
1'105
Ibid
1i06
Ibid.
1'107 Letter
-- -
---
- - -
from Office of the Staff Judge Advocate to COL Stuart Herrington (April 7, 2004).
1708
1709
Ibid.
1710
Ibid
1711 AR-lS-6 Investigation ofCJSOTF-AP and Sth SF Group Detention Operations (November 8, 2004) at 13, IS, 71
219
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
.On
Febm
Commander,
issued
an interrogation policy for
using the September 14,2003 CJTF-7 policy as its basis
and authorizing the use of aggressive interrogation techniques, including the presence of military
working dogs, stress positions, sleep management, loud music, and light control, and
environmental manipulation. 1715 The policy stated that certain techniques, such as presence of
military working dogs, stress positions, and loud music and light control, required approval by
the CJTF-7 Commander ifthey were to be used against enemy prisoners of war. The use of
those techniques against all other detainees, however, was permitted with the written approval of
a
Deputy Commander or Commander.
_
The March 23, 2004 policy stated that "you should consider the fact that some
interrogation techniques are viewed as inhumane or otherwise inconsistent with intemationallaw
1712
1713
1714
171j
1716 _
1717
Ibid.
1718
1719 _
220
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
before applying each technique. These techniques are labeled with a [CAUTION].,,1720
Environmental manipulation, the use of power tools, stress positions, and the presence of
working dogs were all marked with the word "CAUTION."I721
BG
Formica also found that some detainees held by a tactical unit were "kept naked for the initial
interrogation" and fed only bread or crackers and water "ifthey did not cooperate with ...
interrogators.,,1723 He said that a detainee held by another tactical unit under CJSOTF-AP
command "may have been fed just bread and water for 17 days.,,1724
B.
II (
C.
_
The interrogation policy in place for CJTF-180, the conventional forces in
Afghanistan, also continued to include aggressive interrogation techniques well into 2004. A
March 27,2004 CJTF-180 Standard Operating Procedure, signed by LTC Charles Pede, the Staff
Judge Advocate, LTC Scott Berrier, the Director of Intelligence, and LTC Clayton Cobb, the MP
Commander for CJTF-180 included a list of "standard [tactics, techniques, and procedures for
1720
Ibid at 6.
1721
Ibid at 4.
1721
Formica Report at 8.
1723
Ibid. at 74.
1714
Ibid at 8.
Ibid
1727 Ibid.
1728
Ibid.
221
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
use" at Bagram. 1729 That list included the use of "safety positions," "sleep adjustment," "sensory
overload," invading a detainee's personal space to "increase psychological discomfort," "dietary
manipulation," adjusting temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell to "create moderate
discomfort," and using blacked out goggles as an interrogation technique. 1730
D.
Prior to March 2004, however, each operated under a distinct interrogation SOP. On March 26,
2004 the SMU TF implemented a single interrogation policy that covered SMU TF operations in
both Iraq and Afghanistan. 1731
_
The March 26,2004 SMU SOP authorized 14 "interrogation techniques" not
explicitly listed in FM 34-52, including use of muzzled dogs, "safety positions (during
interrogations)," sleep adjustment/management, mild physical contact, isolation, sensory
overload, sensory deprivation, and dietary manipulation. 1732
_
According to the Church Special Focus Team Report, the March 26, 2004 SMU
TF SOP included a larger number of interrogation techniques outside ofFM 34-52 than the SOPs
of any other military organization at the time. 1733 In fact, many ofthe techniques in that SOP had
been abandoned by conventional forces in Afghanistan months earlier, after CENTCOM
identified legal concerns with the techniques. 1734 Although the authority in the March SOP to
use "muzzled dogs" was rescinded on April 22, 2004, the remainder ofthe techniques remained
authorized until May 6, 2004, when GEN John Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander, suspended
use of all non-FM 34-52 techniques. 1735 The Church Special Focus Team report said the
techniques were suspended as a result of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. 1736 GEN Abizaid stated
cm-180 SJA Memorandum for Record, CTJ'F-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
(March 27, 2004).
1730 Ibid
172S1
1731
173~ The 14 techniques were the use of military working dogs, safety positions(during interrogations), use of
blackened goggles/ear muffs during interrogation, sleep adjustment/sleep management, use of female interrogators,
sensory deprivation, sensory overload, change of environment/ environmental manipulation, diet manipulation, use
of falsified documents or reports and deception, use of individual fears, use of isolation, fear of long-term
incarceration, and mild physical contact. Battlefield Interrogation Team and Temporary Screening Facility Standing
Operating Procedures (SOP), Change 2 Dated May 18, 2004.
1733
1734
Ibid
222
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
that neither he nor his staff "reviewed or approved" the March 2004 SMU TF SOP "prior to its
issuance.,,1737
_
Several interrogation techniques authorized for use by the SMU Task Force prior
to GEN Abizaid's suspension, including stress positions, sleep adjustment/management, sensory
overload, and sensory deprivation were similar to techniques used in the resistance phase of
SERE training. In fact, undated SMU TF SOPs from this period suggest a connection between
SMU TF interrogation techniques and SERE. The SOPs state, under interrogation "Standards,"
that "[i]nterrogations will be done [in accordance with] all applicable rules and regulations to
include... SurvivallEvasioniResistance/and Escape regulations. ,,1738
_(
sent a messa e to
wrote that detainees held by his TF were "hardened" and "trained to
resist interrogation" and added:
SLEEP MANAGEMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANIPULATION (LIGHT AND NOISE), EXTENDED
INTERROGATIONS, VARYING COMFORT POSITIONS AND THE USE OF
HOODS TO INDUCE A PSYCHOLOGICAL SENSE OF ISOLATION AND
DEPENDENCE ON THE INTERROGATORS ARE PARTICULARLY
USEFUL. 1740
told
_
(
On May 27, 2004,
formally requested that CENTCOM
grant authority to the SMU TF to use five interrogation techniques: sleep management, control
positions, environmental manipulation, separation, and change of scenery. 1742 The request .
1737 Memorandum
from General John Abizaid, Responses to Request for Information from VADM Church (August
17Ja"
6,2004).
See Department of Defense Headquarters, Joint Task Force 121 (ITF-121), Baghdad Air Base, Iraq
1740
1741
Ibid. at 1.
223
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
stated that control positions - defmed as "requiring the detainee to stand, sit, kneel, squat,
maintain sitting position with back against the wall, bend over chair, lean with head against wall,
lie prone across chairs, stand with arms above head or raised to shoulders, or other normal
physical training positions" - could also "be used in order to implement sleep management" and
that "in the most exceptional circumstances, and on approval from [the SMU TF Commander],"
interrogators could ''use handcuffs to enforce the detainee's position.,,1743 An interrogator could
require a detainee to remain in a control position for "no more than 45 minutes in one hour and
for no more than six hours in a 24 hour period.,,1744
(U) Notwithstanding the May 6, 2004 suspension of all non-FM 34-52 techniques, on
June 4, 2004, GEN Abizaid approved the use of slerE management, environmental manipulation,
separation, and change of scenery for the SMU TF. 1 45 He delegated the approval authority for
the use of those techniques to the "fIrst general officer in the chain of command," and specifIed
that none of the techniques could be used beyond a 72 hour period "without a review by [the
SMU TF Commander] or the fIrst general officer in the chain of command.,,1746
xv.
A.
(U) In the wake ofthe detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
(JPRA) personnel traveled to CENTCOM headquarters to coordinate a plan to send a training
team to assist CENTCOM with interrogations in Afghanistan.
According to Christopher Wirts, the Chief of JPRA's Operational Support Office
(OSO) the meeting at CENTCOM took place after the mission to Afghanistan had been
"tentativelyapproved.,,1747 On May 12,2004 CENTCOM made a formal request through the
Joint Staff for JPRA "interrogation! exploitation" assistance.
In the May 12,2004 request, CENTCOM asked that JFCOM provide a Joint
Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA) team to "conduct an on-site assessment of [Bagram
Collection Point] operations in Bagram and Kandahar to assist in the development and
Ibid
1744
Ibid
174'. Church Special Focus Team Report at 16. Although the request dermed "separation" to include the use of
'use of hooding."
goggles, earmuffs, and hooding, the CENTCOM Cornman
Memorandum from General John Abizaid to Commander,
Request/or Use
a/Interrogation Techniques, Dated 27 May 2004 (June 4,2004).
1746 Ibid
1747.Emai1 from Christopher Wirts to Thomas Markland, John Huffstutter, David Ellis (January 19, 2005). Mr.
Wirts's email stated "Initially when the mission was tentatively approved we went to HQ CENTCOM and
reviewedlbriefed the J2X on how we intended to support. They were satisfied with our methods and intent. After
the CENTCOM visit, we were called to JFCOM and met with ADM [Giambastiani], Gen S01igan, Gen Wagner,
JFCOM Legal and a host of other personnel. In the days following the meeting, the mission was turned off. "
224
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
_That same day, JPRA personnel briefed JFCOM Deputy Commander LTG Wagner,
JFCOM Chief of Staff Maj Gen James Soligan, and JFCOM Commander ADM Giambastiani,
about the planned support. 1750
(U) Materials prepared for those briefm s stated that after September 11, 2001, JPRA
[Defense Intelligence Agency],"
was "requested to support
GTMO, Fort Huachuca, and
,,1751
III
(
The briefmg materials specifically highlighted JPRA's September 2003 trip
to Iraq in support ofthe Special Mission Unit Task Force there and described JPRA's intended
support for CENTCOM in Afghanistan. 1752 Among JPRA's "key tasks" for the planned
Afghanistan trip was to observe "exploitation procedures" used by CENTCOM personnel and to
"identifY areas for improvement" and "assist and advise on alternate approaches.,,1753 The
briefing materials stated that JPRA intended to provide "on the spot recommendations to the
[CENTCOM] staffif appropriate" on these alternate approaches. 17S4
.(
The briefing materia~s also included a proposed Concept of Operations
(CONOP) for the Afghanistan trip. 1755 The proposed CONOP was similar in scope and structure
to the CONOP JPRA had circulated in September 2003, near the end ofthe Iraq trip. Unlike the
Iraq CONOP, however, the Afghanistan CONOP included many ofthe edits that had been
suggested by CAPT Daniel Donovan, the JFCOM SJA (e.g., clarifying that Rules of Engagement
must be within U.S. law and policy including - but not simply limited to - the Torture
'stan
Convention, removing reference to "constant sensory deprivation," etc.. The A:f:
CONOP did not, however, reflect all ofthe SJA's edits. For example,
1748 Message
1749
from CENTCOM, Request for USJFCOM Support, DTG: 121729Z May 04 (May 12, 2004).
Ibid.
1750 Email from Randy Moulton to Steven Johns and Fred Milburn (May 10, 2004); Committee staff interview of
Christopher Wirts (January 4, 2007)
As part of the briefmg materials, an executive summary of the September 2003 trip identified the JPRA
identified deficiencies as the SMU TF's "lack of clear legal guidance on status of captured personnel," "lack of
established [Rules of E~ent or Standard Operating Procedure]," "lack of training and preparation," and "lack
of information sharing." _
See Executive Summary; see also Briefing Slides at 5-8.
1752
1753
1754
Ibid
Several drafts of a Concept of Operations (CONOP) for the planned trip by JPRA personnel to Afghanistan were
provided to the Committee. While those drafts are not dated, communications between and/or among JPRA and
JFCOM personnel discussing revisions to the drafts suggest when those drafts were produced and how the CONOP
evolved
1755
225
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
CAPT Donovan had recommended removing these techniques from the Iraq
liThe
II
1757.Shortly after the briefing. a JFCOM action officer sent JPRA leadership a list of action items for LTG
Soligan. Among those were JPRA (1) locating the after action report from JPRA's support to
and (2) preparing a message to the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to provide policy/guidance on
possibility of extending JPRA roles/responsibilities to the offensive vice defensive preparations/practices." In
response, Col. Moulton told the JFCOM action officer that "[t]here was no [after action report] for t h e "
support" and instead directed him to the "executive summary" of the trip provided in the briefing materials. Col.
Moulton also stated that it was JPRA's understanding that "[Admiral Giambastiani] would approve our participation
[in the Afghanistan trip] with a [Voice Command] from the Joint Staff regardless of the status of the policy guidance
(he has previously approved and we are currently supporting other 'offensive' efforts)." Email from Randy Moulton
to Steven Johns, Fred Milburn, Christopher Wirts, and Dan Donovan (May 13, 2004).
W~er and MG
ms Email from Col. Randy Moulton to Maj Gen James Soligan, CAPT Dan Donovan, RADM John Bird, LTG
Robert Wagner et al. (September 30, 2003).
226
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
CAPT Donovan also expressed his concerns about the intended mission to Col
Moulton, writing in a May 13, 2004 email:
[I]t is not advisable to have JPRA assist in "improving exploitation" (i.e.,
suggesting more effective interrogation techniques). JPRA's core expertise is in
training DoD personnel to resist!cope with techniques - many of them illegal
that may be employed by our enemies if DoD personnel are captured. It just
doesn't make sense to me to have experts in what the "bad guys" do to us
advising our U.S. interrogators - there is a real risk, if theater interrogators then
'do it wrong," for them to claim "JPRA's experts recommended this."
175~mail from CAPT Dan Donovan to ADM Edmund Giambastiani, LTG Robert Wagner and Maj Gen James
Soligan (May 13, 2004) (emphasis in original).
1760.
Draft Concept of Operations in Support of Pending CENTCOM Joint Interrogation Facility Observation and
Assessment Requirement.
1761 Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to ADM Edmund Giambastiani, LTG Robert Wagner, Maj Gen James Soligan.
(May 13, 2004) (emphasis in original).
227
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
III The next day, CAPT Donovan sent another email to ADM Giambastiani, LTG
Wagner, and Maj Gen Soligan pointing out the "potential risk to the entire JPRA mission
if they are in any way implicated in the current mess in Ira~."1763 JPRA's planned May
2004 mission to Afghanistan was subsequently called off 1 64
B.
On June 20, 2004, about a month after their initial request, CENTCOM made another
request to the Joint Stafffor JPRA assistance at interrogation facilities in Bagram and Kandahar
in Afghanistan. 1765 The request sought a team from JPRA to "conduct on-site assessments" in
July and to "assist the commands in ... developing and implementing an indoctrinationJrogram
and other interrogation / exploitation options, required as a result ofthe assessments.,,17
Specifically, CENTCOM requested that the JPRA team "observe exploitation procedures at the
site and identifl improvements or develop alternate approaches to meet exploitation
objectives.,,176
_
When the request arrived at JFCOM, CAPT Donovan again raised concerns with
Maj Gen Soligan about the scope ofthe request. In a June 21, 2004 email, he asked "whether
JPRA is really the appropriate choice" for the mission described in the CENTCOM request, i.e.,
to "observe exploitation procedures at the site and identify improvements or develop alternate
approaches to meet exploitation objectives.,,1768 Maj Gen Soligan subsequently raised the issue
with Maj Gen John Sattler, the CENTCOM Director of Operations (13), who Maj Gen Soligan
said told him that CENTCOM had made a "conscious decision on what capability they want.,,1769
_CAPT Donovan also raised his concerns directly with lawyers at CENTCOM and
the Joint Staff. In an email to the lawyers, he wrote:
1762 Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Col. Randy Moulton and Col Fred Milburn (May 13, 2004).
1763 Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Maj Gen James Soligan. copying ADM Edmund Giambastiani and LTG
Robert Wagner (May 14, 2004).
1764_According to Mr. Wirts, JPRA's OSO Chief, "[W]e went to HQ CENTCOM and reviewedlbriefed the
J2X on how we intended to support. They were satisfied with our methods and intent. After the CENTCOM visit,
we were called to JFCOMand met with [Admiral Giambastiani, Maj Gen Soligan. LTG Wagner], JFCOM Legal
and a host of other personnel. In the days following the meeting, the mission was turned off." Email from
Christopher Wirts to Lt Col Thomas Markland, copying Lt Col John Huffstutter, Col David Ellis (January 19, 2005).
1765 CENTCOM Request for USJFCOM Operational Support, DTG: 200800Z JUN 04 (June 20, 2004).
1766 Ibid
1767
Ibid
1768 Email from CAPT Dan Donovan to Maj Gen James Soligan and LTG Robert Wagner (June 21, 2004).
1769 Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to CAPT Dan Donovan (June 21, 2004).
228
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
I'm concerned that the folks from our Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA)
who oversee training US military personnel how to resist interrogations by our
enemies (e.g., SERE training) - are the wrong guys to be advising US
interrogators how to more effectively exploit PUCs. JPRA considers themselves
to be the exploitation experts, but in many ways my view is that their expertise is
in training US personnel how to best resist ILLEOAL techniques. This kind of
advice may be the last thing you all want/need in Afghanistan right now. 1770
_
Over the next month, JFCOM senior leadership discussed the proposed trip with
JPRA and the Joint Staff. At JFCOM's request, JPRA developed and provided JFCOM with a
training plan for the mission 1771 On June 30, 2004, Maj Oen Soligan told JPRA in an email to
prepare for the trip, but directed them not to deploy until the trip was approved by JFCOM's
Commander ADM Edmund Oiambastiani. 1772 JFCOM also discussed working with Joint Staff
to fmd a capability outside JPRA to send to CENTCOM to assist with their detainee operations,
but expected a "nonconcur" with any "recommendation to use other resources.,,1773
II As discussions about the CENTCOM request continued within JFCOM, Col Kenneth
Rollins, a SERE psychologist added his perspective on the advisability of sending JPRA
personnel to assist with interrogations. The psychologist said:
[W]e need to really stress the difference between what instructors do at SERE
school (done to INCREASE RESISTANCE capability in students) versus what is
taught at interrogator[] school (done to gather information). What is done by
SERE instructors is by definition ineffective interrogator conduct, and
interrogator school, not SERE school is the appropriate focus and model for
investigating interrogators. Simply stated, SERE school does not train you on
how to interrogate, and things you "learn" there by osmosis about interrogation
are probably wrong if copied by interrogators. 1774
II
As Col Rollins's comments were circulated at JFCOM, LtCol Richard Posey, one of
the JFCOM JAOs added that "[i]t would be difficult to come up with a stronger argument against
concurring in this request.,,1775 LtCol Posey added: "CENTCOM needs interrogation experts.
JPRA is telling us ... that their instructors are ineffective interrogators and probably do it wrong
because their focus is on increasing resistance not decreasing it. For the same reasons, this does
1770
Email from Dan Donovan to Joint Staff and CENTCOM lawyers (June 21, 2004) (emphasis in original).
1 7 7 1 _ The
training plan was intended to provide the JFCOM Commander an idea of how JPRA would satisfy
the request to "conduct on-site assessments" at Bagram and Kandahar and "assist the commands in . . . developing
and implementing an indoctrination program and other interrogation / exploitation options ..." Email from Maj Gen
James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton, RADM John Bird, LTG Robert Wagner (June 23,2004).
1772
Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to RADM John Bird, Col. Randy Moulton, et aI. (June 30, 2004).
1m Email from LtCol Richard Posey to CAPT Alan Kaufman, copying LTC John Jones, CAPT Daniel Donovan
(June 30, 2004); Email from LtCol Richard Posey to Maj Paul Voss, copying Col Fred Milburn, Lt Col Steven
Johns, CAPT Alan Kaufman, LTC John Jones (July 12, 2004).
1774 Email from LtCol Richard Posey to Maj Paul Voss, copying Col Fred Milburn, Lt Col Steven Johns, CAPT Alan
Kaufman, LTC John Jones (July 12, 2004) (emphasis in original).
1m Ibid.
229
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
not pass the Washington Post test. DoD already has enough egg on its face concerning detainee
operations. ,,1776
(U) The trip to Mghanistan was subsequently cancelled. Christopher Wirts, JPRA
Operations Support Office (OSO) Chief, told the Committee that although he did not know why
JFCOM cancelled the trip, he recalled discussing the negative media attention from Abu Ghraib
with LTG Wagner and Maj Gen Soligan. l777
c:
U.S. Joint Forces Command Issues Policy Guidance For JPRA "Offensive"
Suppon(U)
1776 Ibid
1m Committee
Email from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton. RADM John Bird, Maj Gen Jack Holbein, Col Fred
Milburn (July 21.2004).
1778
230
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Recent requests from OSD and the Combatant Commands have solicited JPRA
support based on knowledge and their application to U.S. strategic debriefing and
interrogation techniques.
These requests, which can be characterized as
"offensive" techniques include, but are not limited to, activities designed not to
increase one's resistance capabilities to interrogation techniques but rather
intended to instruct personnel, for the purpose of gathering of information, on
how to break down another's ability to withstand interrogation ... The use of
resistance to interrogation knowled~e for "offensive" purposes lies outside the
roles and responsibilities of JPRA 17
(U) The policy did not, however, explicitly prohibit JPRA from conducting such
activities in all instances. Instead, it stated that all requests for "offensive" support should
"continue to" be directed through JFCOM but instructed that:
Email from Col Randy Moulton to Maj Gen James Soligan, RADM John Bird, Maj Gen Jack Holbein (July 26,
2004).
1780 Memo from Maj Gen James Soligan to Col Randy Moulton, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Mission
Guidance (September 29,2004).
1781
Ibid
1782
Memorandum for the Department of Defense Inspector General, signed by LTG Robert Wagner (February 10,
2005).
1783
Ibid
231
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
interrogations," LTG Wagner said that JFCOM sought to clarify that "JPRA is primarily a school
house, not an intelligence gathering activity.,,1784 He added that "JPRA does not have not have
personnel assigned to be interrogators," and that ''the expertise ofJPRA lies in training personnel
how to respond and resist interrogations - not in how to conduct interrogations.,,1785
(U) According to LTG Wagner, JFCOM issued the September 2004 policy statement ''to
ensure that JPRA activities remained within the scope ofthat Agency's mission charter.,,1786 He
stated that JFCOM considered requests for JPRA "interrogator support" to be "inconsistent" with
JPRA's charter. 1787 He stated, however, that the memorandum was not "issued in response to
suspected or known inappropriate JPRA activities, as no such activities were known by this
headquarters to have been conducted.,,1788 Notwithstanding that statement, however, by
September 2004, when JFCOM issued the policy, JFCOM had already approved a trip by JPRA
personnel to Iraq as well as other "offensive" interrogation support - activities that fell outside
JPRA's roles and responsibilities.
1784
Ibid
178~
Ibid.
1786
Ibid
1787
Ibid
1788
Ibid
232
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Aiding Torture:
Health Professionals
Ethics and Human Rights Violations
Revealed in the May 2004
CIA Inspector Generals Report
A Report by
Physicians for Human Rights
August 2009
Advanced Media Group
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Authors
PHR was founded in 1986 on the idea that health professionals, with their specialized skills, ethical commitments,
and credible voices, are uniquely positioned to investigate the
health consequences of human rights violations and work to
stop them.
Scott Allen, MD
Allen Keller, MD
Associate Professor of Medicine, NYU School of Medicine
Director, Bellevue/NYU Program for Survivors of Torture
Advisory Board Member, Physicians for Human Rights
AIding Torture
Advanced
Media Group
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Introduction
The version of the 2004 CIA Inspector Generals report
released on August 24, 2009 provides greater detail on the
central role that health professionals played in the CIAs torture
program and reveals a level of ethical misconduct that had not
previously come to light.
The report confirms that the CIA inflicted torture on
detainees interrogated while in US custody as part of the
agencys counterterrorism activities and exposes additional
interrogation techniques that had not yet been reported. It also
demonstrates that health professionals were involved at every
stage in the development, implementation and legitimization of
this torture program.
The doctors and psychologists who laid the foundation upon
which attorneys rationalized an illegal program of torture also
actively participated in abusive and illegal interrogations, thus
betraying the ethical standards of their professions by contributing to physical and mental suffering and anguish. The very
premise of health professional involvement in abusive interrogations that they have a role in safeguarding detainees is
an unconscionable affront to the profession of medicine.
The Inspector Generals report also reveals that medical
professionals were directed to meticulously monitor the waterboarding of detainees to try to improve the techniques effectiveness, essentially using the detainees as human subjects, a
practice that approaches unlawful experimentation.
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has prepared the
following analysis of the Inspector Generals report, building on
the 2007 report by PHR and Human Rights First (HRF), Leave
No Marks, which assessed interrogation techniques reported up
to that time, which have now been confirmed by the Inspector
Generals report. This paper provides an introductory summary
of techniques newly described in the Inspector Generals report
and then offers a more detailed medical analysis of those
techniques. The paper then reviews the various ways health
professionals were complicit in enabling the torture regime.
HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS
Ethics and Human Rights Violations
Report
1
Advanced
Media
Group
Page 318REVEALED
of 727 in the May 2004 CIA Inspector GeneralS
October
2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
1. Forced shaving
Forced shaving of the head and beard was alleged by two
of the fourteen detainees interviewed by the ICRC for its 2007
report.
Mr. Ramzi Bin-al-Shib alleged that, in his eighth place of
detention, first his head was shaved and then some days
later his beard was also shaved off. He was particularly
distressed by the fact that the people who shaved him allegedly deliberately left some spots and spaces in order
to make him look and feel particularly undignified and
abused.3
In 2007, PHR physicians examined a former US detainee,
who reported:
When they finished hitting me they shaved my hair.
The only hair I had was in the middle. This was only to
humiliate me. 4
Medical Analysis: Forced shaving obviously carries little
risk of physical harm, and is chiefly designed to inflict psychological harm by means of humiliation, both personal and
religious. Forced shaving was part of a campaign to sever the
sense of self derived from religious belief, and was often accompanied by forced removal of religious articles.
In addition to the violation of cultural and religious taboos,
forced shaving constitutes an intrusion into the personal space
and bodily integrity of the person, infringing on autonomy and
self-control. The combined effects of this type of treatment in
combination with other techniques have been associated with
long-lasting psychological injury such as posttraumatic stress
disorder, anxiety and depression.
2. Hooding
Detainees were blindfolded or hooded to instill in them a
sense of fear, disorientation and dependency on their captors.
According to the February 2004 report of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on treatment of detainees
in Iraq:
Hooding [was] used to prevent people from seeing and to
disorient them, and also to prevent them from breathing
freely. One, or sometimes two bags, sometimes with an
elastic blindfold over the eyes which, when slipped down,
further impeded proper breathing. Hooding was sometimes used in conjunction with beatings thus increasing
anxiety as to when blows would came. The practice of
hooding also allowed the interrogators to remain anonymous and thus to act with impunity. Hooding could last
for periods from a few hours to up to 2 to 4 consecutive
days, during which hoods were lifted only for drinking,
eating or going to the toilets.5
PHR reported in Broken Laws, Broken Lives that according
to former detainees medically evaluated by PHR, hooding was
used both during transportation and during interrogation.
Medical Analysis:When not used in transport, hooding is
a form of sensory deprivation aimed at causing dislocation and
confusion. Research shows that prolonged sensory deprivation can result in depression, depersonalization and psychosis.
According to the ICRC report, hooding, and other observed
sensory deprivation techniques resulted in
signs of concentration difficulties, memory problems,
verbal expression difficulties, incoherent speech, acute
anxiety reactions, abnormal behavior and suicidal
tendencies.6
3. Dietary Manipulation
Detainees were deprived of solid food for periods ranging
from days to months. Mr. Abu Zubaydah alleged that for a period of two to three weeks during his initial period of interrogation, he was kept sitting on a chair constantly and only provided with liquid Ensure (a nutrient formula) and water. Mr. Binal-Shib reported that he went three to four weeks without solid
food, and was only provided with Ensure and water. In addition, six other high-value detainees reported being deprived of
solid food for periods ranging from days to weeks.7
Medical Analysis: While physical risks of a liquid diet are
minimal as long as appropriate calories and nutrients are provided, the intent of dietary manipulation is to inflict psychological distress by infringing on the detainees sense of autonomy
and self control and increasing discomfort and a sense of helplessness and dependency. While the risk of death or debilitation
may be minimal, the effects on concentration and mood may be
substantial.
5 ICRC Report.
6 ICRC Report.
7 ICRC Report.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
4. Prolonged Diapering
Detainees were placed in diapers and denied access to a toilet
for prolonged periods of time. According to the ICRC Report,
high value detainees in CIA custody were placed in diapers for
prolonged periods for transport.
The detainee would be made to wear a diaper and dressed
in a tracksuit The journey times obviously varied considerably and ranged from one hour to over twenty-four
to thirty hours. The detainee was not allowed to go to the
toilet and if necessary was obliged to urinate or defecate
in the diaper.
The ICRC report states that one of the detainees, Mr. Bin
Attash, was compelled to wear a diaper for a prolonged period:
[H]e commented that on several occasions the diaper
was not replaced so he had to urinate and defecate on
himself while shackled in the prolonged stress standing position. Indeed, in addition to Mr. Bin Attash, three
other detainees specified that they had to defecate and
urinate on themselves and remain standing in their own
body fluids.8
Medical Analysis: Prolonged diapering especially when
combined with leaving the subject in a diaper soiled with urine
and feces can result in both physical and psychological harm.
Prolonged exposure of the skin can result in skin infection,
skin breakdown and ulceration and urinary tract infections. In
addition, the placement of a normally continent adult in a diaper will likely lead to efforts by the adult to resist urination or
defecation, which in turn will likely result in bowel cramping
and bladder spasm.
Access to toilet is a universally recognized minimum standard for prisoners and detainees. In spite of the physical risks,
the chief aim of this technique is to cause psychological stress
through humiliation, induced dependency, loss of autonomy,
and regression to an infantile state.9 Like all such techniques,
especially when combined with others of the DDD type
(debility-dependency-dread), these are cumulative and lead to
short and long-term debilitation. At Guantnamo, the standard
operating procedures included requiring the detainee to ask
the interrogator for toilet paper, food, and religious articles.
Here, the torturers go even further, returning the detainee to
pre-toilet-training levels. When combined with a liquid diet,
the experiences of regression, humiliation, and dependency are
magnified.
5. Walling
Six of the fourteen high-value detainees interviewed by the
ICRC reported being placed in a neck collar or roll and then
slammed against a wall. According to the CIA guidelines,
8 ICRC Report.
9 The purpose of all coercive techniques is to induce psychological
regression in the subject by bringing a superior outside force to bear on his
will to resist. Regression is basically a loss of autonomy, a reversion to an
earlier behavioral level. As the subject regresses, his learned personality traits
fall away in reverse chronological order Human Resource Exploitation
Manual, CIA, 1983
6. Confinement in a Box
Confinement in a box is a rather extreme version of a stress
position with the added potential for claustrophobia.
According to the ICRC report, Abu Zubaydah alleged that
in Afghanistan in 2002 he was held in boxes designed to constrain his movement. Mr. Zubaydah stated:
As it was not high enough even to sit upright, I had to
crouch down. It was very difficult because of my wounds.
The stress on my legs held in this position meant that my
wounds both in the leg and the stomach became very
painful.
He went on to say that a cover was placed over the boxes
while he was inside making it hot and difficult to breathe.
Medical Analysis: Confinement in a box is an extreme example of stress positions, with the added effect of decreased
access to fresh air, temperature changes, light deprivation and
isolation. Stress positions have been associated with permanent
10 CIA guidelines as reproduced in Inspector Generals report, p. 15.
11 ICRC Report.
12 Leave No Marks.
HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS
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Report
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4
AIDING
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21 See Leave No Marks and Broken Laws, Broken Lives. Although these
reports were published in 2007 and 2008 respectively, they summarized
scientific literature that was well established in 2001. In a bizarre justification
for the safety of the techniques, the OLC report states, You have also
reviewed the relevant literature and found no empirical data on the effect of
these techniques with the exception of sleep-deprivation. OLC August 1,
2002, p. 6. Yet, there is a large body of research on the effects of these and
similar techniques, much of it supported by the CIA. See for example The
Search for the Manchurian Candidate (c) 1979 by John Marks. Published by
Times Books.
22 PHR and HRF previously reported on the harmful effects of many of these
techniques in their report Leave No Marks: Enhanced Interrogation and the
Risk of Criminality.
23 Basoglu M. et al. Torture vs. Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment:
Is the Distinction Real or Apparent? Archives Gen. Psychiatry 277 (2007).
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Conclusion
The newly released version of the May 2004 CIA
Inspector Generals report on Counterterrorism Detention
and Interrogation Activities reveals the use of a number of
previously undescribed techniques including:
Forced Shaving
Hooding
Dietary Manipulation
Prolonged Diapering
Walling
Confinement in a box
These techniques used alone or in combination may meet the
definition of torture under US and international law. Legality
aside, they are associated with high risk of physical and psychological harm, including harm that is enduring, in those subjected to these techniques. They also represent clear violations
of well-established medical ethics governing the behavior of
health professionals.
The report also confirms use of previously reported techniques, covered in the PHR and Human Rights First report
Leave No Marks, such as isolation, forced nudity, stress positions, temperature manipulation, waterboarding, and other
techniques which were used in ways that violated the torture
statute and international law.
6
AIDING
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18 May 2001: Link to CIA description of the biological and chemical warfare program at Ft Detrick,
Maryland, redacted from the report below: http://nl.cryptome.org/mkultra-0004.htm
17 May 2001
Source: MKULTRA digital files from IntellNet.org
Original 41 TIF images, Zipped: http://nl.cryptome.org/mkultra-ig63.zip (3.8MB)
This report was extensively used for questioning CIA officials in two US Senate hearings on MKULTRA in
1975 and another by the Senate in 1977.
See also a shorter 1957 report by the CIA Inspector General on MKULTRA: http://nl.cryptome.org/mkultra0001.htm
xxxxx indicates redactions. EYES ONLY derived from another description of this document.
[41 pages.]
[EYES ONLY]
xxxxxxxxx 185209/1
26 July 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of MKULTRA
1. In connection with our survey of Technical Services Division, DD/P, it was deemed advisable to prepare
the report of the MKULTRA program in one copy only, in view of its unusual sensitivity.
2. This report is forwarded herewith.
3. The MKULTRA activity is concerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and
radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior. The end
products of such research are subject to very strict controls including a requirement for the personal approval
of the Deputy Director/Plans for any operational use made of these end products.
4. The cryptonym MKULTRA encompasses the R&D phase and a second cryptonym MKDELTA denotes
the DD/P system for control of the operational employment of such materials. The provisions of the
MKULTRA authority also cover xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx [probably chemical and biological warfare
research with the US Army]. The administration and control of this latter activity were found to be generally
satisfactory and are discussed in greater detail in the main body of the report on TSD.
5. MKULTRA was authorized was authorized by then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles,
in 1953. The TSD was assigned responsibility thereby to employ a portion of its R&D budget, eventually set
at 20%, for research in behavioral materials and xxxxxxxxxxxxx under purely internal and compartmented
controls, (further details are provided in paragraph 3 of the attached report). Normal procedures for project
approval, funding, and accounting were waived. However, special arrangements for audit of expenditures
have been evolved in subsequent years.
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6. The scope of MKULTRA is comprehensive and ranges from the search for and procurement of botanical
and chemical substances, through programs for their analysis in scientific laboratories, to progressive testing
for effect on animals and human beings. The testing on individuals begins under laboratory conditions
employing every safeguard and progresses gradually to more and more realistic operational situations. The
program requires and obtains the services of a number of highly specialized authorities in many fields of
natural science.
7. The concepts involved in manipulating human behavior are found by many people both within and outside
the Agency to be distasteful and unethical. There is considerable evidence that opposition intelligence
services are active and highly proficient in this field. The experience of TSD to date indicates that both the
research and the employment of the materials are expensive and often unpredictable in results. Nevertheless,
there have been major accomplishments both in research and operational employment.
8. The principal conclusions of the inspection are that the structure and operational controls over this activity
need strengthening; improvements are needed in the administration of research projects; and some of the
testing of substances under simulated operational conditions was judged to involve excessive risk to the
Agency.
9. Attached for the signature of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a memorandum transmitting the
report to the Deputy Director/Plans requesting a summary of action taken or comments on the
recommendations contained herein.
[Signature]
J. S. Earman
Inspector General
Attachments - as stated
[Typed at first page bottom:]
Declassification Review E.O. 12065
Conducted on 17 June 1981
Derivative Classification by 531025
Review 17 June 2001
Derived from C9c.2; C9e
Downgrade xxxxxxxxxxxxx 61140
[EYES ONLY]
xxxxxxxxx - 185209
Cy 2 See D
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operational capabilities in the fields of a) [one line reacted] and b) chemical and biological materials capable
of producing human behavioral and psychological changes, (see Tab A). The cryptonym MKULTRA was
assigned to encompass TSD's research, development and equipment activities in these two fields. The
cryptonym MKDELTA had already been assigned by DD/P Notice No. 229-1 on 20 October 1952 (since
revised - see Tab B) as the indicator covering DD/P policy and procedure for the use of biochemicals in
clandestine operations.
2. The MKULTRA charter provides only a brief presentation of the rationale of the authorized activities. The
sensitive aspect of the program as it has evolved over the ensuing ten years are the following:
a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine
and related fields to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputations of professional
participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy.
b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original charter.
c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S.
citizens in jeopardy.
d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse
reaction in U.S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action in this field on
the part of foreign intelligence services.
3. In recognition of the sensitivity of MKULTRA, TSD was authorized exclusive control of the
administration, records, and financial accountings of the program. Simple statements of certification were all
that were required of TSD to obtain advances of funds from Finance Division. The DCI's memorandum also
exempted MKULTRA from audit, but this provision was modified to permit limited audit before the end of
the first year. Funding of MKULTRA was eventually stabilized at 20 percent of TSD's annual research and
development budget. It has fallen in the neighborhood of xxxxxxxxxx per year over the ten-year history of
the program, of which about 30 percent has been allocated to support of the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, cf. Tab
C for MKULTRA funding record FY 60-63.
4. The inspection of TSD activities in the field of xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx noted below in the section of the
Inspector General's Survey dealing with the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx of TSD, cf.
discussions beginning with paragraphs xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. The security considerations
applying to xxxxxxxxxxxx were found to be significantly different from those governing manipulation of
human behavior. a) Many xxxxx external projects in support of the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx are being funded
and managed securely outside the MKULTRA mechanism. b) Chief, Support, TSD, believes that it may also
be possible in the future to fund xxxxx MKULTRA projects by secure methods more compatible with DD/S
responsibilities. c) The very nature of the xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx requires that a high percentage of
staff contribute and be witting of each operation. xxxxx security practices are tight and the Inspector
General's Survey recommends further refinements in security procedures.
