Ang Tibay Enumerated The Constitutional Requirements of Due Process, Which Ang Tibay Described As The

G.R. Nos.
212140-41, January 21, 2015

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. BERSAMIN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,
FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay described as the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
22
administrative character. These requirements are fundamental and essential because without these,
there is no due process as mandated by the Constitution. These fundamental and essential requirements
cannot be taken away by legislation because they are part of constitutional due process. These fundamental
and essential requirements are:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1)
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must considerthe evidence
presented.
x
x
x.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision
with
absolutely
nothing
to
support
it
is
a
nullity,
x
x
x.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. x x x.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in
the
record
and
disclosed
to
the
parties
affected.
x
x
x.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views
of
a
subordinate
in
arriving
at
a
decision.
x
x
x.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.23
G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015 - SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. BERSAMIN,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015
SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. BERSAMIN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION AND ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine
the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly
provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine.
- Paderanga v. Drilon1
This case is a Petition for Certiorari2 with prayer for (1) the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondents Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), Field
Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and Atty. Levito D.
Baligod (Atty. Baligod) (collectively, respondents), from conducting further proceedings in OMB-C-C-1303013 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 until the present Petition has been resolved with finality; and (2) this Courts
declaration that petitioner Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada (Sen. Estrada) was denied due process of law,
and that the Order of the Ombudsman dated 27 March 2014 and the proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-03013 and
OMB-C-C-13-0397 subsequent to and affected by the issuance of the challenged 27 March 2014 Order are
void.
OMB-C-C-13-0313,3 entitled National Bureau of Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod v. Jose Jinggoy P.
Ejercito Estrada, et al., refers to the complaint for Plunder as defined under Republic Act (RA) No. 7080,
while OMB-C-C-13-0397,4 entitled Field Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman v. Jose Jinggoy P.
Ejercito-Estrada, et al., refers to the complaint for Plunder as defined under RA No. 7080 and for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
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The Facts
On 25 November 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-130313, filed by the NBI and Atty. Baligod, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for Plunder
as defined in RA No. 7080 be conducted against Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in
OMB-C-C-13-0313 on 9 January 2014.
On 3 December 2013, the Ombudsman served upon Sen. Estrada a copy of the complaint in OMB-C-C-130397, filed by the FIO of the Ombudsman, which prayed, among others, that criminal proceedings for
Plunder, as defined in RA No. 7080, and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, be conducted against
Sen. Estrada. Sen. Estrada filed his counter-affidavit in OMB-C-C-13-0397 on 16 January 2014.
Eighteen of Sen. Estradas co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9
December 2013 and 14 March 2014.5
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the
Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings (Request) in OMB-C-C-13-0313. In his
Request, Sen. Estrada asked for copies of the following documents:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Affidavit of [co-respondent] Ruby Tuason (Tuason);

Affidavit of [co-respondent] Dennis L. Cunanan (Cunanan);
Counter-Affidavit of [co-respondent] Gondelina G. Amata (Amata);
Counter-Affidavit of [co-respondent] Mario L. Relampagos
(Relampagos);
(e) Consolidated Reply of complainant NBI, if one had been filed; and
(f) Affidavits/Counter-Affidavits/Pleadings/Filings filed by all the other

respondents and/or additional witnesses for the Complainants. 6
Sen. Estradas request was made [p]ursuant to the right of a respondent to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court) and to have access to the evidence on record (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).7
chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
On 27 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued the assailed Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313. The pertinent portions
of the assailed Order read:
This Office finds however finds [sic] that the foregoing provisions [pertaining to Section 3[b], Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court and Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman] do
not entitle respondent [Sen. Estrada] to befurnished all the filings of the respondents.
Rule 112 (3) (a) & (c) of the Rules of Court provides [sic]:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall beaccompanied by the affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish probable
cause
xxx xxx xxx

(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to
and certified as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the
complainant.
Further to quote the rule in furnishing copies of affidavits to parties under the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman [Section 4 of Rule II of Administrative Order No. 07 issued on April 10, 1990]:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall require
the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto
a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondents to submit, within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of service
thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of
the counter-affidavits.
It can be gleaned from these aforecited provisions that this Office is required to furnish [Sen. Estrada] a
copy of the Complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents; and this Office complied with this
requirement when it furnished [Sen. Estrada] with the foregoing documents attached to the Orders to File
Counter-Affidavit dated 19 November 2013 and 25 November 2013.
It is to be noted that there is no provision under this Offices Rules of Procedure which entitles respondent to
be furnished all the filings by the other parties, e.g. the respondents. Ruby Tuason, Dennis Cunanan,
Gondelina G. Amata and Mario L. Relampagos themselves are all respondents in these cases. Under the
Rules of Court as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the respondents
areonly required to furnish their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence to thecomplainant,
and not to the other respondents.
To reiterate, the rights of respondent [Sen.] Estrada in the conduct of the preliminary investigation depend
on the rights granted to him by law and these cannot be based on whatever rights he believes [that] he is
entitled to or those that may be derived from the phrase due process of law.
Thus, this Office cannot grant his motion to be furnished with copies of all the filings by the other parties.
Nevertheless, he should be furnished a copy of the Reply of complainant NBI as he is entitled thereto under
the rules; however, as of this date, no Reply has been filed by complainant NBI.
WHEREFORE, respondent [Sen.] Estradas Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the
Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings is DENIED. He is nevertheless entitled to
be furnished a copy of the Reply if complainant opts to file such pleading. 8 (Emphases in the original)
On 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 a Joint
Resolution9 which found probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with one count of
plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014) dated 7 April 2014. Sen. Estrada prayed for
the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsmans 27 March 2014 Order denying
his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and
set aside the 27 March 2014 Order.
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THE ARGUMENTS
Sen. Estrada raised the following grounds in his Petition:
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IN ISSUING THE CHALLENGED ORDER DATED 27 MARCH 2014, ACTED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED SEN. ESTRADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.10
Sen. Estrada also claimed that under the circumstances, he has no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, except through this Petition.11 Sen. Estrada applied for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain public respondents
from conducting further proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397. Finally, Sen. Estrada
asked for a judgment declaring that (a) he has been denied due process of law, and as a consequence
thereof, (b) the Order dated 27 March 2014, as well as the proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C13-0397 subsequent to and affected by the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order, are void. 12
On the same date, 7 May 2014, the Ombudsman issued in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-130397 a Joint Order furnishing Sen. Estrada with the counter-affidavits of Tuason, Cunanan,
Amata, Relampagos, Francisco Figura, Gregoria Buenaventura, and Alexis Sevidal, and directing
him to comment thereon within a non-extendible period of five days from receipt of the order.
On 12 May 2014, Sen. Estrada filed before the Ombudsman a motion to suspend proceedings in OMB-C-C13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 because the denial of his Request to be furnished copies of counteraffidavits of his co-respondents deprived him of his right to procedural due process, and he has filed the
present Petition before this Court. The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estradas motion to suspend in an Order
dated 15 May 2014. Sen. Estrada filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 May 2014 but his
motion was denied in an Order dated 3 June 2014.
As of 2 June 2014, the date of filing of the Ombudsmans Comment to the present Petition, Sen.
Estrada had not filed a comment on the counter-affidavits furnished to him. On 4 June 2014, the
Ombudsman issued a Joint Order in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-0397 denying, among other
motions filed by the other respondents, Sen. Estradas motion for reconsideration dated 7 April 2014. The
pertinent portion of the 4 June 2014 Joint Order stated:
While it is true that Senator Estradas request for copies of Tuason, Cunanan, Amata, Relampagos, Figura,
Buenaventura and Sevidals affidavits was denied by Order dated 27 March 2014 and before the
promulgation of the assailed Joint Resolution, this Office thereafter re-evaluated the request and granted it
by Order dated 7 May 2014 granting his request. Copies of the requested counter-affidavits were appended
to the copy of the Order dated 7 May 2014 transmitted to Senator Estrada through counsel.
This Office, in fact, held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration in this
proceeding in light of its grant to Senator Estrada a period of five days from receipt of the 7 May
2014 Order to formally respond to the above-named co-respondents claims.
In view of the foregoing, this Office fails to see how Senator Estrada was deprived of his right to procedural
due process.13 (Emphasis supplied)
On 2 June 2014, the Ombudsman, the FIO, and the NBI (collectively, public respondents), through the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment to the present Petition. The public respondents argued that:
I. PETITIONER [SEN. ESTRADA] WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS PROCEDURALLY INFIRM.

