AZARCON
AZARCON
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C. BATAUSA,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is charged
with malversation of public funds as a principal after the said individual had been
designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distrained
property? Did such accused become a public officer and therefore subject to the graft
courts jurisdiction as a consequence of such designation by the BIR?
These are the main questions in the instant petition for review of respondent
Sandiganbayans Decision in Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated on March 8, 1994,
convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds and property, and Resolution dated
June 20, 1994, denying his motion for new trial or reconsideration thereof.
[1]
[2]
The Facts
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling
dirt and ore. His services were contracted by the Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Occasionally, he
engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the
formers premises. From this set of circumstances arose the present controversy.
[3]
[4]
x x x It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by
the Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) addressed to the Regional Director
(Jose Batausa) or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding
the latter to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a
sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of Garnishment was
issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to
BIR the property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was
received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.
[5]
Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things Seized
Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue, assumed the undertakings specified
in the receipt the contents of which are reproduced as follows:
(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have received from Amadeo V. San
Diego, an Internal Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Philippines,
the following described goods, articles, and things:
Kind of property
---
Motor number
Chassis No.
Number of CXL
Color
Owned By
-----------
E120-229598
SPZU50-1772440
6
Blue
Mr. Jaime Ancla
the same having been this day seized and left in (my) possession pending investigation by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative. (I) further promise that
(I) will faithfully keep, preserve, and, to the best of (my) ability, protect said goods, articles, and
things seized from defacement, demarcation, leakage, loss, or destruction in any manner; that (I)
will neither alter nor remove, nor permit others to alter or remove or dispose of the same in any
manner without the express authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and that (I) will
produce and deliver all of said goods, articles, and things upon the order of any court of the
Philippines, or upon demand of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any authorized officer
or agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
[6]
Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985 to the BIRs
Regional Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating that
Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security manager of
PICOP, Mr. Delfin Panelo, and requested him to prevent this truck from being taken out
of the PICOP concession. By the time the order to bar the trucks exit was given,
however, it was too late.
[8]
Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter dated May 27, 1986, to wit:
An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals that while you are (sic) in
possession of the dump truck owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily assumed the
liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit in behalf of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. This is clearly indicated in the provisions of the Warrant of Garnishment
which you have signed, obliged and committed to surrender and transfer to this
office. Your failure therefore, to observe said provisions does not relieve you of your
responsibility.
[9]
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner Azarcon was charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property under Article
217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in the following
Information filed on January 12, 1990, by Special Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:
[12]
That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Alfredo
L. Azarcon, a private individual but who, in his capacity as depository/administrator
of property seized or deposited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, having voluntarily
offered himself to act as custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No.
E120-22958, Chasis No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number CXL-6 and was authorized
to be such under the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has become a
responsible and accountable officer and said motor vehicle having been seized from
Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of EIGHTY
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS and 59/100 (P80,831.59)
became a public property and the value thereof as public fund, with grave abuse of
confidence and conspiring and confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his personal use and benefit the
aforementioned motor vehicle or the value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then
and there allowing accused Jaime C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow
away the said Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and knowledge of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan on May
14, 1991, alleging that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the preliminary
investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public officer, hence a doubt exists as to
why he was being charged with malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991.
After the reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Roger Berbano, Sr.,
recommended the withdrawal of the information but was overruled by the
Ombudsman.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March 25, 1992 on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner since he was
not a public officer. On May 18, 1992, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
[17]
[18]
When the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner then filed a
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence which was denied on November 16, 1992,
for being without merit. The petitioner then commenced and finished presenting his
evidence on February 15, 1993.
[19]
[21]
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon y Leva GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of Malversation of Public Funds defined and penalized
under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code and, applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in view of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in
its maximum period to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal. To indemnify the Bureau of Internal Revenue the
amount ofP80,831.59; to pay a fine in the same amount without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual disqualification; and,
to pay the costs.
Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the jurisdiction
of this Court up to this date, let this case be archived as against him without prejudice
to its revival in the event of his arrest or voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of
this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, through new counsel, filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration on
March 23, 1994, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
December 2, 1994.
