K. Venkata Ramanan-Nagarjuna's Philosophy-Motilal Banarsidass (1987)
K. Venkata Ramanan-Nagarjuna's Philosophy-Motilal Banarsidass (1987)
PHILOSOPHY
N G R J U N A S P H I L O S O P H Y
As
P r e sen t ed in
By
K.
enka ta
a m a n a n
Branches
Chowk, Varanasi 221 001
Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004
24 Race Course R oad, Bangalore 560 001
120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Madras 600 004
Copyright in Japan 1966 by Harvard-Yenching Institute
Cambridge, M assachusetts, U . S. A.
All rights reserved
PRINTED IN INDIA
BY JAlNENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAIN ENDRA PRESS. A-45 NARAINA
INDUSTRIAL AREA, PHASE I, NEW D ELHI 110 028 AND PUBLISHED BY
NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, DELHI 110 007.
TABLE OF C O N T E N T S
I.
F o rew o rd
P reface . .
13
I n t r o d u c t io n
25
II. C o n c e p t s
and
C o n v e n tio n a l E n titie s
(Ndma a n d
Laksana) ........................................................................................................
70
NATURE OF CONVENTION
MODES OF CONVENTION
I II .. I g n o r a n c e ........................................................................................................
89
IV . I g n o r a n c e
and
K n o w l e d g e .................................................................
N G A R A JU N A 'S PH IL O SO PH Y
V. K n o w l e d g e (PrajH) a s t h e P r in c ip le op C o m p re h e n s io n . . 127
THE MIDDLE WAY: THE NON-EXCLUSIVE WAY
THE WAYS OP TEACHING
VI.
...............................................................
E x tre m e s a n d A lte r n a ti v e s
151
THE EXTREMES
THE ALTERNATIVES
VIII.
T he W o rld an d
t h e I n d i v i d u a l ..................................................... 2 0 9
IX.
R e a l i t y ..................................................................................................................
251
X . T h e W a y ....................................................................................... 276
THE WAY OP COMPREHENSION
THE g r e a t WAY AND t h e s m a ll WAY (MahyZtta a n d HlnayZna)
THE FACTORS OF THE WAY AND THE GATES OF FREEDOM
T A B LE O F C O N T E N T S
XII. C o n c l u s io n
.............................................................................................
317
B ib l io g r a p h y ........................................................................................................................
331
.....................................................................................................................................
335
...................................................................................................................................
381
o tes
In d e x
FOREW ORD
(TO T H E ORIGINAL 1966 E D ITIO N )
N G R JU N A S PH IL O SO PH Y
Acting Director
HARVARD-YENCHING INSTITUTE
Cambridge, Massachusetts
March, 1965
ABBREVIATIONS
AAA
Angu.
Aspects
Asia.
Bareau
Digha
Fa-Ren
Yi-pu-tsttng-lun-lun shu-chi-fa-ren
Oyama, Kyoto, 1891. This includes Kuei-chis Shu-chi
(m)
GOS
Krik
N AG A RJU N A S PHILOSOPHY
Kimura
Majjh.
Masuda
PaBcauimsati
PrasannapadS
see Kdrika.
Samyu.
Sstra
The Mah3-prajRSp3ramit3~s3stra o f N iglrjuna (tr. Kumarajiva), T. 1509, vol. 25, pp. 57A-756C.
T.
Taisho-shinshu-daizokyo
Watanabe, Tokyo, 1922-1933.
Vibhasd
(JOURNALS):
JB O R S
JPTS
JRAS
PREFACE
N A G A R JU N A S PH IL O SO PH Y
PR EFA C E
xnous Buddhist scholar as his friend, viz., Hui-yiian iS5i (334-416), who
was a disciple o f Tao-an otSic (312-385). The correspondence between
Kumarajiva and Hui-yiian is preserved in the Chinese Tripitaka:
T. 1856.
As a scholar, Kumarajivas principal w ork seems to l&ve been the
translation o f Buddhist texts; he seems to have written scarcely any inde
pendent treatise o f his own. W e are told that he did write a text called
Shih-hsiang-lun
(The Treatise on the Real Nature o f Things) at
the request o f the Em peror Yao-hsing, but it is not extant. His oral ex
planations o f the Vimalakirtinirdesa (T. 1775), however, have come
<lown to us through Seng-chao. It is supposed that his influence was due
not to his writings but to his oral explanations and winning personality.4
Kumarajiva translated several recensions o f the Prajndpdramitd-sutras,
like the Pancavimsati-sahasrika, the Asta-sahasrikd and the Vajracchedikd.6
He translated also such important Mahayana Sutras as the Vimalakirtinir
desa and the urangama-samddhi, which breathe the spirit o f the Madhyamika philosophy. He also translated the Saddharmapundarika. All o f
these works have been cited in the Sastra as authoritative. Kumarajiva
translated also texts other than those connected with the Prajndpdramita
o r the Madhyamika; Satyasiddhilastra o f Harivarman was one such.
But this he did very probably to provide a stepping stone to the mature
philosophy o f the Middle W ay, through its criticism o f Sarvastivada.
Kumarajivas appreciation lay in the philosophy o f the Middle W ay.
He was through and through a man o f the prajdnparamita and a follower
o f Nagarjuna.
Kumarajiva translated also some texts on the method o f dhyana
(meditation) and Tao-sheng, one o f his foremost disciples, has been
counted as a precursor o f the C han (or Zen) school. The roots o f this
school lay in the philosophy o f prajndpdramita and that, principally
through the Madhyamika criticism of which Nagarjuna was the un
surpassed master. Kumarajiva translated four o f the principal works
attributed to Nagarjuna, viz., the Madhyamaha-sastra (i.e., the Madhyamika-karika, with the commentary o f Pingala), the Dvddasamukhasdstra, the Dasabhumi-vihhd$d-sdstra and the Mahd-prajndpdramitd-sdstra.
He translated also Devas Sata-sdstra. W e are told that he com
15
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
menced the translation o f the Sdstra in 402 and finished it in 405 ;8 but
it is possible that he began his work while he was still in Ku-tsang.
Although it seems that Kumarajiva did not himself write much, still
under his influence this branch o f Buddhist philosophy came to be much
studied and some brilliant minds in China have left records o f their
deep study o f this school. Seng-chao and Chi-tsang $8 (549-623) are
preeminent among these. Chi-tsang, an important Chinese master o f
the Madhyamika philosophy, has left records o f extensive use o f the
dstra.
(t . 1851) (Exposition o f the Meaning o f Mahayana)
o f Hui-yiian (52392) also makes extensive use o f this text. Hui-yiian
has arranged his exposition o f the topics so as to contrast the accounts
o f Abhidharma (Sarvastivada) and Satyasiddhi with the account o f
Mahayana and under the latter he cites throughout the relevant passages
from the dstra. These works o f Chi-tsang and Hui-yiian were o f great
help to me in coordinating and organizing my materials. W e have also
an analysis and notes on the dstra prepared by one Hui-ying S f (600
A.D.) .7
PREFACE
N A G A R JU N A S PH IL O SO PH Y
PREFA CE
N A G A R JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
than one Sanskrit term. I have given special care to collecting and com
paring occurrences o f such terms, e.g., ft, ff,
Jfc, M* and IS.
The entire work is presented as a Madhyamika would present it.
Thus I have used such terms as the hearers (srdvaka), the Small
W ay (Hinayana) and the Great W ay (Mahayana) as a Madhyamika
would use them. I hope that this will be understood as an expedient in
tended simply to give a more vivid account o f the system which is
being described. dstra itself uses these terms. But it should be re
membered that though the Sdstra speaks caustically o f some teachers
o f the Small W ay, its author need not be supposed to have any animus
against the Small W ay as such. He might well have said, Those who
are followers o f the Great W ay will become small if they shall cling.
O n the other hand, even the elements that are called factors o f the
Small W ay, if they are cultivated non-clingingly, may lead to final
consummation in the Great Way. W hat matters in both ways is the
understanding and the attitude.
M y study and translation o f the Sastra were based on the woodcut edition o f
(1883/1884 a.d.). But in the final
revision o f the work, the references have been made to the Taisho
edition o f the Chinese Tripitaka.
The beginnings o f my study o f the Madhyamika philosophy date
back to my undergraduate days in the Mysore University in the years
1942-1943, and are due in particular to the incentive o f Professor Radhakrishnans presentation o f the philosophy o f Nagarjuna in his Indian
Philosophy, vol. I, (George Allen and Unwin, 1923), pp. 643669. 1
continued my studies at the Benares Hindu University under his guid
ance. I wish to acknowledge here my deepest sense of gratefulness to this
great teacher for the immense help ahd encouragement I have obtained
from him. I found Professor Stcherbatskys Conception oj Buddhist Nir
vana* which embodies a translation o f Chapters I and XXV o f the
Kdrikd with Candrakirtis Prasannapada, o f considerable help in nay
early stages. M y study o f the Chinese Buddhist texts began in China,
when I was a Government o f India Research Scholar at the National
University o f Peking in the years 1947-1949, under the guidance of
PREFA CE
N A G A R JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
N A G R J U N A S P H I L O S O P H Y
As P r e s e n t e d
T he M
aha-
in
r a j a p a r a m i t A - astra
CHAPTER
IN TR O D U C TIO N
Section
LIFE A N D W O R K OF N A g A R J U N A
N A G A R JU N A 'S PHILOSO PH Y
his home even as a child because his parents sent him away being un
able to bear the sight o f his premature death at the age o f seven which
the astrologers had predicted o f him. However, the boy escaped from
this fate, so these sources say, by entering the Buddhist Order and
practising the aperimitdyurdhdrani according to the instructions o f his
teacher Rahulabhadra (or Saraha) at Nalanda.7 Kumarajlva is at vari
ance with this account. He tells us that Nagarjuna was overpowered
with lust and passion in his early days, seduced women in the royal
court by the use o f the art o f invisibility and only narrowly escaped
death at the hands o f the guards at a touching moment. This stirred
him deeply and awakened him to the truth that the origin o f suffering
is passion. Thereupon he entered the Buddhist Order and studied all
the Buddhist texts that were available to him; and not being satisfied
with them, he wandered in search o f other texts.8 The prevailing
tradition which he could readily obtain was presumably Sarvastivada
and Nagaijunas deep study o f it is beyond doubt. This is amply borne
out by his penetrating understanding and searching criticism o f this
school in his Kdrtkd.9 All the accounts o f his life, speak o f his having
obtained the Prajndpdramitd-sutras (Kumarajiva's Vaipulya-sutras) from
a Naga10 and these texts satisfied so deeply his quest for other teach
ings o f the Buddha that he devoted his whole life to teach and pro
pagate the profound truths contained in them.
The Tibetan sources state that Nagarjuna was a teacher at Nalanda
and they speak o f his all-embracing compassion and intense care for the
whole community.11 Kumarajlva however does not mention Nalan
da.12 The accounts o f Nagarjunas passing away though differently
told amount to his having himself put an end to his life or having given
his consent to his own death at the hands o f another, viz., the son o f
the king with whom he was tied in life and death.13 The different ac
counts o f Nagarjunas life, though briefly told, bear out certain broad
facts o f the life o f a master-mind o f Buddhist lore and these could be
hardly said to be too incongruous to be credible. However, the one
point o f great divergence is about the circumstances o f his younger
days leading to his accepting the Buddhist Order. Perhaps in this
regard Kumarajlvas account merits consideration more than the rest
26
IN T R O D U C T IO N
if only for its being presumably earlier than that o f the Tibetan
sources.14
Nagarjuna and the Ndgas: As regards the Naga from whom Nagarjuna is said to have obtained the Prajndparamita-sutras, Kumarajlva
speaks o f the Naga chief (Mahanaga) who led him into the sea and
opened up for him the Treasury of the Seven Jewels (Saptaranakosa).
Nagarjuna read the Vaipulya (Mahdyana) Sutras which the Mahanaga
selected for his reading, and having read them he deeply penetrated
into their meaning. He told the Mahanaga that what he already
read there was ten times o f what he had read in Jambudvlpa and
eventually brought away with him a boxful o f them.15 The Ti
betan sources are more specific with regard to what he brought from
there, for they tell us that there was among these texts, the Prajfidpdramitd-sutras o f 100,000 gathdsJ" The tradition that Nagarjuna
brought these Sutras from the country o f the Nagas may be taken as
pointing to the preservation o f another tradition o f the Buddhist
teaching in the South, different from those that were prevailing in his
time in the North, and it bears on the fact that from his time onwards
the Prajndpdramitd teaching came to overshadow more and more the
other lines o f Buddhist philosophy.
Nagarjuna and the Satavdhanas: The Satavahana king who is stated to
have been the great friend o f Nagarjuna and to have built the monaste
ry for him in Sriparvata seems to have been a breakaway from the
faith o f his forefathers, viz., the Buddhist faith; and to him Nagarjuna
wrote letters o f admonition.17 This royal friend is reputed to have been
the lord o f the three seas.18 The king was presumably Gautamiputra
Satakarni who is called the only brahrnana in his lineage as well as
the lord o f the three seas in the Nasik Edict issued by his mother
Balasrl.19 This is the king that won a victory over Ksaharata Nahapana.
and this victory was proclaimed in the Edict issued from the kings
victorious camp in the year 18 of his reign.20
Two dates are held out for Gautamiputra Satakami who ruled for
twenty-four years, viz., the first quarter o f the second century or the
last quarter of the first century of our era, depending among other
27
N G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
IN T R O D U C T IO N
N A G A R JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
IN T R O D U C T IO N
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
IN T R O D U C T IO N
and providing for them a basis wider than the one to which each school
clung, and thus to remove the ground o f contention and quarrel. The
synthesis that he achieved was essentially one o f revivifying the original
insight o f the Master, viz., the insight o f the Middle W ay, the way that
is all-comprehensive and hence above contention. It is the Buddhist
schools, especially the Sarvstivdins, that keep his attention engaged,
and almost all that he wrote had an immediate, direct, bearing on
their doctrine o f elements. The stra refers to the non-Buddhist schools
but rarely. O f these, it is the Snkhya and the Vaisesika that provide
the specimens respectively o f clinging to identity and difference and
the existence and the non-existence o f the effect in the cause as well
as o f holding fast to the belief in the multiplicity o f separate entities,
I-substances.44 The Krik refers to the imagination that there is an
impervious core o f personality, essentially unrelated to deeds and their
consequences and yet somehow attached to them, eternal and all-per
vasive and yet somehow migrating from one set o f constituents to
another.45 It is these tenets o f the Snkhya and the Vaisesika that become
the objects o f frequent criticism at the hands o f the Buddhist thinkers
and it is not difficult to see that their arguments are patterned after
Nagarjunas.
One o f the im portant criticisms that the &stra levels against the
substantialist theory o f self o f the non-Buddhists is w ith regard to the
part that the latter assign to soul in the act o f knowing. These criti
cisms are levelled w ith particular reference to the nave belief o f the
Vaisesika and the Nyya that the soul which is not o f the nature o f
knowledge or awareness can yet function as the ultimate ground of
knowing4* and with reference to their uncritical acceptance that the
pramnas, the ordinary means o f knowledge, viz., sense-perception and
the inference that is based on it, yield us the understanding o f the ulti
mate truth o f things.47 The criticism that the stra offers amounts
to a dismissal o f the spurious soul, the I-substance, and the revelation
that a critical use o f pramnas means an awareness o f their having their
ground in the undivided prajna, even in their extending our acquaint
ance in the world o f the determinate. Again, as determinate modes o f
knowing, they are not suited to deal with the ultimate truth# the in
33
N G R JU N S PH IL O SO PH Y
IN T R O D U C T IO N
N A G A R JU N A S PHILO SO PH Y
(3860). O f these two, the latter is the Tibetan version o f the original
Sanskrit Prasannapadd.12 O f the works available in Chinese, we have
the following in Tibetan also: Vigrahavydvartam (3828) with its vrtti
(3832); Pratxtyasamutpada-hrdaya-karika (3836) and its commentary
(3837). Bhavasankrdnti (3840) is available in Chinese but its Txka (3841)
is not there; similarly Yuktisastikd (3825) is available in Chinese but its
commentary by Candrakirti (3864) is not found there. But neither
Vaidalya o f which Sutra (3826) and Prakarana (3830) are separately
mentioned, nor Sunyatdsaptati73 (3827) o f which there is a vrtti (3831)
is to be found in Chinese. Three o f the texts listed in the Tibetan Collec
tion belong to separate authors: Aksarasataka (3834) is o f Deva and
3835 is its commentary; Abodhabodhaka (3838) is o f a Nagarjunagarbha.
In Sanskrit as already noted we have two o f the aforementioned
texts extant in their original, viz., Madhyamika-karika with Candrakirtis
commentary, Prasannapada, and Vigrahavydvartam with Nagarjunas
own vrtti. Besides, we have in Sanskrit, Ratndvalx edited by Prof. G.
Tucci who has also edited two o f Nagarjunas devotional verses (stava),
Niraupamya-stava and Paramdrtha-stava in their original Sanskrit varsion.76 One o f these, Niraupamya-stava, along with three others, Lokatxta, Acintya and Stutyafita, have been retranslated into Sanskrit from
Tibetan by Prabhubhai Patel.76 Recently Sjt. Sunitikumar Pathak o f
Visvabharati University has retranslated from Tibetan into Sanskrit a
text, Aryadharmadhatu-garbha-vivarana,77 which is attributed to Nagarjuna. It purports to expound the links in the course o f phenomenal
existence, and has close and unmistakable affinity with the relevant
portion o f the Sdstra. It is probably a work o f Nagarjuna. Nagaijuna
is known to have compiled a collection o f Sutras (Sutra-samuccaya) 18
which o f course is not extant. '
The works that can be attributed to Nagarjuna may be reclassified
into these broad categories:
I.
Texts that constitute chiefly a critical examination o f other schools,
especially o f the Sarvastivada doctrine o f elements:
1) Madhyamaka-sdstra (Mddhyamika-kdrikd); 2) Vigrahavydvartam; 3)
Ekasloka-sastra and 4) Dvadasamukha-sastra. 5) Sunyatd-saptati also per
haps belongs to this class.
36
IN T R O D U C T IO N
II
T H E BASIC C O N C E P T I O N S IN T H E
P H IL O S O P H Y OF N A g A R J U N A
Nonexclusive understanding as the root of the skilfulness of non-clinging: It
appears that, when Nagarjuna approached the main philosophical
teaching of the Buddha, he was confronted with a multitude o f con
tending schools o f philosophy, each making an exclusive claim, seizing
the fragmentary as complete, clinging to the relative as absolute. That
this tendency was quite prevalent then among the Buddhist schools is evi
denced by the emphasis put in the works o f Nagarjuna on non-contentiousness (anupalambha}) which he regarded as belonging to the very
heart o f the Buddha's teachings. There is also the explicit reference in
the Sdstra to the prevailing attitude of contention among the Buddhas
37
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
IN T R O D U C T IO N
and fully satisfying the thirst for the unconditioned, only to meet with
disappointment and frustration.
In right understanding (dhartnatubn bhutapratyavekf) not only there
is revealed the determinate as determinate but there is revealed also in
it the indeterminate or the unconditioned as distinct from the N
determinate.85 But if one were to seize in turn the distinction o f the determinate
and the indeterminate as an absolute separateness, that again would be
to commit once more the error o f clinging. The determinate is not
a self-being; it is not only essentially related to all the other things in
the world which are also specific determinate entities, but as a determi
nate entity it has its being only in dependence on the indeterminate.
Pratityasamutpdda, conditioned or dependent origination, which means
the essential relativity o f things, has its. bearing on the determinate entity
not only in regard to its arising from the complex o f causal factors, but
also in regard to its essentially dependent nature, viz., its dependence
on the independent, ultimate, reality.86 It is a basic conception in the
philosophy of Nagarjuna that while the indeterminate reality is the
ground o f the determinate entities, it is only the ultimate nature o f the
latter themselves and not another entity apart from them .87
The ultimate nature of man is the undivided being: In regard to the
nature and destiny o f the human individual, this has the profound signi
ficance that man as a specific, determinate individual is not absolutely
confined to his determinate nature. As an individual^ man is essentially
related to the rest o f the world. He is also not apart from the indetermi
nate reality which is the ultimate ground o f his very being. A nd in his
ultimate nature man is himself the indeterminate, unconditioned reality,
the undivided being. The ultimate meaning o f the sense o f lack, the
sense o f devoidness (sunyata) , which is the thirst for the real, Nagaijuna
would say, lies in the realization o f this real nature o f oneself. The
imagination that one is bound forever to ones fragmentariness alienates
the conditioned from the unconditioned, reducing the relative distinc
tion to absolute separateness. The thirst for the real in man is not bound
to end in despair. W hat brings about despair is ones own imagination
39
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
IN T R O D U C T IO N
X g A r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
scious individual. One can see it if one develops an eye to see it and it
is his mission to enkindle this insight. His rejection o f views does not
mean that he is opposed to building systems; he would himself formu
late specific systems, not to cling to them, but to use them as a help to
those who are in need o f them. That he does not have any position o f
his own means that he does not seize any specific formulation ex
clusively. This sense o f non-exclusiveness enables him to keep himself
en rapport w ith every system and to see the truth in every position.
Non-exclusiveness (sunyata) , the Mdhyamika would say, is o f the
very nature o f wisdom (prajnd), Rejecting the error o f misplaced ab
soluteness, he reveals the conditioned as conditioned and the uncondi
tioned as unconditioned. In this he is doing just what the sun does; the
sun does not make the high low or the low high, but just reveals the
nature o f things as they are, the low as low and the high as high.98
The place o f the Kdrikd and the dstra in the total system: In the Kdrikd
itself one finds practically all the principal conceptions in the philosophy
o f Nagarjuna. But there these are obscured by its overwhelmingly
negative character. The fact that there he is advancing arguments
reductio ad absurdum needs to be kept in mind while one reads that text.
The negative conclusions belong not to him but to those whose posi
tions are under examination. The absoluteness o f specific views and o f
particular entities is assumed for the sake o f argument and the con
clusions that naturally follow from such a position are exposed, which*
on account o f the absurdity o f the initial assumption, are bound to be
absurd. Thus the imagined absoluteness (sasvabhdvatva) of what is
only relative is rejected and at the same time relativity (naihsvabhdvya)
is revealed as its true nature. Relativity or non-ultimacy o f views and
conditionedness or non-substantiality o f entitiesthis is the truth that
is borne out by sunyata in reference to the mundane nature o f things.
In the Kdrikd, pratityasumutpdda (conditioned origination), sunyata,
upadaya-prajnapti (derived name) and madhyamd-pratipat (the Middle
W ay) are expressly declared as synonyms.99 Here one finds further
that the relativity o f the relative is not its ultimate nature; to cling to
sunyata or relativity as itself absolute is the most serious o f errors.100
42
IN T R O D U C T IO N
Further, the Karikd declares that the distinction o f mundane and ulti
mate truth is basic to understanding the profound meaning in the teach
ings o f the Buddha.101 That which is o f the nature of coming and going,
arising and perishing, in its conditioned (mundane) nature is itself
Nirvana in its unconditioned (ultimate) nature. 102 This means that the
inconditioned reality is the ground o f the conditioned, contingent
entities; that is "he reality and these constitute the appearance.
Throughout the Karikd, there is implied the sense of the unconditioned,
the thirst for the real in man; it is the misapplication o f this sense o f the
real that ,results in the error o f false realism (sasvabhava-vada) .
Thus we find all the essential elements constituting the basic frame
work o f the philosophy o f Nagarjuna are actually provided in the
Karikd. This work, as we have seen, is known to have been written in
order to expound the basic teachings o f the Prajnndpdramitd-sutras. But
actually its chief purpose was not so much to give an exposition o f their
philosophy as to prepare the ground for such an exposition, viz., by
clearing away misconceptions, especially the basic error o f clinging to
the elements o f analysis, to which the Sarvastivadins were subject. It
is ignorance, says the Karikd, to mistake the relative for the absolute,
to hold fast to separateness o f elements as ultimate and to cling to an
unconditional denial o f self.108 It is significant that the Kdrika devotes
a whole chapter (ch. XXIV) for explaining that sunyata is not nihilism
but relativity and conditionedness, that it is not a rejection o f the world
o f becoming and the meaningfulness o f life but the very way mundane
existence is appreciated as a course o f conditioned becoming as well as
the way the values o f life become possible o f realization. For him
who is in agreement with sunyata everything stands in harmony and
for him who is not in agreement with sunyata nothing stands in harmo
ny. 104 Under the circumstances it seems that there is not only nothing
incongruous in the author o f the Karikd accepting things in their mun
dane truth but it becomes incumbent on him to do so. And it seems that
Nagarjuna set for himself a challenge to show how not only the unique
nature o f everything can go well with the ultimate truth o f the undivid
ed being, but, that the mundane existence itself becomes possible, con
ceivable, only on the ground o f the unconditioned reality. Nagarjuna
43
N G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
meets this challenge by pointing, on the one hand, to the different levels
o f comprehension and, on the other, to the absurdity into which one
would drive oneself by mistaking the relative for the absolute.
W hat we do miss in th Krik is an emphasis on and a detailed ac
count o f prajn as the principle o f comprehending the different levels
o f understanding. W e do not have there an analysis o f error and its ways
in regard to the mundane and the ultimate truths. There is no specific
attention drawn in the Krik to the thirst for the real in man nor any
emphasis on the real as the ground or as the immanent reality o f the
determinate. W e also miss in it an account o f the course o f wayfaring
in the various aspects o f the W ay, with the skilfulness o f non-clinging.
It is precisely these that are brought to light in the stra, the first thirtyfour chapters o f which practically set forth all the essential elements in
the philosophy of the Middle W ay with extraordinary vividness. Chap
ter VI o f the stra has a detailed analysis o f illusion (ignorance) ;104a ch.
XVIII has an account o f prajn as the all-comprehensive understand
ing105 and as the very ultimate nature o f all things;108 ch. XXXI has
an account o f all the eighteen kinds o f snyat; 107 ch. XXXII has a
brilliant and vivid account o f the real as the ground o f the world o f the
determinate as well as an account o f the thirst for the real in m an;108
ch. XXXII gives also a very illuminating statement about the nature
and purpose of the negative criticism, in connection with the criticism
o f causes and conditions, when it says that what is denied here is not
the causes and conditions but the prevailing perversions about them ;109
these are the perversions o f clinging to alternatives as extremes and
arriving at distorted accounts about the mundane truth. It is significant
that the Sstra dwells at length (ch. XXXVI) on an exposition o f the
categories o f the elements o f analysis, preliminary to the criticism that
lays bare their snyat.110 Logically analysis is prior to criticism; and
snyat is not the rejection o f elements but the revelation o f their condi
tionedness. Chapters XEX-XXIX again, significantly enough, set forth
the factors o f the W ay according to Abhidharma (Sarvstivda) as well
as according to Mahyna, and practically at the end o f every topic in
this connection, it shows how the elements o f Abhidharma are to be as
similated into the Great W ay. First there is the analysis and then there
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IN T R O D U C T IO N
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
here and there throughout the text shows that it is not only o f one piece
with it but includes and exceeds it. In the light o f the Sdstra, the Kdrika
takes its proper place and bears out its function in the total system of
the philosophy o f prajndpdramita, as preparatory to and as a most essen
tial stage in the wayfaring of the bodhisattva, the traveller on the Great
W ay. The realization o f the non-ultimacy o f specific views and the
non-substantiality o f specific entities is the essential first step in the
wayfarers realization o f the ultimate truth as well as in his work in the
world.
Section
III
IN T R O D U C T IO N
is itself in its ultimate nature the unconditioned reality, that the world
is itself Nirvana, when rightly seen.
It is necessary to remember that the text that is the subject o f our
present study belongs to and breathes the atmosphere o f a time when
the division o f the community (sagha) was an accepted fact and the
two lines were in a state o f constant controversy in which those who
trod the Great W ay took it as their responsibility to show that what
they taught was not only not foreign to but actually the essential, deeper,
meaning o f the teachings o f the Buddha, even as contained in the
baskets o f the Small W ay. The astra frequently says, The big con
tains the small, although the small cannot contain the big.113
W ithout entering into the question o f the crucial difference between
the two chief lines o f Buddhist philosophy, we may briefly review here
the few conceptions that were held basic to the teachings o f the Buddha
by all His followers. W e may thereby see how even these lead to what
constitutes the main teaching in the philosophy o f Ngrjuna.
Conditioned Origination and the Middle Way: The tw o most important
conceptions for our consideration are conditioned origination and
the Middle W ay. These two are treated as synonyms even in the
PaH Canon.134 W ith Ngrjuna it is an essential point that they be seen
as only different expressions o f one and the same principle, the principle
o f relativity or conditionedness.136 One can say that while conditioned
origination emphasizes the import o f relativity in regard to the entities
or events that constitute the course o f mundane existence, the Middle
W ay emphasizes the import o f relativity in regard to views concerning
the mundane nature of things. W e may inquire into these conceptions
as preserved in the PaH Nikyas appraising what we find in the light of
what has been set forth above as the main teaching in the philosophy
o f Ngquna.
The Four Noble Truths: The eradication o f suffering by tracing it to
its roots constitutes the essence o f the Four Noble Truths taught by the
Buddha. They form the subject matter o f His first preaching, the turn
ing o f the Wheel o f Dharma.12* They constitute the foundation of
47
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
Buddhism. The first preaching makes it clear that the cause o f suffer
ing is craving, which is rooted in ignorance. The constituents o f per
sonality are painful precisely because o f clinging, seizing, which is due
to craving. If one destroys the root o f suffering, suffering itself will be
extinguished. This is the truth o f conditioned origination*: This
being, that becomes, and with the extinction o f this, that ceases to
be.117 As the teaching o f the Buddha is mainly concerned with the
origin and extinction o f suffering, this truth o f conditioned origination
constitutes the very heart o f the dharma. Conditioned origination is
identified with the dhamma (dharma). He who sees the dhamma sees
the conditioned origination and he who sees the conditioned origination
sees the dhamma1
The Middle W ay: The first preaching o f the Buddha brings out also
the truth o f the Middle W ay. R ight views which are the first element
in the Eightfold Noble W ay consist in keeping free from extremes.
These extremes, it must be borne in mind, are to be understood as ap
plying not only to morals but also to correct understanding. In the
case o f morals the extremes are sensualism and asceticism.11* In the case
o f correct understanding, the Middle W ay is the way that is free from
the extremes o f is and is not. W hile becoming, conditioned origi
nation, is analysable as is and is not, to cling to any one o f these
aspects exclusively is to turn them into extremes and extremes are
falsifications; they then become the dead-ends o f etemalism and annihilationism.1*0 Actually nothing in the world exists absolutely and nothing
perishes totally. By drawing the fact o f arising to the attention o f those
who cling exclusively to non-being and the fact o f ceasing to the atten
tion o f those who cling exclusively to being, the Buddha reveals that
things here are neither absolutely being nor absolutely non-being, but
are arising and perishing, forming a continuity o f becoming.181
The Buddhas silence as the revealer of truth: In regard to the human
individual, the errors o f etemalism and annihilationism appear as ex
tremes in conceiving ones mundane nature. W hen Vacchagotta asked
the Buddha whether there is the self, the Buddha kept silent. When
48
IN T R O D U C T IO N
Vacchagotta asked the Buddha whether there is not the self, the Buddha
again kept silent. After Vacchagotta went away without an answer,
Ananda asked the Buddha why He had not answered the question.
The Buddha replied that if He had answe ied that there is the self, He
would have been subscribing to the view o f etemalism; if He had an
swered that there is not the self, He would have been subscribing to
the view o f annihilationism.132 That the question was asked b y Vac
chagotta with a clinging mind, with the deep-rooted tendency to seize
is or is not exclusively, is clear.
W hat are old-age and death and what is it that has old-age and death?
In regard to a question like this that tends to swing between the extremes
o f identity and difference o f the self and the skattdhcis, the Buddhas an
swer would be that the question is not rightly put.133 The views that
sensation is myself, that sensation is not myself, that myself possesses
sensation,134 and the views that the body is the self, the self has the body,
the body is in the self and the self is in the body,135 all these are only
different forms o f exclusive views, formulated in terms o f absolute
identity and absolute difference which are themselves further reducible
to the forms o f etemalism and negativism. Again, if the Buddha would
not answer such questions as, Is suffering wrought by oneself or by
another? Is suffering wrought both by oneself and by another? O r is
suffering wrought neither by oneself nor by another?, it was because
an aye or a nay to any of these would lead one either to etemalism or
to annihilationism.138 N ot accepting these extremes the Buddha taught
the truth (dharma) by the Middle W ay, viz., conditioned origination,
as the right view in regard to the mundane nature o f the individual.
Even the fourteen unanswered questions, which the Buddha set
aside and did not answer, are all formulated on the pattern o f the errors
o f etemalism and annihilationism. They are all questions about the
mundane nature o f things.137 These are set forth briefly in the Udarta
where the Buddha gives an account o f them as kinds o f partial views,
to which the ignorant cling as the whole and only view, and thereby
give rise to quarrels. Then He proceeds to narrate the story o f the six
blind men that quarrelled as to what kind o f a thing an elephant was,
one saying that it was like a pot and the other like a winnowing fan,
49
N A G A R JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
and so on. The Buddha proceeds to say that in a similar way the teachers
belonging to the other sects do not know what is the goal and what is
not the goal, do not know what is the way and what is not the way
and so they wrangle, quarrel and dispute/' They have only a partial
view o f things, they do not have a comprehensive understanding.138
The views presented in these questions are about the world and the
individual; and every one o f these is based on a partial observation o f
things and consists in seizing a certain aspect and claiming completeness
for it, even as he that touched the head o f the elephant maintained that
the elephant was like a pot, and he that touched only the ear maintained
that the elephant was like a winnowing fan. Any answer to any o f
them would only lead the questioner to further clinging. And the Bud
dhas dismissal o f them is understandable as due to the falsity o f their
initial assumption o f exclusive division and the tendency o f the ques
tioners to cling to one o f the alternatives as itself ultimate. The question
whether the world is eternal or not eternal (evanescent), for example,
is unanswerable because the assumption o f the dichotomy is false. It
assumes that a thing is either absolutely existent or absolutely non
existent and both these are false in regard to things that exist but con
ditionally. Is the self the same as the body or different from it? No
answer can be given because the question assumes that the self is either
absolutely identical with or absolutely different from the body. The
relation that the self as a self-conscious dynamic organism bears to the
constituents o f personality is not describable in these absolute terms.
Does the self exist after death or does it not exist? The question is not
answerable in this form, for the assumption is that the self is either eter
nal or evanescent. To abandon these views is to give up the claim of
completeness in regard to what is only fragmentary. Everyone o f these
views owes its being to lack o f direct, unimpeded comprehension of
the true nature o f things, viz., the truth o f the conditioned origina
tion, which is revealed by their rejection. The Middle W ay is to see
things as they are, to recognize the possibility o f determining things
differently from different standpoints and to recognize that these deter
minations cannot be seized as absolute. This is the way that realizes the
50
IN T R O D U C T IO N
N A G A R JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
and there is the release from becoming, there is samsara (the course o f
mundane existence, conditioned becoming) and there is Nirvana (the
unconditioned reality); but samsara is not as such Nirvana and Nirvana
is not another entity apart from samsara. And the being o f samsara is
not o f the same kind as Nirvana. It is not difficult to see that we have
here the basic truth about the course o f mundane existence which the
Mdhyamika expresses when he says that that which is contingent in its
conditioned nature is Itself Nirvana in its unconditioned nature.145
The true being o f the Tathgata, say the Nikayas, which, as Ngrjuna would say, is also the true being o f all, is not conceivable in any
specific way.146 The modes o f conceiving simply do not hold there;
they are irrelevant there. In the case o f the Tathgata whose outflows
have become completely, residuelessly, extinct, the imaginations that
he arises, that he does not arise, that he both arises and does not arise
and that he neither arises nor does not arise, do not hold. W hen the fire
that is burning in front becomes extinct, it cannot be said that it went
to the east or to the west or north or south, for this way o f speaking does
not hold here. Just in the same way, all the determinate forms by which
the ultimate nature o f the Tathgata could be predicated have all become
extinct. In this ultimate nature, the Tathgata is deep, immeasurable,
unfathomable, like the mighty ocean.147 The ultimately real nature of
the Tathgata is indeterminable; it is the same as Nirvna, and this the
Tathgata has realized.
It is necessary to note here an important distinction that has emerged
from the above consideration, viz., the distinction between mundane
and ultimate truth. The indeterminability o f the ultimate nature is not
o f the same kind as the indeterminability o f the mundane nature. The
latter is the indescribability o f things as absolutely existent or absolutely
non-existent, etc. These are extremes as descriptions o f the mundane
nature o f things and are as such falsifications. Their rejection reveals
the conditioned, changing, nature o f things. But the indeterminability
o f the ultimate nature is o f a different kind. There the question o f ex
tremes does not arise; for it is not a case o f seizing some one aspect and
claiming absoluteness for it. There the rejection o f the kotis does not
amount to a revelation o f the Middle W ay nor of conditioned origina
52
IN T R O D U C T IO N
Section
IV
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
IN T R O D U C T IO N
N G R JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
the Sthaviras and the Mahsnghikas, later than even the further division
of these main stems into the several different schools, the Early
Schools.
Among these early schools there were those which laid emphasis on
analysis, held to a plurality of ultimate elements, and tended to a kind
o f mechanistic conception of personality; these were chiefly the Sarvstivdins. And there were the Mahsnghikas who tended on the whole
to emphasize the distinction between the conditioned and the uncondi
tioned. They seem to have held from the very beginning the nonultimacy o f the basic elements o f existence and recognized the uncondi
tioned as the ground o f the conditioned, thus being in possession o f all
that is needed for a philosophical absolutism. This is true in general o f
all the schools o f the Mahsnghikas, and all these had already emerged
even before the other stem, that o f the Sthaviras, began to put forth
branches. And between these two main lines o f Buddhist philosophy
during this period, one may notice a kind o f logically unstable line, a
line that tended to move away from the realistic, pluralistic and me
chanistic conception o f the Sarvstivdins and did not quite reach the
other, the absolutistic line.158 These were the schools that chose to
secede from the Sthaviras, dissent from the Sarvastivadins and emphasize
the concrete, integral, organic nature o f life and personality. These
were the Vatsputryas,169 the Smmityas,100 and the Sautrntikas.101
To these one might add the Drstntikas,102 who were, according
to one tradition, the forerunners o f the Sautrntikas and who figure
very prominently in the Vibhs as one o f the formidable schools with
whom the Sarvastivadins had to contend, being in this respect second
only to the Vibhajyavdins. These Schools that fall in between the
pluralistic and the absolutistic lines took becoming seriously and tried
to reject the tendency to cling to the abstract as ultimate, which was.
the dominant tendency o f the analysts (the Sarvastivadins). Among
these one finds the emphasis on the sense o f unity and freedom as basic
to self-hood. These tended to hold the non-ultimacy of difference be
tween individuality and its constituents.
N ot all schools were equally prominent in regard to doctrinal con
tributions and not all o f them were secessions on the ground of doctrinal
56
IN T R O D U C T IO N
differences. But such schools as did have their own developments came
to have them only after long philosophical thinking. Logically analysis
comes prior to criticism, but this need not mean that historically it
was so; both tendencies were presumably there from the very begin
ning. The tendency towards criticism holding the non-substantiality
o f the basic elements o f existence (dharma-sunyata) was there perhaps
even before the actual emergence o f the school that emphasized differ
ence as absolute. But, for the most part, all these tendencies worked
more or less simultaneously and were developing together in different
centres. Each o f these had its own emphasis and all developments were
founded on the words o f the Buddha. Their methods were different,
but they worked together by mutual criticism.
A. The pluralistic line: (I) The basic doctrine of Sarvastivada: The
Sarvastivadins derive their name from their doctrine o f the unvarying,
and therefore ultimate, nature o f the fundamental elements, entities or
essences (dharmah), This is an extreme form o f the emphasis on the
analysis and definition o f elements. For the Sarvastivadins everything
exists (sarvam asti) means: I) all elements are real for they hold firmly
their own essences which they never give upeach element has its own
essence or is itself in its very nature that essence; II) again, all elements,
all fundamental essences, always exist.163 O f the essences themselves there
is no arising or perishing; the arising and perishing are o f their functions.
W hether the elements rise to function or not, they are there all the same;
they are real.164 This doctrine o f the timeless and underived character of
the specific essences is unique to the Sarvastivadins. For them ahhidharma
means a thorough analysis o f the fundamental elements, in order to
understand them clearly, so that there is no further illusion about them.