A. LITIS PENDENTIA EXISTS IN THIS CASE.
B. PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW.
III. PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER.14
On 6 June 2014, Atty. Baligod filed his Comment to the present Petition. Atty. Baligod stated that Sen.
Estradas resort to a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is improper. Sen. Estrada should have either filed a
motion for reconsideration of the 27 March 2014 Order or incorporated the alleged irregularity in his motion
for reconsideration of the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution. There was also no violation of Sen. Estradas right
to due process because there is no rule which mandates that a respondent such as Sen. Estrada be
furnished with copies of the submissions of his co-respondents.
On 16 June 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Reply to the public respondents Comment. Sen. Estrada insisted
that he was denied due process. Although Sen. Estrada received copies of the counter-affidavits of Cunanan,
Amata, Relampagos, Buenaventura, Figura, Sevidal, as well as one of Tuasons counter-affidavits, he claimed
that he was not given the following documents:
a) One other Counter-Affidavit of Ruby Tuason dated 21 February 2014;
b) Counter-Affidavit of Sofia D. Cruz dated 31 January 2014;

c) Counter-Affidavit of Evelyn Sugcang dated 11 February 2014;
d) Two (2) Counter-Affidavits of Alan A. Javellana dated 06 February 2014;
e) Counter-Affidavit of Victor Roman Cojamco Cacal dated 11 December 2013 (to the FIO Complaint);
f) Counter-Affidavit of Victor Roman Cojamco Cacal dated 22 January 2014 (to the NBI Complaint);
g) Two (2) counter-affidavits of Ma. Julie A. Villaralvo-Johnson both dated 14 March 2014;
h) Counter-affidavit of Rhodora Bulatad Mendoza dated 06 March 2014;
i) Counter-affidavit of Maria Ninez P. Guaizo dated 28 January 2014;
j) Two (2) counter-affidavits of Marivic V. Jover both dated 09 December 2013; and
k) Counter-affidavit of Francisco B. Figura dated 08 January 2014.
Sen. Estrada argues that the Petition is not rendered moot by the subsequent issuance of the 7 May 2014
Joint Order because there is a recurring violation of his right to due process. Sen. Estrada also insists that
there is no forum shopping as the present Petition arose from an incident in the main proceeding, and that
he has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Finally, Sen. Estrada
reiterates his application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain public respondents from conducting further proceedings in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and
OMB-C-C-13-0397.
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This Courts Ruling

Considering the facts narrated above, the Ombudsmans denial in its 27 March 2014 Order of Sen. Estradas
Request did not constitute grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, the denial did not violate Sen. Estradas
constitutional right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.
We reproduce below Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule
II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.
From the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 112: Preliminary Investigation
Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for
the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of who must
certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss it if he
finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the respondent attaching to it a
copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.
The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which
he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these
shall be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense.
Objects as evidence need not be furnished a party but shall be made available for examination, copying, or
photographing at the expense of the requesting party.
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and supporting affidavits and
documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting
documents relied upon for his defense. The counter-affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to and certified
as provided in paragraph (a) of this section, with copies thereof furnished by him to the complainant. The
respondent shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the
ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the evidence presented by
the complainant.
(e) The investigating officer may set a hearing if there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or a
witness. The parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-examine. They
may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be asked to the party or witness
concerned.
The hearing shall be held within ten (10) days from submission of the counter-affidavits and other
documents or from the expiration of the period for their submission. It shall be terminated within five (5)
days.
(f) Within ten (10) days after the investigation, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there
is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. If the investigating prosecutor finds
cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under
oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined
the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit
controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10)
days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior
written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his recommendation is
disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy
on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the information against the
respondent, or direct any other assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another
preliminary investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu
proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same rule shall apply in preliminary investigations conducted by
the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.

From the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Administrative Order No. 7, Rule II: Procedure
in Criminal Cases
Section 1. Grounds. A criminal complaint may be brought for an offense in violation of R.A. 3019, as
amended, R.A. 1379, as amended, R.A. 6713, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 of the Revised Penal Code, and
for such other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to office.
Sec. 2. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it
may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
Sec. 3. Preliminary investigation; who may conduct. Preliminary investigation may be conducted by any
of the following:
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
3) Deputized Prosecutors;
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or
5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.
Sec. 4. Procedure. The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer shall
require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the
complaints.
b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file
reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits.
c) If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the investigating officer may consider the comment
filed by him, if any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event,the respondent shall have access to
the evidence on record.
d) No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of
particulars be entertained. If respondent desires any matter in the complainants affidavit to be clarified, the
particularization thereof may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the manner provided in
paragraph (f) of this section.
e) If the respondent cannot be served with the order mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been
served, does not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of
the evidence on record.