[22]
[23]
I. The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely
by private individuals.
II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a private
individual as a custodian or a depositary of distrained property is sufficient
to convert such individual into a public officer, the petitioner cannot still be
considered a public officer because:
[A]
There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which authorizes the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to constitute private individuals as depositaries of
distrained properties.
[B]
In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is the question of whether
petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained property.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
It is hornbook doctrine that in order (to) ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or
not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of
the court must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot
be presumed or implied. And for this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the law at the time of commencement of the action.
[25]
[26]
[27]
In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of this information on January
12, 1990; hence, the applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior to their amendment by R.A.
No. 7975 on May 16, 1995. At that time, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 provided that:
Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and the
preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall
perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee,
agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public
officer.
Thus,
(to) be a public officer, one must be -(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or
Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee,
agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform
public duties must be -a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
[28]
Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck
constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting
public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election. The
next logical query is whether petitioners designation by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent
authority. We answer in the negative.
[29]
The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over
the truck allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Alfredo
Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for it, effectively
designated petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs. Rastrollo, a public officer.
This is based on the theory that
[30]
[31]
(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a distrained
property as a depository of distrained property is necessarily implied in the BIRs
power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer (sic) in distraint as provided for
under Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) x x x.
[32]
We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us
simply because the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those
obtaining here. While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the
sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench dealt with the
BIRs administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged property of
taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was received by petitioner
Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and
judicial power to constitute the judicial deposit and give the depositary a character
equivalent to that of a public official. However, in the instant case, while the BIR had
authority to require petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC
did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
[33]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any
person to preserve a distrained property, thus:
xxxxxxxxx
[40]
[41]
Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The provisions of this chapter shall
apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular,
provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or
depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even
if such property belongs to a private individual.
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. This is particularly
observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which must be construed with such
strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant x x x. The language of
the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the
public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any
of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized
with the same penalty meted to erring public officers. Nowhere in this provision is it
expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be
deemed a public officer.
[42]
[43]
After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds petitioner Alfredo
Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously
charged before and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction
over them. The Sandiganbayans taking cognizance of this case is of no moment since
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to be a
private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump
truck.Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla before the
Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the prosecution was in
fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly
charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the controversy and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the
Decision rendered by Respondent Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
[45]
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Rollo, p. 85.
[7]
Ibid., p.87.
[8]
Ibid., p.86.
[9]
Ibid., p. 88.
[10]
Ibid., p. 7.
[11]
Ibid., p. 197.
[12]
Ibid., p. 94.
[13]
Ibid., p. 97.
[14]
Ibid., p. 100.
[15]
Ibid., p. 103.
[16]
Ibid., p. 199.
[17]
[18]
[19]
Ibid., p. 200.
[20]
Second Division, composed of J. Narciso T. Atienza, ponente, and JJ. Romeo M. Escareal and
Augusto M. Amores, concurring.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
Quiason, Camilo D., Philippine Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1993, p. 36; citing PAFLU v. Padilla, 106
Phil. 591, (1959), De Jesus v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 554, February 28, 1967, Auyong
Hian v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 21 SCRA 749, October 31, 1967, People vs. Lava, 28
SCRA 72, May 16, 1969, and Collector v. Villaluz, 71 SCRA 356, June 18, 1976.
[26]
Ibid.; citing Tenario v. Batangas Transportation Co., 90 Phil. 804, (1952), Dimagiba v. Geraldez, 102
Phil. 1016, (1958), and De Jesus v. Garcia, supra.
[27]
People vs. Magallanes, 249 SCRA 212, p. 227, October 11, 1995.
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
x x x The attached property remained in the possession of the debtor, Rastrollo, who, with the consent of
the attorney for the plaintiff, sold the same to the Manila Fire Department. Rastrollo failed to
deliver the proceeds of the sale x x x to the attorney for the plaintiff x x x.
[32]
Rollo, p. 153.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
Gonzales, Supra; citing Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570, April 30, 1976, and
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620, June 30, 1965.
[37]
Quiason, Supra, p. 121; citing University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376,
(1953).
[38]
[39]
Article 217 of th