5. The inspection of MKULTRA projects in biochemical controls of human behavior raised questions in the
following area of policy and management which are dealt with in the balance of this report:
a. Scope of the MKULTRA charter:
(1) Over the ten-year life of the program many additional avenues to the control of
human behavior have been designated by the TSD management as appropriate to
investigation under the MKULTRA charter, including radiation, electro-shock,
various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology,
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placebos, and the detailed observation, measurement, recording, analysis, and publication of findings. Where
health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the program.
9. A current development in the testing of new products is the tightening of controls over dosages and
procedures by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Since MKULTRA files contained no documentation
on this subject, it was not possible to appraise the significance of this development for MKULTRA objectives.
However, interviews with the TSD officers concerned indicated that that the new rules are affecting
procedures and causing controversy in research hospitals and pharmaceutical houses. The TSD officers have
close relationships with key individuals in many of the leading U.S. pharmaceutical houses and count on their
continued close cooperation in obtaining materials and services deemed vital to U.s. intelligence.
10. The final phase of testing of MKULTRA materials involves their application to unwitting subjects in
normal life settings. It was noted earlier that the capabilities of MKULTRA substances to produce disabling or
discrediting effects or to increase the effectiveness of interrogation of hostile subjects cannot be established
solely through testing of volunteer populations. Reaction and attribution patterns are clearly affected when
the testing is conducted in an atmosphere of confidence under skilled medical supervision.
11. TSD, therefore, entered into a formal arrangement with certain cleared and witting individuals in the
Bureau of Narcotics in 1955 which provided for the released of MKULTRA materials for such testing as
those individuals deemed desirable and feasible. The initial arrangement obtained the services of a senior
representative of the Bureau and one of his assistants on the West Coast. A parallel arrangement was
established on the East Coast in 1961. The Director of the Bureau has been briefed on the activity, but the
Deputy Chief, TSD, who has guided MKULTRA from its inception, is of the opinion that the former would
disclaim all knowledge and responsibility in the event of a compromise. The MKULTRA program director
has, in fact, provided close supervision of the testing program from the beginning and makes periodic visits to
the sites. A sum of $10,000 has been provided annually to each of the two projects to cover cost of
cultivation of targets and maintenance of a safehouse in each area for the observation of effects of substances
on selected test individuals.
12. The particular advantage of these arrangements with the Bureau of Narcotics officials has been that test
subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects have been
informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the Bureau has obtained results of operational
value through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social
levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a
variety of individuals within these categories.
13. A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific
observation of results. The Bureau agents are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom
accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and
in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect. In a number of instances,
however, the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least on case, and the
agent could only follow-up by guarded inquiry after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness
and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects of the testing.
14. The MKULTRA program officer stated that the objectives of covert testing concern the field of
toxicology rather than medicine; further, that the program is not intended to harm test individuals, and that
the medical consultation and assistance is obtained when appropriate through separate MKULTRA
arrangements. The risk of compromise of the program through correct diagnosis of an illness by an unwitting
medical specialist is regularly considered and is stated to be a governing factor in the decision to conduct a
given test. The Bureau officials also maintain close working relations with local police authorities which could
be utilized to protect the activity in critical situations.
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15. There have been several discussions in the public press in recent months on the use of certain
MKULTRA-type drugs to influence human behavior. Broadly speaking, these have argued that research
knowledge of possible adverse effects of such substances on human beings is inadequate, that some
applications have done serious harm, and that professional researchers in medicine and psychiatry are split on
the ethics of performing such research. Increasing public attention to this subject must be expected.
16. The final step in the research and development sequence is the delivery of MKULTRA materials into the
MKDELTA control system governing their employment in clandestine operations. The subject is discussed
further in the next section; however, it is appropriate here to note that the employment of MKDELTA
materials remains an art rather than a scientific procedure. A significant number of variable in the target
individual, including age, sex, weight, general health, social status, and personality structure, may account for
widely varying and unpredictable reactions to a given drug in a given dosage.
17. The final stage of covert testing of materials on unwitting subjects is clearly the most sensitive aspect of
MKULTRA. No effective cover story appears to be available. TSD officials state that responsibility for covert
testing is transferred to the Bureau of Narcotics. Yet they also predict that the Chief of the Bureau would
disclaim any knowledge of the activity. Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and
approval of test programs. The principal responsibility for the propriety of such testing rests with the
MKULTRA program director and the Deputy Chief of TSD. The handling of test subjects in the last analysis
rests with the Narcotics agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of critical results from the top TSD
and CIA management is an inherent risk in these operations.
18. Final phase testing of MKULTRA substances or devices on unwitting subjects is recognized to be an
activity of genuine importance in the development of some but not all MKULTRA products. Termination of
such testing would have some, but an essentially indeterminate, effect on the development of operational
capability in this field. Of more critical significance, however, is the risk of serious damage to the Agency in
the event of compromise of the true nature of this activity. As now performed under Bureau of Narcotics
auspices, non-Agency personnel are necessarily fully witting of the true nature and significance of their
assignments, and of the sponsorship of CIA. Compromise of this information intentionally or unwittingly by
these individuals at some time in the future is a hazard that cannot be ruled out. A test subject may on some
occasions in the future correctly attribute the cause of his reaction and secure independent professional
medical assistance in identifying the exact nature of the substance employed, and by whom. An extreme
reaction to a test substance could lead to a Bureau request for cooperation from local authorities in
suppressing information of the situation. This would in turn broaden the circle of individuals who possessed at
least circumstantial evidence of the nature of the activity. Weighing possible benefits of such testing against
the risk of compromise and of resulting damage to CIA has led the Inspector General to recommend
termination of this phase of the MKULTRA program. Existing checks and balances on the working level
management of such testing do not afford the senior command of CIA adequate protection against the high
risks involved.
19. It does not follow that termination of cover testing of MKULTRA materials on unwitting U.S. citizens will
bring the program to a halt. Some testing on foreign nationals has been occurring under the present
arrangements. Various U.S. deep cover agents overseas would appear to be more favorably situated than the
U.S. narcotic agents to perform realistic testing. Finally, the operational use of the substances clearly serves
the testing function in view of the lack of predictability of human reactions.
III. Current estimate of the MKULTRA/MKDELTA capability
20. The present Deputy Chief of TSD, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, in his then capacity of scientific advisor to the
Deputy Director/Plans (DD/P), released a study (hereafter referred to as the Gottlieb report) on 21 April
1960, covering his six-month investigation of "Scientific and Technical Problems in Covert Action
Operations". Appendix B of the report was entitled, "The Applicability of Special Chemicals and biologicals
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to Clandestine Operations". The inspectors found this Appendix to be a carefully prepared and very useful
treatment of the subject. The remaining paragraphs draw on the Gottlieb report, take account of
developments since that date, and discuss management and funding aspects of MKULTRA.
21. The author opened his discussion with the question of what the operational returns had been from an
eight-year program involving an investment of approximately xxxxxxxxxx. He observed that the Clandestine
Services had encouraged TSD on various occasions to develop and maintain the operational capability in
special drugs and chemicals but that TSD had received little or no guidance in directing the work and that the
Clandestine Services had up to that time shown little inclination to use the end products operationally. He
indicated that there had been approximately 100 operations over the eight years employing harassment
materials (not controlled under the MKDELTA regulation) and only nine operations employing disabling
drugs, (NB: two-thirds of these involved the use of drugs in interrogations). No use of lethal substances was
reported.
22. The factors accounting for the low rate of use of this capability were considered to be the following:
a. the technical shortcomings of the drugs
b. the problem of testing in realistic pilot operations
c. limitations on the dissemination of pertinent information to operations officers
d. organizational and administrative restrictions on operations
e. negative attitudes toward the use of MKDELTA materials
f. problems in the training of case officers in this field
g. the risk of stimulating increased use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence
services
23. Technical shortcomings of the drugs:
As of 1960 no effective knockout pill, truth serum, aphrodisiac, or recruitment pill was known to exist.
MKDELTA was described as inherently a high-risk, low-yield field of operations. Three years later the
situation remains substantially unchanged with the exception that real progress has been made in the use of
drugs in support of interrogation. Ironically, however, the progress here has occurred in the development of a
total psychological theory of interrogation, in which the use of drugs has been relegated to a support role.
[Nine and one-half lines redacted]
24. The problem of testing in realistic pilot operations:
The subject has been discussed above, beginning with paragraph 10. It should also be noted that testing on
operational targets overseas is considered by some operations officers to be quite impracticable. Unilateral
operations are imperative which substantially complicates the delivery problem. The possibilities of
unexpected or critical reactions in test subjects and of ensuring compromise of the activity make most senior
command personnel unwilling to take the risks involved.
25. Limitations on the dissemination of pertinent information to case officers; organizational and
administrative restrictions on operations:
The present-day situation concerning both these problem areas is improved over 1960. TSD now regularly
briefs a variety of senior officers on its MKDELTA capability. Approval of the use of MKDELTA materials
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is now accomplished within the chain of command of the DD/P. The DD/P may consult, for example, with
the Chief, Medical Staff, concerning medical risks involved in MKDELTA operations, but the latter surely
would not expect to exercise final authority for the disapproval of operations.
26. TSD has found that TDY visits of MKULTRA officers to the field in support of specific operations
increases the awareness of the MKDELTA capability and stimulates proposals for additional projects. Of
equal significance, however, has been the TSD decision in 1961 to station in the
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx officer who is informed on MKDELTA matters. A second
officer is scheduled to move PCS to xxxxxxx during the summer of 1963 to support xx and adjacent stations.
While the principal responsibility of these officers lies in the field xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx the
arrangement in the xxxxxxxxx has proved useful in the MKDELTA field -- notably in interrogation -- as well.
It now appears that increased reliance can be placed on this approach to promoting responsible use of the
MKDELTA capabilities.
27. Negative attitudes toward the use of MKDELTA materials; problems in the training of case officers in this
field:
The Gottlieb report observed that some case officers have basic moral objections to the concept of
MKDELTA and therefore refuse to use the materials. Some senior officers were reported to believe that the
proper employment of the capability required more sophistication than most case officers possessed and that
there would be a tendency toward over-reliance on and misuse of drugs in lieu of perfecting classic espionage
techniques. Finally, it was suggested that MKDELTA controls were so restrictive as to have generated a
general defeatism among case officers concerning the chances of getting approval for the use of materials in
routine rather than extreme situations. These matters will be reviewed in future field inspections of DD/P area
divisions. In the meanwhile, the stationing of qualified TSD consultants in the field and increasing operational
experience will tend to develop over time a category of case officers who have acquired direct appreciation
of the potential and limitations of MKDELTA capability.
28. The risk of stimulating increase use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence services:
The Gottlieb report stated that opposition intelligence services are active in the MKDELTA field and
recommended that the CI Staff of the DD/P conduct a systematic study of the evidence. This
recommendation has not been implemented. It is a subject of increasing significance as new materials and
techniques become available.
It is recommend that:
Deputy Director/Plans instruct Chief, CI Staff, to perform a study of the evidence of the use of MKDELTA
materials by opposition intelligence services and recommend appropriate measures for training DD/P case
officers to recognize and counter hostile activity in this area.
29. In summary, present evidence concerning the operational value of MKDELTA capability would appear to
confirm the principal judgments of the 1960 Gottlieb report. There is an extremely low rate of operational use
of the controlled materials. On the other hand, significant progress has been achieved in the development of
an interrogation theory employing chemical substances, and in providing competent guidance to the field in
MKDELTA matters through TSD officers working overseas.
IV. Management of MKULTRA
30. TSD has initiated 144 projects relating to the control of human behavior; i.e,
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx during the ten years of operation of the MKULTRA
program. Twenty-five (25) of these projects remain in existence at the present time, while a number of others
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34. It will be noted that the Chief of Support, TSD, does not participate in the MKULTRA administration. The
predecessor of the present Chief of Support served in TSD throughout the life of the program until 1962
without ever being associated with the management. In his stead, the Chief Scientist and a GS-12 budget
officer have provided administrative support. The Chief Scientist has set policy on the funding of MKULTRA
projects in all respects including salaries, overhead rates, fees, material, equipment, facilities, travel and the
like. The support officer was only added in 1962 under pressure of critical audit findings. This use of the
Chief Scientist in a field where Chief of Support possesses superior qualifications and facilities constitutes a
misuse of talent. The proposed new charter for MKULTRA should take account of this anomaly and also
provide that Chief of Support advise in the future on decisions to fund projects under the MKULTRA
authority and thereby to waive the application of DD/S procedures.
It is recommended that:
Deputy Director/Plans draft and submit for the approval of the Director of Central Intelligence a revision and
re-confirmation of the authority granted him in 1953 (Tab A) to operate the MKULTRA program,
incorporating the following provisions:
a. Deputy Director/Plans assign Chief, Technical Services Division, to operate MKULTRA as a
program for research and development of chemical, biological, and radioactive materials, and of
techniques for the employment of electro-shock, capable of producing human behavioral or
physiological change. Subsequent changes in scope of MKULTRA shall require the written
approval of the Deputy Director/Plans.
b. Deputy Director/Plans arrange with Deputy Director/Research for the coordination of research
relating to MKULTRA objectives to control duplication of effort and to provide for exchange of
information of new capabilities.
c. Chief, Technical Services Division, consistent with established policy, may negotiate for
research in MKULTRA materials and techniques to be conducted by Deputy Director/Research
and by other component offices of CIA. He shall consult regularly with the appropriate officers
of such components to control duplication of effort.
d. Chief, Technical Services Division shall approve the addition of MKULTRA developed
materials to the list of operationally available MKDELTA substances and keep the Deputy
Director/Plans advised of such additions. (cf. Clandestine Services Instruction No. 220-10,
MKDELTA MATERIALS, dated 22 July 1960 -- Tab B -- which governs the employment of
behavioral control materials in clandestine operations.)
e. Deputy Director/Plans, jointly with Deputy Director/Support, establish policy for the
administration of support functions under MKULTRA. Such policy shall seek to limit the
maximum waiver of established Agency support procedures for activities of unusual sensitivity.
f. Chief, Technical Services Division shall maintain exacting internal controls and records of all
substantive and support matters within each MKULTRA project. Records shall include:
(1) A plan of the research and development to be performed.
(2) An administrative annex setting forth security, budget and accounting
arrangements agreed to by the parties of the project. Chief of Support, TSD, shall
then certify to the DD/S for each such project that this annex is in accord with the
agreed DDS/DDP policy. Pursuant to this responsibility, Chief of Support, TSD, shall
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[Signature]
Richard Helms
Acting Deputy Director (Plans)
Attachments: (2)
Tab A - Description of Project MKULTRA and the controls which will be exercised over its
execution
Tab B - Suggested Memorandum from DCI to DD/A authorizing payment of invoices under
Project MKULTRA
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig & 1 w/attachments
DD/P - 1 w/attachments
TSS/OC - 1 w/attachments
Exec. REg. - 1 w/attachments
xxxxxxx 87624
Copy # 1 of 5 copies
TAB A
PROJECT MKULTRA
Extremely Sensitive Research and Development Programs
1. On 5 June 1952, the Project Review Committee approved the TSS Research Program for Fiscal Year 1953.
[Three lines redacted]
2. The PRC approval authorized the Director of Research, at his discretion and with the approval of the
Research Chairman, to apportion and obligate the research funds among individual projects, such projects to
be subject to the usual Agency procedures and administrative controls.
3. This Research Program has been actively underway since the middle of 1952 and has gathered
considerable momentum during the past few months. It is now evident on the basis of work currently
underway that approximately 94% of the projects contemplated can be handled through regular procurement
channels by means of customary contracts signed jointly by the Agency and the organization undertaking to
carry out the work. It has also become apparent that approximately 6% of the projects are of such ultrasensitive nature that they cannot and should not be handled by means of contracts which would associate CIA
or the Government with the work in question. This 6% of the current research effort now lies entirely within
two well-defined fields of endeavor, namely:
(a) Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials. This area involves
the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine
operational. Aside from offensive potential, the development of a comprehensive capability in this field of
covert chemical and biological warfare gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential,
thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the use of these
techniques as we are. For example: we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which
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causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well
predicted for each individual. this material could potentially aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting
information, implanting suggestion and other forms of mental control.
b) [10 lines redacted]
4. It is highly undesirable from a policy and security point of view that contracts should be signed indicating
Agency or government interest in either of these two fields. In a great many instances the work in field (a)
must be conducted by individuals who are not and should not be aware of our interest. In all cases dealing
with field (b), it is mandatory that any connection with the Agency should be known only to an absolute
minimum number of people who have been specifically cleared for this purpose. In no case should any
manufacturer or supplier be aware of Government interest.
5. In many cases in field (a) where the researcher can be cleared and may be aware of our interest in the
program, he is unwilling to have his name on a contract which remains out of his control in his files.
Experience has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of pharmacological, physiological,
psychiatric and other biological sciences are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which
connect them with this activity since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputations.
6. Even internally in CIA, as few individuals as possible should be aware of our interest in these fields and of
the identity of those who are working for us. At present this results in ridiculous contracts, often with
cut-outs, which do not spell out the scope or intent of the work and which contain terms which the cut-out
cannot incorporate in his contract with the researcher without revealing Government interest. Complete
Government audits of such contracts are impossible for the same reason.
7. It is, therefore, requested that the DCI authorize TSS to handle 6% xxxxxxxx of the previously approved
research budget for FY '53 without the establishment of formal contractual relations. This program will be
known as Project MKULTRA.
8. It is suggested that payment of invoices under Project MKULTRA forwarded by TSS be authorized,
provided that:
(a) the total of such invoices does not exceed
(b) the invoices carry a certification by the TSS Research Director that payment of funds is
authorized and that the invoices represent work accomplished within the program approved by
the DCI under Project MKULTRA as outlined in this memorandum;
(c) the invoices carry the certification of the Executive Secretary of the Research Board that the
scope of the program has been approved;
(d) the invoices carry the certification of the cognizant TSS Division Chief that the work has been
satisfactory from a technical point of view.
9. It should be emphasized that this authorization does not involve any new allocation of funds, but merely
applies to a portion of a previously approved budget. The TSS certifications mentioned above will mean that:
(a) the project is being handled under the conditions set forth in this description and specifically
falls within one of the two ultra-sensitive field mentioned above;
(b) the project has been approved in the manner provided for in the PRC document which
originally set up and approved the over-all TSS Research Program. Each project will thus have
been presented by the Chief of the Division monitoring the work to the Research Director and to
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the Research Chairman and will have, as in the past, to be approved by both before any
expenditures are made;
(c) technical control over the project will be exercised by the TSS Division Chief and Project
Engineers to the same extent now applying to projects handled in the normal fashion. Technical
reports will be rendered when necessary and advisable and will be available for inspection in TSS
files at any time;
(d) in the case of each project, TSS will reach an understanding with the individuals who will
perform the work as to the conditions under which the work will be performed and
reimbursement arranged. No standard contract will be signed. In some cases when possible, a
memorandum of agreement will be signed and retained in the TSS files. Under no circumstances
would copies of such agreements leave TSS files where they will be kept available for inspection;
(e) the manner in which the work will be handled and methods of maintaining Agency and
Government sterility will be worked out with the Inspection & Security Office as in the past, and
clearance of individuals to the extent deemed necessary by TSS and I & SO will be obtained;
(f) invoices, when received by TSS, will be forwarded to Finance Division for payment and will
be certified as outlined in Paragraph 8 above. Whenever documents are available supporting a
portion or all of a given invoice, such as cancelled checks, receipted bills, etc., these will be
requested by TSS and retained in TSS files in support of the invoice, where they will at all times
be available for inspection. They will not be forwarded with the invoices. Such documents at best
will cover only a portion of the total expenditures, and regular audit procedures will not be
followed;
(g) other provisions and controls over the Research Program specified in the original PRC
approval will remain unaltered. Technical progress under the separate projects handled under
Project MKULTRA will be included whenever necessary in the regular progress reports now
submitted by the Director of Research. The monthly budget and financial report being submitted
by TSS to DD/A will include full financial information on these projects, including how much of
the 6%
has been committed, how much has been spent and how much remains.
20. The establishment and approval of Project MKULTRA will allow TSS to undertake highly desirable and
necessary research in these two sensitive fields which would not be possible unless the work can be handled
in this manner.
Distribution:
Address - Orig. & 1
DD/P - 1
TSS/OC - 1
Exec. Registry - 1
[Another copy of the Dulles letter shows the 6" %"as $300,000.]
87624
TAB B
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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6%
b) each invoice bear a certification by the Chief, DD/P/TSS, as the Research Director, that the
invoice applies to Project MKULTRA and that the conditions outlined in the DD/P memorandum
for DCI dated 3 April have been complied with. The certification will also request that payment
be made;
c) the invoice shall bear the certification of the Executive Secretary of the Research Board that
the scope of the program has been approved;
d) the invoice shall bear the certification of the cognizant TSS Division Chief that the work has
been satisfactorily performed from a technical point of view and has been carried out in
accordance with the understandings reached between TSS and the individual or concern doing
the work.
6. No further documents will be required to justify payment of the invoices. Exacting control will be
maintained over the Project by TSS. Although no formal contract will be signed, it will occasionally be
possible for TSS to sign an informal agreement with the individual or concern performing the work. In such
cases, TSS will retain in its files all documents. TSS will endeavor wherever possible to obtain documentary
support of invoices, such as cancelled checks, receipted bills, etc., and these will remain in TSS files. Such
documents at best will only cover a portion of the total expenditures, and teh regular audit procedure will not
be followed.
7. Other provisions and control over the Research Program specified in the original PRC approval remain
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unaltered. The monthly budget and financial record being submitted by TSS to DD/A will include financial
information on the work being conducted under Project MKULTRA, showing how much of the 6% has
been committed, how much has been spent, and how much remain.
/S/
ALLEN W. DULLES
Director, Central Intelligence
Distribution:
Addressee - Orig. & 1
DD/P - 1
TSS/OC - 1
Exec. Registry - 1
Not transcribed: 3-page Memorandum for File, 21 April 1953, on Project MKULTRA, showing sample
certification form for approval of projects by the Research Chairman and the Research Director, and stating
procedures for keeping records and accounting for expenditure of funds, as set forth in the Helms and Dulles
letters.
End of the Inspector General Report of Inspection of MKULTRA.
Following are two documents which show responses to the IG report.
[Folder 0000146166; 2 pages.]
1 July 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: MKULTRA - Comments of Chief, TSD, on Draft Report of Inspection
1. I called xxxxxxxxxxx to acknowledge receipt of Dr. Gottlieb's comments on John Vance's report of
inspection of MKULTRA, TSD. I said I felt this reply was very helpful in explaining the TSD position on the
most critical points on our IG recommendations, [one line redacted] testing on unwitting subjects, [one line
redacted]. I reminded xxxxxxxxxxx that his rebuttal dealt with only three of the ten specific
recommendations we had made in our IG report. He replied that the balance of these recommendations really
all related to tightening up the administration of the charter and that he personally welcomed the opportunity
to have this spelled out in greater detail. I said I felt that our recommendations went quite beyond the field of
administration and cited in particular the problem of [one line redacted] -- I said this was much more than an
administration problem, and that would like to know what solution he and Dr. Gottlieb proposed to improve
[half-line redacted]. xxxxxxxxxxx tended to dismiss this problem partially on the grounds that it was a
function of a personal relationship between him and who ever might be the DD/R at any given time, and
partially because he didn't think there was any dogmatic or systematic solution.
2. I told xxxxxxxxxxx that we would prefer not to submit our MKULTRA paper to the DD/P without some
more explicit statement from him on the problem of [one-half line redacted] and that we also felt Dr.
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Gottlieb's three page endorsement failed to comment on our detailed proposals for tightening up the
administration of MKULTRA activities. Mr. xxxxxxxxxxx appreciated this but felt that they had registered
their views on the most important points at issue, and they urged us at this state to go ahead and submit our
report with the Gottlieb endorsement as it now stands to the DD/P.
3. Recommendation: I think we have little to gain by massaging this report any further and recommend that
we submit it to the DD/P with a request for his specific comments on our recommendations. I recommend
that we redraft the last recommendation on the audit function in accordance with the proposal of
xxxxxxxxxxx .
[Signature]
E. J. Applewhite
[Folder 0000146165; 2 pages.]
29 November 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: MKULTRA PROGRAM
1. A meeting was held in General Carter's office on 29 November 1963 to discuss the subject program. Those
present, in addition to General Carter, were Messrs. Helms, Kirkpatrick, xxxxxxxx, Gottlieb and Earman. The
main thrust of the discussion was the testing of certain drugs on unwitting U.S. citizens. Dr. Gottlieb gave a
brief history of the MKULTRA program which was not in any way at variance with the IG report of August
1963 on this subject.
2. Messrs. Gottlieb and xxxxxxxx argued for the continuation of unwitting testing, using as the principal point
that controlled testing cannot be depended upon for accurate results. General Carter, Mr. Kirkpatrick, and I
do not disagree with this point. We also accept the necessity for having a "stable of drugs" on the shelf and
the requirement for continued research and development of drugs -- not only for possible operational use but
also to give CIA insight on the state of the art in this field and in particular to alert us to what the opposition is
or might be expected to do in the R&D and employment of drugs.
3. xxxxxxxxxx noted that there was no disagreement with the recommendations of the IG survey on
MKULTRA with the exception of the unwitting testing problem. In response to a query from General Carter,
he stated that since the IG report such testing has been held in abeyance.
4. General Carter made it clear that he understood the necessity for research and development of all types of
drugs, to include their testing. However, he was troubled ty the "unwitting aspect". This led to a brief
discussion on the possibility of unwitting tests on foreign nationals, but according to xxxxxxxx this had been
ruled out as a result of several conversations he recently had with senior chiefs of stations -- too dangerous
and the lack of controlled facilities. (This seemed an odd conclusion to me since the same dangers exist in the
U.S. and from what we were able to find out during our survey, the facilities we have for uncontrolled testing
leave much to be desired -- I made a point of this.)
5. After further discussion, it was agreed:
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a. That the charter of MKULTRA would be revised along the lines recommended in the IG
Survey.
b. The procedures for testing drugs are to be reviewed and new alternative proposals submitted.
c. If it is concluded by the DD/P that unwitting testing on American citizens must be continued to
operationally prove out these drugs, it may become necessary to place this problem before the
Director for a decision.
6. I made the point that the IG survey had found other problems with the MKULTRA program in addition to
the unwitting testing, but stated if the charter is rewritten along the lines recommended, I believe these
problems would be corrected.
7. NOTE: the IG Survey of MKULTRA was handed to xxxxxxxx after the meeting for his use in redrafting
the charter.
[Initials]
J. S. Earman
Inspector General
JSE:cm
Transcription and HTML by Cryptome.
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Technical Services Division (TSD) was a participant or observer in the following events:
Ordering
Date ascending
The CIAs Technical Services Division (TSD) considers plans to undermine Fidel
Castros charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. At one point, there is
discussion of spraying Castros broadcasting studio with a hallucinogenic
chemical. The plan is taken of the shelf because the chemical is deemed
unreliable. During this period, the TSD laces a box of cigars with a chemical
that would produce temporary disorientation, hoping that he will smoke one
of the cigars before giving a speech. In another instance, the TSD comes up
with a scheme to dust Castros shoes with thallium salts during a trip outside
of Cuba. The salts would cause his beard to fall out. The plan is abandoned
when Castro cancels the trip. [US CONGRESS, 12/18/1975]
Entity Tags: Fidel Castro, Technical Services Division (TSD)
Timeline Tags: US-Cuba (1959-2005)
The CIA plans an operation to poison Fidel Castro, as well as his brother Raul
and Che Chevarra, with pills containing botulinum toxin. The plan drags on for
more than two years, but is ultimately aborted. [US CONGRESS, 12/18/1975; CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSPECTOR GENERAL, 1/1996]
Entity Tags: Technical Services Division (TSD), Robert E. Maheu, William Harvey, Sheffield
Edwards, Richard Bissell, Raul Castro, James O Connell, Ch Guevara, Fidel Castro
Timeline Tags: US-Cuba (1959-2005)
The CIAs Task Force W devises two plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. The first
one, involving an exploding sea shell that would be placed where Castro
regularly dives, is dismissed by the CIAs Technical Services Division (TSD) as
impractical. In the second plan, James Donovan (who has been negotiating
with Castro for the release of prisoners taken during the Bay of Pigs
operation) would present Castro with a contaminated diving suit. TSD decides
to give the plan a try. It purchases a diving suit and laces its breathing
apparatus with tubercule bacillus. The suit itself is dusted with a fungus that
is known to cause a chronic skin disease. But the suit never leaves the
laboratory. [US CONGRESS, 12/18/1975; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INSPECTOR GENERAL,
Time period
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1/1996]
Entity Tags: Technical Services Division (TSD), James Donovan, Fidel Castro
Timeline Tags: US-Cuba (1959-2005)
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
:
:
v.
( 23 Pages)
___________________________
Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
[email protected]
www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com
717-826-5354 Phone
888-533-3606 Facsimile
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CITIZENS COMMISSION
ON HUMANRIGHTS
INTERNATIONAL
Stanley J Caterbone
1250 Fremont St
Lancaster, PA 17603
Dear Mr.cetertonerrWe would like to thank you for sending your psychiatric abuse report to the Citizens
Commission on Human Rights International (CCHR). After reviewing your information, it is
evident that you experienced many psychiatric abuses. However, it has been determined that
CCHR is unable to take any action on the information.
Unless you request otherwise, your confidential information will remain on file with CCHR and
could potentially be used in the future. For instance, because we receive hundreds of abuse
reports each year, it is possible that other people might file reports on the same practitioner or
facility. CCHR can use such data to show a pattern of abuse.
Please understand that CCHR is not a law enforcement or legal agency in any way. We are
not an attorney referral service, cannot bring lawsuits against individuals and do not have law
enforcement powers.
CCHR Int'l, 6616 Sunset Blvd., Hollywood, CA 90028,
[email protected]
s~
Lura Schmiedeke,
Abuse Case Documenter
Page
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525
3 of
of 23
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October 2, 2009
l. and
CI-08-13373
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of Common
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PSYCHIATRY'S CORRUPT INDUSTRY
r
A Public Service Reportfmm
AdvancedCitizens
MediaCommission
Page
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he 2009 Lancaster
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Pleas Exhibit
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A-37
ClTIZENS COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The Citizens Commission on Human
Rights (CCHR) was established in 1969 by
the Church of Scientology to investigate
and expose psychiatric violations of human
rights, and to clean up the field of mental
healing. Its co-founder is Dr. Thomas
Szasz, professor of psychiatry emeritus and
an internationally renowned author. Today,
CCHR has more than 130 chapters in over
30 countries. Its board of advisors, called
Commissioners, includes doctors, lawyers,
educators, artists, business professionals,
and civil and human rights representatives.
Advanced MediaPage
Group
Page
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http://us.mg4.mail.yahoo.com/dc/launch?.gx=1&.rand=e7fnqgnk5rvfb
U.S. Sponsored MindCase
Control
No. and
CI-08-13373
the 2009 Lancaster
Senate Investigations
County Court
into
of Common
CIA Interrogation
Pleas Exhibit
Programs
A-37
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2 of 3
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U.S. Sponsored MindCase
Control
No. and
CI-08-13373
the 2009 Lancaster
Senate Investigations
County Court
into
of Common
CIA Interrogation
Pleas Exhibit
Programs
A-37
surveillance technology have advanced far beyond what most Americans would imagine.
The Advanced Media Group is a Lancaster based company that was formed in 1990 as an information
technologies company that began as a joint venture partner with American Helix Technology Company
and High Industries in order to develop CD-ROM technologies. Advanced Media Group has worked with
the following list of companies and organizations U.S. Based Companies include: Donnelly Geo Systems (Mapquest); Mansco, Inc.; National Assoc Of
Watch & Clock; Parsons & Brinkerhoff Engineers; Ford New Holland; Mobil Oil, Inc.; Indiana Bell;
Congressional Info Systems; Microsoft, Inc; Bell Atlantic; Tandy Electronics, Inc; Exxon Research And
Production; Compaq, Inc; Ipsoa; Veda, Inc.; Cbis, Inc; Library Of Congress; Commodore Business
Machines, Inc; Amp, Inc, Now Tandy Corporation; U. S. Postal Service; Arthur Anderson; At&T / Data
Devision; Bancroft And Whintney; American Bankers Association; Pa Blue Shield; American Bond
Buyers; HEARST Publications; NASA Goddard Space Flight Center; Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) of
Department of Defense; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); National Institute of Standards &
Technology (NIST)/Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); AIM Mutual Funds ; Power
Station Studios; MIT; Microsoft; IBM; U.S. Department of Commerce; The Hearst Corporation; SONY
DADC; DRI McGraw Hill; Capitol Records; NEC Corporation.
Lancaster Based Companies include: The Hotel Brunswick; Gallo Rosso Restaurant; Mazzi
Restaurant; B2B Communications; Pflumm Contractors, Inc.; The Jay Group; Lancaster Container;
American Helix Technology Corporation/High Industries; Cross Microwave; S.N.Lombardo Development;
Sprecher Management (Excelsior Place); Contact ONE.
Stan J. Caterbone
Advanced Media Group
www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com
Notice and Disclaimer: Stan J. Caterbone and the Advanced Media Group have been slandered, defamed, and publicly discredited since 1987
due to going public (Whistle Blower) with allegations of misconduct and fraud within International Signal & Control, Plc. of Lancaster, Pa. (ISC
pleaded guilty to selling arms to Iraq via South Africa and a $1 Billion Fraud in 1992). Unfortunately we are forced to defend our reputation
and the truth without the aid of law enforcement and the media, which would normally prosecute and expose public corruption. We utilize our
communications to thwart further libelous and malicious attacks on our person, our property, and our business. We continue our fight for
justice through the Courts, and some communications are a means of protecting our rights to continue our pursuit of justice. Advanced
Media Group is also a member of the media. Reply if you wish to be removed from our Contact List. How long can Lancaster County and
Lancaster City hide me and Continue to Cover-Up my Whistle Blowing of the ISC Scandel?
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U.S. Sponsored MindCase
Control
No. and
CI-08-13373
the 2009 Lancaster
Senate Investigations
County Court
into
of Common
CIA Interrogation
Pleas Exhibit
Programs
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immensely.
So, when would be a good time to meet for everyone? Weekends are best for me. Or daytime hours
until around 2 pm EST, since I work in the evenings. I'll attend the first meeting or so to get things
started. After that, I'll hope that you all can meet weekly and/or exchange communications regularly
to do this. Let me know at your earliest convenience what works best for each of you.
Bing brings you maps, menus, and reviews organized in one place. Try it now.
3 of 3
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The Associated Press: Ex-Bush officials face lawsuits over their actions
2 of 3
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hRh2OMc1xO2G...
Photo 1 of 3
In two cases, judges appointed by Republican presidents have refused at an early stage to
dismiss lawsuits that were filed against Ashcroft and former Justice Department official John
Yoo. One complaint challenges Ashcroft's strategy of preventive detention. The other seeks to
hold Yoo accountable for legal memos he wrote supporting detention, interrogation and
presidential power.
In a third case, the full federal appeals court in New York is reconsidering an earlier decision by
three of its members to toss out a lawsuit by a man who was changing planes in the United
States when he was mistaken for a terrorist and sent to Syria, where he claims he was
tortured.
Senior officials are accustomed to having their actions in office judged by history, not the
courts. Exposing them to legal risk might complicate recruitment as top prospects shun
positions that could land them in personal trouble. It also could make officials think twice about
aggressive use of executive authority.
The cases have been uncomfortable for the Obama administration, which inherited the task of
representing Ashcroft and Yoo from the Bush administration, even though President Barack
Obama opposed some of the homeland-security practices under his predecessor. As well, both
the Obama and Bush administrations renounced some of Yoo's legal positions.
Among the Yoo memos retracted was his Oct. 23, 2001, opinion that the Fourth Amendment's
protections against unreasonable searches did not apply to domestic military operations aimed
at terror suspects so soldiers could enter and search homes without warrants in pursuit of
terrorists.
The Obama administration has yet to spell out its views on when people may be detained
because of suspected terrorism links but without evidence of criminal activity.
No attorney general has ever been held personally liable for official actions, said Yeshiva
University law professor Alexander Reinert, who represents another post-9/11 detainee who is
suing Ashcroft. Other federal officials, particularly at a lower level, have been held personally
liable for their actions. It's just very rare.
Supreme Court rulings allow high-ranking officials to be held liable but set a high bar: An official
must be tied directly to a violation of constitutional rights and must have clearly understood the
action crossed that line.
Even when officials are held personally liable, their agencies still may agree to pay damages
assessed against them unless there is blatant wrongdoing, like clear racial prejudice. And
for many plaintiffs, the chance to saddle a top official with the shame of a court's condemnation
is more important than collecting cash from the officeholder.
Map
Critics of George W. Bush's administration see the recent actions of the courts as a chance to
wring a measure of accountability from the Bush White House at a time when Obama
expresses reluctance to look backward and Congress has shown little appetite for investigating
the past.
"It shows a willingness on the part of the courts to hold those who authorized illegal action
responsible, not only those who carry it out," said David Cole, a constitutional law professor at
Georgetown University.
But Ashcroft's former chief spokesman, Mark Corallo, said there is good reason to protect
officials from damages for actions they take in the course of their duties.
"People are not going to want to serve in government if they have to hire a battery of lawyers
the minute they take their oath of office," Corallo said.
Most lawsuits seeking personal liability of officials are dismissed early. Either a plaintiff hasn't
made a strong enough case or a judge finds the officeholder can't be held liable for those
official actions.
In these three cases, however, judges have considered arguments from both sides and still
allowed the lawsuits to proceed or, in the case of the man sent to Syria, are weighing the
arguments now.
"This is frustrating for judges," said Orin Kerr, a constitutional law professor at George
Washington University. "The law is not that clear and it's hard to get rulings that clarify it."
But Kerr said the Ashcroft case has enough important elements that it could be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, where a ruling might clarify the law.
First, though, the Justice Department has to decide whether to appeal an early September
ruling by a panel of the San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The appeals court said a Muslim U.S. citizen could pursue his lawsuit to hold Ashcroft
personally liable for his arrest in 2003
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Editors note: Click here to listen to Jeffrey Kaye discuss his groundbreaking report with radio talk
show host Peter B. Collins.
A number of new articles have been published recently that have highlighted evidence of illegal
human experimentation on U.S.-held terrorism prisoners undergoing torture. These articles
followed the release of a white paper by Physicians for Human Rights [PHR], Aiding Torture: Health
Professionals Ethics and Human Rights Violations Demonstrated in the May 2004 Inspector Generals
Report.