f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting evidences, there are facts material to the
case which the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing
during which the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the appearance of the parties or witnesses is
impracticable, the clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to
be asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and served on the witness
concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing and under oath.
g) Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall forward the records of
the case together with his resolution to the designated authorities for their appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of
the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy
Ombudsman in all other cases.
xxxx
Sec. 6. Notice to parties. The parties shall be served with a copy of the resolution as finally approved by
the Ombudsman or by the proper Deputy Ombudsman.
Sec. 7. Motion for reconsideration. a) Only one (1) motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper deputy ombudsman as the case may be.
xxxx
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the corresponding
Information in court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion.
(Emphasis supplied)
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates
his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which
states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estradas claim.
What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish the
respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b),
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, [a]fter such affidavits [of
the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order,
attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x. At this point, there is still no
counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counteraffidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse
of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which
denied Sen. Estradas Request.
Although Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a
respondent shall have access to the evidence on record, this provision should be construed in relation
to Section 4(a) and (b) of the same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4(a)
states that the investigating officer shall require the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute
affidavits to substantiate the complaint. The supporting witnesses are the witnesses of the complainant,
and do not refer to the co-respondents.
Second, Section 4(b) states that the investigating officer shall issue an order attaching thereto a copy of
the affidavits and all other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit.
The affidavits referred to in Section 4(b) are the affidavits mentioned in Section 4(a). Clearly, the affidavits
to be furnished to the respondent are the affidavits of the complainant and his supporting witnesses. The
provision in the immediately succeeding Section 4(c) of the same Rule II that a respondent shall have
access to the evidence on record does not stand alone, but should be read in relation to the provisions of
Section 4(a and b) of the same Rule II requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant or supporting witnesses.
Thus, a respondents access to evidence on record in Section 4(c), Rule II of the Ombudsmans Rules of
Procedure refers to the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant or supporting witnesses
in Section 4(a) of the same Rule II.
Third, Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [t]he respondent
shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have
been furnished and to copy them at his expense. A respondents right to examine refers only to the
evidence submitted by the complainant.
Thus, whether under Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or under Rule II of the
Ombudsmans Rules of Procedure, there is no requirement whatsoever that the affidavits executed by the
co-respondents should be furnished to a respondent.
Justice Velascos dissent relies on the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Reyes (Reyes case),15 anadministrative case, in which a different set of rules of procedure and standards
apply. Sen. Estradas Petition, in contrast, involves the preliminary investigation stage in a criminal case.
Rule III on the Procedure in Administrative Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
applies in the Reyes case, while Rule II on the Procedure in Criminal Cases of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman applies in Sen. Estradas Petition. In both cases, the Rules of Court apply in a
suppletory character or by analogy.16
In the Reyes case, the complainant Acero executed an affidavit against Reyes and Pealoza, who were both
employees of the Land Transportation Office. Pealoza submitted his counter-affidavit, as well as those of his
two witnesses. Reyes adopted his counter-affidavit in another case before the Ombudsman as it involved the
same parties and the same incident. None of the parties appeared during the preliminary conference.
Pealoza waived his right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit the case for resolution based on
the evidence on record. Pealoza also submitted a counter-affidavit of his third witness. The Ombudsman
found Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and dismissed him from the service. On the other hand, Pealoza
was found guilty of simple misconduct and penalized with suspension from office without pay for six months.
This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals finding that Reyes right to due process was indeed violated.
This Court remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman, for two reasons: (1) Reyes should not
have been meted the penalty of dismissal from the service when the evidence was not substantial, an d (2)
there was disregard of Reyes right to due process because he was not furnished a copy of the counteraffidavits of Pealoza and of Pealozas three witnesses. In the Reyes case, failure to furnish a copy of
the counter-affidavits happened in the administrative proceedings on the merits, which resulted
in Reyes dismissal from the service. In Sen. Estradas Petition, the denial of his Request happened
during the preliminary investigation where the only issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose
of determining whether an information should be filed, and does not prevent Sen. Estrada from requesting a
copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even during the trial.
We should remember to consider the differences in adjudicating cases, particularly an administrative case
and a criminal case:
Any lawyer worth his salt knows that quanta of proof and adjective rules vary depending on whether the
cases to which they are meant to apply are criminal, civil or administrative in character. In criminal actions,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for conviction; in civil actions and proceedings, preponderance of
evidence, as support for a judgment; and in administrative cases, substantial evidence, as basis for
adjudication. In criminal and civil actions, application of the Rules of Court is called for, with more or less
strictness. In administrative proceedings, however, the technical rules of pleading and procedure, and of
evidence, are not strictly adhered to; they generally apply only suppletorily; indeed, in agrarian disputes
application of the Rules of Court is actually prohibited. 17
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers to establish his innocence.18 Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are
limited to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether
there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to engender a well founded belief as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.We are in accord with the state prosecutors findings in the case at bar that there
exists prima facie evidence of petitioners involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently
supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioners argument that the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are
inadmissible as to him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to crossexamine the witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counteraffidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.Thus, even if
petitioner was not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and Hanopol at the time they were
presented to testify during the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he cannot assert any
legal right to cross-examine them at the preliminary investigation precisely because such right was never
available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial
court during the trial proper and not in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the
Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court if
not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And, even if the prosecution does present such
testimonies, petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can rule on the admissibility thereof; or
the petitioner can, during the trial, petition said court to compel the presentation of Galarion and Hanopol
for purposes of cross-examination.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in citing the Reyes case, Justice Velascos dissent overlooked a vital portion of the Court of
Appeals reasoning. This Court quoted from the Court of Appeals decision: x x x [A]dmissions made by
Pealoza in his sworn statement are binding only on him. Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another.In OMB-C-C-13-0313
and OMB-C-C-13-0397, the admissions of Sen. Estradas co-respondents can in no way prejudice
Sen. Estrada. Even granting Justice Velascos argument that the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-CC-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-13-039720 mentioned the testimonies of Sen. Estradas co-respondents like Tuason
and Cunanan, their testimonies were merely corroborative of the testimonies of complainants witnesses
Benhur Luy, Marina Sula, and Merlina Suas and were not mentioned in isolation from the testimonies of
complainants witnesses.
Moreover, the sufficiency of the evidence put forward by the Ombudsman against Sen. Estrada to establish
its finding of probable cause in the 28 March 2014 Joint Resolution in OMB-C-C-13-0313 and OMB-C-C-130397 was judicially confirmed by the Sandiganbayan, when it examined the evidence,found probable
cause, and issued a warrant of arrest against Sen. Estrada on 23 June 2014.
We likewise take exception to Justice Brions assertion that the due process standards that at the very
least should be considered in the conduct of a preliminary investigation are those that this Court
first articulated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations [Ang Tibay].21 Simply put, the Ang
Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary investigations in criminal cases. An
application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations will have absurd and disastrous
consequences.
Ang Tibay enumerated the constitutional requirements of due process, which Ang Tibay described as the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.22 These requirements are fundamental and essential because without these,
there is no due process as mandated by the Constitution. These fundamental and essential requirements
cannot be taken away by legislation because they are part of constitutional due process. These fundamental
and essential requirements are:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must considerthe evidence presented. x x x.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with
absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, x x x.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. x x x.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. x x x.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. x x x.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. 23
The guidelines set forth in Ang Tibay are further clarified in GSIS v. CA24 (GSIS): what Ang Tibayfailed to
explicitly state was, prescinding from the general principles governing due process, the requirement of an
impartial tribunal which, needless to say, dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute may not sit as
judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he review his decision on appeal.25 The GSIS clarification
affirms the non-applicability of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations in criminal cases: The
investigating officer, which is the role that the Office of the Ombudsman plays in the investigation and
prosecution of government personnel, will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary investigation, after
conducting its own fact-finding investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing an information,
and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under the law, which is the
purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay. The investigating officer investigates, determines probable
cause, and prosecutes the criminal case after filing the corresponding information.
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts are not clogged with weak cases
that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a person from the travails of a needless prosecution. 26 The
Ombudsman and the prosecution service under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the
Department of Justice are inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing officer, judge and jury of the
respondent in preliminary investigations. Obviously, this procedure cannot comply with Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. However, there is nothing unconstitutional with this procedure because this is merely an
Executive function, a part of the law enforcement process leading to trial in court where the requirements
mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, will apply. This has been the procedure under the 1935, 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. To now rule that Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, should apply to preliminary
investigations will mean that all past and present preliminary investigations are in gross violation of
constitutional due process
The rights to due process in administrative cases as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
granted by the Constitution; hence, these rights cannot be taken away by mere legislation. On the other
hand, as repeatedly reiterated by this Court, the right to a preliminary investigation is merely a statutory
32
right, not part of the fundamental and essential requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang
Tibay and amplified in GSIS. Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The
constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary
investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his right to confront
the witnesses against him.
33
A preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing
the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
34
It is, moreover, necessary to distinguish between the constitutionally guaranteed rights of an accused and
the right to a preliminary investigation. To treat them the same will lead to absurd and disastrous
consequences. All pending criminal cases in all courts throughout the country will have to be
remanded to the preliminary investigation level because none of these will satisfyAng Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations are conducted by prosecutors, who are the same officials who
will determine probable cause and prosecute the cases in court. The prosecutor is hardly the impartial
tribunal contemplated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. A reinvestigation by an investigating officer
outside of the prosecution service will be necessary if Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, were to be applied.
This will require a new legislation. In the meantime, all pending criminal cases in all courts will have to be
remanded for reinvestigation, to proceed only when a new law is in place. To require Ang Tibay, as amplified
in GSIS, to apply to preliminary investigation will necessarily change the concept of preliminary investigation
as we know it now. Applying the constitutional due process in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to
preliminary investigation will necessarily require the application of the rights of an accused in Section 14(2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This means that the respondent can demand an actual hearing and the
right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, rights which are not afforded at present to a respondent
in a preliminary investigation.
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM, Petitioner-Intervenor, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is
likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as
SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is,
having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral
turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office
notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing [h]e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila in the
May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the presidential
pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly
provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of
his (former President Estrada) right to vote and be voted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President
Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President
Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estradas rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, or to otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardons text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
x
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may
not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress
by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
27
28
In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935 Constitution,
wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar phraseology with what is
found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that subject to the
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
29
action. The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that,
under the present Constitution, a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by
legislative action. Thus, it is unmistakably the long-standing position of this Court that the exercise of the
pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court,
except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the Presidents power of pardon by acts of Congress,
specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the
1987 Constitution when they flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power
of the President in the form of offenses involving graft and corruption that would be enumerated and
defined by Congress through the enactment of a law.
G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMIL DORIA DAHIL AND ROMMEL CASTRO Y
CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.
The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule involving the presumption of regularity
of the performance of official duties could apply in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the
performance of duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records were
51
replete with indicia of their serious lapses. The presumption stands when no reason exists in the records
by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the
presumption of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be
presumed innocent.
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA
AND THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON,
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanate
All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and
preferred right to expression of the electorate during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will
be tolerated.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election
32
33
protest. At issue was the validity of the promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution. No motion for
reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En Banc. This court declared that it did not
have jurisdiction and clarified:
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution] 34 to mean final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision
must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory
order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections. 35 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this
general rule. Repol was another election protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan,
36
Samar.
This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First Division issued a status
37
quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending appeal. This courts
ponencia discussed the general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review
interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.
v. COMELEC,
39
it clarified the exception:
38
However, consistent with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for
reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle
of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,
or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.40
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC in electoral contests
despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:
1)
2)
It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3)
4)
5)
The issue involves the protection of labor;

The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or
The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only
adequate and speedy remedy available.
Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repol and decided that the status quo ante order issued by the
COMELEC Division was unconstitutional.
Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC. This case was also an election protest case involving
41
candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa City.
Petitioners in Soriano, Jr. filed before this court a
petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First Division.
42
While the petition was

43
pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest case. Soriano applied
the general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court,
however, acknowledged the exceptions to the general rule in ABS-CBN.
44
Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a disqualification case of one of the mayoralty
45
candidates of Meycauayan, Bulacan. The COMELEC Second Division ruled that petitioner could not qualify
for the 2007 elections due to the findings in an administrative case that he engaged in vote buying in the
46
1995 elections. No motion for reconsideration was filed before the COMELEC En Banc. This court, however,
took cognizance of this case applying one of the exceptions in ABS-CBN: The assailed resolution was a
47
nullity.
Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election protest case involving the mayoralty
48
candidates of Taguig City.
Petitioner assailed a resolution of the COMELEC denying her motion for

49
reconsideration to dismiss the election protest petition for lack of form and substance. This court clarified
the general rule and refused to take cognizance of the review of the COMELEC order. While recognizing the
50
exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court ruled that these exceptions did not apply.
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as
precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve
election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning
candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed
to assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers.
When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcing election laws.
cralawred
I.B
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,
and limitations on political speech
The main subject of this case is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the
chilling effect caused by respondent COMELECs notice and letter.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the notice
the removal of the tarpaulin.
53
51
dated February 22, 2013 and letter
52
dated February 27, 2013 ordering
It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right to freedom
of expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state and, thus, are unconstitutional.
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition.
54
Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
55
court and defines its powers.

respondents.
Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different from the cases cited by
Nothing less than the electorates political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC.
Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is
concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through the election of
representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal
with which we protect this kind of speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message.
Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We evaluate
restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because the
quality of this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
COMELECs notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents acts are capable of repetition. Under the
conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case, it could result in a chilling effect
that would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the elections. Other citizens
who wish to express their views regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear
of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC.
Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural
platform for raising grave abuse of discretion.
Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this courts
expanded exercise of certiorari as provided by the Constitution as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.56(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all
questions affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution, provides:
Sec.
.
2.
The
Commission
on
Elections
shall
exercise
the
following
powers
and
functions:
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination
of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
Respondents reliance on this provision is misplaced.
We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely
abused it. We are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with
its acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political speech.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELECs notice and letter on free
speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word
affecting in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to
decide any and all questions that arise during elections. COMELECs constitutional competencies during
elections should not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution. This
provision provides for this courts original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should
be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus,
the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this courts power to review.
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted
with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by
the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts constitutional mandate to protect the people against
governments infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the
jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
cralawre d
I.C
Hierarchy of courts
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing
their petition before this court.
Respondents contend that petitioners failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent
jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition.
57
They add that observation of the