The dharmas, the elements or essences, exist, and they exist by their
own right. They are in this sense atman, self-being. The Vibhasd
admits dharmdtma while it denies pudgaldtma;166 the latter refers to the
individual, which is a name for the specific complex o f the functions of
these fundamental elements and it is this that is seized as "I and
mine. In truth the self that is the object o f the notion o f I is a com
plex of the functions of elements that appear and disappear, but the
57
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
(II)
Time and change: The Sarvastivadins lay great emphasis on minute
analysis o f the causal factors that bring about every event in the course
o f mundane existence. W hile this is not the place to go into the details
about the Sarvastivada analysis o f causes and conditions, the essential
thing to bear in mind here is that the work turned out by the causal
functioning of the elements is the thing constituted of the functions
that they give rise to by way o f mutual association; the thing is there
fore conditionally originated and destroyed, but the basic elements
themselves rest in their own nature unaffected by temporality.168 W hile
the basic elements are non-temporal, their function is temporal; tem
porality consists in functioning.169 The unit o f time is the unit o f func
tion. A unit-function is the minimum conceivable period for the cycle
o f rising to function, carrying out the function and ceasing to func
tion.170 This minimum conceivable division o f function or process is
58
INTRODUCTION
NAGARJUNA*S PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
this they fail to make room for change or becoming, which was taught
by the Buddha to be the essential nature of things. Again, the Sarvasti
vadins cling to the distinct as separate and hold separateness to be ab
solute. W ith this they fail to provide for the organic nature of the course
o f phenomenal existence, and the difficulties in this regard become pro
nounced especially in connection with the problem o f personality. The
Sarvastivadins have not swerved from the natural conclusion o f their
position, viz., o f explaining away the sense of unity and freedom which
is instrinsic to self-hood, and which is in fact the very basis o f the moral
endeavour o f man.180 Subjectivity or individual experience hardly
claims their attention, and with it, negation and privation or error
naturally need to be explained away. One could perhaps see here- an
instance o f the objectivism o f the analysts at its peak.
These considerations led the seceders from the main line o f the Sthaviras to dissent from the Sarvastivadins. All those who dissented from
the Sarvastivadins and made significant contributions to Buddhist
thought were such as emphasized the meaningfulness o f subjectivity,,
and the organic unity o f personality. These they brought to the front
as the cardinal elements in their interpretation o f the basic conceptions
o f Buddhist philosophy, viz., conditioned origination,, and the Middle
W ay. And with these they sought to oppose the extreme kind of objec
tivism in which they found the Sarvastivadins involved. The Vatslputriyas, the Sammitiyas, and the Sautrantikas (Sankrantivadins) are at
one on this point. They maintain the actuality of becoming, change,,
development, and maintain the meaningfulness o f the sense o f self.
They tend to hold that conditioned origination does not mean a
super-addition o f a world o f unchanging elements to a world o f func
tions, but the essentially conditioned and changing nature o f the ele
ments themselves. In contrast with the Sarvastivadins, these interpret
becoming as the arising and perishing o f events essentially related in and
through a common ground which persists while the particular events
arise and perish. As the Sammitiyas say:
M omentary extinction is not (a total) extinction; It is a proceeding from
moment to moment.181
61
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
The Vatslputriyas hold that there are satnskaras that last for a while,
and there are satnskaras that perish every moment.182 The Sautrantikas,
in denying the reality o f past and future and in maintaining that the
meaningfulness o f non-existence does riot mean the existence o f the
non-existent,188 stood for the actuality o f becoming, which as they
show, is denied in the etemalism o f the Sarvastivadins. Even the Mahasarighikas, who will be considered soon, maintained the actuality o f
becoming, as the later Mahasanghikas held that the seed develops into
the sprout184 and the Prajnaptivadins, that karma (deed) develops into
the result.186
Even as regards personality the Vatslputriyas, the Sammiriyas, the
Sautrantikas and the Mahlsasakas186 maintained the actuality o f self
hood, implying the meaningfulness o f personal life. They tended to
emphasize the sense o f unity and freedom as intrinsic to the sense o f
selfhood. As the Sammitiyas would say, it is an error o f the analysts
to reduce the constituted wholly to the terms o f constituents, to miss
the organic unity o f the self, to split the organism into minute divisions,
reduce it to a mere collocation o f simple atomic elements and then
imagine that the self is a mere name while the simple atomic elements
are real and ultimate. They say:
Therefore absolute difference is a heresy. Therefore not to take the lead
o f absolute difference is not to follow heresy.187
C.
The absolutist line: The Mahasanghikas: The line o f Buddhist
thought that stressed the actuality o f becoming and the meaningfulness
o f the sense o f sclf-hood and denied the absoluteness o f difference does
not seem to have stressed the distinction between the mundane and the
ultimate, the one as conventional and the other as transcendental or real
and eternal: The credit o f having kept alive the emphasis on the ultimacy o f the unconditioned reality by drawing attention to the non
substantiality o f the basic elements o f existence (dharma-sunyata) be
longs to the Mahasanghikas. Every branch o f these clearly drew the dis
tinction between the mundane and the ultimate, came to emphasize
the non-ultimacy o f the mundane and thus facilitated the fixing o f at62
INTRODUCTION
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION
dhas or there are not the Buddhas the true nature o f things ever remains
the same. It is precisely teachings like these that come to be emphasized
and developed in Mahayana, culminating in the absolutistic philosophy
o f the Prajnaparamitd-sutras, But it is to be remembered that the line o f
thought that came to a culmination in these Sutras and obtained a sys
tematic form in the works o f Nagarjuna had a history o f its development
from implicit beginnings and these beginnings are to be found in those
who emphasized the transmundane over the mundane, the uncondi
tioned over the conditioned, and stood for nonexclusiveness in under
standing.201
One can appreciate the fact o f Nagarjunas attention being focussed
so much on the root o f the Sarvastivadins* doctrine o f elements as a
continuation o f the old controversy between the Mahasanghikas and the
Sarvastivadins which flows down through the Prajndparamitd-sutras, To
them he would say that while Mahayana would go all the way with
them with regard to their analysis, definition and classification o f ele
ments, and would emphasize these phases o f understanding as essential
for a complete comprehension o f the true nature o f things, the traveller
on the Great W ay would keep free from the error o f the analysts, viz.,
the error of clinging to the ultimates o f analysis as ultimates in reality.202
The imagination that the distinct, in being distinct, is separate and sub
stantial, he would say, is the basic error in the doctrine o f elements. Thus
he says in the Karika, those who conceive the elements o f existence as
each separate from the other and reduce the self to the terms of these
separate elements are not experts in understanding the teachings of the
Buddha.203 In rejecting the false notion o f separateness o f basic elements,
Nagarjuna would join hands with the line o f Buddhist thought that
emphasized the concreteness o f becoming and the meaningfuiness of
the sense o f self-hood. Subjectivity, the sense o f unity and freedom
intrinsic to self-hood, is the very fulcrum on which personal life rests;
it is an error to ignore this and try to explain away self-hood as an illu
sion and the person as a collocation o f essentially separate elements.204
But Nagarjuna would point out that while accepting and appreciating
the actuality o f becoming and the meaningfulness o f subjectivity, it is
not only necessary to recognize but essential to emphasize that the
65
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
mundane truth is not the ultimate truth. For the ultimate meaning o f
the thirst in man consists in the realization o f the unconditioned reality.
The sense o f the real in man needs to be put on its own. N ot to empha
size it is to allow for the possibility o f its getting ignored. And a failure
to comprehend its complete meaning will inevitably lead to a substitu
tion o f false absolutes, resulting in dead-ends in understanding and
suffering in life. For, the sense o f the unconditioned which belongs to
the very essence o f self-hood can in no way be explained away.
But if this emphasis on the unconditioned were to lead one again
either to imagine that the conditioned is separate from the uncondi
tioned or to explain away the conditioned as a mere illusion, that would
again be a case o f clinging, clinging to the conditionedness o f the condi
tioned as ultimate or clinging to the unconditioned as exclusive o f the
conditioned. The ultimate reality is devoid o f significance for the
mundane except as its very real nature; for, apart from the mundane
there is no ultimate. In truth, the ultimate nature o f the conditioned is
itself the unconditioned reality. The world is itself Nirvana when rightly
seen. And while the realization o f this truth sets one free from clinging
to creatureliness as the ultimate nature o f oneself, it reveals also a way
o f living the mundane life different from that which breeds conflict and
suffering. It is this understanding, which is the deeper understanding of
the mundane, Nagarjuna would say, that distinguishes those who only
hear from those who comprehend the teachings o f the Buddha. In the
Great W ay, he would say, nothing needs to be abandoned except one's
own perversion. Everything stands in harmony with him who is in
harmony with sunyata
Nagarjuna on Hinaydna and Mahayana: W e may perhaps refer here
very briefly to what seems to have been the circumstance leading to the
origin o f Mahayana and how Nagarjuna considered the question of
the relation between the Small W ay and the Great W ay. As noted
above, it was chiefly the Sarvastivadins, on the one hand, and the Mahasanghikas, on the other, that seem to have been the participants in the
keenest controversy and even rivalry; and presumably the controversy
began even before the actual emergence o f the Sarvastivadins as a sepa
66
INTRODUCTION
rate school from the Sthaviras. The teaching o f the Mahayana is under
standable as a continuation o f the early absolutistic tendency which was
the chief characteristic o f the Mahsghikas. Presumably it was they
who later chose to call their way the Great W ay in order to distinguish
it from that o f those w hom they considered as falling short o f the
deeper insight contained in the teachings o f the Buddha, and in order
to show that they did not exclude the latter but included and tran
scended them.205 From the beginning the Mahsaghikas must have
considered the Sthaviras not adequately advanced in the deeper under
standing o f the doctrine, even as the Sthaviras must have looked down
upon the former as too liberal in matters o f discipline. And yet the
Mahsaghikas must have from early times sought to incorporate the
Sarvstivda analysis o f elements into the body o f their own doctrines
without forsaking their own unique, fundamental, emphasis, and prov
ing thereby that they accepted whatever is acceptable in the Sarvsti
vda while not getting stuck in the morass o f analysis. The assimilation
o f the Sarvstivda analysis, far from making them deviate from their
emphasis on the non-ultimacy o f the elements o f existence, seems to
have enabled them t q develop their absolutism on better grounds and
make it richer in comprehension.
It is in some way like this that one can understand the emergence of
the new composition o f the Sutras directly emerging among the
Mahsaghikas,* while at the same time incorporating all the cate
gories o f Sarvstivda, demonstrating them to be non-ultimate and nonsubstanrial which the Sarvstivdins themselves held to be ultimate and
substantial. Thus they were only deepening and making more thorough
the original insight which inspired them from the very beginning, the
insight o f the transcendental essence o f the mundane as well as the
sense o f non-exclusiveness. The emergence o f the new name Mahyna
and the literature called the Mahdyna-stras marked an epoch in the
history o f Buddhist philosophy; but although the literary compositions
were new, the basic ideas that they embodied were still those found in
the teachings o f the Buddha as emphasized and elaborated by the Mahsghikas. The emergence o f Mahayana was the arising o f a new name
for a fresh synthesis o f the Masters teachings. It was a creative synthesis
67
NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
o f the old. In this the Mahasanghikas must have worked closely on the
materials provided by the Sarvastivadins who had much to contribute
to this development o f Buddhist philosophy.207
If the farer on the Great W ay is asked to offer a basic point o f dis
tinction between the two ways, the Great and the Small, he will
no doubt point to all-comprehensiveness more than any other as charac
teristic o f his way. Comprehension has its dimensions o f depth and
width and to the farer on the Great W ay this means, on the one hand,
the penetration into the deeper nature o f things which culminates in
the realization that the ultimate nature o f the conditioned is itself the
unconditioned reality. On the other hand, comprehension stands also
for the realization o f the essential relatedness o f determinate entities.
This is the mundane truth, and with regard to the human individual it
has the all-important bearing o f ones essential relatedness w ith the rest
o f the world. It is this insight o f the true nature o f things that is the basis
o f the universal compassion o f the wise.
In practical religious life the most frequent and the most common
criticism in regard to the farers on the Small W ay is that they lack
wisdom, lack compassion and lack skilfulness.208 The farers on the
Small W ay are intent on seeking their ow n good, working for their
own salvation.209 Their wayfaring is conditioned by fear and not in
spired by compassion. They seek to enter Nirvana only too hurriedly.210
They do not have the necessary patience, the capacity for forbearance
(ksanti) ,211 They are only too anxious to do away w ith their individu
ality, for they do not see that individuality, when rightly understood
and rightly lived, can itself become the channel for unbounded love
and unsurpassed jo y with which to elevate and gladden the entire world.
They do not have sarvdkdrajnata, the knowledge o f all forms, which
is the knowledge o f all things from all standpoints at all levels.212 They
do not need it as they are not interested to know the unique way o f
every individual and to help everyone to attain to perfection in ones
own way, for this is the w ork only o f the bodhisattvas and the Buddhas.
The hearers (srdvaka) are not interested jn the extraordinary powers
(rddhi) that are an aid to convert the minds o f the common people and
to turn them away from ignorance and passion and towards the ulti
68
INTRODUCTION
69
CHAPTER
IT
Section
N A T U R E OF C O N V E N T I O N
The thirst for the real as the urge to build: The thirst for the real in m an1
is the starting point as well as the foundation o f the philosophy o f the
Middle W ay. It is a basic fact about human thinking that it confronts
everywhere an other to itself, which it endeavours to subsume into
its own being. Growth in knowledge consists in a progressive assimila
tion o f the object and an establishment o f a unity w ith it.2 The progres
sive extension o f acquaintance as well as the progressive deepening o f
comprehension are ways in which man responds to the urge in him for
the limitless, an urge which is basic to all his activities. The intuition o f
sense, the synthesis o f imagination and understanding and even the
appropriation o f the different kinds o f experience to oneself by which
the otherwise mute becomes meaningful, all these are different ways in
which the self-conscious person gives vent on the* cognitive plane to
his deepest urge, the thirst for the real. And mans accomplishment in
the sphere o f theoretic understanding cannot be sharply divided from
his function as a person on the plane o f action. In fact, knowledge is^
inefficient without action and action is blind without knowledge. They
flow into each other and are essentially different phases o f one and the
same basic urge.3
70
The self as the builder of the world: The person is a unity, an integrated
reality. He is not a collocation o f several otherwise separate elements,
as the analysts would imagine. The elements found in personality are
what the person himself gives rise to as his self-expression in response
to the urge in him. The thirst for the real is the basic fact about man.
W hat we are and what we do depends on the way we respond to and
interpret to ourselves this deepest urge. Thus says the Sdstra,
The bodhisattva constantly loves and delights in meditating on the
Buddha and therefore while leaving the body and while assuming the
body, he constantly realizes the presence o f the Buddha. This is like the
beings that constantly cultivate the sense o f passion and in whom there
fore the sense o f passion is intense (fi), taking up the body o f a passion
ate bird like a peacock, . . . and those in whom anger is intense taking
birth among poisonous insects. . . . (The bodhisattva) takes on the
bodily (existence) according to what his mind intensely thinks and
esteems high (iS'l>/5f]6 ).4 (276a)
The bodhisattva meditating on the Buddha realizes everywhere the
presence o f the Buddha . . . as he is collected and pure in his thought.
This is like the person (standing before) a mirror (TkSfc) having very
well decorated his body; the m irror being bright and clean reflects all
things (as they are); the image is not in the mirror, itself. The person
sees the image o f his own body as the m irror is bright and clean. Every
thing, always, in its very nature is pure.6 (276b)
The world around us is a reflection o f the condition o f our mind;
we do deeds that build the world for us exactly in the way we interpret
to ourselves the reality o f things.
W hatever is in the three realms (^If*), all that is the construction o f
mind (citta). How is it so? It is in accordance with ones thought that
one realizes all things (P S 'i> /^^S :i # ^ ). By mind does one see the
Buddha and by mind does one become a Buddha. The mind itself is
the Buddha, the mind itself is my body. (Under ignorance) the mind
does not know itself; does not see itself; it is due to ignorance that one
71
That men are ignorant does not mean that they are ignorant like
cows and goats
(Even) these people seek the path
way to reality. But owing to perversion, they give rise to several
kinds o f misconstruction. (6ob)
The ignorant pursue names while what they seek is reality (*
(T92C)
In any case, whether it is the world o f the Buddha or o f the common
man, it is what it is precisely as we make it.
All things are creations (nirmana) (ft); among these there are the
creations o f the srdvakas, the creations o f the pratyekabuddhas, the crea
tions o f the bodhisattvas, and the creations o f the Buddha. There are
also the creations o f afflictions (klesa) and o f deeds (karma). . . . W hat
ever thing there is (that is subject to birth and death), all that is a nir
mana.10 (728c)
(Although all things are alike nirmana and therefore) devoid o f reali
ty (still) there holds among them the distinction o f one thing from an
other . . . even as the things seen in dream, despite their unreality,
admit o f distinctions.11 (729c)
In fact all that is created is a creation o f deeds; but there is a difference
between the deeds that are undefiled and the deeds that spring from
affliction and passion. The one is the world o f the wise, and the other,
the world o f the ignorant. The creations o f the ignorant that arise from
impure deeds are prompted by affliction, while the creations o f the
sages spring from wisdom and compassion.
The world o f convention is called nirmana to indicate that it is a crea
tion; it is called samvrti to indicate that it veils the truth o f things; it is
called vyavahara to say that it has mundane truth, empirical validity/'
although devoid o f ultimacy; it is called prapanca to show that it is an
elaboration through concepts and conventional entities. The builder"
o f the world is vijfidna or citta as a self-conscious principle o f intellec
tion.12 And in this building o f the world the two, nama and laksana
names and what they stand for, constitute the warp and woof.
73
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
arise from their references to the nature and function o f their respective
referents.16
B) Laksana (I) Sign: Says the stra:
Nma is the w ord (varna)
(that designates) the thing. For ex
ample, fire is the w ord that designates the (complex) entity the nature
o f which is heat (and illumination). Laksana (is the sign by means o f
which the thing may be cognized. Smoke, e.g., is the sign o f fire). Seeing
the smoke one understands that it indicates the presence o f fire. (While
smoke is the sign o f fire) heat is the essential nature (f) o f fire. Again,
in reference to the complex o f the five skandhas, man or wom an
is the nma (name); the bodily features by means o f which the person
can be distinguished as man or woman, constitute the laksana (sign).
On seeing these signs, the name is given as man or woman. (691b)
Speaking almost in the same terms but referring to artha (H), the
meaning, instead o f laksana, mark or sign, we have the stra.saying:
There are in all two things, nma (^fei) and artha (& ), the name
or the w ord and its meaning. For example, fire is the name and the
meaning that it conveys is the complex entity composed o f heat and
illumination . . . It is the complex o f these two elements, that is called
fire. If there were another fire apart from these two, then it should
have had a third function apart from them but which is not the case.
So it should be known that it is the complex o f these two elements that
is derivedly named fire (ftS f D p ' ( 3 5 8 a )
W hen it is said that smoke is the laksana o f fire, laksana is taken as
a mark, a sign. Nma and laksana are mutually dependent, and the per
ception o f the laksana is the condition for the naming o f the thing.
First there is the perception o f the features of man or wom an and then
the name is given as man or woman. Laksana is the root and nma is
the. branch.18 (691b)
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
The ignorant who attend only to the obvious miss the hinterland;
they seize the specific as the self-contained. The wise are awake to the
complete truth. Thus the Sdstra commenting on the above passage,
says:
The things that constitute duality cannot be one without the other
('RtffiBi). But common people speak o f them as two, (i.e. separate
and independent) and so what they say is a perversion. . . . W hatever
is a case o f seizing the laksana is a case o f faring in duality (ffitfBliff t ).23
(664a)
To seize the determinate (BXffi) is really to allow oneself to be misled
by names; it is to imagine that different names mean separate essences;
this is to turn relative distinctions into absolute divisions. W hen names
are not seized as standing for separate substances, then they cannot be
made objects o f clinging.
A thing derives its significance only when specified and named. All
things are spoken o f only through name, determination.
It is only in name (ffl.iT1^) that the bodhi is spoken of. Even the bodhisattva is spoken o f only through names . . . All these names (as well
as the named) are born o f the complex o f causes and conditions and
they are spoken o f only through derived names, thought-constructions
( f f l # m S f g t ) .23a (318a)
W hen a determinate thing is analyzed into its constituent elements by
virtue o f the combination o f which the thing derives its name, it cannot
be placed either inside or outside or in between them. The composite
thing is not one more thing in addition to its components. The thing is
the components themselves in combination; the latter are the thing it
self analyzed into different aspects. Between the constituents and the
constituted there cannot be any such relation o f inside or outside or in
between which holds only among entities that are mutually apart.
78
(The referent of) the name fire for example is not itself inside the
tw o elements o f heat and light (which constitute the object called fire).
But why? These elements are two while fire is one; one is not two and
tw o is not one.
There can be no confusion (n ) between the name and what it means
(i.e., the thing named). In such a case when the w ord fire is being
uttered, the mouth should get burnt. (Again, the name and the named
are not completely apart.) If they were completely apart (SI), then,
having asked for fire one might get water. On account o f these reasons,
it should be known that the name fire is not itself inside these two
elements.
But suppose fire is outside these two elements (unconnected with
them in any way). Then, when one hears the name fire, there should
not be bom in him the thought o f fire in regard to these two elements.
And if the name fire is in between these two elements (being vague in
its significance), then it has not any fixed sphere of reference (ftihJ)
. . . And in that case there cannot be any definite knowledge o f fire
<**J*n).
Therefore it should be known that fire cannot be found in any of
these three zones. Fire is only a derived name (and the thing designated
by it is also only a conditioned entity).
Just the same is the case with the bodhisattva. Tw o elements, nama
and rupa, combine and it is the complex o f these two elements that is
called the bodhisattva. Rupa is different and nama is different. And
(apart from these two) if there is any entity called the bodhisattva, that
should be a third entity (separate from these). But actually there is no
such thing. Therefore it should be known that bodhisattva is only a
derived name. And the name bodhisattva cannot be located either in
side or outside or in between (nama and rupa)?k (358a-b)
W hen we imagine the components to be separate and independent,
we cannot get back to the unity o f the thing. It is only the awareness
o f the determinate as determinate, the relative as relative that restores
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NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
rion and destruction; and it has its consequences. So, they contend,
cloth should be recognized as a real, substantial entity.
(Surely) the cloth can function as the condition for the birth of differ
ent thoughts and emotions in the minds o f the perceivers. For example,
when one gets it, one feels happy and losing it one becomes sad. (147b)
In reply the Sastra points out:
Things that act as conditions for the rise o f ideas are, again, o f two
kinds. Ideas arise from things that are true and they also arise from things
that are false. The notions o f the objects o f dream, the moon in the
water, the stump o f wood in the dark mistakenly seen as man, are the
ones that arise from false objects. So nothing definite can be said about
the things that act as conditions for the birth o f ideas, (viz., whether they
are real or unreal). Therefore, (being the condition for) the birth of
ideas should not be taken as the (decisive) reason (for the reality o f the
objects seen). If the birth o f the ideas were itself the criterion for the
reality of the object, then there should not be the further search into
the nature o f the object whether it is really there or not (X 'Fflkkfrfi').
N ow the eyes see the moon in the water; the idea is bom that this is
the moon. And if that (moon) from which the idea o f the moon was
bom were itself the real moon, then there would n o t be any other (moon
as) the real moon, (i.e., the moon in the sky) at all. (i47b-i47c)
In other words, that things have names, that they have their re
spective natures and functions, that they serve as objects o f cognition
and as occasions for the rise o f thoughts and emotions, these cannot be
adduced as reasons for their reality. But to mistake the unreal for the
non-existent is again to swing from the extreme o f absolute existence
to that o f absolute non-existence. Absolute existence and absolute non
existence both are false as referring to things mundane. Things are
unreal, i.e., conditioned and non-substantial but not non-existent. Again
everything has its own nature but is not unconditioned. This is the truth
of conditioned origination, the Middle W ay.
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
Section
II
M O D E S OF C O N V E N T I O N
Modes of determinate being: The conventional entities that constitute the
mundane existence can be distinguished as o f three kinds: The complex
thing, the subde constituents and the ways in which the latter combine
to constitute the thing. Every one o f these has its own kind o f being.
Each is a kind o f conventional entity with its own name. But this should
not mislead one to imagine that these kinds o f entities which are arrived
at by logical analysis have all their own unconditioned and separate ex
istence. O f course, as relative modes o f being they not only hold good
but are essential aspects o f common experience.
Thus we find the Sastra mentioning three modes o f determinate
being which can be called relational modes o f being or relational
entities, actual entities (subtle constituent elements o f the complex ob
jects) and the complex objects themselves.
Thus the Sdstra says:
(Determinate) being can be o f three kinds (iP& H il): that o f rela
tional entities (ffi#iT), that o f (complex things with) derived names
(iK&ii), and that o f the subtle constituents (&%).
(The first kind o f being viz.,) that o f relational entities, (stands for
what is designated by such relational terms as) long and short, this and
that. . . . (In themselves these are abstractions.) These designations refer
to and derive their meaning from the mutual relations (that actual things
bear to one another). Long derives its significance depending on the
short, and short derives its significance depending on the long.
(Similarly) this depends on that and that on this. If one is to
the east o f a thing, then the thing is to ones west, and vice-versa. The
thing is one and the same and not different ( ^ ^ 7 ^ ) , and yet there
are these distinctions o f east and west. All these (long, short
etc.) have names but are devoid o f substantial referents, (ififfn$lUr).
Such names as these are called the names o f mutual relations (among
actually existent entities). They do not stand for any actual entities
82
X g r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
(As to the being o f the subtle atomic elements like form, smell,
taste and touch,) these siibde elements combine and there are the subtle
particles o f hair. Through (the combination of) the subtle particles o f
hair there is the hair itself. Through (the combination of) several hairs,
there is a lock o f hair. And through the collections o f locks o f hair there
are threads and from the threads there is cloth. From cloth there is the
ready made dress. N ow , in the absence o f the particles o f hair there
would not be the hair; in the absence o f the locks o f hair, there would
not be the threads; in the absence o f the threads there would not be the
cloth, and in the absence o f the cloth there would not be the ready-made
dress. (147c)
But are the subde elements, being ultimate in analysis, themselves
real? Speaking o f the subdest as only a name imposed, the Sastra
says:
The subtlest has nothing (substantial) as its referent. The name is
simply imposed (on what is conceived by some as the subdest) (:#$$
^ @ , 1 ); because gross and subde are only relative terms. From the
standpoint o f something gross, there is something subtle; but this
subde thing itself has still subder elements (as its constituents and
there could be no end to this division). (147c)
Pursuing in this way, one finds that (subtle and indivisible and there
fore real and imperishable) atomic elements cannot be found. (The
name atoms meaning indivisible is only superimposed on some
thing that is not truly indivisible.)27 (148a)
Stripping bare the true being: (1) The three modes of convention: To strip
reality bare o f the veils o f confusion consists not in the literal destruction
or even abandoning o f things o f mundane existence but in giving up
ones false imaginations in regard to the true nature o f things. It is a
progressive deepening o f ones comprehension o f reality. Correspond
ing to the grossness or subdety o f the conventional entities that become
objects o f clinging under ignorance, the Prajprmit-stras give two
accounts o f this stripping bare. These are really accounts o f conventional
84
NA6ARJUNA'S
p h il o s o p h y
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
88
CH APTER
in
IGNORANCE
Section
N A T U R E AND F U N C T IO N OF IG N O R A N C E
Nature of Ignorance: W e have already noted that even the ignorant has
the sense o f the real. But in him the sense o f the ground o f things has
been minimized to the limit; and the exclusive absorption in the specific
and the obvious is at its peak. He does not distinguish the mundane and
the ultimate. He imagines the conditioned as unconditioned. But this
imagination o f his does not alter the true nature o f things; and this unalterability is the only hope for man, although f this he may not be
always aware.1 The Prajnpramit-stras emphasize the fundamental
truth that the true nature o f things ever remains the same, unaffected
by our imaginative constructions, and convey this truth by the illustra
tions o f illusion.2 W e may note here a few points about illusion and its
cancellation.
(I) W ith the cancellation o f error, the character that is revealed to
be false comes to be realized as something that has been superimposed
on things by virtue o f our own imaginative construction. It was in our
ignorance that we imagined it to belong to the thing itself as its true
nature. Unreflective belief in the reality o f the imagined is cancelled
as false in the light o f reflective criticism: if it were true, it should not
have been negated. W hile truth is revealed by rational criticism, falsity
is imagined by ignorance.
(II) To deny false beliefs is not to deny the things themselves, nor
does this denial necessarily amount to the actual negation o f the ap
pearance.3 The denial is o f our uncritical belief in regard to things.
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NGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
IGNORANCE
(II)
Error in regard to the ultimate truth: If this comprehension o f things
as conditioned and non-substantial be taken as itself the comprehension
o f their ultimate truth, this again would be a case o f clinging. This is a
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
IGNORANCE
away (from the minds o f the common people) the screen o f the clouds
o f perversion enabling them to get (back to) the (original) purity. B ut
in truth, the ultimate nature o f things itself neither (becomes) impure
nor clean.7 (698b)
Error is not devoid of object: It is to be noted that whether it is at the
mundane level or at the transmundane level error is not devoid o f
object. W hile at the mundane level the object o f error is the condition
ed, changing, entity, the error in regard to the ultimate truth has for its
object the unconditioned reality itself. W hile in the one case the error
consists in the imagination o f unconditionedness and substantiality in
regard to the conditioned and non-substantial, in the other case it con
sists in the imagination o f division and determination in regard to that
which is undivided and indeterminate. The cancellation o f error in the
one case means the revelation o f the conditioned and changing nature
o f things, and the cancellation o f error in the other case means the revela
tion o f the ultimate reality as the undivided being. And under all cir
cumstances the root form o f error still stands as the error o f misplaced
absoluteness, which always functions by way o f seizing, clinging.
The Sdstra points out that it is not true that at any time cognition hap
pens w ithout an object. Thus it says:
If it is said that things are seen to be existent (purely) out o f perversion
(without any objective basis), then, where one sees a single person w hy
does one not see two or three persons instead? For (is it not the conten
tion here that) cognition happens without any object and that every
thing is seen purely out o f perversion? (171c)
Even in a dream cognition is not devoid o f an object, although it
cannot be taken as true beyond the state o f the dream. Those w ho
argue that dream objects are as real as the objects o f waking experience,
commit the same error as those who deny the object altogether, holding
it to be totally non-existent. Both commit alike the error o f clinging
to dead-ends.
Posing the question whether it is not true that even in a dream there
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
is cognition only when the mind confronts the proper object and how,
in that case, it could be that the dream objects are unreal, the Sastra
proceeds to say that although in a dream we do see many things, still,
they are not unconditionally true. For, the unconditionally true is unde
niable, while the dream objects are denied beyond the state o f dream,
as they are private and inconsistent with the objects o f normal, waking
experience which is open to all. Thus the Sastra says:
(In dreams) we see things that (are inconsistent with the things o f
waking experience and which therefore) should not be seen (as true)
(^JSjlffDj?,). In a dream (for example) one sees a man with horns on
his head. Sometimes one sees in a dream that the human body flies in
the sky. Actually, no m an has horns on his head nor can the human
body fly in the sky. Therefore (the objects seen in the dream) are not
true.
B ut surely, says the inquirer, there is the human head and surely there
are the horns although in different places. O n account o f the confusion
in the m ind (W'frSifc) one just sees that the human head has horns.
Again, surely, there is the sky and there are the things that fly, and
simply out o f confusion, one sees that ones body itself flies in the sky.
It cannot be that the objects seen in the dream are false (^#iftil). (For,
is it not the very objects which we see in waking experience that
constitute the objects in dream?)8 (103c)
There is no doubt, says the astra, that there is the hum an head and
there are also horns; still, that the hum an head bears horns is false. But
the inquirer would urge:
The w orld is wide and the fruits o f the deeds done by men in their
former lives are various. It may be that in some other country the
human head bears horns; It may be that there men have only one hand
and one leg and are only one foot high, or they may even be nine feet
high. W hat is there to wonder if a man has horns on his head?
N ow , if people in other countries have horns on their head, let them
have; but in a dream we see that in this very country, the very person
94
IGNORANCE
whom we know has horns on his head, and this cannot be true. Again,
if one would see in a dream the end o f space, the end o f the regions, the
end o f time, how can this be true? W here is the place where there is
no space, no region, no time? Therefore it is said that in a dream we see
things as existent which are actually non-existent. (i03c-i04a)
In a dream we do experience objects, but they hold only there;
they have no truth beyond that state. And when we judge that in a
dream we experience as existent the things that are truly non-existent
we are judging the dream-state from the standpoint o f the waking state.
But even in a dream, cognition is not without an object.
As to your question as to how there can be cognition even when there
are no objects, now, although, (in truth), there are not in dream the
five kinds o f sense objects (as substantial entities), still, out o f ones own
thought (aided by) memory,
there arise (the diverse
kinds of) things (that serve) as objects
For example, some one
might say men have two heads; by hearing these words, there arises (in
some mind) the thought (that men really may have two heads). That
in a dream one sees as existent things that are really nonexistent is also
like this. The same is the case with all things. Although all things are
devoid o f reality, all the same, (they are objects o f experience), they
are heard and seen and known. (104a)
The things that are illustrated as illusory are indeed objects o f experi
ence, but they are not real and self-existent; there arises the sense o f
reality in regard to them only in the mind o f the uncritical, who, in
accepting these things as real and self-existent, allow themselves to be
bound by them; but the wise, who have realized the illusoriness of
these things stand beyond them, for they know the true nature o f these.
(When for example) the ignorant (hear an echo) they would say that
(inside the cave there, is actually) a person making the sound. But the
wise understand within themselves that this sound which is an echo is
not produced b) any person (inside the cave). The sound that emerges
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from the cave arises only on account o f the contact (of the first sound
with the cave) and only thus derives its name, echo. The echo is sunya,
devoid o f substance, and yet it can deceive the ears (of the hearers).
(103a)
Again, when a child sees an image in the mirror, it feels delighted at
heart, and passionately seeks to seize it. W hen the image disappears, it
breaks the m irror to pieces (out o f rage), but attempts to seize (the
image once again). The elders laugh at this. Now, this is just the case
with (the ignorant, who) having lost the pleasaure (of the five senses),
seek it once again. And these are laughed at by the wise who have
realized the W ay. (104c)
The wise and the ignorant: W hile the thing is one and the same, our
attitude in regard to it differs according to the way we understand it.
No one can alter the true nature o f things, but everyone can improve
his own conception o f them. This is the idea that is sought to be set
forth in the several illustrations o f illusion.
The sharp in understanding grasp (without difficulty) this (central)
idea o f the Buddhas teachings, but those whose power o f grasping is
blunt give rise to clinging at every step. They cling to words and names.
If they hear o f sunyata, to this they cling. If they hear that sunyata is also
sunya even to this they cling. If they'hear that all things in their
ultimate nature are themselves the peace, (the Nirvana), where the
entire course o f words stops, even there they cling. As their own
mind is impure so, even the noble truths that they hear they mistake,
seizing them in an impure way. W hen a person with his eyes covered
with a coloured screen perceives the pure crystal, the sphatika, even there
he perceives only the screen o f his own eyes; (in his ignorance he imputes
the colour o f the screen to the crystal itself and) he just says that the crys
tal is itself impure. (7220-7230)
In reference to the elements (like the sense, the object and the contact
o f sense with object that arise by way o f conditioned origination) one
gives rise to all kinds o f kleas and sinful deeds as a result o f ones per
verse thoijghts. But in regard to these very elements one who has the
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right thought (and right attitude) gives rise to elements o f merit (that
are o f help to him in his way-faring).9 (364c)
Difference, distinction, is essential to the mundane nature o f things,
where everything is a specific, determinate entity. The course o f the
world is an organic unity o f the distinct and the unique. And yet if one
clings to the determinate as itself the ultimate, then, neither the mundane
nature nor the ultimate nature o f things can be rightly conceived; one
then fails to realize the good that the world is capable o f yielding. If one
clings to the divided, the determinate, as itself ultimate then one cannot
enhance ones potency for merit
But the bodhisattva, faring in the ultimate reality, viz., the undivided
dhartna, ever increases his potency for good from the very beginning
up to the end o f his wayfaring. There is no mixture o f error (in his
potency for merit, and so it stands invincible). (656c)
To repeat the central idea in the philosophy o f Nagarjuna, with
which his works are replete:
W hen one fares by seizing, by clinging, then (in ones case) the world
would be a (mass of) perversion; but when one fares free from seizing,
free from clinging, then (the world itself) is Nirvana.9(644c)
W hen the Buddha specifies things and their relations, when He
speaks o f the conditioned entities and their ways o f working, He is not
violating the ultimate nature o f things, for He is aware o f them as condi
tioned and specific and He does not mistake their determinate nature
itself to be their ultimate nature. Those who lack the sense o f the beyond
cling to the determinate while the wise have no confusion about
things.10
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Section
II
T H E S E N S E O F I A N D T H E FA L SE
S E N S E O F SELF
The rise of the sense o f! : The sense o f l 11 implying by contrast the
sense o f not-I naturally belongs to the world o f the determinate.
But the uniqueness o f self-consciousness is that there is immanent in it
the awareness o f the unconditioned reality as its ultimate nature. The
self-conscious intellect, having differentiated the undifferenced, identifies
itself with the specific complex entity, the body-mind. And in this
identification, the intellect, owing to the operation o f ignorance, wrong
ly transfers its sense o f unconditionedness which is its ultimate nature
to itself in its mundane nature. The sense o f self is due to self-conscious
intellection, but the falsity in the false sense o f self is due to ignorance.
The sense o f self or the sense o f I , according to the Sastra, is the reflec
tion o f the unconditioned reality in the conditioned self-conscious intel
lect; it is the sense o f the real in man.
X
The moon is really in the sky, but the image appears in the water
The rhoon o f the universal reality is in the sky of
tathata, dharma-dhatu, bhutakoti, while (its reflection, the sense of) I and
mine, appears in the water o f the minds o f men and gods.12 (102b)
The sense o f I in its true form is the sense o f the real immanent
in man; the true import, the ultimate, original meaning of I is self
being, unconditionedness. But the mind, the self-conscious intellect,
under the influence o f ignorance, comes to apply wrongly this sense
o f unconditionedness to itself in its mundane, i.e., conditioned nature,
as well as to that with which it identifies itself and through that to all
things that it lights upon.
A shadow appears only when there is a bright light; when there is
no light there is no shadow. Similarly, when the klesas, afflictions, and
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do not quarrel. So they abandon the two roots o f worldly discourse that
are impure and use only the one that is pure. The Buddha and His dis
ciples use the sense o f I in keeping with the ways o f the world. And
there is nothing wrong in it. (64a-b)
Names or concepts as well as their root, the principle o f self-con
sciousness, are in themselves pure; they can be either rightly used or
misused.17 The root o f our misuse lies in our ignorance. The basic error
is*to cling to the determinate as itself absolute. This holds good as much
in the case o f the affirmation o f I as in its negation. The wrong affir
mation o f I i$ its absolute affirmation, the affirmation that the I as
the principle o f individuality, as the specific centre of personality is ab
solute and unconditioned. The wrong denial of I is its total denial, its
denial even as a mundane truth, as a derived name, as a relative concept.
A non-clinging affirmation o f individuality is the one in which it is not
affirmed as absolute but recognized to be relative and a non-clinging
denial o f I is the one in which the sense o f I is recognized as a
derived name, a relative concept, but is denied to be ultimate and
underived. The stra says that even in their teaching o f no I and
mine (the Buddha and) His disciples do not cling to this determina
tion o f no I.
To him who would cling to thfe determination o f no I (and
mine), and would say that this alone is true and the rest is false, one
should indeed, object: According to you, in the true nature o f things,
there is no I, and so how can you say, I have heard? But now, ac
tually, while the Buddha and His disciples teach that all things are
snya, akincana, (even) in regard to this they* remain non-clinging at
heart. They do not cling even in regard to the universal truth o f things,
how much less to the things that are devoid o f self-hood. Therefore,
there should be no difficulty o f this kind, viz., as to how they can speak
in terms o f I (and mine).18 (64b)
W hen the sense o f I refers to the mundane nature o f the individual,
i.e., the empirical self, it would be false if it should mean that the
1 04
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Section
III
T H E F ALS E S E N S E O F SELF
The false sense of self as the root of afflictions and drstis: Trsna as the
origin o f kleh stands for thirst, passion, as the root o f seizing and cling
ing. Klesa is the painful state o f emotional conflict which results from the
failure to fulfil the thirst, from the disparity between the expected and
the realized. Ignorance, functioning again through trsna,, gives rise to
drsti, which is to seize the specific concepts and the conceptual systems
that embody them as themselves absolute and limitless. This is dogma
tism, claiming absoluteness for the relative, completeness for the frag
mentary. This is perversion. Both klesa and drsti have their origin in the
false sense o f self, the root-error.