This report looks at those recent charges, and reveals that experiments by a CIA researcher on
human subjects undergoing SERE training went unreported in the legal memos the Bush
administration drafted to approve their torture program. It will also connect major military and
intelligence figures to the SERE experiments, and tie some of them to major science and
experimental directorates at the CIA and Special Operations Command.
An article by veteran journalist William Fisher, looking at PHRs white paper, asks, Did physicians
and psychologists help the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency develop a new research protocol to
assess and refine the use of waterboarding or other harsh interrogation techniques?
A column at Scientific American quotes PHRs medical advisor on the subject:
[PHR] also raises questions about the ethics of medical note-taking during some of the
interrogations. Medical doctors and psychologists colluded with the CIA to keep
observational records about waterboarding, which approaches unethical and unlawful
human experimentation, Scott Allen, lead study author and PHR medical advisor, said
in a prepared statement.
Finally, a story in Wednesdays UK Guardian discussed the significance of the charges of unlawful
human experimention:
Human experimentation without consent has been prohibited in any setting since 1947,
when the Nuremberg Code, which resulted from the prosecution of Nazi doctors, set
down 10 sacrosanct principles. The code states that voluntary consent of subjects is
essential and that all unnecessary physical and mental suffering should be avoided.
Advanced Media Group
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21 retweet
Article printed from The Public Record: http://pubrecord.org
URL to article: http://pubrecord.org/torture/4607/research-torture-charges-human/
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Page
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14 retweet
Article printed from The Public Record: http://pubrecord.org
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The Associated Press: Ex-Bush officials face lawsuits over their actions
2 of 3
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hRh2OMc1xO2G...
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Photo 1 of 3
In two cases, judges appointed by Republican presidents have refused at an early stage to
dismiss lawsuits that were filed against Ashcroft and former Justice Department official John
Yoo. One complaint challenges Ashcroft's strategy of preventive detention. The other seeks to
hold Yoo accountable for legal memos he wrote supporting detention, interrogation and
presidential power.
In a third case, the full federal appeals court in New York is reconsidering an earlier decision by
three of its members to toss out a lawsuit by a man who was changing planes in the United
States when he was mistaken for a terrorist and sent to Syria, where he claims he was
tortured.
Senior officials are accustomed to having their actions in office judged by history, not the
courts. Exposing them to legal risk might complicate recruitment as top prospects shun
positions that could land them in personal trouble. It also could make officials think twice about
aggressive use of executive authority.
The cases have been uncomfortable for the Obama administration, which inherited the task of
representing Ashcroft and Yoo from the Bush administration, even though President Barack
Obama opposed some of the homeland-security practices under his predecessor. As well, both
the Obama and Bush administrations renounced some of Yoo's legal positions.
Among the Yoo memos retracted was his Oct. 23, 2001, opinion that the Fourth Amendment's
protections against unreasonable searches did not apply to domestic military operations aimed
at terror suspects so soldiers could enter and search homes without warrants in pursuit of
terrorists.
The Obama administration has yet to spell out its views on when people may be detained
because of suspected terrorism links but without evidence of criminal activity.
No attorney general has ever been held personally liable for official actions, said Yeshiva
University law professor Alexander Reinert, who represents another post-9/11 detainee who is
suing Ashcroft. Other federal officials, particularly at a lower level, have been held personally
liable for their actions. It's just very rare.
Supreme Court rulings allow high-ranking officials to be held liable but set a high bar: An official
must be tied directly to a violation of constitutional rights and must have clearly understood the
action crossed that line.
Even when officials are held personally liable, their agencies still may agree to pay damages
assessed against them unless there is blatant wrongdoing, like clear racial prejudice. And
for many plaintiffs, the chance to saddle a top official with the shame of a court's condemnation
is more important than collecting cash from the officeholder.
Map
Critics of George W. Bush's administration see the recent actions of the courts as a chance to
wring a measure of accountability from the Bush White House at a time when Obama
expresses reluctance to look backward and Congress has shown little appetite for investigating
the past.
"It shows a willingness on the part of the courts to hold those who authorized illegal action
responsible, not only those who carry it out," said David Cole, a constitutional law professor at
Georgetown University.
But Ashcroft's former chief spokesman, Mark Corallo, said there is good reason to protect
officials from damages for actions they take in the course of their duties.
"People are not going to want to serve in government if they have to hire a battery of lawyers
the minute they take their oath of office," Corallo said.
Most lawsuits seeking personal liability of officials are dismissed early. Either a plaintiff hasn't
made a strong enough case or a judge finds the officeholder can't be held liable for those
official actions.
In these three cases, however, judges have considered arguments from both sides and still
allowed the lawsuits to proceed or, in the case of the man sent to Syria, are weighing the
arguments now.
"This is frustrating for judges," said Orin Kerr, a constitutional law professor at George
Washington University. "The law is not that clear and it's hard to get rulings that clarify it."
But Kerr said the Ashcroft case has enough important elements that it could be reviewed by the
Supreme Court, where a ruling might clarify the law.
First, though, the Justice Department has to decide whether to appeal an early September
ruling by a panel of the San Francisco-based 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The appeals court said a Muslim U.S. citizen could pursue his lawsuit to hold Ashcroft
personally liable for his arrest in 2003
October 2, 2009
10/2/2009 12:56 AM
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
HAARP,TheUnitedStatesGovernment,MindControl
and
TheAdvancedMediaGroup
September24,2009
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
TABLEOFCONTENTS
1. U.S. PATENT ISSUED FOR MIND CONTROL THROUGH. HAARP TYPE
ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES.
2.
3.
4. High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program HAARP by DOD & U.S. Navy, 1993 by
Wikipedia.
5. The Purpose and Objectives of the HAARP Program as stated in the Environmental
Impact Statement.
6. United States Secretary of Defense, History and List.
7. United States Presidents, History and List.
8.
9. Michael Hayden, Director of NSA 1999 to 2005, Director of CIA 2006 to 2008.
10. Dick Cheney, Interim Congressman, White House Chief of Staff 1978, House of
Representatives, Secretary of Defense 1989 to 1993, CEO Haliburton 1995 to 2000, Vice
President 2000 to 2008.
11. Director of Central Intelligence, History and List.
12. Director of Central Intelligence Agency, History and List.
13. Lancaster Newspapers Headlines of October 31, 1991 "U.S. Indicts Geurin on $1 Billion
Fraud..Selling Arms to Iraq".
14. ISC RICO Matrix of 1991.
15. The Bringing Down of Bobby Ran Inman for Secretary of Defense Under President
Clinton, Murray N. Rothbard, March 1994.
16. Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, Director of Navy Intelligence 1974 to 1976, Director of the
NSA 1977 to 1981, Deputy Director of the CIA 1981 to 1982, Board of Directors ISC
1983 to ?.
17. MK ULTRA The Navy Mental Telepathy by Thomas Porter 1996 re Bobby Ray Inman
and Para Normal Research.
18. Science Applications International Corporation, (S.A.I.C.), by Wikipedia.
19. Joseph F. Roda, Esq., Joseph Tate, James Guerin and Dick Cheney.
20. James Guerin and ISC deposit funds in Fulton Bank Escrow Account.
21. Recorded Transcript with PA Securities Commission Meeting in Stan J. Caterbones
Home/Office re ISC; FMG, Ltd., Fulton Bank; Commonwealth Bank; etc.,
22. Advanced Media Group and Stan J. Caterbone Executive Summary.
23. September 7, 2009 Letter to Derrick Robinson, Director of Freedom From Covert
Harassment & Surveillance re Is Lancaster County Ground Zero?
Advanced Media Group
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Title: U.S. PATENT ISSUED FOR MIND CONTROL THROUGH HAARP TYPE
ELECTROMAGNETIC WAVES -- CONNECTION TO SCHOOL SHOOTINGS -PART 2
Subtitle: We follow-up our expose' of the convincing pattern of school shootings
according to the map of the United States in NEWS1344, with the revelation that the U.S.
Patent Office granted a patent in October, 1992, to protect the profits of the inventor of the technology
to effect Mind Control over large numbers of peoples at once.
The New World Order is coming! Are you ready? Once you understand what this New World Order really is,
and how it is being gradually implemented, you will be able to see it progressing in your daily news!!
Learn how to protect yourself, your loved ones!
Stand by for insights so startling you will never look at the news the same way again.
YOU ARE NOW ON
THE CUTTING EDGE
NEWS BRIEF: "United States Patent 5,159,703, Lowery, October 27, 1992 Silent Subliminal Presentation
System, Inventors: Lowery, Oliver M. Appl. No. 458339 Filed December 28, 1989.
"Abstract: A silent communications system in which nonaural carriers, in the very low or very high audio
frequency range or in the adjacent ultrasonic frequency spectrum, are amplitude or frequency modulated with
the desired intelligence and propagated acoustically or vibrationally, for inducement into the brain, typically
through the use of loudspeakers, earphones or piezoelectric transducers. The modulated carriers may be
transmitted directly in real time or may be conveniently recorded and stored on mechanical, magnetic or
optical media for delayed or repeated transmission to the listener."
In the beginning of our Seminar 3 discussion of HAARP technology to control the weather and to use weather
as a weapon against us, we present the United Nations' Treaty prohibiting such warfare and ask the rhetorical
question: If man cannot control the weather and use it as a weapon, why do you need an international treaty
prohibiting such a weapon? Laws on the books in every state in the Union regulating cars prove the existence
of cars; laws on the international books prohibiting weather warfare prove the ability to control the weather
first and the ability to use weather as a weapon secondly.
Likewise, this patent to allow the inventor the exclusive right to create, and market, the technology to use
certain frequencies for "inducement into the brain" prove the technology exists and is being used in one form
or another for Mind Control. We suspect that the Illuminist government of ours currently is able to control
the minds electromagnetically of people whom they have individually programmed, such as is the case in the
school shootings, where the shooters had been previously heavily involved in the occult. However, our
government is also moving full-speed ahead to the point where they can program minds enmasse prior to the
time they want to actually begin controlling minds of entire populations. From the U.S. Patent website we can
see that this inventor references scientific work done as far back as 1962 [Ibid.]. Therefore, we know that
certain segments of science have been working steadily on this project, to control the minds of people.
Certainly, a "silent subliminal presentation system" utilizing electromagnetic radio which no one can see,
hear, or smell would certainly hold the promise of controlling people's minds. Further, if none of the slaves
knew that they were being manipulated, or how they were being manipulated , you have the potential of
people living lives of slavery without realizing they were slaves! How delicious this prospect must be to the
Illuminists who want so desperately to control the entire population of Mother Earth!
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people, are being silently bombarded with HAARP-type radio transmissions in exactly the same frequency as
all human brains normally function, in an effort to perfect the capability to control the moods and/or minds of
entire subjected populations! If this scenario sounds like Science Fiction, or like Orwell's 1984 , you are right
on target. But, will these signals affect normal, ordinary people? Listen to more of this article:
"Experts we have spoken with believe that such mentally destabilizing signals would, naturally, most strongly
and primarily affect individuals whose grip on mental/emotional equilibrium is less than solid; but
EVERYONE within range of the transmissions would have distinctly negative reactions to some extent or
other." [Emphasis was in the original]
While these "mentally destabilizing signals" would primarily affect people who are on the fringe of mental
stability, everyone will feel somewhat mentally distressed. How many jobs in Northern California have been
lost because people could not function anymore at the consistent level demanded by the employer? How
many marriages have been ruined? How many careers have been ruined? How many teenagers, who are
normally mentally and emotionally stressed anyway as they are going through these trying years, have been
pushed overboard into real emotional or mental disturbance? We shall never know, and the Mass Media will
never report a story like this.
Most people want to believe their elected and unelected officials have their best interests at heart. People
will believe heinous acts by government officials might occur because of negligence, or selfishness, or by
criminal acts; but, no one wants to believe their government officials have a specific agenda designed to
destroy the lives of its citizens. To believe this is to stay up all night, every night, worrying about whether you
might be the next target.
Normal, everyday Germans during the time of Adolf Hitler found themselves in the same quandary. Despite
the fact that Adolf had publicly published Mein Kampf , in which he told the Jews and others he was going to
murder them all, most Jews refused to believe. They found all sorts of excuses to not believe. When the
killing began in earnest, and many non-Jewish Germans came face-to-face with some of the evidence, most of
them refused to even consider the possibility that such murder on such a scale could ever take place. Even
German citizens living in close proximity to the mass murder facilities refused to even believe that the smell
of burning human flesh that was pouring forth from the chimneys 24 hours per day could possibly be human.
They discounted the sightings of countless railcars going to these facilities full of people and leaving
empty. Just before the end of the war, when the Allies broke the story of such atrocities, one German woman
wrote to her friend that "someone should tell Adolf of these terrible things; he surely does not know"!
What is your reaction to these truths being shared with you now? Are you going to be a believer or are you
going to bury your head in the sand deeper and deeper?
THE TIMING OF THE NORTHERN CALIFORNIA HAARP EXPERIMENTS
When were these experiments being carried out against the unsuspecting tax-paying citizens of Northern
California? Let us return back to this article. "This activity has been ongoing for most of 1999--with a pause
of a couple of months or so during the summer (the perpetrators were obviously busy elsewhere!). These
signals, primarily in the ULF (ultra-low-frequency) and ELF frequency range, have been recorded on a
variety of equipment by several researchers and are in the process of being analyzed. During the many
months these signals have been broadcast, they have been transmitting TWENTY-FOUR hours a day,
EVERY DAY!!" [Emphasis was in the original]
One of the details of these experiments that need to be "analyzed" is the fact that, once a specific frequency
for a certain type of brain function is proven, that frequency of transmission can be recorded on a computer.
NewsHawk explains the science behind this insidious effort. "The purpose of all this high technology is to plot
and display a moving cluster of periodic brainwave signals. The illustration shows an EEG display from a
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single individual, taken of left and right hemispheres simultaneously ... By using these computer-enhanced
EEGs, scientists can identify and isolate the brain's low-amplitude 'emotion signature clusters', synthesize
them and store them on another computer. In other words, by studying the subtle characteristic brainwave
patterns that occur when a subject experiences a particular emotion, scientists have been able to identify the
concomitant brainwave pattern and can now duplicate it . These clusters are then placed on the Silent
Sound[TM] carrier frequencies and will silently trigger the occurrence of the same basic emotion in another
human being!" [Ibid]
In layman's language, once these specific frequencies that causes a certain emotion or thought is precisely
identified so exactly that a "fingerprint" of it can be made and stored on a computer, then this "fingerprint"
can be sent out over other types of Mass Media! In other words, the frequency of brain wave that is proven
to cause suicidal thoughts, for example, can be recorded by computer and then subliminally sent out via radio
programs or TV shows! Or, if the government wants to cause huge numbers of people to suddenly go into
depression, or into euphoria, they can emit the recorded signals via radio or TV and reach the entire
population over a period of time!
This capability can even implant specific thoughts or commands into the minds of people. Huge numbers of
people within a population can suddenly receive simultaneous thoughts or commands, causing many numbers
of them to suddenly carry out the command. If the command is to "kill anyone", you suddenly might have
large numbers of unexplained violent assaults by people who have never committed crimes before. Of
course, the application to Biblical prophecy is direct and very serious for citizens living in the End Times.
Listen:
"And I saw one of his heads as it were wounded to death; and his deadly wound was healed: and all the world
wondered after the beast." [Revelation 13:3] Notice the word, "all" in this sentence. All the peoples of the
world looked upon the Beast [Antichrist] with amazement and awe. The Bible then tells us exactly what "all
" the peoples of the world were saying in unison.
"And they worshipped the dragon which gave power unto the beast: and they worshipped the beast, saying,
Who is like unto the beast? who is able to make war with him?" [Revelation 13:4]
"All" the peoples of the world will be simultaneously amazed and thrilled by Antichrist. This admiration will
lead "all" the peoples of the world to "worship" the dragon [Satan] and his man, the beast [Antichrist]. As I
have read the volumes of material on the New World Order Plan, I realized that their #1 goal was to
successfully stage their New Age Christ -- Maitreya is his name. Their #1 goal after Maitreya is successfully
staged is to lead all the peoples of the world into a worship of him, a worship of him as God. New Age author,
David Spangler, stated this part of the Plan most succinctly.
"No one will enter the New World Order unless he or she will make a pledge to worship Lucifer. No
one will enter the New Age unless he will take a Luciferian Initiation", David Spangler,Director of
Planetary Initiative, United Nations. [
But, then, Spangler chills the s oul of any Born Again Christian who knows their Bible
generally a nd p rophecy o f R evelation s pecifically. " The lig ht t hat r eveals t o u s t he
presence of the Christ comes from Lucifer. He is the light-giver, he is aptly named the
Morning Star b ecause it is h is lig ht t hat h eralds fo r m an t he d awn o f a g reat
consciousness. He stands as the Great Initiator, the one who hands the soul over to
the Christ." [Ibid]
Did you get that last sentence? Lucifer is the "one who hands the soul over to the Christ" for worship. Wow!
How much more bold and Biblical can you get? The New Age Plan of the New World Order Kingdom of
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Antichrist is to so prepare mankind through the workings of Lucifer as the "Great Initiator" so that he can
hand each soul of each person over to Antichrist. Isn't this just what prophecy declares?
"If any man worship the beast and his image, and receive his mark in his forehead, or in his hand, The same
shall drink of the wine of the wrath of God, which is poured out without mixture into the cup of his
indignation; and he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the
presence of the Lamb: And the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever: and they have no rest
day nor night, who worship the beast and his image, and whosoever receiveth the mark of his name."
[Revelation 14:9-11]
"And the first [Angel] went, and poured out his vial upon the earth; and there fell a noisome and grievous sore
upon the men which had the mark of the beast, and upon them which worshipped his image." [Revelation
16:2]
"And the fifth angel poured out his vial upon the seat of the beast; and his kingdom was full of darkness; and
they gnawed their tongues for pain, And blasphemed the God of heaven because of their pains and their
sores, and repented not of their deeds." [Revelation 16:10-11] We can see here that God considers all people
who have had their souls delivered to The Christ [Antichrist] as being of "his kingdom", and they are all
brought into Divine Judgment.
Conversely, we see the reward God heaps on those who refuse to follow the Antichrist. "... I saw the souls of
them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus, and for the word of God, and which had not worshipped
the beast, neither his image, neither had received his mark upon their foreheads, or in their hands; and they
lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years." [Revelation 20:4]
CONCLUSION
We must conclude that, if Antichrist has the capability to condition entire populations and to trigger the
response they wish on most of the people, the fact that significant numbers of people refuse to give in to this
efficient Mind Control must mean that God is Divinely protecting His own. We see huge numbers of people
being saved in the 7-year Tribulation Period, and we see those people getting specific rewards for just such
resistance. Therefore, God has to be protecting His own people.
At the conclusion of NEWS1344, concerning the occult map of the USA being used in the school shootings,
we presented three Scriptures promising that God does "seal" His own people from Satan. Let us look now at
Psalm 91 for other such reassurances.
Read carefully verses 1 and 2, for the promises God gives below are reserved for someone who carefully and
daily fulfills the conditions in these two verses. These promises are reserved for someone who "dwells" in the
"secret place of the Most High", who depends solely on the power of the Lord for protection.
"Surely he shall deliver thee from the snare of the fowler, and from the noisome [deadly] pestilence." [Verse
3] Notice the firm promise word, "shall", not "might" or "maybe", but "shall".
"Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night; nor for the arrow that flieth by day; Nor for the pestilence
that walketh in darkness; nor for the destruction that wasteth at noonday." [Verses 5-6] We are instructed
not to be afraid of anything the enemy of our souls -- Satan -- can throw our way, including the most powerful
Illuminist Witchcraft in the world, or their high technology.
"A thousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousand at thy right hand; but it shall not come nigh thee. Only
with thine eyes shalt thou behold and see the reward of the wicked." A thousand people may fall at our side,
and ten thousand may fall at our right side, but the true believer in Jesus Christ shall not be affected.
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"Because you have made the Lord your refuge, and the Most High your dwelling place, there shall no evil
befall you, nor any plague or calamity come near your tent. For He will give His angels special charge over
you to accompany and defend and preserve you in all your ways of obedience and service. They shall bear
you up on their hands, lest you cast your foot against a stone. You shall tread upon the lion and the adder;
the young lion and the serpent shall you trample underfoot." [Psalm 91:9-13, Parallel Bible, KJV/Amplified
Bible Commentary].
God will prevent His people from falling prey to these insidious technological breakthroughs. Make no
mistake about the fact that Satan is revealing these secrets to massive Mind Control just as fast as God allows
him to reveal them. But, this "calamity shall not come near you", God promises.
With King David, "I give myself unto prayer." [Psalm 109:4]
Truly, the sudden advent of population-wide Mind Control in the hands of the Satanic Illuminati is one more
sign of the End of the Age. Are you spiritually ready? Is your family? Are you adequately protecting your
loved ones? This is the reason for this ministry, to enable you to first understand the peril facing you, and then
help you develop strategies to warn and protect your loved ones. Once you have been thoroughly trained, you
can also use your knowledge as a means to open the door of discussion with an unsaved person. I have been
able to use it many times, and have seen people come to Jesus Christ as a result. These perilous times are also
a time when we can reach many souls for Jesus Christ, making an eternal difference.
If you have accepted Jesus Christ as your personal Savior, but have been very lukewarm in your spiritual
walk with Him, you need to immediately ask Him for forgiveness and for renewal. He will instantly forgive
you, and fill your heart with the joy of the Holy Spirit. Then, you need to begin a daily walk of prayer and
personal Bible Study.
If you have never accepted Jesus Christ as Savior, but have come to realize His reality and the approaching
End of the Age, and want to accept His FREE Gift of Eternal Life, you can also do so now, in the privacy of
your home. Once you accept Him as Savior, you are spiritually Born Again, and are as assured of Heaven as
if you were already there. Then, you can rest assured that the Kingdom of Antichrist will not touch you
spiritually.
If you would like to become Born Again, turn to our Salvation Page now.
We hope you have been blessed by this ministry, which seeks to educate and warn people, so that they can
see the coming New World Order -- Kingdom of Antichrist -- in their daily news.
Finally, we would love to hear from you.
You can contact us by mail or email.
God bless you.
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Home
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Questions of a technical
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HAARP Cam
HAARP Cam 2
October 2, 2009
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HAARP is often confused with Project HARP, the High Altitude Research Project (a joint project of the
Pentagon and the Canadian Department of National Defense).
Established
Research Type
Director
Location
Website
1990-1993
Ionospheric
John Heckscher
Gakona, Alaska
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The project site (622330N 1450903W) is north of Gakona, Alaska, just West of the Wrangell-Saint Elias
National Park. An environmental impact statement led to permission for an array of up to 180 antennas to be
erected. The HAARP has been constructed at the previous site of an over-the-horizon radar (OTH) installation.
A large structure, built to house the OTH now houses the HAARP control room, kitchen, and offices. Several
other small structures house various instruments.
The HAARP site has been constructed in three distinct phases (http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/phases.html)
.
The Developmental Prototype (DP) had 18 antenna elements, organized in three columns by six rows. It was
fed with a total of 360 kilowatts (kW) combined transmitter output power. The DP transmitted just enough
power for the most basic of ionospheric testing.
The Filled Developmental Prototype (FDP) had 48 antenna units arrayed in six columns by eight rows, with
960 kW of transmitter power. It was fairly comparable to other ionospheric heating facilities. This was used for
a number of successful scientific experiments and ionospheric exploration campaigns over the years.
The Final IRI (FIRI) will be the final build of the IRI. It has 180 antenna units, organized in 15 columns by 12
rows, yielding a theoretical maximum gain of 31 dB. A total of 3600 kW (3.6 MW) of transmitter power will
feed it. The total ERP (effective radiated power) will be 3,981 MW (96 dBW). As of March 2007, all the
antennas were in place, but the final quota of transmitters had not yet been installed, the final phase was
completed and the antenna array was undergoing testing aimed at fine-tuning its performance to comply with
safety requirements required by regulatory agencies.
The Ionospheric Research Instrument (IRI) is the primary instrument at HAARP, which is a high-frequency
(HF) transmitter system used to temporarily energize a portion the ionosphere. Study of this modified volume
yields important information for understanding natural ionospheric processes.
During active ionospheric research, the signal generated by the transmitter system is delivered to the antenna
array, transmitted in an upward direction, and is partially absorbed, at an altitude between 100 to 350 km
(depending on operating frequency), in a small volume a few hundred meters thick and a few tens of kilometers
in diameter over the site. The intensity of the HF signal in the ionosphere is less than 3 W/cm, tens of
thousands of times less than the Sun's natural electromagnetic radiation reaching the earth and hundreds of times
less than even the normal random variations in intensity of the Sun's natural ultraviolet (UV) energy which
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creates the ionosphere. The small effects that are produced, however, can be observed with the sensitive
scientific instruments installed at the HAARP facility and these observations can provide new information about
the dynamics of plasmas and new insight into the processes of solar-terrestrial interactions. [1]
(http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/tech.html)
Each antenna element[2] (http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/ant3.html) [3] (http://www.haarp.alaska.edu
/haarp/ant2.html) consists of a crossed dipole that can be polarized for linear, ordinary mode (O-mode), or
extraordinary mode (X-mode) transmission and reception. Each part of the two section crossed dipoles are
individually fed from a custom built transmitter, that has been specially designed with very low distortion. The
ERP of the IRI is limited by more than a factor of 10 at its lower operating frequencies. Much of this is due to
higher antenna losses and a less efficient antenna pattern.
HAARP can transmit between 2.8 and 10 MHz. This frequency range lies above the AM radio broadcast band
and well below Citizens' Band frequency allocations. The HAARP is licensed to transmit only in certain
segments of this frequency range, however. When the IRI is transmitting, the bandwidth of the transmitted
signal is 100 kHz or less. The IRI can transmit continuously (CW) or pulses as short as 100 microseconds (s).
CW transmission is generally used for ionospheric modification, while short pulses are frequently repeated, and
the IRI is used as a radar system. Researchers can run experiments that use both modes of transmission,
modifying the ionosphere for a predetermined amount of time, then measuring the decay of modification effects
with pulsed transmissions.
Current facilities
The United States has three ionospheric heating facilities: the HAARP, the HIPAS, near Fairbanks, Alaska, and
(currently offline for modifications) one at the Arecibo Observatory in Puerto Rico. The European Incoherent
Scatter (http://www.eiscat.se/about.html) Scientific Association (EISCAT) operates an ionospheric heating
facility, capable of transmitting over 1 GW [4] (http://www.kurasc.kyoto-u.ac.jp/s-ramp/abstract/s19.txt)
(1,000,000,000 watts) effective radiated power (ERP), near Troms in Norway. Russia has the Sura ionospheric
heating facility, in Vasilsursk near Nizhniy Novgorod, capable of transmitting 190 MW ERP.
A fluxgate magnetometer built by the University of Alaska Fairbanks Geophysical Institute is available to chart
variations in the Earth's magnetic field. Rapid and sharp changes may indicate a geomagnetic storm. A digisonde
provides ionospheric profiles, allowing scientists to choose appropriate frequencies for IRI operation. The
HAARP makes current and historic digisonde information available online. An induction magnetometer,
provided by the University of Tokyo, measures the changing geomagnetic field in the ULF (ultra low frequency)
range of 05 Hz.
Another site, operated by military sub-contractor under unknown arrangement between the US and Canadian
government, is located near Cape Race, Newfoundland, Canada, at N46 38.649' W53 9.010' There is minimal
or no grid power available at this site, so this may be a passive listening post for the transmissions emitted by
other HAARP sites.
HAARP's main goal is basic science research of the uppermost portion of the atmosphere, known as the
ionosphere. Essentially a transition between the atmosphere and the magnetosphere, the ionosphere is where the
atmosphere is thin enough that the sun's x-rays and UV rays can reach it, but thick enough that there are still
enough molecules present to absorb those rays. Consequently, the ionosphere consists of a rapid increase in
density of free electrons, beginning at ~70 km, reaching a peak at ~300 km, and then falling off again as the
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atmosphere disappears entirely by ~1000 km. Various aspects of HAARP can study all of the main layers of the
ionosphere.
The profile of the ionosphere, however, is highly variable, showing minute-to-minute changes, diurnal changes,
seasonal changes, and year-to-year changes. This becomes particularly complicated near the Earth's poles,
where a host of physical processes (like auroral lights) are unlocked by the fact that the alignment of the Earth's
magnetic field is nearly vertical.
On the other hand, the ionosphere is traditionally very difficult to measure. Balloons cannot reach it because the
air is too thin, but satellites cannot orbit there because the air is still too thick. Hence, most experiments on the
ionosphere give only small pieces of information. HAARP approaches the study of the ionosphere by following
in the footsteps of an ionospheric heater called EISCAT near Troms, Norway. There, they pioneered
exploration of the ionosphere by perturbing it with radio waves in the 2-10 MHz range, and studying how the
ionosphere reacts. HAARP performs the same functions but with more power, and a more flexible and agile HF
beam.
Some of the main scientific findings from HAARP include:
1. Generation of very low frequency radio waves by modulated heating of the auroral electrojet, useful
because generating VLF waves ordinarily requires gigantic antennas
2. Production of weak luminous glow (below what you can see with your eye, but measurable) from
absorption of HAARP's signal
3. Production of ultra low frequency waves in the 0.1 Hz range, which are next to impossible to produce any
other way
4. Generation of whistler-mode VLF signals which enter the magnetosphere, and propagate to the other
hemisphere, interacting with Van Allen radiation belt particles along the way
5. VLF remote sensing of the heated ionosphere
Research at the HAARP includes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Ionospheric heating
Plasma line observations
Stimulated electron emission observations
Gyro-frequency heating research
Spread F observations
Airglow observations
Heating induced scintillation observations
VLF and ELF generation observations (http://www-star.stanford.edu/~vlf/publications/2008-03.pdf)
Radio observations of meteors
Polar mesospheric summer echoes: Polar mesospheric summer echoes (PMSE) have been studied using
the IRI as a powerful radar, as well as with the 28 MHz radar, and the two VHF radars at 49 MHz and
139 MHz. The presence of multiple radars spanning both HF and VHF bands allows scientists to make
comparative measurements that may someday lead to an understanding of the processes that form these
elusive phenomena.
11. Research on extraterrestrial HF radar echos: the Lunar Echo experiment (2008).[3][4]
12. Testing of SS-Spread Spectrum Transmitters 2009
The HAARP project aims to direct a 3.6 MW signal, in the 2.8-10 MHz region of the HF band, into the
Advanced Media Group
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ionosphere. The signal may be pulsed or continuous wave. Then effects of the transmission and any recovery
period will be examined using associated instrumentation, including VHF and UHF radars, HF receivers, and
optical cameras. According to the HAARP team, this will advance the study of basic natural processes that
occur in the ionosphere under the natural but much stronger influence of solar interaction, as well as how the
natural ionosphere affects radio signals. This will enable scientists to develop techniques to mitigate these
effects in order to improve the reliability and/or performance of communication and navigation systems, which
would have a wide range of applications in both the civilian and military sectors.
The project is funded by the Office of Naval Research and jointly managed by the ONR and Air Force Research
Laboratory, with the principal involvement of the University of Alaska. Fourteen other universities and
educational institutions have been involved in the development of the project and its instruments, namely the
University of Alaska, Penn State University (ARL), Boston College, UCLA, Clemson University, Dartmouth
College, Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, University of Maryland, College Park, University of
Massachusetts, MIT, Polytechnic Institute of New York University, Stanford University, and the University of
Tulsa. The project's specifications were developed by the universities, which are continuing to play a major role
in the design of future research efforts. There is both military and commercial interest in its outcome, as many
communications and navigation systems depend on signals being reflected from the ionosphere or passing
through the ionosphere to satellites. Thanks to the more penetrating properties of VLF and ELF, advancements
in underwater and underground research and applications are now possible. This may lead to improved methods
for submarine communication and the ability to remotely sense the mineral content of the terrestrial subsurface,
among other things.
The HAARP project offers annual open days to permit the general public to visit the facility, and makes a public
virtue of openness; according to the team, "there are no classified documents pertaining to the HAARP." Each
summer, the HAARP holds a summer-school for visiting students, including foreign nationals, giving them an
opportunity to do research with one of the world's foremost research instruments.
Supporters
Power emitted
The critics' views have been rejected by HAARP's defenders, who have pointed out that the amount of energy
at the project's disposal is minuscule compared to the colossal energies dumped into the atmosphere by solar
radiation and thunderstorms. A University of Alaska Fairbanks Geophysical Institute scientist has compared the
HAARP to an "immersion heater in the Yukon River."
Since the ionosphere is inherently a chaotically turbulent region, HAARP's defenders state any artificially
induced changes would be "swept clean" within seconds or minutes at the most. Ionospheric heating
experiments performed at the Arecibo Observatory's ionospheric heater and incoherent scatter radar have
shown that after periods of modification (up to an hour), the ionosphere returns to normal within about the same
period of time it had been heated.
For instance, HAARP generates 3.6 megawatts (MW) of power. 3.6 MW is considered a minuscule percentage
of the energy compared to all of the energy constantly injected into the Earth, and the ionosphere, by the sun.
Open activities
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Furthermore, supporters of HAARP argue that its activities have been, since its establishment, extremely open.
All activities are logged and publicly available. Scientists without security clearances, even foreign nationals, are
routinely allowed on site. The HAARP facility regularly hosts open houses, during which time any civilian may
tour the entire facility.
In addition, scientific results obtained with HAARP are routinely published in major research journals (such as
Geophysical Research Letters, or Journal of Geophysical Research), written both by university scientists (both
US and foreign) or by Department of Defense research lab scientists.
Waste
HAARP was constructed at the site of an obsolete over-the-horizon radar facility for reasons of cost reduction.
Critics
Waste
The cost of building the HAARP has exceeded the dollar-adjusted cost of similar facilities around the world.
Weapon
The objectives of the HAARP project became the subject of controversy in the mid-1990s, following claims that
the antennas could be used as a weapon. A small group of American physicists aired complaints in scientific
journals such as Physics and Society[5], charging that the HAARP could be seeking ways to destroy or disable
enemy spacecraft or disrupt communications over large portions of the planet. The physicist critics of the
HAARP have had little complaint about the project's current stage, but have expressed fears that it could in the
future be expanded into an experimental weapon, especially given that its funding comes from the Office of
Naval Research and the Air Force Research Laboratory.
These concerns were amplified by Bernard Eastlund, a physicist who developed some of the concepts behind
the HAARP in the 1980s and proposed using high-frequency radio waves to energize the ionosphere in order to
disable incoming missiles, thus "knocking out" out enemy satellite communications. The US military became
interested in the idea as an alternative to the laser-based Strategic Defense Initiative. However, Eastlund's ideas
were eventually dropped as SDI itself mutated into the more limited National Missile Defense of today. The
contractors selected to build HAARP have denied that any of Eastlund's patents were used in the development
of the project.
After the physicists raised early concerns, the controversy was stoked by local activism. In September 1995, a
book entitled Angels Don't Play This HAARP: Advances in Tesla Technology by the former teacher Nick
Begich, Jr., son of the late Congressman Nick Begich (D-AK) and brother of U.S. Senator Mark Begich (D-AK),
claimed that the project in its present stage could be used for "geophysical warfare."
HAARP has been referenced twice by the History Channel series That's Impossible, once in regards to its
supposed weather control capabilities and later for its claimed connection to mind control.
In August 2002, a critical mention of HAARP technology came from the State Duma (parliament) of Russia.
The Duma published a critical report on the HAARP written by the international affairs and defense
committees, signed by 90 deputies and presented to then President Vladimir Putin. The report claimed that "the
U.S. is creating new integral geophysical weapons that may influence the near-Earth medium with
high-frequency radio waves ... The significance of this qualitative leap could be compared to the transition
Advanced Media Group
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from cold steel to firearms, or from conventional weapons to nuclear weapons. This new type of weapons
differs from previous types in that the near-Earth medium becomes at once an object of direct influence and
its component."However, given the timing of the Russian intervention, it is possible that it was related to a
controversy at the time concerning the US withdrawal in June 2002 from the Russian-American Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty. This high level concern is paralleled in the April 1997 statement by the U.S. Secretary of
Defense over the power of such electromagnetic weaponry. Russia owns and operates an ionospheric heater
system as powerful as the HAARP [6], called 'Sura,' which is located roughly 150 km from the city of Nizhny
Novgorod.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Ionosphere
Ionospheric reflection
Conspiracy theories
European Incoherent Scatter Scientific Association
HIPAS-HIgh Power Auroral Stimulation
Sura Ionospheric Heating Facility
SuperDARN
Poker Flat Research Range
Ionospheric Observatory, subsidiary of Kharkiv Polytechnical Institute, located near Zmiiv, Ukraine
(494037N 361732E) [5] (http://www.kpi.kharkiv.edu/iion/) [6] (http://tourist.kharkov.ua
/review_niceplaces/index.php?viewtopic=16)
Platteville, Colorado
Hansell, Clarence W., U.S. Patent 2,389,432 (http://www.google.com/patents?vid=2389432) ,
"Communication system by pulses through the Earth." 1945.
Tanner, R. L., U.S. Patent 3,215,937 (http://www.google.com/patents?vid=3215937) , "Extremely
low-frequency antenna." 1965.
Leydorf, G. F., U.S. Patent 3,278,937 (http://www.google.com/patents?vid=3278937) , "Antenna near
field coupling system." 1966.
Eastlund, Bernard J., U.S. Patent 4,686,605 (http://www.google.com/patents?vid=4686605) , "Method
and apparatus for altering a region in the earth's atmosphere, ionosphere, and/or magnetosphere."
1987.
Eastlund, Bernard J., U.S. Patent 5,038,664 (http://www.google.com/patents?vid=5038664) , "Method
for producing a shell of relativistic particles at an altitude above the earths surface." 1991.
1. ^ http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/factSheet.html
2. ^ http://www.haarp.alaska.edu/haarp/prpeis.html
3. ^ Reeve, W.D. (2008). "The Lunar Echo Experiment (Part 1)". Radio User 3 (8): 5658. ISSN 1748-8117
(http://worldcat.org/issn/1748-8117) .
4. ^ Reeve, W.D. (2008). "The Lunar Echo Experiment (Part 2)". Radio User 3 (9): 5657. ISSN 1748-8117
(http://worldcat.org/issn/1748-8117) .