58
hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. While respondents claim that
while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this
case.
59
60
On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this courts discretionary power to take cognizance
of a petition filed directly to it if warranted by compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the
61
issues raised. . . .
Petitioners submit that there are exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a direct
62
resort [with] this Court.
In Baez, Jr. v. Concepcion,
63
we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield
the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and
thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to
justify an exception to the policy.64
In Baez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari,
65
prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto:
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened
with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important
reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies
whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of
an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in
either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented. This is and
should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.66 (Emphasis omitted)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not
only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise
competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
67
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial
boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence
as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial
jurisdiction, which properly present the actual case that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality
of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases
where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed
before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and
law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of
the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts
and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating in the
light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar existing precedents. Rather
than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates
these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Courts role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the
hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.
68
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has full discretionary power to
take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons
70
in the petition.
69
or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
As correctly pointed out by petitioners,
71
we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches
of the government.
72
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners right to freedom of
expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves
an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare
occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political
theorist:
[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments
through democratic procedures. It comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The
theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new society in which man's
mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and
enlightened civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative,
progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It contemplates a mode of life that, through
encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities. It
spurns the alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant. 73
In a democracy, the citizens right to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political
decision-making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may provide, as public
participation in nation-building is a fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage
in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court.
74
A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from
the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and
freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this
decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of
elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for ones chosen candidate, but also the
right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said
that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The
protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this
court.
75
Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States
76
v. Purganan,
lower courts:
this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings,
we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first
impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts. 77
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the
right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to
provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim,
that:
78
this court held
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of
this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a
collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.79 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on
whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution
through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013
election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that
necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct
resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. InAlbano
80
v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that [i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the
Court of First Instance of each and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend,
or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced
81
to impotence.
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower
courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place
in the same situation. Besides, this court affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties
imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order
that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally
compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course
of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
82
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy. In the past, questions similar
to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens
right to bear arms,
83
government contracts involving modernization of voters registration lists,
status and existence of a public office.
84
and the
85
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is
permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct
resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the
recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
cralawre d
I.D
The concept of a political question
Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not
within the ambit of this courts power of review. They cite Justice Vitugs separate opinion inOsmea v.
COMELEC
86
to support their position:
It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined
by law. I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution to be all that adversarial
or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general
application, must yield to the specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly
holds, it is true, a vantage point in hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined rights but, like all fundamental
rights,
it
is
not
without
limitations.
The case is not about a fight between the rich and the poor or between the powerful and the weak in
our society but it is to me a genuine attempt on the part of Congress and the Commission on Elections to
ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to media coverage and thereby be equally perceived as
giving real life to the candidates right of free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of
that freedom. The wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be best in
giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to question; it is a matter that lies beyond the
normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.87
This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is not in point in this case.
The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on
their equal opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This
case concerns the right of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private
property, as an exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the political question
doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case.
In Taada v. Cuenco,
question:
88
this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter
which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically
delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to
act.89 (Emphasis omitted)
It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In
political forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the text of the law is based on a general
discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the
executive branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the
rights of certain individuals, per se.
Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a specific
case-to-case basis, where parties affected by the legal provision seek the courts understanding of the law.
The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order to
ensure that the rights of the general public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this balance,
branches of government must afford due respect and deference for the duties and functions constitutionally
delegated to the other. Courts cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence dictates that we are careful
not to veto political acts unless we can craft doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political
question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different agencies
and departments of the executive or those of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a
defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the domain of
their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively,
this court should act with deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so
capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional
organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the
COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot
do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Marcos v. Manglapus
90
limited the use of the political question doctrine:
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose
action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to
decide.91
How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the
time that it had been first invoked in Marcos v. Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical
and social context of the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and narrowly tailored
constitutional doctrines. This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson
Jr.
92
and Coseteng v. Mitra
93
Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution involving the removal of petitioners from the Commission on Appointments. In times past, this
would have involved a quintessentially political question as it related to the dominance of political parties in
Congress. However, in these cases, this court exercised its power of judicial review noting that the
requirement of interpreting the constitutional provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner
by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This approach was again reiterated in Defensor
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.
94
95
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, this court declared again that the possible existence of a
political question did not bar an examination of whether the exercise of discretion was done with grave
abuse of discretion. In that case, this court ruled on the question of whether there was grave abuse of
discretion in the Presidents use of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence.
96
In Estrada v. Desierto, this court ruled that the legal question as to whether a former President resigned
was not a political question even if the consequences would be to ascertain the political legitimacy of a
successor President.
Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the resolution of
constitutional issues as leverage. But the expanded jurisdiction of this court now mandates a duty for it to
exercise its power of judicial review expanding on principles that may avert catastrophe or resolve social
conflict.
This courts understanding of the political question has not been static or unbending. In Llamas v. Executive
Secretary Oscar Orbos,
97
this court held:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are
exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns
the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not
constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the
functions of the President.98
The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political question was discussed most
99
extensively in Francisco v. HRET. In this case, the House of Representatives argued that the question of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint that was filed against former Chief Justice Hilario Davide
was a political question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno elaborated on this
concept in his concurring and dissenting opinion:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the new
Constitution which expanded the definition of judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. As well observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz,
this expanded definition of judicial power considerably constricted the scope of political question. He opined
that the language luminously suggests that this duty (and power) is available even against the executive
and legislative departments including the President and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary
powers.100 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the political question, as applied in the
following cases:
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The allocation of constitutional boundaries is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, (t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases. (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason
is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still
not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in
proper
cases,
even
the
political
question. x
x
x
(Emphasis
and
italics
supplied.)
....
In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable
question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. 101 (Citations omitted)
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review
of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this
right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political
question brings.
cralawred
I.E
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Respondents insist that petitioners should have first brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of
its divisions.
102
Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 65 that there is no
103
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
They add that the
proper venue to assail the validity of the assailed issuances was in the course of an administrative hearing to
104
be conducted by COMELEC.
In the event that an election offense is filed against petitioners for posting
the tarpaulin, they claim that petitioners should resort to the remedies prescribed in Rule 34 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
105
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe
for adjudication. Ripeness is the prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed
by either branch [or in this case, organ of government] before a court may come into the picture.
106
Petitioners exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable
relevance especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the election offense
against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal
litigation is enough to curtail petitioners speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their
pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
107
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales,
Justice
Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized: [i]f ever there is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political
expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of
108
109
fair and honest elections would be at the top.

Sovereignty resides in the people.
Political speech is a
direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to
protect this fundamental right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current
controversy is within the exceptions to the principle. In Chua v. Ang,
110
this court held:
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (e)
when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.111 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allege that
the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church
and state. This is a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case indicate the
urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections.
Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.
Time and again, we have held that this court has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a
case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant, or when the purpose of justice requires it,
[and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is
112
discretionary upon the court.

Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has threatened to
prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want
debated by the public in the manner they feel would be effective is one of those cases.
cralawred
II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
II.A
COMELEC had no legal basis
to regulate expressions
made by private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power
113
to regulate the tarpaulin.

However, all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties.
Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a noncandidate in this case.
cralawred
II.A.1
First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.114 (Emphasis supplied)
Sanidad v. COMELEC
115
involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for the creation of
the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
116
Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision prohibiting

117
journalists from covering plebiscite issues on the day before and on plebiscite day.
Sanidad argued that
the prohibition was a violation of the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the
118
press. . . .
We held that the evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a
franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or
119
radio or television time.
This court found that [m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates[,]
120
thus, their
right to expression during this period may not be regulated by COMELEC.
121
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates.
cralawre d
II.A.2
Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows:
122
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
.
.
.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the enumeration made on acts that may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only
affects candidates.
Petitioners assail the Notice to Remove Campaign Materials issued by COMELEC. This was followed by the
assailed letter regarding the election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or
123
against the candidates and party-list groups. . . .