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A g a r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
The common people, out o f ignorance and perversion, and (the con
sequent) seizing o f the determinate (as ultimate) give rise to all kinds o f
klesas viz., trsna, etc.; from these in turn there arise the different kinds
o f deeds, leading to different kinds o f bodily existence and the experi
encing o f different kinds o f pain and pleasure. For example, the silk
worm emits silk from within itself and becomes caught within it, and in
consequence suffers the pain o f being boiled and burned. (This is just
the case with the ignorant). But the wise with thevpower o f their pure
wisdom analyze and distinguish everything, root and branch, (and find
that) all things are sunya (non-substantial). In order to help all people,
they speak to everyone about the nature o f the objects o f their clinging,
viz., the five skandhas etc. They tell them: You have yourselves given
rise to all this simply out o f your ignorance, and having yourselves
given rise to them you yourselves cling to them ( li f ^ ^ S ) .20 (294b)
The false sense of self as the root of afflictions: Ignorance working
through the false sense o f self is thus at the root o f our being limited to
the rounds o f birth and death, and thus at the root o f all our hankering
and suffering.
Ignorance is the root (of all klesas).21 (696b)
O ut o f perversion people do deeds that bind them to a limited life.
. . . O f all that they do, passion, greed, is the root. Simply being shrouded
by passion, they give rise to the clinging mind. (61 ic)
Craving is the root o f clinging. (200a)
People really do not know that essentially things are non-substantial.
Therefore, they follow their (perverse) thoughts, seize the characters of
things and give rise to clinging (Iffl'MStBifeiF). From clinging there
arises attachment (rdga) ( W f ) . Due to attachment they pursue the
five kinds o f the objects o f desire. Due to this pursuing o f the objects
o f desire they become shrouded by greed. Due to greed there arise
jealousy, anger and quarrel. From anger there arise sinful deeds. But
they do not have any knowledge about this course o f things. There
fore, at the end o f their life, they follow their deeds which function as
the conditions for their birth in another sphere for the next span of life.
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Again they continue to do deeds that prepare for them lives o f birth
and death. Thus they revolve for ever in the six states o f existence
(thus making the cycle) that knows no end.22 (720a)
If one would seek to become free from suffering, he should then
first put an end to trsnd; when trsnd has been ended, suffering will just
become extinct. (720b)
The root o f suffering is clinging, the root o f clinging is craving, and
the root o f craving is ignorance.
The false sense of self as the root of drstis: In regard to understanding,
ignorance working through the false sense o f self generates in us the
belief o f limitlessness in regard to the specific concepts or determinate
conceptual systems. W e select from out o f the presented only the aspects
o f our interest and neglect the rest; to the rest that is neglected we be
come first indifferent and then blind; in our blindness, we claim com
pleteness for the aspects that we have selected. W e seize them as absolute,
we cling to them as the complete truth, we become dogmatic. The
dogmatic views that thus develop can all be traced back to their root,
viz., the tendency to seize the conditioned as unconditioned, which
is the error o f misplaced absoluteness. This error consisting in seizing
hold o f aspects o f things as self-complete and absolute, swings from
extreme to extreme, from the extreme o f being to the extreme o f nonbeing, from the extreme o f (complete) self-possessedness o f things to
the extreme o f absolute devoidness o f selfhood. The extremes are com
pletely exclusive o f each other: either wholly being or wholly nonbeing, either wholly self-possesSed or wholly devoid o f selfhood. W hile
the intellectual analysis o f the presented content into its different aspects
is conducive to and necessary for a comprehensive understanding,
analysis is miscarried if the fragmentary is mistaken for the complete,
the relative is mistaken for the absolute. Existence and non-existence,
when held as absolute characters o f things, become extremes.
If one would (exclusively) see the arising and enduring o f things, then
that would (result in) the wrong view o f the absolute existence o f things.
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p h il o s o p h y
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the past or it will have an end in the future etc., and in this way there
arise the remaining fifty-seven views. Therefore it is said that satkdyadrsti comprehends all the sixty-two kinds o f drstis2i (607b)
If one avoids these extremes o f absolute existence and absolute non
existence, one will realize the Middle W ay, the true view o f the nature
o f thingsand then one will see things as the bodhisattva or the Buddha
sees them; then one will not cling either to the particular, the specific
or to the universal, the indeterminate.
The Buddha cancels (S) the two extremes and teaches the Middle
W ay, viz., the way o f neither duality nor non-duality; duality here
means the particular, unique natures o f all things (conceived exclusive
ly), and non-duality means the one (universal) nature o f sunyata
(again conceived exclusively). Here by means o f sunyata is denied (the
false sense) that every thing is (absolutely) unique and separate. W hen
this cancellation is accomplished, even the sense o f non-duality is given
up (lest it might itself be exclusively embraced). (727a)
n o
C H APTER
IV
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
created, o f which it could be said that it has a real being. All the same
the magically created things are undoubtedly objects o f experience;
and they do indeed produce the various feelings o f jealousy, pleasure,
etc. But how could it be that although they do not have any real being,
they are all the same capable o f functioning as objects o f experience
and capable o f giving rise to pleasure, etc.? The thert tells the Buddha:
Such is the very nature o f magical creation
Although
devoid o f (any real) being at root, they are yet objects o f sight and ob
jects o f hearing. (102a)
The Buddha adds:
Such is the nature o f ignorance too. Although, o f it, it cannot be
(said) that it is inside or outside, . . . although it is devoid o f any
ultimate nature o f its own (fcMJftt), . . . still, ignorance does indeed
function as the condition for the birth o f the samskaras . . . W hen the
magical power o f creation ceases, the magically created objects also
come to an end; (even so) when ignorance comes to an end, (the pro
ducts o f ignorance), the samskaras (etc.), also come to an end.3 (102a)
Ignorance is indeed a power that creates objects o f experience; it
has its nature and function; but it cannot be held on that account to be
an ultimate entity. Ignorance is not wholly determinable as either ex
isting or not existing; it shares in this respect the nature o f all mundane
entities, itself being in fact the root o f all things as the common people
conceive them . But there is a very important difference between the
mundane entities and ignorance which is the root o f misconstruction.
W hile ignorance, when realized as ignorance, has itself totally disap
peared, the mundane entities, even after being realized as unreal may
continue to be experienced. This is to say that the conditioned nature
o f things which is their mundane nature need not itself be bound up
with ignorance. The mistaking o f the conditioned as itself the uncondi
tioned pertains not to the continuation or the extinction o f the objects
o f experience, but to ones belief in regard to their reality or unreality.
It is not that even with the realization o f the ultimate truth the mundane
things necessarily disappear; they continue to appear but the wise do
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p h il o s o p h y
when all things internal and external enter prajpramit, they blend
and become o f one essence. W hy is it so?
Because prajpramit is by nature completely pure.
Moreover, the real nature o f stupidity is itselfpraj. But if one would
mistake and cling to this praj, then this itself would be stupidity. Thus,
(in truth), what difference is there between stupidity and wisdom?
W hen one first enters the W ay o f the Buddha, then there is the
distinction that this is stupidity and this is wisdom. But later, when
one's penetration gradually becomes deep, then, (at last), there would
be no difference between stupidity and wisdom. (32ia-b)
This is to deny not the presence o f ignorancfc but its ultimacy. W ith
the correction o f error the wrong notion does not persist; ignorance
does not coexist with knowledge in regard to the same thing in the same
m ind.6 W hen the bodhisattva, with the intention o f putting an end to
ignorance, seeks to know its true nature (II), then:
Ignorance would just become knowledge itself (SPB^ifeW) (for it is
then seen to be in its ultimate nature) the universal reality (bhutalakfana),
the bhutakoti, itself. (697a)
Even o f the ptoducts o f ignorance, the true nature is purity, which
is another name for the ultimate reality, the undivided being. So the
Sutra says:
(In its ultimate nature) ignorance is purity itself; and so even the
satnskras (etc., the products o f ignorance) are (in their ultimate nature)
purity itself.6 (505b)
Com menting on this, the stra says that the Buddha is speaking here
about the ultimate nature o f the three elements o f poison, which as
lewdness etc., owe their being to ignorance, while in their ultimate
nature they are purity itself (H$)p[ftf?^).7
This holds good even o f the mind, the belt-conscious principle of
intellection, the centre o f personality, as well as o f all that it gives rise to.
114
Section II
KINDS OF K N O W L E D G E
Praja as reality and praja as knowledge: Praja as knowledge is to be dis
tinguished from praja as realky. Praja as reality is the unconditioned
dharma, the undivided being, the unnameable that is yet spoken through
names.
Prajpramita .is the real nature o f all things, the undeniable, inde
structible dharma. W hether there is the Buddha or there is not the Bud
dha, this real nature o f things eternally is. This eternal nature o f things
(dharma-sthana) is not any thing made by the Buddha (or any one else).*
(370a)
Praja is the ultimately real nature o f the divided and determinate.
The ultimate reality is called praja, the basic principle o f knowledge,
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only by imposing a name and that, in the mundane truth, on the plane
o f the relative, i.e., when it is contrasted with the objects and systems o f
objects that arise and perish. In the ultimate truth it is the reality in which
there is not even the distinction o f knowledge and reality, knowing and
being, or even o f knowledge and ignorance. It is the real which is the
ultimate end o f all our seeking. Praj as reality pertains to the later
part o f the present work. It is with praj as knowledge that the present
part is concerned.
Praj as the ultimate principle of knowledge and praj as the act of know
ing: Praj as knowledge is significant only in reference to the world
o f the determinate, where there is the distinction o f knowledge and
reality, o f knowing and being as well as o f knowledge and ignorance.
According to the Sstra, praj as knowledge can be distinguished into
two kinds which can be called the eternal (substantial) and the func
tional (impermanent). W hile the eternal praj is the ultimate reality
itself only derivedly called praj, i.e., as contrasted with the objective
world o f relativity and change, the functional praj is the function o f
the mind, the self-conscious intellect contrasted with ignorance and in
regard to the objective reality which it confronts.
There are two kinds o f praj. The one is the eternal praj. The other
is (the impermanent praj) which functions along w ith the five pramits. (The latter is) the functional praj-pramit (ffljfrfcSS)
(while the former could be called the substantial or the stable praj).
. . . The functional praj can put an end to the darkness o f ignorance,
and can fetch the true (eternal) praj. . . . In the eternal praj (the
undivided reality) there cannot be found (even the distinction of) igno
rance and knowledge. (521b)
The eternal praj is the ultimate, permanent principle o f knowledge
which is the eternal light in the heart o f m an. The praj itself ever
remains unextinct while the particular objects arise and perish. It is the
permanent principle in the light o f which alone the critical judgem ent
o f things as impermanent is meaningful. Nothing, not even Nirvana
116
(as set against samsdra), can claim absoluteness in the light o f the criti
cism instituted with the principle that the ultimate reality is the undi
vided being.
The prajnaparamita (the ultimate principle o f knowledge) can cancel
all things, it can cancel even Nirvana; it straightaway transcends all
things, unimpeded. (While all things perish) the power o f wisdom
does not itself perish, (as) it transcends all and there is nothing else that
can deny it. Therefore it is said that if there is anything excelling even
Nirvana, even that the power o f wisdom can deny. (But prajnaparamita
itself remains undenied).9 (449b)
The functional prajfia is really the act o f knowing which can be said
to consist of I) analysis, II) criticism and III) comprehension.02 These
acts o f knowing, as modes o f the power o f prajfia>have their ground in
the permanent principle o f knowledge.
The knowledge of the unconditioned reality: The act o f knowing that
has for its object the unconditioned reality is in its basic form the judge
ment that the real is the unconditioned, which is carried out in the light
o f the highest knowledge that is completely free from all distorting
elements o f ignorance and passion. It is a knowledge (judgement)
regarding the ultimate nature o f things, the highest reality, and hence
it is called the highest knowledge, prajfia par excellence. This act of
knowing which is also called prajnaparamita is, however, impermanent
and it should be recognized as such, despite the fact that it is called
permanent. In this regard the Sdstra points out:
Prajnaparamita is o f the nature o f knowledge; it is a seeing o f things;
it arises from the combination o f causal factors. . . . O f the prajndparamita, the object is tathatd, dharma-dhatu, hhutakoti, the incomposite
dharma; therefore it is (called) permanent. (521a)
Although (this) knowledge arises from the combination o f causes
and conditions, still, it takes for its object the dharma which is devoid
of birth and is by nature sunya, Therefore (even this knowledge) is called
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NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
things are completely devoid o f all determinate natures, therefore prajnapramit (the real nature o f things) is most profound. In it all thoughts
and all activities o f mind come to an end, therefore it is difficult to see.
In it there is not the clinging even to prajpramit and therefore it is
said to be difficult to comprehend. In it all the three kinds o f poison and
all kinds o f prapaca come to an end and therefore it is called Peace.
W ith the realization o f the excellent taste o f this prajna, one realizes a
permanent fulfilment (of heart), and there is no more any hankering
left
All other kinds o f prajna are gross, rough, devoid
o f joy. Therefore this praj is called excellent.12 (450a)
People have various misconstructions o f klesas and false notions*
making their minds turbid. But when they realize th0 prajna, then their
minds become pure and o f one form (ftf*fe). . . . Prajaparamit
can illuminate the darkness o f ignorance that is associated with all ele
ments o f affliction as well as the ignorance that is not so associated; (it
can brighten, up) the darkness o f stupidity in regard to all things. . . .
Prajpramit can cure (the disease of) the eye o f wisdom and then the
eye o f wisdom would itself change into praj. . . . It can turn (t6W)
the attention o f peoples minds from the usual objects o f desire and
pleasure (towards the object o f eternal fulfilment and joy). (478c479a)
Section
III
LEVELS A N D P E R S P E C T I V E S
The Jive eyes: Levels and perspectives of understanding: The fact that prajna
in its purest form is ever there as the very nature o f the self-conscious
individual is a point that should not be missed. But in ordinary people
it is covered up with the dirt o f ignorance and passion. It is not only
possible but essential to wash away this dirt; then the original brightness
o f prajna shines forth once again. The five kinds o f eyes that the prajnapramit-stras speak o f13 are really the different levels o f comprehension,
the different degrees o f removal o f this dirt from the mirror o f mind,.
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enabling it to reflect the true nature of itself as well as of all things. The
eyes yield views; but the views differ not only in range, but in depth
and in the quality of illumination.
The bodhisattva already has the eyes o f flesh and has partially even
the other four kinds o f eyes. But these eyes are covered up with (the
dust of) the limitations o f sin (i.e., ignorance and passion) (SfP/Sili?#)
and are therefore unclean. For example, the m irror is by its nature
bright, but due to the dust (#5$ ) on it, (its brightness) cannot be seen;
but if the dust is washed away, then it shines bright as ever before (fiS
W in*) (347a)
The eye is the faculty or power o f sight, yielding a view, an idea, a
judgment, o f the nature o f things. As kinds of the power o f sight the
eyes arc always in themselves pure, although there are differences among
them o f depth and extension, as well as o f the mode o f comprehension.
The deepening o f the sight consists in realizing the relative nature and
value o f the different levels and perspectives; and this naturally implies
a level o f complete comprehension. To persist in the limited levels and
perspectives and cling to them as themselves limitless is an error. The
ultimate sight is the sight o f the ultimate, the unconditioned. Nothing
short o f that can yield the ultimate view. But the ultimate view is
not any view/* not any definite view exclusive of all the rest. It is a
view in so far as it is an awareness, a comprehension; but it is an aware
ness that is complete, an understanding that is comprehensive of all other
levels and entirely free from errors and shortcomings.
The eyes of the flesh and the deva eye: The eyes o f flesh and the deva
eye sec only partially. By confining oneself to these eyes one commits
the error o f seizing the determinate as itself the absolute. But it should
be borne in mind that none that is self-conscious is bereft o f the sense o f
the real; in fact all eyes, as kinds of sight, have their origin in prajfid.
Thus the Sutra says:
All the five eyes o f the Buddha arise from prajhdparamitd. (467c)
120
In the light o f the sense o f the real one puts an end to the factors o f
ignorance and passion that limit ones vision; by the cultivation o f the
sense o f the beyond one purifies ones eyes. Thus the Sutra says:
The bodhisattva while cultivating prajndparamita purifies his five
eyes. (347^)
In themselves the eyes are not such as to constrain one to cling to
characters. The view is due to the eyes; but the clinging to the view
is due to ignorance. The Buddha also sees through the eyes o f flesh, but
He does not cling to the view.
The objects o f sight for the eyes o f flesh or the physical eyes are the
gross objects o f ordinary experience; with the purification o f the physi
cal eyes the bodhisattva can see (the whole o f) visible rupa1* all the
three thousand great thousand worlds. 16 W hile the eyes o f flesh
become pure through ones (moral) deeds, the deva eye becomes pure
through dhyana and samadhi, contemplation and meditation, as well
as by the leading o f moral life.18 The objects o f sight for the deva eyes
are birth and death, good and bad and the causal factors o f the good
and evil deeds o f all beings in all the worlds, which lead them to differ
ent kinds o f existence in different spheres.17
The eyes o f flesh cannot see things that lie even beyond a wall; they
cannot see distant objects.18 These are the eyes with which common
people see things.
(The eyes o f the common people are capable o f only a partial seeing).
They see the near but not the distant; they see the external but not the
internal; they see the gross but not the subtle. (If) they see the east they
cannot see the west; (if) they see this, they cannot see that; (if) they see
the combination they cannot see the dispersion; (if) they see birth, they
cannot see extinction.19 (350c)
These eyes see everything as having its own nature and different
from all the rest. The sight that these eyes yield is not different from
that o f animals.20 Therefore the view o f the eyes o f flesh cannot be
121
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
lose sight o f the truth o f the non-exclusive dharma which the eye o f
wisdom yields.
If the bodhisattva should see (exclusively) the composite, the world
ly, the defiled, then he would just fall a victim to the false notion o f
existence
but if he would see (exclusively) the incomposite,
the transmundane, the undefiled, he would just fall a victim to the false
notion o f non-existence (iPEH&SjjL1^). Abandoning these extremes, by
means o f the unerring wisdom ( J i ^ Jtfcf&&), he fares on the Middle
W ay. This is the eye o f wisdom. . . . Realizing this eye o f wisdom
one puts an end to all elements o f perversion ( 3M i&ffi), to all elements
o f ignorance, general or particular, to every thing (that owes its being
to ignorance). (348a-b)
People lose their eye o f wisdom through ignorance, doubt and
repentance, perversion and false notions. But- when they realize the
prajna, then the eye o f wisdom just becomes clear (again). (478c)
The common people owing to perversion see (only) through the eyes
offlesh which yield the six kinds o f sense-cognition. Thus they see things
as each (with its own nature and) different (from all the rest and thus
they cling to them). But if one will see things through the eye o f
wisdom, then one will realize that all these determinate entities are un
real, and that Nirvana is the only true reality. (495c)
The eye of dharma: W hile the eye o f wisdom is the eye that is fixed
on the universal reality, on Nirvana, the eye o f dharma is fixed on the
diverse ways in which the minds o f people function. While the eye
o f wisdom has no direct reference to the compassionate heart o f the
bodhisattva, the eye o f dharma is directly inspired by his universal love
and his original oath to save all beings. The eye of dharma yields one the
knowledge o f the diverse ways in which the minds o f people work,
the knowledge that is essential in order to help every individual so that
one intensifies ones sense o f the real, gives up ones clinging to the
determinate, fares on the way with insight and compassion, helping all
others also to realize the true nature o f things. It is this knowledge o f
the definite ways suited to specific individuals (marganvayajndna) (U S
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NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
Ag A r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
pure, as in them the traces o f kleia are not extinguished, and therefore
even they should be abandoned, transcended. But in the eye o f the
Buddha there is no error, no perversion, (for in it) all perversion has
been completely extinguishedextinguished to its very end.(348b)
The eye o f the Buddha is the eye that is completely free from passion
and is saturated with unbounded compassion for all beings every
where.29 It is the eye o f wisdom itself come to consummation.
(When the bodhisattva) becomes the Buddha the eye o f wisdom
itself comes to be called in turn the eye o f the Buddha. As ignorance
and other klelas including even their traces, will all have been con
cluded, (he gains) a clear comprehension in regard to every thing. . . .
(When one gains the eye o f the Buddha) nothing remains unseen, un
heard, uncomprehended and unrecognized. (348b)
The highest knowledge that the Buddha achieves is also called the
knowledge o f all forms;80 it is the knowledge o f every specific way o f
every determinate entity. It is the comprehension that is non-exclusive,
neither exclusive o f the mundane nor o f the ultimate. It is the compre
hension in which the true nature o f things is clear as daylight; it is at
the same time the bearing o f limitless love and compassioh toward all
beings. It is the comprehension in which ignorance and passion have
been concluded and which is aware that the true nature o f ignorance is
itself wisdom, that the true nature o f passion is itself compassion. It is
the true wisdom. This is the goal o f the wayfaring o f the bodhisattva.
In the Buddha all the five eyes function and that in perfect unison. His
comprehension is altogether saturated as much w ith compassion as
with wisdom.
12 6
CHAPTER
K N O W L E D G E AS T H E P R I N C I P L E OF
CO M PREH ENSIO N
Section
Prajfid compared to the principle of accommodation: In regard to being allcomprehensive, prajhapdramita is compared to akdia, the principle o f
accommodation,1 which has room for everything. It is not itself any
thing, and yet all things live, move and have their being in dependence
upon it. Prajfid as the sense o f the unconditioned is the ground o f all
conditioned specific views, while it is not itself any specific view. All
views derive their being from prajfid, for it is in response to and as ex
pressions o f the sense o f the unconditioned that views are built, in order
to satisfy the specific needs. These needs are the specifications or canali
zations o f the one basic urge, the urge to realize the real. W hile this is
so, it is under ignorance that one claims absoluteness for ones own view.
This is to lack in comprehension; this is exclusiveness, dogmatism. The
non-exclusive understanding is the all-comprehensive prajfid. This is
the same as the Middle W ay that rises above extremes and hence above
exclusiveness, reveals the mundane nature o f things and leads one also
to their ultimate truth. A middle way that does not open up the truth
o f things ceases to be the middle and ceases also to be the way. It would
itself be an extreme and hence a dead-end.
Speaking o f prajnapdramita as the comprehension that is non-clinging
(anupalambha), the 5 dstra points out that it cannot itself be conceived
as anything specific nor can it be confined to any specific level or per
spective;
127
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
KNOWLEDGE
NGRJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
KNOWLEDGE
In the dharma o f the Buddha one abandons all passion, all wrong
views, all pride o f self; one puts an end to all (these) and does not cling
(to anything). (63c)
Referring to the Sutra on the Raft ,9 the Sastra says that the Buddha
has taught there that one has to abandon ones clinging even to good
things, how much more to bad ones! He does not encourage any fond
notion even in regard to the praj nap aramita or any leaning on it or cling
ing to it. How much less should one lean on or cling to other things!10
The Sastra proceeds:
The intention of the Buddha is this:
M y disciples (must be) free from passion for dharma, free from attach
m ent to dharma, free from partizanship. W hat they seek is only the free
dom from (passion and) suffering; they do not quarrel about the
(diverse) natures o f things. (63 c)
In the Arthavargxya Sutra11 Makandika puts a difficulty before the
Buddha:
(It may be that) in the case o f rigidly fixing (and holding on to)
things, there directly arise all sorts o f (wrong) notions. But if all is
abandoned, the internal as well as the external, how can enlightenment
( bodhi ii'.) be realized at all? (63c)
The questioner commits the mistake o f imagining that the determi
131
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
nate in itself leads to clinging, and that the indeterminate nature (sunyata) o f things means a literal abandoning o f them. These are only
different phases o f the error o f clinging, the error o f imputing the limi
tations in our approach to the nature o f the things themselves. If the
determinate in itself leads one to clinging, then, certainly, there is no
way o f realizing the bodhi; then, it would follow that to abandon cling
ing would be to abandon the determinate itself, and the indetermi
nate would mean a total denial o f the determinate. These are the
wrong notions that arise from the initial mistake o f imagining that the
determinate is inits very nature such as to lead one to clinging. But this
is a view which leads one to self-contradiction at every step. For how
can one speak and convey his meaning through specific concepts and
yet say that the determinate leads one by its very nature to clinging?
The Buddhas answer amounts to saying that what is to be abandoned
is not the determinate itself, but ones clinging to it. One can realize
freedom by abandoning the false sense o f self, which is the root o f all
clinging:
Bodhi is not realized by seeing or hearing or understanding, nor is
it realized by the (mere) observance o f morals; nor is it realized by
abandoning hearing and seeing and it is (definitely) not realized by
giving up morajs.
Thus what one should abandon is disputation as well as the (false)
notion o f I and mine ; one should not cling to the diverse natures
of things. It is in this way that bodhi can be realized. (63 c)
Makandika clings again. He imagines that the Buddha means a literal
denial o f thought and speech and o f every course o f mundane activity.
Then, as I see it now, (just) by an acceptance o f the way o f the dumb
(!#'&) one can realize the way. (64a)
He misses the meaning in the words o f the Buddha as his clinging to
the determinate, his imagination that the root o f suffering lies in the
determinate itself, shuts him out from the truth that it really lies in his
clinging to it. So the Buddha summarily replies:
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KNOWLEDGE
You take your stand (#c) on the path o f wrong notions; I know
your foolish way. Now , when you are not able to see (your own)
wrong notions, you are yourself the dumb. (64a)
Words, concepts, are in themselves pure; what makes the difference
is the way in which we use them. Views constructed o f concepts need
not all be false; there is the right view as well as the wrong view.12
Section
II
T H E W A Y S OF T E A C H I N G :
A.
NGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
elements o f merit, while some other times it is taught that all things
are devoid o f construction (and impossible o f collection). In this way,
(the one dharma) has been taught in several ways.13 (192a)
The Buddha taught that the self exists and He also taught that there
is no self. Again He taught that all things exist and He also taught that
all things are snya, that everything is devoid o f existence. The Sstra
observes that while for a superficial view there seems to be mutual
contradiction in these, there is no contradiction in fact, for these are
different ways o f expressing one and the same truth. By nature things
arc such that they are neither absolutely existent nor absolutely non
existent; they are conditionally existent and by nature becoming. In
the becoming o f things the aspects o f is and is not are distinguish
able though not separable. And a thing is describable from the stand
point o f any one o f these aspects but only relatively and not absolutely.
It is this truth o f the relativity o f descriptions, the possibility o f describ
ing any given thing from several standpoints in several ways, that the
Buddha uses in order to reveal the one-sidedness o f the ignorant who
cling exclusively to some one specific aspect and ignore the rest.14 And
there is no contradiction in making different statements about the same
thing from different standpoints. That the self exists and that the self
does not exist, both are true, even as the statements that everything
exists as well as that all things are non-existent are equally true. There
is no mutual contradiction among them, for they do not clash.
Both these teachings are true. Take for example, the ring finger; it
is both long and short. From the standpoint o f the middle finger it is
short, and from the standpoint o f the little finger it is long. That it is
short and that it is longboth are true. The same is the case with the
teaching of existence and non-existence. The teaching o f existence is
sometimes meant as the mundane truth and sometimes as the highest
truth. The teaching o f non-existence is also sometimes meant as a mun
dane truth and sometimes as the ultimate truth. The Buddhas teachings
that the self exists and that the self does not exist, both are true.15 (254a)
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KNOWLEDGE
The Sastra observes that the teaching that all things exist, that the self
exists is meant for householders, as they mostly do not aspire to realize
Nirvana but just seek to reap the fruits o f their deeds in their future
spans o f life. To those who have abandoned the home-life and have
taken to a life o f renunciation, it is taught that things do not exist, that
the self does not exist. This is because those who have renounced the
family life mostly aspire to realize Nirvana. Those who seek Nirvana
do not seize anything and therefore their clinging naturally dies out
and this death o f clinging is itself Nirvana.16
Again, the Sastra states that when the power of faith etc. have not
become ripe, people first seek the way through clinging, and later when
their power o f faith and understanding has become mature, they will
be able to give up their clinging. For the sake o f these the Buddha has
taught concerning all the good elements in order that depending on
them people will be able to give up their clinging to the bad ones.
There are some in w hom the power o f faith etc. are already mature;
they do not seek anything in a clinging way. They seek only the way
to freedom from the course o f birth and death. For the sake o f such
people, the Buddha has taught that all things are sunya,17
The direct and the expedient ways: There is the distinction o f the teach
ing o f the ultimate nature o f things and the teaching o f their relative
nature. Again, there is the distinction o f direct (nitartha) teaching, viz.,
that all things are sm y a and the indirect, expedient (neyartha) teaching,
viz., that the self does not exist.18 And it is necessary to note that both
these kinds of teaching are true statements, statements o f things as they
arc. While the direct teaching sets forth in a direct manner the basic
and the complete truth regardless o f the specific tendencies o f the hear
ers, the indirect, expedient, teaching emphasizes precisely such aspects
of things as are suited to the specific tendencies of the individuals. But
whether direct or expedient, whether o f the ultimate truth or of the
mundane truth, all the teachings o f the Buddha have one single aim,
viz., to enable all to destroy their ignorance, overcome their clinging
and realize freedom from suffering. Again all these teachings are com
i 35
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
O f these different teachings all are true, and yet none is true.19 Every
one o f them has its respective, relative significance; and yet none o f them
is absolutely true. Even to cling to sunyata (relativity) as itself absolute
would be a case o f exclusiveness, and hence o f blindness, dogmatism. It
is to shut oneself out from the truly absolute, the non-exclusive, in the
light o f which relativity is itself seen to be non-ultimate.
If one does not cling to the sunyata o f all things ones m ind does not
give room to quarrel; one just abandons all limitations ({BJ&nf).
This is the true wisdom. But if one clings to the sunyata o f things and
thus gives rise to quarrel, his bonds are not cut; then one would lean
on (and cling to) this knowledge. But this is not the true knowledge.
As the Buddha has said, all His teachings are intended to help all
people to cross (the ocean o f birth and death). There is nothing in these
that is not true. W hether an teaching is true or not depends solely on
whether one is non-clinging or clinging in regard to it.
r). (254b)
The ultimate truth, the reality that is not itself anything specific
(akihcana) is the heart o f the teaching o f the Buddha. All the statements
o f the Buddha carry the ultimate significance o f the unconditioned
reality.20 One who understands this does not contend.
B.
The two truths and the four siddhantas: The distinction in the teachings of
the Buddha between those that pertain to the mundane truth and those
that pertain to the ultimate truth, which we discussed in the preceding
136
KNOWLEDGE
section, is set forth, again, in another form, viz., as the four siddhantasr1
These represent four different statements o f one and the same truth but
from different standpoints, the mundane and the individual, the remedi
al and the ultimate. In fact, the individual and the remedial kinds are
only restatements o f the mundane form; they arc the kinds o f indirect
or expedient teaching suited to the individual needs o f the people as
they promote the good in them and serve as remedies for the specific
kinds o f diseases in their minds. Thus the primary distinction is still
between the mundane and the ultimate. The Sdstra says:
All these are true and there is no mutual contradiction among them
(eftJTSSffiiS*). (59b)
It is to be noted that the scheme o f the four siddhantas as well as that
o f the direct and indirect teachings, and even the distinction o f abtridharma (analysis) criticism (sunyata) and moral code fpitaka or vinaya) ,
are all intended to bring out the intrinsic consistency and harmony in
the teachings o f the Buddha. To bring this to light the Sdstra emphasizes
the need to penetrate beneath the apparent contradictions in His different
teachings, and gives as an illustration His teachings about the self. A
certain Sutra, for example, says:
From different kinds o f deeds (one) is born in different kinds o f life
in the world and experiences different kinds o f touch and feeling. (60a)
Again in the Phalgunasutra22 it is said that there is no individual who
experiences touch, and there is no individual who experiences feeling.
(60a)
There is an apparent contradiction between what these two Sutras
say. Those who do not penetrate deep enough into the inner meaning
in these teachings would condemn these two statements as contradic
tory; but in fact, these are only different expressions of the mundane
nature o f the self o f the individual which is a ceaseless becoming, and
in which the aspects of arising as well as perishing are distinguishable.
It is in reference to these distinguishable aspects that the different state137
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
mcnts are made. As is and is not are opposed to each other so,
these statements that the self exists and that it does not exist are opposed
to each other; but again, as the opposed concepts is and is not
hold good equally of the conditioned, changing, entity from different
standpoints, so do these opposing statements. There is no intrinsic con
tradiction in the mundane entitys being conceived as a complex o f
is and is not ; similarly there is no inherent contradiction in the
two teachings equally holding good in regard to the individual viewed
from two different angles.
The mundane truth: Essential conditionedness (pratltyasamutpada), is
the direct teaching of the mundane nature of things.
The mundane truth is that things exist as the result of the combina
tion o f causes and conditions, and that they have no separate essences
o f their own. A cart for example exists as a complex entity composed
o f wheel etc.; there is no cart (with a being o f its own) apart from its
components. Such is also the nature o f the individual. The individual is
there as the complex o f the five fskandhas) (groups o f material and
mental elements); there is no individual apart from (and independent
of) these five groups.23 (59b)
That there is the individual is the mundane truth and not the highest
truth, and tathata as unconditioned and unchanging nature is not true 111
regard to the mundane nature o f things.24 The being of the individual
is a dependent being as it is a complex of the five skandhas, and it is not
anything unconditioned or independent. Milk, for example, is a com
plex o f colour, smell, taste and touch; it is not anything in itself. Nor
is it a non-entity, purely illusory like the second head or the third hand.25
In that case there could not have been any such thing as the components
o f milk. But there is such a thing as the components o f milk; this is
admitted even by those who tend to dismiss individuality as a mere
name without anything corresponding, not recognizing the individual
even as a conditioned entity. To hold that there are only the skandhas
and no individual at all is an error in regard to the mundane truth.
13 8
KNOWLEDGE
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
KNOWLEDGE
(There) the sphere o f the speakable ceases, the activities o f mind come
to an end; the unborn, the undying dharma is o f the nature o f Nirvana.
The sphere o f the speakable is the domain o f the determinate; the
sphere where the words do not reach is the highest dharma.27 (6ib)
The comprehensive knowledge is not only o f the relativity and com
patibility o f the many determinate views, it is also an awareness o f their
underlying unity; in what they ultimately mean they are not anything
specific. Concepts which hold among the specific arid the relative are
irrelevant in regard to the ultimate truth o f things. But at the same
time the ultimate truth is not exclusive o f specific concepts, not absolute
ly unutterable.28 The wise teach through names and characters, the
dharma that lies beyond these but this they do in a non-clinging way.
C.
The three doors to the dharma: Analysis, criticism and cultivation o f moral
life: The distinction o f Abhidharma (analysis), Sunyata (criticism), and
Pitaka (or Vinaya, the moral code) is also meant to bring to light the
basic harmony in the teachings o f the Buddha.29 The Abhidharma em
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
tion and pain and enhancing the elements conducive to the realization
o f the undivided being. Elements o f disintegration are terminated and
the factors o f integration are brought to birth. This harnesses both
analysis and criticism, the knowledge o f the unique nature o f every
specific entity as well as the sense o f their conditioncdness and contin
gency. Now , although there is an apparent conflict between analysis
which emphasizes distinction and individuality o f things and smyatd
which emphasizes their inadequacy, relativity and contingency, still,
for one who penetrates beneath the surface they become the revealers
o f the inner harmony in the teachings o f the Buddha.
W hen the ignorant hear (the different kinds of teachings) they say
that it is all a perversion.
But the wise enter the three gates (Abhidhartna} nyat and Pitaka)
and comprehend that all the words o f the Buddha are true and there is
no contradiction among them. (192a)
Analysis is not in itself opposed to criticism; the knowledge o f the
unique nature o f specific things or the specific systems o f things is not
in itself in conflict with the knowledge o f the essential relativity o f every
specific thing or o f every specific system o f things. And the knowledge
o f their basic unity, the unity o f origin and the unity o f purpose, enables
one to deal with them and bring them to their natural fulfilment; this
is the strength and skilfulness o f the wise. Again, while the cultivation
o f the moral life, bereft o f the knowledge o f the true nature o f things,
is apt to land one in the errors o f clinging, these errors are not inevitable,
nor are they inherent in analysis or criticism or even in the cultivation
o f the moral life itself. They owe their being to our ignorance and hence
to our clinging to the fragmentary as complete.
Analysis and the error of the analysts: The ideal representation o f the
world o f becoming in terms o f the relative notions o f is and is not,,,
self and other, identity and difference is the very means by
which its different aspects are distinguished and their mutual relations
in the whole are appreciated; this is the mission o f thought. It is this
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KNOW LEDGE
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
fact the inseparable aspects o f the spiritual life o f the wayfarer. In him
who fares rightly on the W ay, all these three blend in a unison, for
they are united at root as the different expressions o f the one urge, the
urge for the real, and they arc united also at the end as they blend and
become o f one essence in that which is the ultimate end o f the way
faring, viz., the realization o f the undivided being. It is the power o f
prajnaparamita, which is the power o f comprehension, that keeps one
aware o f their essential unity. To fare in these devoid o f this power is
to be devoid o f the sense o f their true nature.
Thus the Sastra says:
W ithout (the power of) prajnaparamita if one enters the door o f
Abhidharma (analysis), one falls into (the wrong notion of) existence;
if one enters the door o f Siinyata (criticism) one falls into (the wrong
notion of) non-existence; and if one enters the door o f Pitaka (moral
discipline) one falls into (the wrong notion of) both existence and non
existence.31 (194ab)
But if one would rightly comprehend things, and would not lose
the sense o f the beyond, then in his case these three constitute not
hindrances but doors which open upon the profound meaning in
the teachings o f the Buddha.812 The building o f views as systematic
presentations o f the constitution o f things from different levels and
standpoints is legitimate and natural. The views would be o f help to
one who does not cling. To one who clings they are a hindrance, for
they are then perversions; they cease to be doors they become dead
ends. The wise, the non-clinging, formulate concepts, construct systems
as well as alternate them freely, as freely as they would dismiss them.
Although the bodhisattva faring in prajnaparamita understands the
universal natures o f things, he understands also their unique natures;
although he understands the unique natures o f things, he knows also
their universal natures/12 (194b)
144
KNOWLEDGE
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
The silence of the Buddha: The Buddha adopted different ways o f answer
ing the questions that were put to Him. Silence was His way o f answer
ing certain kinds o f questions that clearly indicated the state o f the
questioners mind as one that was steeped in the tendency to cling and
therefore not conducive to see things as they are. The fourteen ques
tions^ in regard to which the Buddha kept silent are the kinds o f diffi
culties in which men get entangled on account o f clinging to the condi
tioned, seizing the relative as itself ultimate. Although the constructions
to which men give rise are o f various kinds, still all these pertain in the
last analysis to the five skarnllias,37 the basic factors o f the world o f the
determinate, which are all relative and devoid o f absoluteness. These
questions arc based on the notions o f absolute existence and absolute
non-existence, as well as o f absolute identity and absolute difference.
These are different forms o f the basic extremes, the extremes o f eternalism and negativism or annihilationism, and are asked with a clinging
mind. They are questions about the world or the body and the self or
146
KNOWLEDGE
A g a r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
KNOWLEDGE
Buddha would say that it is perversion. For instance, that the world is
permanent and that the world is impermanent, both these (become)
perversions when these enter the fourteen questions (A +PH $ii) (and
thus come to be seized as absolute being and absolute non-being). (266a)
NGRJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
150
CH APTER
VI
THE EXTREM ES
NGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
n a g A r j u n a s p h i l o s o p h y
That the thing was there absolutely but is now totally lost, this is the
view o f annihilationism.4
Ordinary thought would stop at being and non-being taken one at
one time. Either a thing is a being or it is a non-being; if it is not the one
it should be the other. And being as well as non-being are taken as ab
solute, total. It is the swinging between the two extremes that is the cycle
o f ignorance in which common people are caught. But reflective
thought, the reviewer o f views would see the partiality, the incomplete
ness o f each o f these positions o f being and non-being. The reflective
mind feels the need to put the fragments together which were taken
apart by the ordinary unreflective thought. But while seeking to arrive
at the togetherness which constitutes the thing, the imagined absolute
ness o f what are only distinguishable aspects is yet accepted without
question. Being and non-being are taken as absolutes, reals, ultimates, although it is held that these are always found together and
never alone. Being is an ultimate, a real and so is non-being. Experience
is a combination o f ultimate reals, being and non-being. Certainly being
is different from non-being. H ow can the one be the other? But despite
their being intrinsically different, absolutely independent, still they
form a combination and the one is never found apart from the other*
The dualism o f the Sankhya is an instance o f such a view.