5. ^ [THE IMPRUDENCE OF "PRUDENT AVOIDANCE"; Physics and Society, Vol. 24, No. 3]
6. ^ USA and Russia supposedly develop secret meteorological weapons Pravda.Ru (http://english.pravda.ru
/science/19/94/379/16227_hurricanes.html)
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Satellite Image
Google maps satellite image of HAARP
(http://maps.google.com/maps?f=q&hl=en&q=62.39
%C2%B0+N,+145.15%C2%B0+W&
ll=62.389972,-145.149994&
spn=0.036835,0.171661&t=k)
Conspiracy
Russian Journal: HAARP Could Capsize Planet
(http://thought-criminal.org/article/node/1140) (08
January 2008)
Marshall D. Smith The Unauthorized History of
HAARP (http://www.brojon.org/frontpage
/bj1204.html) (27 June 2000)
Jerry E. Smith author personal website
(http://jerryesmith.com)
"HAARP: The Ultimate Weapon of the
Conspiracy." Adventures Unlimited Press,
1998. ISBN 0-932813-53-4
"HAARP Tremors Rock Earth Deep Beneath San
Andreas Fault (http://portland.indymedia.org
/en/2004/12/305741.shtml) ." Portland IMC.
Begich, Nick, and Jeane Manning, "The Military's
Pandora's Box (http://www.haarp.net/) ." haarp.net.
"To Understand HAARP: NWO's Scalar
Electromagnetics (http://portland.indymedia.org
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Home
About HAARP
Technical
On-Line Data
Learn
Photos
Contacts
Quick Links
Home Page
HAARP FAQ
Site Map
Glossary of Terms
How to Contact HAARP
Privacy Statement
Please read the
Cautionary statement
Questions of a technical
nature may be submitted
via e-mail to:
The High-frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) is a congressionally initiated program
jointly managed by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy. The program's goal is to provide a state-of-the-art
U.S. owned ionospheric research facility readily accessible to U.S. scientists from universities, the
private sector and government. This facility would be the most advanced in the world and would attract
international scientists and foster cooperative research efforts. The program's purpose is to provide a
research facility to conduct pioneering experiments in ionospheric phenomena. The data obtained from
the proposed research would be used to analyze basic ionospheric properties and to assess the potential
for developing ionospheric enhancement technology for communications and surveillance purposes.
The layer of the earth's atmosphere called the ionosphere begins approximately 30 miles above the
surface and extends upward to approximately 620 miles. In contrast to the layers of the atmosphere
closer to the earth, which are composed of neutral atoms and molecules, the ionosphere contains both
positively and negatively charged particles known as ions and electrons. These ions and electrons are
created naturally by radiation from our sun.
The ionized gas in the ionosphere behaves much differently from the neutral atmosphere closer to the
earth. A major difference is that although radio signals pass through the lower atmosphere undistorted,
the signals directed through the ionosphere may be distorted, totally reflected or absorbed. For example,
communication links from the ground to earth-orbiting satellites can experience fading due to
ionospheric distortion; an AM radio signal sometimes can reflect, or "skip", off the ionosphere and be
heard at locations hundreds of miles distant from the broadcasting radio station; the characteristic fading
on the high-frequency (HF) or "shortwave" band is due to ionospheric interference. Because of its
strong interaction with radio waves, the ionosphere also interferes with U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) communications and radar surveillance systems, which depend on sending radio waves from one
location to another.
Ionospheric disturbances at high latitudes also can act to induce large currents in electric power grids;
these are thought to cause power outages. Understanding of these and other phenomena is important to
maintain reliable communication and power services. HAARP is needed to continue and expand basic
research efforts on the properties and potential uses of the ionosphere for enhanced communications and
surveillance. To meet the project's research objectives, the HAARP facility would utilize powerful, high
frequency (HF) transmissions and a variety of associated observational instruments to investigate
naturally occurring and artificially induced ionospheric processes that support, enhance or degrade the
propagation of radio waves.
Investigations conducted at the HAARP facility are expected to provide significant scientific
advancements in understanding the ionosphere. The research facility would be used to understand,
simulate and control ionospheric processes that might alter the performance of communications and
surveillance systems. This research would enhance present civilian and DOD capabilities because it
would facilitate the development of techniques to mitigate or control ionospheric processes.
Civilian applications from the program's research could lead to improved local and world-wide
communications such as satellite communication. Furthermore, and possibly more significant is the
potential for new technology that could be developed from a better understanding of ionospheric
processes.
A potential DOD application of the research is to provide communications to submerged submarines.
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These and many other research applications are expected to greatly enhance present DOD technology.
There are several HF transmitters located throughout the world which conduct research similar to that
proposed by HAARP. However, no facility, located either in the U.S. or elsewhere, has the transmitting
capability needed to address the broad range of research goals which HAARP proposes to study. The
most capable HF transmitters currently operating are located in Russia and Norway and have effective
radiated powers (ERP) of roughly one billion watts (1 gigawatt). One gigawatt of ERP represents an
important threshold power level, allowing significant radio wave generation and analysis of key
ionospheric phenomena. The HAARP facility is designed to have an ERP above one gigawatt. This
would elevate the United States to owning and operating the world's most capable ionospheric research
instrument.
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Home
About HAARP
Technical
On-Line Data
Learn
Photos
Contacts
What Is HAARP?
The High frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) is a program focused on the study of
upper atmospheric and solar-terrestrial physics and Radio Science. The HAARP program operates a
Quick Links
major Arctic ionosphere research facility on an Air Force owned site near Gakona, Alaska. Principal
instruments installed at the HAARP Research Station include a high power, high-frequency (HF) phased
array radio transmitter (known as the Ionosphere Research Instrument (IRI), used to stimulate small,
well-defined volumes of ionosphere, and a large and diversified suite of modern geophysical research
instruments including an HF ionosonde, ELF and VLF receivers, magnetometers, riometers, a UHF
diagnostic radar and optical and infrared spectrometers and cameras which are used to observe the
Home Page
complex natural variations of Alaska's ionosphere as well as to detect artificial effects produced by the
Site Map
IRI. Future plans include completion of the UHF radar to allow measurement of electron densities,
Glossary of Terms
How to Contact HAARP electron and ion temperatures, and Doppler velocities in the stimulated region and in the natural
Privacy Statement
ionosphere using incoherent scatter techniques.
Please read the
Cautionary statement
Questions of a technical
nature may be submitted
via e-mail to:
HAARP Cam
HAARP Cam 2
Is HAARP Unique?
Ionosphere research facilities have been in continuous use since the 1950s to investigate fundamental
physical principles which govern the earth's ionosphere, so that present and future transmission
technologies may take into account the complexities of this highly variable medium. In addition to
HAARP, the United States has operated two other ionosphere research sites in recent years, one in
Puerto Rico, near the Arecibo Observatory, and the other (known as HIPAS) in Alaska near Fairbanks.
Both of these facilities were built with both active and passive radio instrumentation similar to those at
the HAARP facility. Interest in the ionosphere is not limited to the US: a five-country consortium
operates the European Incoherent Scatter Radar site (EISCAT), a premier ionosphere research facility
located in northern Norway near Tromso. Facilities also are located at Jicamarca, Peru; near Moscow,
Nizhny Novgorod ("SURA") and Apatity, Russia; near Kharkov, Ukraine and in Dushanbe,
Tadzhikistan. All of these installations have as their primary purpose the study of the ionosphere, and
most employ the capability of stimulating to a varying degree small, localized regions of the ionosphere
in order to study methodically, and in a detailed manner what nature produces randomly and regularly
on a much larger scale. HAARP is unique to most existing facilities due to the combination of a research
tool which provides electronic beam steering, wide frequency coverage and high effective radiated
power collocated with a diverse suite of scientific observational instruments.
Who is Building HAARP?
Technical expertise and procurement services as required for the management, administration and
evaluation of the program are being provided cooperatively by the Air Force (Air Force Research
Laboratory), the Navy (Office of Naval Research and Naval Research Laboratory), and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency. Since the HAARP facility consists of many individual items of
scientific equipment, both large and small, there is a considerable list of commercial, academic and
government organizations which are contributing to the building of the facility by developing scientific
diagnostic instrumentation and by providing guidance in the specification, design and development of
the IRI. BAE Advanced Technologies (BAEAT) is the prime contractor for the design and construction
of the IRI. Other organizations which have contributed to the program include the University of Alaska,
Stanford University, Cornell University, University of Massachusetts, UCLA, MIT, Dartmouth
University, Clemson University, Penn State University, University of Tulsa, University of Maryland, SRI
Advanced Media Group
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MHz band and is used to provide scientists with information about the electron density profile in the
ionosphere. Another is the UHF ionosphere radar which transmits radio wave signals in the 430 - 450
MHz band and which will eventually be expanded to provide incoherent scatter capability.
Among the passive on-site instruments are two magnetometers for the measurement of the earth's
magnetic field and its variations, and two riometers (relative ionosphere opacity meter) to sense
ionosphere absorption of the celestial background electromagnetic radiation. The radio spectrum from
100 kHz to 1 GHz is being recorded to determine frequency of usage and to monitor HAARP
transmissions to ensure adherence to FCC and NTIA requirements. Other passive on-site instruments
include sensitive optical imagers and photometers, ELF/VLF receivers, and Total Electron Content
receivers. Data obtained from these scientific instruments are readily accessible on the internet in near
real time, allowing scientists to observe and participate in the investigations directly from their
laboratories. In addition to the instruments specifically developed by HAARP, a number of diagnostics
potentially are available through other federal agencies and the University of Alaska's Geophysical
Institute.
Use of Local Resources
The Geophysical Institute of the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) has played a major role in the
development of diagnostics and coordination of Arctic programs with the US scientific community. UAF
led a consortium of universities and industries which provided support in the design and development of
the Gakona facility and its associated scientific instruments. BAE Advanced Technologies, the prime
contractor for the IRI, utilized Eric Goozen for initial site survey work. Ahtna Construction, Inc., a
Glennallen based contractor, has contributed very extensively to the development of the facility. Ahtna
currently provides housekeeping and security services. Anchorage-based engineering firms Duane Miller
& Associates and USKH prepared the civil and pad design work and conducted the on-site testing and
evaluation. Arctic Foundation of Anchorage designed and manufactured, and Kiewit Pacific Company
installed thermopiles in the pad, using Amtec, Inc. to survey the thermopile locations and Tester Drilling
and EBA Engineering to provide drilling support. Acme Fence Company installed fencing, using the
services of Mark Lappi to survey the fence lines and B&B Plumbing to steam thaw the ground for
drilling. City Electric, Inc. erected the towers, antennas, and ground screen. Pacific Detroit Diesel and
Valley Diesel refurbished and installed the 2.5 MW diesel generators which are used to power the HF
transmitters. Service Oil provides fuel oil. Copper Valley Telephone installed the telephone lines, and
Copper Valley Electric supplies commercial housekeeping power. Bishop & Sons Enterprises supplies
water, while CBS Service provides trash removal and sewage disposal. Harley McMahon flew sorties to
test the capabilities of the aircraft alert radar and provide the opportunity for aerial photography.
Current/Future Operations at the HAARP Research Facility
Construction of the full IRI was completed in early 2007. In the near term, emphasis is being placed on
validating the performance of the complete IRI to include compliance with all specifications for
interference mitigation and safety of operations. Initial IRI testing began during March 2007.
Both on- and off-site scientific, observational instruments are now providing data on the natural high
latitude ionosphere. A complete listing of these scientific instruments is available.
Environmental Process
In accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), an environmental impact statement
(EIS) evaluated the consequences of constructing and operating the HAARP research facility in Alaska.
The EIS discusses impacts on such diverse topics as electromagnetic and radio frequency interference,
vegetation, wetlands, wildlife, air quality, subsistence, cultural resources, atmosphere and others.
State and federal environmental regulatory agencies were consulted to identify issues, and additional
input was solicited from the public during scoping meetings held in Anchorage and Glennallen, Alaska in
August 1992. A draft of the EIS was prepared and distributed to the public and to specific organizations
on March 12, 1993. Public hearings were held in Glennallen and Anderson, municipalities close to the
sites under consideration. The final EIS was released to the public on July 15, 1993 and the Record of
Decision selecting Gakona, Alaska as the site for the HAARP Ionosphere Research Facility was signed
on October 18, 1993.
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In addition to the NEPA process described above, the HAARP facility complies with all applicable state
and federal regulations that are appropriate for its construction and operation.
Additional Information
An updated version of this fact sheet will be issued as often as program changes warrant to keep
interested parties appraised of significant developments in regard to HAARP. Any individual seeking
additional information about HAARP, or wishing to provide comments regarding HAARP, may contact:
Office of Public Affairs
Air Force Research Laboratory
3550 Aberdeen Ave S.E.
Kirtland AFB NM 87117-5776
June 15, 2007
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Official Seal
Incumbent:
Robert Gates
since: December 18, 2006
1 History
2 Organization
3 List of Secretaries of Defense
4 Line of succession
5 Living Former Secretaries of Defense
6 Footnotes
7 References
8 External links
First
James Forrestal
Formation September 19, 1947
Presidential Sixth
succession
Website
www.defense.gov (http://www.defense.gov)
The position was created in 1947 when the Navy, Army, and newly created Air
Force were merged into the new National Military Establishment. In the same massive reorganization, the
Secretary of War was replaced by the Secretary of the Army and, along with the Secretary of the Navy and the
new Secretary of the Air Force, became non-Cabinet positions placed under the Secretary of Defense. In 1949,
the National Military Establishment was renamed the Department of Defense, which remains the current name
of the department.
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In the U.S. Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense is often referred to as SecDef.
The Secretary of Defense and the President together constitute the National Command Authorities (NCA),[3]
which has sole authority to launch strategic nuclear weapons. All nuclear weapons are governed by this
dual-authority - both must concur before a strategic nuclear strike may be ordered.
The Secretary of Defense heads the United States Office of the Secretary of Defense and is assisted by a Deputy
Secretary and five Under Secretaries in the fields of Acquisition, Technology & Logistics; Comptroller/Chief
Financial Officer; Intelligence; Personnel & Readiness; and Policy. All of these positions require Senate
confirmation.
The Secretary of Defense also supervises the six members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of
the ten Unified Combatant Commands.
Along with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Defense is generally regarded as one of the Big Four important cabinet officials.
Picture
Name
Term of Office
Start
End
September 19,
1947
September 19,
1950
President(s) served
under
Harry S. Truman
3
September 19,
1951
Robert Abercrombie
Lovett
September 19,
1951
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October 8, 1957
October 9, 1957
Robert Strange
McNamara
10
John F. Kennedy,
Lyndon B. Johnson
Lyndon B. Johnson
Richard Nixon
11
12
James Rodney
Schlesinger
July 2, 1973
November 19,
1975
Richard Nixon,
Gerald Ford
13
November 20,
1975
Gerald Ford
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14
Harold Brown
15
Caspar Willard
Weinberger
November 23,
1987
Jimmy Carter
Ronald Reagan
Frank Charles Carlucci
III
November 23,
1987
None
17
18
February 3, 1994
19
February 3, 1994
20
21
December 18,
2006
16
George H. W. Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
October 2, 2009
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22
December 18,
2006
Incumbent
George W. Bush,
Barack Obama
In an Executive Order of December 22, 2005, President George W. Bush modified the line of succession
regarding who would act as Secretary of Defense in the event of a vacancy or incapacitation as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1. ^ http://www.dod.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook/DoD.htm#Secretary%20of%20Defense
2. ^ George Marshall was legislatively waived by Congress; he had only been a civilian for five years before his
appointment in 1950. See Defenselink bio (http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/marshall.htm)
, retrieved 11/15/2008.
3. ^ http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O63-NationalCommandAuthoritis.html
October 2, 2009
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2002.
"Executive Order: Providing An Order of Succession Within the Department of Defense
(http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051222-7.html) ". Office of the
Press Secretary. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051222-7.html.
Retrieved December 22 2005.
"The Department of Defense Organizational Structure (http://www.dod.mil/odam/omp/pubs/GuideBook
/DoD.htm#Secretary%20of%20Defense) ". U.S. Department of Defense. http://www.dod.mil/odam/omp
/pubs/GuideBook/DoD.htm#Secretary%20of%20Defense. Retrieved November 13 2006.
6th in line
Succeeded by
Attorney General
October 2, 2009
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
1 Presidents
2 Notes
3 See also
4 References
5 External links
October 2, 2009
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Parties
Independent
Federalist
Presidency[n 1]
Democratic-Republican
President
Took
office
Democratic
Left office
Whig
Republican
Party
Vice
President
Term
1
1
George
Washington
[2][3][4][5]
April 30,
1789
Not formally
March 4,
affiliated
John Adams
1797
with any
party
2
John Adams
[6][7][8][9]
Thomas
Jefferson
[10][11]
[12][13]
March 4,
1797
March 4,
1801
March 4,
1801
Federalist
March 4, Democratic1809
Republican
Thomas
Jefferson
Aaron Burr
George
Clinton
George
Clinton[n 2]
March 4, 1801 April 20, 1812
vacant[n 3]
James
Madison
[14][15]
[16][17]
March 4,
1809
March 4, Democratic1817
Republican
Elbridge
Gerry[n 2]
March 4, 1813 November 23,
1814
vacant [n 3]
November 23,
1814 - March 4,
1817
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8
5
James
Monroe
[18][19]
[20][21]
March 4,
1817
March 4, Democratic1825
Republican
Daniel D.
Tompkins
9
John Quincy
Adams
[22][23]
[24][25]
March 4,
1825
DemocraticMarch 4, Republican
1829
National
Republican
John C.
Calhoun
10
John C.
Calhoun [n 4]
Andrew
Jackson
[26][27]
[28][29]
Martin Van
Buren
William
Henry
Harrison
[30][31]
[32][33]
[34][35]
[36][37]
March 4,
1829
March 4,
1837
Democratic
vacant
11
[n 3]
December 28,
1832 - March 4,
1833
Martin Van
Buren
12
March 4,
1837
March 4,
1841
Democratic
Richard
Mentor
Johnson
13
March 4,
1841
April 4,
1841[n 2]
Whig
John Tyler
14
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Andrew
Johnson
17
Andrew
Johnson
[66][67]
[68][69]
April 15,
1865
March 4,
1869
Democratic
National
Union[n 8]
20
vacant
[n 3]
Schuyler
Colfax
18
Ulysses S.
Grant
[70][71]
[72][73]
21
Henry
Wilson[n 2]
March 4,
1869
March 4,
1877
Republican
vacant
22
[n 3]
November 22,
1875 - March 4,
1877
19
Rutherford
B. Hayes
20
James A.
Garfield
[74][75]
[76][77]
[78][79]
[80][81]
March 4,
1877
March 4,
1881
March 4,
1881
Republican
William A.
Wheeler
September
19,
Republican
[n 7]
1881
Chester A.
Arthur
23
24
21
Chester A.
Arthur
[82][83]
[84][85]
September March 4,
19, 1881
1885
Republican
vacant [n 3]
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Thomas A.
Hendricks[n 2]
22
Grover
Cleveland
[86][87]
[88][89]
March 4,
1885
March 4,
1889
Democratic
25
vacant [n 3]
November 25,
1885 - March 4,
1889
23
24
Benjamin
Harrison
[90][91]
[92][93]
Grover
Cleveland
(2nd term)
[86][87]
[88][89]
March 4,
1889
March 4,
1893
Republican
Levi P.
Morton
26
March 4,
1893
March 4,
1897
Democratic
Adlai E.
Stevenson I
27
Garret
Hobart[n 2]
25
William
McKinley
[94][95]
[96][97]
March 4,
1897
September
14,
Republican
1901[n 7]
28
vacant [n 3]
November 21,
1899 - March 4,
1901
Theodore
Roosevelt
29
vacant
26
Theodore
Roosevelt
[98][99]
[100][101]
September March 4,
14, 1901
1909
[n 3]
Republican
Charles W.
Fairbanks
30
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vacant [n 3]
October 30,
1912-March 4,
1913
32
28
Woodrow
Wilson
[106][107]
[108][109]
March 4,
1913
March 4,
1921
Democratic
Thomas R.
Marshall
33
29
Warren G.
Harding
[110][111]
[112][113]
March 4,
1921
August 2,
1923[n 2]
Republican
Calvin
Coolidge
34
vacant [n 3]
30
31
Calvin
Coolidge
[114][115]
[116][117]
Herbert
Hoover
[118][119]
[120][121]
August 2,
1923
March 4,
1929
March 4,
1929
March 4,
1933
Republican
Charles G.
Dawes
John Nance
Garner
32
Franklin D.
Roosevelt
[122][123]
[124][125]
March 4,
1933
April 12,
1945[n 2]
Democratic
35
36
37[n 9]
38
Henry A.
Wallace
39
Harry S.
Truman
40
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Alben W.
Barkley
34
35
Dwight D.
Eisenhower
[130][131]
[132][133]
John F.
Kennedy
[134][135]
[136][137]
41
42
January
20, 1953
January
20, 1961
Republican
Richard
Nixon
43
January
20, 1961
November
22,
Democratic
[n 7]
1963
Lyndon B.
Johnson
44
vacant [n 3]
36
Lyndon B.
Johnson
[138][139]
[140][141]
November January
22, 1963 20, 1969
Democratic
Hubert
Humphrey
Spiro
Agnew[n 4]
37
Richard
Nixon
[142][143]
[144][145]
January
20, 1969
August 9,
1974[n 4]
Republican
vacant [n 3]
October 10,
1973 - December
6, 1973
vacant [n 3]
Gerald Ford
[146][147]
[148][149]
46
Gerald Ford
38
45
August 9,
1974
January
20, 1977
47
Republican
Nelson
Rockefeller
December 19,
1974 - January
20, 1977
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39
40
41
Jimmy Carter
[150][151]
[152][153]
Ronald
Reagan
[154][155]
[156][157]
George H.
W. Bush
[158][159]
[160][161]
January
20, 1977
January
20, 1981
Democratic
Walter
Mondale
48
49
January
20, 1981
January
20, 1989
Republican
George H. W.
Bush
50
January
20, 1989
January
20, 1993
Republican
Dan Quayle
51
52
42
Bill Clinton
[162][163]
[164][165]
January
20, 1993
January
20, 2001
Democratic
Al Gore
53
43
44
George W.
Bush
[166][167]
[168][169]
Barack
Obama
[170][171][172]
54
January
20, 2001
January
20, 2009
Republican
Dick Cheney
55
January
Incumbent Democratic
20, 2009
Joe Biden
56
October 2, 2009
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
1. ^ A presidency is defined as consecutive time in office served by a single person. For example, George Washington
served two consecutive terms and is counted as the first president (not the first and second). Gerald Ford assumed
the presidency after the resignation of Richard Nixon, serving out the remainder of what would have been Nixon's
second term. The fact that Ford was not voted into office does not affect the numbering, which makes him the 38th
president. In addition, under this numbering, Grover Cleveland is counted as having two separate presidencies,
having served two non-consecutive terms.
2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Died in office of natural causes.
3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Prior to ratification of the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
in 1967, there was no provision for filling a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. Richard Nixon was the first president
to fill such a vacancy under the provisions of the Twenty-fifth Amendment when he appointed Gerald Ford. Ford
later became the second president to fill a vice presidential vacancy when he appointed Nelson Rockefeller to
succeed him.
4. ^ a b c Resigned.
5. ^ Being the first vice president to assume the presidency, Tyler set a precedent that a vice president who assumes
the office of president becomes a fully functioning president who has his own presidency, as opposed to just a
caretaker president. His political opponents attempted to refer to him as "Acting President", but he refused to allow
that. The Twenty-fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution put Tyler's precedent into the Constitution.
6. ^ Former Democrat who ran for Vice President on Whig ticket. Clashed with Whig congressional leaders and was
expelled from the Whig party in 1841.
7. ^ a b c d Assassinated.
8. ^ a b Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson were, respectively, a Republican and a Democrat who ran on the
National Union ticket in 1864.
9. ^ This term was shortened by 43 days due to the Twentieth Amendment to the United States Constitution going into
effect, moving inauguration day from March 4 to January 20.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/adams_john.shtml) ". American Heritage. Forbes.
http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/adams_john.shtml. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "John Adams Federalist Party 2nd President
American Presidents (http://www.history.com
/presidents/adams) ". History.
http://www.history.com/presidents/adams. Retrieved
January 12 2009.
^ "John Adams (October 30, 1735 July 4, 1826)
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=2) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=2. Retrieved
January 12, 2009.
^ "Biography of Thomas Jefferson
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/thomasjefferson/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 12,
2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/thomasjefferson/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Third President: 18011809 Thomas
Jefferson "The Renaissance Leader"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/jefferson_thomas.shtml) ". American Heritage.
Forbes. http://www.americanheritage.com/people
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^ "Thomas Jefferson Democratic-Republican Party
3rd President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/jefferson) ".
History. http://www.history.com/presidents/jefferson.
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^ "Thomas Jefferson (April 13, 1743 July 4, 1826)
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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January 12, 2009.
^ "Biography of James Madison
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/jamesmadison/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 12, 2007.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/jamesmadison/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Fourth President: 18091817 James Madison
"The Nation Builder"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/madison_james.shtml) ". American Heritage.
Forbes. http://www.americanheritage.com/people
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^ "James Madison Democratic-Republican Party
4th President American Presidents
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19.
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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^ "James Madison (March 16, 1751 June 28, 1836)
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=4) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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^ "Biography of James Madison
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/jamesmonroe/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 12, 2007.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/jamesmonroe/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Fifth President: 18171825 James Monroe
"The Era of Good Feelings"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/monroe_james.shtml) ". American Heritage. Forbes.
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^ "James Monroe Democratic-Republican Party
5th President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/monroe) ".
History. http://www.history.com/presidents/monroe.
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^ "James Monroe (April 28, 1758 July 4, 1831)
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=5) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=5. Retrieved
January 12, 2009.
^ "Biography of John Quincy Adams
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/johnquincyadams/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 12,
2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/johnquincyadams/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Sixth President: 18251829 John Quincy
Adams "Born to Lead"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/adams_johnquincy.shtml) ". American Heritage.
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^ "John Quincy Adams Federalist, DemocraticRepublican, National Republican, WHIG Party 6th
President American Presidents
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History. http://www.history.com/presidents
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^ "John Quincy Adams (July 11, 1767 February
23, 1848) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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^ "Biography of Andrew Jackson
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/andrewjackson/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 12,
2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
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^ "The Seventh President: 18291837 Andrew
Jackson "Old Hickory"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/jackson_andrew.shtml) ". American Heritage.
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55.
56.
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Pierce "Overwhelmed by Events"
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1869) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
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Buchanan "An American Hero"
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^ "The Twenty-First President: 18811885 Chester
Alan Arthur "The Self-Reformer"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
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/president.asp?PresidentNumber=21) ". American
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^ a b "Biography of Grover Cleveland
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^ a b "The Twenty-Second President: 18851889
The Twenty-Fourth President: 18931897 Grover
Cleveland "The Law Man"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/cleveland_grover.shtml) ". American Heritage.
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and 24th President American Presidents
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^ a b "Grover Cleveland (March 18, 1837 June 24,
1908) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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Benjamin Harrison "Presidential Grandson"
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". History. http://www.history.com/presidents
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^ "Benjamin Harrison (August 20, 1833 March 13,
1901) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=23) ". American
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^ "Biography of William McKinley
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^ "The Twenty-Fifth President: 18971901 William
McKinley "Bridge to a New Century"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/mckinley_william.shtml) ". American Heritage.
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^ "William McKinley (January 29, 1843
September 14, 1901) (http://americanpresidents.org
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^ "Biography of Theodore Roosevelt
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^ "The Twenty-Sixth President: 19011909
Theodore Roosevelt "The Giant in the Bully Pulpit"
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". History. http://www.history.com/presidents
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^ "Theodore Roosevelt (October 27, 1858 January
6, 1919) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
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^ "Biography of William Howard Taft
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/williamhowardtaft/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 13,
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/williamhowardtaft/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Twenty-Seventh President: 19091913
William Howard Taft "Reluctant Leader"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/taft_william.shtml) ". American Heritage. Forbes.
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President American Presidents
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^ "William Howard Taft (September 15, 1857
March 8, 1930) (http://americanpresidents.org
/presidents/president.asp?PresidentNumber=26) ".
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^ "Biography of Woodrow Wilson
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/woodrowwilson/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 13,
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/woodrowwilson/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Twenty-Eighth President: 19131921
Woodrow Wilson "Prophet Without Honor"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/wilson_woodrow.shtml) ". American Heritage.
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^ "Woodrow Wilson Democratic Party 28th
President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/wilson) ".
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^ "Woodrow Wilson (December 28, 1856
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(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
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/herberthoover/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Thirty-First President: 19291933 Herbert
Clark Hoover "The Great Engineer"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/hoover_herbert.shtml) ". American Heritage.
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12, 2009.
^ "Herbert Hoover Republican Party 31st
President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/wilson) ".
History. http://www.history.com/presidents/wilson.
Retrieved January 12 2009.
^ "Herbert Hoover (August 10, 1874 October 20,
1964) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=30) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
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/president.asp?PresidentNumber=30. Retrieved
January 12, 2009.
^ "Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/franklindroosevelt/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 20,
2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/franklindroosevelt/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Thirty-Second President: 19331945 Franklin
Delano Roosevelt "New Dealer and Global Warrior"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/roosevelt_franklin.shtml) ". American Heritage.
Forbes. http://www.americanheritage.com/people
/presidents/roosevelt_franklin.shtml. Retrieved
January 12, 2009.
^ "Franklin D. Roosevelt Democratic Party 32nd
President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/fdr) ". History.
http://www.history.com/presidents/fdr. Retrieved
January 12 2009.
^ "Franklin D. Roosevelt (January 30, 1882 April
12, 1945) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=31) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=31. Retrieved
January 12, 2009.
^ "Biography of Harry S Truman
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/harrystruman/) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 12, 2007.
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/harrystruman/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Thirty-Third President: 19451953 Harry S.
Truman "The Buck Stopped Here"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
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/geraldford/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Thirty-Eighth President: 19741977 Gerald
Rudolph Ford "A Time for Healing"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/ford_gerald.shtml) ". American Heritage. Forbes.
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/ford_gerald.shtml. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "Gerald Ford Republican Party 38th President
American Presidents (http://www.history.com
/presidents/ford) ". History. http://www.history.com
/presidents/ford. Retrieved January 12 2009.
^ "Gerald R. Ford (July 14, 1913 December 26,
2006) (http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=37) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
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/president.asp?PresidentNumber=37. Retrieved
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^ "Biography of Jimmy Carter
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/jimmycarter) ". Whitehouse.gov. March 12, 2007.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/jimmycarter. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Thirty-Ninth President: 19771981 James
Earl Carter "Not a Politician"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/ford_gerald.shtml) ". American Heritage. Forbes.
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/ford_gerald.shtml. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "Jimmy Carter Democratic Party 39th
President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/ford) ". History.
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January 12 2009.
^ "Jimmy Carter (October 1, 1924 )
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=38) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
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/president.asp?PresidentNumber=38. Retrieved
January 12, 2009.
^ "Biography of Ronald Reagan
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/ronaldreagan/) ". Whitehouse.gov. June 25, 2008.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/ronaldreagan/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Fortieth President: 19811989 Ronald
Wilson Reagan "The Great Communicator"
(http://www.americanheritage.com/people/presidents
/reagan_ronald.shtml) ". American Heritage. Forbes.
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/reagan_ronald.shtml. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
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^ "Bill Clinton (August 19, 1946 )
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=41) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
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^ "Biography of President George W. Bush
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/georgewbush/) ". Whitehouse.gov. February 25,
2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents
/georgewbush/. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "The Forty-Third President: 2001present George
Walker Bush (http://www.americanheritage.com
/people/presidents/bush_george_jr.shtml) ".
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/bush_george_jr.shtml. Retrieved January 12, 2009.
^ "George W. Bush Republican Party 43rd
President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/georgewbush) ".
History. http://www.history.com/presidents
/georgewbush. Retrieved January 12 2009.
^ "George W. Bush (July 6, 1946 )
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=42) ". American
Presidents: Life Portrait. C-SPAN.
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/president.asp?PresidentNumber=42. Retrieved
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^ "President Barack Obama
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration
/president_obama/) ". Whitehouse.gov. January 20,
2009. http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration
/president_obama/. Retrieved January 20 2009.
^ "Barack Obama Democratic Party 44th
President American Presidents
(http://www.history.com/presidents/obama) ".
History. http://www.history.com/presidents/obama.
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^ "Barack Obama (August 4, 1961 )
(http://americanpresidents.org/presidents
/president.asp?PresidentNumber=43) ". American
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_the_National_Security_Agency
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_the_National_Security_Agency
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Agency overview
Formed
4 November 1952
Preceding
agency
Jurisdiction
United States
Headquarters
Employees
Classified
Parent agency
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
1 AFSA directors
2 NSA directors
3 External links
4 References
The Armed Forces Security Agency was the predecessor to the National Security Agency and existed from 1949
to 1952.
#
Director
Service
Term
2 MG Ralph Canine
USA
Director
Service
Term
1 MG Ralph Canine
USA
19521956
Harry S. Truman
Dwight D. Eisenhower
USAF
19561960
Dwight D. Eisenhower
USN
19601962
Dwight D. Eisenhower
John F. Kennedy
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USAF
19621965
John F. Kennedy
Lyndon B. Johnson
USA
19651969
Lyndon B. Johnson
Richard Nixon
USA
19691972
Richard Nixon
USAF
19721973
Richard Nixon
USAF
19731977
Richard Nixon
Gerald Ford
Jimmy Carter
USN
19771981
Jimmy Carter
Ronald Reagan
USAF
19811985
Ronald Reagan
USA
19851988
Ronald Reagan
USN
19881992
Ronald Reagan
George H. W. Bush
19921996
George H. W. Bush
Bill Clinton
USAF
19961999
Bill Clinton
USAF
19992005
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
USA
2005present
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Hayden
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
President
Preceded by
Succeeded by
In office
1999 2005
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Kenneth Minihan
Keith B. Alexander
Born
October 2, 2009
9/23/2009 3:58 AM
2 of 6
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Hayden
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
4 References
5 External links
Michael Vincent Hayden was born on St. Patrick's Day in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania to an Irish-American couple,
Sadie and Harry Hayden, Jr. who worked as a welder for a Pennsylvania manufacturing company. He has a
younger brother, Harry III, and a sister, Margaret.
He graduated from Pittsburgh's North Catholic High School. While at Duquesne University he earned a B.A. in
history in 1967 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant. He then attended graduate school at Duquesne
for an M.A. in modern American History.
He is a graduate of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps program. Hayden entered active military
service in 1969.
Hayden has served as commander of the Air Intelligence Agency and Director of the Joint Command and
Control Warfare Center, both headquartered at Lackland Air Force Base. He also has served in senior staff
positions in the Pentagon; Headquarters U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany; the National Security
Council, Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in the then-People's Republic of Bulgaria. Prior to his current
assignment, the general served as deputy chief of staff for United Nations Command and U.S. Forces Korea,
Yongsan Garrison. He has also worked in intelligence in Guam.
He is married to Jeanine Carrier, and they have a daughter and two sons.
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George G. Meade, Maryland from March 1999 to April 2005. As the Director of NSA and Chief of CSS, he was
responsible for a combat support agency of the Department of Defense with military and civilian personnel
stationed worldwide.[5]
Strategy for the NSA
Hayden and the NSA have a strategy to increase their use of American industry for domestic surveillance.[6][7]
[8][9]
Rear Admiral Sidney Souers, a Navy officer, who was the first man to
hold the position when the nascent organization was known as the
Central Intelligence Group; then-Lieutenant General (later General)
Hoyt S. Vandenberg, an Air Force officer, also Director of the CIG; Rear
Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, a Navy officer who was just prior to his appointment was a Captain and
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Commanding Officer of the USS Missouri and who was the first DCI of the CIA; General Walter Bedell
Smith, an Army officer
President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed Vice Admiral William Raborn, a Navy officer
President Jimmy Carter appointed Admiral Stansfield Turner, a Navy officer and a classmate of President
Carter at the United States Naval Academy
Military awards
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star
Meritorious Service Medal with two bronze Oak Leaf Clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal
Air Force Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award
Air Force Organizational Excellence Award
National Defense Service Medal with bronze service star
Armed Forces Service Medal
Air Force Overseas Ribbon (Short Tour) with bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Air Force Overseas Ribbon (Long Tour) with two bronze Oak Leaf Clusters
Air Force Longevity Service Award with one silver and one bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Small Arms Expert Marksmanship Ribbon
Air Force Training Ribbon
Order of National Security Merit Cheonsu Medal (Republic of Korea)
Military badges
Presidential Service Badge
Air Force Intelligence Badge, Master-level
Dates of rank
June 2, 1967 Second Lieutenant
June 7, 1970 First Lieutenant
December 7, 1971 Captain
June 1, 1980 Major
February 1, 1985 Lieutenant Colonel
November 1, 1990 Colonel
September 1, 1993 Brigadier General
October 1, 1996 Major General
May 1, 1999 Lieutenant General
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Succeeded by
Keith B. Alexander
Preceded by
Initial Principal Deputy
Director
Succeeded by
Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. (acting)
Preceded by
Porter Goss
Succeeded by
Leon Panetta
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Dick Cheney
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In office
January 3, 1979 March 20, 1989
Preceded by
Teno Roncalio
Succeeded by
Craig L. Thomas
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deferments.[14][15] In 1989, The Washington Post writer George C. Wilson interviewed Cheney as the next
Secretary of Defense; when asked about his deferments, Cheney reportedly said, "I had other priorities in the
'60s than military service."[16] Cheney testified during his confirmation hearings in 1989 that he received
deferments to finish a college career that lasted six years rather than four, owing to sub par academic
performance and the need to work to pay for his education. Initially, he was not called up because the Selective
Service System was only taking older men. When he became eligible for the draft, he applied for four
deferments in sequence. He applied for his fifth exemption on January 19, 1966, when his wife was about 10
weeks pregnant. He was granted 3-A status, the "hardship" exemption, which excluded men with children or
dependent parents. In January 1967, Cheney turned 26 and was no longer eligible for the draft.[17]
Cheney was Assistant to the President under Gerald Ford. When Rumsfeld was
named Secretary of Defense, Cheney became White House Chief of Staff, succeeding Rumsfeld.[12] He later
was campaign manager for Ford's 1976 presidential campaign as well.[20]
In 1978, Cheney was elected to represent Wyoming in the U.S. House of Representatives and succeed retiring
Congressman Teno Roncalio, having defeated his Democratic opponent, Bill Bailey. Cheney was reelected five
times, serving until 1989. He was Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee from 1981 to 1987 when he
was elected Chairman of the House Republican Conference. The following year, he was elected House Minority
Whip.[21]
Votes
Among the many votes he cast during his tenure in the House, he voted in 1979
with the majority against making Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s birthday a
national holiday, but then voted with the majority in 1983 when the measure
passed.[20] He voted against the creation of the U.S. Department of Education,
citing his concern over budget deficits and expansion of the federal
government, and claiming that the Department was an encroachment on states'
rights.[22] He voted against funding Head Start, but reversed his position in
2000.[23]
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In 1986, after President Ronald Reagan vetoed a bill to impose economic sanctions on South Africa for its
policy of apartheid, Cheney was one of 83 Representatives to vote against overriding Reagan's veto.[24] In later
years, he articulated his opposition to unilateral sanctions against many different countries, stating "they almost
never work"[25] and that in that case they might have ended up hurting the people instead.[26]
In 1986, Cheney, along with 145 Republicans and 31 Democrats, voted against a non-binding Congressional
resolution calling on the South African government to release Nelson Mandela from prison, after the Democrats
defeated proposed amendments that would have required Mandela to renounce violence sponsored by the
African National Congress (ANC) and requiring it to oust the communist faction from its leadership; the
resolution was defeated. Appearing on CNN, Cheney addressed criticism for this, saying he opposed the
resolution because the ANC "at the time was viewed as a terrorist organization and had a number of interests
that were fundamentally inimical to the United States."[27]
Cheney also served as ranking minority member of the Congressional committee investigating the Iran-Contra
affair.[12][28] He promoted Wyoming's petroleum and coal businesses as well,[29] and as a result, the federal
building in Casper, a regional center of the fossil fuel industry, is named the Dick Cheney Federal Building.[30]
Early tenure
Cheney worked closely with Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public
Affairs, and Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, from the
beginning of his tenure. He focused primarily on external matters, and left most
internal Pentagon management to Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald J. Atwood,
Jr.[31]
Secretary of Defense
Dick Cheney
Budgetary practices
Cheney's most immediate issue as Secretary of Defense was the Department of
Defense budget. Cheney deemed it appropriate to cut the budget and downsize the
military, following President Ronald Reagan's peacetime defense buildup at the
height of the Cold War.[33] As part of the fiscal year 1990 budget, Cheney assessed
the requests from each of the branches of the armed services for such expensive
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programs as the B-2 stealth bomber, the V-22 Osprey tilt-wing helicopter, the Aegis destroyer and the MX
missile, totaling approximately $4.5 billion in light of changed world politics.[31] Cheney opposed the V-22
program, which Congress had already appropriated funds for, and initially refused to issue contracts for it before
relenting.[34] When the 1990 Budget came before Congress in the summer of 1989, it settled on a figure
between the Administration's request and the House Armed Services Committee's recommendation.[31]
In subsequent years under Cheney, the proposed and adopted budgets followed
patterns similar to that of 1990. Early in 1991, he unveiled a plan to reduce
military strength by the mid-1990s to 1.6 million, compared with 2.2 million
when he entered office. Cheney's 1993 defense budget was reduced from
1992, omitting programs that Congress had directed the Department of
Defense to buy weapons that it did not want, and omitting unrequested reserve
forces.[31]
Secretary of Defense Cheney
delivering a speech before the
launch of a new destroyer.