Section 9 of the Fair Election Act
campaign materials only mentions parties and candidates:
124
on the posting of
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list
groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as
plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election
propaganda: Provided, That the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or
its
equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in
not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its
equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner
thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the
candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the Fair
Election Act, provides as follows:
SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any lawful campaign
material in:
a.
Authorized common poster areas in public places subject to the requirements and/or limitations set
forth in the next following section; and
b.
Private
places
provided
it
has
the
consent
of
the
owner
thereof.
The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common poster areas
and those enumerated under Section 7 (g) of these Rules and the like is prohibited. Persons posting
the same shall be liable together with the candidates and other persons who caused the posting. It
will be presumed that the candidates and parties caused the posting of campaign materials outside
the common poster areas if they do not remove the same within three (3) days from notice which
shall be issued by the Election Officer of the city or municipality where the unlawful election
propaganda
are
posted
or
displayed.
Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election Officer or other
officials of the COMELEC shall apprehend the violators caught in the act, and file the appropriate
charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions
regulating the posting of campaign materials only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners
are neither of the two.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006 on Lawful Election Propaganda also states that these are allowed for
all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the
party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to
the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . . Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 provides for a similar wording.
These provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination
with candidates and political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties for
whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these candidates and political parties
maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.
125
The tarpaulin was not paid for by any candidate or political party.
There was no allegation that petitioners
coordinated with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand,
petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
Respondents also cite National Press Club v. COMELEC
126
in arguing that its regulatory power under the
Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to free speech during election period.
127
National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political
advertisements, limiting political advertisements to COMELEC-designated space and time. This case was
brought by representatives of mass media and two candidates for office in the 1992 elections. They argued
that the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements is tantamount to
censorship, which necessarily infringes on the freedom of speech of the candidates.
128
This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However, this
case does not apply as most of the petitioners were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in the
instant case. Moreover, the subject matter of National Press Club, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No.
6646,
129
only refers to a particular kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or

130
television.
Justice Feliciano emphasized that the provision did not infringe upon the right of reporters or
broadcasters to air their commentaries and opinions regarding the candidates, their qualifications, and
program for government. Compared to Sanidad wherein the columnists lost their ability to give their
commentary on the issues involving the plebiscite, National Press Club does not involve the same
infringement.
In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates for the 2013 national
elections because of the COMELEC notice and letter. It was not merely a regulation on the campaigns of
candidates vying for public office. Thus, National Press Club does not apply to this case.
Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, defines an
election campaign as follows:
(b) The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote
the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of
soliciting
votes
and/or
undertaking
any
campaign
for
or
against
a
candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of
any
candidate
for
public
office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of
any
candidate;
or
(5)
Directly
or
indirectly
soliciting
votes,
pledges
or
support
for
or
against
candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if performed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for
nomination for candidacy to a public office by a political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not
be
considered
as
election
campaign
or
partisan
election
activity.
Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming election or on attributes of
or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming political party
convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity
contemplated under this Article.(Emphasis supplied)
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties
themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be designed to promote the election or defeat of
a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either
appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to
cralawred
II.B
The violation of the constitutional right
to freedom of speech and expression
Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their
regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
notice and letter ordering its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.
131
II.B.1
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. 132
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department,
this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution even to governmental acts.
In Primicias v. Fugoso,
133
respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of

134
1927 of Manila for the public meeting and assembly organized by petitioner Primicias.
Section 1119
requires a Mayors permit for the use of streets and public places for purposes such as athletic games,
sports, or celebration of national holidays.
135
What was questioned was not a law but the Mayors refusal to
136
issue a permit for the holding of petitioners public meeting.

Nevertheless, this court recognized the
constitutional right to freedom of speech, to peaceful assembly and to petition for redress of grievances,
albeit not absolute,
granted.
137
and the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Mayor to issue the permit was
138
In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419
where the COMELEC resolved to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN from
conducting exit surveys.
139
The right to freedom of expression was similarly upheld in this case and,
consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set aside.
140
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .

All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the
abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation. The primary and
incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in the
Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our
Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition to the
freedom of speech and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word expression was added in the
1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. I would like to recommend to the Committee the
change of the word speech to EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND EXPRESSION after the word
speech, because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would refer to means of expression
other
than
speech.
THE
FR.
PRESIDING
BERNAS:
OFFICER
Expression
MR.
(Mr.
is
Bengzon):
more
What
broad
than
BROCKA:
THE
PRESIDING
FR.
OFFICER
does
the
speech.
Committee
We
accept
Thank
(Mr.
Bengzon):
say?
it.
you.
Is
it
accepted?
BERNAS:
Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the
amendment
is
approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
expression or of the press . . . .141
Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as [t]he right to think is the beginning of
freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of
142
thought.
II.B.2
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.
143
Communication exists when (1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional actions because he
or she reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2)
144
the audience so takes the actions.

[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims
by . . . either accepting the speech acts claims or opposing them with criticism or requests for
145
justification.
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. [C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred
146
to as symbolic speech[,]
such that when speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, the communicative element of the conduct may be sufficient to bring into play the
[right to freedom of expression].
147
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to
conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of communication.
148
In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,

students who were members of the
religious sect Jehovahs Witnesses were to be expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge.
149
In his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz discussed how
the salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of expression.

of speech includes even the right to be silent:
150
He adds that freedom
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that
guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to
utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its message
as clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more
than it can be prohibited in the face of valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it
on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids them to be silent. This
coercion
of
conscience
has
no
place
in
the
free
society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and
even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing
the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or unpopular views as in this
case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with
them, are protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within
rebels. 151
Even before freedom of expression was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present Constitution, this
court has applied its precedent version to expressions other than verbal utterances.
152
In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak,

petitioners objected to the classification of the
motion picture Kapit sa Patalim as For Adults Only. They contend that the classification is without legal
153
and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression.

This court recognized
that [m]otion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression
154
of the artistic impulse.
It adds that every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of

155
expression he may use, should be freed from the censor.
This court found that [the Boards] perception

156
of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive.

However, the petition was dismissed
solely on the ground that there were not enough votes for a ruling of grave abuse of discretion in the
classification made by the Board.
157
II.B.3
Size does matter
The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression.
The present case is in point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to
view its messages from greater distances. Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier for passengers
inside moving vehicles to read its content. Compared with the pedestrians, the passengers inside moving
vehicles have lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the fonts and images, the greater the
probability that it will catch their attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they will understand its
message.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader. From an
ordinary persons perspective, those who post their messages in larger fonts care more about their message
than those who carry their messages in smaller media. The perceived importance given by the speakers, in
this case petitioners, to their cause is also part of the message. The effectivity of communication sometimes
relies on the emphasis put by the speakers and on the credibility of the speakers themselves. Certainly,
larger segments of the public may tend to be more convinced of the point made by authoritative figures
when they make the effort to emphasize their messages.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more opportunities
to amplify, explain, and argue points which the speakers might want to communicate. Rather than simply
placing the names and images of political candidates and an expression of support, larger spaces can allow
for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates platforms for governance. Larger spaces allow for
more precise inceptions of ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a more educated
and reasoned electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the possibilities of both good governance
and accountability in our government.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political parties, that
speaks. Too often, the terms of public discussion during elections are framed and kept hostage by brief and
catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the candidate. Worse, elections sideline
political arguments and privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide obstacles to their
speech, government should in fact encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have
the better incentive to demand discussion of the more important issues. Between the candidates and the
electorate, the former have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on
appearances and empty promises.
158
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place.

They are fundamentally part of
expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution.
cralawre d
II.B.4
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize
government actions.
Proponents of the political theory on deliberative democracy submit that substantial, open, [and] ethical
159
dialogue is a critical, and indeed defining, feature of a good polity.

This theory may be considered broad,
but it definitely includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all who will be affected by
160
the decision.
It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty
161
resides in the people.

To ensure order in running the states affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and
individuals would be elected or nominated in key government positions to represent the people. On this
note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government
accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to
governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus
be protected and encouraged.
Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
162
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies.
In this jurisdiction, this court held that [t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good government
163
demand a full discussion of public affairs.

This court has, thus, adopted the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open . . . [including even] unpleasantly sharp attacks
164
on government and public officials.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was
articulated by Justice Holmes in that the ultimate good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in
ideas:
165
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.166
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to consider, test, and develop their own
167
conclusions.
A free, open, and dynamic market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This
promotes both stability and change where recurring points may crystallize and weak ones may develop. Of
course, free speech is more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and economic arrangements
as it includes, [t]o paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for
168
the thought that agrees with us.
In fact, free speech may best serve its high purpose when it induces a
169
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.
It is
in this context that we should guard against any curtailment of the peoples right to participate in the free
trade of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is a means of assuring
170
individual self-fulfillment,
among others. In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc,
171
this court discussed as follows:
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political
rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government
through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive
public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental
officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring
public officers and employees.172 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, [v]oluntary associations perform [an] important
democratic role [in providing] forums for the development of civil skills, for deliberation, and for the
formation of identity and community spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any] governmental
173
interference.
They also provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a free space for the
development of individual personality, distinct group identity, and dissident ideas - and a potential source of
174
opposition to the state.

Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find those who have similar and
shared values and ideals, to join together and forward common goals.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to protect individuals and minorities against
175
majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of democratic governance].

Federalist
framers led by James Madison were concerned about two potentially vulnerable groups: the citizenry at
176
large - majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by despotic federal officials

and the minorities
who may be oppressed by dominant factions of the electorate [that] capture [the] government for their
177
own selfish ends[.]

According to Madison, [i]t is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the
178
other part.
We should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially in light of any potential
oppression against those who find themselves in the fringes on public issues.
179
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.
manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence[.]
180
This provides that nonviolent
[A] dam about to burst . . . resulting in the
banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of restriction
181
has been used to describe
182
the effect of repressing nonviolent outlets.