The attitude engendered by the sense o f impossibility either o f the
two exclusive characters residing in the same thing as its absolute nature
or o f the effective togetherness o f two independent entities that are total
exclusives gives rise to the fourth extreme. But the attitude o f the fourth
extreme is one in which all the possible alternatives, here conceived as
absolutes, are exhausted. It is therefore an attitude o f despair, a total
rejection o f all possibility o f expressing the nature o f the thing. This is
an attitude which either rejects reason altogether and clings to chance
(ahetuka), or one which rejects even that and accepts a position o f com
plete negation o f any certain knowledge while accepting the reality o f
the thing (agnosticism). Or, again one denies even that and ends in a
state o f utter doubt (scepticism). The agnostic or the sceptic does not
question the initial assumption o f absoluteness in regard to what are
only the distinguishable aspects. He sees the difficulty in the combi
154
nation o f the intrinsically opposed, but he does not question the veracity
o f the absolute division o f the thing nor o f the ultimacy o f the aspects;
to these he remains blind.
The formulation of extremes ( koti): Extremes exemplified: It may be
noted that there are two or three ways o f formulating the four kotis:
(A) existence (asti, bhdva, sat) , non-existence (nasti, abhdva, asat), both
(sadasat, bhdvdbhava), and neithernor ( haivdsti, na ca ndsti); (B) self
(sva), other (para), both (ubhaya) and neithernor (anubhaya); one
(eka), many (ndnd), both (ubhaya) and neithernor (anubhaya);
identical (tat), different (anyat) , both (ubhaya) and neithernor
(anubhaya); and (C) self (sva), other (para), both (ubhaya), and chance
or devoid o f reason) ( ahetuka) . b W hat these kotis deny and what their
rejection reveals is the conditioned origination o f things.
(1) The first koti in all the three forms stands for the naive acceptance
o f things as they appear to be and that as absolutely so; this is the case
o f the common people. In the case o f the philosophers, the first koti
stands for the position o f the analysts who mistake the simple elements
which are the ultimates in analysis to be ultimates also in reality. This is
the position o f the Vaibhasikas and we may add here even the Vaisesikas. This amounts to holding that every element is an absolute self
being (svabhdva), an ultimate. This is etemalism; it is practically a deni
al o f negation, and even the negative is accepted to be a kind o f positive
entity. This amounts to ignoring the aspect o f cessation altogether.
(2) The second position holds firmly to the very aspect that was
neglected or explained away in the first, viz., the aspect o f cessation, and
it is held to be the absolute nature o f things, i.e., cessation is a total
cessation. This amounts to ignoring the aspect o f being which figures
clearly as continuity in the stream o f becoming; as denial o f continuity,
this amounts to a denial o f becoming itself. O f the sixty-two drstis seven
kinds o f annihilationism are mentioned, all o f which are exemplifica
tions o f the doctrine o f the total cessation o f personality after death.
Those who hold this view are termed nihilists in Buddhist literature.
The Vaipulyakas, who cling to sunyatd as an extreme, also belong here.
In regard to the problem o f causation, particularly in regard to the ques155
NGRJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
tion o f the relation between cause and effect or o f the relation between
the preceding and the succeeding moments in the causal series, the Bud
dhists always considered the Sakhya as holding the view o f identity and
the Vaiserikas as holding the view o f difference, identity and difference
being alike conceived as total identity and total difference.
(3)
The third koti, that o f both is and is not or both identity
and difference may be compared with the position f the Nirgranthas, the Jainas. It is to be noted that the Jainas are epistemologically
non-absolutists (relativists), but metaphysically pluralists. Their posi
tion is by its very nature unstable; to take relativism seriously is to deny
ultimacy o f difference and with the denial o f the ultimacy o f difference
pluralism cannot stand. O n the contrary, if they take pluralism seriously,
they cannot be relativists. However, the Jainas do combine in them both
these features and for the Buddhist who fares on the Middle W ay this
position seems to involve two difficulties. These are:
I) In regard to the mundane truth, while relativism is not only
valid but essentia], to hold that relativism is an ultimate feature o f reality
is to conceive the relative phases as absolute, or to seize the specific as
ultimate. This is to miss the true im port o f absolute. Is division or
difference ultimate? The relativism o f the Jainas amounts to saying both
yes and no ; their pluralism amounts to a categorical yes. But
to the farer on the Middle W ay, who rises above exclusiveness, the
mundane truth is describable in terms o f difference as much as identity,
plurality as well as unity. The ultimate truth, which is not anything
specific or determinate, is neither describable as identity nor as difference,
although the Buddha taught o f it mostly through identity or unity5a
and that, in a non-clinging way, i.e., not clinging to either identity or
unity as itself ultimate. The ultimate is strictly nisprapatica, non-conceptual; all conceptual formulations belong to the relative and hence to
the mundane level.
II) Again, the pluralism o f the Jainas lends itself to an interpretation
that theft relativism is really a syncretism, a mechanically putting to
gether o f the different elements. Every view as much as every thing,
should have to be viewed as a complex o f many independent reals, a
view which is in this respect similar to that o f the Vaibhasikas and the
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
A g a r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
Section
II
TH E ALTERNATIVES
Relative judgements and absolute statements: The farer on the Middle W ay
has no scope for contention. The Middle W ay is non-contentious pre
cisely because it is non-clinging. This is the all-embracing compre
hension which is inclusive o f all specific views. It is not a denial o f any
thing; it is a rejection only o f the dogmatic, exclusive claims. Thus the
wise understand the origin o f etemalism and understand also the grain
o f truth in it as well as its exaggerations. There is the aspect o f is in
becoming into which it can be analyzed and o f which it cannot be
denied. But the etemalist clings to is and leaves out or explains away
the other aspect, is not. Clinging to the aspect o f arising and con
tinuing, one ends in etemalism and clinging to the aspect o f perishing,
ceasing to be, one ends in annihilationism. To start with is and is
not as reals and thus to get becoming out o f their combination is
absurd.
How can being and non-being be together in the same thing at the
same time?
And to deny all possibility o f understanding, just because one has
failed to understand in the way in which one has started, is a still greater
folly. This would be a fools talk, or a surrender to chance.
The farer on the Middle W ay is free from these errors, for he keeps
himself free from clinging to is and is n o t; he recognizes these as
essentially relative aspects distinguishable in the fact o f becoming; as
such they are not ultimate; and being essentially relative, they are not
mutually exclusive. From one standpoint is is true o f things, from
16 0
EXTREMES A N D ALTERNATIVES
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
true; everything is neither true nor not true. This is the teaching o f the
Buddha. (XVIII.8)
These are cases where, if clinging were to operate, every one of
these positions would become an extreme and hence false; but now,
as these are positions free from clinging, they are not wrong; these are
not extremes; they are alternatives, o f which each is true and all are true.
Regarding the fourth alternative, an observation is necessary. As
expressive o f the indeterminate nature o f the mundane truth, i.e., as
a denial o f the possibility o f absolute statements in regard to the relative,
this alternative suits best to the purpose o f the farer on the Middle W ay
as it is his intention to point to the error o f clinging. W hen there is no
clinging in regard to it, then it is quite admissible for the Madhyamika.
Thus, commenting on the statement o f the Sutra that the bodhisattvas
realization o f the bodhi cannot be conceived even in terms o f neither
by cultivation, nor by non-cultivation, the Sdstra observes that the
Buddha denies even the fourth alternative because this question, wheth
er it can be said that the bodhisattva realizes the bodhi by neither
cultivation nor non-cultivation was asked by Subhuti w ith a clinging
mind. Therefore the Buddha replies in the negative.
It is by (the former) clinging to the position o f both cultivation and
non-cultivation, that there arises (through its rejection) (the fourth
position) that o f neither by cultivation nor by non-cultivation; but
if this position is mentioned w ith a non-clinging mind, without seizing
the determinate, then there is nothing w rong in it.9 (644a)
To cling to the fourth position amounts, on the one hand, to clinging
to the denial o f the describability o f the fact o f realization, i.e., even o f
its describability in conditioned terms, and, on the other, it amounts to
mistaking the distinction between bodhisattva and the bodhi, which is
only a relative distinction holding only in the mundane truth, as an
absolute division, thereby removing the very possibility o f this realiza
tion. So we have there itself in the Sutra a further clarification in regard
to the way the bodhisattva realizes the bodhi. The question is asked, if
162
none o f these four ways are proper in understanding the fact o f realiza
tion, how else should one understand it. And the Sutra replies:
The bodhisattva realizes the sarvakdrajfiata in accordance with the
true nature o f things. (641c)
It is by refraining from seizing, it is by non-clinging, that the bodhi
sattva cultivates the prajna.lc But what does non-clinging mean? To
cling is to conceive in terms o f two (i.e., division) ( f tif
the undivided is the non-clinging
The denial is not o f the fact o f realization, nor o f its understandability, but o f the possibility o f understanding it in terms o f duality, or ex
tremes.
As noted in the beginning o f this work, while extremes are falsifica
tions in regard to the mundane nature o f things, they are irrelevant in
regard to their ultimate nature. Actually in regard to the latter they have
no special significance; for it is as contrasted with the Middle W ay that
they make sense. The Middle W ay is not the ultimate truth. As a syno
nym o f conditioned origination it belongs to the mundane level. As
the awareness o f the essential relativity o f all views and o f the essential
conditionedness o f all entities, i.e., as the ncn-exclusive way, it is signi
ficant only on the plane o f the relative. As the remover o f dogmatism,
again, it is significant as distinct from and as the remedy for dead-ends.
In short, the Middle W ay is, in terms o f the Sdstra, truth taught as
remedy. It is as a remedy to dogmatism that sunyatd as criticism has sense;
and sunyatd as criticism is the Middle W ay.
Rejection is of extremes: There are several places in the Prajnapdramitdsiltra where extremes are stated and rejected as views that spring from
the ciinging mind. The rejection of these extremes is clearly shown as
intended to reveal that it is impossible to understand the mundane truth,
the conditioned origination, by seizing concepts, by clinging to charac
ters. The rejection of extremes is again intended to reveal the ultimate
identity or undividedness of the bodhisattva or the Buddha and the
bodhi, i.e., of the individual and the ultimate reality. This is the non
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
duality o f the way and the goal, o f the conditioned and the uncondi
tioned. The faring on the way as well as the realizing o f the goal are
accepted as mundane truth, but the clinging to them as ultimate in that
nature is denied.
W hatever is a case o f seizing duality all that is a case o f clinging; to
be free from seizing duality is to be non-clinging. Duality means
clinging to the division that this is the eye and this is the form, this is
the bodhi and this is the Buddha.11
The (truly) non-clinging dhartna is the (ultimate) sameness (samata)
o f clinging and non-clinging. (642b)
Even the distinction between clinging and non-clinging may itself
be clung to; then also the comprehension o f the ultimate reality, the
undivided being, is missed. The Buddha has realized the bodhi, but not
halting in the ultimate reality, nor stopping in the mundane. Neither o f
these is the right view. Did not the Buddha realize the bodhi at all? The
Buddha says:
I did indeed realize the bodhi, but not halting either in the composite
or in the incomposite. (645c)
The Sutra points out that by halting in the way there is no realiza
tion o f reality; and even by halting in the not-way there is no realiza
tion o f reality. Even by halting in both the way and the not-way there
is no realization o f reality. N ot even by halting in neither the way nor
the not-way there is any realization o f reality. One should realize
the reality by not halting anywhere, not even on the W ay.12
The Sastra explains that in this passage halting means seizing the
determinate, clinging to characters (ttBxf@).12a
There is the realization o f Reality but not as it is imagined in these
four extremes . . . Neither anything nor nothing, devoid o f all praparicathis is what is called realization o f the Way. (658c)
The Sdstra observes;
164
If one is free from these four extremes, then the prapanca itself would
be the W ay. (662a)
As we have been observing, prapanca, in the sense o f conceptual con
struction and elaboration, is not in itself opposed to the truth o f things;
on the contrary that is the very way in which the true nature o f things
could be set forth, expressed, communicated; this is essential for way
faring. Pratityasamutpada is itself such a system o f concepts, setting forth
the nature o f things as they are.
By the cultivation o f the way, one does not realize the goal, nor by
not cultivating the way does one realize the goal. By giving up the way
one does not realize the goal, nor by staying in (or sticking to) the way
does one realize the goal. (686a)
It is by not imagining an ultimate division between the composite
and che incomposite that one realizes all the fruits o f wayfaring.,,ia The
Sastra observes that this statement in the Sutra is occasioned by the fact
that Subhuti asked the question about the way and the goal with a
clinging mind:
He means to extract the fruit from the way even as (ordinary people
conceive the fact of) oil being squeezed from the hemp . . . If one
would cultivate the way free from seizing characters, free from the
clinging mind, then in his case there is the way, and there is the goal.
(687b)
Is the bodhi realized by the way o f origination or by the way o f non
origination, or by both or by neither? None o f these is true because
there is not that division between the bodhi and the way which is here
conceived and clung to.
The bodhi is itself the way, the way is itself the bodhi. (706b)
The Buddha does not realize the bodhi, for in the ultimate truth, there
NAGARJ U NA S PHILOSOPHY
is not that division between the Buddha and bodhi which is here con
ceived and clung to as ultimate.
The Buddha is Himself the bodhi, the bodhi is itself the Buddha.
(706b)
Interpreted in the context o f the mundane truth this means that
O f all things, cause and effect are neither identical nor different.
(708a)
Although both identity and difference are false as absolute characters
of'the relation between cause and effect, still, as relative characteriza
tions, the wise use both identity and difference in this context, and that
in the non-clinging way. The Buddha mostly used identity in conveying
the ultimate truth, but He did not cling to it.14
In regard to this question o f the relation between cause and effect
we have in the Sutra a very interesting passage which considers whether
the bodhi is attained by the first m oment o f thought or by the sub
sequent m oment o f thought. If the first moment is unconnected with
the next, and the next moment is unconnected with the first, how then
can the bodhisattva cultivate the way and collect the elements o f merit?
The example o f the flame o f the burning lamp is given. It is asked
whether the wick is burnt by the first moment o f flame or by the next
m oment o f flame. Neither by the first itself nor without the first, nor
by the next itself nor without the next. But is the wick burnt or not?
Indeed it is burnt. This is just the case even with the moments of
thought in regard to the cultivation o f the way. Neither by any o f the
moments o f thought themselves nor completely without any o f these,
is the bodhi realized. But the bodhi is indeed realized by the bodhisattva.
Exclaims the Sutra:
Profound indeed is this pratitya-samutpada! (585a)
It should not be difficult to get at the import o f this discourse in the
166
EXTREMES A N D ALTERNATIVES
Sutra. W hat is denied here is not the fact o f realization, not even the
understandability o f its course, as it is clearly expressed as conditioned
origination ; what is denied here is its intelligibility in terms o f absolute,
non-relational, entities corresponding to the ultimate* o f analysis seized
as self-being, in which
The first m oment o f mind does not reach the next moment, and the
next m oment is not contained in the first moment. (584c)
Commenting on this passage o f the Sutra, the Sastra observes:
If merely by die first m om ent o f thought one could become the
Buddha, even independendy o f the succeeding moments, then with the
very first thought o f bodhi, the bodhisattva should have become the
Buddha. But if there is not the first thought at all, (if it totally ceased to
be) then how can there be the successive moments, the second, the third
(etc.)? O f the successive moments, the second, the third (etc.) the first
moment is (in fact)/the very root . . .
(Again) even the next moments are not (totally) apart from the first
moment. If there is not the first moment, then there are not also the
subsequent ones. It is only when from the first moment (onwards)
there is the collection o f the different kinds o f merit, that the last mo
ment becomes complete; and when the last m om ent is complete, it can
put an end (completely) to klesas and their residues and fetch the unex
celled bodhi. (585c)
The difficulty arises here on account o f conceiving that the earlier
and the later moments o f thought are not related. Being not related,
the past is conceived as totally extinct, and does not provide for any
relatedness. In the absence o f relatedness between the first and the next,
the**e is no possibility o f collecting the roots o f merit. And in the absence
o f the collection o f the roots o f merit, how can there be the realization
o f the unexcelled bodhi?15
The Sastra observes that by the example o f the lamp the Buddha
means to say:
167
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
You see actually with your very eyes that the wick is burnt; although
it is neither (exclusively) by the first m om ent nor is it (exclusively) by
the next, still the wick is indeed burnt. Even so I see with the eye o f
the Buddha that the bodhisattva does indeed realize the bodhi. Although
it cannot be that it is by the first thought itself nor completely apart
from the first thought that the realization is accomplished, still, the
bodhisattva does . . . indeed realize the bodhi. (585c)
The negative criticisms: Their significance: The above account o f the
Siitra shows a way to understand the negative criticisms o f the farer on
the Middle W ay. These criticisms are intended to lay bare the absurdities
in exclusive clinging, clinging to the specific as the ultimate. The funda
mental reductio ad absurdum is the impossibility o f mundane existence if
everything is as the upholders o f exclusive views conceive it to be. It
is a rejection not o f is or is not as the distinguishable aspects o f
becoming, but o f etemalism and negativism, the false views built on
relative truths, which are truths turned into falsity by exclusive cling
ing. It is again not a denial o f the possibility o f understanding the truth
o f things, but its revelation by means o f criticism or rational investiga
tion. So, far from being a denial o f the mundane truth, criticism reveals
it as pratityasamutpada.
It is to be noted that iunyata as criticism is not an end in itself; as
revelatory o f the non-substantiality o f mundane things it is die means
to the further realization o f the ultimate reality. Sunyata as criticism lays
bare on the one hand the conditionedness o f the things to which we
cling in our ignorance as unconditioned and on the other, it lays bare
the truth that the entities that are seen to arise and perish in their con
ditioned nature are themselves in their ultimate nature the uncondition
ed reality, the Nirvana. Those w ho cling in mind conceive iunyata as
total negation. Actually, total negation is false in reference to the m un
dane truth, while negation and affirmation are irrelevant in regard to
the ultimate truth. In the mundane truth:
It is the change (anayathabhava) o f the existent that people call nega
tion.16*
168
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
the sphere o f the determinate and the relative nature o f the knowledge
they yield, as well as their ultimate dependence on prajna to which they
owe their being and w ith which they are identical in their ultimate
nature. It is the prajna itself that functions as the eyes o f flesh and as the
knowledge o f all forms.
170
CH APTER
C R I T I C I S M OF C A T E G O R I E S
Section I
TH E M U N D A N E AND THE U L T IM A T E T R U T H
The disclosing of the mundane and the ultimate truth: To cut at its root the
tendency to cling to the specific as ultimate is the deepest truth o f the
denial o f self which the Buddha taught. It is a denial not o f the self itself
but o f the falsely imagined self-hood in regard to the body-mind com
plex. The basic meaning o f self is underivedness, unconditionedness.
The self-being (svabhava) is the independent, unconditioned being
which does not depend on anything to come into existence.1 Even the
coming into existence is not relevant in regard to it, for it never goes
out o f existence. That which was not existent before, is existent now,
and will cease to be later is not the self-being. But arising and perishing
are the very nature o f the elements that constitute the body-mind
complex. So die Buddha declared that the entities that are subject to
arising and perishing are not fit to be considered as the self, for they are
devoid o f the nature o f self, viz., self-being. It is this imagination o f self
being or absoluteness in regard to the conditioned and contingent that
is the root o f error and suffering. It is this that the Buddha exhorts every
one to dispel. In its general form this is the error o f misplaced absolute
ness. W e have already seen that for Nagaijuna the Sarvastivadins doc
trine o f elements becomes an important and glaring instance o f this basic
error. It is the categories o f the Sarvastivadins that become the primary
object o f criticism in his works. He points out that the Sarvastivadins
cling at every step; they seize the relative as self-being and commit the
171
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
very error against which the Buddha warned all His disciples, viz., the
extreme o f etemalism.
The extreme o f negativism takes a minor place in the works o f
Nagaijuna, although its mention and criticism become necessary for
him for at least tw o reasons: I) Criticism o f categories culminating in
the revelation o f their non-substantiality may itself tend in the case o f
one who follows the way o f unyat but with a clinging mind to end in
the extreme o f negativism, denying even the relative being o f things and
thus denying the very possibility o f causal continuity* II) Again, the
clinging in mind who are not the followers o f the way o f unyat might
easily tend to mistake it as a negativism that ends in an utter blank, a
complete nothing.2W hile the latter is the false imagination that criticism
puts an end to things themselves, making them non-existent, the former
is the error o f imagining that the non-being o f things indicated by their
passing away is total. The latter mistakes the nature o f criticism and the
former, the nature o f the course o f things. Both these are really forms
o f the same kind o f clinging, viz., the clinging to negation or nonbeing. The way out o f these lies in realizing relativity as the essential
nature o f things. Criticism or critical examination o f the categories is
a means to lay bare this true nature by putting an end to the false
imagination o f absoluteness in regard to the relative. Further, the very
relativity o f is and is not, being and non-being, removes the notion
o f an absolute cessation o f things. W hat is called relative non-being is
only difference or change, which is not unconditioned.
It must be noted that the charge o f negativism brought against the
M ldhyamika is occasioned partly by the circumstance that he does not
always make the distinction clear between the rejection o f uncondi
tionedness that reveals conditioned becoming as the mundane truth and
the rejection o f the ultimacy o f the conditionedness o f the conditioned
that reveals the unconditioned, the undivided being as the ultimate
reality. The primary meaning o f unyat is devoidness which is a direct
reference to the truth o f things, mundane and ultimate; but it refers also
to the method (criticism) by which unyat as truth is brought to light,
viz., by rejecting the imagination o f ultimacy and absoluteness in regard
to what is only relative and non-ultimate. unyat s the mundane truth
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CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
173
NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
Section
II
C R IT IC IS M OF C A T E G O R IE S
A.
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
wrong view o f non-existence because they cling to sunyatd (non-ultimacy) (as itself the ultimate nature o f things). There are some others
who would say that everything that forms the object o f the six kinds
o f sensation is real, and this is the existence view.
Again, they in whom trsnd is more cling to existence, and they in
whom drsti is more cling to non-existence. Such people cling to existence-view and non-existence-view. Both these kinds o f views are
false, not true; they reject the Middle Way. (331b)
Criticism: W hat these extremes amount to is a complete denial of
conditioned origination, becoming, change as well as its necessary
principle, viz., causal continuity. Says the Sastra:
If everything has an absolute being o f its own (^JfW ), then all things
are devoid o f causes and conditions. But if anything is bom o f the con
nectedness o f causes and conditions, then it is devoid o f (absolute) self
being (gtt). To be devoid o f (absolute) self-being is itself to be
sunya.
Further, if (absolute) non-existence ($&) were true (flf) o f things
then there would be neither sin nor merit, neither bondage nor freedom;
there would not also be the varied natures o f things
Further, those who cling to the existence view stand opposed to
those who cling to the non-existence view. O n account o f this opposi
tion there arise (the contentions of) right and wrong ( S ^ ) ; on account
o f such contentions there arise disputes ( ft# ). O n account o f disputes
there arise the elements o f bondage (&*{). O n account o f the elements
o f bondage there arise deeds (that bind creatures to states o f suffering).
From such deeds ways o f evil become open. In the true nature o f things
there are not thesfc oppositions nor these (contentions of) right and
wrong nor (the consequent) disputes.
Further, in the case o f those who cling to things as (eternally) existent,
there arise grief and affliction when things are (revealed to be) imperma
nent; and those who cling to (the passing away of things as absolute)
non-existence, commit all kinds o f sinful deeds and (despite their dis
belief in causal continuity) they fall into hell and suffer pain.
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A g X r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
have already seen the stra warning that the presence o f names does
not mean the reality o f the things named. The names themselves arise
depending on the distinct essences and so they cannot serve as the ground
to prove the unconditionedness o f these essences themselves. The astra
further draws attention to the fact that cognitions and their contents
again are correlatives; it is by cognitions that the specific things are
known to exist and it is depending on the nature o f the specific things
that cognitions arise; they are distinguishable but cannot be supposed
to have any independent being.14 To say that while all is utterly non
existent, it is only out o f perversion that things are seen as existent is
to reduce normal perception to baseless illusion.15
That things were existent formerly but are now totally lost, that they
are existent now but will be wholly lost later on. this is the view of
negativism. This is to deny the very possibility o f causal continuity and
along with it the very possibility o f change or becoming, and this is to
contradict the very nature o f mundaneexistence.
Rejection and revelation: The rejection of absoluteness is the revelation
o f relativity. It is not that things are utterly non-existent nor that they
have no nature o f their own. Everything has its own nature but this
nature o f the thing is not absolute, not unconditioned.18 This is the non
substantiality o f tilings, conveyed by the teaching that things are im
permanent. Impermanence is not their ultimate nature; when rightly
appraised as reference to the passing away o f things it leads one to the
comprehension o f iiinyata.11 But when clung to as an absolute character
it would mean their.total extinction and would thus become the wrong
view o f annihilationism. Impermanence as the relative truth means
change or becoming; it is not a denial o f the causal continuity but a
step towards bringing it to light. In that way it puts an end to the wrong
notion o f permanence, absoluteness and self-being with regard to things
in their determinate natures; it is the remedial kind o f teaching and not
a teaching o f the ultimate truth.18
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
B.
Critical examination: (A ) The Sdhkhya and the Vaisesika: W ith the prob
lem o f carnal relation there is bound up the question o f the relation of
being and becoming. The world o f becoming is conceived by philoso
phers to have one or several principles as its ground. W hile particular
things arise and perish, their ground remains ever in its being, it knows
no change. W hile the Madhyamika would agree that the world o f
becoming is essentially conditioned and has for its ground the uncondi
tioned reality which is eternal being, he would point out that the un
conditioned ground o f the conditioned cannot be anything short o f
the indeterminate reality, the undivided being, and that while in re
spect to the mundane nature o f things there can be no one definite way
o f describing their relation to their ultimate ground, still, every de
scription is true from its own standpoint and each has its own relative
merit. In respect to the ultimate nature o f things there can be no question
o f any description, for there is no division there between the condition
ed and the unconditioned. Strictly, the ultimate truth is non-conceptual.
Even the statement that the ultimate nature o f the conditioned is itself
the unconditioned reality is relevant only to the way o f the self-con
scious intellect on the plane o f mundane truth. The wise who com
prehend the relative truth contained in specific determinations are able
by their power o f skilfulness to put into use any o f these under a particu
lar situation. All their varied statements are one-pointed, viz., to help
people to overcome ignorance and suffering. And so when philosophers
cling to specific points o f view and assert not only that the ultimate
ground o f the world o f becoming is o f a specific nature and o f a specific
number but that even the relation between the contingent entities and
their absolute ground is o f a specific kind, the Madhyamika would
point out that they commit the error o f seizing the determinate as
ultimate, cling to the relative as absolute. It is in this way that the Sutra
as well as the astra mention that the specific views prevalent in the
world pertain only to the constituents o f the world o f the determi
nate; they do not touch the unconditioned reality.
The non-Buddhistic schools that are most often referred to in Bud178
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
dhist works in this connection are two: the Sankhya and the Vaisesika,
the one holding that the ultimate principles are two and the other,
many; the one holding that identity is the true relation between cause
and effect and the other, difference; the one holding that the effect is
contained (as a potency) in the cause and hence as existent in the
cause and the other that the effect is wholly different and non-existent'
in the cause.18a These two provide for the Madhyamika eminent ex
amples o f the extremes o f existence and non-existence, identity and
difference, one and many.
W hen he says that,
Neither by itself nor by another nor even by both is anything pro
duced; and the birth o f the thing is not also devoid o f conditions,19
(104b),
what he refers to is the impossibility o f conceiving the conditioned
origination o f things under the imagination that self and other are
absolute, non-relational, totally separate.
The birth o f a thing by itself would mean that the thing is there even
before its birth and that having been there it brings itself to birth. This
view o f the self-origination o f things is presented by the Buddhist as
the view o f the Sankhya, who holds that the effect is existent in the
cause (sat-karya-vada) . And the Madhyamikas criticism is that the birth
o f an existent thing is devoid o f sense. Again, the Sankhyas maintain
that identity is the true relation between cause and effect. The criticism
o f this is that in the case o f total identity, there could be no question of
any relation, for relation holds only between two distinguishable: entities.
The Sankhyas would no- doubt bring in the conception o f manifesta
tion (ahhivyakti) .20 They would say that it is not that the effect is non
existent in the cause but that it is unmanifest. Thus their distinction
between the cause and the effect is one o f potency and actuality. Even
then, the Madhyamika would say that they will have to accept that
there is an element o f novelty in the causal production; that which was
non-existent has come into being; this is true at least o f manifestation.
This means to give up the position o f absolute identity between cause
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
and effect, for they will have to distinguish between the cause and the
effect, the potential and the actual, the unmanifest and the manifest,
although as different states o f one and the same principle. W hen prakrti
is undistinguished from its products there does not arise the question o f
identity or difference for there is just one principle, the prakrti, and not
it a* well as its products. And when prakrti is distinguished from its
products then the relation between them cannot be total identity, for
there is distinction; the two are different, though not absolutely so.
But proceeding to bring forth and to emphasize the distinction
between cause and effect, the ground and the consequent, if one would
swing to the extreme o f total difference, and hold to total non-existence
o f the effect in the cause, as the Vaisesikas do, even that, the Madhyarrdka w ould'say, would be to deny all causal relation.21 H ow can this
relation or any relation be conceived between things that are absolutely
separate? If the other is wholly another, how can it be productive o f
this thing? Further, in order that there may be this relation o f other
ness, there must already be this thing, the effect, and if it is already
there, how is it conceivable that it is produced by this other, the
cause? There is difference no doubt between the cause and the effect
but not an absolute difference, even as there is identity or sameness but
not totally so. The distinction is relative and it must be appreciated as
such; and the one-sidedness, the exclusive clinging, needs to be aban
doned. W ithout this necessary correction if one proceeds to place to
gether mechanically the self and the other, the cause and the effect, and
thus tries to conceive their relation, one will only incur the errors o f
both these extremes. Having failed to arrive at the right understanding
o f causal relations, to resign oneself to chance is a still greater folly. O f
what thing can there be a production without the necessary causal
factors?22 *
Critical examination: B) The Abhidharnrika; The Abhidhartna analyzes
causal relations in terms o f hetu (causes) and pratyaya (conditions). O f
the latter there are four, the productive, the objective, the immediately
preceding and the decisive.23 In regard to the basic question o f the rela
tion between the cause and the effect, the causal factors that cooperate
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to bring the effect into birth and the product that is thus brought into
birth, hctu and pratyaya stand on the same ground. W hat is sought to
be driven home by means o f criticism is the absurdity involved in con
ceiving that the ultimates o f analysis are ultimates also in reality. Causal
relation stands denied in the case o f those who commit this error and the
doctrine o f elements is an eminent example o f it. The same will be die
result even in the case o f the negativists who cling to the passing away
o f things as their total extinction.
In regard to the condition o f the first kind, the productive, hetu, the
Madhyamika raises the question, what is produced? Is it the existent or
is it the non-existent? The production o f the existent is devoid o f sense,
and the production of the non-existent is impossible; and there is no
third tiling which is both existent and non-existent. So, what is it that;
is produced? In the absence o f anything produced, how can there be
anything called productive?24 In regard to the second kind o f condition,
alatnbana, the object o f cognition, is it the condition o f the existent
cognition or o f the non-existent? Either way condition is inconceivable.
In the one case there is no need for it and in the other case condition is
devoid o f sense.25 In regard to the third kind, satnanantara, the immedi
ately preceding, the condition is said to be extinct before the production
of the thing; but if the condition is thus absolutely extinct (ffliS) how
can it function as a condition?26 It may be added, in the case o f there
being no origination either o f the existent or o f the non-existent,, either
by itself or by an other, how can there be any extinction? In the
absence o f extinction, how does the definition o f the immediately pre
ceding condition hold?
Does the product arise after the extinction o f the condition or before
its extinction? If the product arises after the extinction o f the condition,
that woulcTmean again a negation o f all causal relation between them.
The condition is extinct and hence non-existent and the product has
come into being and is existent. W hat relation can there be between
something completely non-existent and an entity completely existent?
But if the product should arise before the extinction o f the condition,
then the condition and the product would be simultaneous and hence
causally independent.27
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Ag a r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
Everything arises from its own causal factors. Therefore it must not
be held that either there is the product in the causal factors or that there
is not the product, or that there is and is not, or that neither there is nor
there is not the product. (105a)
The causally born is devoid o f substantiality, self-being. The exposi
tion o f the four pratyayas as set forth in the Abhidharma is only what the
beginners learn.
In one's search for (the deeper) truth if one would seize (determi
nate natures as expounded in the Abhidharma as themselves ultimate then
one's clinging in regard to things) would become deep and thus one
would enter into the wrong notions. (297b)
It is in order to destroy this clinging and remove this perversion that
the criticism o f categories is instituted, whereby the absurdities that
would arise from clinging to the ultimates o f analysis as ultimatcs in
reality are exposed.
O n account o f ones misconstruction (Helm) aboiit the true nature of
the four conditions, there arise all such errors. But (if one understands
them) in the light o f the non-clinging sunyata o f the prajnapdramita, then
there will be rjo such error. People in the world take all that they hear
or see, (and even) birth? old age, and death, as real and underived. But
when the nature o f these things is minutely examined (/iffl^KiB) then
these (are found to be) unobtainable. It is therefore that in the prajnaparamitd, only the perverse notions are cancelled, the four pratyayas
(themselves) are not rejected
(297b)
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C.
Motion: Activity
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
the presently moving. Now, o f any one o f these agents motion cannot
be predicated in regard to any one o f these objects.36
It cannot be that the already traversed or the not yet traversed is being
traversed. Since both are alike devoid o f movement, how can move
ment be predicated o f them? The same is the case even with the moving
body, the agent. It cannot be that the not yet moving body moves, nor
that the no longer moving body moves.37
O f the presently moving (agent) or o f the presently being traversed
(locus) also no movement can be predicated. A statement that the
moving body moves or that the presently being traversed object is
traversed involves a duplication o f movement, for in both movement
is predicated o f the moving.38 The duplication when literally clung
to engenders the notion o f there being two separate entities, the moving
body and the movement it makes. The moving body is there as such
in its own right and a movement is predicated o f it. In the case o f dupli
cation o f movement, there being two acts, there should be two agents,
for, every act should have an agent.39 This argument that movement
cannot be predicated o f (any object) whether past, present or future,
holds good also in the case o f the objects o f all types o f activity,
like birth, stay and death, production, destruction and maintenance,
etc.40
Again, to add to the above from the Karika, how can one conceive
the relation between the act and the agent? Are they identical or differ
ent? It cannot be that the act is totally different from the agent.41 Again,
the agent does not cause that very movement by virtue o f which he is
called the agent, nor can he make any movement totally different from
and therefore totally unconnected with himself.42 The statement the
mover moves predicates the movement o f the mover. And in predi
cating a movement o f the mover, either we predicate o f him the same
act o f movement by virtue o f which he bears the name m over, or we
predicate o f him a movement different from that. In the former case,
strictly, there can be no predication, for, if our statement is to be
significant, one thing must be predicated o f another, and o f the same
thing the same thing is not predicated. But if it is a movement separate
from the mover, then how can that be predicated o f him? O n the one
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hand the subject and the predicate are separate, unrelated to each other,
and on the other hand the mover cannot be supposed to have another
movement in addition to that by virtue o f which he bears the name
m over. How can we understand this relation o f movement to the
mover? Neither identity nor difference can be predicated o f them.
When the two cannot be established either by way o f identity or by
way o f difference, what other way is there o f establishing them?43
Again, o f the same agent two different acts cannot be predicated,
e.g., it cannot be that the mover is resting, or that the existent is
extinct.44 It is as absurd to say that the existent is bom as to say
that the existent is extinct. Again, it cannot be that the existent agent
does the existent act, or the non-existent agent does the existent-non
existent act. N or can it be that the non-existent agent does the existent,
the non-existent or the existent-non-existent act. And where is the agent
other than the existent and the non-existent?45
Criticism: B) Birth, decay and death: As in the case o f motion, so even
in the case o f birth etc, it cannot be held that the born is born, nor that
the unborn is born nor even that the born-not-born is bom .40 The ana
lysts conceive that birth, decay and death are all comprised in a unit o f
function and are yet different and so belong to separate essences which
are ultimate and independent.47
If every element for ever rests in its own nature what makes it
rise to function? Again, how is the element related to the function?
And how to explain this relatedness o f functions on the ground o f the
essential separateness o f the basic elements? W hile the analysis o f be
coming into arising and perishing is the intellects way o f representing
it, and while this representation is essential for the appreciation o f the
orderly procedure and the richness and variety o f the conditioned be
coming that constitutes the mundane nature o f things, to seize these
aspects as themselves basic and independent entities and to attempt to
derive the becoming o f things from the putting together o f these
abstract elements now imagined as ultimate is a perversion that is bound
to end in an impasse.
Birth, decay and death are distinguishable aspects in the dynamic
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
not happen to things. If birth is itself one thing and death another,
each mutually opposed to the other and both different from the thing,
how can we conceive the relation o f birth to death and o f bodi to the
thing itself? W hen we cannot sec how a thing arises, how can we
conceive its extinction?
It has been already observed that tilings by themselves cannot come
'to birth nor can it be conceived that certain things are brought into
existence by certain other tilings. And how can we conceive birth
and death to be there except as belonging to something? H ow can this
something be conceived without birth and death?51 Birth and death do
not happen to an absolute being. Again birth and death are not either
totally identical, or utterly different and disconnected. As the Kdrika
puts it,
To him who conceives (absolute) existence in regard to things there
happen the two views o f eternalism and negativism, for the things then
should be either absolutely existent or utterly evanescent.52
But can it not be that existence is a stream o f elements which are
really completely evanescent? In that case, there would happen on the
one hand a complete negation o f causal connection, and on the other,
there would result the position that the thing having been absolutely
existent now becomes totally non-existent. Again, even granting that
there is a causal link, how is the last m oment o f one span o f existence
related to the first moment o f the next? W hether the last moment o f
the preceding span o f existence be conceived as already extinct, or not
yet extinct or being presently extinct, in any case it cannot be related to
the first moment o f the succeeding span o f existence.53
What is denied? Here again the negative criticism is a denial not o f
motion or birth or any other activity but o f the possibility o f under
standing these on the supposition o f the reality and separateness o f the
ultimates o f analysis. It brings to light the truth o f conditioned origina
tion; that is not itself denied.
Speaking o f right deeds, the Sdstra recounts practically all the argu
ments o f the Kdrika (ch. II) and concludes:
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
In this way all deeds are sunya (relative and contingent); and the deeds
(that are done with this understanding) are called the right deeds
3EH). (Thefareron the Great W ay), the bodhisattva, comprehends (A)
the (ultimate) sameness o f all deeds; and he does not take the good deed
as meritorious and the evil deed as devoid o f merit. (For, in the ultimate
truth there is not this distinction o f good and bad.) In the ultimate truth
there are no deeds, good or evil. This is the true prajnd. But this is itself
also the right deed (for it issues in the deed that is done with the right
understanding). . . . Having achieved the true understanding o f deeds,
one neither does deeds nor desists from them (for one is devoid o f
clinging and so one does not consider oneself as the doer o f deeds). And
such a wise man always does the right deeds and never any wrong ones.
This is the right deed o f the bodhisattva.54 (205c)
Rejecting on the one hand the clinging in regard to deeds and, on
the other, the consequent sense o f pride and passion, here is revealed the
true understanding which is the basis of right deeds. The deeds them
selves are not denied.
D.
Beginning and end as absolute concepts: One o f the outcomes o f the dis
cussion on the characters o f compositeness is the impossibility o f con
ceiving any absolute beginning in regard to the course o f birth and death
which is essentially conditioned becoming.
The world, whether o f the constituted being or o f the constituent
elements, is devoid o f beginning (and devoid of end).55 (290c)
To conceive absolute beginning and absolute end in regard to the
course o f existence is to see them as devoid o f conditions, which means
a denial o f causal continuity. Origination would then be uncaused and
extinction, total. This predicament o f beginning and end in fact con
fronts one at every step, in the case of every unit of becoming. In order
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CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
ninglessness in regard to the cycle o f birth and death. But this notion
is false and is based on clinging to identity and difference (*
Actually,
Even as the iunyata o f the composite negates (the clinging to) the
composite things and when the sunyatd o f the composite itself turns out
to be a perversion
(giving rise to a clinging to the
incomposite) then, by means o f the sunyatd (indeterminate nature) o f
the incomposite (the clinging to) the incomposite is also denied
just so, now, by means o f (the idea of) beginninglessness
o f the cycle o f existence the position o f the beginning is denied and
when beginninglessness is itself turned into (an extreme and when it
thus turns out to be itself) a perversion (B), then by means o f the sun
yatd o f beginninglessness, even beginninglessness is denied. This is the
sunyatd o f beginninglessness. (291a)
That all beings revolve in the cycle o f birth and death o f which the
prior end cannot be found was mentioned by the Buddha only to
impress on people the unmeasured length o f the time o f their revolving
in the cycle, so that there m ight arise in them a sense o f disgust (JR&'L>)
in regard to things o f passion and clinging.56 It is not a teaching o f the
ultimate truth (^^ U T ii).67 It is a teaching o f the remedial kind.