Over his four years as Secretary of Defense, Cheney downsized the military
and his budgets showed negative real growth, despite pressures to acquire
weapon systems advocated by Congress. The Department of Defense's total
obligational authority in current dollars declined from $291 billion to $270 billion. Total military personnel
strength decreased by 19 percent, from about 2.2 million in 1989 to about 1.8 million in 1993.[31]
International situations
Using economic sanctions and political pressure, the United States mounted a campaign to drive Panamanian
ruler General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power after he fell from favour.[31] In May 1989, after Guillermo
Endara had been duly elected President of Panama, Noriega nullified the election outcome, drawing intensified
pressure. In October, Noriega suppressed a military coup, but in December, after soldiers of the Panamanian
army killed a US serviceman, the United States invasion of Panama began under Cheney's direction. The stated
reason for the invasion was to seize Noriega to face drug charges in the United States, protect US lives and
property, and restore Panamanian civil liberties.[37] Although the mission was controversial,[38] US forces
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achieved control of Panama and Endara assumed the Presidency; Noriega was convicted and imprisoned on
racketeering and drug trafficking charges in April 1992.[39]
In 1991, the Somali Civil War drew the world's attention. In August 1992, the
United States began to provide humanitarian assistance, primarily food,
through a military airlift. At President Bush's direction, Cheney dispatched the
first of 26,000 US troops to Somalia as part of the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF), designed to provide security and food relief.[31] Cheney's
successors as Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin and William J. Perry, had to
contend with both the Bosnian and Somali issues.
Secretary of Defense Cheney
during a press conference on
the Gulf War
On August 1, 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein sent invading forces into
neighboring Kuwait, a small petroleum-rich state long claimed by Iraq as part of its territory.[40] An estimated
140,000 Iraqi troops quickly took control of Kuwait City and moved on to the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait border.[31]
The United States had already begun to develop contingency plans for the defense of Saudi Arabia by the US
Central Command, headed by General Norman Schwarzkopf, because of its important petroleum reserves.
US and world reaction
The first phase of Operation Desert Storm, which began on January 17, 1991, was an air offensive to secure air
superiority and attack Iraq's forces, targeting key Iraqi command and control centers, including Baghdad and
Basra. Cheney turned most other Department of Defense matters over to Deputy Secretary Atwood and briefed
Congress during the air and ground phases of the war.[31] He flew with Powell to the region (specifically
Riyadh) to review and finalize the ground war plans.[40]
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After an air offensive of more than five weeks, the UN coalition launched the ground war on February 24.
Within 100 hours, Iraqi forces had been routed from Kuwait and Schwarzkopf reported that the basic objective
expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait had been met on February 27.[41] After consultation with Cheney and
other members of his national security team, Bush declared a suspension of hostilities.[40]
Aftermath
A total of 147 U.S. military personnel died in combat, and another 236 died as a result of accidents or other
causes.[31][41] Iraq agreed to a formal truce on March 3, and a permanent cease-fire on April 6.[31] There was
subsequent debate about whether the UN coalition should have driven as far as Baghdad to oust Saddam
Hussein from power. Bush agreed that the decision to end the ground war when they did was correct, but the
debate persisted as Hussein remained in power and rebuilt his military forces.[31] Arguably the most significant
debate concerned whether U.S. and coalition forces had left Iraq too soon.[42][43] In an April 15, 1994 interview
with C-SPAN, Cheney explained that occupying and attempting to take over the country would have been a
"bad idea" and would have led to a "quagmire."[44][45]
Cheney regarded the Gulf War as an example of the kind of regional problem the United States was likely to
continue to face in the future.[46]
We're always going to have to be involved [in the Middle East]. Maybe it's part of our national character,
you know we like to have these problems nice and neatly wrapped up, put a ribbon around it. You deploy a
force, you win the war and the problem goes away and it doesn't work that way in the Middle East it never
has and isn't likely to in my lifetime.
Between 1987 and 1989, during his last term in Congress, Cheney was a director of the Council on Foreign
Relations foreign policy organization.[47]
With the new Democratic administration under President Bill Clinton in January 1993, Cheney left the
Department of Defense and joined the American Enterprise Institute. He also served a second term as a Council
on Foreign Relations director from 1993 to 1995.[47] From 1995 until 2000, he served as Chairman of the Board
and Chief Executive Officer of Halliburton, a Fortune 500 company and market leader in the energy sector.
Cheney's record as CEO was subject to some dispute among Wall Street analysts; a 1998 merger between
Halliburton and Dresser Industries attracted the criticism of some Dresser executives for Halliburton's lack of
accounting transparency.[48] During Cheney's tenure, Halliburton changed its accounting practices regarding
revenue realization of disputed costs on major construction projects.[49] Cheney resigned as CEO of Halliburton
on July 25, 2000. As vice president, he argued that this step removed any conflict of interest. Cheney's net
worth, estimated to be between $30 million and $100 million, is largely derived from his post at Halliburton, as
well as the Cheneys' gross income of nearly $8.82 million.[50]
In 1997, along with Donald Rumsfeld, William Kristol and others, Cheney founded the Project for the New
American Century, a neoconservative think tank whose self-stated goal is to "promote American global
leadership."[51] He was also part of the board of advisors of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA) before becoming vice president.[36]
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2000 election
See also: United States presidential election, 2000
In early 2000, while serving as the CEO of Halliburton, Cheney headed George
W. Bush's vice-presidential search committee. On July 25, after reviewing
Cheney's findings, Bush surprised some pundits by asking Cheney himself to
join the Republican ticket.[12] Halliburton reportedly reached agreement on
July 20 to allow Cheney to retire, with a package estimated at $20 million.[52]
Cheney campaigned against Al Gore's running mate, Joseph Lieberman, in the
2000 presidential election. Cheney, who had been typecast as being aloof
during most of the campaign, was remarkably lively during his visit to Chicago,
where he rode the L, danced the polka, served attendees kielbasa with stuffed
cabbage and addressed a cheering crowd.[53]
While the election was undecided, the Bush-Cheney team was not eligible for public funding to plan a transition
to a new administration. So, Cheney opened a privately funded transition office in Washington. This office
worked to identify candidates for all important positions in the cabinet.[54] According to Craig Unger, Cheney
advocated Donald Rumsfeld for the post of Secretary of Defense to counter the influence of Colin Powell at the
State Department, and tried unsuccessfully to have Paul Wolfowitz named to replace George Tenet as director
of the Central Intelligence Agency.[55]
First term
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Cheney remained physically apart from Bush for security reasons.
For a period, Cheney stayed at an undisclosed location, out of public view.[56]
On the morning of June 29, 2002, Cheney served as Acting President of the United States under the terms of the
25th Amendment to the Constitution, while Bush was undergoing a colonoscopy. Cheney acted as President
from 11:09 UTC that day until Bush resumed the powers of the presidency at 13:24 UTC.[57][58]
Iraq War
Following 9/11, Cheney helped shape Bush's approach to the War on
Terrorism. Despite contrary claims from The Pentagon, Cheney continued to
assert a connection between Al-Qaeda and Iraq prior to the Iraq War in several
public speeches, drawing criticism from some members of the intelligence
community and leading Democrats.[59][60][61] He also made numerous public
statements regarding Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, and made
repeated personal visits to CIA headquarters, where he questioned mid-level
agency analysts on their WMD conclusions.[62]
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Cheney remained steadfast in his support
of the war, stating that it would be an "enormous success story",[63] and made
many visits to the country. He often criticized war critics, calling them opportunists who were peddling
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cynical and pernicious falsehoods to gain political advantage while U.S. soldiers died in Iraq. In response,
Senator John Kerry asserted, It is hard to name a government official with less credibility on Iraq [than
Cheney]."[64]
Second term
See also: United States presidential election, 2004
Bush and Cheney were re-elected in the 2004 presidential election, running
against John Kerry and his running mate, John Edwards. During the election,
the pregnancy of his daughter Mary and her sexual orientation as a lesbian
became a source of public attention for Cheney in light of the same-sex
marriage debate.[65] Cheney has stated that he is in favor of gay marriages but
that each individual state should decide whether to permit it.[66]
Cheney's former chief legal counsel, David Addington,[67] became his chief of
staff and remained in that office until Cheney's departure from office. John P.
Hannah served as Vice President Cheney's national security adviser.[68] Until
his resignation in 2005, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Jr. served in both roles.[69]
On the morning of July 21, 2007, Cheney once again served as Acting President for about two and a half hours.
Bush transferred the power of the presidency prior to undergoing a medical procedure, requiring sedation, and
later resumed his powers and duties that same day.[70]
After his term began in 2001, Cheney was occasionally asked if he was interested in the Republican nomination
for the 2008 elections. However, he always maintained that he wished to retire upon the expiration of his term,
and indeed he did not run in the 2008 presidential primaries, the GOP nominating Arizona Senator John McCain
instead.[71]
Disclosure of documents
Beginning in 2003, Vice President Cheney's staff opted not to file required
reports with the National Archives and Records Administration office charged
with assuring that the executive branch protects classified information, nor did it allow inspection of its record
keeping.[74] Cheney refused to release the documents, citing his executive privilege to deny congressional
information requests.[75][76] Such media outlets as Time Magazine and CBS News sarcastically questioned
whether Cheney had created a "fourth branch of government" that was not subject to any laws.[77] A group of
historians and open-government advocates filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,
asking the court to declare that Cheney's vice-presidential records are covered by the Presidential Records Act
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of 1978 and cannot be destroyed, taken or withheld from the public without proper review.[78][79][80]
CIA leak scandal
Main article: CIA leak scandal
See also: CIA leak grand jury investigation and United States v. Libby
On October 18, 2005, The Washington Post reported that the vice president's
office was central to the investigation of the Valerie Plame CIA leak scandal,
for Cheney's former chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, was one of the
figures under investigation.[81] Following an indictment, Libby resigned his
positions as Cheney's chief of staff and assistant on national security affairs.
On September 8, 2006, Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State,
publicly announced that he was the source of the revelation of Plame's status.
Armitage said he was not a part of a conspiracy to reveal Plame's identity and
did not know whether one existed.[82]
In February 2006, The National Journal reported that Libby had stated before a grand jury that his superiors,
including Cheney, had authorized him to disclose classified information to the press regarding Iraq's weapons
intelligence.[83]
On March 6, 2007, Libby was convicted on four felony counts for obstruction of justice, perjury, and making
false statements to federal investigators.[84]
Hunting incident
Main article: Dick Cheney hunting incident
On February 11, 2006, Cheney accidentally[85] shot Harry Whittington, a 78-year-old Texas attorney, in the
face, neck, and upper torso with birdshot pellets when he turned to shoot a quail while hunting on a southern
Texas ranch.[86]
Whittington suffered a mild heart attack, and atrial fibrillation due to a pellet that embedded in the outer layers
of his heart. The Kenedy County Sheriff's office cleared Cheney of any criminal wrongdoing in the matter, and
in an interview with Fox News, Cheney accepted full responsibility for the incident.[87] Whittington was
discharged from the hospital on February 17, 2006. Later, Whittington apologized to the vice-president for the
trouble the event had caused him and his family. Cheney reiterated that it was an honest accident.[88]
Assassination attempt
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Policy formulation
Cheney has been characterised as the most powerful and influential Vice
President in history.[92][93] Both supporters and detractors of Cheney regard
him as a shrewd and knowledgeable politician who knows the functions and
intricacies of the federal government. A sign of Cheney's active policy-making
role was then-House Speaker Dennis Hastert's provision of an office near the
House floor for Cheney[94] in addition to his office in the West Wing,[95] his
ceremonial office in the Old Executive Office Building,[96] and his Senate
offices (one in the Dirksen Senate Office Building and another off the floor of
the Senate).[94][97]
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After leaving office, Cheney purchased a home in McLean, Virginia (Washington suburbs), and maintains
homes in Wyoming and on Maryland's Eastern Shore.[113]
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Said to be writing a book,[114] his memoirs are likely to be published in spring 2011. It is thought the book will
charge that in his second term George W. Bush ignored Cheney's advice and, in a word, went soft. According to
a front page article in The Washington Post, Cheney "felt Bush was drifting away from him. Cheney said Bush
was shackled by public reaction and the criticism he took. The Cheney doctrine was cast iron strength at all
times - never apologise, never explain while Bush moved towards a conciliatory approach." Personal factors
also contributed to the growing distance between the two men. Cheney was dismayed when Mr. Bush forced his
old friend and mentor Donald Rumsfeld out of the Pentagon in 2006. Cheney reportedly further accused Bush
of abandoning Lewis "Scooter" Libby, likening his action to leaving a soldier on the battlefield. [115] Cheney
maintained a visible public profile after leaving office,[116] being especially critical of Obama administration
policies on national security.[117][118]
In May 2009, Cheney spoke of his support for same-sex marriage, becoming one of the most prominent
Republican politicians to do so. Speaking to the National Press Club, Cheney stated: "People ought to be free to
enter into any kind of union they wish, any kind of arrangement they wish. I do believe, historically, the way
marriage has been regulated is at a state level. It's always been a state issue, and I think that's the way it ought to
be handled today."[119]
Although, by custom, a former Vice President receives unofficial six month protection from the United States
Secret Service, President Obama reportedly extended the protection period for Cheney[120].
On 11 July, 2009 CIA Director Leon E. Panetta told the Senate and House intelligence committees that the CIA
withheld information about a secret counter-terrorism program from Congress for eight years on direct orders
from Dick Cheney. Intelligence and Congressional officials have said the unidentified program did not involve
the CIA interrogation program and did not involve domestic intelligence activities. They have said the program
was started by the counter-terrorism center at the CIA shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but never
became fully operational, involving planning and some training that took place off and on from 2001 until this
year.[121] Wall Street Journal reported, citing former intelligence officials familiar with the matter, that the
program was an attempt to carry out a 2001 presidential authorization to capture or kill al Qaeda operatives.[122]
Cheney's long histories of cardiovascular disease and periodic need for urgent health care raised questions of
whether he was medically fit to serve in public office.[123] Once a heavy smoker, Cheney sustained the first of
four heart attacks in 1978, at age 37. Subsequent attacks in 1984, 1988, and 2000[124] have resulted in moderate
contractile dysfunction of his left ventricle. He underwent four-vessel coronary artery bypass grafting in 1988,
coronary artery stenting in November 1994, and urgent coronary balloon angioplasty in December 1994.[125]
As vice president, Cheney was cared for by the White House Medical Unit (WHMU).[126] Staff from the
WHMG accompany the president and the vice president while either is traveling, and make advance contact
with local emergency medical services to ensure that urgent care is available immediately should it be necessary.
He has undergone a number of procedures during his tenure.
In 2001, an examination of Cheney with a Holter monitor revealed the presence of brief episodes of
(asymptomatic) ectopy. An electrophysiologic study was performed, at which Cheney was found to have an
unsteady and potentially fatal heartbeat.[127] An implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) was therefore
implanted in his left upper anterior chest.[128]
On September 24, 2005, Cheney underwent a six-hour endo-vascular procedure to repair popliteal artery
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aneurysms bilaterally, a catheter treatment technique used in the artery behind each knee.[125] The condition
was discovered at a regular physical in July, and was not life-threatening.[127] Cheney was hospitalized for tests
after experiencing shortness of breath five months later. In late April 2006, an ultrasound revealed that the clot
was smaller.[125]
On March 5, 2007, Cheney was treated for deep-vein thrombosis in his left leg at George Washington University
Hospital after experiencing pain in his left calf.[125] Doctors prescribed blood-thinning medication and allowed
him to return to work.[129]
CBS News reported that during the morning of November 26, 2007, Cheney was diagnosed with atrial
fibrillation and underwent treatment that afternoon.[125]
On July 12, 2008 Cheney underwent a cardiological exam, and doctors reported that his heartbeat was normal
for a 67-year-old man with a history of heart problems. As part of his annual checkup, he was administered an
electrocardiogram and radiological imaging of the stents placed in the arteries behind his knees in 2005. Doctors
said that Cheney had not experienced any recurrence of atrial fibrillation and that his special pacemaker had
neither detected nor treated any arrhythmia.[130]
On October 15, 2008, Cheney returned to the hospital briefly to treat a minor irregularity.[131]
On January 19, 2009, Cheney strained his back "while moving boxes into his new house". As a consequence, he
was in a wheelchair for two days, including his attendance at the 2009 United States presidential
inauguration.[132]
In the beginning of the Bush administration, Cheney's public opinion polls were more favorable than
unfavorable. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, both Bush's and Cheney's approval ratings rose,
with Cheney reaching 63 percent[133] and the president with 90 percent.[134] The polling numbers for both men
declined after the September 11 attacks, however.[133][135] Cheney's Gallup poll figures are consistent with
those from other polls:[133][136]
April 200163% approval, 21% disapproval
January 200268% approval, 18% disapproval
January 200456% approval, 36% disapproval
January 200550% approval, 40% disapproval
January 200641% approval, 46% disapproval
July 200730% approval, 60% disapproval
March 200930% approval, 63% disapproval
In April 2007 Cheney was awarded an honorary doctorate of public service from Brigham Young University,
where he delivered the commencement address.[137] His selection as graduate commencement speaker was
controversial. The college board of trustees issued a statement explaining that the invitation should be viewed
"as one extended to someone holding the high office of vice president of the United States rather than to a
partisan political figure."[138] BYU permitted a protest to occur so long as it did not "make personal attacks
against Cheney, attack (the) BYU administration, the church or the First Presidency."[139]
14 of 25
October 2, 2009
9/23/2009 3:59 AM
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dick_Cheney
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Cheney is a member of the United Methodist Church,[140] and was "the first Methodist Vice President to serve
under a Methodist president".[141]
His wife, Lynne Cheney, was Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities from 1986 to 1996. She is
now a public speaker, author, and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. The couple have two
children, Elizabeth and Mary, and six grandchildren. Elizabeth, his eldest daughter, is married to Philip J. Perry,
General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security. Mary Cheney, a former employee of the Colorado
Rockies baseball team and Coors Brewing Company and campaign aide to the Bush re-election campaign,
currently lives in Great Falls, Virginia with her longtime partner Heather Poe.[142]
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^ Gellman, Barton; Becker, Jo
(June 25, 2007). "Angler: The
Cheney Vice Presidency
Pushing the Envelope on
Presidential Power
(http://blog.washingtonpost.com
/cheney/chapters
/pushing_the_envelope_on_pres
i/index.html) ". Washington
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i/index.html. Retrieved
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^ Gellman, Barton; Becker, Jo
(June 26, 2007). "Angler: The
Cheney Vice PresidencyA
Strong Push From Backstage
(http://blog.washingtonpost.com
/cheney/chapters
/a_strong_push_from_back_stag
e/index.html) ". Washington
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/cheney/chapters
/a_strong_push_from_back_stag
e/index.html. Retrieved
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^ "Angler: The Cheney Vice
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/cheney/chapters
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". Washington Post. June 27,
2007.
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/cheney/chapters
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Retrieved 2008-01-17.
^ Sherwell, Philip (June 28,
2008). "Dick Cheney 'tried to
block North Korea Nuclear
deal'
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk
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(http://news.yahoo.com
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(http://news.yahoo.com
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^ Loven, Jennifer (The
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gonale-indicted/
2009). "Obama, Cheney at odds
^
on Gitmo
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com
(http://www.edmontonsun.com
/2008/11/18/texas-grand/news/world/2009/05
jury-indicts-cheney-gonzales/
/22/9532251-sun.html) ".
^ http://www.mysanantonio.com
Edmonton Sun (Sun Media).
/news/Cheneys_lawyer_files_motion_to_quash_indictment.html
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^ http://www.kveo.com
/news/world/2009/05
/home/ticker/34783409.html
/22/9532251-sun.html.
^ "Cheney, Gonzalez
Retrieved 2009-05-30.
Indictments Dismissed in Texas
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Prison Case
Strobel, Warren P. (May 21,
(http://www.foxnews.com
2009). "Cheney's speech
/politics/2008/12/01/cheneyignored some inconvenient
gonale-indictments-dismissedtruths
texas-prison-case/) ".
(http://www.mcclatchydc.com
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December 1, 2008.
McClatchy (mcclatchydc.com).
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/politics/2008/12/01/cheney/226/story/68643.html.
gonale-indictments-dismissedRetrieved 2009-05-30.
texas-prison-case/. Retrieved
119. ^ http://www.pinknews.co.uk
2008-12-02.
/news/articles/2005-12687.html
^ http://news.yahoo.com
120. ^ http://news.yahoo.com
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/ap_on_go_pr_wh
121. ^ Scott Shane (July 11, 2009).
/us_cheney_no_exit
"Cheney Is Linked to
^ Rutenberg, Jim and Rich,
Concealment of C.I.A. Project
Motoko (May 22, 2009).
(http://www.nytimes.com
"Cheney Seeks Book Deal on
/2009/07/12/us/politics
Bush Years and More
/12intel.html) ". New York
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^ Siobhan Gorman (July 13,
2009). "CIA Had Secret Al
Qaeda Plan
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/SB124736381913627661.html)
". Wall Street Journal.
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/SB124736381913627661.html.
Retrieved 2009-08-06.
^ Bruni, Frank (2000-07-24).
"THE 2000 CAMPAIGN: THE
TEXAS GOVERNOR; New
Sign Bush Favors Cheney as
No. 2 (http://www.nytimes.com
/2000/07/24/us/the-2000campaign-the-texas-governornew-sign-bush-favors-cheneyas-no-2.html) ". The New York
Times. http://www.nytimes.com
/2000/07/24/us/the-2000campaign-the-texas-governornew-sign-bush-favors-cheneyas-no-2.html. Retrieved
2009-05-24.
^ http://archives.cnn.com
/2001/HEALTH/06/29
/cheney.chronology/index.html
^ a b c d e "V.P. Cheney Treated
For Irregular Heartbeat
(http://wcbstv.com/topstories
/cheney.irregular.heartbeat.2.59
5859.html) ". CBS News.
2007-11-26. http://wcbstv.com
/topstories
/cheney.irregular.heartbeat.2.59
5859.html. Retrieved
2007-12-13.
^ "White House Medical Unit
History
(http://whmureunions.com
/History_Page.htm) ".
http://whmureunions.com
/History_Page.htm. Retrieved
2009-05-25.
^ a b "Dr. Zebra" (2007-12-01).
"Health & Medical History of
Richard "Dick" Cheney
(http://www.doctorzebra.com
/prez/a_cheney.htm) ". Dr.
Zebra.com.
http://www.doctorzebra.com
/prez/a_cheney.htm. Retrieved
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2008-01-10.
128. ^ Karoub, Jeff (2001-07-02).
"Mems Device in Cheney's
Chest helps Veep's Ticker Keep
Time
(http://www.smalltimes.com
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/article_display.cfm?Section=A
RCHI&C=Bio&
ARTICLE_ID=267535&p=109)
". Small Times.
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ARTICLE_ID=267535&p=109.
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129. ^ Malveaux, Suzanne
(2007-03-05). "Cheney treated
for blood clot in his leg
(http://www.cnn.com
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/cheney.health/index.html) ".
CNN. http://www.cnn.com
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/cheney.health/index.html.
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130. ^ "Look at Cheney's health
history over the years
(http://www.newser.com/article
/d91sdbo80/look-at-cheneyshealth-history-over-theyears.html) ". Associated Press.
2008-07-12.
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/d91sdbo80/look-at-cheneyshealth-history-over-theyears.html. Retrieved
2008-07-25.
131. ^ "Cheney experiences
abnormal heart rhythm
(http://news.yahoo.com
/s/ap/20081015
/ap_on_go_pr_wh/cheney) ".
Associated Press. 2008-10-15.
http://news.yahoo.com
/s/ap/20081015
/ap_on_go_pr_wh/cheney.
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132. ^ "Vice-President Dick Cheney
to watch Barack Obama
inauguration in a wheelchair
(http://www.theaustralian.news.
com.au/story
/0,,24939969-5013948,00.html?
Advanced Media Group
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/library.aspx?id=2410#m5.
Retrieved 2009-05-24.
142. ^ "Vice President Cheney's
legacy grows by one grandchild
(http://www.cnn.com
/2007/WORLD/europe/05/23
/wednesday/index.html) ".
http://www.cnn.com
/2007/WORLD/europe/05/23
/wednesday/index.html.
Works by
Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress : A Report of the Crisis Study Group
on Professional Military Education (Csis Report) 1997. ISBN 0-89206-297-5
Kings of the Hill: How Nine Powerful Men Changed the Course of American History 1996. ISBN
0-8264-0230-5
Works about
Andrews, Elaine. Dick Cheney: A Life Of Public Service. Millbrook Press, 2001. ISBN 0-7613-2306-6
Gellman, Barton. Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency. Penguin Press, 2008. ISBN 9781594201868
Hayes, Stephen. Cheney: The Untold Story of America's Most Powerful and Controversial Vice
President. HarperCollins, 2007. ISBN 0060723467
Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. Viking, 2004. ISBN
0-670-03299-9
Nichols, John. Dick: The Man Who is President. New Press, 2004. ISBN 1-56584-840-3
24 of 25
Succeeded by
Hamilton Jordan
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Preceded by
Frank C. Carlucci
Succeeded by
Les Aspin
Preceded by
Al Gore
Succeeded by
Joe Biden
Succeeded by
Craig Thomas
Succeeded by
Jerry Lewis
California
Preceded by
Trent Lott
Mississippi
Succeeded by
Newt Gingrich
Georgia
Preceded by
Jack Kemp
Succeeded by
Sarah Palin
Succeeded by
John Dingell
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The Office of United States Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was established by U.S. President Harry
Truman on January 23, 1946 with Admiral Sidney Souers occupying the position. The DCI was coordinating
intelligence activities among and between the various United States intelligence agencies, also called the
American Intelligence Community.
Until April 2005, the DCI also served as de-facto Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and was often
referred to colloquially as the "CIA Director." After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States and the subsequent investigation by the 9/11 Commission, a movement grew to re-organize the
Intelligence Community. That movement prompted the creation, on April 21, 2005, of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (DNI), in whose purview was the job portfolio that had been performed previously by
the Director of Central Intelligence. The latter position then ceased to exist.
Porter J. Goss was the 19th and final CIA Director to serve in the position of DCI.
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Director
Tenure
Allen W. Dulles
John McCone
Richard M. Helms
James R. Schlesinger
William E. Colby
George H. W. Bush
William J. Casey
William H. Webster
Robert M. Gates
R. James Woolsey
John M. Deutch
George J. Tenet
Porter J. Goss
Position replaced by Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Director of National Intelligence.
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Director of the OSO after the CIA's disastrous role in the attempted Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961]].
After falling out with the Kennedys, he was sent off to Vietnam where he oversaw the coup to overthrow
President Ngo Dinh Diem. Following the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Helms was made Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence under Admiral William Raborn. A year later, in 1966, he was appointed Director.
In the early 1970s, partially as a result of the Watergate break-ins under President Richard M. Nixon, the United
States Congress took a more active role in intelligence agencies, as did independent commissions such as the
1975 United States President's Commission on CIA activities within the United States, also called the
Rockefeller Commission after its chairman. Revelations about past CIA activities, such as assassinations and
attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, illegal domestic spying on U.S. citizens, drew considerable
congressional oversight that had not been previousy exercised. It was determined, by several investigating
committees, that the CIA had given inappropriate assistance to persons affiliated with the White House and the
1972 Nixon reelection campaign. Certain of the individuals involved in the Watergate breakins had worked, in
the past, for the CIA. In an audio tape provoking President Nixon's resignation, Nixon ordered his chief of staff,
H.R. Haldeman, to tell the CIA that further investigation of Watergate would "open the whole can of worms"
about the Bay Of Pigs of Cuba, and, therefore, that the CIA should tell the FBI to cease investigating the
Watergate burglary, due to reasons of "national security".[4] CIA did not comply.
The ease of Helms's role under President Lyndon Johnson changed with the arrival of President Richard Nixon
and Nixon's national security advisor Henry Kissinger. After the debacle of Watergate, from which Helms
succeeded in distancing the CIA as far as possible, the Agency came under much tighter congressional control.
Nixon, however, considered Helms to be disloyal, and fired him as DCI in 1973. Helms was the only DCI
convicted for irregularities in office; his autobiography describes his reactions to the charges[5]
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Colby's tenure as DCI congressional investigations into alleged U.S. intelligence malfeasance over the preceding
twenty-five years. Colby cooperated, not out of a desire for major reforms, but in the belief that the actual scope
of such misdeeds was not great enough to cause lasting damage to the CIA's reputation. He believed that
cooperating with Congress was the only way to save the Agency from dissolution. Colby also believed that the
CIA had a moral obligation to cooperate with the Congress and demonstrate that the CIA was accountable to
the Constitution. This caused a major rift within the CIA ranks, with many old-line officers such as former DCI
Richard Helms believing that the CIA should have resisted congressional intrusion.
Colby's time as DCI was also eventful on the world stage. Shortly after he assumed leadership, the Yom Kippur
War broke out, an event that surprised not only the American intelligence agencies but also the Israelis. This
intelligence surprise reportedly affected Colby's credibility with the Nixon Administration. Meanwhile, after
many years of involvement, South Vietnam fell to Communist forces in April 1975, a particularly difficult blow
for Colby, who had dedicated so much of his life and career to the American effort there. Events in the arms
control field, Angola, the Middle East, and elsewhere also demanded attention.
William Colby's death, officially in a boating accident, happened on the same date when a New York prosecutor
got permission to set up a grand jury to investigate the role of the CIA in the death of Frank Olson who worked
at Fort Detrick, Maryland and was involved in chemical warfare research. Frank Olson was one of the
experimental subjects in the CIA MKULTRA experiments with LSD and other drugs. He did not give informed
consent for the CIA to experiment on him, as would be ethically required under the medical research principles
of the Declaration of Helsinki. The CIA claimed that he committed suicide by jumping out of a hotel window
but the family did not believe this explanation. An autopsy of the remains of Frank Olson had found blunt force
trauma to the head, which might have come from the fall, or been inflicted before the fall. The Olson matter
remains unresolved and continues to arise in reviews of questionable activities.
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technical collection methods such as SIGINT and IMINT, and his apparent dislike for, and firing of, HUMINT
specialists made him extremely unpopular. Under Turner's direction, the CIA emphasized IMINT and SIGINT
more than HUMINT. Turner eliminated over 800 operational positions in what was called the "halloween
massacre." This organizational direction is notable because his successor William Casey was seen to have a
completely opposite approach, focusing much of his attention on HUMINT. Turner gave notable testimony to
Congress revealing much of the extent of the MKULTRA program, which the CIA ran from the early 1950s to
late 1960s. Reform and simplification of the intelligence community's multilayered secrecy system was one of
Turner's significant initiatives, but produced no results by the time he left office. He also wrote a book on his
experience at CIA.[11]
During Turner's term as head of the CIA, he became outraged when former agent Frank Snepp published a book
called Decent Interval which exposed incompetence among senior American government personnel during the
fall of Saigon.[12] accused Snepp of breaking the secrecy agreement required of all CIA agents, and then later
was forced to admit under cross-examination that he had never read the agreement signed by Snepp.[13]
Regardless, the CIA ultimately won its case against Snepp at the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court forced Snepp
to turn over all his profits from Decent Interval and to seek preclearance of any future writings about
intelligence work for the rest of his life. The ultimate irony was that the CIA would later rely on the Snepp legal
precedent in forcing Turner to seek preclearance of his own memoirs, which were highly critical of President
Ronald Reagan's policies.[13] Turner, who was not a lawyer, did not understand the concept of precedent, and
did not grasp the broader implications of pushing the U.S. Department of Justice to take an aggressive stance
against Snepp.[14]
In the documentary "Secrets of the CIA" Admiral Turner commented the MK ULTRA project.
"It came to my attention early in my ten years as director, and I felt it was a warning sign that if you're not
alert, things can go wrong in this organization."
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Hours before Casey was scheduled to testify before Congress about his knowledge of Iran-Contra, he was
reported to have been rendered incapable of speech, and was later hospitalized. In his 1987 book,[16]
Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward, who had interviewed Casey on numerous occasions, said that he had
gained entry to Casey's hospital room for a final, four-minute long encounter a claim that was met with
disbelief in many quarters, and adamant denial by Casey's wife, Sofia. According to Woodward, when he asked
Casey if he knew about the diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan Contras, "His head jerked up hard. He stared,
and finally nodded yes."[17]
Another quote about his relationship with Clinton, according to Paula Kaufman of Insight Magazine:
Remember the guy who in 1994 crashed his plane onto the White House lawn? That was me trying to get an
appointment to see President Clinton.[21]
David Halberstam notes in War in a Time of Peace that Clinton chose Woolsey for CIA director because the
Clinton campaign had courted neoconservatives leading up to the 1992 election, promising to be tougher on
Taiwan, Bosnia, and human rights in China, and it was decided that they ought to give at least one
neoconservative a job in the administration.
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In 1995, President Bill Clinton appointed him Director of Central Intelligence (cabinet rank in the Clinton
administration). However, Deutch was initially reluctant to accept the appointment. As head of the CIA, Deutch
continued the policy of his predecessor R. James Woolsey to declassify records pertaining to U.S. covert
operations during the Cold War.[22] He put restraints on what he considered to be politically incorrect agent
recruitment and sought to encourage more diversity at the Agency in order to include more women and
minorities in its ranks.[23]
In 1996, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating
that: "Hundreds of employees on a daily basis are directed to break extremely serious laws in countries around
the world in the face of frequently sophisticated efforts by foreign governments to catch them. A safe estimate is
that several hundred times every day (easily 100,000 times a year) DO officers engage in highly illegal activities
(according to foreign law) that not only risk political embarrassment to the US but also endanger the freedom if
not lives of the participating foreign nationals and, more than occasionally, of the clandestine officer himself."
[24][25]
In the same document, the committee wrote, "Considering these facts and recent history, which has shown that
the [Director of the Central Intelligence Agency], whether he wants to or not, is held accountable for overseeing
the [Clandestine Service], the DCI must work closely with the Director of the CS and hold him fully and directly
responsible to him."[25]
Soon after Deutch's departure from the CIA in 1996 it was revealed that classified materials were being kept on
several of Deutch's laptop computers designated as unclassified. In January 1997, the CIA began a formal
security investigation of the matter. Senior management at CIA declined to fully pursue the security breach.
Over two years after his departure, the matter was referred to the Department of Justice, where Attorney
General Janet Reno declined prosecution. She did, however, recommend an investigation to determine whether
Deutch should retain his security clearance.[26] President Clinton pardoned Deutch on his last day in office.[27]
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On September 15, 2001. Tenet presented the Worldwide Attack Matrix, a blueprint for what became known as
the War On Terror.[30] He proposed firstly to send CIA teams into Afghanistan to collect intelligence on, and
mount covert operations against, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The teams would act jointly with military Special
Operations units. "President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his
thinking."[31]
After the September 11 attacks, many observers criticized the Intelligence Community for numerous
"intelligence failures" as one of the major reasons why the attacks were not prevented.[30] In August 2007, a
secret report written by the CIA inspector general was made public (originally written in 2005 but kept secret).