In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from
resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. This includes free
183
expression and political participation

in that they can vote for candidates who share their views, petition
their legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature alerting other citizens of their
184
185
concerns[,]
and conduct peaceful rallies and other similar acts.
Free speech must, thus, be protected
as a peaceful means of achieving ones goal, considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent
may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
cralawred
II.B.5
Every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Respondents argue that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners way of endorsing candidates
who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it.
COMELEC under its constitutional mandate.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows:
187
186
As such, it is subject to regulation by
Election propaganda is defined under Section 1(4) of
SECTION
1.
Definitions
.
.
.
4. The term political advertisement or election propaganda refers to any matter broadcasted, published,
printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color
motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated with a
candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or
oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast
media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs,
live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by
commercial
advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any
Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in
return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
On the other hand, petitioners invoke their constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and
188
beliefs about issues and candidates.

They argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and
appreciation of the named public officials act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism toward those
189
who voted in its favor.
190
It was part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law,
which was not
191
paid for by any candidate or political party.

Thus, the questioned orders which . . . effectively
restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared unconstitutional and
192
void.
This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as highly ranked in our scheme of
193
194
constitutional values.
These rights enjoy precedence and primacy.
In Philippine Blooming Mills, this
court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human
rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power
of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential
and
powerful,
and
of
oligarchs
political,
economic
or
otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority
gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.195 (Citations omitted)
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
196
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.

A similar idea appeared in our
jurisprudence as early as 1969, which was Justice Barredos concurring and dissenting opinion in Gonzales
v. COMELEC:
197
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine
democracy thrives only where the power and right of the people to elect the men to whom they would
entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of principles of
our Constitution, The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them (Section 1, Article II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the
Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed only by officials whom
they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in it is on this cornerstone that I hold it to be selfevident that when the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being
exercised in relation to suffrage or as a means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified citizen to vote,
they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of
public affairs by our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or
unfavorable, everyday and at all times. Every holder of power in our government must be ready to undergo
exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way
that he can rightfully gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard
public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to be indulged by the people only at certain periods of
time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances, when
exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly
enjoyed. It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be next to useless if these liberties cannot
be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time. 198(Emphasis supplied)
Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this court discussed that some types of speech
may be subject to regulation:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in
order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. The
difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political
speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made in the
treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech.
We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as
fighting words are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized. 199 (Citations omitted)
We distinguish between political and commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech both intended and
200
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,

201
minded deliberation.
foster[ing] informed and civic-
On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does no
202
more than propose a commercial transaction.
The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.
In Justice Brions dissenting opinion, he discussed that [t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing
203
of its posting, makes it subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615.
He adds
that [w]hile indeed the RH issue, by itself, is not an electoral matter, the slant that the petitioners gave the
issue converted the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the
204
plea to support one and oppose the other.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted in return for
consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the rules and regulations
implementing Republic Act No. 9006 as an aid to interpret the law insofar as the facts of this case requires,
states:
4.
The term political advertisement or election propaganda refers to any matter broadcasted,
published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium, which contain the name, image, logo,
brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of
being associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a
segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election of the said candidate or
candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of
spots, appearances on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and
other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion,
that appear on any Internet website, including, but not limited to, social networks,
blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable
of pecuniary estimation.(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages
are covered.
Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:
SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:

1.
The term election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office, and shall include any of
the
following:
.
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be considered
acts of election campaigning or partisan political activity unless expressed by government officials in
the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters should be
deemed narrowly tailored only in relation to the facts and issues in this case. It also appears that such
wording in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 does not similarly appear in Republic Act No. 9006, the law it
implements.
We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.
205
As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos,

this court recognized the need for full discussion of public
affairs. We acknowledged that free speech includes the right to criticize the conduct of public men:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and
an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and
dignity of the individual be exalted.206
Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, allowing
207
208
for criticism, save for some exceptions.

In the 1951 case of Espuelas v. People,
this court noted every
citizens privilege to criticize his or her government, provided it is specific and therefore constructive,
reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.
The 1927 case of People v. Titular
210
209
involved an alleged violation of the Election Law provision penaliz[ing]

211
the anonymous criticism of a candidate by means of posters or circulars.

the posters anonymous character that is being penalized.
212
This court explained that it is
The ponente adds that he would dislike very
much to see this decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public opinion.
213
214
In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing

discussed the importance of allowing individuals to vent their views.
According to this court, [i]ts value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth hearing from the
215
dissenter [and] [t]hat is to ensure a true ferment of ideas.
Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms against their government contributes to
every societys goal for development. It puts forward matters that may be changed for the better and ideas
that may be deliberated on to attain that purpose. Necessarily, it also makes the government accountable
for acts that violate constitutionally protected rights.
In 1998, Osmea v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibits mass media
from selling print space and air time for campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a democracy-enhancing
216
measure.
This court mentioned how discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the government established by our
217
Constitution.
As pointed out by petitioners, speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of elections
when the free exercise thereof informs the people what the issues are, and who are supporting what
218
issues.
At the heart of democracy is every advocates right to make known what the people need to
219
know,
while the meaningful exercise of ones right of suffrage includes the right of every voter to know
what they need to know in order to make their choice.
220
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,

this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the
freedom of expression especially in relation to information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right
of suffrage:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate,
the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of
suffrage.221 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Speech with political consequences is at the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this
court.
Justice Brion pointed out that freedom of expression is not the god of rights to which all other rights and
222
even government protection of state interest must bow.
The right to freedom of expression is indeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still
subject to some restrictions. The degree of restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content223
based or content-neutral.
Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker
or the subject of the expression.
cralawre d
II.B.6
Content-based regulation
COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The order was
made simply because petitioners failed to comply with the maximum size limitation for lawful election
propaganda.
224
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it applies only to
225
political speech and not to other forms of speech such as commercial speech.
[A]ssumingarguendo that
the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner regulation, its still
unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective.
226
227
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based.

Regardless, the
disposition of this case will be the same. Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed
speech is content-based.
As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned order applies only
to posters and tarpaulins that may affect the elections because they deliver opinions that shape both their
choices. It does not cover, for instance, commercial speech.
Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non-candidates will be
adjudged as election paraphernalia. There are no existing bright lines to categorize speech as electionrelated and those that are not. This is especially true when citizens will want to use their resources to be
able to raise public issues that should be tackled by the candidates as what has happened in this case.
COMELECs discretion to limit speech in this case is fundamentally unbridled.
Size limitations during elections hit at a core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily
divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and
present danger rule as measure.
228
Thus, in Chavez v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the
clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling
reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. 229 (Citations omitted)
Under this rule, the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and
230
the degree of imminence extremely high.

Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and
present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming
231
the presumed unconstitutionality.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment
of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone
elses constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the utterance or
232
speech.
In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech
such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
233
This court has attempted to define content-neutral restraints starting with the 1948 case of Primicias v.
234
Fugoso.
The ordinance in this case was construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to determine the
public places that may be used for the procession or meeting, but not the power to refuse the issuance of a
235
permit for such procession or meeting.

This court explained that free speech and peaceful assembly are
not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
236
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams
237
involved the National Traffic Commission resolution that

238
prohibited the passing of animal-drawn vehicles along certain roads at specific hours.
This court similarly
discussed police power in that the assailed rules carry out the legislative policy that aims to promote safe
transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public.
239
240
As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado

recognized that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions
241
feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. . . .

It is with this backdrop that the state is
justified in imposing restrictions on incidental matters as time, place, and manner of the speech.
In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must
follow which include informing the licensing authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and
242
time of the assembly.

This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if there would be valid
objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the standard used for his decision and the
243
applicants are given the opportunity to be heard.

This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa
No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the
2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita,
244
this court discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880 does not prohibit
245
assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and manner.
In 2010, this court found inIntegrated Bar
246
of the Philippines v. Atienza

that respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he
modified the rally permit by changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first
affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.
247
We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced
from the size of its medium.
cralawre d
II.B.7
Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the provisions imposing a size limit for tarpaulins are
content-neutral regulations as these restrict the manner by which speech is relayed but not the content of
248
what is conveyed.
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the three
249
requirements for evaluating such restraints on freedom of speech.

When the speech restraints take the
form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its
250
validity,
and it is subject only to the intermediate approach.
251
This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases.
neutral government regulation is sufficiently justified:
252
A content-
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; 3 if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and 4 if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.253
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As
discussed earlier, this is protected speech by petitioners who are non-candidates.
On the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or substantial, it must
also be compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for
example, that the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for them, asparens
patriae,
254
constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . . utterances in TV

255
broadcast.
Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal opportunity for public information campaigns
among candidates in connection with the holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
election.
256
Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that [s]ize limits to posters are necessary to ensure
equality of public information campaigns among candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives
candidates and their supporters the incentive to post larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places candidates with
more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against candidates with more
257
humble financial capabilities.
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to
258
freely express his choice and exercise his right of free speech.
In any case, faced with both rights to
freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to try to resolve the tension in a way that
259
protects the right of participation.
Second, the pertinent election laws related to private property only require that the private property owners
260
consent be obtained when posting election propaganda in the property.
This is consistent with the

261
fundamental right against deprivation of property without due process of law.

