Syria Paper
Syria Paper
former territory and cannot provide basic needs to its citizens? Do other
nations have the right to intrude in what is, in name, a civil war?
These tensions define the Syrian conflict.
(If you use 1.5 spacing in Arial 12, this is the most you can write in two pages)
Syrias counterinsurgency strategy is informed by the previous experience of
the Assad regime in suppressing the 19771982 Muslim Brotherhood
rebellion and by Soviet/Russian doctrine developed during the Soviet Unions
occupation of Afghanistan and Russias two wars in Chechnya. It is a ruthless
approach that differs significantly from Western counterinsurgency doctrine,
which places emphasis on population protection and avoidance of civilian
casualties and collateral damage combined with efforts to win the hearts and
minds of the people. That doctrine reflects the fact that insurgencies in distant
lands are not viewed as existential threats to Western governments.
Moreover, such missions come out of the chutes burdened with guilt arising
from colonial pasts or questions about their legitimacy. Syrias history is
different, and so are the lessons the regime draws from that experience. The
1982 uprising in Hama culminated five years of guerrilla warfare and terrorist
assassinations. When Islamist rebels seized control of the city of Hama in a
final showdown with the Hafez al-Assad government in 1982, government
forces sealed off the town and pounded it with artillery before sending in army
commandos and Baathist Party irregulars to mop up the resistance. The
military operation lasted three weeks, razing entire districts and killing
thousands of civilians. Although widely denounced by the international
community, Syrias brutal response succeeded in snuffing out any wider
resistance to Damascus, preventing precisely the kind of chaos seen in the
country today. At issue now is regime survival. If Syria cannot be saved, those
loyal to the government are committed to protecting themselves against the
annihilation that they believe will be their fate if the rebels triumph. Syrias
campaign against the insurgency is characterized by the static defense of
major population centers, sectarian enclaves, military bases, and strategic
lines of communication. This has required withdrawing from large portions of
the country. Offensive operations in key areas the government must hold
feature intensive aerial and artillery bombardment followed by clearing
operations carried out by commandos or militias. It is destructive and
indiscriminate. Airpower and artillery are also used to pound areas not under
government control, deliberately targeting crops, bakeries (a critical source of
food for many), and hospitalsdestroying commerce and the infrastructure of
life support. The objective is to force people to move out of rebel zones,
thereby depriving the rebels of popular support. These tactics explain the vast
numbers of refugees. Military operations are supplemented by intensive
propaganda programs portraying the regimes opponents as terrorists and
As the US military strikes Isis in Iraq, President Bashar al-Assads forces have
significantly stepped up their own campaign against militant strongholds in
Syria, carrying out dozens of air strikes against the Islamist groups
headquarters in the past two days. But in hitting hard against Isis, Assad has
another motive. His aerial bombardment of militant strongholds in Syria in a
way mirrors the US militarys air strikes against extremists across the border
in Iraq.
Assads strikes aim at sending a message that he is on the same side as the
Americans, reinforcing the Syrian governments longstanding claim that it is a
partner in the fight against terrorism and a counterbalance to extremists. That
comes after the US itself nearly bombed Syria after it blamed Assads forces
for a chemical weapons attack on rebel-held areas near Damascus last August.
Support for Assad
if Assad is knocked out of power or if the rebels are not exterminated by the
SA then the country will be thrown into an eternal proxy warfare. FSA is in no
respected position to form a coercive government. They barely have control
over their own people and they are helpless against the growing number of
fundamentalist factions who will eventually unite for their common cause
against the FSA once Bashar is out of power. You'll have pro-Assad groups
combating anti-Assad groups, members of families seeking revenge from their
killed loved one (this goes both ways), Iran-backed mercenaries, Saudi-backed
mercenaries, the remaining FSA, and al-Qaeda-linked groups as well as many
other heavily backed fundamentalist groups, all fighting each other, just as
shown in other middle-eastern countries, Syria being the worst. Not only that,
but Assad, the state and many other key positions in security and wealth are
virtually indistinguishable due to his dictatorship which involves the close
relationship between the state and the upper-class. Killing all of the Assad
supporters would be like hitting the reset button on the Syrian economic
timeline, given that most of their infrastructure is already vastly in ruin. For
the FSA to think that they can walk straight into office unopposed while
expecting the people to obey their order is a joke. A funny, sad joke. Iran has
many U.S. military bases with their guns pointed directly at it, I doubt they
would accept another one.
Although it is sad to say in such a gloomy situation, the only hope for the
Syrian people is if Bashar stays in power for his remaining term (which he
added in the constitution due to protest) and neutralize all rebel factions,
including the FSA, and then give the people the human rights they deserve.
Otherwise there will be no rights, now law; just anarchy.