The 19-page summary states that Tenet knew the dangers of Al Qaeda well before September 2001, but that the
leadership of the CIA did not do enough to prevent any attacks. Tenet reacted to the publication of this report
by calling it "flat wrong".[32]
Bob Woodward, in his book Plan of Attack,[33] wrote that Tenet privately lent his personal authority to the
intelligence reports about weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq. At a meeting on December 12, 2002,
he assured Bush that the evidence against Saddam Hussein amounted to a "slam dunk case." After several
months of refusing to confirm this statement, Tenet later stated that this remark was taken out of context. (Tenet
indicated that the comment was made pursuant to a discussion about how to convince the American people to
support invading Iraq, and that, in his opinion, the best way to convince the people would be by explaining the
dangers posed by Iraq's WMD i.e., the public relations sale of the war via the WMD, according to Tenet, would
be a "slam dunk").[34] The search following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S., British and international forces
yielded no stockpiles of WMDs, however. Tenet and his Director of Operations resigned at approximately the
same time, and it was suggested this was in penance over the WMD issue in Iraq.
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commentator on intelligence issues, believed the report showed that Goss gave "clear priority to providing
political protection for the president" when conducting the inquiry. Goss chiefly blamed President Bill Clinton
for the recent CIA failures. He confided in a reporter: "The one thing I lose sleep about is thinking what could I
have done better, how could I have gotten more attention on this problem sooner." When asked whether he ever
brought up his concerns with the administration, Goss claimed he had met three times with Clinton to discuss
"certain problems". The upshot? "He was patient and we had an interesting conversation but it was quite clear
he didnt value the intelligence community to the degree President Bush does."
Goss was nominated to become the new director on August 10, 2004. The appointment was challenged by some
prominent Democrats). Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV), vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, expressed concerns that Goss was too politically partisan, given his public remarks against
Democrats while serving as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. Another Democratic member of the
committee, Ron Wyden (D-OR), expressed concerns that given Goss's history within and ties to the CIA, he
would be too disinclined to push for institutional change. In an interview carried out by Michael Moore's
production company on March 3, 2004, Goss described himself as "probably not qualified" for a job within the
CIA, because the language skills the Agency now seeks are not languages he speaks and because the people
applying today for positions within the CIA's four directorates have such keen technical and analytic skills,
which he did not have when he applied to the Agency in the early 60s.
He brought with him five personal staff that were to implement change that became unpopular with CIA
professionals. Steve Kappes the Director of Operations and his subordinates including Michael Sulick,
Kappes' then-deputy. Although Kappes came back to a responsible position, it has been reported that he quit the
Agency rather than carry out a request by Goss to reassign Michael Sulick. Following Goss's departure, both
Kappes and Sulick have returned to positions of higher authority in the U.S. Intelligence Community. Kappes is
the Deputy Director of the CIA and Sulick was appointed Director of the National Clandestine Service on
September 14, 2007.
Speculations on the reason for his departure include a desire to have military agency heads, or, perhaps more
likely,
For many analysts, Goss' departure was inevitable, given the widespread perception that the White House
had lost confidence in his ability to reorganise the CIA. Goss' departure appears to have been due, at least in
part, to his repeated clashes with John Negroponte who was appointed in 2005 as the US Director of
National Intelligence, a new post created to co-ordinate all 16 of the US intelligence agencies in the aftermath
of the Al-Qaeda attacks.
[36]
A claim that the black sites existed was made by The Washington Post in
November 2005 and before by human rights NGOs.[37] US President George
W. Bush acknowledged the existence of secret prisons operated by the CIA
during a speech on September 6, 2006.[38][39]
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On 27 June 2007 the CIA released two collections of previously classified documents which outlined various
activities of doubtful legality.
The first collection, the "Family Jewels," consists of almost 700 pages of responses from CIA employees to a
1973 directive from Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger requesting information about activities
inconsistent with the Agency's charter.
The second collection, the CAESAR-POLO-ESAU papers, consists of 147 documents and 11,000 pages of
research from 1953 to 1973 relating to Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, and Sino-Soviet relations.[40]
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Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency
Incumbent
Leon Panetta
since February 12, 2009
Appointer
Inaugural
Porter J. Goss
The post of DCI was established in 1946 by President Harry
holder
September 24, 2004
Truman; it thus predates the establishment of the Central
Formation
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Intelligence Agency (created by the National Security Act of
Prevention Act of 2004,
1947). After the end of World War II, the Office of Strategic
December 17, 2004
Services was dismantled and its functions were split between
Website
http://www.cia.gov
the Departments of State and War (now Defense). President
Truman soon recognized the inefficiency of this arrangement
and created the Central Intelligence Group, which could be considered a smaller precursor to the National
Security Council. The following year the National Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency
and National Security Council, while formally defining the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence. The
duties of the DCI had been further defined over the years by tradition, congressional acts, and Executive
Orders.
What follows is a list of Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency (in chronological order).
October 2, 2009
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Director
Tenure
George W. Bush
Leon Panetta
Barack Obama
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METROPOLITAN
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president, until Clinton's mother's funeral and his Russian trip were
out of the way, and then Inman went out in a blaze of fury, in a
remarkable televised press conference on January 18, less than a week
before his Senate confirmation hearings were slated to begin.
The almost monolithic response by the media was the most instructive
and revealing aspect of the Inman Affair. Almost exclusively, the
media focused on speculations of the supposedly odd psychological
state of mind of Admiral Inman. How could Inman retreat just
because Bill Safire and a couple of other columnists were criticizing
him? How could he possibly conjure up a "conspiracy" between Safire
and Senator Dole to attack him and besmirch his character? Inman
talked about "sources" but he couldn't prove his charges, could he?
Inman was denounced as remarkably "thin-skinned," his behavior in
charging conspiracy treated as "weird" and "bizarre," and the general
reaction echoed that of Senator Dole: that someone harboring
"fantasies" of this sort was not really equipped to be the captain at the
helm of America's defenses. In the psychobabble beloved by the
media, it was noted (which Inman had never denied) that Inman was
always reluctant about taking the job, and that therefore these
fantasies and this thin skin were really excuses for Inman's not taking
the position.
Amidst all the stress on Bobby Ray's supposedly fragile psyche, it was
overlooked that very little space was devoted to the content of the
charges that Safire and the others were leveling against Bobby Ray;
and virtually no space to Bobby Ray's explanation of the hostility that
Safire and the others had long harbored against him, and which led to
their anti-Inman campaign.
The media accounts all stress that no Senators were opposing the
Inman nomination; but the Senate staffers were preparing detailed
and thorough "scrutiny" of Inman's affairs. The media all imply that
Inman was "paranoid" and engaging in fantasies. But if Bobby Ray,
formerly Deputy Director of the CIA and head of the National Security
Agency, is not equipped to distinguish between "paranoia" and
genuine conspiracies, who is? Surely, "Mr. Intelligence" is better
equipped for this task than reporters for the New York Times or the
Wall Street Journal.
So let's stop the juvenile psychoanalyzing of Bobby Ray and cut to the
content. The charges about to surface against Inman in the hearings
included possible financial and even criminal peccadilloes in the
private sector, centering around two companies. One was Inman's role
as a member of the board of International Signal and Control, a firm
found by a federal district judge to be a criminal enterprise engaged in
illegal arms dealing, money laundering, and business fraud on a
massive scale. The other firm was Tracor, Inc., an Austin, Texas
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military contractor of which Bobby Ray was chief executive, but not
before Inman received nearly $1 million in executive compensation.
Then, of course, there was Inman's Nannygate, in which he hastily
paid $6,000 in back Social Security taxes for an aged part-time
housekeeper only after he had been nominated for secretary of
defense.
Furthermore, Bill Safire was not above ridiculing Inman's name in his
widely influential column. Brushing aside the knowledge that a name
like "Bobby Ray" is common in Texas and throughout the South,
Safire ridiculed such a name for a grown man.
There was also a particularly ugly side to the media campaign against
Inman. One of the points dredged up against Inman was that, while a
high official in intelligence in 1980, he had acted to keep a gay in the
National Security Agency from being fired from his post. Part of the
anti-Inman tactic was a vicious whispering campaign to the effect that
Inman himself, though married, is a secret gay. Before he dropped
out, Inman told friends that no less than four reporters had called him
up to ask him if he is gay.
Is it any wonder that Inman, who had left Washington because he
hated the chronic back-stabbing, decided to Hell with it, and that, in
fury, he decided to strike back at his tormentors instead of giving the
usual bromides about "personal reasons" for withdrawal and making a
quick exit from the scene?
It is fascinating, by the way, that so many of the Liberal media, always
quick to attack "homophobia" and to proclaim that they are pro-gayer
than thou, should not be above vicious gay-bashing against political
figures they dislike. (The last time they pulled this stunt was against
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, after he won the Russian election, but of course
the U.S. media are still a bit less powerful in Moscow than they are in
Washington, D.C.)
Saluting "The Withdrawal of Admiral Inman," the New York Times
(Jan. 20) crowed that "there was no politician or commentator so
contrarian as to believe his [Inman's] improbable parting charge of a
conspiracy" between Senator Dole and William Safire. Hey, not so
fast, fella! You forgot to check with us at Triple R. Why not believe it?
Stranger things have happened in Washington, and in recent weeks
many neocons (e.g., at the Wall Street Journal) have been making
noises about shifting their allegiance for 1996 from Jack Kemp to
none other than Senator Dole, who of course is eagerly seeking media
support. And Bill Safire is a powerful leader of the neocon forces.
And, as we said above, who in the U.S. is in a position to know more
about political conspiracies than Admiral Inman?
This is not to say that Inman's conspiracy charge is proven. What we
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Times, but three other media powers: New York Times columnist
Anthony Lewis, Boston Globe columnist Ellen Goodman, and
Washington Post cartoonist Herblock (Herbert Block). On the face of
it, a concerted campaign by these people against Inman would seem
implausible; after all, Safire is a neocon, whereas the New York
Times, Tony Lewis, Ellen Goodman, and Herblock are all notorious
left-liberals. What could they all possibly have in common?
The answer is that they all have one important thing in common, one
tie that binds. They are all ardent Zionists, and the source of the
hostility to Inman at not being sufficiently pro-Israel now makes sense
in underpinning the vendetta when Inman reluctantly agreed to
Clinton's and Talbott's importuning to return in triumph to
Washington.
In a fuller perspective, then, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman does not seem
to be a paranoid nut after all. On the contrary, no one can blame him
for saving himself and fleeing back to the warmer milieu of Austin,
Texas. It is no wonder that Bobby Ray feels more "comfortable" in
Austin than in Washington, to use one of his favorite words. But it
would have been far healthier for America, and for Americans'
knowledge of the political forces at work in this country, if Bobby Ray
had stood fast, and had forced a knock-down drag-out confrontation,
in the course of which much of the truth might have come to the
surface. As it is, it is inevitable that Safire & Company will be accorded
near-legendary political influence from now on. In a town that
worships Power, Bill Safire has now virtually attained the status of a
Rajah.
March 1994
Order the Book Here
Murray Rothbard Library & Resources
Back to LewRockwell.com Home Page
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1 Career
2 Political appointment
3 Statements
4 References
5 External links
Place of birth
Rank
Rhonesboro, Texas
Admiral
Inman has been influential in various advisory roles. Notably, he chaired a commission on improving security at
U.S. foreign installations after the Marine barracks bombing and the April 1983 US Embassy bombing in Beirut,
Lebanon. The commission's report has been influential in setting security design standards for U.S. Embassies.
Since 2001, Inman has been the LBJ Centennial Chair in National Policy at The University of Texas at Austin
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, and in 2005 was the school's interim dean [1]. Inman graduated
from Texas with a bachelor's in history in 1950.
Inman has also served on the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, Dell Computer, SBC
Corporation (now AT&T) [2] and Massey Energy.
Inman was announced as President Bill Clinton's choice to succeed Les Aspin as Secretary of Defense on 1993
December 16, initially receiving broad bipartisan support. He accepted the post at first, but withdrew his
nomination during an unusual press conference on 1994 January 18 that shocked members of both major
political parties.
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During the press conference, Inman made angry remarks about perceived mistreatment by New York Times
columnist William Safire.[3] Safire wrote paragraphs on Inmans "anti-Israel bias shown", and ended in a four
point list of other negative qualifications. Inman suggested that Safire had recruited Senator Bob Dole of Kansas
to engage in a "vitriolic attack" on Inman, and also claimed that Dole and Senator Trent Lott were planning to
"turn up the heat" on his nomination.
Dole's reaction was to state that "I have no idea what's gotten into Bobby Inman... Admiral Inman's letter doesn't
make any sense to me." Lott appeared even more surprised, saying that "I am floored by [Inman's] bizarre press
conference," while an unnamed White House aide added: "Most of us were glued to the tube, our mouths open
in shock."[4]
In 2006, Inman criticized the Bush administration's use of warrantless domestic wiretaps, making him one of the
highest-ranking former intelligence officials to criticize the program in public [5][6]
Succeeded by
Lincoln D. Faurer
Preceded by
Frank Charles Carlucci III
Succeeded by
John N. McMahon
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Text is available under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License; additional terms may
apply. See Terms of Use for details.
Wikipedia is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.
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Mind Control
CIA MK-Ultra Program
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There have been persistent rumors of Navy research involving attempts at telepathy from submarines
under water, the Nautilus being the most famous of these. Detection of enemy submarines, and
communicating with our own, has continued to be an important area of conventional research for the
Navy, so it is no surprise that researching the use of ESP for these purposes would be of interest.
Communicating with a submerged submarine is the only kind of communications where the very act of
receiving puts the receiver in danger, since submarines must normally stick an antenna out of the water
for high speed radio traffic, or rely on trailing a long wire antenna under water relatively near the surface
to receive very slow speed traffic using ELF radio waves. Newer techniques may involve the use of
blue-green wavelength lasers, but evidently penetration to any depth is still a problem.
If you look at telepathy as a problem in the transfer of information in a very noisy environment, then
certain existing solutions suggest themselves: There have already been experiments in the transmission
of five distinct symbols via telepathy, namely Zener card symbols. I suggest that there is already a way
of transmitting information using two symbols only, namely Morse Code. Current ELF or VLF radio
transmission methods for communicating with fleet ballistic missile submarines to issue them their
launch orders involve very low data transfer rates, on the order of 3 to 30 bits per minute, if I am not
mistaken. Messages are very short, consisting of pre-formulated action or targeting codes. I suggest that
telepathic 'Zener Morse' is an operational technique for information transfer under severe signal to noise
conditions. In fact the use of five Zener symbols would increase data transfer rates, but at the expense of
a higher error rate due to the problems in discriminating between five and just two symbols.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND REPORTS
Reports of Project SCANNATE in 70's, most likely done by Swann, since his method for RV is very
similar to that reportedly used in this project; namely providing latitude and longitude coordinates and
telling what is there. Later changed to assigning random number for unique session number and Swann
picked up location anyway.
"The New Age Army:" Over the past 10 - 15 years a number of military personnel, most in significant
positions in Military Intelligence, have expressed interest in and directed programs or projects that have
explored paranormal activities and capabilities. Several government studies on Enhancing Human
Performance took place during this time. Most, if not all of them, were savaged in the NRC study on
Enhancing Human Performance, but recent critiques and rebuttals of this study have indicated severe
irregularities in the evaluation procedures for papers submitted to the NRC study, suppression of
favorable results, and a definitely one-sided evaluation panel.
Much modern research in parapsychology tends to support the idea that Enhanced Perception is a
survival-related trait from our distant past, not the tip of the iceberg as far as new emerging human
powers go. This is supported by the observation that many psychic episodes center around catastrophic
or traumatic events. Studies of Siberian and Eskimo shamans also show the development of ESP or
similar shamanic powers due to injury, exposure to cold, and isolation. Dissociation with tendencies
towards Multiple Personality Disorder also occurs in these Shamans due to their ordeals. This is in
contrast to the experiences of most tropical shamans who tend to find their powers through exposure to
mind-altering drugs.
The Vietnam war, with its exceedingly stressful combat environment of no clear-cut enemies combined
with ambush being the normal way of making contact, produced a large body of individual reports
stressing enhanced perception and awareness. This showed up as detecting ambushes and booby-traps
before they were sprung; detecting the presence of enemy soldiers without any conscious sign of them;
time dilation when bullets could be seen slowly traveling around the battlefield, and even reports of
soldiers avoiding those bullets by jumping out of their paths as they were shot at.
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Dr. Ian Wickramasekera of Eastern Virginia Medical School has studied the expansion of sensory input
during trauma which would lead to time dilation, etc. This gentleman has also studied the effects of
sensory deprivation on hypnotic susceptibility in young women.
In a recent article in U.S. News & World Report, John Gittinger, a CIA psychologist associated with a
CIA front organization, the Human Ecology Society admitted to knowledge of experiments in
developing ESP by giving electric shocks to subjects when they gave wrong answers.
Recently, a Russian researcher in psychotronics, Dr. Igor Smirnov, has helped to start up a new Virginia
company, called Psycho-Technologies, I believe. It is supposed to conduct research on various kinds of
LTL technology, with a concentration on Soviet-developed psychotronic warfare capabilities involving
the use of electromagnetic and sonic waves to influence and disable individuals or crowds. Supposedly
this ranges from simply falling to influencing peoples thoughts via audio or visual subliminal messages.
SOME OF THE PLAYERS
The Monroe Institute, located near Charlottesville, Virginia. Bob Monroe, author of many books on Out
of Body experiences, has long and close ties with the C.I.A. James Monroe, Bob's father, if I'm not
mistaken, was involved with the Human Ecology Society, a C.I.A. front organization of the late 50's and
60's. The Monroe Institute has done research on accelerated learning and foreign language learning
through the use of altered states of consciousness for the C.I.A. and other government organizations.
Government interest in the more radical research going on at the institute remains only tantalizing
speculation. Official classified document storage boxes have been seen at their mail-order outlet located
in Lovingston, VA.
Albert Stubblebine and John Alexander. Both retired Army officers, a General and Colonel respectively.
Both worked at U.S. Army Intelligence & Security Command, or INSCOM, Stubblebine as its head at
one time. Stubblebine has publicly stated that an enlisted man under his command inadvertently
'mentally fried' an intelligence gathering computer located in Augsberg Germany. This was Lynn
Buchanan, discussed later.
Alexander wrote the rebuttal to the NRC paper on Enhancing Human Performance. He used this rebuttal
as the basis for a book he co-authored called "The Warrior's Edge" which describes various techniques
for enhancing performance and perception utilizing the power of the mind. (Alexander headed up
research on Less Than Lethal weapons at Los Alamos National Laboratories until 'retiring.')
Jack Houk, Aerospace Engineer, and his Spoon bending parties, done for last 12 - 15 years. Stubblebine,
Alexander, and others have attended and hosted these parties. While even Houk admits that much of the
bending activity that occurs is due to hysterical strength, people getting excited, etc. there are always a
few really perplexing feats of bending at each party. Curled and twisted hacksaw blades comes to mind,
since these normally snap if they are bent.
S.A.I.C. involvement in 1993 American Parapsychological Association meeting arrangements, via their
'Cognitive Sciences Laboratory'. Science Applications International Corporation is a big time defense
contractor, has held the largest number of research contracts of any defense contractor. Bobby Ray
Inman is on its board of directors, among others.
Startup of TREAT, Center for Treatment and Research into Experienced Anomalous Trauma, by Rima
Leibow. Leibow is a psychiatrist who started studying trauma associated with alien abductions, noting
its similarities to PTSD. She has hosted open and closed meetings for the past six years. Leibow is a
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close friend of/or married to Stubblebine, which certainly raises some interesting questions. Another
abduction researcher and friend is Victoria Lacas, who happens to be married to Alexander.
One other TREAT hanger-on, and friend of Stubblebine's, is Lynn Buchanan. Buchanan offers services
similar to PSI-TECH and has worked with Ed Dames on a contract basis. He taught a Remote Viewing
workshop at the latest TREAT conference. Also offers continued training in RV skills to those whom he
decides to work with. Veteran of INSCOM, and the famous 'computer frier' mentioned by Stubblebine.
A real mystery man in all of this is C.B. Scott Jones: Ex-Navy Intelligence officer, one time aide to
Senator Claiborne Pell, founder of the Human Potential Foundation; Jones appears to have his fingers in
every 'weird' pie around. He has been involved with several UFO research organizations, dolphin-human
communications research, served on the boards of several scholarly parapsychological research
organizations. Jones strikes many people as a 'Cardinal Richelieu' figure, manipulating events behind the
scenes, but rarely emerging into the spotlight.
There is literally no conference on parapsychology that he does not attend. He has traveled and done
research with Alexander and Rima Leibow. He works at keeping very well informed about the 'pulse' of
the New Age community and about UFO and parapsychological research in particular. He rarely writes
anything for print, but keeps in contact with many of the players in the fields. He has presented papers to
many conferences, most of the examples I have seen are complex, lengthy, and elaborate pieces of disinformation which leave the listeners more confused than when he started. This is an individual who
bears watching.
Back To Top Secret Projects
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Type
Founded
1969
Industry
Defense contractor
Revenue
Operating
1 History
1.1 Initial public offering
income
Net income
2 Operations
3 Subsidiaries
4 SAIC and ScottishPower Form Joint Venture
5 Calanais announces brand transition to parent
company SAIC
6 East Kilbride, Peel Park office
7 India presence
8 Former subsidiaries
9 FBI allegations
10 References
11 External links
Employees
46,000 total
www.saic.com
(http://www.saic.com/)
On November 3, 2003, Kenneth C. Dahlberg was named the CEO of SAIC, ending Beyster's 30+ years of
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leadership. In May 2005, under the new CEO, the company changed its external tagline from An
Employee-Owned Company to From Science to Solutions, retaining the former for internal communications.
The company has had as part of its management, and on its Board of Directors, many well known
ex-government personnel including Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense in the Nixon administration; William
Perry, Secretary of Defense for Bill Clinton; John M. Deutch, President Clinton's CIA Director; Admiral Bobby
Ray Inman who served in various capacities in the NSA and CIA for the Ford, Carter and Reagan
administrations; and David Kay who led the search for weapons of mass destruction for the U.N. following the
1991 Gulf War and for the Bush Administration following the 2003 Iraq invasion.
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) transitioned a Remote Viewing Program to SAIC in 1991 and it was
renamed Stargate Project.
In January 1999, new SAIC consultant Steven Hatfill and his collaborator, SAIC vice president Joseph Soukup,
commissioned William C. Patrick (a retired leading figure in the old U.S. bioweapons program) to report on the
possibilities of terrorist anthrax mailings in the United States. (There had been a spate of hoax anthrax mailings
in the previous two years.) Barbara Hatch Rosenberg said that the report was commissioned "under a CIA
contract to SAIC". However, SAIC said Hatfill and Soukup commissioned it internallythere was no outside
client.
Patrick produced his 28-page report in February 1999. Some subsequently saw it as a "blueprint" for the 2001
anthrax attacks. The report suggested the maximum amount of anthrax powder2.5 gramsthat could be put
in an envelope without producing a suspicious bulge. This was just a little more than the actual amounts2
grams eachin the letters sent to Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. But the report also suggested that a
terrorist might produce a spore concentration of 50 billion spores per gram. This was only one-twentieth of the
actual concentration1 trillion spores per gramin the letters sent to the senators.[7]
In 2002, SAIC was chosen by the NSA to produce a technology demonstration platform for the agency's
Trailblazer program in a contract worth $280 million. Trailblazer is a "Digital Network Intelligence" system,
intended to analyze data carried on computer networks. Project participants included Boeing, Computer
Sciences Corporation, and Booz Allen Hamilton. SAIC had also participated in the concept definition phase of
Trailblazer, beginning March 2001.[8] According to science news site PhysOrg.com, Trailblazer was a
continuation of the earlier ThinThread program.[9] In 2005 NSA director Michael Hayden told a Senate hearing
that the Trailblazer program was several hundred million dollars over budget and years behind schedule.[10]
Advanced Media Group
October 2, 2009
9/23/2009 3:25 PM
4 of 6
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
bd Systems
Bechtel SAIC Company, LLC, a joint venture between SAIC and Bechtel
Benham, a subsidiary of SAIC and its subsidiaries
Danet
Eagan, McAllister Associates, Inc a wholly owned subsidiary of SAIC under the C4I business unit.
Hicks & Associates
SAIC-Frederick, Inc.
SAIC International Subsidiaries
SAIC Venture Capital Corporation
Varec
Applied Marine Technology Corporation, A SAIC Operation
EAI Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary
May 8, 2000 - Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), through its wholly owned United
Kingdom subsidiary SAIC Ltd., and ScottishPower's Information Systems Division announced the formation of a
joint venture (JV) between the two organizations.
The JV company, called CALANAIS, was 50 percent owned by ScottishPower and 50 percent owned by SAIC
Ltd. The new company exploited the growing demand for information technology (IT) expertise in the rapidly
changing global utilities sector. While continuing to focus on providing IT services to ScottishPower, the JV
sought to develop external IT service business with customers within the multi-service utility sector.
CALANAIS, exploiting the combined strengths of both companies, also marketed expertise in business change
and Internet-enabling strategies aimed specifically at the utility sector. Initially based in Glasgow, Scotland and
Chester, England, CALANAIS employed approximately 600 people, mainly drawn from existing ScottishPower
staff who transferred to work in the new enterprise.
29 August 2002 Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) announced that Calanais, SAIC`s
wholly-owned subsidiary, will trade and market under the global SAIC brand. The existing Calanais brand and
logo was phased out through a planned transition period. The Calanais entity became recognised as SAIC Ltd`s
Utilities Group.
The group, now employs around 1500 people in the UK, 450 of whom are at its Scottish headquarters in East
Kilbride.
Its East Kilbride facility currently acts as a centre of excellence serving the UK utilities sector and as the call
centre base responsible for handling all UK clients.
October 2, 2009
9/23/2009 3:25 PM
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
SAIC has development centers in Delhi and Bangalore, India. Scicom Technologies Noida was acquired by
SAIC in September 2007.
AMSEC LLC, a business partnership between SAIC and Northrop Grumman subsidiary Newport News
Shipbuilding divested on July 13, 2007. Network Solutions was acquired by SAIC in 1995,[11] and subsequently
was acquired by VeriSign, Inc. for $21 billion.[12]
In June 2001 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) paid SAIC $122 million to create a virtual case file
system (VCF) software to speed up the sharing of information among agents. But the FBI abandoned VCF when
it failed to function adequately. Robert Mueller, FBI Director, testified to a congressional committee, "When
SAIC delivered the first product in December 2003 we immediately identified a number of deficiencies 17 at
the outset. That soon cascaded to 50 or more and ultimately to 400 problems with that software ... We were
indeed disappointed."
SAIC executive vice president Arnold L. Punaro claimed that the company had "fully conformed to the contract
we have and gave the taxpayers real value for their money." He blamed the FBI for the initial problems, saying
the agency had a parade of program managers and demanded too many design changes. During 15 months that
SAIC worked on the program, 19 different government managers were involved and 36 contract modifications
were ordered, he said.
"There were an average of 1.3 changes every day from the FBI, for a total of 399 changes during the period,"
Punaro said. [13]
October 2, 2009
9/23/2009 3:25 PM
6 of 6
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
9/23/2009 3:25 PM
U.S.
Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigationshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Tate
into CIA Interrogation Programs
Joseph Tate - Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia
Joseph Tate
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Joseph Tate is an American attorney who has represented Lewis Libby in the CIA leak grand jury
investigation. Tate is a partner with the law firm Dechert, LLP in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He specializes in
defending clients against charges of complex white collar, in particular, anti-trust and other regulatory issues.
Previously, Tate worked in the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice.
Contents
1 Education
2 Involvement with the CIA leak grand jury investigation
3 Letter related to CIA leak investigation
4 See also
5 External links
Education
Tate graduated from Villanova University in 1963 and Villanova University School of Law in 1966. He was a
member of the Villanova University Law Review.
Media Group
1 ofAdvanced
2
October
2, 2009
6/28/2007
8:01 PM
U.S.
Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigationshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Tate
into CIA Interrogation Programs
Joseph Tate - Wikipedia, the free
encyclopedia
See also
CIA leak grand jury investigation
Plame Affair
Judith Miller
External links
Dechert LLP (http://www.dechert.com/index.jsp)
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Tate"
Categories: Year of birth missing | Living people | American federal lawyers | Pennsylvania lawyers
This page was last modified 10:34, 19 February 2007.
All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License. (See Copyrights for
details.)
Wikipedia is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a US-registered 501(c)(3)
tax-deductible nonprofit charity.
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2 ofAdvanced
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2, 2009
6/28/2007
8:01 PM
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Guerin arrives
:o testify on
12.75-million
pay dispute
1y Ernest Schwlber
bnd Tlm Mekeel
James H. Guerin, right, founder of International Signal and Control, walks into a law office il
today. He isaccompanied by his attorney, Joseph A. Tate, of Philadelphia.
-b4
'A
paid Clark $1 million in spring $750,000 for Clark's estate in
Court documents 1
1989, but halted payment Of the York County - because, he indicate that be wa:
remainder, claiming that Clark charges, Clark "extorted'' the tion Guerin about
+ lieves the
secrec.
had
broken
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the agreement.
. 7Today's
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and wh
In addition, Guerin has agrue@'
to allow Clark's attorney, Joseph
in court, he should not be
quired to pay the.
money - $1 million
See GUEl
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
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October 2, 2009
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Guerin is expected
to testify ~uesday
?ewn mEraMekeel
StaflWrlter
James H.Guerin is scheduled to give preliminary testimony Tuesday in his $2.75 million severance dispute with his former corporate
attorney.
If Guerin appears, it would be the first time his whereabouts have
been established since September.
Guerin. the founder of International Signal & Control, is disputing
the validity of the deal with William A. Clark, formerly its vlce
president and general counsel.
Guerin's deposition is set for 9:30 a.m. in the office of Clark's
S m s i o n is closed to the
attorney, Joseph F. Rod? 36
.- E. King
-.ns.hlie
r
UU....
I'Eideoosition
was scheduled in December at the order of Judge
-~
~..
Michael A. Georgelisof Lancaster County Common I'leasCourt.
Geargelis denled Guerin's bid to ha\.e the session delayed. pending
resolutl'on of ~ossiblecriminal charges aaainst him. and denied his
rique.it lolimit questionsstr~ctlyt o t h c a g k n e n t .
In court papers. Hoda has indicated he \ r i l l ask Guerin about issues
currmll\. under investigation b?' British and American authorltlcs.
becauseihey relate toGierln's stateof mlnd whcn he signed thedcdl
lnternatlonal Signal is being prubcd for posslblecontract fraud and
~llevalexDorts. Nocharges hare been fllcd
But Guerin
is beine sued bv International Signal's merger Dartner.
~Ferranti, torallegcdly participating ina $331)nilllion cont?acifraud.
Guerin's whereabouts have been a mystcry slncr. news 01 thc frautl
broke in Se~tember.Though he has homes in Naples. Fla.. and Lancaster. f r b r k ~~nattemnts
t ~ . . 6v
~the~Dress
- toreach hiin ha've been unsuc~.
cessful He reportedly has been t ; a v e l ~ nabroad.
~
In court DaDers. Guerin has said Roda's questioning \rill force him
to choose between defending himself against Clark and asserting his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. thereby posslbly losing to Clark.
Guerin also has said that answers to Roda's questions could "expose facts" that could hamper his defense against possible criminal
charges.
Tuesday's deposition is the latest development in seven months of
legal jousting between Clark and Guerin.
Clark signed the deal March 28 with Guerin and Parent Industries
Inc., at that time Guerin's holding company.
Guerin paid $1 million of the agreement. then balked at paying the
rest. Clarkstartedcourt proceedingslast July to collect the balance.
Guerin contends that Clark used extortion and coercion to obtain
the deal, and broke a secrecy provision in it. so the deal is void.
Guerin also claims that he has audiotapes of Clark that prove extortion was used.
Clark denies he used extortion to win the deal. He argues that it is a
legitimate agreement to compensate him for unfulfilled financial
promises.
Parcnt Industries Inc. presldenl Michael A. Peck is schcduled for
de~ositlonWednesdas. Peck bought
- Parent Industries Inc from Gutriliin September. In other developments today:
Ferranti is expected this week to report a loss of at least $8
million for the six months ended Sept. 30, in part because of the
restructuring costs from the fraud, said The Guardian newspaper.
The French firm Thomson-CSF is unlikely to complete a rescue
bid for Ferranti before Ferranti's Feb. 5 deadline, The London Times
reported.
~
.~~
----
~~~
~~
~~~~
-~
~~
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
October 2, 2009
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criminal charges have been
biggest defense
in Europe, but one of the ,nost
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filed.
cleverly
orchestrated
99
ucts
wcre
actual\\
Guerin has steadfastlv" denied
"illegal" products
any wrongdoing.
a former Ferranti financial official
looking at whether
Guerin's attorney. Joseph A.
products were ship
Tate, said this week it is impossibiled military purp
ble to provide a detailed rebuttal
Whatev~r
h r.~a
~..
~- .. t.
...
to the fraud allegations because
of the ongoing criminal investi- suit as Lerwick Holdings S.A. ifying the French Mirage fightcr ranti bcgan raisi
gation. He said he cannot allow Marwick, an outside auditipg jet that would carry the missiles, about the Tech Ltc
Guerin to present his explanation firm that regularly checked In- the missiles were not shipped to ments from South i
a sudden halt.
of the alleged fraud. Nor, hesaid, ternational Signal's figures, took the Middle East kingdom.
Ferranti has wri
is there anyone who can steps to verify thecontract.
Turning that delay to its advanFerranti auditors and officials tage, Tech Ltd. signed the UAE $50 million that it
knowledgeably give Gucrin's
even visited Pakistan, where to a contract for a more sophistiside at present.
Shireman, the Marietta man they interviewed a man believed cated version of the Hakim, and
Fcrranli-is cxnec
who was head of finance at Tech to be Major Gen. Talat Masood, sold, or supposedly sold, the old
Ltd.. was out of town this week then in charge of Army ord- missiles to the People's Republic
and could not be reachedfor com- nance, and received satisfactorv of China.
Durine those
ment on the detailed fraud ac- answers to their questions, iimFerranti
officials
say
auditors
Guerin
and the 0th
count. His attorney didnot return pany officials say.
from Peat Manvick ins~ected
.
will have an oppo
phonecalls.
The alleged fraud began to un- portions of the old mi~silc
vr(1c.r.
The other two employees ravel as Guerin left the company orwhat they though1 a a s t h c mis- fend themselves
explanation (
named in the suit, Radcliife of in May to organize a Leveraged sile order, in a warehouse in 19nh. their
Pass
contract.
buyout
that
would
have
returned
Lancaster, and Resch, of San
But afte'r the missiles were
Meanwhile, the c
Clemente, Calif., have declined several divisions - including shipped from the warehouse, tigation
into Intet
comment on their lawyers' ad- TechLtd. -to hisownership.
they vanishcd. Private investigaThat deal collapsed when Gue- tors hired by Ferranti to find nal's business deal
vice. Radcliffe has told the Brituing.
ish court that he intends to o p rin was unable to get financing, them have beenunsuccessful.
Federal author?
after being turned down by Drexpose Ferranti's lawsuit.
are working "in c
During
a
chairman's
commitel
Burnham,
Citibank
and
Ferf the three losses idention" with their cc
tified by Ferranti, the ranti itself. Had the buyout been tee meeting, however, Sir Derek Britain's Serious :
Alun-Jones,
Ferranti
chairman,
completed,
investigators
believe
fictitious "Khyber
congratulated Guerin on the sale Taking part in the
Pass" contract was the alleged contract fraud might of
the missiles, which were then U.S. Attorney's 01
by f a r the most dam- not have come to light.
code-named
Project Alpha, one Department, IRS,
The
first
substantial
sign
that
aging. accounting for about $250
and other agencies.
director
recalls.
something was amiss came when
~ 1 1 l i k othe
f totdloss.
SO,
wherever
those
missiles
Ferranti
officials
noticed
a
lack
The contract, brought to the
company in late 1986 by Guerin of consistency on dates on con- are today, Ferranti says it had to
swallow a loss on them totaling
nersonall\~.called for delivery of tract documents.
about $100 miltion.
Further
financial
discrepanbroductiin systems for at least
The final shortage discovincorrect date
three missile systems - air-to- cies came to tight in summer, ered by Ferranti financial inves- theAnspeech
Retire,
andin
mid-July,
the
front
compaair, air-to-ground and ground-tonies abruptly were dissolved. At tigators is the smallest - under Richard Scott will
air.
$50 million - and the simplest to Lancaster Histori
~
was month's end, payments on the understand.
Tech Ltd.'s S U.D. D O S ~role
about his escape frc
Pakistan
deal
stopped
altogetht u pnll the pieces together. in this
Since the late 1970s. Ferranti prisoner of war ca
rase buyins h;~rd\vareand tech- e..r. ~
Ferranti officials now are con- officials say, Tech Ltd. and its rect day is Tuesdaj
South Africa. and asn o l o ~ from
r
vinced
the Pakistan1 contract predecessor ISC companies had New Era regrets the
sembling the systems for resale
been selling large volumes of
wasenttrely f~ct~ttous.
to Pakistan.
electronics - integrated cirJoseph C. Kauff
They
say
the
front
companies
Its contract called for supply of
cuits, antennas and other hightooling, technological "how-to" were all controlled by Guerinand tech communication equipment been re-appointed
ship roadmaster by
data, test facilities and missile had no ties to the CIA or South
to South Africa, a nation supervisors. A stor
Africa.
prototypes, all supplied by an
The contract managers, a shunned by many U.S. eorpora- day's New Era inco:
arms subsidiarv of BarlowFerranti official says. tions because of its racial segre- that another towr
high-level
Rand, a South ~ j r i c a ncorporahad been named to
wcre
people
simply posing in that gationpolicies.
tion, and a second as-yet unidenThose. sales were based on New Era regrets thc
role.
tified company.
The major general either was
Even by Tech Ltd.'s normal another impostor, paid by the
~
~
*
~
=
5
3
s
s
~
standards for high secrecy, the Perpetrators, or was a genuine rll
"Khyber Pass" contract had ex- official mistakenly responding to
ccptionalsecurity safeguards.
questions about a different misFirst, it was not accompanied sile project, company officials
a bank's now suspect.
by a letter of credit
guarantee that Tech Ltd. would
All the known contract docube paid. Supposedly, Pakistan ments were fabricated for the auobjected to such a letter, fearing ditors' benefit, a former Ferranti
news of the deal might
- leak official says, Other documents
through the bank.
that would have supported a real
Second, Pakistan's payments contract are nowhere to be found.