W hen one sees things with ones eye o f wisdom then one compre
hends that the individuals and the constituent elements are really com
pletely sunya (conditioned and relative). Hence the teaching o f the
sunyatd o f beginninglessness. (291b)
Beginning and end as relative notions: Although permanence and im
permanence are not absolutely true o f things,
still, the Buddha has often taught that the ideas o f permanence and
pleasure are perverse (#J), while the ideas o f impermanence and suffer
ing are true (1$). This He did because He saw that
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193
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
E.
Time as a substance: The Sdstra makes clear that the wrong views about
the beginning and end o f the course o f existence owe their being to a
lack o f right understanding o f the nature o f the three times:
Some give rise to wrong notions about the three times and make
(unconditional) statements that the individuals and the constituent ele
ments o f the past have an (absolute) beginning or that they do not have
(absolutely) any beginning. (255b)
Even as the wrong view o f the beginning is concerning the past, so
the wrong view o f the end is concerning the future. The one remedy
to these wrong views is the right understanding that all things are es
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
not be the future as this would lead to a confusion o f times. So, if this
view, were right, then there would be no past or future and similarly
there would be no present.62 The holders o f the view that time is a reali
ty would justify the reality o f the past as the necessary condition o f the
present. Thus, e.g., the subtle particles o f earth are the necessary condi
tion o f the birth o f a pot. Granted the reality o f the past, present and
future must be real also. Thus, time should be accepted as a reality.83
Now, granting that the pot is future and the subtle particles o f earth are
past, still the past cannot make the future. For, on this view both the past
and the future should have to be eternal. Again, if the past could make
the future pr if the future could arise from the past, then the past would
be within the future. But then, how could it be called the past? So,
even the past would then have to be denied.84
Do past, present and future always exist? An objector like the Abhidharmika might argue:
How can it be that there is no time? Time must be accepted (as a
reality). The present has the character o f presentness, the past has the
character o f pastness and the future has the character o f futurity.85
(65c)
To this, the Sastra replies:
But if it is held that all the three time-divisions have (already, even
now) their respective characters, then all o f them must be equally just
present
Then there would not be any past or future. If
the future is here even now ( i r ^ i f ^ f c ) then it is just present and not
future. (It should not be the not yet come. It should be the already
come). (65c)
But can it not be that while the past and the future do not function
in the present, the past functioned in the past and the future will func
tion in the future, that although all these have their respective charac
ters even now, still every element has its own time o f functioning?66
The Sastra replies:
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Now , either the past is past or it is not. If the past is past (infiiiai),
then it is already extinct, and if it is not past
then it has
not the character o f pastness. But why? Because it has given up its own
character (of pastness). The same is the'case with the future. (None o f
these can be said to have any own nature or self-being.) Therefore time
itself is not a substance, not a reality (ff#i^Jf). And how can it bring to
birth all things, the beautiful and the ugly, flower and fruit? (65c)
Time as a derived notion: The. denial o f time as a substance is not a total
denial o f time but is a revelation o f time as a derived notion. As a means
o f referring to the course o f events time is essential in the everyday
world. The Sastra says,
If there were absolutely no past or future, if there were only the pres
ent lasting for a moment, then even the Buddha could not have striven
in the path and achieved the immeasurable merits (which He did indeed
achieve). . . . So it must be known that the past and the future arc
there indeed. (254c)
But the statement that the past and the future are there does not mean
that all the three times are just present. To those who hold that view,
the objection may be raised that if past, present and future aze all ex
istent what is non-existent? Has not the Buddha caught that there are
the four Noble Ttuths? Is not the truth o f suffering (duhkha) the
foremost among them? And is not the cultivation o f the truth o f imper
manence the foremost factor in the cultivation o f the first Noble Truth?
If the past, which is truly the not any more existent is also existent as
well as the present, then, surely, the past cannot any more be said to be
impermanent, lost, impossible to obtain?07 Again, to hold that a thing
is existent in all the three times, arid that in passing from one state to
another it has ever remained as it was, and is not lost, would be to fall
into the wrong notion o f eternalism.68 Then,
This tiling which is there really in the future would pass from there
and enter the present and pass from there and enter the past even as a
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
person, for example, passes from one room to another and in this move
ment he is not said to be himself lost. (254c)
But what is wrong if the thing is not lost in this passage from future
to present and from present to past?
That in this passage the thing is not lost means that it ever remains
self-identical which means that it is not impermanent. A denial o f im
permanence would amount to a denial o f birth and death, o f sin and
merit and o f bondage and liberation. (254c)
But these objections do not arise in the case o f those who accept time
as a derived notion. So the Sastra observes that all the three periods o f
time do have their respective characters. The past has the character o f
pastness, the future has the character o f futurity, the present has the
character o f presentness. The difficulties urged occur only if one holds
that past and future have the character o f being present. But now, past
and future have each its own character (# ^ + 0 ) but not the character
o f being present.69
That the past and the future are equally present would be to end in
eternalism, while that they are absolutely non-existent
would
be to end in negativism. To hold that past and future are absolutely
non-existent Would be to deny causal continuity, which would render
impossible the cultivation o f moral life. If one is at the present moment
dwelling in evil thought; and if all the moral w orth that one has
achieved from past deeds is now totally extinct, then one cannot now
be considered as a wayfarer in dharma.70 Again, on this supposition o f
total non-existence o f past and future if the mind o f a sage were at
any time directed to worldly activities, then at that time he would be
simply and wholly a common man, for all his former cultivation o f the
way would be completely non-existent now. Similarly, there would
be no committing o f the five deadly sins, nor would there be any culti
vation o f moral worth. This indeed is a perverse notion.71
The Sdstra continues,
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W e do not say that past and future are there in the same way in
which the present is said to be ( Q
we say that although the
past object is not any more existent, still it can be revived in memory
(pJ^fS) (consequently) giving rise to the mental states. For example,
the fire o f yesterday (is certainly not here now), it is extinct; (still) its
impressions can be revived in memory '(^T^tS^). Just because the
thought (of the fire o f yesterday) is (now) in mind, revived through
memory, it cannot be held that the fire itself is here. Similarly, seeing
the bundle o f firewood one anticipates the fire o f the future ( u # # ^ ),
which also gives rise to the thought o f the fire o f tomorrow. As in the
case o f (the thought of) yesterdays fire so in the case o f the fire of
tomorrow, the presence o f the thought of fire does not mean the actual
presence o f the fire itself. (255a)
Although the present mind does not endure even for a moment,
still, as the stream (of the moments o f thought) arises in continuity the
mind can know things. W ith the present (moment of) citta, the mind,
the internal element, as the hetu (the cause) and with the external object
as the pratyaya (the condition) there arises the internal unifying cogni
tion (lit. m ind-cognition); by means o f this internal unifying cognition
one can freely know all things, past, present and future. (255a)
It is in this way that the Buddha is said to know all things past, pres
ent and future without any impediment. This is a mundane truth and
should not be mistaken to stand for the ultimate truth. The knowledge
o f the past, present and future is pertinent, but pertinent only to the
world o f the determinate. In the ultimate truth there is neither past nor
present nor future. In reference to the ultimate truth o f things it has
been said that all the three times are o f one nature, viz., devoid o f any
specific nature.72
The astra observes that it is precisely in order to remove the w rong
notion o f etemalism in regard to time that the Buddha has used the
word samaya and not kala for time.72*
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A g a r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
F.
Spatial directions (dik) as realities: It has been already noted above that
spatial distinctions are o f the same nature as temporal ones with regard
to being derived names, relational concepts, and not standing for sub
stantial entities. There is not any substance called east or west, even as
there is not any substance called long or short, past or present. East and
west are references to the ways in which the actual entities or events
stand related to one another in the complexes they constitute. And yet
the way in which the analysts would conceive things lends itself to the
position that east and west, as well as long and short, or even past, pres
200
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
ent and future are substantial entities which for ever remain in them
selves and yet by associating with things give to them spatial and tem
poral distinctions.
Thus some would urge that dik is a reality (dravya), that it is*eternal
and has its own characters (Wffi)J* They would urge:
As (our) Sutra would have it, the direction in which the sun rises is
the east and that in which the sun sets is the west, the direction where
the sun travels (0 ffj# ) is the south and that where the sun does not
move (0
is the north. The sun has contact with three parts (0
viz., before, now and after: The order in its contact with the
parts depends on the direction (IStif P # ) . Its first contact is with the
east, (the next contact is with the south, and the last contact is with the
west). No part (of the sun) is in contact with that dik (viz., the north)
in which it does not move (0
(Again) this divides from
that, that divides from this (Mlfclfcffl&)this is the character o f dik.
If there is no dik there is neither this nor that. (Division of) this
and that is the (essential) character o f dik ( i t i ( 1 3 3 b )
T o this the Sdstra replies:
N ow , this is not correct. Sutm ru is in the middle o f the four regions
(0Ai). The sun turns around Sumeru and illumines all the worlds every
where. . . . There is no absolute first (touch to the sun) anywhere
(&Jf$S#J). W hy? Every direction can be east or south, west or north
(in reference to the specific sphere o f reference).78 (i33b-c)
The Vaiiejikas say that the direction in which the sun rises is the east
etc. without any reference to any world. The $dstra observes that it can
not be maintained that there is any direction unconditionally fixed as
east or south or west, for each world will have its own east and its own
west. Again, the Vaisesikas say that the direction in which the sun has
no contact is the north; but on this score, the Sdstra observes, they can
not call it a dik, for* it has not the character o f contact with the sun.77
But here the Vaiseikas would argue that they have mentioned the
characters o f dik in reference only to one country, whereas the critic
takes it as referring to the countries on all the four sides and brings an
201
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
objection, while according to them it does hold that the east has indeed
the first contact.78 On this the Sdstra stresses another point, viz., that
even if in one country the sun has its contact with the east, this means
that the dik ends (WiS) at the point where the sun begins. So having an
end, dik would not be all-pervasive and could not be permanent. There
fore dik is only a name, a mode o f reference and not any eternal sub
stance.79
Spatial directions as derived names: As modes o f reference spatial direc
tions are in fact held to be supremely important and are called the
great.
(Dik is called great in the mundane truth) because it is endless, it is
everywhere, it pervades all that is material, it is everlasting (^''fr) and
it benefits the whole world saving people from getting lost in con
fusion.80 (288a)
But this does not mean that dik is any thing-in-itself. Dik is a derived
notion. In the system o f thevcomposite material entities there hold the
distinctions o f this side and that side and it is from these distinctions
that the notion o f direction is derived. It is a derived name.
(In the world by common consent) the direction in which the sun
rises is (called) the east, and that in which the sun sets is called the west.
This is the character o f dik. Dik naturally lasts for ever (
). There
fore it is not any specific entity causally produced. It is not any specific
entity that was not before but is present now and will cease to be later;
therefore it is not anything made. It is not perceptible by the senses
fl) and therefore it is most subtle. (288a-b)
Still, it is not anything ultimately real.
It is admitted only in the mundane truth. In the ultimate truth it is
denied. (288b)
And here there is no question o f falling into the errors o f eternalism
and negativism. For,
202
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
Dik is admitted in the mundane truth (as a derived name) and there
fore there is no falling into negativism, and it is denied in the ultimate
truth and therefore there is no falling into etemalism. (288b)
Clinging to the specific as absolute would create in regard to the
spatial and temporal divisions the wrong notions o f absolute end and
absolute devoidness o f end, leading to the errors o f negativism and
etemalism. The Sdstra observes that this would lead the wayfarer to a
total abandoning o f the attitude o f unbounded love and service for all.
Suppose the wayfarer traverses helping people o f one nation, in one
direction, say, in the east, and takes up another in the same direction and
thus continues to traverse country after country, in one and the same
direction, helping all with his merciful heart. N ow if he should give
rise to the notion that the direction as well as his faring in it are absolute
ly endless, then he m ight give rise to the false notion o f absolute endless
ness, i.e., etemalism; and if he would think that the direction and his
faring in it are exhausted, then he would be a victim to the false notion
o f absolute end, i.e., negativism. W ith the rise o f these two kinds o f
wrong notions his loving heart would not be there any more. But
through the iunyatd o f dik, if he would reject his clinging to directions
then there would not be these wrong notions o f absolute end and
absolute endlessness.81
For example, in the great ocean, at the time o f tide the water reaches
the never-ending banks and then returns. And if the fish (that is thrown
out in the tide) would not return to the ocean (along with the water
flowing back) then it would have to be tossing about on the moist earth
(SiESSifi) and would be subject to all pain and confusion. But if the
fish is wise it will return to the ocean along with the water, and will
for ever be in peace and security. The same is the case with the wayfarer.
If he will not return along w ith his mind (to sunyata) then he will be
tossed about in perversion. But if he will return along with his mind
(to sunyata), then he will not lose his heart o f love. This way the great
perversions about dik are removed in this sunyata o f dik. Hence the name
great. (288b)
203
NGRJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CRITICISM OF CATEGORIES
NAGXftjUNAS
p h il o s o p h y
and so in it there is no scope for any quality at all. Apart from the
qualified and the not qualified, there is no (third) thing in which the
quality can inhere.958 (549a)
Further, there is nothing absolutely fixed
as the qualifier and
the qualified.96 That which is the qualifier in one situation can itself be
the qualified in another and vice versa. Again, it is only in relation to
the qualified (substance) that there is the qualifier and it is only in rela
tion to the qualifier that there is the qualified.97
Again, between substance and quality there cannot be any conceiva
ble relation o f priority or posteriority. Between the two, which comes
earlier and which, later? W hich o f them is found prior to the other de
pending on which the other can come into existence? Could the charac
ter be prior (5fcifiE) and hence existent even when there is not the sub
stance? O r could the thing be prior to quality (ifc^T#?#!)? Either way
the fact that quality and substance are correlative is ignored.98 Could
they be simultaneous? Then, as the iCIr/feJ points out, they should be
independent o f each other.988 Further, it is only having found that sub
stance and attribute could not be established as separate, that one enter
tains the idea o f their togetherness. N ow , in order to pr6ve their to
getherness their separateness is desired. As their separateness has not
been proved, their togetherness is also not.proved. Moreover, how can
they be together, if they are separate? Between substance and attribute
there can bd neither togetherness nor separateness.90
Starting with the completely isolated, self-contained elements, to
suppose that they later get related is to fail to provide a basis for their
relation. Moreover, even the one substance/ which is to provide the
basis for the relation o f the many attributes, itself becomes reduced
to one o f the many, and stands itself as much in need o f a relating princi
ple as the many attributes themselves. That way neither substance ndr
attribute can be established. And there being neither substance nor
attributes, there cannot also be anything existent. In the absence o f
anything existent, there is also nothing non-existent, and there is also
no one who would cognize these.100 This is the impasse that results
from the supposition that substance and quality are things in themselves.
208
CH A P TE R
V III
TH E W O R LD A N D TH E IN D IV ID U A L
Section
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
that because the visible matter which is gross is itself the earth and has
hardness for its character therefore it must have been matter derived
from the basic element of earth
which is the element of hardness,
then, the visible matter has in it the characters o f moisture and heat too,
which should, according to the Abhidharmika, properly belong to the
basic elements o f water and fire.4
But here the Abhidharmika would say that these four basic elements
are not apart from one another; in the derived earth there is not only
the basic element o f earth but there are also the basic elements o f water,
fire and wind. Similarly in each o f the other derived forms o f physical
elements also all the four basic elements are found. Only in earth, the
earthy element is more and therefore it is called earth. The same is the
case with the other elements too.
But how can he maintain this?
If, e.g., in fire all the four basic elements are present, then all o f them
should be o f the nature o f heat. For, there is nothing in fire that is not
hot. But if the other three elements are there in fire and yet are not hot,
they are not called fire. But if they are not there, then you should admit
that these elements give up their selfinature, and the entire thing is called
fire. (194c)
Suppose the Abhidharmika would say that these three are there as
such, but they are too subtle to be perceived
Then they are
as good as not being there
for we have no ground to speak
o f them as being there.5
It is only if anything is obtained in its gross state then we can reason
back to their subtle state (even when unperceived). But if the thing is
not perceived in the gross state, there is no way o f knowing that it is
there in the subtle state
(i94c-i95a)
NGRJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
not hold. All things, physical or mental; gross or subtle are alike nya.
Non-ultimacy of atomic elements: But is it necessary that everything
should exist by only depending on the cooperation o f causal factors?
How about the atomic elements? They are most subde and are therefore
indivisible. Being indivisible they cannot be said to be the results o f the
combination o f causal factors. O f the gross things it can be said that they
are produced and destroyed; but how can the atoms which are indivisi
ble be produced and destroyed?6
Here the Sastra replies that there is not anything absolutely fixed as
the subtlest ; the name has been simply imposed on certain things.
Gross and subde are relative denominations. It is only depending on the
gross that there is the subde. Moreover, the things that one takes to be
subde would admit o f even further analysis into still subder elements
(in the light o f which the former would be gross).7 The subdest, the
atomic element, is a purely conceptual limit which is significant not
in itself, but only in relation to the gross.
Further, if the subde elements are physical, then they are not indivisi
ble (atomic), and if they are indivisible they would lack the character
o f being physical as they would not have the spatial divisions.8 Again,
the subde physical elements must have in them as much share o f color
as o f taste, smell and touch. If they have these, then they are not indivisi
ble, but if they do not have these, then they lack these* qualities. The
divisible is not eternal and the eternal (indivisible) is not physical. The
Sastra observes, in truth as the Sutra says, W hether gross or subtle,
internal or external, rpa is found on examination to be devoid o f per
manence and self-being. 9
Some may say that they do not admit o f the subtle eternal entities
called atoms; they just take the visible form as rpa which is there de
finitely and undeniably. How can this be analysed and demonstrated as
snydi10 The Sastra says:
Now , even if you do not accept atoms (as subde, eternal entities),
still, the visible rpa that is bom out o f the togetherness o f the four basic
elements is also a derived name. For example, when the wind blows the
214
water all over the four sides, there arises the ball o f foam (which is not
anything substantial). This is the case even with the rupa that is bom o f
the four basic elements.11 (292a)
If the four basic elements are scattered apart (teWt) there is nothing
like the physical object o f sight. For, in the case o f the exclusion o f all
elements, smell etc., there is no separate physical, entity as such.12
W hen by means o f understanding one analyses everything into its
component elements, then, one finds that rupa (fe) the physical entity
is unobtainable as anything substantial. If rupa were a substantial selfexistent entity (JC#) then even apart from all these elements there
should be a separate entity called rupa, but (actually) there is no such
separate entity. Therefore the Sutra says, W hatever rupa is there, all
that arises from the cooperation o f the four basic elem ents/ As it arises
from the cooperation o f several causal factors, it is all a derived name.
Being a derived name, it can be analysed and scattered (and known to
be composite and therefore iintya, non-substantial).18 (292a)
Further, it may be recalled that the fret that there are names for things
should not be taken as the ground for their substantiality. W hile signifi
cant names suggest the possibility o f the objects which they stand for
they do not necessarily mean that they are substantial; to suppose that
they do so is to fall into the error o f etemalism.
The mental elements: Experience and the object of experience: Further,
objects o f experience have no being isolated or disconnected from the
experiencing o f them; these are inseparable correlatives. An exclusive
emphasis on either o f them would be only a falsification.
Take, for example, the hardness o f earth. Hardness is there only as
(an object o f experience) perceived by the sense o f touch (#<S#Sfc) (and
interpreted by the sense o f manas). If it is not an object o f the experience
o f touch, then there is no (possibility) o f (knowing that there is such
a thing as) hardness at all. (171a)
215
X g a r j u n a s PHILOSOPHY
216
II
T H E N O T I O N O F SELF AS A S U B S T A N T I A L
E N T IT Y (SOUL)
The notion of self as a substantial entity (soul): Prom pted by the sense o f
I, under ignorance one imputes unconditionedness to the conditioned,
imagines permanence in regard to the impermanent, and clings to the
composite entity as incomposite and simple. Hence the false notion o f a
particular yet permanent entity called soul, in regard to what is only
a composite organism o f conditioned events.161 The soul is held to be
specific, one o f the many, and is yet imagined to be permanent and non
relational, individual and yet an eternal substance. In addition to the
inherent incongruity o f an imagination o f this kind, there is a further in
congruity in that it makes the individual unrelated to die organic,
dynamic course o f personal life and deprives the latter o f all significance.
The imagination is spurious; it is linked at its root w ith the notion o f
the ultimacy o f difference. W hat it amounts to is the etemality o f the
divided. TheVaisesikas as pluralists hold this. The Jainas and Sankhyas,
although tending to denying the ultimacy o f difference in epistemology
and ontology respectively, still hold to the plurality o f the individual
souls. Thus they all hold a position which is inherendy unstable.
The Buddhists who think that self is a substance: O f the Buddhists, some
seem to have entertained this notion o f self or person as a simple, eternal,
substance.16 The Sarvastivadins deny the reality o f self or person; but
in their denial they swing to the other extreme o f denying personality
altogether, thus tending, on the one hand, to a mechanistic conception
o f personality and, on the other, to a plurality o f ultimate elements.
Here again extremes meet. A total assertion o f personality and a total
denial o f personality alike result in a purely mechanistic view o f life;
both alike fail to provide adequate ground for the purposefulness o f
life and the dynamic, organic nature o f personality.
To such o f the Buddhists who tend to hold the view that apart from
217
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
(I) Is soul as the basis of the distinction o fself and other ? As regards the
sense o f self and the sense o f other, the Sdstra draws attention to
their correlativity as references and observes that there is no rigidness
even in regard to their spheres o f reference. N o rigid line could be drawn
between self and other. W hat is referred to as self at one time
or in a certain context may be the other (or not-self) at another time
or in another context so that this question as to why the sense o f I
should not arise in reference to another person could be met with a
counter question: If in reference only to another person one holds the
sense o f I
Then, why does this sense not arise in the case o f ones own person?
(148b)
Further, this question is based on a supposition o f an absolute dis
tinction between self and other, which again presupposes an absolute
entity called soul
as the object o f the reference o f
self conceived as independent o f and separate from the other. But
it is this very existence o f the soul (if) as a separate entity that is in
question; when this is itself not settled, how could the further point o f
the absolute distinctness o f self and other be based on it?
This is like the question being asked about the nature o f the hares
horn and the reply being given that it resembles the horn o f the horse.
(148b)
Further, the objection, why the sense o f I is not bom for one in
reference to another, is relevant to the position o f the soul-theorist and
not o f the Madhyamika. Because, the soul-theorist holds that the soul
is all-pervasive and so, there should arise for one the sense o f I even
in reference to another. The Sdstra observes that actually there are per
sons who do give rise to the sense o f self even in reference to other
persons as well as in reference to what is usually considered as not-self
219
NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
(III)
Has soul any definite nature? Moreover, o f this soul that these
people imagine as the definite object o f the notion o f I, truly, no de
finite nature can be found. It cannot be held that the soul is absolutely
permanent or that it is absolutely impermanent, that it is completely
self-possessed or utterly devoid o f self-possession, that it is something
material or immaterial, etc.
A definite substantial entity must have its own definite nature; a
thing devoid o f nature is (as good as) non-existent. If the soul is devoid
o f all nature, it is as good as non-existent.22 (149a)
The soul, for instance, cannot be held to be eternal; if it were eternal,
it should be devoid o f death and rebirth; a person should not then be
conceived as possible o f being killed. An eternal and all-pervasive entity
such as soul should not be conceived again as transmigrating, for it
should for ever be existent everywhere. So how can there happen birth
or death to it? Does not death mean leaving this sphere, and birth,
emerging in another? Again, such an eternal soul should be devoid o f
the experience o f pleasure and pain. If the soul became sad with the
approach o f pain and glad with the approach o f pleasure, then it should
not be beyond change, and hence not eternal. The soul that is eternal
and all-pervasive should be like dkasa which the rains cannot wet and
the sun cannot dry; it should then be devoid o f the distinctions o f this
world and the other world; it should not be that it dies here and emerges
there. Again, if the sopl were eternal, then the sense o f I should also
be for ever there, and there should then be no way o f becoming free
from it. Again, if there were an eternal soul, as these people conceive,
then there should be no question o f forgetting anything. Only because
there is no such eternal soul, and because vijndna, the principle o f intel
lection, is not a permanent entity, therefore there is the forgetting o f
things. So it cannot be held that there is any such real, substantial, per
manent (i) entity called soul. It cannot also be that the person is as
such eternal.23
But can the soul (i$) be evanescent (i ^ ), or even as impermanent
as the ever perishing skandhas? To imagine that the self is evanescent is
221
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
body it receives. A t the time o f death, so they hold, the soul is the first
to go out o f the body. But these views are not proper. For, anything that
has a shape and is physical is made o f the four fundamental physical
elements and is causally bom and is not therefore anything permanent
or substantial.26 To imagine on the contrary that the person is utterly
impermanent is to entertain the error o f negativism.
(IV)
Is soul the subtle body? Some distinguish between two kinds
o f body, gross and subtle, and say that while the gross body (& # ) is
impermanent, the subtle body
is the same as the soul and that
in every span o f life, the subtle body emerges out o f one gross body and
enters into another, thus revolving in the five states o f existence.26 The
Sastra observes that, first o f all, such a subtle body cannot be found
anywhere.
Suppose there is the subtle body as you imagine; it should have a
location; actually whether in the five kolas or in the four bodies
0Sfi), searching everywhere no (such) subtle body can be found (which
can answer to the notion o f soul).2fla (149b)
But these people say that the subtle body is too subtle to be seen; at
the time o f death it will have already left the previous habitation, and
when alive one cannot find it by searching for it. So how can one see
it? Moreover this subtle body is not an object o f the five physical senses;
only the sages with extraordinary powers can see it. To this the Sastra
replies that a thing which is not an object o f experience is as good as
non-existent. Further one can add that anything that is a body is
impermanent and non-substantial. The Sastra observes that in fact what
these people are speaking o f as subtle body (&0#) is simply the complex
o f the subtle skandhas o f the intermediary state ( 4^ ) , i.e., the state be
tween death and rebirth.27 The physical element, whether internal or
external, subtle or gross, is all impermanent, subject to birth and death.
It is not any real substantial entity.28
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
skandhasj and on the other, there are the incomposite elements. The
mental elements are subject to birth and death; they do not endure even
for a m om ent; they owe their being to causes and conditions and are
not self-possessed. So these cannot answer to their notion o f soul. O f
the incomposite also there is nothing that can answer to their notion o f
soul, for the incomposite is not anything that could be seized as T*
or mine. 20
In this way between heaven and earth, inside or outside, in any o f
the three times or any o f the ten directions, searching for the soul, one
can not find it
(149c)
(V)
Is soul an object of inference? The existence o f soul cannot even be
inferred as there are no characteristic signs o f its own by which it can
be inferred. Anything known as existent is known by virtue o f its
characteristic sign
Seeing the smoke and feeling the heat,
one can know that there is fire. As there are different kinds o f senseobjects one can know that there must be the different senses to perceive
them. By reason o f the different activities o f considering and under
standing things, one can know that there are the mind and the mental
states. But the soul is devoid o f characters and how can it be known that
it exists?80
The soul-theorists argue: Are there not breathings in and out (ffJA
&)? Can they not serve as the marks o f soul? Again, the opening and
closing o f the eyes (iSNu), the duration o f life
the different states
o f mind like the feeling o f pain and pleasure, love and hatred, and effort,
all these can serve as the marks o f soul (ikffcfS).31 If there is no soul who
has all these? Therefore it should be known that inside the body there
is the soul. Because the soul impels from within, the vital principle
functions. It is the soul that directs and puts into action even the mind;
w ithout a soul it would be like an ox without a driver. If there is no soul
who directs the mind? It is the soul that experiences pleasure and pain.
Devoid o f soul, the body would just be like wood, without the capacity
to distinguish things. Although the soul is subtle and cannot therefore
be cognized through the five senses, still through these signs o f soul one
224
W ORLD A ND INDIVIDUAL
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
Is soul the necessary condition of deeds and moral responsibility? The third
point o f the substantialists is that in the absence o f a permanent soul, as
the present element o f vijnana becomes extinct at the time o f the termi
nation o f the present span o f life, the deeds done here would all be lost,
for there would be none to follow them and receive their results. W ho
follows the deeds and who receives the results? W ho is the receiver o f
pain and pleasure? W ho realizes freedom?413
To this the Sdstra replies that when the true way has not yet been
realized by one
), as one's mind is covered up with klesa, one
does deeds which breed for one the next span o f life. At the time o f ones
death, in continuity with the five skandhas o f the present span o f life,
there arises the complex o f the five skandhas o f the next span o f life. This
is like one lamp lighting another. This is again comparable to the birth
o f the sprout from the seed. Now the birth o f the sprout from the seed
requires three conditions: soil, water, and seed. Just the same is the case
even with the birth o f the next span o f life from the present one; there
is the body, there are the defiled deeds and there are the factors of
bondage ($q{) like greed etc.; and out of the cooperation o f these three
conditions there arises the next body. O f these three, the body that is
already there and the deeds that are already done cannot be destroyed or
229
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
abandoned. But there remain the factors o f bondage, and these alone
can be terminated
Although when these are terminated,
the body and the deeds may continue, still one can realize freedom
from the cycle o f birth and death. This is like the sprouts not arising .in
the absence o f water although the soil and the seeds are there.42 And so
even without the need to suppose a soul it can still be shown how the
realization o f freedom is possible.
Bondage is through ignorance and freedom is through kowledge;
the soul (that you imagine) is useless here
(150a)
N ot that there is no person that becomes bound or becomes free.
There is no such soul as the substantialists imagine. In truth, it is the
complex o f bodily and mental elements that is derivedly called the per
son. T he ignorant is bound by the bonds o f greed, hatred and stupidity.
But when one realizes the claws (/ft) o f the undefiled wisdom one
tears off (fl?) all these bonds; then one is said to have become free. It
is like the tying ($3) and the untying ($?) o f the rope. The rope itself
is the knot; the knot is not something apart from the rope. Still in the
world, one speaks o f the knotting and the unknotdng o f the rope. The
same is the case with nama and rupa, the bodily and mental elements.
It is the complex o f bodily and mental elements that is derivedly called
the person; the bondage and the body-mind complex are not two sepa
rate things. It is only in name that the body-mind complex is said to
become bound or become free. (150a)
In common discourse there is the talk o f bondage o f person and free
dom o f person. But this should not lead one to imagine that there is
an eternal substantial, separate entity that becomes bound and becomes
free and remains all the time unaffected in essence either by bondage
or by freedom. Just the same is the case even with the receiving o f the
results o f good and evil deeds. Although there i* not any single self
identical entity called soul, still with regard to the composite entity,
viz., the body-mind, there is the receiving o f the results o f deeds,
230
good and bad. Still, in the world we say that the person receives them.
Hence there is the imagination that there is a separate substantial entity
called soul. This is again like the cart containing the load (W ^ ). There
is no real, substantial entity called cart apart from and independent
o f its different parts. All the same the cart gets the name o f contain
ing the load. This is just the case with the person receiving the fruits o f
sin and merit.43 W hat receives merit and sin is the body-mind com
plex, and this is referred to by the derived name, person. Here it is the
unwary that is led to wrong notions.
Section
III
T H E C O U R S E O F P E R S O N A L LIFE
A
Person as an organism
(I) Person as an organism: There is no denial here o f the fact that the
person does deeds and receives the results, good or bad.44 The deeds
are in fact what the self, the self-conscious person, brings to birth as his
very way o f giving expression to his potencies and aspirations; the deeds
constitute his very being. But in regard to this, the soul that the substantialists imagine is o f no use. O n the contrary it would make the per
son altogether unrelated to his deeds and his relation to them becomes
a mystery.
As the subject, the person is the self-conscious, self-determining prin
ciple. He works out a career for himself under the stress o f the sense o f
the unconditioned. He is conditioned by the forces dormant in him.
He confronts an objective reality which he perceives, understands and
interprets. He works out for himself an organic system o f events which
is to give expression to the basic urge in him, and he identifies himself
with it. As identical with it, the person is an organism, and personality
is an organization, a way o f being.
(II) The organism and the constituent events: Between oneself and the
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system o f events that one gives rise to, the two aspects o f the integral
course o f personal life, there cannot be any description in terms o f
absolute identity or absolute difference;45 one would reduce the self
to the terms o f its own creations and the other would make it alien to
the expressions o f its very being. The self is not just the skandhas, the
bodily and mental elements themselves put together; the person is one
and integral, whereas the skandhas are distinct and five, many.
One is not five and five is not one.46 (369a)
The person continues while the specific elements arise and perish
every moment. If the person also perished along with the perishing
skandhas, then he would be as good as just grass or wood, arising and
dying automatically. He would just be an automaton, without any o f
the implications o f selfhood. In that case personal identity and moral
obligation would be devoid o f sense. Again, the view that the person
is completely apart from the skandhas, which is the substantialist view,
commits all the errors o f etemalism. This would be practically to de
prive the course o f personal life o f all its significance, denying the
purposiveness o f life, denying causal continuity and denying ones con
nection w ith ones deeds.47
The Kdrika compares the person to the fire and the skandhas to the
fuel, in order to illustrate the nature o f the relation between them.48 If
the fire is absolutely the same as the fuel, the agent and the object would
be one and the same; if they are absolutely different, the one would
be independent o f the other. Having started w ith the notion o f their
separateness, it is futile to try to establish their relation as mutual de
pendence. The relation between them is inconceivable in absolute terms.
Just the same is the case with self and its constituentsthere can be no
unconditional description o f the relation between them.49
But this is not to deny either the self or its constituents. Even with
regard to the relation between them, it is always possible to make rela
tive statements from specific standpoints, in a non-clinging way. Person
ality is not only admitted in the mundane truth, but is essential there.
Being essentially conditioned, the individual owes his being to the
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constitute and the forces that condition the course o f personal life, by
giving up ones clinging to the extremes o f existence and non-existence*
The astra says:
Free from these two extremes o f existence and non-existence to dwell
in the Middle W ay, this is the universal truth. The universal truth is
itself the Buddha. For it is by virtue o f ones realizing the universal
truth that one is said to have attained Buddhahood. (747a)
Even the Buddha is not an exception to the mundane truth that indi
viduality is a conditioned being and is derivedly named.
All the virtues o f the roots o f merit that the Buddha sowed from the
start o f His m ind on the W ay are the sources o f His bodily features.
Even His body is not anything substantial and self-contained; all (that
is found there) belongs to the original causes and conditions; all o f that
has come into being as the result o f (His) deeds. Although these causal
factors (and their results) stay for long in the world, still by nature they
are composite (and conditioned) and so even these should return finally
to impermanence (or extinction). W hen these constituent factors o f
the Buddhas body are dispersed and destroyed, it is no more there.
This is like the arrow shot into the sky by a skilful archer; although the
arrow would reach a long distance, still it has to fall to the ground. This
is just the case with the Buddhas body; although it is brilliant with all
the features and subfeatures, although the merits He achieved (are
innumerable) His name and fame are limitless, and the number o f
people He saved are beyond measure, still even His body had to return
to extinction. (747b)
Is the Buddha existent or non-existent after passing away? Thoughts
such as these do not fit in the case o f Him, who is by nature iiinya. This
remark holds good both in the case o f the mundane and the ultimate
nature o f the Tathagata. The Buddha as a person is not any uncondi
tioned being. Buddhahood is an essentially conditioned, continuous
234
course o f personal life albeit the liighest, the purest, and the best. In His
ultimate nature the Buddha is the unconditioned reality itself.
The Tathagata is the (ultimate) dharma devoid o f birth and death;
how could one seek to know His (ultimate) nature through the prapafica
(jfc!w) (conceptual constructions) (of is and is not )? If one seeks
(to see) the Tathagata through prapafica then one will not see Him.
But if by this one should hold that there is no Tathagata at all, then one
would fall (again) into perversion. Therefore it is not proper to seek
(to see) the Tathagata through the prapafica o f is and is not.
W hatever is the nature o f Tathagata is also the nature o f all things;
whatever is the nature o f all things is also the nature o f Tathagata. The
nature o f the Tathagata is complete sunyatd; that is also the nature o f all
things.51 (455a)
B.
Cycle of Life
The cycle of the life of the ignorant : O f the course o f life that the igno
rant live the root is ignorance, while o f the life that the wise live the root
is wisdom ; and o f both, in fact, o f all things, the ultimate root is dharmatd, which functions in the mundane truth as the ground and the order
o f the course o f all things and is itself, in the ultimate truth, the universal
reality, the Nirvana. That there is orderliness in the course o f things
holds good in every case o f becoming. Conditioned becoming is the
very way in which there happen the cultivation o f the way to freedom
as well as the course o f life in bondage, even as concepts, words, are
the very means as much for the teaching o f the non-contentious way
as for clinging, contention and quarrel. W hat makes the difference is
the continuation or the extinction o f the perverting force o f ignorance.
Under ignorance people seize the determinate as itself the ultimate
and cling to things. Thus they give rise to passion and do deeds that lead
them to the diverse states o f existence. O ut o f their own deeds they
suffer all kinds o f pain. They do not know this truth. Having them
selves given rise to things they themselves cling to them.52
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
, Links in the cycle of the life of the ignorant: (I) Birth as the condition oj
old age and death: The bodhisattva who helps all to terminate the root of
suffering should analyse and investigate the forces that operate in the life
o f the ignorant and trace them to their root. Searching for the root of
pain ( ^ r H i ^ ) , he understands that jati birth or (clinging to) embodi
ment is its root (S ifc).53 As the Buddha has taught in His teaching
o f the twelve links, it is owing to birth or (clinging to) embodiment
that there come into being the factors o f old age, disease and death.
Common people do not know that it is from birth that one suffers
pain. W hen they meet with a painful situation they simply get enraged
and hate (other) people; they do not hold themselves responsible for it.
At the outset they do not reprove birth (which is truly the source o f
pain). Therefore they only increase the factors that bind them; they
multiply (reinforce and enhance) the conditions o f birth. (The com
mon people) do not know the true origin o f suffering. (696a)
(II) The tendency for embodiment as the condition of birth: The bodhi
sattva pursues his enquiry further to find the reason for ones birth in
the life o f bondage (iitfidfe E3^ ) . He finds that the reason for birth is
hhava (W) the tending to become. This tending is for embodiment in
one o f the three worlds (dhatu), the sensuous world, the world o f fine
matter and the incorporeal or immaterial world. (Tending towards and)
clinging to ( i ) life, embodiment or becoming in one o f these three
spheres, one gives rise to deeds, good and evil.54 It is this tending, this
inclining towards the kinds o f embodiment that is the source o f birth
in bondage.
(III) Craving and clinging: But what is the origin o f bhava, this
tending to become?
The origin o f bhava is the upadana (seizing) o f four kinds (PHftBx),
and the source o f upadana is klesa headed by trsna ^X^fSiiSISa).55 (696B)
The Sdstra makes out that it is one and the same element that is called
236
craving as well as seizing; when subtle ('b) and still unable to produce
deeds it is called craving (trsna) while when developed (ifiit) and able
to produce deeds, it is called seizing (Bx) (upadana). The four kinds of
seizing are, seizing the objects o f sense-desire, seizing views, seizing mere
moralism and seizing the I under the wrong notion that the individual
self is a substantial entity. It is by craving for these four kinds o f things
and by seizing (Bx) and clinging (il) to them that one gives rise to the
different kinds o f deeds that lead one to birth in the different kinds of
life in bondage.50 Craving for, clinging to, and tending towards definite
forms o f life are but different phases o f the one urge, the urge for em
bodiment, which is the thirst for fulfilment. Such fulfilment yields
satisfaction, pleasure, while the state o f lack is the state o f pain.
(IV) Senses, sense-contact and thefeeling of pleasure and pain: The crav
ing is a seeking for fulfilment in embodiment, leading to achieving the
feeling ( ) o f pleasure which attends on fulfilment and satisfaction.
Negatively, this is the longing to overcome the state o f pain; this is the
root of craving. The feeling o f pleasure depends on touch (sparsa) (),
the contact o f the senses with their respective objects. The Sastra ob
serves that the element o f touch is the root o f all mental elements like
feeling etc.
Touch comes into being out o f the to
getherness o f the three things, the organ o f sense, the element of aware
ness and the object. The six senses (viz., the five externals and the one
internal, the manas) are the bases (ayatana) for the function o f sense
and the arising o f touch, sensation. Although touch arises from the
togetherness o f all these three factors, still, it takes the six (internal)
bases (A A) i.e., the six senses as its basis; they are the primary factors
and hence only they get the name o f being the origin o f touch.58
(V) The physical and the mental bases of personality and the seed ofperson
al life: The six bases (a A ) o f sensation and cognition arise from the
nama-rupaf the body-mind complex. Nama here stands for the
incorporeal or mental and rupan for the physical aspects o f individu
ality.59 The two together constitute the being* o f the individual.