The present facts do not
involve such posting of election propaganda absent consent from the property owner. Thus, this regulation
does not apply in this case.
262
Respondents likewise cite the Constitution

on their authority to recommend effective measures to
minimize election spending. Specifically, Article IX-C, Section 2(7) provides:
Sec.
2.
The
Commission
on
Elections
shall
exercise
the
following
powers
and
functions:
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of
places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds,
offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
This does not qualify as a compelling and substantial government interest to justify regulation of the
preferred right to freedom of expression.
The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on the two feet (2) by three feet (3) size
limitation under Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements the Fair Election
Act that provides for the same size limitation.
263
This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that [c]ompared to the paramount interest of the State in
guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal
264
significance.
In fact, speech with political consequences, as in this case, should be encouraged and not
curtailed. As petitioners pointed out, the size limitation will not serve the objective of minimizing election
spending considering there is no limit on the number of tarpaulins that may be posted.
265
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the
restriction, but more so at the effects of such restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not be
narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues for the
actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum size of
the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners message and violate their right to exercise freedom of
expression.
The COMELECs act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with
political consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the
equally important right to suffrage.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for contentneutral regulations.
The action of the COMELEC in this case is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the
stature of petitioners and their message, there are indicators that this will cause a chilling effect on robust
discussion during elections.
The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In the words of Marshall McLuhan, the
266
medium is the message.

McLuhans colleague and mentor Harold Innis has earlier asserted that the
materials on which words were written down have often counted for more than the words
267
themselves.
III
Freedom of expression and equality
III.A
The possibility of abuse
Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of private individuals for the endorsement of
their electoral campaigns.
On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when endorsement materials in the form of
tarpaulins, posters, or media advertisements are made ostensibly by friends but in reality are really paid
for by the candidate or political party. This skirts the constitutional value that provides for equal
opportunities for all candidates.
However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this case, this is not the situation that
confronts us. In such cases, it will simply be a matter for investigation and proof of fraud on the part of the
COMELEC.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate
should not be held hostage by the possibility of abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there
can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidates real levels of expenditures.
However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections
as election paraphernalia would be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case.
Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement will be the least restrictive means to the
fundamental freedom.
On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of a candidate, others will spend their
own resources in order to lend support for the campaigns. This may be without agreement between the
speaker and the candidate or his or her political party. In lieu of donating funds to the campaign, they will
instead use their resources directly in a way that the candidate or political party would have done so. This
may effectively skirt the constitutional and statutory limits of campaign spending.
Again, this is not the situation in this case.
The message of petitioners in this case will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in
their election posters or media ads. The message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social
issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of Diocese that the
positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be determinative of how the public will
vote. It primarily advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily even almost incidentally
will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a literary form that employs such devices
268
as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride prevailing vices or follies,

and this may target any individual or
group in society, private and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a greater purpose, often
269
used for political and social criticism

because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and
unmasks hypocrisy. . . . Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty
270
lampooned and spoofed.

Northrop Frye, well-known in this literary field, claimed that satire had two
defining features: one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the
271
other is an object of attack.

devices.
Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical
The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, Team Patay does not refer to a list of dead individuals nor could the
Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended it to mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his
list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies the intention of
those in the list. Furthermore, the list of Team Patay is juxtaposed with the list of Team Buhay that
further emphasizes the theme of its author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of
petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia
from candidates and political parties are more declarative and descriptive and contain no sophisticated
literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they usually simply exhort the public to vote for a person with
a brief description of the attributes of the candidate. For example Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga, Vote for
[y], Mr. Palengke, or Vote for [z], Iba kami sa Makati.
This courts construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or
subsequent punishment that entails evaluation of the speakers viewpoint or the content of ones speech.
This is especially true when the expression involved has political consequences. In this case, it hopes to
affect the type of deliberation that happens during elections. A becoming humility on the part of any human
institution no matter how endowed with the secular ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails
that we are not the keepers of all wisdom.
Humanitys lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides space for the weakest dissent. Tolerance
has always been a libertarian virtue whose version is embedded in our Bill of Rights. There are occasional
heretics of yesterday that have become our visionaries. Heterodoxies have always given us pause. The
unforgiving but insistent nuance that the majority surely and comfortably disregards provides us with the
checks upon reality that may soon evolve into creative solutions to grave social problems. This is the
utilitarian version. It could also be that it is just part of human necessity to evolve through being able to
express or communicate.
However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical document. It contains other provisions which,
taken together with the guarantee of free expression, enhances each others value. Among these are the
provisions that acknowledge the idea of equality. In shaping doctrine construing these constitutional values,
this court needs to exercise extraordinary prudence and produce narrowly tailored guidance fit to the facts
as given so as not to unwittingly cause the undesired effect of diluting freedoms as exercised in reality and,
thus, render them meaningless.
cralawre d
III.B.
Speech and equality:
Some considerations
We first establish that there are two paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving priority to
272
equality vis--vis liberty.
In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation
273
promoting political equality prevails over speech.

This view allows the government leeway to redistribute
or equalize speaking power, such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing, unpopular or dissenting voices
274
often systematically subdued within societys ideological ladder.

This view acknowledges that there are
dominant political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that
may drown out the messages of others. This is especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is
part of the majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find ones authentic self or to participate in
the self determination of ones communities is not new only to law. It has always been a philosophical
problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how
institutionalized inequality exists as a background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such
275
limitation as merely protect[ing] the already established machinery of discrimination.

In his view, any
improvement in the normal course of events within an unequal society, without subversion, only
strengthens existing interests of those in power and control.
276
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become
meaningless if not taken in a real context. This tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises
liberties. In his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomythis is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from a
whole series of synthetic judgments. It stipulates the ability to determine ones own life: to be able to
determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this autonomy is
never the contingent, private individual as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is rather the
individual as a human being who is capable of being free with the others. And the problem of making
possible such a harmony between every individual liberty and the other is not that of finding a compromise
between competitors, or between freedom and law, between general and individual interest, common and
private welfare in an established society, but of creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved by
institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In other words, freedom is still to be created
even for the freest of the existing societies.277 (Emphasis in the original)
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument with all opinions presented to and deliberated by the
people implies a necessary condition, namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating and
choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information, and that, on this
278
basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought.

He submits that [d]ifferent opinions
and philosophies can no longer compete peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the
marketplace of ideas is organized and delimited by those who determine the national and the individual
279
interest.
A slant toward left manifests from his belief that there is a natural right of resistance for oppressed and
overpowered minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be
280
inadequate.
Marcuse, thus, stands for an equality that breaks away and transcends from established
hierarchies, power structures, and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as
repressive tolerance.
Legal scholars
The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal scholars for stringent protections of
281
expressive liberty,
especially by political egalitarians. Considerations such as expressive, deliberative,

282
and informational interests,
costs or the price of expression, and background facts, when taken together,
produce bases for a system of stringent protections for expressive liberties.
283
Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed that
284
public discussion is a political duty.
Cass Sustein placed political speech on the upper tier of his two-tier
model for freedom of expression, thus, warranting stringent protection.
285
He defined political speech as

286
both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue.
287
But this is usually related also to fair access to opportunities for such liberties.
Fair access to opportunity
is suggested to mean substantive equality and not mere formal equality since favorable conditions for
realizing the expressive interest will include some assurance of the resources required for expression and
some guarantee that efforts to express views on matters of common concern will not be drowned out by the
288
speech of better-endowed citizens.
289
Justice Brandeis solution is to remedy the harms of speech with more speech.
This view moves away
from playing down the danger as merely exaggerated, toward tak[ing] the costs seriously and embrac[ing]
290
expression as the preferred strategy for addressing them.
However, in some cases, the idea of more speech may not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the
need for context and the specification of substantive values before [equality] has full
291
meaning.
Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon adds that equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather
292
than a substantive sense.

Thus, more speech can only mean more speech from the few who are
dominant rather than those who are not.
Our jurisprudence
This court has tackled these issues.
Osmea v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the validity of Section 11(b) of the
293
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.

This section prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge
print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
294
Elections.
This court explained that this provision only regulates the time and manner of advertising in
order to ensure media equality among candidates.

provisions mandating political equality:
295
This court grounded this measure on constitutional
296
Article IX-C, Section 4

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XIII, Section 1
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its
increments. (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 26
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitutions guarantee for more substantive expressive
freedoms that take equality of opportunities into consideration during elections.
The other view

However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or equality in the
ability of citizens as speakers should not have a bearing in free speech doctrine.
Under this view, members of the public are trusted to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and
government is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left
297
to a freely competitive ideological market.