Clutches Billfolds- French
were routed indirectly to Tech
"If you'rean accountant, evRoute 340 o n The P l a ~ n& Fancy Far
Ltd. through a Swiss bank ac- erything is there for you. But the
O p e n Dally 9-5,Frl 9-8. Closed Sun 7~
count managed by a front compa- only paper is what was generated
s
a
~
~
~
~
~
~
ny. identified in Ferranti's law- for the financial people." another h
~
-..r..>4n
OUlrll,llL1Ci),
VUI
~~
I,"
~~~
fku&
-LLu
g;
/-5-98
$,irkel's o f New Y
BUXTON WALLE
I.'
October 2, 2009
U M e r l l l GUr 1 lpdl ly
yullly 5-f8-7a
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
7' 6
c-,,
8-.
'
Outburst
Continuedfrom Page One
breakdown in s e v e r a l
jurors. ~
l pale,~,,bvi- ~
ously tired, some dissolved
into tears. one juror, her
face awash in tears, put her
arms around another sobbing woman inthe jury box.
1, . The prosecqtors - First
I
Assistant District Attorney
!
joseph C. ~
~
and city police ~
~
t
~~h~ wary - slumped siin their seats.
1 lently
judge ~~~i~~ gently told
! the spectators to try and be
Advanced Media
Group
:
quiet
as he thanked and dis,
rni~end
the 111t-v
....
Z
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Subject:
Date of
Conference:
September 6 1987
Place
of
Conference:
0
0
Relationship to
James Guerin:
ISC Shareholder
Debtor to Parent Federal Savings and Loan
The following transcriptsd represent a few of the converstions recorded during the meeting.
Stan Caterbone
Stan Caterbone
"Jim Christian owned it now I hear rumors that I was tied to ISC and I am
close to several people in that organization. Why they sent someone'in to
California to see me, I don't know. They wobt answer me."
Stan Caterbone -
"they wanted me to talk to a guy from D.C., New York, a guy from the
Caribbean. I don't know what the hell is going on."
" Chem Con is the big local minority-held corporation that was doing a lot
of Defense contracts-it was associated with ISC. They went under last
spring, beginning of the summer, and there was a lot of criminal auegations
made, none of them substantiated. And I was connected with that. They
sent a board member in to see me a week before this happened. Why. I
don't know."
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Howard Eisler
"the supposition was - I don't know how true it was a front for ISC."
Stan Caterbone -
"It was, I'll tell you why. Because when Chem Con was started, back to their
inception, you look at ISC's books. They didn't have any money. Well, the
f i s t thing Chem Con did was they went and got all that free money from the
government and you look where that money went. I bet I know where it
went."
Stan Caterbone
"this guy named Geurin, James Geurin. And I know that they were selling
contracts back. He runs ISC and he also has his fmgers pretty deeply into
Chem Con. He's the one who started Chem Con, Guerin is the one who
started it."
Howard Eisler
(I
'C\
"You bet. They were tied, you'd better believe they were tied with Wedtech.
The same guys in Wedtech were invoked with ISC and Chem Con."
"ISC is sold over the London Exchange. (I bought my shares from Gib
Armstrong) I owned a thousand shares."
"
N
"
Stan Caterbone -
"What they did was, they fronted all that money and started the contracts,
went bankrupt, and now the government is stuck for $18,000,000."
Stan Caterbone -
"I know right now in this town's viewpoint, I stole money, I am insane, and
I am a lunatic I tell you I will not condemn Jm
i
Christian until he tells to
my face what happened."
C)
Stan Caterbone
Stan Caterbone -
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
/?
$.fibne of
0"
- somehow
somebody associated with - oh, someone associated - in your District Office? Yea. Of
course you were also one of the principals in the - I still am the minor one
Financial Management Group
- yes, the
are all very similar so I have to be --- Financial Management Group Ltd. filed for 202B
exemption. Now all the security sold in PA had to be registered. Some securities are
exempt but you have to apply the detention type of thing. It is a registration, not a
registration that
- explanation of
it is going to be run, who runs the corporation and all that sort of thing. Now under
the umbrella of this Financial Management Group there is a whole (now I a m repeating
what is in the 203D which I spent some time Friday reading)
- there is about
15, 14 - I
guess under that there is about 5 other corporations which are going to be an insurance
agency, an investment advising agency, a group
- now a lot of
come about. Well we simplified it. What do you mean simplified it? They are operating
but because of the accounting procedures they would have been a nightmare with all
those stubs. So, they a r e operating
Everything else is operating under Financial Management Group Limited. So these other
corporations have not really come into being. Technically, legally, no.
I seen also; I guess there is an application for a n investment advisor. Now, if you are
that time I was President, but now there is another application i n that is being acted on
now by somebody else. There is? I don't know who. Is that for the advisor? Yes, the
investment advisor.
Do your current records in Harrisburg indicate that he is still an executive with FMG?
Yes, because this offering memorandum was given back last March I think,
- last August
when I initially did it. Oh, no, pardon me. We are talking about two different
things. You a r e talking about your application for the investment advisor. No, I a m
talking about FMG
when
I started raising the money. August of 1986 is when I did the initial filing for the
offering memorandum
- the
144
after conception. Alright, yea. There is a report that is due a year after
that's what is coming up
- Right,
spent with the idea then of protecting investors. The idea of the
your are
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
limited to like 35 investors. You can't sell to 105 - you are limited. What the state
does is comes in and says, how are you going to raise the money in your offering
memorandum. Then a year after it is raised, or a year after
they comc i n
and say, now what did you do with the money. You raised 4 hundred and some odd
thousand, now how did you spend it? Now that has not been filed yet. It is due, in
fact I think it is overdue. It is due October 20. I got the letter right here. They just
sent me the letter. You guys just sent me the letter, I have it right here.
I have nothing to do with that end of it. I just came. well whenever I called you
I didn't get a hold of you the next day; it was the following day which was
Friday t h a t w e made contact.
Our idea in coming here was to let you ask whatever questions you had in terms of the
investigation. Of my limited knowledge of the type of securities these guys deal with
and securities in general, the things that came t o interest me was the fact that there
are stock certificates in here in force with names on them that
, that there
are with the annual report, his name is forged by someone else. This gentleman has
some involvement with the original group and the President suggested that he make false
reports to the bonding company so that he can get money back. They are the three
things that stuck out to me as a regular criminal attorney, that I thought you might be
interest in because, but like I say. we a r e here to have you ask questions of anything
that you might.
O.K., this offering then
their
203D, I get the idea they were going to raise four hundred and some odd thousand
dollars. At that time, they listed Bob Kauffman a t 60,000 shares and you and Hartlett
40,000 a piece. So, Kauffman a t this point is the main factor? Or, when 1 was talking
to you, it was really your idea that put this whole thing together. I put i t all together.
I brought him up from Atlanta to be president because I have a lot of business interests
and I didn't want to be tied down to the day-to-day operation. Plus, I never had any
management experience. Most of my work was consulting, business deals, this and that,
so I actually brought him up from Atlanta to be president. And, Hartlett
- is he a
complete local person. He's local. We all started together in IDS back in 1982. That's
your connection with Kauffman. you know him through IDS? He's the one that got me
started in business. I am the one who took him to FSC, that was our broker/dealer and
C
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
we started putting it together. Are they registered as FSC? Yes, that's John Keegel.
This similarity in names is a hassle; you are going to have to bear with me because you
throw these names out at me
-----.
So then, you had the public offering which you were going to sell another 120,000 shares
and raise $435,000. That would be in addition to what yon people put in. We put in 20
grand a piece. Well, we had 5 people. You were allowed 5 shareholders
- so we put in
5. Five put in 100,000 - five a t 20,000 yon mean? No, it was a little bit more than
that. Three of us put in 20; two put in 25. What we are talking roughly is one half
million dollars? Right. Financial Management Group now is responsible for maintaining
proper control over that money and it would be invested as 5
many people
- there is roughly
- now I don't
know how
I have that here. Do you mind if I look at it. That's 0.k. I went through a half hour
of frustration to get here. I wasn't running late until I got caught in the
The
way you described it, I assumed it was going to be in the country and I knew ...I stopped
a t the Post Office. I said where is 2300 New Danville Pike. I don't know. I was here
on Friday and I drove past it this morning. You'll bear with me then.
This is interesting. I've got about 40 shareholders. Is this as a result of the 203 deal?
Yes. Did you know about that. These are all the ones that are forged by the other
guys? No, no, just one is forged.
Now, yon people were acting as your own sales
properly accounted for? Were they all collected and put in the bank and the people
received their stock certificates. Uh, huh. Who all would have been in charge of that.
Mainly me. I was in charge of just about everything. Now, we have one-half a million
dollars or there about in the bank account. Where? They never would show me the
book
- my partners - never.
shut out literally. What brought that about? They were trying to take the company
from me from day one. I had too much power, too much control. They wanted to cheat
and be dishonest and I wouldn't. What happened was we had to acquire a n interest in a
broker/dealer to assume our equity, to realize our equity potential. So back in January,
we drummed u p this deal with a broker/dealer called
The deal was we were going to acquire 20% of their broker/dealer in return for aligning
our group with them. What I found was
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
them not doing what we needed, I got scared. I had so much money and time into this
company. I went down there myself and found an empty shell
- nothing.
Now, as a
corporate office, I know how liable I am, for everything, personally. Then what I find
out is that Hebron is a born-again, just like Kauffman. Oh, Kauffman is - yes. And,
is a Jehovah Witness. I get pissed off, so I swing the whole bore, change
everything and I line us with Planner's Security Group in Atlanta
that group is Wade Webster. Bill Carter
- Bill Kaker.
Now, in
ISP?
around, turned the whole board over, aligned up with them. The day after I get back
from Atlanta, Kauffman calls me into his office and goes through this spiel with I
thought I was president, who's running the company? I said 1 don't care who runs it, it
just got to be run right and for the right reason. Two weeks later, I am in New Jersey
working on a movie and doing some things
security reasons. I find that they have all these stock certificates and everything that
were in my office. You had the locks changed? You had them changed yourself, but
they still got into your office? I don't know how. They stole my files. July 1, I went
in and took all my files out of the office and went to an attorney, Joe Roda, and
explained what happened. Nothing. I met with attorneys in New York, New Jersey,
Boston. I found all these security violations and everything else, but no one could help
me. Then, about four weeks later. I called the FBC, the NAFC, the FBI, the Attorney
General, Senator, Governor, everybody. And, they all think I am bluffing.
Actually, they all thought he was crazy. They all thought I was crazy. And that was
started because of Robert Kauffman. That's what he did. The day after I went out and
got my files out, he spread rumors that I left the company, that I was thrown out, that
I was mentally unstable, that I was spending money. At that same time, I get
blackballed by all the local lending institutions. They repossessed my claim three weeks
before my first payment, with the files in it, of which a brother of the broker in FMG
is one of the lending officers. It gets ugly. That was before he spent the 5 days in
jail. I tried to get arrested. I had to. Then after you were arrested, you were in the
hospital at St. Joseph. I was coerced into going there.
No, that was my idea. I wanted him in a place where we were going to satisfy the
victim so to speak, and the police a t one point, that he would still be able to work with
them. In reality, he was in the hospital but had his car in the parking lot. He was
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
going to play basketball and come back. He was not committed. He was just there. I
walked in to satisfy the bail. Are you on medication? No.
One of the police officers mentioned to me that he was
alright now. Again, this might be one of these stories coming from FMG. What
Kauffman did was, back when they started doing this I had a psychiatrist that was my
client. I was depressed. I mean they were making a fool out of me in public; they were
firing people that were very close to me for no reason other than they were close to
me. So I went to A1 Schultz, a psychiatrist, because I was depressed. Very normal,
given the environment I was thrown in after putting this big thing together then having
these guys slam i t in my face, then take all the credit for what I did. He diagnosed me
as having biphola, depression. My father was schizophrenic and my brother committed
suicide two years ago. The reason he diagnosed that was because I was on a low, and
a t previous'times he thought I was on a high when I put this company together. So,
what I did was, three weeks before July 1, this previous July 1, I told Kauffman that I
went to see a psychiatrist because of how depressed I was because of what he and
Hartlett were doing. They fed on that, and tried to use that to use as their alibi for
'
- I didn't
- I just
haven't
to make inquiry a t the police office and one said that you were taken
not.
I was
with my family to have me committed and take guardianship over my assets so he could
buy the stocks from them a t what ever price he felt like it.
Incidentally, you may want to point out that as late as mid-August of this year,
Kauffman wanted t o buy you out for $2.50 a share or something like that. We have that
documented. Eight weeks prior t o that, I was working with the attorneys to do a 5 to 1
split. That makes the stock worth $25. Either he is ripping me off or he is ripping the
people off who are paying $25 a share.
The offering as you people had it was 3
issue completely sold
- that
120,000 shares? No. Was the best part of it? There was
4 hundred and some thousand sold. Did you buy any of that stock? No, I was in the
organizational sale. You don't know how that money is being accounted f o r now. I have
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
the corporate books. When I went in there June 30, I mean I was in there. I mean it
is not like I went in from the outside; I had a plane and was flying back and forth for
me. In fact, what happened was, I was granted a 60-day leave of absence late June with
pay. Really, what I wanted to do was meet with legal counsel and find out how I was
going to resolve all these problems that I was finding. What happened was, in June I
copied everything in that office (June 30th). and I copied the books. You see, I
developed a computer system. So I just took one of the copies
I've got the books. I don't know how accurate they are because the way that the guys
kept the records, the accounting is all screwed up too. I have an idea, but I found a
lot of money going to people that should not have been. In what way? What they did
was, there was a lot of Jehovah Witnesses that were hired in that firm
- receptionist,
cleaning, etc. Then what they did was replace all the staff people that I brought in
with their own. Then, there was money going out to a fellow by the name of Tom
Turner in Minneapolis. Now Tom Turner was the biggest divisional manager in IDS. Hc
was terminated by IDS in February because of religious convictions
- another born-again.
Then I find this guy was making $750,000 a year with IDS and I find FMG loaning him
money? Is that what they are going after
money are we talking about going to Tom. 12-15 grand. Then. I find checks going to
(-1
Kauffman's wife. Large amounts? Are you talking a hundred dollars? No, a thousand
here, $800 here.
FSC, which is a registered broker/dealer, was an entity started by you? No. What
happened was, back in 1983 I had a dinner meeting
the IAFC - and I drummed up a business meeting and had Alex Armstrong. Do you know
who Alexandria Armstrong is? Yea. She was one of the most prominent financial
planners in the company, a woman from DC. I brought her up to speak a n d I told her
that I wanted to get out of thc proprietary business. She said, go talk to John
FSC. Now, this is when Kauffman, Hartlctt, everybody was still a t IDS. So, I went a n
had a meeting a t FSC in Atlanta. At this time, Bob Kauffman was the Divisional
Manager for IDS in Atlanta. The next thing I know. I left; then he was hired by FSC to
be an officer and to run their sales force.
Then the idea of the company you a r e forming up here is to invest other people's
money? No, it is a one-stop financial entity
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
They are
that line. I mean big. We're talking an office of 10,000 sq. ft. right here and 35
people; then we travel all over the country. When I say offering services, we have 2
attorneys in there, we have 2 realtors, 4 insurance people, a portfolio manager, 8
financial planners, 5 brokers
- I mean, in depth.
mortgage banking. I had started a mortgage banking operation and the minimal loan I
wa looking a t was $3,000,000. 1 bet you I bid on S150,000,000 in the first 6 months of
1987. These were loans that you were going to provide the people with? You bet.
Where was those funds going to come from? They were coming from the largest biggest
insurance companies, the largest pension funds, and some of the largest banks. 0 . K . you
were going t o be a s a mortgage banking type of thing. That is right. You were not
lending the money; you were putting the lenders together with the borrowers and you
get a finders fee, or whatever. Yes.
(--')
&:how
did you get into this? You were an initial investor? No. I've been with Stan
since he started in business in 1982. I had come into some money and I was investing. I
had lent Stan some money and things got really screwed up with
with them, they more or less asked me to say to the bonding company (that they took
out after June 30th of this year) - t h e y wanted me to tell the bonding company that I
gave Stan the money to invest for me and
&fm
with the funds, which I flat our
refused to do. As a matter of fact, I damn near punched Kauffman in the mouth when
he was asking me to commit a very serious crime.
Now, Kauffman's background, is decent, is it not? Clean on paper. I mean he worked
for
- clean on paper;
there's a lot of people after that man. What he did to FSC was,
he was double dipping. He was telling FSC that we were going to stay with FSC the
rest of our lives; in reality, he was telling me that we were telling them what I wanted
them to hear that we were going to do our own broker/dealer so we could obtain our
own equity. And then, I find out that he is receiving a salary from FSC up until
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
February this year. Plus, his salary is in violation of the offering memorandum. Two
weeks before I left, he had the Board approve a salary of about 2-3 times what is in the
offering memorandum.
Maybe this is why the 203D
what to do. I did all that legal work; they don't know how to do it. This offering
memorandum we are talking about
- I just
9 and 10 because the type of information that is in it. That is the only thing we do
not have a copy here of. Well, we have a copy in the office if you need one. It is
public information; there is no problem with it. So are the books public - I got thrown
in jail for trying to get them. Well, we will try to resolve this; it is not going to
happen overnight.
Who is Kauffman connected with here. He called up everybody I know and told them I
left the company; told them I was stealing money from clients; told them I was mentally
insane. I was doing business everywhere. I was doing business with the Japanese; I was
doing business with the President, Stoney; I was doing business with High at New York,
Boston, Houston. Everybody all over the country heard that I was insane. Everybody.
f'\-
I've been 4 months without money. I haven't paid a bill since June 30. What do I do?
No one believes me. I tried going to the unemployment office. Do you know what they
did? When 1 was in the hospital, that was over $3,000. They called up the insurance
carried and told them to terminate me
- my hospitalization.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Did Kauffman in the initial offering that you had, the preorganizational offering - each
of you put up $20,000
other 10 for the remainder of the shares. He was supposed to put in 30 for his 50 $50 a share. The three of you put in 20. Then, he had a back agreement with me to
sell me 10; so we both would have 50,000 shares. I got that contract and he never
fulfilled that. I said no way are you getting more shares than me when 1 put it
together. I said you can be equal with me. But how did that come about? We signed a
back agreement so Hartlett wouldn't get mad. I had to write to buy about 10,000 shares
from Kauffman, 50, to give us both 50 a t anytime a t $.50 a share. You have that
agreement? Yes, he never signed it after he got his 50. It was a bad move on your
part. There is nothing wrong with the idea but do you think a t that point he was
conniving to d o
was in the middle constantly between Kauffman and Hartlett. In fact, a t one time
Kauffman was going over an idea
into the
office - about how he could set Hartlett up to get him out. Then, when he couldn't get
Hartlett out then the two of them tried to get me out.
Now, everything is in place and it is operational? But obviously you have a lot of
Ci
contacts to make this thing go. I'm out. I haven't talked to anybody? But you did
have initially. You already made them and they now have the
But now they've picked up your contacts really, so to speak? Exactly right. They are
acting as mortgage bankers, etc. The whole bit
they just
stole away from me. See, I never communicated with people. I couldn't, only because I
couldn't find competent legal counsel to tell me what to do. All they did, was send me
bills. I didn't even want to send a letter to everyone explaining the situation until I got
a competent legal counsel to tell me what is right, what is wrong, and what to do. I
went to 3 attorneys and they tell me there is no violation
- and I'm
- forged my name.
had an Annual Shareholder's Meeting; they never let people examine the books that have
wanted to.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Of course, all of this would boil down to their getting money from somewhere, extracting
money. Either they are cheating somebody and putting it in their pockets or taking
exorbitant salaries
We are paced to do
$4,000,000 PC1 a year, that's a lot of money passing through your hands.
skeptical of what's happening? I have no idea. I know the clients that 1 have talked to
to, that came down from New Jersey to find out what really went on ran the other way
as soon as they talked to me. In fact, one woman got so sick, she went downstairs and
threw up when I told her.
Well, you know the corporation, regardless of what the situation is when there is a
problem like this with you, or anyone, the corporation has to continue to function? The
fact that somebody has signed your signature to a financial management semi-annual
report. I don't know if that is a security violation, in that end of it. If it would be
corporate law, it may be, but not at the security end of it. Well, someone changed my
address. Who knows who gets my mail? I never changed it. From where? From 1755
Oregon Pike, FMG. It goes here; it goes down to New Jersey. 1 never did it; who did
it. They go through all my mail
days later. This is the Financial Management Group that does this? Of course, it is
coming to you as one of the principals in the corporation, and if i t comes in from their
standpoint, they wouldn't know if it had to do with corporate business or your business
personally. The fact that they opened it may not be ethical, but I don't know that
-.
If you change my address, that is forgery. You got to go to the Post Office and sign to
change an address, don't you? Well, I don't know. If you are no longer associated with
them
that. If somebody comes in and says you are no longer here, you're over there - I don't
know that the Post Office - somebody there should not have done it.
These are things that show this is not fabricated or something; they are actually
happening. I got so desperate I already wrote 60 Minutes.
How much money are we talking? Millions. That they have taken? I was Executive
Producer of the first digital movie ever, in the world. I was to get 40% of the profits.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
I could have made 100-200 million dollars. I was ready to do a deal with the owner of
Turkey Hill. I was supposed to receive a check in July for $200,000; after he heard the
rumor, he backed off. How much have they squandered? How do I know? I can't get
at their books.
These stock certificates that you
2,000 shares of stock. Now the signature that is forged on yours is the secretary. It
should have been yours, but there is nothing wrong with the certificate as such
- aside
from the secretary signing the certificate? There is something shady about that stock
deal too. You see this is a year, not quite a year. Would this be part of the of 203
offering? Yes, everything is. All stock is part of the 2030. What I a m saying is, Scott
Robinson bought the 2,000 at $5 a share or whatever; he put up $10,000 and he was
entitled to get a certificate. If you weren't there to sign i t
Telephone call
'
If Scott Robinson put up the money and Peter Ponderose put up 8,000 shares, if he paid
$5 a share
- they didn't
pay $5; they paid $2.50. Regardless, they were entitled to the
-- why couldn't
in that office. Oh, you were still there in June. Yes. Even according to them. When
were you actually locked out? July 1. That's when I went in there and took my files,
when I found out they were doing that. Because they only way they could get the
certificates was to break into my office, because I had them. You had the stock
certificate book? Yes, I did everything
- they didn't
stuff. That's how I caught them. I knew the law because I did it. I did the
memorandum and everything.
The thing that is wrong with these certificates basically is the fact that Long is signing
as secretary and at that point, on the 25th of June, you're the secretary. As f a r a s we
know, these things could have really been negotiated a t the end of July a n d backdated.
I am not trying to beat you down. I got them July 1 - my attorney copied them for me.
That's how I got those copies. What you are saying, prior to your being locked out of
this place, they were already bypassing you. They found out that I was talking to an
attorney. Now what would they be afraid of when you were talking to the attorneys.
(-
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
What they were doing. Of course, they do have control of the corporation
- between
Hartlett and - I did, I controlled the Board. That is why they threw me out. When I
made a decision, the Board followed it. But now, they are gaining control of the Board
I have no idea. I have never heard of a Board Meeting. Who is on the Board of
Directors? Me, Bob Kauffman, Mike Hartlett, Bob Long and Alan Loss. I heard those
names; I can't remember where. They were the signatures on the semi-annual report. Is
Long a born-again Christian. No, he is the accountant who hired from Main Herdman.
Were you a party to hiring all of these. Everybody. Pete
was terminated by
Shearson and I was the only person in time to give him a job. He already had some
trouble with the NASD. He was suspended; it took about 5 months just to get him
relicensed
- they had charges against him, allegations - forgery - in fact what he did
in
June was he went and used another persons rep number a t FSC to do options trading and
that person supposedly reported him, or wanted to report him
from Lancaster?
- Greek.
- Dick Sherbach.
Is he
Harrisburg a t Shearson. They fired him in November. I saw his name but I can't
connect it. So many names came up as a result of this
- I'm
get everybody straight. It's not easy, believe me. Time is one thing that I have a lot
of
- so do I.
or
They had a big shindig down a t the Strasburg Inn. A lot of people from New York came
in. The whole thing fell through although Environmental Technologies are is a local
corporation in business a n d they were trying to merge with
Corporation out of New York. I a m not familiar with it.
Shell
Again, it was a lot of born-
again people that would meet; they would push on the idea that all things stock up.
Well, I know h e is running advertisements on the radio that deals with the religious
sect.
Now, that they are set up, does the Financial Management Group need money or do they
have enough money to operate. No, they've got money. They are a self-sustaining
operation then; anything they get from selling securities they will pick up the
commission, if there is brokers mortgages they will pick up the commission on the
mortgages, and that's enough to keep them going, right? Oh, yea. They a r e not pressed
for money? No. Have the handled the customers/investor's money correctly. No. You
.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
have mentioned they've given money to Tom Turner and Kauffman's wife, what else
have they mishandled? I know the Federal people wanted to investigate Kauffrnan's
books, of his stock book that he was managing. This is when he was down at Atlanta?
No, this is now. That's why they wanted him to liquidate his mutual funds so he could
manage it f o r him. They wanted you to liquidate your mutual funds? I told him that 1
was a little unhappy with the performance of the mutual funds that I had; he wanted me
to liquidate it and go into the stock market and let him work it for me. He was going
to act as your financial planner? I would imagine, yea, broker, buy and sell stock.
Have they acted as financial planners?
Is the one that you
last year
- illegally.
see it? Yea, let me. Who is registered now? No one is registered. I was that close to
getting it registered when I got shut it. It was all ready set to go; I got the papers. I
think it was just some questions. Were you working with Jamino? Yea, he is the
corporate attorney that I got
He is good. There's
no problem with him. No, Jeff's a good guy. He taught me securities law. I am trying
to think, this application here? Paul Short is who I was working with. I asked to see
the file quickly on Friday
C'!
- I didn't
They threw me out of the Financial Management Group; they never mentioned FMG
Advisory which I was President of. Is this the one that applied to
using the initials FMG. that's Financial Management Group? Right. I set up an umbrella
so it would be consistent. What threw me off was. when Financial Management Group
was registered there was a whole lot of other entities involved which used the initial
FMG Advisory Service, Accounting Service. That was for continuity. O.K., then FMG
Advisory Service was never really, up to now. was never really registered a s an
investment advisor, right? Correct. They were registered
state?
Right
1986
until now. they have done investment advisory services a n d these a r e the fees that they
collected? I charged some. You are allowed to charge up to, what is it
- 14 people?
think it is only 5. I was careful about that one. I know I only charged 5 clients, I am
sure of it. T h e FCC really gave me a rough time getting that thing filed
- I couldn't
even understand their questions half of the time. They are a mess, they really are. I
13
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
must have spent 100 hours. I agree with you, there is a lot of attorneys work in the
Harrisburg, and the question is the application
the
answer is Not Applicable. Yea, it takes you 3 hours to figure out that you don't answer
it. I agree with you. I have a tendency to want to throw it away. Well, after 5
months of fooling with it myself, I called Jeff up and said, Jeff, you got to help me get
through this thing. I got to get this registered. I called Jeff on the RIA probably in
January
- no, probably
February or March.
So, June 1987 was the last correspondence you had. Yea, right there it is. Right there,
it was done on June 23. I am going to want a copy of this. I need to get a copier in
here and copy it for you. I can't leave these out of here without copying them. These
files are just to valuable to me
- if
whatever you want, but I want to get a copier in here and make copies f o r you and you
can just run. I don't know where I am going to get money for a copier but
--.Well,
these files have been literally all over the country. In fact, most of these files are in 2
law firms in California and New Jersey. I was all over the place.
This is the application for your registration as an investment advisor. I would like to
see what the new one says on it. As you can see, they are all like a standard form.
Like I said, I have difficulty looking a t these things. If I am looking a t something I can
find it, but~justto look over and say its alright or whatever. But I would like to see
who they have listed on as officers. I just looked at it Friday and didn't take particular
notice other than I knew that Kauffman and Hartlett were some of the people. My name
wasn't on it. Oh, no, no, your name wasn't on it. Well if they are using FMG
Advisory, I am still President of that company. Well, I don't know in corporate law
what it takes to do away with a President at the Board of Directors meeting. I'll tell
you what it takes.
----- that's
Meeting. No, the shareholders must vote on the Board. Shareholders must vote and
approve, and shareholders must exempt people on the Board. Shareholders have to vote
to remove someone from the Board. Yes, but the Board of Director would be elected for
a year to two years, whatever the situation would be. So that corporate officer would
be there for that entire period. The three of us were elected to the board for a period
of 3-5 years. The initial Board members
control over a one-year term. Me, Kauffman, and Hartlett were 3-5 year terms. When
did that take place? We did that back in June of 86 when we started the company.
I
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October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Your only connection with the company now is the fact that? I have no connection.
They will not let me
money. That is something that you two are going to iron out. See, my involvement is
criminal charges
- that's
- FMG
Management Limited; Financial Management Limited owns all the other subs. O.K., 100%
- that's
had mentioned that there are offices throughout the country. How are those people
connected here? Shareholder and they are aligned with us through the broker/dealer.
They go through us to the brokerjdealer, rather than direct. We own 5% of Planner's
Security Group in Atlanta. We get the same deal that we 're supposed to with
Brown with this outfit in Atlanta. They are a fairly large broker/dealer. They are
doing about 15-20 million dollars a year right now, gross commission and
Is it Heubert? No, they are the born-agains that I left, I moved away from. What's the
name of the Atlanta Group? Planners Security Group
- Bill Kegler.
There's nothing
wrong with that group? Yea. they terminated me for no reason. As a registered rep?
Yep. I am sure they will come up with a reason; there is a reason why they did i t
because with the NFAC they had to file. I would like to know why? You know, you
were termed because you were sick or, you know there is going to be a reason.
Whether it is true or not. Lying has become a n accepted norm for all of this. Well, in
their compliance department, all of these broker/dealers should and generally do keep
very good close track of their sales people. How can they when 1 did the deal? But
Financial Management Group owns 5% of Planners Security? Bill Kegler was with FSC
and got angry when he couldn't run FSC 3 years ago. Then he started his own
broker/dealer. This is with Planners Security? That's right. He left John Keebel
because of a power struggle with them.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
But now, other than terminating you when they shouldn't have, they are not doing
anything bad? How do I know? Do you suspect they are? Yea, they terminated me,
you bet. You better believe I suspect. If they are doing that to me, what are they
doing to the poor clients who don't know anything. The same thing with FMG
- if
they
are doing all this to me, what are they doing to the clients that don't know anything.
My clients are pissed.
So, what they could do is withdraw their money from the organization whether its in the
form of stock or whatever, but there is nobody making investments
? I've got the former Medical Director
St. Joseph Hospital that owns 10,000 shares with FMG that is very upset about all of
this. He,is away; I couldn't get him last night to come to the meeting. They got 35,000
of his. He went through everything from that company
What did they offer you $2 a share or something? They didn't offer me anything. But
in that letter they did. They offered me when it came time for me to get the check
because they knew what I was going to do. Well, you wouldn't have taken the $2 a
share would you, because you were talking about a 5-1 split. I would have taken i t but
I would have pursued my civil and legal rights and sued them for the rest. I went 5
days without food
- I was starving.
- people
look at me a n d laugh. Did you ever go 5 days without food? when you are worth a
considerable amount of money?
Kauffman told me that he was going to offer Stan $1-1.25 a share to settle it out, to
buy his
and out of the proceeds of that he was going to pay me the money
that is owed to me first, right off the top, I was his first consideration
- that he
wouldn't buy the stock unless my note was satisfied. You have a note with First
Financial Group claiming they are liable for it. So you took the money and put it into ?
No, I don't know who has the money. A bank either has it or Lancaster Aviation. It
was embezzled from me, I don't know who has it. But they are acknowledging that they
have custody of it? They were acknowledging liability for it. We don't know who has
it. Either Commonwealth Bank has it or Lancaster Aviation, I don't know. But you put
it in the bank? No, I didn't put it anywhere. He gave you the money, what did you do
with it? I gave it to Lancaster Aviation for the airplane. Then they repossessed the
airplane before my first payment for, I don't know why. And I don't know where the
$25,000 down payment is. He don't have it and I don't have it. But the $25,000 went to
7
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
him, not as an officer of the corporation? To me personally. The airplane is not part
of this corporate complex? No. But now Financial Management Group is saying they
will pay you back that $25,000? Uh, huh. They sent letters to all my creditors. They
told me that on 3 different occasions
company. Then they gave me a letter saying basically that if 1 wanted to talk about it,
talk to their attorney. Well, did you tell him about the bonding company? Yea. They
wanted you to sort of make the allegation that I gave Stan the money to invest f o r me
and that he had scuffled the money
that,
which I refused to do. They took out the bond after July 1. I got a thing in the mail
about a bond; I thought what is going on. Then he told me about a week later
that's what that is
- a $4,000,000 bond.
- I said
seen the $25,000. No, I don't know, maybe they have it. They might have it. Well, the
only way they could get it is if it were a reimbursement made on the airplane. They
were the ones calling the bank and the Aviation Company about the plane, asking what I
was doing with it, where I was going? They were the ones that initiated all the
conspiracy with the lending institutions. My credit rating was excellent up until August
I : (
This-is going to drag out; I will keep in touch with you. Now. you also have
investments through mutual funds through Financial Management Group? And how much
money are we talking about roughly? About 170,000. Now. do you have the certificates
for this. No, they were never issued. They are held in
the broker in this case was? His probably weren't transferred yet, it was probably FSC.
So, it would still be a monthly statement from them
- FSC is noted as
the broker/dealer, I a m sure. I doubt that they were yet to Planners Security. I get
the interest off that money, I get a check every month. But your investment is not in
jeopardy now, as f a r as you know.? No, but he is on disability a n d 25 grand meant a lot
to him.
Now, Kauffman wants you to sell these the mutual funds a n d give him t h e $100,000 to
invest as a broker? Right. Of course, you are reluctant to do that because you still
have confidence in Stan. I have confidence with Stan and I am not very comfortable
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
dealing in the stock market just now. I like more settled investments - the stock
market idea and I don't get along very well. I am looking for safety of my investments.
Like Stan said, I a m on disability a n d I d o need income. And K a u f f m a n promised you a
fortune if you made this transaction? He didn't come right out and promise me a
fortune but he insinuated that I could d o a lot if I let him work the stock market.. He
was doing all options, that's all he does. Well, I don't want no d a m n parts of options.
You look a t his client files; they are all option accounts. All of them, little old ladies
down to
--.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Here again, which you know, the broker when he is talking to you, or the registered rep
when he is talking to you, should file a form as to what you want. Now you just
mentioned to me that you are a conservative of man. I had him in government
securities.
- And
they should have these on file. Now, if you are conservative and you
give him the moncy and he starts dealing in options, he is really violating the trust that
the government and the NAFC is trying to establish between the client. I tell you what.
I feel sorry f o r you guys. You guys got a hell of a nightmare. Stan always backed me
up; there were times I pulled my investments out and put them in CDs for a while
because I was just not comfortable with what was happening. And, I tell him what CDs
to buy a t local banks. I have the utmost confidence in Stan. Mr. Kauffman tried
extremely hard to shake that confidence.
He tried to shake up my own family. He had my own family believing. Do you want to
know something. I n August, I was on my way to Hollywood to the film studio and to
see some legal clients I was working with one day
to get a night's rest. I get thrown in
- that
order against my family that didn't understand what was going on - I get retained in the
police station f o r two hours, get taken to a hospital. That day, someone called the
Stone Harbor police and said I had a gun and was running to the beach to kill myself.
This thing is ugly.
As a matter of fact, I would believe I am the only one left to believe Stan is still sane.
Well, I caught on real ~ u i c k . I don't believe he had anyone to talk to except me. I
didn't. 1 could talk to him every other day since April; someone had to believe what
was going on. I have tapes
client of mine
that I shouldn't been, and wasn't taking care of my clients. He told me the same thing.
that Stan had wasted away somewhere between $45,000 and $70,000 of his own money,
And, they
were both picked up last week, as a matter of fact. I was involved in that too. Right
there. I thought I heard
- is he connected with
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
- one of
that common a name, and I heard the name mentioned in the newscast of the NFL strike
and it was like - what was that, but it was too late. That Thursday, right after I called
you, was when I got the call.
Stan held his own free agent camp so that the players who didn't get chances in the
bigger camps had an opportunity to do it. 50 people showed up, from all over the
country. The most innovative camp
- I taped
55 teams. When was that, 84? Yes, right there it is. And some of them got picked up
as a result of this? Only one, my brother. I guess they had to have some body. Yea,
that was a fun day that day. That camp cost me 5 grand and generated so f a r
$200,000.00 in salaries for my brother.
That airplane that 1 bought would have made me $3,000 net profit a month, leasing it
out. I had a t least 20 hours of leasing every month for 350 a month a t $7,000, and my
payment was $1500.00. You were leasing it to? My contacts, my network. With you as
a pilot, you mean? No. It's a big plane. I hired my own pilot. When I'm doing
business all over the country I can't fly commercially. I three weeks, my charter bill
was 4 grand for using another person's plane 5 times. Then, you bought this. and before
the first payment was due they grabbed it back. Can they do that? No they can't.
Why do you think I've got a large lawsuit against 3 banks. One of the reasons they said
they did it was because it wasn't properly insured, but he had insurance. The other
reason they said, he took it to Florida. Now I don't know why you would buy $100,000
airplane and leave it a t the airport. Do you know why I was taking it to Florida? I
bought a place on a n island, another very good investment. Now they are suing me
because I couldn't settle because I got blackmailed 2 months later. They said I was
going to Florida to run away and hide. I was going to Florida to settle my property.
They had to come up with a reason so that's the reason that was around I guess. But,
Pete
anything about United ChemCon? They are being investigated right now by the FBI and
Attorney General. Chemcon is the big local minority-held corporation that was doing a
lot of defense contracts
beginning of the summer, and there was a lot of criminal allegations made, none of them
substantiated. And I was connected with that. They sent a Board Member in to see me
a week before this happened. Why, I don't know. Is this Lancaster based. Yes, Jim
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Christian owned it
- now I hear
people in that organization. Why they sent someone to California to see me, I don't
know. They won't answer me. Who is this, the FBI? No, this is Chemcon. I said if
you ever come back or you have someone else call me, I want a $10,000 retainer fee.