Although these six bases are themselves the nama-rupa, when the six
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NGRJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
are developed and distinguished from each other they are called the six
bases, and when not developed they are called just nma-rpa. O f these
six bases, all the physical elements arise from the basic physical element
" rpa while all the mental elements arise from the basic mental ele
ment, nma Thus, of the six bases o f cognition, the five physical
bases are accomplished by rpa, and the one internal base is accom
plished by nma.60 Actually, tima and rpa are the two phases
or aspects distinguishable within the integral organic entity. In the
developed, distinguished state, the individual is named after these as
nma-rpa, while in the subtle, undistingusihed state the individual is
simply called vijnna The undistinguished state is the root o f the dis
tinguished ; vijnna is the root o f nma as well as o f rpa.
Vijnna, as we have already seen is the person in the subtle inter
mediary state ( i ^ ) . 61 His proceeding from one span o f life to another
is prompted by the basic urge in him for self-expression; he is ever
seeking to become, to bring to manifestation all that is dormant in. him.
The constitution o f personality ever undergoes a ceaseless change, em
bodying in numberless ways the original insight and the basic urge. It
is the seeking o f a new self-expression that prompts the self-determining,
self-conscious principle to proceed to a new birth. It is due to the felt
need to give form to its basic aspiration that it seeks embodiment.
Vijnna in this special state o f seeking a new abode may be called the
subtle self-conscious seed o f personal life. It is subtle and is in seedform because it is unexpressed but all expressions proceed from it. It
is aware of its, present being as its own making as well as o f its future
possibility which it seeks to realize.
It is the defiled citta born from the traces (ff) o f (the passionate) deeds
(of the past) that is the primary source o f (th present) embodiment
(#J#H ). Even as the calf recognizes its mother, the citta, (the selfconscious person) (in this state o f transition) understands his own nature
(which is but what has given rise to his present state) and hence the
name vijnna
(ioob)
238
The Sastra observes that if vijitdna does not enter the womb, the
womb rots and becomes destroyed.62
Vijnana is (the complex of) the five (subtle) skandhas o f the intermedi
ary state.63 (696b)
The intermediary state is the state between death and rebirth. In this
state, the constituent factors o f the selfconscious individual are subtle
($ 9), undeveloped, and are therefore simply named after vijnana,64
The Sastra gives an account o f the rise o f the intermediary state:
At the time o f the death o f a person, he gives up the five skandhas
o f this span o f life and enters the five skandhas o f the intermediary state.
At this time, the present body becomes extinct and he receives the body
o f the intermediary skandhas. This extinction o f the present body and
this arising o f the intermediary state cannot be (said to be) before or
after (each other). The time o f the extinction is itself the time o f (re)birth (SS^PfiP^). For example, tKe wax-seal impresses the clay; at the
time when there is received the impression in the clay, at that very
time, the seal also becomes extinct. Accomplishment (of the new) and
the extinction (of the old) are simultaneous (/$ 8 ^ B # ); even here, there
is no (distinction of) before or after. At this time one receives the com
plex o f the skandhas o f the intermediary state ( S ^ & i 1# ) . Giving up
this intermediary state one receives the state o f the next span o f life.
W hat you call subtle body is just this complex o f the intermediary
skandhas. The body o f the intermediary skandhas has neither any going
out nor any coming in. It is comparable to the flame o f the lamp, a
stream o f constantly arising and perishing events, neither eternal nor
evanescent.65 (149b)
W hen it is said that the individual in the subtle, seed-form proceeds
to take another birth, it does not mean that there is a substantial entity,
a soul, that transmigrates from one abode to another, itself remaining
unaffected. The person in the state o f this transition is not a substance
but an organism. The movement is not as that o f a ball in an empty
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X g r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
space, but a transition like the moving o f the flame from one spot to
another. It is a continuous process where particular events arise and
perish while the activity with a persistent pattern moves on by realizing contact with a different set o f elements. It is an unbroken process,
a continuous becoming; even the elements are also processes, becom
ings. The arising o f the newTspan o f life after death is comparable to
one lamp lighting another. This is again comparable to the sprout
arising from the seed.86
(VI)
The tendencies dormant in the seed of personal life, and the root oj
the cycle of life: W hat conditions the entering o f the womb by vijana,
in order to take on a definite embodiment? The samskaras (if) condition
it. Samskaras are the impressions, the traces o f deeds done in the past
and it is the deeds that lead the vijana into the womb for a (definite)
embodiment (HffcAfin).06*
W hen the wind blows and the flame goes out, the flame enters akd;
at that time it rests on wind. (696b)
Similarly in the intermediary state the samskaras rest on vijana.
In the previous span o f life, when one was a human being, (ones
thirst for) sense-contact was aflame and, at the end o f that span o f life
the deeds done there (came to rest on vijana as subtle tendencies). It is
these deeds that lead the vijana to the wom b.67 (696b)
The basic thirst takes form and becomes canalized in different ways
according to deeds. Deeds are prompted by the forms o f thirst which
in turn become reinforced by the fresh performances o f deeds; they
revolve in an endless cycle, each depending on and conditioning the
other. Deeds leave their traces which give form to thirst and become
tendencies; tendencies lead the person to work out and assume ever
new embodiments.
The deeds of the present span o f life are called bhava (W) as they pre
240
pare for (and tend to) the fresh embodiment in the next span o f life.
But now, the deeds that are already past (and are now in the form of
tendencies) are called the samskaras (tr), because, o f them only the
ndma (the tendency) remains.68 (696b)
Is there a further principle that conditions even these tendencies,
these forms o f thirst that set the lines o f embodiment? W hat is the root
o f the subtle dormant forces that condition the individual to proceed
towards embodiment? W hat is the source o f the samskaras?
The source o f samskaras is ignorance (avidya). Although all the klesas
are alike the source o f past deeds (and thus, o f samskaras), still, avidya is
their root and therefore all these get only the name o f avidya. Again, of
the forces that condition the individual in the present span, thirst and
clinging are the prominent ones, and so (in regard to the present span),
they get the name. But in regard to the things o f the past as ones at
titude is one o f doubt and perversion, there, only avidya gets the name.
N ow the root o f all suffering is (avidya).99 (6p6b-c)
And\
If one can know ignorance and deeds as the conditions o f ones
existence in the life o f bondage even in regard to one span o f life,
then one can know this (by extension) with regard to even millions
o f spans o f life. (697a)
For everywhere it is the same basic principles that function.
This is like knowing the nature o f the fire o f the past or o f the
future by extending ones knowledge o f the fire that is here now.
(697a)
But if one would attempt to pursue ones enquiry further even be
yond ignorance, seeking to know even its condition (E^fcft^), this
search would be simply an endless repetition. And this endlessness of
repetition, when clung to, may easily lead one to the extreme o f eithar
total devoidness o f all beginning and end or o f absolute beinning and
absolute end (EPSHjS ^ ) .70 Then one would miss the way to truth, and
be led to mistake the endlessness o f regression to mean the utter devoid
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
what they get is still more pain. They see things only with the eyes o f
flesh.72
(II)
The eye of dhamta: The analysts who lay bare these links under
stand these as leading to suffering; they strive to put an end to its roots,
the afflictions (klesas), and they cultivate elements o f goodness con
ducive to this end.
They analyse all things by means o f the eye o f dhamta. They loath at
heart and seek to become free from the suffering o f old-age, disease
and death. They seek to know the origin o f old-age and death. (They
understand that these) proceed from birth (the embodiment) that comes
from deeds (karma) and passion (klesa). . . . (They understand that) the
source o f klesas is ignorance. It is due to ignorance that people give up
what they should take up and take up what they should abandon.
(622a-b)
The ignorant seize the klesas and abandon their cultivation o f the
moral life which should be earnestly pursued. But the analysts who
analyse and see things more clearly and seek to abandon the root o f
suffering and cultivate the factors o f the W ay do so only in order to seek
freedom for their own sake. Again, they do not press their enquiry
further to know the ultimate nature o f suffering (T ^sS f#).73 They are
not interested in comprehending the ultimate nature o f things.
The seeking o f freedom for ones own sake as well as the absence of
the zest to pursue ones enquiry up to the ultimate nature o f things
have their common root in ones tendency to cling to the specific, the
determinate, as itself ultimate. This tendency forbids one from realizing
the essential relatedness o f oneself with all the rest, as well as from
recognizing the undivided being as the ultimate reality. The lack o f
patience and o f firmness o f purpose, the lack o f the zest to know the
ultimate truth o f things function as obstacles. Clinging to the determi
nate as itself the ultimate these people end in the extreme o f etemalism.
They remain blind to the consequences of their own views by their
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
This is like the cart being there when the necessary factors combine.
Cart as a name stands for the complex o f several factors, every one o f
which is also an essentially conditioned element. A cart is not any ulti
mate entity, not a thing in itself. Old-age or even ignorance is also like
this; it is also essentially conditioned; it is also a derived name and is not
anything unconditioned, not any thing in itself (iSii^flT).77
The wise who understand the conditionedness o f even avidya see that
in its true nature avidya is o f the same nature as akdsa. In truth, every
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
There is also the other analysis o f the cycle o f life, viz., in terms o f
past, present and future. The Sastra refers to this also. Thus it says:
O f these twelve links, the first two (ifl) (avidya and satnskara)
belong to the past, the last t w c ^ ^ ) (the further state o f embodiment
and the states o f old-age -and death that ensue it) belong to the future,
and the remaining eight in the middle ( ^ A ) belong to the present,
(ioob)
If we bear in mind that time for the Buddhist is not an entity but a
way o f comprehending the course o f events, it becomes clear that what
they mean even in this analysis in terms o f time is also the succession it
self o f the different phases o f the course o f life, one conditioning another
and all together constituting the cycle.
The basic import in the account of the cycle of life: W hat is o f major inter
est in this account o f the cycle o f life is the basic teaching which it is
intended to convey, viz., that it is the thirst functioning under ignorance
and issuing in clinging that lies at the root o f the life o f the ignorant.
Error and pain o f all kinds are ultimately traceable to their root, viz.,
clinging, which itself owes its being to the thirst for fiilfilment miscon
strued and miscarried under the influence o f ignorance. The error of
misplaced absoluteness, the seizing o f the determinate as itself ultimate
is the root-error, the root form o f all errors It is rooted in the false sense
o f self, the imagination o f unconditionedness in regard to a specific
embodiment, the ego, the body-mind complex as itself ultimate. Even
the imagination o f a substantial entity, a soul, is rooted in the miscon
struction o f the thirst for the unconditioned, its confinement to the level
o f the conditioned, and resulting in endless regression in understanding
and endless repetition o f birth and death. The truth that man is not
confined to the level o f the determinate, but has in him the possibility
o f rising above it, that he is the meeting point o f the real and the unreal,
the conditioned and the unconditioned, is the basic im port o f the sense
of the real in him. It is the ground o f all his activities as a self-conscious
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
being. To set free the sense o f the real from its moorings in abstractions
constitutes the chief-most mission o f the farer on the Middle W ay.
Vijnana, the subtle body and the mahat: W e have seen that the Sdstra
identifies the subtle body of the non-Buddhists like the Saiikhya with
the antarabhava-vijnana, the intermediary state, o f the Buddhists; it
identifies also the mahat o f the Sankhyas with this antardbhava. It seems
that a distinction has got to be made between the antardbhava which is
a composite entity constituted o f all the skandhas, the constituents o f
individuality, in the subtle form, and the principle o f self-conscious
intellection (vijnana) which is their maker, their master, the principal
element among them.80 W hen a vijnana99 is mentioned to be the same
as the subtle body it is as the antardbhava, the composite entity, the whole
personality in the subtle form, that is meant. W hen it is said to be the
same as the mahat it is to the principle o f intellection that the special
reference is made. However, this can be only a relative emphasis. For,
on the one hand the mahat at the stage o f evolution is full with potencies.
On the other hand when it is identified with vijnana which is self-con
scious intellection it has got to be taken with ahankara, the I. Vijnana
and mahat are alike the principles o f determination from which there
proceed all further determinate entities or categories. They are alike
the subtle, i.e., non-specific, undistinguished, seed o f all distinct and
determinate events. In both alike there he implicit the lines o f future
development which become explicit and are made specific. They con
tain the tendencies which develop and take form, become definite.
Both are alike not substances but principles o f activity and systems o f
activities.
But while the Sankhyas tend to take mahat as a universal principle,
vijtiana is here definitely an individual principle. W hile the drawing o f
these and other parallels and contrasts that spring from this prolific
statement o f the Sastra that the mahat is the same as vijnana would indeed
be fruitful towards the working out o f an outline o f the relation between
the Saiikhya and the Buddhist philosophies, it is necessary to note that
the intention o f the Sdstra does not lie in the suggestion o f these parallels.
It lies in pointing to the fact that the Sankhya conception that prakrti
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NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
250
CH APTER
IX
R E A L IT Y
Section
T H E IN D E T E R M IN A T E G R O U N D
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
Tathata
The import of the essential relativity of the determinate: The precise import
o f the conditioned is its dependent nature, its deriving its nature from
an other, a beyond which is not itself dependent. It is possible to
ignore this import but it is impossible to deny it. Unconditioned reality
asserts itself in the very denial; for the ground o f the denial is just the
sense o f the undeniable. It is to the unconditioned as the ground o f the
conditioned that the attention o f the wayfarer is directed, ,for he is the
seeker o f the ultimate truth. While confinement to the conditioned
in ones search for the unconditioned inevitably results in an endless
regression, criticism is meant to enable one to rise above this confine
ment by realizing the essential conditionedness o f all that is specific.
To cling to the determinate as itself ultimate is not only futile but lead
ing to self-contradiction. It is the laying bare o f this self-contradiction
that should enable one to cease to cling.
Can it not be that the conditioned is essentially different and there
fore completely separate from the unconditioned? Between the things
that are essentially different and completely separate there is no relation
o f essential dependence. The unconditioned is not another entity apart
from the conditioned. N or are the conditioned and the unconditioned
as such identical. The unconditioned is relevant to the conditioned pre
cisely as its ground. The one is the real and the other is the unreal; the
one ever remains as it is, the other arises and passes away; the one is
undivided by time or space, devoid o f the divisions o f internal and
external, while the other is essentially distinct, determinate, admitting
o f the division o f internal and external. The determinate has its being
precisely as a determinate form o f the indeterminate, a division within
the undivided. But o f the indeterminate, there is no absolute determina
tion, o f the undivided there is no absolute division. In other words, the
undivided is the reality and the divided is the appearance. The real is
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the real nature o f all that is; it is the nature that no entity ever leaves;
the many unique, distinct entities are different among themselves as
many, but as the real, in their real nature, they are undivided.
But as the comprehension that the unconditioned is the ground of
the conditioned is one in which there is still the distinction o f the one
from the other, it is not the comprehension o f the ultimate truth; it is
still the mundane truth. It belongs to a level which is not confined to
the determinate nor wholly exclusive o f it. Those who cling to the
determinate as well as those who cling to the indeterminate commit
the error o f exclusiveness; they cling to extremes. To seize the determi
nate as itself the ultimate is to commit the error o f eternalism, while to
imagine that the indeterminate is wholly exclusive o f the determinate
is to commit the error o f negativism; the latter view amounts to the
imagination that a literal abandoning or even an annihilation o f the
determinate is the necessary condition to realize the indeterminate.
These exclusive views conceive the determinate and the indeterminate
as separate from each other. As the two are essentially different, so they
think, they should be entirely separate. Actually, in the essential nature
o f things* there is the difference of mundane and ultimate. The mun
dane nature is called the essential nature only by convention. Certainly
it is not meant as an absolute truth. To imagine that things are ultimate
and self-existent in their unique and distinct natures is to commit the
error o f eternalism. But this is not to deny the unique and distinct as
essential in the mundane truth; it is to deny the imagined ultimacy and
absoluteness with regard to them.
(In the ultimate truth) all things are sunya, devoid o f their own
natures; there is no individual, no I and (mine ). And yet (in the
world) conditioned by causal factors, there are the four fundamental
physical elements as well as the six senses. And each o f these ten elements
has its own (nature and) capacity; it can come into birth (as the result
o f the cooperation o f its causal factors) and can bring into birth (in its
turn other things, itself functioning as a causal factor for their birth).
And everyone o f these has its own function, for example, earth can hold
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things and water can moisten things.In this way everything has its
ow n (nature and) function.2 (444b)
W hile tathata as the mundane truth means such natures o f things as
impermanence, relativity, non-substantiality, devoidness o f selfhood,
tathata as their ultimate nature means the unconditioned, unborn
dharma.
One comprehends that in the universal reality there is nothing that is
determinable either as permanent (or as impermanent,) . . . and one
abandons even these comprehensions. (In the ultimate realization,) all
such modes o f intellection come to an end. This is the universal reality,
the same as Nirvana, the unborn and the unextinct dharma, which ever
remains in its true nature and is never subject to birth (and death).
W ater, for example, is cold by nature and it becomes hot only when
fire is added to it. W ith the extinction o f fire, the heat o f the water also
becomes extinct and water returns to its original nature and remains
cold as before. The mind using all the diverse modes o f intellection is
like the water getting fire. The extinction o f all modes o f intellection is
like the extinction o f fire. The original nature o f mind, the tathata, is
like the coldness o f water. . . . This is tathata. It eternally remains in its
fundamental nature ( in jf^ f t) . For such is the very nature o f things.
(299a)
Speaking with special reference to the human individual, while the
determinate being, the organism worked out by the self-conscious per
son as the expression o f his very being, is a system o f events which to
gether constitute his self, if one imagines that, being determinate, one
is essentially other than and therefore completely separate from the
indeterminate dharma, one would commit the error o f misplaced ab
soluteness, for that would amount to thinking that the determinate self
is ones real self, ones ultimate nature. This is to miss the true import
o f the sense o f the unconditioned; this is to make reality altogether
irrelevant to man. The wise who rise above exclusive clinging under
stand the conditioned as well as the unconditioned; they understand
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REALITY
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
REALITY
o f the basic truth that in their ultimate nature all things are realized to
be the unconditioned reality itself.
All the different streams ultimately return to the great ocean; all
the small kings live by the support o f the great emperor; all the stars
derive their light from the sun. (334a)
Even so do all things have their being dependent on the dharmadhtu, live their lives on its support and ultimately return to it.
If the bodhisattva would not conceive that this is dharma and this is
not dharma, (if he would comprehend that) all things blend into one
essence, even as all the myriad streams blend and become f one essence
in the great ocean, then, indeed, has his cultivation o f prajpramit
found fulfilment. . . . The indeterminate nature is the true nature of
all things. Determinations and divisions are the constructions o f imagi
nation. (528a)
Tathat or the true nature o f things at the different levels, mundane
and transmundane, is also called dharmat at two different levels
S). Thus while the unique nature and capacity o f every specific thing
which one comes to know through analysis o f things with a nonclinging mind can be called the mundane dharmat, the limitless dharma
(S&*), the ultimate reality may be called the transmundane or the
ultimate dharmat.'2 This distinction between the mundane and the
transmundane natures o f things is also described in terms o f dharmalaksana,13 Thus the mundane dharma-laksana (ILtfitl&flJ) means the
unique, distinct, natures and capacities o f things, their causes and condi
tions which produce them, and the consequences which follow from
them in turn. But when these distinct characters o f things are analyzed
and examined to the very end, then they arc seen to enter the unborn
(anutpada) dharma ( A ^ & 't1), which is their ultimate nature; there
is nothing that exceeds it.14 The unborn dharma is another name for the
unconditioned reality, Nirvana
The mundane dharmalaksana is also called composite, conditioned, dharma-laksatia (WSSuifcfc
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REALITY
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
form brick and stone into gold. But those who are not sharp in their
power o f grasping adopt suitable means and seek to realize the dharmadhatu (through long cultivation) and only then will they be able to
realize it
This is like smelting the ore in the great
cauldron and then obtaining gold from it.23 (298b)
For example, within the wall, there is already the empty space
Now, if a child were to try to fix a wooden peg there, he would
not be able to do it, for he has not the necessary strength. But a grown
up man can drive it in, for his strength is great (A A #n6A ). The same
is the case with ones faring (in prajndparamitd). W ithin the heart o f
everything there is the ultimate reality, (the ever-present) self-being
(u fiiii SWinJf+S). But when ones capacity to comprehend is little,
one cannot make all things enter sunyata, (and therefore one cannot
realize the ultimately real nature o f all things). But those whose power
o f comprehension is great can comprehend the ultimate truth. (563 c564a)
Again, we have the Sdstra saying:
(This tathatd, the universal reality, is in all). It is in the Buddha, it is
also in the bodhisattva, for it is one (undivided). It is therefore that the
bodhisattva is considered to be the same as the Buddha (fSSnife). Apart
from and devoid o f tathatd, there is nothing; there is nothing that docs
not ultimately enter the tathatd . . . (There is no doubt that) even in
the beasts there is the tathatd. But they have not yet fulfilled the neces
sary conditions (to realize the ultimate reality in them). They have not
yet brought to light the tathatd in them. Therefore they are not able
to course in tathatd and (benefit either themselves or) other beings.
They arc not able to course in tathatd and reach sarvdkarajnatd. (There
fore they are not said to be the same as the Buddhas.) Therefore the
bodhisattva should cultivate this tathatd-prajnapdramita
Cultivating the tathata-prajnapdramitd, the bodhisattva can fulfil the reali
zation o f the tathatd, (the ultimate essence o f all things). (653c)
The real as the supreme end: It is to the skilful penetration o f the mind
into the dharma-dhatu, the unconditioned reality, that bhutakoti
refers.
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The thirst for the real in man: W hile the dharma-dhatu is the ultimate
nature o f all beings, in man there is immanent the sense o f the uncondi
tioned as his true essence. While the limitless dharma is immanent in the
heart o f every determinate entity, it is only the self-conscious individual
that is aware o f his real nature. But under ignorance the sense o f the un
conditioned is misconstrued, and hence the sense o f lack, the thirst, the
restlessness in the heart o f man. This is mans thirst for the real. Losing
(ones comprehension of) the true nature o f things, one sees all things
only pervertedly, crookedly. And the meaning o f this restlessness lies in
realizing ones ultimate nature, getting back to ones real self, ones true
essence.28 W ith the realization o f this ultimate reality the thirst is
completely quenched, the heart becomes full and contented, and there
is no longer any hankering for anything. Thus, the Sdstra says:
Even as it is the very nature o f water to flow down (iP7k ttT i 5ft) by
reason o f which all waters return
to the great ocean, blend and
become o f one essence, just in the same way all determinate entities,
all natures general and particular, return ultimately to dharma-dhatu,
blend and become o f one essence w ith it. This is dharma-dhatu. Even as
the diamond which is at the top o f the mountain (^H'liEUJXR) gradually
settles down until it reaches its destination, the field o f diamonds, and
having got there it will have got back to its self-nature (iiJS tt) and
only then does it come to a stop, just the same is the case with all things.
Through knowledge, through discrimination, (the mind seeks the true
nature o f things and thus) gets to tathatd. From tathatd, the mind enters
its original nature (A 14), where it remains as it ever was, devoid o f
birth (and death) and with all imaginative constructions put an end
to. This is the meaning o f dharma-dhatu.
Again, even as the calf (#DHT-), alarmed (by the sight o f the diverse
things) all around, bleats (and runs about in restlessness) and comes to
rest only when it has gotten back to its mother, just the same is the case
with all beings. Beings are varied and different; their acceptances and
rejections vary. But when they reach their inmost nature, then their
movement stops. Nothing else is there to reach exceeding this. This is
the meaning o f dharma-dhatu. (298b-c)
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(W ith the realization o f this ultimate reality) the heart becomes full
and contented ('il'BliSS); never more has it any desire to seek (a fulfil
ment) ( jE T ^ # ) . It is then that the mind has realized (its true nature).
For example, the person walking on the road, walks forth every day
never stopping. But when he reaches his destination, then indeed he has
no more o f the mind to walk (SSI'll'). Just the same is the case with
the wayfarer when he gets ultimately established in bhta-koti.28a (299a)
Factors conducive to comprehension: In right understanding, the many
things themselyes are not denied, nor do they stand apart constituting
an impediment to comprehending the ultimate truth; they open up
their true nature, reveal their ultimate truth. They flow into the
ultimate reality, where all things blend and become o f one essence. It
is in the realization o f this ultimate truth that the meaning o f the rest
lessness in the heart o f beings consists. The dharmadhtu, the ultimate
nature o f everything, is itself the prajpramit. It is the complete, the
perfect, which is immanent in all things. By following up everything
in its unique nature and by progressively assimilating it into the limitless,
one comprehends that all things enter the dharma-dhtu, the fullness, the
completeness o f being. Everything is led up to its perfection in its own
way by a progressive assimilation o f that which lies beyond it; it is in
truth a gradual realization o f the true nature. The Sutra as well as the
Sastra bring out this truth o f the perfection immanent in everything by
declaring that the perfection (paramita) o f everything is prajpramit.2!l
That which is the highest in all is the prajpramit; the true essence of
every determinate entity and every conceivable character is prajpra
mit. Thus the perfection (paramita) o f the endless (Mfcfc#?) is prajparamita, for it is comparable to ka. It is immeasurable like the waters
o f the great ocean, says the Sastra.30 Endlessness means limitlessness
which is devoidness o f an other. Devoidness o f division exemplified
in akasa, when rightly comprehended, would convey the ultimacy o f
the non-dual dharma. Ends mean again the extremes o f perversion
(ffl^JS).30* Dcvoidness o f ends means to rise above extremes and to
fare on the Middle W ay, the way o f praj. W hether in the mundane
truth or in the ultimate truth, endlessness in its true form is the praj26 s
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
REALITY
As the Sdstra observes, the elements, rupa etc. are themselves the
knowledge o f all forms and the latter is itself all the elements; the tathatd
o f the one is also the tathatd o f the other.35
Section
II
T H E U N D I V I D E D B E IN G
The distinction of the determinate and the indeterminate: Even as the es
sential conditionedness o f things, when rightly comprehended, leads
one to the unconditioned as their ground, just in the same way the com
prehension that the conditioned entity is itself in its ultimate nature the
unconditioned reality leads one to the further comprehension o f the
ultimate truth that the conditioned and the unconditioned, are not two,,
not separate. The distinction holds only in the mundane truth where it
is a relative distinction and not an absolute division. The highest truth
is the undividedness o f the conditioned and the unconditioned ; there is
not even the distinction o f the divided and the undivided.
The (ultimate) meaning o f prajfid should not be conceived as either
divided or as undivided; (it is the dharma) that is neither existent nor
non-existent, neither entering nor emerging, . . . neither tathatd, nor
not tathatd, neither bhutakoti nor not bhutakoti. (482b)
To conceive that the distinction o f the conditioned and the uncondi
tioned is an absolute division is to separate the determinate entities and
the indeterminate dharma; this is to deny not only the relevance o f the
unconditioned to the conditioned but also to deny the very possibility
o f determinate existence. The Sutra says:
If the koti (extremity) o f reality and the koti (extremity) o f the indi
viduals were.(ultimately) different
then the bodhisattva
could not fare in the prajndparamitd. Truly the koti o f reality and the koti
o f beings are not (ultimately) different; therefore the bodhisattva is able
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p h il o so p h y
REALITY
was a way o f expressing the truth that the conditioned is itself in its
ultimate nature the unconditioned reality, and to misconceive the nature
o f the conditioned and o f the unconditioned. In the ultimate truth it
does not hold that the unconditioned is within the distinct, determinate,
entities.
The ultimately real nature (the tathatalaksana p+S), o f the Tathagata
is not past or present or future. . . . The ultimately real nature o f the
Tathagata is not in the real nature o f the past, etc.; the ultimately real
nature o f the past etc. is not in the ultimately real nature o f theTathagata. The ultimately real nature o f the past etc. and the ultimately real
nature o f the Tathagata, all this is one reality, not two, not divided
(
M$J). The ultimately real nature o f the I (ffeia) . . . the
ultimately real nature o f the knowledge o f all forms (sarvdkarajnata),
the ultimately real nature o f the Tathagata, all this is one reality, not
two, not divided. W hen the bodhisattva realizes this reality (tathatd) he
is called the Tathagata
(563b)
W hile the determinate entities are themselves in their ultimate nature
the indeterminate dharma, it cannot be maintained that the ultimate
nature o f the determinate is itself anything determinate, that the nature
o f things in which they are undivided is itself anything divided, and that
the determinate entities are subject to birth and death in their ultimate
nature. Thus the Sutra says:
The non-dual nature o f riipa is not riipa
# & ) . . . . All the
riipa that there is and the entire non-dual dharma, . . . all this is in truth,
the one, undivided, ultimate reality, which neither gathers nor scatters,
is devoid o f color, devoid o f shape, devoid o f resistance; it is all o f one
nature, viz., being o f no particular nature (iQ3 flHiS+0) . . . . It is there
fore that the non-dual nature o f rupa is not rupa. . . . Rupa enters nonduality (AM
. . . (All things enter non-duality. The non-dual,
undivided being is the unborn dharma.) Riipa is not different from the
unborn dharma
the unborn dharma is not different from
riipa. . . . It is therefore that riipa enters non-duality. (436c)
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p h il o s o p h y
REALITY
dharma-laksana
The eternal dharma-laksana is another name
for the svabhdva-sunyatd. It is also called the universal reality (ftiJfffi).
In it there is neither birth nor extinction. (697c)
The svabhaua-sunya-dharma should not be clung to even as sunya.
T o seize the lunya nature o f the svabhdva-sunya-dharma is to turn sunyatd
itself into something determinate, while the reality that is the svabhdvasunya-dharma is free from all determinations.373
(B)
Samatd: The ultimate nature o f things, the svabhdva-sunyatd, is
also called samatd to mean the essential sameness o f things in their true
nature.
The sunyatd o f the internal . . . the sunyatd o f the external . . . the
Junyatd o f self-nature, this is the samatd o f things
which the bodhi
sattva should cultivate. Rupa is devoid (sunya) o f the character o f rupa
. . . the unexcelled samyak-sambodhi (the complete bodhi par excellence)
is devoid (sunya) o f the character o f samyak-sambodhi. This is the samatd
o f things. The bodhisattva dwelling in this samatd o f things
realizes the samyak-sambodhi. (604c)
This essential sameness o f all things is comprehensible both in regard
to their mundane and to their ultimate nature. In respect to their mun
dane nature it means their essentially conditioned relative, dependent
nature. In regard to their ultimate nature, it means the ultimate reality
o f the undivided being which is the very real nature o f all that is.
The bodhisattva who comprehends the essehtial sameness o f all beings
as well as o f their constituent elements holds his mind in balance
(## 5) and fares with equanimity
o f mind.38 The Sutra says:
The samatd o f all things
is not made by anyone . . . not
even by the Buddha. W hether there are the Buddhas or there are not
the Buddhas, the true nature o f all things remains eternally sunya. This
svabhdva-sunyatd is itself Nirvana. (7280-7292.)
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X g X r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
(C) Purity: This ultimate samatd or the ultimate nyatd is also called
purity, to indicate its complete devoidness o f all determinate nature.
Purity is another name for the undivided being, the ultimate reality.
It is the ultimate samatd o f things that I call purity. W hat is this sama
td? It is what is called the tathatd, the unchanging, the not-false, the
dharma-laksana, the dharma-dhatu, dharma-sthiti, dharma-sthana, bhtakoti. W hether there are the Buddhas or there are not the Buddhas, the
dharmata eternally stays. It is this eternal dharmata that is called purity.
But even this (name, purity) is mentioned only in the mundane truth
(vyavahdra); this is not a teaching o f the ultimate truth. The ultimate
truth transcends all definitions and descriptions, transcends all com
ments and disputations, transcends all words. (724a)
(D) Nirvana, the Island: To indicate that the ultimate, profound
nature o f all things ever remains unaffected by the imaginative con
structions o f the ignorant, it is called the island, the central land which
the streams o f ignorance and passion do not reach. Nirvana, the ulti
mate nature o f things, is thus comparable to an island. Thus the Siitra
says:
W hether in a river or in a great ocean, (if in a spot) the water is
prevented from flowing in from any o f the four sides, the spot comes
to be called an island. . . . Such is also the nature o f rpa (and all other
things when) the prior and the posterior ends are terminated. . . .W ith
the prior and the posterior ends stopped, all things themselves would
be (the profound dharma) the peace, the most precious jewel, viz., the
snya, anupalambha (&0T#), the residueless extinction o f thirst, the
complete freedom from passion (SlSfc), the Nirvana. The bodhisattva
teaches the world this dharma, the most profound dharma, the complete
peace. (558c)
And the Sastra comments:
W ater here refers to the three streams o f defiling elements (dsrava)
(viz., ignorance and passion in regard to things o f the world o f desire
and* o f the higher worlds) . . . all the klesas and all the deeds and their
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results. The central principle, the land in the middle, is the dharma of
complete sunyatd, the utterly unseizable, viz., the Nirvana. This is the
island. People get sunk in the waters o f the four streams and all the
klesas, but the Buddha, with His boat o f the Eight-fold W ay picks
them up and puts (3 I3F*) them on the island o f Nirvana. (559b)
(E)
The unutterable truth and the wheel of dharma: In the highest truth,
really, there is nothing spoken. For, the ultimate dharma being com
pletely lunya and therefore devoid o f determinate characters is unut
terable.
The sambohdi par excellence (this highest truth o f non-duality) is
most profound, difficult to see, difficult to understand, most incompre
hensible. Only he who has realized the subtle profound peace, thtprajfid
can comprehend this most profound truth. It is difficult
for anyone else to (comprehend it and) have faith in it. (In the ultimate
truth) the sambodhi par excellence is devoid o f any obtainer, devoid o f
any place or time o f obtaining. This is the most profound truth, viz.,
devoidness o f duality. (562b-c)
The Sutra observes that it is for this reason that the Buddha, when
He realized the truth, at the outset, delighted at heart in keeping silent;
He did not like to speak about this dharma. For, this dharma o f the Bud
dhas, viz., the unexcelled samyak-sambodhi, is most profound, difficult
to comprehend.39
Commenting on the reason for the Buddhas silence the Sdstra
states that in addition to the incomprehensibility o f this profound truth
by ordinary minds, there is yet another reason (HiftH^:):
Tathatd is the truly real nature (RJftE) o f all things. For example,
whether it is in a palace or in a humble hut, whether it is the sandal
wood or just the ordinary wood that is being burnt, in regard to the
space (akdia) in both these places there is no difference. O f all things,
when one seeks to know the (ultimately) true nature, (one finds that)
all that is just the tathatd (the undivided, non-dual dharma). (And where
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N A G A K JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
all is 011c and devoid o f distinction how can there be any speech?) For
this reason, the Buddha delighted at heart in keeping silent, when He
first realized the bodhi
He did not like to teach the dharma *
He knew that it is difficult for ordinary minds to comprehend the
profound dharnta, (563c)
The setting o f the wheel o f dharma in motion is not denied as a mun
dane truth, but it is not an ultimate truth. The wheel o f dharma is prajndpdratnild itself.41 And in the ultimate truth, the dharma is devoid o f
movement; in their ultimate nature all things are devoid o f movement.
Parjdpdramitd does not emerge either for moving forth or for
moving back. (516c)
It is necessary to note that the utter unspeakability o f things in this
ultimate truth docs not mean that they cannot even be spoken o f in
the mundane truth. The undivided being, the indeterminate dharma,
is non-exclusive; it is this that is the highest reality. It is not exclusive
of determinations although it is false to hold them as absolute. In the
mundane truth the indeterminate dharma is expressed through the de
terminate modes o f thought and speech in a non-clinging way. The
question is not one o f speaking or not speaking but o f clinging or not
clinging to the speech and to the things spoken of.
(F)
Comparable to dkdsa: The ultimate reality is compared to akdfa,
the principle of accommodation, which is not anything in particular
and is yet the universal possibility o f movement depending on which
everything lives and moves.
Akdsa, being completely pure, is not anything specific (akicana);
still, depending on dkdsa all things get accomplished and fulfilled. All the
same, it cannot be said that dkdsa itself does anything, nor can it be said
that dkdsa is devoid o f use. (Precisely the same is the case with prajndpdramitd.)iU (507c)
Akdsa is not any determinate entity; it has no specific character that
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CH APTER
THE W AY
Section
TH E W A Y OF C O M P R E H E N S IO N
THE WAY
NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
hand and feeling on the other. Understanding and activity are essentially
related to each other; they arc the distinguishable aspects o f the integral
self, the distinct ways in which the person seeks to realize the values
of life. They are also ways in which the wise seek to awaken in everyone
the sense of the truly unconditioned. The way o f knowledge consists
in analysis and criticism, laying bare the distinct and unique natures o f
things and comprehending their mundane as well as their ultimate truth.
It is as truth that the real is sought to be realized in the path o f knowl
edge. The way o f compassion consists in effectively widening ones
sense o f ones kinship, essential bound-up-ness, with all that exists; and
this is done through feeling, emotion, work, service. This sense o f kin
ship is deepened by directing attention to the true, abiding essence in
every being. The understanding that stops at the surface cannot brighten
up permanently the love o f man; and the love o f man that is not bright
ened up by deep understanding cannot make for bringing about any
permanent good. The ultimate basis o f sympathy is the ultimate undi
videdness o f oneself with others. The individual in himself is an abstrac
tion.
Section
II
T H E G R E A T W A Y A N D T H E SMALL W A Y
The Great Way (Mahdyana) and the Small Way (Hinaydna): The Sastra
points out that the Great W ay is distinguished from the Small W ay
precisely by virtue o f its comprehensiveness: The big contains the
small, while the small cannot contain the big. 4 The farers on the Great
W ay stress these points to distinguish themselves from the farers on the
Small W ay:
(I) The Small W ay is the way o f the hearers of truth (srdi'akas) and
not o f those who comprehend it. It is the way of those who cling to
difference as ultimate and this amounts to imagining separateness as
absolute. Although capable o f putting an end to ignorance and passion
in themselves, their wayfaring is conditioned by fear o f birth and death
and not inspired by the ideal o f Buddhahood.
27s
THE WAY
NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY
animal, if need be, in order to save even a single being from suffering.
Further, the Great W ay is great precisely because it is not exclusive
o f anyone or o f anything; it is the way o f all beings as it is not itself any
specific way. In this it is comparable to kfa, the principle o f accommo
dation. This is the way which works for peace and harmony in the world
through the rejection o f exclusive clinging. Comprehension with its
two phases o f wisdom and compassion is what characterizes the Great
W ay. It starts from the realms o f determinate existence and its destina
tion is praj, the knowledge o f all forms.9
The Great Way is the way of perfection (pramit): The Great W ay is
the way that is inspired and guided by praj, the sense o f the undivided,
which is basic to wayfaring. It is the prajpramit itself.10 Actually it
is the cultivation o f the prajparamita in all its different aspects that is
itself distinguished as the different kinds o f perfection.
The six pramits and the prajpramit are one and the same thing
and not different.11 (n6 b )
Prajpramit contains all elements o f merit for it is, by obtaining its
power o f skilfulness that these get into the way o f the Buddha.12 All
that is good is contained within the six pramits;1* they constitute the
body (IS) o f the Great W ay,14 which is the Buddhas W ay.15 This way
faring in the light o f the sense o f the unconditioned is itself distinguish
ed as the phases or aspects o f wisdom and merit. It is these phases them
selves that are further distinguished as kinds o f perfection. Thus the
stra says:
These two things (merit and wisdom which are the two phases o f
wayfaring) are cultivated in six different aspects, and these are called
the six kinds o f perfection (pramit) .lfl (262c)
O f all the kinds o f perfection (pramit) the perfection o f wisdom,
insight (praj) is the foremost.
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W ithout it the other five do not get the name o f paramitd at all; they
would then be like the blind; prajna is like the eye. The five pdramitas
without the prajfid would be like the unbaked earthen pot filled with
water, while prajndpdramitd is like the well-baked earthen pot (holding
w ater); the five pdramitas are like the bird without wings while prajnd
pdramitd is like the bird with wings.17 (314b)
The essential quality of perfection: A) Dana: Charity: The Sastra ob
serves that the Sutra speaks o f five characters (S S ffi) as constituting the
perfection o f charity: I) with the thought associated with the knowledge
o f all forms (sarvdkdrajndtd or prajna), II) one gives away all things,
internal and external; III) (having given away all things in charity)
and sharing this merit with (&) all beings, IV) one looks back (iiip]) to
the highest samyaksambodhi; and V) (all this one does) with the skilful
ness o f non-clinging.18 Commenting on this, the Sdstra says:
To associate the thought with sarvdkdrajfiatd . . . is to base ones
thought ( ^ ) and rely (ft) on the W ay o f the Buddha.19 (395a)
To aspire to the W ay o f the Buddha, to saturate ones mind with
the thought o f the W ay o f the Buddha, is the foremost condition for
ones faring on the way to perfection.