This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of
viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.
The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision uses negative rather than affirmative
298
language. It uses speech as its subject and not speakers.
Consequently, the Constitution protects free

299
speech per se, indifferent to the types, status, or associations of its speakers.
Pursuant to this,
government must leave speakers and listeners in the private order to their own devices in sorting out the
300
relative influence of speech.
Justice Romeros dissenting opinion in Osmea v. COMELEC formulates this view that freedom of speech
includes not only the right to express ones views, but also other cognate rights relevant to the free
301
communication [of] ideas, not excluding the right to be informed on matters of public concern.
adds:
She
And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of elections qualifications of voters and
candidates, education, means of transportation, health, public discussion, private animosities, the weather,
the threshold of a voters resistance to pressure the utmost ventilation of opinion of men and issues,
through assembly, association and organizations, both by the candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua
non for elections to truly reflect the will of the electorate. 302 (Emphasis supplied)
Justice Romeros dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only to emphasize free speech primacy such
that courts, as a rule are wary to impose greater restrictions as to any attempt to curtail speeches with
303
political content,
thus:
the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to
enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to
secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources and to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.304
This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes submission that the market place of ideas is still the best
305
alternative to censorship.
Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the argument, the majority of the US Supreme Court
in the campaign expenditures case of Buckley v. Valeo condemned restrictions (even if content-neutral) on
expressive liberty imposed in the name of enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others and thereby equaliz[ing]
306
access to the political arena.
The majority did not use the equality-based paradigm.
One flaw of campaign expenditure limits is that any limit placed on the amount which a person can speak,
which takes out of his exclusive judgment the decision of when enough is enough, deprives him of his free
307
speech.
Another flaw is how [a]ny quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the sum of
public information and runs counter to our profound national commitment that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.
308
In fact, [c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to raise funds does not ease the plight of
those without funds in the first place . . . [and] even if ones main concern is slowing the increase in political
costs, it may be more effective to rely on market forces to achieve that result than on active legal
309
intervention.
According to Herbert Alexander, [t]o oppose limitations is not necessarily to argue that the
skys the limit [because in] any campaign there are saturation levels and a point where spending no longer
310
pays off in votes per dollar.
III.C.
When private speech amounts
to election paraphernalia
The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for human
potentiality and the effect of speech. It valorizes the ability of human beings to express and their necessity
to relate. On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration the effects it will have
in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the cultural hegemony of the
majority may have the effect of drowning out the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a
sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and effect of the guarantee of free speech. Those
who have more will have better access to media that reaches a wider audience than those who have less.
Those who espouse the more popular ideas will have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters
of society. To be really heard and understood, the marginalized view normally undergoes its own degree of
struggle.
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her
expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that allows public officials to make judgments of the
value of such viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to some
expression during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members
of their political parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the
effect of our rulings in Osmea v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who
do not speak as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social
issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is inconsistent with
the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those
that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount to an
election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who
are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if
what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement
of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to
meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy
of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object.
The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In
no situation may the speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will
not matter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in
the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law Section 3.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 if applied to this case, will not
pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the
distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by
3 feet could no longer be read by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will
amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
cralawre d
IV
Right to property
Other than the right to freedom of expression
311
and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage,
312
the
313
present case also involves ones right to property.
Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the circumvention of regulations relating to
election propaganda by applying such regulations to private individuals.
314
Certainly, any provision or regulation can be circumvented. But we are not confronted with this possibility.
Respondents agree that the tarpaulin in question belongs to petitioners. Respondents have also agreed,
during the oral arguments, that petitioners were neither commissioned nor paid by any candidate or political
party to post the material on their walls.
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz:
315
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the
constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. 316 (Citation omitted)
This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is so
317
broad that it encompasses even the citizens private property.

Consequently, it violates Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law. This court explained:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose
of it; and the Constitution, in the 14 th Amendment, protects these essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to
acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free use,
enjoyment, and disposal of a persons acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land.
1 Cooleys Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])[318]
This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a
liberty interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing
and
irrefutable.
The
burden
is
not
met
in
this
case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of
election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned
by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his
own front door or on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are
no limits to what overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation,
may do.319
Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property.
The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELECs interpretation
of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression
when there is no place where the expression may be made. COMELECs infringement upon petitioners
property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to speech.
Respondents have not demonstrated that the present state interest they seek to promote justifies the
intrusion into petitioners property rights. Election laws and regulations must be reasonable. It must also
acknowledge a private individuals right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will
be violated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election propaganda
in private property without the consent of the owners of such private property. COMELEC has incorrectly
implemented these regulations. Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act of respondents in
seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible
encroachments on the right to property.
cralawred
V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech
We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned notice and letter
violated the right of petitioners to the free exercise of their religion.
At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state.
Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, for instance provides:
320
This takes many forms.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
There are two aspects of this provision.
321
The first is the non-establishment clause.
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship.
322
Second is the free
323
The second aspect is at issue in this case.

Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such
act immune from any secular regulation.
society that is regulated by law.
324
The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to religious
expression. This notwithstanding petitioners claim that the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop
and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic dogma, faith, and moral
325
teachings. . . .
The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be motivated
by moral, ethical, and religious considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts
range from belief, to expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a secular
character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same faith or may not subscribe
to any religion, may not have any religious bearing.
Definitely, the characterizations of the religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court. Certainly, our
powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by bare claims that acts are religious in nature.
Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu
326
in claiming that the court emphatically held that the adherents of a particular religion shall be the
327
ones to determine whether a particular matter shall be considered ecclesiastical in nature.

This court in
Ebralinag exempted Jehovahs Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony out of respect for their
328
religious beliefs, [no matter how] bizarre those beliefs may seem to others.
This court found a balance
between the assertion of a religious practice and the compelling necessities of a secular command. It was an
early attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.
In Estrada v. Escritor,
329
this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of
religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically
into account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups
to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the government
[may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.330
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it
has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an
excessive entanglement with religion.
331
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, does not convey any religious doctrine of
332
the Catholic church.

That the position of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the
tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech.
On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under Team Patay and Team Buhay
according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the expression
on the tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines
relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a
tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the
tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Furthermore, the definition of an ecclesiastical affair in Austria v. National Labor Relations
333
Commission
cited by petitioners finds no application in the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin
does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in
the Austria case such as proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration
334
of sacraments and other activities with attached religious significance.
A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case.
However, it was misdirected.
COMELECs general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending among
candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it
strives to participate in the electoral exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office.
Their message may be construed generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as belonging to Team Patay or Team Buhay.
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue
and a complex piece of legislation at that can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the
candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as in
fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and nonjudgmental. Some may have expected that the authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and
humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is
not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience,
not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can
often be expressed by dominant institutions, even religious ones. That they made their point dramatically
and in a large way does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they have basis, or that
they have been expressed in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression
protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and
hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical duty, but
their parishioners actions will have very real secular consequences.
Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to
rouse the public to debate contemporary issues. This is not speech by candidates or political parties to entice
votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is the substantive
content of the right to suffrage.
This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a
fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners
deserves our protection.
chanrobleslaw
G.R. Nos. 183152-54, January 21, 2015

REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA AND ANTONIO G.
HABALO, Petitioners, v.SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG AND AVELINO MANGUERA, Respondents.
Section 6, Rule 120, ROC as well as Section 4, Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan (which
makes applicable Section 6, Rule 120, ROC when the accused is absent during promulgation of judgment)
merely regulates the right to file a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606. These are mere rules of
procedure which the Supreme Court is competent to adopt pursuant to its rule-making power under Article
VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. And, contrary to the view espoused by the accused, said rules do not
take away, repeal or alter the right to file a motion for reconsideration as said right still exists. The Supreme
Court merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a judgment of conviction done in absentia in cases
when the accused fails to surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from promulgation. The
Supreme Court can very well do this as the right to file a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606 is not
preclusive in character. Indeed, there is nothing in P.D. 1606 which prevents the Supreme Court from
regulating the procedure for promulgation of decisions in criminal cases done in absentia.
56
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

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G.R. Nos.

212140-41, January 21, 2015

SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner, v. BERSAMIN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN,

Affidavit of [co-respondent] Ruby Tuason (Tuason);

(f) Affidavits/Counter-Affidavits/Pleadings/Filings filed by all the other

xxx xxx xxx

II. THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS PROCEDURALLY INFIRM.

b) Counter-Affidavit of Sofia D. Cruz dated 31 January 2014;

This Courts Ruling

the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.

the evidence on record.

A preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

G.R. No. 212196, January 12, 2015

G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

it clarified the exception:

However, consistent with ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation

It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

The issue involves the protection of labor;

candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa City.

Petitioners in Soriano, Jr. filed before this court a

While the petition was

candidates of Taguig City.

Petitioner assailed a resolution of the COMELEC denying her motion for

dated February 22, 2013 and letter

dated February 27, 2013 ordering

It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right to freedom

court and defines its powers.

They add that observation of the

resort [with] this Court.

In Baez, Jr. v. Concepcion,

we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:

prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v. Suelto:

or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised

As correctly pointed out by petitioners,

we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

this court held

government contracts involving modernization of voters registration lists,

status and existence of a public office.

to support their position:

this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political

limited the use of the political question doctrine:

and Coseteng v. Mitra

this court held:

The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

fair and honest elections would be at the top.

this court held:

discretionary upon the court.

to regulate the tarpaulin.

the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision prohibiting

radio or television time.

This court found that [m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of

right to expression during this period may not be regulated by COMELEC.

against the candidates and party-list groups. . . .

in arguing that its regulatory power under the

only refers to a particular kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or

respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of

issue a permit for the holding of petitioners public meeting.

consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set aside.

. . . shall be passed abridging. . .

the audience so takes the actions.