Never heard from them since. Then, two weeks ago, Jim Christian called me while I
was in the hospital. That guy hated my guts for five years. Why, he called me, I don't
know. What did he want? I don't know. You didn't speak to him to find out? I spoke
to him, he said nothing. The same thing the Board Member said when he came from
California. Asked if I could go get ChemCon another building; asked if I would be
interested in saving the company from bankruptcy
guy from
Belgium, they wanted me to talk to, a guy from DC and New York, a guy from the
Caribbean. I don't know what the hell is going on. Then I find out the Commonwealth
Bank went and nailed ChemCon. Commonwealth Meridian said Christian personally signed
for the $18,000,000 that was invested or lost of the governments money for these
contracts. I don't know. I am sick of asking questions and people lying to me.
You don't have any connection with that, other than you knew some people? No, I've
got their files, I got their financial statement, everything
- they wanted
me to do
something. But you're not connected with the company? You're not an investor? No, 1
sold my ISC stock June 8.
A lot of people were saying that ChemCon. which is a minority - Christian is a black
guy
- was getting all the minority government contracts because he was one of the
leading minority defense contractors around, and actually the supposition was
know how true it would be
- I don't
Because when ChemCon was started, back to their inception, you look at ISC's book.
They didn't have any money. Well. the first thing ChemCon did, was they went and got
all that free money from the government and you look and see where that money went.
I bet you I know where it went.
This guy named Geurin, James Geurin. And I know that they were selling contracts
back. He runs ISC and he also has his fingers pretty deeply in ChemCon. He's the one
who started ChemCon, Geurin is the one who started it. Wasn't there some allegations
about a tie with Wedtack You bet. They were tied, you'd better believe they were tied
with Wedtack. The same guys in Wedtack were involved with ISC and ChemCon. ISC is
21
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
exchange-.
and Control? I owned a thousand shares. I sold it when things started to hit the
Now they just did a multibillion dollar merger with a company in London
They probably think it is going to cover their tracks. You mean United ChemCon is a
local corporation. Yes, they went bankrupt as of this last 3 months. What was it,
$18,000,000 in liabilities? What they did was, they fronted all that money and started
the contracts, went bankrupt, now the government is stuck for $18,000.00. They weren't
paying employees, they weren't producing the product. they weren't paying their
unemployment and everything else. Did they pay the withholding taxes? No. It turns
out that Christian, who I have had a few dealings with, had a n office that would be
I know right now in this town's viewpoint, I stole money, I am insane, and I am a
lunatic. I tell you I will not condemn Jim Christian until he tells me to my face what
happened. I was framed and set up and I know (I see what you mean, your experience).
I don't know, maybe Jim Christian doesn't have the money. Maybe Geurin has it or
somebody else. $18,000,000 is a lot of money and he is broke because he lives with one
of my best friends,
if he took it, he would have something. You're pretty nice, Stan, to somebody who has
hated your guts for 5 years. I know what I am going through, a n d who knows, maybe
he was innocent too. Is this Christian you are talking about. Yes.
You were going to make copies of these. I can't make copies. I can f a x them to you.
I will make copies for you, in fact, what I should do is get everything copied for you.
Well, no, because that is a tremendous expense. I would rather, if you have the time, or
can stick me in the corner somewhere, maybe say, this and this, a n d this, I a m sure we
can eliminate half of it. O.K.but you should tell me what you want and I will make
copies. I just don't want this stuff to leave my hands anymore. I can get them to you
overnight. Well, there is nothing we can do overnight. I can't elevate your problem as
far as being out of the corporation
- oh, I thought
before you leave. So, anything that I would be involved in is going to be long and
drawn out; it is not going to be a n answer to your immediate problem.
I know, but I had to get someone involved. I had to get authorities to start taking
action for me.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
the FCC
They said
they were sending 2 guys up here last week for 2 days. Did you talk to them about
what was going on? How did you happen to talk the FCC. I was just trying to get m y
money back. They promised me my money and they didn't come up with it. So, I called
. If
------
no, they were curious as to some of the other things that were
going on. I talked to them a couple of times. They were curious for one thing,
Kauffman wanting to take my investment and putting i t in the stock market and working
it for me, they were curious about that. They were curious about the allegations of
Stan's alleged insanity and forcing him out of the corporation, and I think they were a
little confused about why they would accept liability for the money if it wasn't there
liability. That would be a question that I would ask. I think that aroused their
curiosity, but he also said that they have never been checked, and they are about due,
so we might just as well go up there and dig into it and find out what was going on.
As f a r as I know, that is what they did, what they call a compliance examination. I
don't know that they were there looking
they looked into some items like that, but I think basically it was just a compliance
examination. What did they find? I don't know. They were there though? There was
two people supposed to be up there. Were they there last week? Well, it was recent,
the report isn't even written, but the report I think will be more on the lines that they
don't have a client complaint form filed
Proper
procedures, etc.
I am still interested as to how you wcrc alerted to it. I have yet to get it
- I was
coming down as an appointment last Tuesday o r Wednesday, which ever day, it was the
next day I called you. I had an appointment here i n Lancaster. I had gotten a call
about 4 3 0 in the afternoon from the Phila office, and my supervisor down there said
there is a newspaper clipping of your break-in of the Financial Management Group. I
don't know whether to make a n investigation out of it or not. It seems there are some
securities involved. The only 2 articles that appeared are right over there and none of
them say anything about it. They just know my name, right? They just knew that I
was involved with the company?
- it doesn't
Nothing a t all? Then how it came to our office I don't know, unless somebody sent it.
Even if they sent the articles, there is nothing i n there to indicate who
- they just
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
called me an ex-worker. That is the interesting thing about it. "burglary, theft,
unlawful restraint, robbery, unlawful use of computer, criminal mischief, and terroristic
threats." I've never seen the article. There it is, pull them down. No, that's alright.
They were supposed to send it up to me and they didn't. I'm leasing that building and
accused of burglarizing his own building.
See, he called me and said, you are going down to Lancaster. See if we should start an
investigation. Stop up to the
-- exemployee.
officer? Mathias, they said Lancaster Detective Mathias. He's not, he's Manheim Twp.,
fortunately I found that out. I called Township 2 months ago and they didn't help me.
Then they throw me in jail when my partners call.
So anyhow, I stopped up that evening, Tuesday or Wednesday night, the next day I called
you but did not get you until Thursday or Friday, so that is my association. They were
supposed to send up the newspaper clipping or whatever it was they had. But the only
thing I know is that your name was associated in our office computer file with Financial
Management Group. Your not telling me anything new. But you see I was supposed to
have this. Why I don't, I don't know because they were supposed to send it up. But
the state in their own way to save a .40 postcard, they have a messenger service to
Harrisburg. So, its alright if you get it in the mail, like if I was in the office this
morning and put it in the mail before 10:OO it goes to the central office and gets
distributed
you miss that 10:OO mail, it don't leave our office until the next day then the next day
in the central file. then somebody drives it down to Philadelphia. I should buy you
guys some stamp. I had to deal with the State that long so you know these are just
little quirks that keep popping up every now and then.
1'11 tell you an interesting part that I had when I went out to view - they had to
I was there to
get property returned to Stan, and Hartlett started going through things and paying a lot
of attention to what was there, and had already admitted wasn't his. There was a lot of
correspondence there, he was very interested in, and the policeman even came to my aid
and made him not be nosey. even its yours or it isn't, and he released everything to me.
Do you know what I took out of the office was on the books, everything that I wanted
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
to see. Did they let you keep that? No, no, in fact the inventory from the service
warrant, just about everything on here is Stan's files, even labeled as such. Then I
found a
they returned that to Kauffman. K & H, what do you think that stands for? Kauffman
and Hartlett. Well, that's what the initials stand for but what type of business? I
never heard of it. You don't know what it would be? I can imagine what it would be.
A brokers business somehow? It's something fishy. I can't remember the bank, I think
Well, who mentioned to you about medicine. I t wasn't Mathias; Seigler was involved.
Why, how did they get wind of that? Harlctt and I were there and Hartlett was talking
!
That's what Hartlett was telling him. And Hartlett was saying is he taking care of
himself and all of this stuff. That son of a bitch. He is really painting a nice picture.
Well, the cops didn't really buy it because they asked Hartlett to leave and they gave me
the information that they told Hartlett they weren't going to give me.
Yea, well they mentioned the things that you had taken, a couple of items, that they had
given back and allowed you to have them. They gave all the files back to FMG before
we were involved and then he gave me the personal correspondences, but they kept his
camera. Apparently, Stan was doing the policeman's work when he was in there the
night he was accused of burglarizing the place. He took pictures of all his files i n their
office and they said they had better keep that.
This is June 30th. It is my files in their office. That's the night I left. Who's taking
the pictures? A friend of mine. You were with someone? This was 3 o'clock in the
morning. Oh, you weren't arrested on the premises, were you? No, but this is when I
was in the office. This is when they stole my files out of my locked doors. He was
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
there then, I guess. These aren't the films that you are talking about? No, the films he
is talking about I took of my files again in their office, and attorneys say they didn't do
anything wrong
for 5 days.
This is the stock certificate book here, this big black book? Yea. You are still
connected with the company here? This is June 30th. The funny thing is, even the
second one is not breaking in
He
is still President and a t the time he was still Secretary I guess. I don't think the police
feel too awfully strong that they have a burglary type charge. I know. Well, I tell you
what, they abused me the night they arrested me.
me up here left me ride on the front seat and everything. When I get to Township,
handcuffed me, put my hands to the belt, threw me in a cell, bounced me around the
car. They wouldn't even listen to who I was. I had all the documents to hold them
that I was lease holder of the building
- wouldn't
anything. I know why they a r e acting nice now. They are going to hear from my
attorney.
I don't know who even made the complaint, whether it was the girl who made the
complaint. You were arrested the next day? No, that night. I told 5 people that I
wanted to arrested that night: I had to. But then somebody had to call the Manheim
police. Do you know what they did? They called up the police that day and said 3 days
previous t o that, that I made a bomb threat to that building
picked me up for. Oh. really?
- that's
for. Then, while I was there they charged me with the burglary. They initially picked
me up for a terroristic bomb threat, that took FMG three days to report, they couldn't
even remember when the phone call was, and the person that reported it, I don't even
know who she is
roughly what time? I went there about 10:30 Thursday night; you were there an hour?
Not even that, about a half hour. I left and dropped off at
, had a drink,
and got a girl to take the car I had, I borrowed somebody's car because my cars were in
New Jersey
- I flew back,
Conestoga police were right behind me. I said, great, they're here. And when the
Conestoga Twp. cop, I said, let me take all these files with me so I can show you guys
who I a m and what I was doing. Well, they just took everything and threw me in the
.
Advanced Media Group
26
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Well, let me get started. I didn't read these letters yet. Read that one letter right
there.
That's right we have that other thing now. Yea, he's being sued civilly f o r this office
furniture here which was purchased from FMG. But FMG then tells the Office Supply
Store that he has not connection with us. When they have my suite of furniture in that
building. Oh, that what the pictures, is that your personal furniture? You bet. I
purchased this in June to go down to Stone Harbor; see the movie that I was working
on, FMG was to get 15% of the profit f o r my endeavors down there. This was purchased
as a n agent of Financial Management Group.
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
copyright 2009
Date Completed:
Date Initiated:
July 8, 2009
_____________________________
Stan J. Caterbone
Advanced Media Group, Targeted Individual
Member Freedom From Covert Harassment and
Surveillance Organizations
Pro Se Litigant, U.S. District & Commonwealth of PA
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
[email protected]
www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com
717-826-5354
888-533-3606 Facsimile
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
HISTORY
In 1987 Stan J. Caterbone went public with allegations of fraud within International Signal
and Control, or ISC as they were commonly referred.
Chem Con officials (an ISC/James Guerin straw company), and as a shareholder of record since
1983 of ISC, Stan J. Caterbone had a meeting with an ISC executive on June 23, 1987, which
resulted in a 22 year legal odyssey. The discussions involved a joint venture with his company,
Financial Management Group, Ltd., or FMG, Ltd., but ended in disclosure of his recent public
allegations of fraud. Four years later, ISC founder and chairman James Guerin, and other officials
and companies pleaded guilty to a $1 Billion Dollar Fraud and export violations including the
selling of arms through South Africa to Iraq and Sadaam Hussein.
influence and public corruption had been used to cover-up the activities and Federal False Claims
Act violations of Stan J. Caterbone for the next eighteen years. There ensued a total blockade of
all United States Courts for all redress and remedy available in accordance with federal, state,
and local laws. This included recovery of his business interests; intellectual property; real estate;
personal and business real property; his unblemished and impressive reputation; and his most
valuable asset - the ability to produce income. This might be legally referred to as the Right-ToWork under federal statutes.
investment or developed a business that did not make a profit over the next 22 years.
This
includes two real estate properties that were illegally seized through foreclosure proceedings.
Since 1987 Stan J. Caterbone has been a prisoner and enemy of the state.
ISC was a
Department of Defense (DOD) Contractor and a partner with United States Intelligence Agencies
since it's beginings in the early 1970's. One of it's first contracts was Project X with the National
Security Agency or NSA of Ft. Meade, Maryland.
In summary, the following are facts and
INTERNATIONAL SIGNAL & CONTROL OR ISC:
part
of
the
public
record
regarding
Once the third (3rd) largest employer in the County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, with
over 5,000 employees.
James Guerin, founder and CEO was once the largest philanthropist to charitable
organizations in the County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania.
The ISC/Ferranti Scandal was the third (3) largest white-collar fraud within the United
States as of 1992.
The following are some of the public officials and politicians associated with ISC:
George H.W. Bush, former U.S. President, and Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Robert Gates, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and current
Secretary of Defense.
Bobby Ray Inman, former Board of Directors if ISC, former Director of the NSA, and
currently associated and directly involved with Mind Control Research organizations.
Alexander Haig, former U.S. Secretary of State, and ISC lobbyist and Board of Directors?
Carlos Cardoen/Cardoen Industries, a joint venture partner with ISC and arms
merchant for the cluster bomb who eventually sold to Iraq and other Middle Eastern
Countries under U.S. sanctions.
ISC was credited with the design of the cluster bomb, and has patents filed in the U.S.
Patent Office.
In 1987 ISC completed the merger with the 3rd largest defense contractor of Great
Britain, Ferranti International; who paid $1 billion dollars for ISC and all of it's subsidiaries.
ABC News/Financial Times aired 3 episodes on ABC Nightline with Ted Koppel regarding
the ISC/CIA defense weapons; technologies; and cluster bombs to Iraq story and lead into
the allegations that then nominee for the Director of CIA Robert Gates was involved with
ISC and the selling of arms to Iraq.
ABC News 20/20 aired a story on the ISC/CIA efforts to sell cluster bombs to Saadam
Hussein and Iraq on February 1, 1991 days after the start of the Persian Gulf War I, with
the initial bombing raid destroying a cluster bomb factory built in Iraq by Carlos Cardoen.
On July 1st and 2nd of 1987 Stan J. Caterbone solicited the legal counsel of Lancaster
Attorney Joseph Roda for counsel regarding, FMG, Ltd., International Signal & Control
(ISC); Commonwealth Bank, etc., and was billed for his services. Joseph Roda did
absolutely nothing but refute Stan J. Caterbone's claims and would not believe him.
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investigation into ISC was still ongoing. It is not known whether it has closed or not. All of these
activates constitute a RICO crime due to the pattern and organization of the perpetrators. The
pattern and source of the activities can be traced back to 1987, with subgroups changing over
time, but still engaging in the same practices. The following plan of action was followed in order
to perpetrate the cover-up:
Totally discredit Stan(ley) J. Caterbone and any and all allegations in every way
possible.
Extort and maintain his net worth to $ zero or load him with debts.
Keep him out of any profession and or occupation when and where possible.
Totally isolate him and disenfranchise him from his friends, colleagues, and family
into a life of solitaire.
Somehow persuade the community of Lancaster County to buy into this plan of
action through money, favors, etc.,
Always keep attorneys and anyone remotely involved with the legal community
away at times when efforts for justice are pursued.
When attempts to enter the U.S. legal system arise, isolate, harass, and extort any
monies and/or possessions of value.
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This case is still not settled and has been withdrawn by plaintiff Stan J.
Caterbone in October of 2008 after a successful ruling in the U.S. Third Circuit Court of
Appeals (07-4474) in September of 2008. The case will be continued upon the security
of evidence and the cease and desist of obstruction of justice and due process. On May
16, 2005 at the Federal Courthouse in Philadelphia, Stan J. Caterbone filed the case under seal.
One week later in the United States Bankruptcy Court for Eastern Pennsylvania in Reading,
Pennsylvania, again appearing as pro se, Stan J. Caterbone filed a petition for protection under
the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Code, in case no. 05-23059.
These acts of entering the United States legal system with these issues triggered yet
another round of attempts to keep these cases from the courts and judges - Organized Stalking
with Directed Energy Devices and Weapons, built on a foundation of mental telepathy or total
Mind Control.
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suicide. As far back as the late 1980's Stan J. Caterbone knew that his mind was being read, or
"remotely viewed". This was verified and confirmed when information only known to him, and
never written, spoken, or typed, was repeated by others. In 1998, while soliciting the counsel of
Philadelphia attorney Christina Rainville, (Rainville represented Lisa Michelle Lambert in the Laurie
Show murder case), someone introduced the term remote viewing through an email. That was
the last time it was an issue until 2005. The term was researched, but that was the extent of the
topic.
Remote Viewers may have attempted to connect in a more direct and continuous way
without success.
In 2005 the U.S. sponsored mind control turned into an all-out assault of mental
telepathy; synthetic telepathy; and pain and torture through the use of directed energy devices
and weapons that usually fire a low frequency electromagnetic energy at the targeted victim.
This assault was no coincidence in that it began simultaneously with the filing of the federal action
in U.S. District Court, or CATERBONE v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al., or 05-cv-2288.
This
assault began after the handlers remotely trained Stan J. Caterbone with mental telepathy. The
main difference opposed to most other victims of this technology is that Stan J. Caterbone is
connected 24/7 with a person who declares that she is Interscope recording artist Sheryl Crow of
Kennett Missouri. Stan J. Caterbone has spent 3 years trying to validate and confirm this person
without success. Most U.S. intelligence agencies refuse to cooperate, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the U.S. Attorney's Office refuse to comment.
more information.
In 2006 or the beginning of 2007 Stan J. Caterbone began his extensive research into
mental telepathy; mind control technologies; remote viewing; and the CIA mind control program
labeled MK ULTRA and it's subprograms.
FAMILY HISTORY
If you listen to the propaganda machine and the community of Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania, including professionals, the family history of Stan J. Caterbone goes something like
the following:
Father, Samuel Caterbone, Jr., Schizophrenic who ran out on his family because
of nervous breakdowns while trying to run a small dry cleaning business.
He
traveled the world looking for the Blessed Mother Mary and Space Aliens. He ended
up living in government subsidized housing broke and with a severe mental illness.
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Brother, Samuel A. Caterbone, suffered from the very same illness has his
father, Schizophrenia, who finally killed himself trying to live in California.
Brother, Thomas W. Caterbone, suffered from the very same mental illness as
his brother, Stan J., Bipolar Mood Disorder, who ran a lawn business and finally
committed suicide at an early age.
Stan J. Caterbone, suffered from Bipolar Mood Disorder, or Manic Depression and
had a nervous breakdown in 1987 trying to compete in the financial services
industry.
everyone in court and is deeply paranoid in thinking the whole world is against him.
He always spends all of his money during his fits of mania and has delusions about
his success as a businessman.
The Family History was formulated back in the 1960's when Samuel Caterbone, Jr.,
father of Stan J. Caterbone, became engaged in a black budget mind control program that began
during his service in the United States Navy as a radioman and air gunner.
Samuel Caterbone,
Jr., was most likely a direct product of MK ULTRA or one of it's subprograms. His brother, Samuel
A. Caterbone, was most likely part of the LSD experiments of MK ULTRA. Stan J. Caterbone is
most likely part of a program sponsored by the Department of Defense Agencies, such as DARPA
or the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The facts of Stan J. Caterbone's intimate discussions
with both his father and brother over the years before they died, the totality of documents that
were preserved in thier estate, including service records; letters; official court papers; high school
documents; and the like - all will prove that they were in fact part of MK ULTRA or one of it's
subprograms.
The following are the facts and the real record of the family history:
Samuel P. Caterbone, Jr., (Father) served in the Navy from 1943 to 1946 and
graduated with honors from Air Gunners School in Jacksonville, Florida. He was an exceptional
student/athlete while attending Lancaster Catholic High School, participating in the band as well
as sports. He was also his senior class secretary/treasurer. After the Navy, he went on to build a
successful dry cleaning business, which he is credited with inventing a filtration system for the
solvents.
He also developed a very good investment in real estate along the Manheim Pike,
owning several properties. By his own writings and from his personal accounts to me, he was
definitely a remote viewer for some U.S. Agency with telepathic abilities.
His viewing is
documented to have begun back in the early 1970's. He also suffered from organized stalking,
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traveler, this is documented by his passports. Samuel P. Caterbone, Jr., may have been a covert
carrier for someone in intelligence. Samuel P. Caterbone, Jr., had his mental health history laced
with electro shock therapy.
ULTRA. In addition, and especially disturbing is his criminal record with the Lancaster City Police
Department and the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas. In 1973 Samuel P. Caterbone, Jr.
was convicted of forging a 2 checks from the Caterbone Cleaners, Inc., checking account. The
one check to Joe the Motorists Store at the Manor Shopping Center was never entered into
evidence, it was for a total of $70.00.
James Coho for $200.00 with "divorce proceedings" written in the memo.
criminal record.
wrote an ORDER releasing him from probation and ordering him to "leave the vicinity of the
County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania". The President Judge of Lancaster County Court of Common
Pleas literally threw my father out of Lancaster County for forging 2 checks from his own
corporation. In 1987 I was arrested for stealing my own files from my own company, Financial
Management Group, Ltd., You can research the life of Candy Jones and Kate O'Brien to learn
more on this topic. Samuel Caterbone, Jr., has left enough writings and documentation to know
that his life fits the model for targeted individuals, complete with economic ruin, isolation,
disenfranchised from family and friends, and of course a fabricated mental illness history. You
can view most of his record online.
Samuel A. Caterbone, (Brother) served in the United States Air Force in 1968 to 1970.
In 1991, Stan J. Caterbone accused the United States Government of using his brother, Samuel
A. Caterbone for part of the LSD experiments on mind control, or MK ULTRA. A notarized letter of
October 23, 1991 was sent certified mail to the California Attorney General on the subject matter,
with a return letter from the California Attorney General on January 14, 1992.
By his own
admission before his death, Samuel A. Caterbone disclosed to Stan J. Caterbone of the "bad LSD"
trips while in the Air Force. Since his death of December 25, 1984, Stan J. Caterbone and others
questioned the classification of suicide, and made allegations of foul play that was ultimately
responsible for his death. Finally in a meeting in Santa Barbara, California with the Santa Barbara
Public Guardian's Office, an office admitted that the death was more likely due to foul plan than
suicide.
Samuel A. Caterbone was also an exceptional student and athlete while attending
Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, his hunting pants caught fire trying to stay warm.
Lancaster General Hospital for months, going through painful skin grafts and isolation.
The
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hunting accident interrupted his athletic career and scared his legs for life.
The Schizophrenia
diagnosis was a combination of LSD flashbacks and organized stalking and harassment.
Thomas P. Caterbone, (Brother) had an unfortunate transaction at Fulton Bank that set
a course of action that resulted in a suicide. Although diagnosed with Bipolar Disease and Manic
Depression -- embezzled and extorted monies were most likely the reason for his suicide in 1996.
Fulton Bank was involved in a fraud that took $72,000 from a real estate settlement closing and
lead to his total financial ruin and collapse in June of 1995. The funds were never recovered and
Fulton Bank is a defendant for a wrongful death claim in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in CATERBONE v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al., 05-cv-2288.
FULTON BANK triggered a severe and lethal death blow to Thomas P. Caterbone, and as of this
day has refused to acknowledge any wrongdoing or remorse. Thomas P. Caterbone was also an
exceptional athlete. Playing for Lancaster Catholic High School, Franklin and Marshall College, the
Harrisburg Patriots, and even the Philadelphia Eagles.
McCaskey and Franklin and Marshall College. Thomas P. Caterbone had a very successful lawn
and landscaping business before joining forces with John DePatto of United Financial Services and
selling residential mortgages.
James Guerin and ISC. Parent Bank, owned by ISC also foreclosed on 2323 New Danville Pike,
Conestoga, Pennsylvania in 1988, which was owned by Stan J. Caterbone. Thousands of dollars
of equity was extorted in the process, despite still being short sold for a profit to Mr. Keith
Kirchner, an executive of Lancaster Newspapers and former graduate of Lancaster Catholic High
School.
Stan J. Caterbone is a remote viewer, is telepathic, and a federal whistleblower with
an exceptional entrepreneurial record in spite of all of his adversaries and their assaults. In spite
of the U.S. Sponsored mind control and torture, he has endured and will prevail. Legally, Stan J.
Caterbone has been able to preserve his claims, and progress his legal challenges and claims
through both the federal and state court system appearing pro se, without the aid or expense of
additional legal counsel. Some of his claims and briefs will most likely be landmark decisions in
years to come. Stan J. Caterbone was a 2-Sport MVP at Lancaster Catholic High School, in both
football and track. Stan J. Caterbone never received less than a B grade in his four years of high
school and had an 87+ average. Stan J. Caterbone excelled in computer technologies, taking his
first full term course in 1975, while in high school and continuing into college at Millersville
University, graduating with a degree in business administration in 1980.
Stan J. Caterbone
excelled profoundly at building his companies, first beginning with Financial Management Group,
Ltd., then working with Tony Bongiovi of Power Station Studios and the "Digital Movie"; then
building Advanced Media Group, Ltd..
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foreclosures, Stan J. Caterbone has amassed a portfolio of impressive real estate deals that have
always paid off in profits, no matter how or when they were sold.
businesses.
Financial Management Group, Ltd., was a $20,000 dollar investment in 1986 and
was still sold for approximately $100,000 two years later, despite the false arrests and the
extortion of most of it's real value and equity.
The mental health history and the criminal records were completely fabricated, and a
close review and investigation into the actual court records and hospital records can prove that in
very short fashion.
There are TWO (2) ways to quickly dispute the Mental Health History and
Record:
One - Review the word "Delusional; delusions; etc.,;
used by mental health professionals, and the false reports by friends and family were associated
with facts, and matters of the official record, the complete opposite of the meaning of the word
"delusional". And they still exist to this very day.
Two - Review the 3 Fabricated Suicide Allegations of the following dates: August
10(?), 1987 at Burdette Tomlin Hospital (Cape May County New Jersey); February 18th(?), 2005
by Kerry Egan and the Southern Regional Police Department; and July 19, 2009 for the 302
Commitment by the Lancaster City Police Department at Lancaster General Hospital.
The Criminal Record is very similar, since 1987 Stanley J. Caterbone has had 31 false
arrests; formal charges and convictions dismissed prior to court proceedings or won on summary
appeals in the County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania; most of which Stan J. Caterbone appearing as
pro se (representing himself). These have resulted in civil complaints filed in 2008 in CATERBONE
v. The County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.
In all some
40,000 pages of documents are now filed and electronically scanned or microfilmed in
prothonotary offices. In addition in both the U.S. Federal Courts and the Lancaster County Court
of Common Pleas there are more than 11 hours of audio recordings; some 3,000 scanned
images; and several video broadcasts of the ISC News broadcasts all stored on a CD-ROM and
filed as an exhibit to some of the law suits filed by Stan J. Caterbone and Advanced Media Group,
as plaintiffs. Stan J. Caterbone has over 100 court docket sheet numbers in federal, state, and
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local courts.
There are also Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation records; Department of Welfare
and Lancaster County Assistance Office records; Local Real Estate Tax records; Lancaster County
Tax Assessment records; Social Security Administration Benefits records; Lancaster Catholic High
School transcripts; Millersville University transcripts; all for Stan J. Caterbone, in addition to his
court filings.
For Samuel A. Caterbone, my brother, there are United States Air Force service
records; Lancaster Catholic High School transcripts; Millersville University transcripts; Social
Security Administration records; Santa Barbara County Guardian and Public Defender records;
and papers and documents persevered from his estate.
For Samuel P. Caterbone, my father, there are United States Naval records, Lancaster
Catholic High School transcripts; Social Security Administration records; Lancaster County
Assistance Office records; Local Real Estate Tax records; Lancaster County Tax Assessment
records; Samuel Caterbone Cleaners, Inc., corporate records; Real Estate Deeds and Mortgages;
Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas civil and criminal records; and of course papers and
documents persevered from his estate
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often the evolution of most technologies born out of the U.S. Department of Defense.
Top Secret experiments and the resulting technological advancements can stay
secretive for so long.
broadcast on WHAN Coast to Coast with a guest that was one of the leading Physicist
turned Remote Viewer and expert that testified to this same notion.
________________________________
Stan J. Caterbone
Advanced Media Group, Targeted Individual
Member Freedom From Covert Harassment and
Surveillance Organizations
Pro Se Litigant, U.S. District & Commonwealth of PA
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
[email protected]
www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com
717-826-5354
888-533-3606 Facsimile
October 2, 2009
U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
September 7, 2009
Stan J. Caterbone
Advance Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17603
Derrick Robinson
Freedom From Covert Harassment and Surveillance
P.O. Box 9022
Cincinnati, Ohio 45209
Phone 1-800-571-5618
Fax 1-866-433-4170
email: [email protected]
Re: Is County of Lancaster, Pennsylvania Ground Zero for Organized
Stalking and Covert Surveillance?
Derrick,
My pleasure. Derrick, I was trying to get group rates at our new Lancaster
Convention Center Marriot Hotel last week, just as a little fact finding mission. I
have a theory that I would like to send your way. I thought it would be very
fruitful to bring some TI's together for a conference, unless you think the
exposure would be harmful.
I believe that they try new models for harassment; organized stalking and
surveillance on me here in Lancaster. Remember, Lancaster is now one of the
most "Watched Communities" in the country. "With those cameras, the Safety
Coalition will operate and monitor 165 cameras across Lancaster City making
Lancaster the most watched city of its size in the nation." See article attached,
Watching you: City to add 105 more cameras.
I believe that Lancaster may be ground zero for some of the models of organized
stalking and harassment that we TI's experience and wanted to get some
reaction from Lancaster. Some history on the Lancaster Convention Center. Dale
High of High Industries is the lead partner in our new convention center/hotel. It
is first class all the way. Now in the late 1980's I was a joint venture partner with
Dale High in American Helix Technology Company/Advanced Media Group.
American Helix was a cd manufacturer and I and my company Advanced Media
Group was the CD-ROM division of American Helix. I was one of a handful of CDROM manufacturers in the domestic United States back then. Also in 2005 I filed
a civil action against the lead hotel, the Eden Resort Inn, for trying to block the
development and building of the Hotel/Convention Center, see attached.
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Now, some history about Lancaster and the intelligence community. Back in the
1980's there were several defense contractors located in Lancaster, the main
being International Signal & Control, which I, of course, blew the whistle on a
billion dollar fraud and arms to Iraq.
Click here for an overview of ISC.
Click here to see the Lancaster Newspapers Archives regarding International
Signal
&
Control,
or
ISC.
Click here to view the live video of the WGAL-TV News Broadcast of October 31,
1991 the evening of the ISC indictments. The U.S. Department of Justice and
other U.S. Agencies held a Press Conference in the Philadelphia Federal
Courthouse to announce the indictments and $ Billion Dollar Fraud.
Click here for Part 2 of the WGAL-TV 8 Broadcast.
Now politically, Lancaster is and has always been predominately Republican.
Lancaster is one of the oldest cities in the country and our courthouse was one of
the first in this country. Lancaster has one of the oldest fraternities of the
Masons. Lancaster and the George W.Bush administration has a close and very
"interesting relationship". George H. Bush had a very close relationship with ISC,
and of course the NSA and CIA all had a very "close" relationship with
International Signal & Control, or ISC. The following are some transcripts for Ted
Koppel and ABC News Nightline regarding ISC and Arms to Iraq and the
intelligence community. The transcripts are contained in my Amicus for Case No.
2006-cv-2160 filed in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division.
Now, Robert Gates, presently the Secretary of the United States Defense
Department, and his relationship to Lancaster. First of all, the attached video is
the authentic transcript of Robert Gates' confirmation hearing in September of
1991 for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). If you fast forward
to approximately 9:00:00 you will see the back and forth questions from Senator
Murkowski to Robert Gates regarding the allegations by several members of the
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding his alleged involvement
with ISC and the Arms deals with Carlos Cardoen and the shipping of cluster
bombs through South Africa and on to Iraq. Of course, he denied all of the
allegations.
Robert Gates also has relatives that live in Lancaster County, if fact he attended a
wedding here a few months ago, on May 3, 2009 at St. John Neuman Catholic
Church in Manhiem Township, Lancaster County. His wife has a niece that lives in
Manheim Township.
Now, I'll give you the ABC News Nightline May 23, 1991 excerpt regarding ISC
and the NSA, National Security Agency:
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
"It all started legally, if covertly, back in 1974. That's when the National Security
Agency, a super-secret U.S. Intelligence unit asked ISC to help complete project
X, a chain of electronic listening posts based at South Africa's Simonstown Naval
Station. South Africa was using these posts to follow Soviet submarine traffic off
of the Cape of Good Hope. To ensure secrecy, ISC and the NSA made sure
shipments could not be tracked back to them. They created a company called
Gamma Systems Associates. In fact, this company was nothing more than a post
office box at John F. Kennedy Airport. Gamma was a cut-out. ... But this
sanctioned covert operation was stopped in 1977 when President Carter, a strong
opponent of South Africa's apartheid regime, told U.S. firms to stop any militaryrelated business with Pretoria. But ISC continue shipping electronics, some
civilian, some military, to South Africa. The in the early 1980's, South Africa
began to intensify its efforts at ballistic missile development. For ISC, that was a
golden opportunity because on of its top executives was a man named Clyde
Ivey, an American electronics expert who has been the father of South Africa's
missile program. Ivey had extraordinary contacts in the nations defense
structure. Begining in 1984, federal investigators say, senior ISC exeutives,
including Ivey, began regular contacts with CIA officials." You can read the rest.
The entire transcript of the May 23, 1991 ABC News/Nightline broadcast.
Now remember, George H. Bush was director of CIA. "He served in this role for
357 days, from January 30, 1976 to January 20, 1977.[22] The CIA had been
rocked by a series of revelations, including those based on investigations by
Senator Frank Church's Committee regarding illegal and unauthorized activities
by the CIA, and Bush was credited with helping to restore the agency's
morale.[23] In his capacity as DCI, Bush gave national security briefings to
Jimmy Carter both as a Presidential candidate and as President-elect, and
discussed the possibility of remaining in that position in a Carter
administration[24] but it was not to be," according to Wikipedia.
Now, lets get to Bobby Ray Inman, former Navy, Director of the National Security
Agency (NSA), former Director of International Signal & Control (ISC), and
currently part of the Mind Control industry. The following appears on the
Welcome page of my website:
"S.A.I.C. involvement in 1993 American Para psychological Association meeting
arrangements, via their 'Cognitive Sciences Laboratory'. Science Applications
International Corporation is a big time defense contractor, has held the largest
number of research contracts of any defense contractor. Bobby Ray Inman (ISC
Board of Directors) is on its board of directors, among others."
by John Porter, CIA Program on Mind Control copyright 1996. In 1994, after
Bobby Ray Inman requested to be withdrawn from consideration as Bill Clinton's
first Defense Secretary, his critics speculated that the decision was motivated by
a desire to conceal his links to ISC. Inman was a member of the so-called
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"shadow board" of the company which was allegedly either negligent or approved
the exports." by Wikipedia on International Signal and Control, (ISC).
Now, lets list the former Navy personnel:
George H. Bush, former President of the United States, former Director of
CIA.
James Guerin, President and Founder of International Signal & Control.
Bobby Ray Inman, former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA)
and Director of International Signal & Control, (ISC).
My father, Samuel P. Cateronne, Jr.
His father, Samuel J. Caterbone, Sr.
George Noory, of Coast to Coast Radio (just anecdotal, nothing assumed or
alleged).
George W. Bush flew with the Navy.
James Cross
I will Finish later and add more.
Next we get to Jim Guerin's attorney back in 1989 through at least 1992. His
name was Joseph Tate, of Philadelpha. This link will take you to a document
regarding Joseph Tate, James Guerin and Joseph Roda, Esq., of Lancaster, my
former attorney who said I fabricated everything back in 1987. The document
contains a letter of September 12, 2005 from Special Prosecutor Patrick
Fitzgerald regarding Scooter Libby, Former Vice President Dick Cheney's Chief of
Staff. the letter involves Scooter Libby's Grand Jury Indictment for leaking
Covert CIA Operative Valerie Plame and eventually outing her.
Now in Austin Texas in July of 2005 I was detained by 2 Agents from The Defense
Intelligence Agency. I was merely visiting a Military Museum, that had old and
vintage helicopters and airplanes. near where my brother, Dr. Phillip Caterbone
lived. I was visiting on my way to California. While inside the museum 2 Agents
from the Department of Defense Defense Intelligence Agency escorted me
outside to my Honda Oddesey and interrogated me making me confirm that I was
visiting and staying with my brother. They caused a problem for my brother's
Medical Practice by shaking up one of his secretaries. The reviewed my court
documents for CATERBONE v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al., Case No. 2005-cv0288 filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The
demanded that I stay off all military bases before releasing me.
In 2006 I was telepathic with an older NSA executive on many occasions who
wanted to meet me at the Clipper Stadium who told me he wanted to rent a
facility in Lancaster for a training exercise. I told him to to and see Dale High and
the High Group for space at the Greenfield Industrial Park. He said he was
retiring and that our discussions were keeping him a few weeks longer than
expected. We had intimate discussions of my history and the Chesapeake Bay
Area. We also discussed Sheryl Crow, and he told me his wife was a fan. I turned
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
him on to her new album, Wildflower, and he said she liked it. We had to
disengage because he was being harassed by other telepathic assailants.
My former secretary (Susan Bare) at Pflumm Contractors, Inc., where I was
controller and was hired to rescue the company from near bankruptcy in 1993,
told me that her husband, Ross Bare, who grew up just some 10 or so doors from
me, worked for the NSA. She disclosed this soon after I hired her in 1994 or
1995.
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U.S. Sponsored Mind Control and the 2009 Senate Investigations into CIA Interrogation Programs
Stan J. Caterbone
Advanced Media Group, Targeted Individual
Member Freedom From Covert Harassment and Surveillance Organizations
Pro Se Litigant, U.S. District & Commonwealth of PA
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
[email protected]
www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com
717-826-5354
888-533-3606 Facsimile
October 2, 2009