By giving away all things (internal and external) in the light o f the
W ay of the Buddha, one gives up all klesas. (395a)
By virtue o f ones heart o f great compassion one shares with all
being the merit that arises as the fruit o f the act o f charity. That one
looks back to the highest sambodhi means that by means o f the act
o f charity one seeks only the W ay o f the Buddha (i&^t^iS) and not
any other fruit.20 By virtue o f his achieving a share in the spirit (M #)
o f prajndpdramitd, the true nature o f all things, one performs the act o f
charity in the non-clinging way.21 Actually the last four o f these five
characters are subsidiary to the first, viz., devotedness to the way o f the
Buddha. It is this that is essential. The Sdstra observes that because this
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THE WAY
and all other factors o f bondage that follow from it. W hen done with
the clinging mind it would no doubt be an act o f charity but not its
perfection. It would then be a worldly act that binds one and not
the transcending act that liberates one. While the cultivation o f charity
is essential, ones clinging to it is to be rejected.27
B) ila: Moral Conduct: The bodhisattva^s cultivation is solely to
achieve the W ay o f the Buddha, and this, in order to help all beings
that have sunk in the stream o f birth and death. W ith this mind he
cultivates the elements o f moral conduct.28 As a result he is born in a
good family, meets good people, gives rise to the right understanding
and thereby cultivates all the six kinds o f perfection, and obtains the
W ay o f the Budhha.29 O ut o f the heart o f great compassion does the
bodhisattva cultivate his moral conduct and by this cultivation he
reaches the W ay o f the Buddha. It is in this way that his cultivation o f
moral conduct achieves completeness and by virtue o f this it gets the
name o f perfection.30 The highest kind o f moral conduct, its perfection,
consists in the non-clinging way, not clinging to sin or merit as absolute
and unconditioned. The bodhisattva that enters deep into the truth o f
things, cultivating the contemplation o f their sMrtyd-nature, beholds
with his eye o f wisdom that sin and merit are not absolute and uncondi
tioned.31 The excellence o f moral conduct does not permit any attitude
o f despising the sinner nor any attitiude o f taking pride with regard to
the merited. It is the non-clinging way imbued with the right under
standing o f things that gives perfection to morality.
C) Ksdnti: Forbearance or Endurance: In the spirit o f non-clinging,
with the comprehension o f the true nature o f things and by the heart
of great compassion, the bodhisattva cultivates the perfection o f ksdnti
(;S), forbearance, endurance.32 By the cultivation o f forbearance in
regard to beings (sattva) he achieves unlimited merit, and by the cultiva
tion o f endurance in regard to the true nature o f elements (dharma) he
achieves the limitless wisdom. Achieving these two elements o f merit
and wisdom he accomplishes all that he wishes even as people who have
both eyes and feet can go anywhere they wish.33 If the bodhisattva hap
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THE WAY
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
THE WAY
From the very beginning the bodhisattva always seeks the sarvakdrajnatd ( ^ f lU i? ) ; in between (starting to achieve and actually achieving
it) he (progressively) gains the knowledge o f the true nature o f things.
(190a)
Prajndpdramitd includes all other kinds o f knowledge . . . The bodhi
sattva, the seeker o f the W ay o f the Buddha, should cultivate all dharmas
and achieve every kind o f knowledge, viz., that o f the sravakas, that o f
the pratyekabuddhas as well as that o f the Buddhas. (191a)
But still it is the prajnd realized by the Buddha that is truly perfect,
the true pdratnitd (#2$1?).
Because it is in order to realize this truly perfect prajnd that the bodhi
sattva cultivates the W ay, therefore even the prajnd o f the bodhisattva is
called the prajndpdramitd. . . . In the mind o f the Buddha this prajndpdra
mitd becomes the knowledge o f all forms. As the bodhisattva cultivates
the way to realize this true prajnd and to cross over to the other shore,
(his wayfaring in the path o f knowledge) is called pdramitd, reaching
perfection, while in the case o f the Buddha who has already crossed over
to the other shore, the prajnd is called sarvdkdrajnatd, the knowledge o f
all forms. (190a)
II)
The wisdom of the sravakas (hearers) and the pratyekabuddhas: Unlike
the bdvakas whose knowledge is limited and who arc just interested in
seeking for themselves a liberation from birth and death, the bodhisattvas, the farers on the Great W ay, make the great resolve at the very start
o f their career to help all beings. They possess great love and compassion
for all beings everywhere. They seek to attain all the merits o f the Bud
dha and honour and worship all the Buddhas everywhere. They con
centrate their attention on the ultimate nature o f things, external and
internal, and they do not seize and cling to the notions o f purity, im
purity, etc. The comprehension o f the noble is pure everywhere, unde
niable and indestructible. This is prajndpdramitd. In the teachings o f
the sravakas the emphasis is on impermanence which they seize as an
ultimate clement, whereas the farers on the Great W ay comprehend
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that birth and death do not constitute the ultimate nature o f things; they
do not also seize the denial o f birth and death as absolute. In the Great
W ay, it is the extinction o f the clinging to specific views and determi
nate natures that is the ultimate truth.
Briefly, the distaste for the world, the constant thought o f Nirvana,
the abandoning o f the three realms o f existence, the extinction o f all
klesas and the obtaining o f the highest dharma, viz., Nirvanait is these
that constitute the knowledge o f the sravakas.51 Although as knowledge
this is one in kind with that o f the bodhisattvas, the sravakas do not
have the strength o f skilfulness. They are devoid o f the great resolve,
devoid o f the great love and compassion. There is not in them the urge
to realize the factors o f Buddhahood, nor the aspiration for the knowl
edge o f all forms. They simply detest old age, disease and death, put
an end to the bonds o f passion and tend straight to Nirvana. This is
what differentiates the knowledge o f the havakas from that o f the farers
on the Great W ay.52 The knowledge o f the pratyekabuddhas is not sub
stantially different from that o f the sravakas; there are differences only
of time
the sharpness o f understanding (illffir), and the extent o f
merit (il ).53 The difference o f time refers to the fact that the pratyeka
buddhas arise only when no Buddhas are bom and when the Buddhas
teachings have disappeared in the world. At such a time the pratyeka
buddhas abandon home-life occasioned even by a small incident and
obtain the W ay.54 That their understanding is sharp (fijffi) does not
mean any difference in the quality (f@) o f their knowledge, but there is
a difference in the extent, in the number o f elements (2fe) cognized.55
Ill)
The wisdom of the bodhisattvas and the Buddhas: The knowledge
o f the bodhisattva excels that o f the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas.
During innumerable spans o f life the bodhisattva deeply studies.the ulti
mate nature o f all things. His knowledge is supported by and furnished
with the other five paramitas. He has the strength o f skilfulness; he has
the great love and compassion for all beings, and therefore his knowl
edge is not hindered by perversions. He dwells in the ten stages (bhumis)
o f the Great W ay and therefore his knowledge is powerfiil and pro
found. These virtues the w orthy (arahan) and the pratyekabuddhas do
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THE WAY
not have.56 Again, while the knowledge o f the srdvakas and the prat
yekabuddhas is sarvajnata (50) the all-inclusive understanding which is
only rough and gross, sarvakdrajnata which is the thorough and detailed
knowledge o f everything belongs only to the Buddha; the one is brief
while the other is comprehensive. But rightly pursued, the former can
lead to the latter, i.e., the brief to the comprehensive, the rough and broad
to the thorough and the detailed; thus the one may be the cause o f the
other. The one cancels ignorance only in a general way while the other
comprehends in detail everything in every way.57 The srdvakas and the
pratyekabuddhas cannot exhaustively know even the details o f the life of
one individual, such as the sphere o f his birth, his virtues and vices, the
nature and extent o f his deeds, etc., and much less can they know the
details o f the life o f every being. But the Buddha exhaustively knows
the general and the specific natures o f every distinguishable entity, and
therefore His knowledge is called the knowledge o f all forms. The
sarvajnata, the all-inclusive understanding of the iravakas and the pra
tyekabuddhas is like the lamp in the picture, which has only its name
and not its function.68
Again, o f the eleven kinds o f knowledge (H *), the first ten, viz.,
dharmajnana (i) the knowledge o f the constituent elements o f things
in the world o f desire and anvayajnana (It ) knowledge o f the con
stituent elements in the world o f fine matter and the immaterial world,
the knowledge o f the mind and mental states o f other persons (fife'll'),
the worldly knowledge (lit), the knowledge o f suffering (S1), its
origin (ife), its extinction (SS) and the way to it (il ), and the
knowledge o f the final and complete extinction o f the roots o f suffer
ing (3 !) as well as o f their non-origination (M ), these are com
mon to the srdvakas, the pratyekabuddhas and the bodliisattvas, while
the knowledge o f the true nature o f things (yatharthajndna #nflf) be
longs only to the Buddha.5'1 The last mentioned is the true prajna; it is
beyond the scope of the other kinds and it is. the knowledge also of
these other kinds.
By this true prajna one can understand the distinctive features of
knowing (#^+ 0) o f these other kinds, their respective objects
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III
TH E F A C T O R S OF TH E W A Y A N D TH E
GATES OF F R E E D O M
The thirty-seven factors of the Way: These factors that are emphasized in
the way o f the hearejs are distinguished into seven kinds and these are
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called the kinds o f power (t ), bala). These very factors, the twelve, are
called the factors o f the W ay when the work o f their cultivation has
not yet been accomplished
while they are called the factors o f
enlightenement when the work has been accomplished and when they
are deeply assimilated
That there is much overlapping in the enumeration o f these factors
o f the way, thirty-seven in all, seems to have been felt even from very
early times. These thirty-seven are set forth as an elaboration o f the ten
basic elements, viz., faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, knowledge
or insight, the sense o f joy, serenity and equanimity, determination or
will and such elements of the moral life as right speech, right deeds and
right kind o f living.68 All these thirty-seven factors o f the W ay are
cultivated by the bodhisattva as the means to comprehending the true
nature o f things.69 Application o f mindfulness on the different kinds o f
the basic elements of existence starts with understanding them in their
mundane nature as determinate and conditioned, impermanent and
sources o f suffering. The first form o f contemplation is that all things
are impure. But it does not stop there. The insight needs to be deepened.
The ultimate nature o f rupa is not rupa; in its true nature, rupa is devoid
o f the nature of resistance. Resistance as an activity is not anything
unconditioned; and at the root o f the phenomenon o f resistance there is
no substance, no entity which is rupa in itself.70 All the forms o f the
cultivation o f mindfulness, the application of thought and the process
o f analysis and criticism serve in the case o f the bodhisattva as means for
getting at the basic reality, the indeterminate dharma.7l The application
o f mindfulness is facilitated by the concentration on the impurity o f
things; but this is not a general rule. Again, the contemplation on the
impermanence o f things is helpful, but not with all persons. There is
the aspect o f purity in things as much as impurity; there is again, the
aspect o f permanence (or endurance or continuity) in things as much
as impermanence (arising and perishing).711 Again, impurity, imperma
nence, etc. are not the absolute natures o f things. It is essential for the
farer on the Great W ay, which is itself the Middle Way, to analyze,
understand and appreciate all the distinguishable aspects o f all things;
but what is characteristic o f the Middle W ay is its rising above the ex
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p h il o s o p h y
THE W AY
N A G A K J U N A S PHI LOSOPHY
eludes the other. If one enters the door free from clinging it will take
him straight to the ultimate truth; but if one clings to the door itself,
then the more one pokes in the more will one be daubed with dust and
the greater will ones path get blocked (ffiM Hil).91 In the Mahliyana,
the Sastra observes, all these three doors, which are essentially of the
nature of wisdom, insight, have for their ultimate object the universal
reality
By means o f these one beholds that the world is
itself Nirvana
in its ultimate nature.92
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CH APTER
XI
CONSUMMATION
Section
THE BODHISATTVA
The meaning of the word bodhisattva : W e have noted above that the
bodhisattva, the farer on the Great Way, makes the great resolve at the
very start o f his career that he shall become the Buddha in order to save
all beings from ignorance and passion, error and evil. From the very
outset he seeks to realize the wisdom that constitutes Buddhahood, viz.,
the knowledge o f all forms, the knowledge o f all the ways o f all beings.
This is what gives the Buddhas and the advanced bodhisattvas the
ability to keep themselves en rapport with every situation and render
help to each individual in the way suited to him.1 Speaking o f the im
port o f the term (<hodhisattvayn the astra says:
Bodhi means the way o f all the Buddhas
sattva means
the individual
it also means the great mind (^ ^ ') . This indi
vidual (that is called the bodhisattva) seeks to realize exhaustively all
the merits o f the Buddha. This thought o f his (^'C') is unbreakable,
indestructible, firm like the diamond-mountain. This is the meaning of
great mind. (86a)
As these stanzas put it:
All the factors o f Buddhahood, wisdom as well as moral conduct
and concentration, can benefit every being; it is this (way o f the Bud
dhas) that is called the bodhi.
O f him (who fares on the way to bodhi) the citta is unshakable; it is
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CONSUMMATION
rive constructions in regard to things. Like the deer that is besieged and
hit by the poisonous arrow, they just grow anxious and seek quickly
to get rid (of all things); they do not entertain any other thought. Even
the pratyekabuddhas loathe old-age, disease and death, and yet, they can,
to some extent, look deeper into the nature o f things, and they can also
to some extent help other people to cross (the stream o f ignorance and
passion). They are like the yak caught in the net; although it is hit with
the poisonous arrow, it can still look at its cubs with affection and pity.
But as to the bodhisattva (the farer on the Great W ay), even though he
has distaste for old-age, disease and death, he still has the ability to
comprehend the true nature o f all things; (examining them) to their
very bottom, he penetrates deeply into the twelve-linked (chain of
causation), enters straight into the comprehension o f the non-ultimacy
o f the basic elements o f existence, and enters the limitless dharma-dhatu.
He is like the elephant o f the highest kind (& # ), the king o f elephants
(fc 3i), that has entered the hunters net. Although it is hit with the
arrow, it looks at the hunter with kindness and affection, and remains
absolutely free from fear. It has the ability even then to lead its herd to
the camp, moving forth in peaceful gait.7 (295b)
W hat is it that gives the bodhisattva this strength by which he excels
all the rest? It is his capacity to sustain the comprehension o f the true
nature o f things, his capacity to bear with every circumstance devoid
o f doubt, devoid o f fear and anxiety, and his ability to meet every situa
tion with unimpeded insight and unbounded compassion. It is this that
is known as the anutpattika-dharma-ksdnti, the capacity to endure and to
sustain the truth o f the unborn dharma. By attaining this capacity the
wayfarer enters the true status fnydtna & )9 o f the bodhisattva. Thus the
Sdstra says:
The (true) status o f the bodhisattva is the anutpattika-dharma-ksdnti.
Having achieved this dharma-ksanti (^ifeifeS), he comprehends the
entire world as sunya and remains completely non-clinging at heart.
Being (firmly) established in the true nature o f all things, he does not any
more cling to the world with passion.
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CONSUMMATION
the path) in order to collect (M) all (the further) elements o f merit,
(272a)
They tell him further that although he has understood the true nature
o f things, other people do not know it, and so it is his mission to help
them on the path.1
The power o f skilfulness lies again in his ability to institute different
ways in order to enable all to comprehend the ultimate truth o f things17.
It is by virtue o f his power o f skilfulness that the bodhisattva enters the
determinate modes o f existence in the five states (iSAffifi), experiences
the five kinds o f objects o f sense-pleasure (SSSfc) and in that state, he
leads all beings to freedom from ignorance and passion.18
Cultivating the perfection o f wisdom, the bodhisattva sees every
where all things as lunya, sees that even lunyata is sunya. At this time all
the determinate modes o f knowing become extinct and he realizes the
unimpeded perfect wisdom. And by virtue o f his great compassion and
power o f skilfulness, he gives rise again ( S fi) to all deeds o f merit, and
by virtue o f his pure, (non-clinging) deeds (of merit) leaves no wish o f
his unfulfilled. (314b)
The most distinctive feature o f the true status o f the bodhisattva is
the anutpattika-dharma-ksanti. It is this that gives him the necessary
strength d f skilfulness. This is the basis o f his unbounded compassion.
If he does not efface his individuality and does not abandon beings, it
is because o f his unshakable comprehension o f his essential bound-upness, as an individual, with all the rest. The understanding o f the sutiyanature o f things and the unbounded compassion are only different ex
pressions o f one and the same principle, on the planes o f knowledge and
o f feeling and will respectively. This is the characteristic o f the irreversi
ble bodhisattva.
He deeply thinks o f Nirvana, the unconditioned reality, and in
whatever he does, he does not abandon the world. He is like the great
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dragon (A il) which keeps its tail in the great ocean and its head in the
sky above, and in this way causes the earth to quake, emits lightning
and thunder and brings down great shower. (263c)
Bodhisattva the great being: Bodhisattva is also called mahasattva, a
great being, a being o f brave heart; for he can accomplish great tasks, is
devoid o f any fall, devoid o f any set back. On account o f his heart that
is great and brave (API'i>), he is called a great being. He is the highest
o f beings; he gives rise to great love and compassion, he establishes the
Great W ay, has the ability to tread the Great Path, achieves the highest
state (ftAiS) and accomplishes all the features o f great men (AAiB).
He teaches the W ay and puts an end even to the strongest elements o f
passion and pride. He can exhaustively help all beings to cross over to
the other shore o f peace and joy. Therefore he is called a great being.19
Even if one has accomplished all the factors o f the W ay, the faculties
(ffi), the powers (A), the factors o f enlightenment (% #), the limbs o f the
way (iK#), the six extraordinary powers (abhijna) (A i$S ), all kinds o f
concentration and meditation, as well as the power o f prajna, still, if
one effaces ones individuality only in order to seize the ultimate Nir
vana, one would no doubt be deserving the respect o f all people, but
one would not be held in high esteem by the Buddhas. But in the case
o f one who is truly on the path o f bodhi, even though he is still in the
state o f limitations and afflictions, is still in the womb o f ignorance and
passion, the womb o f the three poisons, and even if one has just set
his mind on the Great, unexcelled W ay and has not yet done anything
to cultivate it, one is nevertheless held in high esteem by all the Buddhas,
as one is sure to reach the status o f the true bodhisattva by progressively
cultivating the six kinds o f perfection and by realizing the power of
skilfulness. One will then realize the knowledge o f all forms, become
the Buddha, and help innumerable beings to cross over to the other
shore. That way, the lineage o f the Buddha, the lineage o f the dharma,
and the lineage o f the sahgha do not become extinct.0
(Although in the initial stage) the bodhisattva will not have emerged
from the shell o f ignorance ($$^1), his voice in the teaching o f dharma
excels that o f the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas,21 (267a)
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CONSUMMATION
Section
II
The preliminaries: The ground that the farer on the Great W ay has to
cover has been distinguished into several stages. Says the Sastra:
The Mahayana is itself the ground; and the ground has ten stages;
to move on from the first to the second (and so on), this is the meaning
o f proceeding (fiffi). This is like riding the horse and moving on to
the elephant; giving up the horse and mounting the elephant; riding
the elephant and moving on to the dragon and giving up the elephant
and mounting the dragon.22 (411a)
As the Sutra puts it, the starting point o f the Great W ay is the de
terminate existence in the three realms and the final destination is the
knowledge o f all forms23 which is distinctive o f Buddhahood. The
different stages mark in a very broad way the progressive cultivation
and the attainments o f the bodhisattva during the course o f his way
faring. He progresses from one stage to another until he reaches the final
destination, the attainment o f Buddhahood which he accomplishes by
achieving all its factors, putting an end to all the traces o f klesa and
realizing the knowledge o f all forms. This consummation he achieves
in the tenth stage, which is the final stage. But the wayfaring begins
with a deep thought
; he thinks deeply o f the W ay o f the Buddha
and deeply delights in it.24 This deep thought, the Sastra says, is really
the responding to, the fixing o f the mind (US) on the final aim, the sarvdkarajnata (HKir), the knowledge o f all forms.2,0 That which is charac
teristic o f the wayfarer in the first stage is this deep thought, deeply
fixing his mind on the final aim. He develops the sense o f equanimity,
approaches the teacher, seeks from him the teaching o f the good dharma,
and himself also imparts it to others.20 The Sastra says that while in the
first stage the wayfarer emphasizes the cultivation o f charity (datia),
in the second stage he emphasizes the cultivation o f purity in moral
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conduct (silo)21 which gives him a sense o f poise and joy.28 He culti
vates forbearance and compassion and does not abandon any being.
He cultivates the sense o f gratefulness for all that he gets in the world.29
In the third stage the wayfarer seeks to achieve wide learning, decks his
mind, the field o f the Buddha, with the virtues that go to make for
Buddhahood; he imparts the pure dharma to all; he remains free from
pride and cultivates the sense o f shame in regard to his own sins.30 In
the fourth stage the wayfarer cultivates the taste for solitude and does
not leave it;31 he becomes a person o f few wants, learns to be contented
and loathes objects o f sense-pleasure and gives away all that he has. His
mind does not give rise to thoughts that spring from the sense o f duali
ty.32 Here he cultivates the ascetic practices (dhuta-gunas). The Sastra
observes that the real dhutaguna is the anutpattika-dharma-ksanti, for this
is the result o f that. The cultivation o f dhuta-guna leads to moral purity
which leads to concentration and meditation which in turn lead to the
anutpattika-dharma-ksanti. Anutpattika-dharma-ksanti is itself the true
prajndP In the fifth stage the wayfarer keeps away from the company o f
the house-holders and nuns, and keeps free from the sense o f jealousy;
he does not indulge in useless talk, and keeps free from pride, anger and
lewdness.34 In the next stage we are told that the wayfarer cultivates all
the six paramitas and does not give rise to pride, passion or misconstruc
tion m regard to his cultivation o f them; he does not entertain the
thought o f adopting the path o f the sravakas or the pratyekabuddhas.35
The decisive stage: While the first six stages may be considered as
preparatory, the most decisive stage in the career o f the bodhisattva is
counted as the seventh stage. In this stage his cultivations and attainments
could be put under three broad heads. Firstly, this is the stage at
which he attains complete freedom from all sense o f clinging; he does
not cling to self or being ; does not cling to the extremes o f ex
istence and non-existence; does not entertain false notions in regard to
the causal origination o f things; does not cling to the constituents o f
individuality; remains free from clinging even in regard to the three
jewels, the Buddha, the dharma and the sahgha; and remains free from
clinging even in regard to his own pure conduct. And here he turns
306
CONSUMMATION
back (tt) from all false notions, all imaginative constructions and all
klesas, and remains completely free from passion.30
Secondly, this is the stage where the bodhisattva realizes the anutpattika-dharma-ksanti,37 This is the element that is characteristic o f the
true status o f the bodhisattva; it is by virtue o f its power that he is
called the irreversible,38 the power by which he is permanently free
from falling back into lower aspirations, especially the intentions o f
adopting the courses o f the sravakas and the pratyekabuddhas. It is here
that the bodhisattva is susceptible to the temptation to efface his indi
viduality,39 by overcoming which he gains the true status o f the bod
hisattva and thereafter he remains irreversible. This is due to the ksanti
that he has now realized, i.e., the capacity to sustain the comprehension
o f the ultimate truth o f things, the dharma devoid o f birth. This ksanti
develops here itself into a complete understanding (jnana),A0 and the
wayfarer realizes the unimpeded understanding (^ 8 8 ^ ) in regard to
all things;41 here he comprehends the ultimately true nature o f things
and rejects the ultimacy o f all particular natures
t@).42 Here he achieves in his cultivation a balance between concentra
tion and understanding ( ^ ^ S ) . 43
Thirdly, we are told, the bodhisattva here abandons his last physical
body and obtains the dharma-kayaj the body born o f dharmata. Thus
the dstra says:
The bodily life in which the bodhisattva achieves the anutpattikadharma-ksanti and puts an end to all the factors o f limitation is his last
physical body, the last pure body o f flesh. W ith the ceasing o f this he
receives the body born o f dharmata, unimpeded by factors o f limitation.
From this state onwards he does not need to be taught the factors o f the
W ay, and even as the boat in the mid-stream o f the great river Ganga
reaches the ocean o f its own accord, without being directed by any
boatman (just so does the bodhisattva in this stage reach straight to Buddhahood). (263c)
The bodhisattva even though embodied in the dharmakaya, still as
sumes the body o f flesh for the purpose o f helping people.44 He is not
307
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CONSUMMATION
I should extol evil things people would readily accept them. How much
m ore readily would they accept if I taught them the true way!48a
(721b)
The Sdstra observes that in the case o f the bodhisattva who is in the
seventh stage although the klesas become extinct, still their vdsand,
residual impressions remain. It is by virtue o f these impressions that he
retains his individuality even when he receives the dharma-kaya; he is
capable o f spontaneously assuming embodiments in physical form;
on account o f his great compassion for all and on account o f his original
oath he comes back to the world
) in order to complete his at
tainment o f the rest o f the factors o f Buddhahood.47 He is different from
ordinary people as his kleias have become extinct; and as he has still
their residual impressions continuing, he is different from the Buddha
in w hom they are totally extinct. The Sdstra observes that it is only in
such a state, viz., when the kleias have become extinct and the residual
impressions have not yet ceased to be, that the bodhisattva can collect
the elements o f merit that go to make for Buddhahood.48 Thus it says:
W hen the bodhisattva realizes the anutpattika-dharma-ksanti he puts
an end to kleias and when he achieves Buddhahood he puts an end to
their residual impressions. (262a)
The consummation: The bodhisattva's attainments in the eighth stage
consist chiefly o f tw o things: firstly, he gains the ability to penetrate into
the minds o f other people and know their mental constitution; this
is very essential for one who wants to help them according to their
own capacities and tendencies. Secondly, in this stage, he freely exercises
all the abhijfids, the elements o f extraordinary power and understand
ing;49 he realizes the constant presence o f the Buddha and beholds Him
in His true nature (inftSSffilf').50 Ever since he set his foot on the path,
it has been his deep desire to be in His constant presence and in this he
is like the calf that always likes to follow the cow, its m other.51 And it
is by such constant thought o f the Buddha that he gets an entry into
His way; it is the irreversible bodhisattva that will achieve this ability
309
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CONSUMMATION
into all the ways o f all things. And so he is not called the Buddha. W hen
he has already entered the door o f the knowledge o f all forms, has com
prehended the universal reality and with the instantaneous enlighten
ment
has realized the highest samyaksambodhi, by putting
an end to all the residual impressions o f kleias and by realizing the power
o f unimpeded, absolute freedom in regard to everything, then he is
called the Buddha.58
There is a difference between the two. But the difference is slight.
It is comparable to the difference between the moon o f the fourteenth
day and the moon o f the fifteenth day. The moon o f the fourteenth
day is almost complete so that when people see it they are not certain
whether it is complete or not; the bodhisattva with the dharma-kya
is like this; he has not really reached compltion and has not yet become
the Buddha. The Buddha is like {he fiill niotm; there can be no doubt
about His completeness.69 Although thfc moon o f the fourteenth day
is also bright, still its brightness is not equaled that o f the fifteenth day.60
The former cannot raise the tide in the greAt ocean as high as the latter.
In a similar way, although the bodhisattva has the true praj in its
purity, still, he has not yet been able to fulfil all the factors of Buddhahood, he cannot move (j) the mind o f all the people everywhere.
But even as the full moon o f the fifteenth day can cause the highest
rise o f the tide in the great ocean, jst -sd, tfye bodhisattva, when he
becomes the Buddha, can shed light everywhere, can move the minds
o f all the people in all regions.61 The difference between the two is that
the one is on the move towards (tfJil) fulfilment, while the other has
already achieved fulfilment.62
.
The view of the analysts: The Sastra deals at length with the nature of
Buddhahood as well as o f the wayfaring o f the bodhisattva as conceived
by the Sarvastivadins, viz., Katyayanlputra and his followers. It points
out that they do not see the Buddha in His true essence. They lay em
phasis on the physical body and they have no conception of the tran
scendental nature o f the Buddha or q f the way how the Buddhas and
311
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
and remarks that this is arithmetic arid constitutes a small part o f the
worldly knowledge; it is not the true prajndparamitd which consists in
the comprehension o f the ultimate nature o f things as the unconditioned
reality, the undivided being.60
The true prajndparamitd is the mother of all the Buddhas, (for) it can
lay bare ( ^ ) the ultimate reality o f all things. This true prajna (which
is the same as the ultimate truth) is beyond all determinations, neither
going nor coming. It cannot be obtained anywhere by looking for it.
(93a)
312
C O NSUM M A TIO N
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
are only o f the Buddha. They are found even in other great men like
the emperor, although in the latter they cannot be said to be complete.
In the Buddha, however, they arise as the fruit o f the long cultivation
o f the kinds o f perfection, under the guiding light o f the perfection o f
wisdom; only then do these features become complete (A S ) and these
are specially o f the Buddha. The essential point is the cultivation o f the
wayfaring in the light o f the perfection o f wisdom. The others cultivate
merely the acts o f charity etc. devoid o f the perfection o f wisdom. In
them these features have not attained to completeness.71
The Sastra observes that in the Great W ay the thirty-two bodily
features are taught in regard to the path o f merit; and the devoidness
o f features has been taught in regard to the path o f wisdom. In regard
to the physical body ( ) these features have been taught while the
devoidness o f features has been taught in regard to the dharma-body
(dharmakaya
The physical body o f the Buddha is decked with the
thirty-two features and the eighty minor signs, whereas the dharmtikaya o f the Buddha consists o f the ten powers ( + ^ ) , the four elements
o f self confidence (MSk)t die four elements o f expertness (SSSBfP), and
the eighteen extraordinary elements
avenikadharmah).12 T o
these there must be addaU he element o f great love and compassion and
the six kinds o f abhijHd, alignstituting the dharmakaya.7a The dharmakaya
is not anything substantial; it is also conditionally originated. It arises
as the fruit o f long cultivation in the path o f wisdom and compassion;
it arises from the togetherness o f many factors.74 These elements that
constitute the dharmakaya being undefiled are truly no occasions for
clinging; even these are a t anything substantial; these are also condi
tionally originated and impermanent. In their ultimate nature they are
not anything determinate; they are the indeterminate dharma, the un
conditioned reality itself. In that nature they enter the tathata, dharmadhatu, bhutakotiJh
In the world for the sake o f those who take delight in seeing the
beautiful physical form and through that set their minds on the path,
the body o f the thirty-two features is manifested. This is the mundane
truth, but this is not to deny the ultimate truth o f the indeterminate
dharma, nor the conditionedness o f the determinate. The Buddha takes
314
CONSUMMATION
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
o f the dharmakaya are the limitless wisdom and the unbounded com
passion; these are the different phases, different expressions o f the ulti
mate truth o f the undivided being on the plane o f mundane life. It is
as wisdom and compassion that paramartha is relevant to vyavahara, in
regard to wayfaring.
316
CHAPTER
XII
CONCLUSION
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CONCLUSION
A g X r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
CONCLUSION
is on the need to overcome the false sense o f the real, the error o f mis
placed absoluteness, and in this light, for him the specific formulations
have all their respective places and functions, while not any o f them is
absolutely true nor any end in itself His interest did not consist in
offering any system o f metaphysics. It lay in bringing to light the basic
insight that underlies the construction o f all such systems, o f any system.
In this the Madhyamika philosophy is on a footing different from the
Advaita Vedanta which obviously emphasizes and brings to prominence
a specific formulation o f the basic truth while not overlooking the allimportant truth o f the non-ultimacy o f such a formulation, viz., that
it is a means and not an end in itself. In a similar way the Madhya
mika philosophy is on a footing different even from Vijnanavada.
Vijnanavada also attempts to formulate a specific metaphysical system,
emphasizing the subjective element in cognition and built on the
central conception o f alayavijnana, the center and the basis o f the
course o f personal life. But certainly even Vijnanavada does not
overlook the ultimate truth o f the undivided being.12
The Madhyamika in the early Chinese thought: (I) Kumdrajiva: It was
Kumarajiva who introduced Nagarjuna to China. O ur only source for
gathering some idea o f his own thought is his correspondence with
Hui-yiian now preserved in the Chinese Collection under the title
(Exposition o f the Great Meaning o f Mahayana).13 The
major part o f the correspondence is devoted to an elucidation o f the
nature o f dharmakdya. There are also discussed the Sarvastivada doctrine
o f elements, their atomism, the meaning o f taihata, dharmadhatu and
bhutakoti, the nature o f the process o f cognition and the all-inclusive
learning or cultivation
o f the bodhisattva. The main features o f
Kumarajivas thought have been set forth by Professor T ang Yungtung as follows:14
(1) Kumarajiva laid special emphasis on the Prajndpdramita-sutras and
on the works o f Nagarjuna for whom he had great respect; he always
looked to these, especially to the Sdstra as his source for insight.15
(2) He deeply criticised the Sarvastivada doctrine of elements. It may
be recalled that he was first a student o f Sarvastivada a later he rejected
321
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CONCLUSION
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CONCLUSION
pdramitasutras and the Sdstra. And it is these, again that Chi-tsang also
brought to the fore as the essential points in the philosophy o f the Madhyamika, by drawing attention to the need for non-clinging which is
the skilfulness o f the wise. His theory o f double truth38 is an extension
or an elaboration of the central teaching o f the Madhyamika, viz., o f not
clinging to existence or to non-existence, not clinging to the sunya or
to the asunya. To cling to the false notion o f existence is the error of
the common people (and o f the Sarvastivadins) and to cling to sunyata,
which Chi-tsang takes as clinging to Nirvana, is the error o f the sravakas
and the pratyekahuddhas and to cling to the comprehension o f neither
existence nor non-existence is the error o f the clinging bodhisattva.89
The comprehension that is truly non-clinging is neither mundane nor
ultimate, neither birth and death nor Nirvana, not even the negation o f
mundane or ultimate, nor o f birth and death, nor o f Nirvana. It is
this that is the true awakening.40 Neither birth and death nor Nirvana,
this is the ultimate truth o f things.41 But this is really not a rejection o f
anything.42 The wise who are skilful do not reject anything. By not
destroying, not violating the truth o f derived name, the wise teach the
ultimate truth o f things. N ot moving from the sambodhi, they establish
everything.43 In fact nothing is denied, for the things o f derived name
are themselves in their ultimate nature the unconditioned reality. Here
Chi-tsang quotes Seng-chao to the effect that things o f the world are
neither truly, i.e., absolutely existent nor purely illusory, and so the'
rejection is not o f the things themselves.44 It is the realization o f the
nature and distinction o f the mundane and the ultimate truths, not
clinging to these, that is the Middle Way. Chi-tsangs thought is certain
ly one o f the very best examples o f the Madhyamika W ay. His emphasis
also is on the negative way, the way by which to reject at different levels
the tendency to cling, and to realize the truly ultimate, the undivided
reality. The rejection o f clinging is the negative import o f sunyata and
it is this that is emphasised in the School o f the Three Treatises ( S
&).4r>
(IV)
T ien-tai (^S :) and Hua-yen (j8c): The positive import of
sunyata, viz., the tathatd came to be emphasised in the T ien-tai School
325
Xg a r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
which takes as its basic texts the works o f Nagrjuna, especially* the
stra along with the Saddharmapundarika-sutra.4* It is to be noted that
the philosophy o f Nagrjuna allows for conceiving the real as the
ground o f the universe. This is in fact an essential import o f dharmadhtu; the real is the true root o f things; it is the immanent as well as the
transcendent; it is within the heart o f all beings; it is the ultimate goal
o f the whole course o f life. But with Nagrjuna this is not the ultimate
truth; this is a way o f expressing the essential nature o f things, viz.,
that in their ultimate nature they are themselves the unconditioned
reality. The conception o f dharmadhtu, viz., that the real is the ground
o f the universe, comes to be emphasised in the T ien-Tai School, and
this is elaborated by the use o f the conception o f tathgatagarbha as found
in The Awakening of Faith.11 There comes to be in it a mixture o f
Vijnavda also.48 W hile the distinction o f the three characters4 or
natures, viz., the real (parinispanna 35T), the dependent (paratantra iftftfe)
and the illusory (parikalpita ftM ), are framed in terms o f Vijnavda,
the ten kinds o f tathat we are told have their basis in the Saddharmaptindarika\ these latter bear close relation to the nine kinds o f inferior
tathat that the stra speaks of.50 The central doctrine of T ien-tai
is the Integration o f All Things, i.e., that all things and events o f the
phenomenal world, despite their manifold variety, are in a state o f
harmonious integration (St), one with another.51 This is not different
from the teaching o f the Prajpramit-sutras when they say that every
thing tends to everything else.52 W e have already seen its place in
the Philosophy o f Ngrjuna; it is an essential import o f smyata as rela
tivity. This is also the synthesis o f the real and the phenomenal, as con
veyed in the teaching that the real is not anything apart from the
world, it is the world itself seen with the eye o f wisdom. Again, when
the world is seen as distinct from the real the latter is the ground o f the
former. These ideas come to be developed in T ien-fai. Again, in the
true spirit o f the Mdhyamika we have the advice, Only eliminate the
ills but not the things. The ills consist in the sensory clingings but not
in the great functioning itself.52" . . . we can remain within that
world without that fact causing any impediment to ourselves. 53 These
features more or less hold good even in the case o f Hua-yen.54 The six
326
CONCLUSION
NAGARJUNAS PHILOSOPHY
CONCLUSION
n a g X r j u n a s p h i l o s o p h y
330
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I. The Works of NBgSrjuna that arc (I) available in orginal Sanskrit (II) attributed to
him in Chinese and/or Tibetan traditions as well as (III) their restorations and re
translations by modem authors have all been noted on pp. 34-37.
On life and work o f Nagatjuna cp. also 1) Mochizuki ShinkS, Bukkyo Daijiten}
vol. V, pp. 4995a-4997b and Wintemitz, History of Indian Literature (Calcutta
University, 1933), vol. II, pp. 34i 35i*
II. PrajffBparamitB-sutras, editions and Chinese translations: 1) Pancauimsati-sahasrika and
2) AstasahasrikB:
1)
PaHcauimsatisBhasrikB-prajffapBramitB, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt (Calcutta Oriental
Series), London, 1934. This is a rearranged version o f the original Paffcauimsati to
suit to AbhisamayBlafikdra o f Maitrcya (abhisamayBlahkBrBnusBrqta samsodhita).
Still, except for the differences in division that are due to rearrangement, the Skt.
text closely follows
T. 223, which is Kumirajivas translation
o f Paffcauimsati. The text edited by Nalinaksha Dutt is incomplete; only the first
abhisamaya is published which corresponds up to the end ofprakarana XXVI
*ft) o fT . 223.
There are two complete translations o f Paffcauimiatl in Chinese:
1) TaishS 221
tr. Moksala (291 a .d .); see Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine, vol. I, p. 121.
II) T. 223,
tr. KumSrajiva (403-404 A.D.); see Bagchi, op.,
cit., p. 185.
The Mah B-prajHapdrami ta-sastra is a commentary on the original Paffcauimsati;
both this Sutra and the Bstra were translated by Kumarajiva. The Bstra appears
along with the Sutra (T. 223) in T. 1509.
III) T. 222
is an incomplete translation o f Paffcauimsati covering only up
to the end o f prakarana XXIX (EftTEtfp) o f T. 223.
2) AstasahsrikB-prajffaparamitB, ed. Rajendralala Mitra, Bibliotheca Indica,
Calcutta, 1888; the text o f Asta. is incorporated in the Abhisamayalankaraloka, ed.
U Wogihara, Tokyo, 1932-1933; this version is considered to be the earliest ver
sion of the Prnjftaparmita; see N. Dutt, Aspects, pp. 39-40. The Sanskrit text o f
Asta. (ed. R. Mitra) is consulted in the present worK specially in regard to that
portion o f T 223 for which no corresponding Skt portion has been published.
The earliest Chinese translation of Asta. was by Lokaksema (179 A.D.); igtff
# 8 (T. 224); see Bagchi, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
33 i
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
Cp. also:
I) T. 225,
tr. Chih-chien (d. 273 a.d.); see Bagchi, op. cit., p. 289;
II) T. 227,
tr. Kumarajiva (408 a.d.); see Bagchi, op. cit.,
p. 289;
III) T. 228,
tr. Danapala (10th cent. a.d.);
see Bagchi, op. cit., vol. II, p. 600. The Taish 5 edition adduces Skt. parallels in the
foot notes, T. 225, 227 and 228 as well as T. 224 are translations o f Asia.
For a short account o f the different versions o f the Prajnaparamita-sutras, see
Prof. Etienne Lamotte, Le Traite dc la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, vol. I, pp. vii-ix;
Prof. T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (Allen & Unwin, 1955),
pp. 83-84.
Prof. Koun Kajiyoshi in his
1944 ) has
tried to trace the original version o f the Prajnaparamita-sutra by comparing the
different versions that are now available.
III. Editions of the Buddhist Canon in Chinese:
I) Taisho-shitishii-daizdkyd (;^IE#f{ijE;*:SM), ed. Professor Takakusu and Pro
fessor Watanabe, Tokyo, 1922-1933 (abbreviated in the present work as T.);
and
II) Hsii-tsang-ching (iH&KO. Supplement to the Kyoto Edition o f the Chinese
Tripitaka (pub. Zokyo Shoin Tokyo, 1905-1912), reprinted, Commercial Press,
1923.
III) 38* publ.
is an excellent annotated edition o f selected texts,
including
( # 1-34) and
( # 1-15).
IV. Modern Catalogues and Indices:
1) Shdwa Hobo So Mokuroku ( B B f P f e J f t t J 3IH&, 1929*
2) Bussho Kaisetsu Daijiten ( t t # # * * , * 3lCWJ8 iitt
1931)
3) Nanj 5 Bunyu, Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka,
Oxford, 1883, rev. ed. Tokyo, 1929;
4) P. C. Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique en Chine, 2 vols. (Librarie Orientaliste
Paul Gunther, Paris, 1927 and 1938);
5) Daijo Tokiwa and Unrai Ogiwara, Japanese Alphabetical Index of Nanjios
Catalogue of the Buddhist Tripitaka, Nanjio-Hakushi Kinen Kakkokwai, Tokyo.
6) Hobogirin (feftig#), Fascicule Annexe, 1931; and
7) Fo-tsang tzu-mu yin-te, CombinS Indices to the Authors and Titles of Books and
Chapters in Four Collections of Buddhist Literature, Harvard-Yenching Index Scries
11, in 3 vols., 1933.
V. Dictionaries:
1) Mahavyutpatti, ed. Sakaki Ryosaburo ($ $ I f li;* :^ ) 2 parts
4 ^, pt. I, text, 1916 and pt. II, Index, 1925);
2) Mahavyutpatti, ed., Wogihara Unrai, Tokyo, 1926;
3) Mochizuki Shinko, Bukkyo Daijiten
Tokyo, 1954);
4) Oda T 5 kund, Bukkyo Daijiten
Tokyo, 1917); this has a Chinese
translation by Ting Fu-pao (7 wii,
Shanghai, 1919);
332
BIB L IO G R AP H Y
5) Fa-hsiang tz'u-tien
in 4 vols., Commercial Press, 1939;
6) Soothill W. E. and Levis Hodous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms
(K. Paul, Trench, Trubner& Co., London, 1937);
7) O. Rosenberg, Introduction to the study of Buddhism according to Material pre
served in China and Japan, pt. I, Vocabulary (#&#t#F$;ji$|), Tokyo, 1916.
8) Pali-English Dictionary by T. W. Rhys Davids and William Steed, Pali Text
Society, London.
9) Nyanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, Island Hermitage Publication No. 1,
Frewin & Co. Ltd., Colombo, 1956.
VI. Studies or Explanatory Notes on the Prajnpramit-sstra by the ancient Chinese and
Japanese Scholars:
1) Hui-ying jg*f (6th cent.),
(Sub-commentary on the Mah-prajtpramit-sstra) ; available only in fragments in Hsii-tsang-chin, vols. 74 and 87;
contain chs. I, VI, XIV-XV, XVII, XXI and XXIV, the explanatory notes re
spectively on chs. I, XIX-XXI, XXXII-XXXVI, LIX-LXIV and LXXVLXXXII o f die stra.
This work has been referred to by Prof. Demieville in his review o f Prof.
Lamotte's tr. (vol. II) o f the stra; see Journal Asiatique, Anne 1950, fascicule,
no. 3 (pp. 375-395), pp. 376-377 and p. 377, n. 1.
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
lost. There are in all two hundred and twenty sub-headings for so many topics;
in all these, every topic is explained in accordance with Abltidharma, Satyasiddhi
and MahByBna and under the last mentioned the PrajBaparamitB-sBstra is quoted
throughout, often at great length. This work was of help to me in organizing the
materials collected from the Bstra. The Taisho edition bean the notations indicat
ing the references to the chapters ($ ) in the respective texts quoted, including the
Bstra.
On Hui-yiian, see
(T 2060) 4890-492^
on Chi-tsangfs
4) Xncho, a Japanese Buddhist monk, has his Notes
Commentary on the Madhyamaka-sastra (T. 2225). This was composed in the years
801-806; see Fung Yu-lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II, p. 727.
5)
(H
v ol. 27 p p . 457-539) o f 0
( o f f^AlSs
jS # ) (c o m p ile d 1668 a .d .) is a useful in d e x to the Bstra.
VII.
NOTES
Preface
1 See Professor Demivilles review of
Professor Lamotte's Le Traite De La
Grande Vertu De Sagesse, vol. II, Journa Asiatique, (Anne 1950 pp. 375- 395)*
p. 380.
1 On the life and work o f Kumrajiva,
see his biographical account in Kaoseng-chuan, T. 2059: 3302-333a. Pro
fessor T'ang Yung-tung has a whole
chapter on Kumrajiva and his dis
ciples: Han Wei Liang-chin Nan-pei(h'ao Fo-chiao Shih
fe S t.
I 95 J). vol. I, pp.
278-340. Cp. also Professor Tsukamoto,
Studies in Chao Lun, Kyoto, 1954 ( $
IW ^.feRI.P7t3).pp-130-146;
Dr. P. C. Bagchi, Le Canon Bouddhique
en Chine, I, (Paris, 1927), pp. 178-200;
W. Liebenthal, The Book of Chao, (ffc
Jft) (The Catholic University o f Peking,
1948), pp. i ff. and p. 67, n. 241. Dr.
Bagchi and Professor Liebenthal give
translations of extracts from Kao-sengchuan. Professor Demiville, op. cit.,
also gives a short account of Kumrajiva.
3 While the generally accepted dates for
Kumrajiva and his disciple Seng-chao
are 343 /44-413 and 383-414 respectively
Prof. Tsukamoto (op. cit. p. 113) pro
poses the dates 350-409 and 374-414
respectively.
4 See Licbenthal, op. cit., p. 3.
6 For an account o f the translations by
Kumrajiva, see Bagchi, op. cit., pp.
335
N A G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
NOTES
his account o f the topography o f the
area at large) and inasmuch as these
accounts o f Hsiian-tsang cannot possi
bly be about the Siddha Nagarjuna,
for the latter can hardly be held to have
been the friend o f the Satavahana king,
the tradition that connects the earlier
Nagarjuna with Bhramaragiri can be
accepted. On the identification of Bhra
maragiri with Sriparvata as well as on
other names connected with Nagaijuna,
see K. R . Subramanian, op. cit. and P. S.
Sastri, op. cit.
7 Max Walleser, Life of Nftgdrjuna. p.
427. W hile the Saraha o f the Tibetan
tradition may be the teacher of Siddha
Nagarjuna, one has to take note o f the
mention by Asanga o f a Rahulabhadfa
as a renowned teacher o f the Madhyamika Philosophy; see
T. 1565,
p. 40b.
8 T. 2047, 184b, 185c.
9 Pag-sam-jon-zang says that Nagaijuna
began to study SarvSstivada in his
eighth year under Rahula and was
given initiation; see Sunitikumar Pathak, Life of Nagarjuna (from Pag-samjon-zang), (Ind. Hist. Qly.t XXX,
1954) p. 93; see Max Walleser, Life of
Nagarjuna pp. 437-3 8. It is difficult to say
who this Rahula is and to which NagJrjuna this refers. It may be recounted
that the study o f Sarvastivada as a pre
liminary in their career was common
to many Mahayana teachers; Vasubandhu and Kumarajiva are examples.
10 T. 2047: 184c, 186a; cp. Max Wal
leser, Life of Nagarjuna, passim. T. 2047,
1846 speaks of Nagarj una's being
given the Mahayana sutras by an old
bhiksu and later, after speaking of N agaij unas wandering in search of more
sutras, it states (184c) that a Mahanaea
took him into the sea, opened up the
Treasury of Seven Jewels, laid before
N A G A R JU N A S PHILOSO PH Y
A
29 See Sastra
70a, 92a, 273a, 341c, 343a.
The Chinese Collection has three Vibhdsd texts: T. 1545, T. 1546 and T.
1547. The first two are close to each
other but the second is incomplete.
The first one is the Abhidharma-mahavibhdsa-sastra (tr. Hsiian-tsang). The
third, T. 1547, seems to be a different
text. W hile the first two are said to
have been compiled by five hundred
arahats*, the third one is attributed to a
Shitohanni (Katyajtaniputra?).
29<j JHanaprasthana has two different
translations in Chinese: T. 1543 and
T. 1544. For a recent retranslation of
this text into Sanskrit, see Santibhiksu
Sastri, Jfidnaprasthdna-sdstra, Viivabharati University, Santiniketan, 1955.
80 Watters, op. cit., I, pp. 270-278.
31 T. 2049: i89a-b. Paramartha work
ed in China 546-569 A.D.
32 dstra, 70a.
33 W hile the whole o f the present work
may be said to be an attempt to lay bare
the different meanings o f this central,
the most basic concept, sunyatd, we
may note here roughly its chief im
ports: 1) In reference to vyavahdra, the
mundane nature o f things, it means
basically naihsvdbhdvya which means
devoidness o f self-being, o f uncondi-
9 5 ~ 9 7
338
NOTES
212, n. 1.
86 That Nagarjuna was not the earliest
to interpret the PrajHaparamita-sutras is
perhaps borne out by such places in
the astra where it refers to the differ
ent opinions in regard to matters like
the definition o(prajHd; cp. ibid., 139c.
88 See N. Dutt, op. cit., p. 330-331.
87 For a complete list o f dtations from
the Buddhist Scriptures in the astra see
Mochizuki Shinko, Bukkyo Daijiten,
vol. IV, pp. 3322 ff; the Nei-hsiiehyiian edition o f the astra has noted
all dtations in regard to chs. I-XXXIV;
Prof. Lamotte op. cit. has identified
many of these in regard to chs. I-XVIII.
38 Kumarajivas transl. o f this Sutra,
T.475 (vol. 14: 537a~557a); cp. also
T. 474 (tr. Chih-chien) and T. 476
(tr. Hsiian-tsang). See espedally the
section, AAvayadharmadvSra (T. 475:
550b ff.)
89 Cp. among other places, 168b, 97b.
40 Cp. Kasyapaparivarta (Skt. text ed.
Stael Holstein) pp. 82 ff.
41 Dasabhumivibhasa-sastra, T. 1521 (vol.
26, 2oa-i22b); ibid. 21b makes it clear
that the text is intended as a commen
tary on the Dasabhumika-sutra.
42 See especially ibid., 28c, 39a-4oa,
117a-!18b.
43 Cp. astra, among other places (ch.
XXXI), 292a-c. Many references to
Agamas are found throughout the first
thirty-four chapters; these have been
noted by the editors o f the Nei-hsiiehyuan edition o f this text.
** astra chs. XII, XIV and LXX have
references to the doctrines of Sankhya
and VaiSesika; see below, chs. VII and
VIII. astra, 5460-5472 gives a sucdnct
account o f the twenty-four tattvas o f
the Sankhya. Dasabshumi-vibhasa men
tions a number o f non-Buddhist
schools; seeT. 1521, 31c. Cp. Ratndvali
N G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
NOTES
N A G A R JU N A 'S PH ILO SO PH Y
NOTES
sthdnam na karoti panditah. On right
view, see dstra 312c, 412b and 677c;
see below, ch. V.
93 Cp. Karika, XXV: 24:
Sarvopalambhopasamah
prapaHcopasamah sivah; na kvacit kasyacit kascit
dharmo buddhena desitah.
94 Cp. Candrakirti: Prasannapadd, p.
57: paramartho hydrydnam tusnimbhavah.
96 Ibid., p. 494: kin tu laukikam vyavahdram anabhyupagamya abhidhandbhidheyajdanajdeyddilaksanam asakya eua
paramartho desayitum . . . tasmdt . . .
samvrtir addv evdbhyupeya bhajanam iva
salilarthind.
96 O n the ultimate meaning o f the sense
of 1/ see below, ch. Ill; see also the
author's paper, The Sense o f I (Proc.
Ind. Phil. Cong., 1956, 173-182).
97 Cp. Vigrahavydvartani, 29-30.
98 Cp. Sastra, 75a, 253b.
99 Karika, XXIV: 18.
199 Ibid., XIII: 8.
191 Ibid., XXIV: 8.
192 Ibid., XXV: 9.
103 Ibid., X: 16; XXVII: 8.
194 Ibid., XXIV: 14
104a dstra, 102a if.
105 Ibid., 191a ff.
106 Ibid., 195c.
107 Ibid., 285b-296b.
108 Ibid., 298b-299a.
109 Ibid., 297b.
110 Ibid., 324b ff.; also ibid., 326b.
111 See e.g., ibid., 256b.
112 Ibid., 347a-35ib.
113 See ibid., $6}c-s64*, also ibid., 653c.
114 Ibid., 692c ff.
116 See especially section 79 of the
Sutra, ibid., 687c, ff.
118 Karika, XXIV: 10.
117 See the colophon, dstra, 756c: The
first prakarana of the Sutra has been ex
plained in the thirty-four chapters and
this part is complete; but from the
N A G A R JU N A S PH IL O SO PH Y
yam;
NOTES
N A G A R JU N A 'S PH ILO SO PH Y
I 55- U 9 .
182 Ibid., pp. 160-166. In the Vibhasd
(T. 1545) the Darstantikas figure as a
very important group of Buddhist
thinkers. W e do not have any school
o f this name in the lists o f die early
Buddhist schools. It is quite possible
that the formation o f this school was
rather late, some time before the com
position o f the Vibhasd; but by the time
o f its composition they had already
become a very important group and
they are very firequendy mentioned
there. There is a tradition that the
Darstantikas belonged to the same
lineage as the Sautrantikas and were
anterior to them. Thus K*uei-chi tells
us in his Notes on Siddhi (ch. IV, q. in
Fa Ren, II, 9b) that the lineage of
the Sautrantikas is to be distinguished
into three stages: I) under the leader
ship of Kumaral&a (100 years A.N.)
who is also known as drstdnta (ddrstantika). teacher; II) under Srilata and
III) the Sautrantika proper; the last men
tioned have the name Sankrantivadins
and they apper 400 years A.N. Cp.
also Fa Ren III, 46a.
The Darstantikas, as it could be
gathered in the Vibhdsa, show very
clear leanings in the direction o f ab
solutism and even idealism. They hold
that the derived, dependent nature o f
things means their lack o f absoluteness
(T. 1545, 154b, 479a-c, 76oa-b, 797b),
that the pratyayas are not real and sub
stantial (ibid. 283a) and they admit a
theory of illusion and say that illusory
objects are devoid of reality, (ibid. 193 b,
390c and 696b).
163 Both these interpretations are based
on the words o f the Buddha. The first
is based on such statements as Sabbam uccati dvddasdyatandni,, (Mahaniddesa) and the second, on Atitam ced
346
NOTES
N G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
NOTES
well as its commentary, the Abhidharmamaha-vibhasa-sastra expound the bodhisattva-way. (See T. 1545, 893 if.) The
point that the astra makes out is that
the Sarvastivadins do not properly
comprehend and adequately appreciate
the nature and value o f the path of
bodhisattva or o f the ideal o f Buddhahood; they fall short o f true wisdom
and compassion.
7 Cp. tatn, 86a:
see below, ch. X.
Chapter II
1 For a graphic account o f mans thirst
for the real, see astra, 298b-299a;
see below, pp. 264-265.
2 The ultimate object is the uncondi
tioned reality which one realizes by
stripping it bare o f the veils o f conven
tion; see below, Section II, Modes of
Convention.
3 The factors o f the W ay are all traced
to prajna and punya, wisdom and meri
torious action; see Stra, 262c. Sec
below, p. 280.
4 It is to be noted that hereafter
throughout the work the closely printed
passages are translations from the
astra, unless otherwise indicated; the
raised number appearing immediately
at the end o f the passage refers to the
number o f the note that appears at the
end o f this book; the number it). the
parenthesis that follows the raised
number refers to the place where the
passage occurs in the Taisho edition
o f this text, T. 1509; Sutra, unless
otherwise indicated refers to the Sutra
portion in this text.
bodhisattva: the full text is bodhisat
tva mahasattva; in this compound,
hereafter mahasattva is omitted for
the sake o f brevity wherever the sense
o f the passage is not affected; for the
349
N G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
NOTES
351
N G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
Chapter III
1 Cp. Paficavimsati., p. 232: sa cet
kmadhtuh . . . aviparinmadharmt
bhvo abhavisyat nbhvah naivedam
mahdynam sadevamanussuram okam
abhibuhya niraysyat.
2 The illustrations o f illusion occur at
several places in the Prajnpramitstras: see stra, chs. VI, LXXI,
LXXXVIII, XCV and XCVI; these
are intended to bear out the nature of
ignorance by which one gives rise to
misconstruction and clinging as well
as the wisdom o f the wise who under
stand the unreal as unreal and fare in
things w ith the skilfulness o f non
clinging.
3 See ibid., 296c, 338b and 546c.
4 Cp. Paficavimsati., p. 147: Naite
riputra dharmh tath samvidyante
yath blaprthagjannfim abhinivesah . . .
yath na samvidyante tath satmridyante,
evam avidyamnh, tenocyate avidyeti. . .
taira blh avidyym trsnym ca
abhinivisth; tait avidym tjjm ca
kalpitm kalpayitv avidytrsnbhym abhinivisya ubhbhym antbhym sakth;
te ubhav antau na jnanti na pasyanti;
yath dharmh na samvidyante, te tn
dharmn kalpayitv namarupe abhinivis
th. Cp. also Asia., p. 15.
They so exist etc.: The Chinese
passage could also be rendered: Things
are o f such and such nature, things are
devoid o f such and such naturethis
the people do not know and this is
ignorance. The Sanskrit parallel o f this
is not very dear and it has a tendency
to identify avidy with the objects o f
avidy (avidyamn tenocyate avidyeti);
Asta., p. 15 has: tenocyante avidyeti.
perversions and imaginative construelions ( ^ l ^ g l j ) : also, Jg ^ ^ -g lja n d t t
to all these variants o f imagi-
N O TES
101C -105C .
NAGARJUNA'S
p h il o s o p h y
Chapter I V
NOTES
devoid o f objects
(and hence
devoid o f sanction) one would not
fall into the lot o f birth and death,
one would then realize the eternal
peace, the joy o f Nirvana.
Ibid., 563c: The bodhi par excellence
is itself prajBBpBramitB; when in the
heart o f the Buddha it is^called bodhi
while in the heart o f the bodhisattva it
is called prajBB.
See below, ch. V.
10 The prajBB that arises from the combi
nation of causal factors is the functional
prajBB; it has for its object the ultimate
reality as well as the conditioned, con
tingent entities. Sometimes Bstra dis
tinguishes between prajBBpBramitB and
the expedient knowledge; the
latter consists in hearing the Siitras, and
thinking, weighing, and considering
their meaning; the former arises from
this latter kina. (Sec ibid., 1960-1972 and
263c). See ibid. 162a where
means the consummating wisdom o f
ikillfulness (upBya); cp. also ibid., 552a
where
tulanB (weighing) is said to be
the knowledge (^JK ) t^ lt *s different
from prajBB. Referring to the limidessness of objects, Bstra says: As the objects
are unending, so is knowledge too; even
as when the vessel is big the lid is big
too. (see ibid., 74bc,124a, 266a). Ibid.
125b distinguishes jnSna (<*) from
vijBana {$&): jfiana weighs things and
distinguishes between good ana bad,
while vijBBna simply seeks pleasure
always and does not enter into the pro
per and the essential. Ibid., 251a distin
guishes between jBana (p) and darsana
ClL): a^ r reading or reciting the scrip
tures following other people, to weigh
and consider (the meaning o f what is
read or recited), this isjBBna; (thereupon)
to realize the truth in ones self ( g Jjf'
^JiE ) is darsana; the one is not neces
n a g a r j u n a s p h i l o s o p h y
NOTES
10 Cp. dstra 63 c.
11 Sec above, p. 356 n. 3.
12 On the mundane right view (ttfrflfljE
* ) see ibid., 312c; on the distinction
between the mundane right view and
the transmundane right view see ibid.,
412b. See also ibid., 677c.
12 Cp. Kdrikd, XVIII: 6:
Atmetyapi prajflapitam andtmetyapi desitam; buddhair ndtmd nacdnatmd kaicid
ityapi desitam.
14 See above p. 344, n. 131.
15 both these teachings are true, cp. ibid.,
59b, 139c, 297C-298a, 338b-c, 424a.
the ringfinger:
is a literal trans
lation o f andmikd,n nameless, a
term which is most apt to convey the
relatively indeterminate nature, which
is the point o f the analogy here.
16 Cp. ibid., 254a; cp. also ibid. 424a.
17 Cp. ibid. 254a.
18 Candrakirti tells us that Nagatjuna
wrote the Madhyamaka-sdstra in order
to set forth the distinction between
the Sutras of neydrtha and those of
nitartha; see Prasannapada, p. 41: ata
evedam madhyamakasdstram pramtam
dcdryena neyanltdrthasutrdntavibhdgopadarsanartham.
19 See dstra (338c) which cites Kdrika,
XVIII, 8: Sarvam tathyam na vd tathyam
tathyan cdtathyam eva ca; naivdtathyam
naiva tathyam etad buddhdnusdsanam.
20 Cp. 254b.
21 The four siddhantas arc: (tfcl?-) mun
dane (laukika), ( # 4 j S A ) individual
(prdtipaurusika),
remedial (prdtipahsika) and (fj|H ) the ultimate
(paramdrthika). These renderings are of
Prof. Lamotte; cp. Lamotte, op. cit.,
p. 27, n. I. For the whole account o f
the four siddhdntas, see dstra, 59b-6ib.
22 Cp. Lamotte, op. cit., p. 32, n. 2.
has another reading
which allows the rendering: The
Xg a r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
* * * )
40 impermanence
to sunyata):
Cp.
Chapter VI
358
NOTES
causal continuity and the effectiveness
o f deeds and the right view of sunyata
that does not cling to the total denial
o f things. Cp. Kdrikd, ch. XXIV; cp.
Candrakirtis Prasannapada, p. 159.
3 This is the substance o f ch. XXIV
o f Kdrikd.
4 dstra, 171a; cp. the Buddhas teach
ing to Katyayana [Samyu. II, 17) cited
above p. 344, notes 130-131; cp. Kdrikd,
XV: 7; astra 170c cites a gdthd to
say: W hen one sees the dharma devoid
o f birth then one becomes free from
(clinging to) the bom, the conditioned;
when one sees the incomposite dharma
then one becomes free from (clinging
t6) the composite entities. Cp. above, pp.
139-140, the pratipaksikasiddhanta. Kdri
kd XV: 9-11 mak^ out that the denial
o f the extremes o f is and is not *s
in order to bring to light the nature of
things as change (anyathdtva). Cp. also
ibid., XIII: 2-5.
6 Cp. dstra, 331a.
6 Cling to sunyata, etc.: cp. Kdrikd,
XIII: 8; also XXII: 11; see especially
ibid., XXIV: 11. See above, n. 2.
7 O n the criticism and rejection of
absolute being and absolute non-being
as false in respect to the mundane nature
o f things, see dstra, i j i z - i j i z and
207b; cp. also ibid., 292b; cp. Kdrikd,
chs. XV and XIII, also ibid., ch. XXIV.
W hat follows in this as well as in the
following sections o f the present chap
ter on the criticism o f categories, is, in
each case, a substance o f the relevant
passages in the astra, amplified at
times by citations from the Kdrikd.
Such amplifications, however, have
been stated as such, wherever they
occur. Actually this is the portion where
the dstra practically incorporates here
and there, often verbally repeating
either in prose or in verse, the entire
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
N O TES
dvate.
u Sdstra, 297b; cp. Karika, I: 13.
84 For the criticism o f motion as set
forth in KBriltd, ch. II, see astra, 205bc, and 427074282; cp. also Dasabhiimiuibhdfd (T. 1521) 28a. In astra
2Q5b-c die negative arguments con
clude by pointing out that the true
prajM, is ie elf also the right deed, and
he who has the right understanding
always does the right deed, never any
wrong deed.
87 Ostra, 205b; cp. Karika, II: 1, 8.
38 Oslra, 205c; cp. Kdrikd, II: 5, 11.
w astra, 205c; cp. Karika, II: 6.
40 dstra, 428a: "Com ing and staying
361
n g Ar j u n a s p h i l o s o p h y
NOTES
71 Ibid.
71 Cp. ibid., 563b, 564b.
7,1 Ibid. 65c.
" I M S . . . I B : the reading ibid.
n. 14 is preferred.
Cp. ifcu/., 65c-66a; cited above,
P
I 3*
74
596, n. 2.
77 S fctra, 133c.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 288a, says that while accord
ing to die Sr3vakas the sQnyata o f the
great fmah3sQnyat3)** means the iwnyata o f the basic elements, in Mahayana
it means the snyata o f the ten direc
tions (dik) the directions are devoid
o f the nature o f directions; cp. ibid.,
288b: O f the transmundane Nirvana
is great, while o f the mundane dik is
great.
everlasting evidently means here
non-tem poral, a nature w hich all con
cepts share.
Xg a r j u n a s p h il o s o p h y
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.; cp. Kdrikd, VI: 1:
Ragad yadi bhavet purvam rakta rdgatiraskftah; tam pratitya bhaved rdgo
rakte rago bhavet sati.
Cp. also ibid., 2-3.
98a Ibid., 3.
99 Cp. Ibid., 8 ff.
Cp. ibid., V: 5-6.
Chapter V III
1 astra, 171a; cp. also ibid., 294b.
2 Ibid., 194c.
2* Cp. ibid. 369a.
8 Ibid. 194c.
** For a similar argument to rgect self
364
NOTES
n Xg X r j u n a ' s p h il o s o p h y
7^ is omitted.
88 See also ibid., 149c.
88 Ibid.; cp. VaiiesikasQtras III. ii. 1:
Atmendriydrthasannikarse jBdnasya bhdvo,
bhdvas ca manaso liBgam. For the
Sankhyas o f course it is the buddhi that
does the knowing o f things, see SdAkhyakdrikd, 35:
Sdntahkarand buddhih sarvam visayam
avagdhate.
87 dstra, 20ob-c; cp. also ibid., 230c;
ibid., 454c-455a, the same argument is
put forth by a Buddhist in regard to
Tathagata, which in the context o f
these arguments is exchangeable for
self or even soul; see ibid., 369a:
sdrdham ghatapatddibhih.
49 On the five kinds o f examination,
4<paHcadhd mrgyatndnah (3l5}0 o f
Kdrikd, XXII, 8, i.e., o f the relation
between the person and the skandhas,
which, in addirion to identity and
difference consist o f the notions that he
is in them, they are in him and he
possess them, see dstra, 454c-455a,
746c.
49t Cp. ibid., 60a.
60 Cp. ibid., 3i9b-c.
81 Cp. ibid., 7460-7472; cp. Kdrikd,
XXII. 15-16:
PrapaBcayanti ye buddham prapaHcdtltam avyayam; te prapaBcahatdh
sarve m posyanti tathttgatam.
Tathdgato yatsvabhdvah tatsvabhdvam
idam jagat; tathdgato nihsvabhdvah
nihsvabhavam idam jagat.
This holds good not only in the case
o f Tathagata but also in the case of
every individual; see above, n. 37.
82 C p .. the example o f silk worm,
dstra, 294b, 697a; see above, p. 106.
63 dstra, 696a; cp. ibid., 622b, also
Kdrikd, XXVI: 8-9. W hat ensues here
is an account o f the different links
(stages or phases) in the life o f the
ignorant; this is what is known as the
twelve-spoked wheel o f phenomenal
existence; this is a specific, although
die very important, case o f the general
principle o f conditioned origination.
dstra refers to this topic in several
places; see especially ioob-c, 622a623 b, 696a-697a. Cp. Kdrikd, ch.
XXVI; cp. also Pratityasamutpada-hrdaya-sdstra; cp. also Arya-dharmadhatugarbhavivarana and Bhavasankrdnti-sdstra.
84 Ibid., 696b; cp. ibid., 100b, also
Kdrikd, XXVI: 8. Kdrikd explains
bhava as the existence embodied in the
five skandhas (paBcaskandhah sa ca
bhavah). In the dstra (696b) bhava is
NOTES
88 dstra, 696b.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.; cp. ibid., ioob. In
^
is taken as altogether; see ibid., n. 35.
80 Ibid., 696b.
61 Ibid., see above, p. 233.
62 Ibid.
83 O n the intermediary state (antardbhava), see Sdmmitiya-Nikaya astra,
pp. 160-162, 195-205 and 233-235.
84 dstra, 696b.
86 Cp. the long account o f this topic in
Prasannapada, pp. 543-552.
88 See above, p. 229.
88a dstra, 696b.
47 Cp. Kdrikd, XXVI: 1:
Punarbhavdya samskdrdn avidyattivrtah
tridha abhisamskurute ydn taih gatim
gacchati karmabhih.
68 Thus bhava and samskara are o f the
same nature; the difference is o f time;
the one leads to a future birth and the
other has already led to the present
birth.
Nama (,) may just be taken as
name ; but here it is perhaps better
to take it in the sense o f mental element,
i.e., as tendency.
astra, ioob has: The deeds that pro
ceed from ignorance have the capacity
Chapter IX
1 Cp. ostra, 428a: The ultimate
nature o f rpa can be known by the
power that is in its very nature
a i w r f c i) -
2 Cp. ibid., 499c; cp. also ibid., (Stra),
443a; cp. Vigrahavydvartanl, 22.
8 O n the kinds o f tathatd, see also dstra,
303a.
4 Cp. ibid., 297c:
fc# ; 29^ :
cp. Prasannapadd p.. 41: ta
thatd, avitathatd, also ibid., p. 265:
<fkeyam tathatd, tathdbhdvo avikdritvam
sadaiva sthdyitd sarvadd anutpddah! '
6 dstra, 437a.
6 Ibid., 566a.
7 Cp.tyf$Ijl(Saddharmapundarka36 7
n Xg Xr j u n a ' s p h il o s o p h y
N OTES
Chapter X
26 Ibid. 272a.
27 Cp. ibid., 150a: It is the intention
o f the. Buddha to enable the wayfarer
to cultivate th$ right way and realize
the right fruit.
28 astra (154c) defines sila as stop
ping the evil deeds and not committing
them any more. Ibid., I54c-i62a has
a short account o f the five elements of
moral conduct: viz., to refrain from
killing, stealing, lewdness, telling lies
and drinking wine; ibid., 162a ff. sets
itself to the question: While these con
stitute sila, what constitutes its perfec
tion. Ibid., 415b has: The cultivation
o f the twelve ascetic practices (dhutagunas jptpfc) (like wearing clothes
made o f rags taken from a dust heap,
not possessing more than three robes
at a time" etc.) leads to the purity of
moral conduct; this facilitates contem
plation which in turn leads to wisdom;
the true wisdom is anutpattika-dharmaksdnti, ones endurance for the ultimate
truth of devoidness of birth. On
dhuta-gunas, see Hardayal, The Bodhi
sattva Doctrine (Kegan Paul, London,
1932), pp. 134-140.
29 astra, 162b.
88 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 163 c.
82 Ksdnti, forbearance or endurance is
with regard to beings (sattva) and with
regard to the truth o f things (dharma);
cp. ibid., io6c-i07a, 164b ff. The latter
kind refers also to the teachings (dharma)
that contain this truth. Ksdnti with re
gard to dharma (dharmaksanti) has thus
these meanings: I) the capacity to ac
cept the teachings in faith, II) under
stand their import and III) sustain ones
comprehension o f the truth o f tilings
that one thus gains, so much so that it
is saturated in ones whole being, re
flected in ones whole life, see Ibid.,
369
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILOSO PH Y
43 Ibid., 172b.
44 Ibid., 173c. Ibid. 174a has: One
must have the ability to start
the thing and should have no question
or difficulty about it; one must have the
strong will and determination ( jjc),
must be free from the feeling of fatigue,
and must see it through to the very end;
these five constitute the characteristics
o f virya.
45 Ibid., 174c.
46 Ibid., 180c. Here we have cittaikdgrata, i.e., single-mindedness or onepointedness o f mind, and samadhi, and
dhyana which have been here trans
lated as concentration and meditation;
this rendering of the latter is admittedly
very wide. W hen dhyana is used as
a technical term to stand for the four
states o f fine material sphere (rupadhatu) perhaps it could be best rendered
as trance; it has been also rendered
as mental absorption; samadhi has the
root meaning of the mind being col
lected and completely fixed in the ob
ject which would then be strictly con
centration. Samadhi as meditation
(which has the import o f thought,
reflection) has its relevance to the three
samadhis, the gateways o f freedom,
at least in the earlier stages; cp. ibid.,
206aff. See below, pp. 293 ff. Bhdvand
), which is used to form the com
pound samadhibhavana, has been ren
dered as development; it could as
well be cultivation that leads to the
development. There is another term
samdpatti which is usually transliter
ated in Chinese; literally it means well
attaining; this term is specially used in
the compound drupya-samapattayah
which stands for the four trances of
the immaterial sphere. On these terms
see their Pali equivalents in Nyanatilokas Buddhist Dictionary, besides
N O TES
N A G A R JU N A S PH IL O SO PH Y
NOTES
Chapter XI
1 For the various aspirations o f the
bodhisattva which he seeks to fulfil
by cultivating prajndparamitd, see the
introductory part o f SQtra, 235a ff.=
T. 223: 2i8c-22ia.
2 This is an interesting analysis o f the
term bodhisattva" which would thus
373
Ag X r j u n a s
p h il o s o p h y
416a.
80 Cp. SQtra, 4iob-c, 4i6b-c and dstra,
4i7a-4i8a.
87 Cp. Sutra 410b, 416c; dstra, 417c.
88 Cp. ibid., 262a; cp. also ibid. 263c:
Anutpattika-dharmaksanti is itself the
ground o f the irreversible.
30 Ibid., 132a.
40 Ibid., 417c.
41 Ibid., 418a.
42 Ibid., 417c;
is here taken as
distinguishable or distinct natures;
however it may also mean the con
ceived or imagined characters kalpita
laksana).
48 Ibid. 417c. observes that in the first
three stages the chief element is under
standing rather than concentration
which grows stronger in the next three
stages.
44 Ibid., 265b.
45 Ibid., 106b.
40 Ibid., 130a.
t Cp. also ibid., 303c. On the thirtytwo features see below, p. 314.
47 Ibid., 261c.
48 Ibid., 262a.
49 Cp. Sutra (ibid.) 410c, 416c; dstra,
418a ff.
50 Ibid., 418b; cp. ibid., 416c. See above,
p. 300.
61 Sdstra, 127b.
02 Ibid., 86c.
53 Ibid., 418b; cp. the well known line
(q. in Prasannapada, p. 448): ffdharmato
buddha drastavyah, dharmakayd hi ndyakdh.,}
64 Ibid., 418c; these are nirukti (language)
and pratibhdna (ready wit), two o f the
four pratisamvit or the elements o f ex
pertness; on this topic, cp. Hardayal,
op. cit., pp. 259-267.
65 dstra, 419a.
60 Ibid., 4i9b-c.
57 Ibid., 419b.
374
NOTES
68 Ibid., 719b.
69 Ibid., io6b-c; this example o f the
moon occurs in astra at three places:
io6b-c, 273b, and 719b.
60 Ibid., 273b.
61 Ibid., 7i9b-c.
62 Ibid., 719c; cp. Sutra (ibid.) 718b.
63 This is a long discussion occurring in
Sastra, ch. IV, where the view o f Katyayaniputra and his followers is stated
(ibid., 86c-9ic) and the rest o f the
chapter (91c if.) is devoted to the Mahayana criticism o f this view; cp. also
ibid., 273a. For the Sarvastivada view
o f bodhisattva vide Vibhasd (T. 1545)
886 ff.; the Sastra (92a) makes a re
ference to the Bodhisattva-prakarana in
Abhidharma-vibhdsd.
64 astra, 92a.
66 Cp. ibid., 92b.
66 Ibid., 93a.
67 Ibid., 93a-b.
68 Ibid., 93b, 3i2a-b.
9 ibid., 93b:
s& si
= tfc + ;frfc .
70 Ibid., 93c-94a; cp. ibid., 126b.
71 Ibid., 273a, b.
72 Ibid., 274a.
73 On the physical features o f the Bud
dha cp. Mahavyutpatti, XVII and XVIII.
For a short account o f these see Hardayal, op. cit., pp. 299-305. astra
(chs. X X IV -X X V I) gives an exposi
tion o f the different elements o f the
dharma body; on these cp. Mahavyutpatti, VIII, IX and XIII; for a short
account o f these see Hardayal, op. cit.,
pp. 19 ff. and 259 ff.
The Dasabhumi-vibhasa (T. 1621:
71 ff.) counts avenika-dharmas differently
but agrees (390-402) w ith astra in
criticizing those who emphasize the
physical features and holds (65c) with
it that the root o f even these is prajnd.
74 astra, 418b, cp. also ibid., 747b.
76 Ibid., 274a.
375
76 Ibid., 274c.
77 Ibid., 274-2752.
78 Ibid., 245c.
79 Ibid., 236b.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 256a.
82 Ibid., 257b.
83 Ibid., 256c.
Chapter X II
1 It may be noted that pudoala-sunyata
is not among the eighteen kinds; all
these latter are in fact species o f dharmasunyata (cp. Sutra, ibid., 583a),
dharma being understood in the sense
o f both the mundane truth o f concepts
and conventional entities and the ulti
mate truth, the Nirvana, as well as the
teachings that embody these truths.
All these eighteen kinds are elaborately
set forth in astra 285b-i96b. In the
present work, the sunyatd as the nonultimacy o f the conventional entities
has been set forth in the chapters,
" Criticism of Categories'* and The
World and the I n d iv id u a land lunyatd
as indescribability, or the inapplica
bility o f concepts in regard to the
ultimate reality, that the real is not
any thing, has been given in the
chapter Reality." astra points out that
the number and kinds o f sunyatd depend
on the number and kinds o f things to
which people cling
see ibid., 630b. Cp. also ibid., 55ob-c
on the mention o f the various ways o f
driving home the understanding o f the
sunyatd o f all elements. Ibid., 346b: By
attaining the two kinds o f sunyatd,
viz., o f dharma an dpudgala, one gradual
ly reaches the ultimate tru tlr (anupalambha-sunyatd). Cp. also ibid., 584a.
References to the clinging sunyatd arc
found in several places; sec, e.g., ibid.,
48oc-48ia, 207b. Cp. Karikd, XIII: 8,
N A G A R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
NOTES
N G R JU N A S PH ILO SO PH Y
5253:
NOTES
379
INDEX
abhijnd
(elements o f extraordinary
power and understanding), the six,
304. 309, 314
abhitiiveia
(the interestcdness that is
sues in clinging; clinging), 352a-53a;
see grdha, sakti
abhivyakti (manifestation), as the Snkhya conception o f causation, 17980; see Snkhya
Abodhabodhaka, 36
absolute existence and absolute non
existence, as extremes, 81, 152-55;
their criticism and rejection, 174-77,
359b - 3<foa
absolute statements, and relative judge
ments, 160-3
absolute views, versus relative positions,
152-3
absoluteness, imagined in regard to
the conditioned, 42, 89-90, 154, 171;
misplaced, see error
absolutes, alternatives conceived as,
154; the false, 66; see error, ex
tremes
absolutist line o f Buddhist Philosophy,
46, 62-64; see Mahsnghikas
abstract, imagined as ultimate, 187, 188
accommodation, the principle of; see
dkdia
Acintyastava, 36, 37
activity (kriyd) and motion, critical
examination o f the conceptions of,
185-87; cf. karma
adhipati-pratyaya i _ h ^ (decisive con
dition), critical examination of, 182,
361b; set profy aya
IN D E X
lambana-pratyaya
(object o f cog
nition), as one o f the kinds o f con
ditions, 181, 36ia-b; see pratyaya
ayvijnna (the vijnana that is the store
house of potencies), as conceived in
Vijnanavda, 321, 340a; see vijnana
alchemist, bodhisattva compared to the
skilful, 145, 358a
alchemy, referred to in the stra, 337b,
358a
alternatives, 160-70; extremes and,
151-70; see extremes
ma ^ (immaturity, passion for dharma,
in nyma'), 373b
Amarvatl, 25, 336b
analysis
(abhidhartna, vibhajana)
and the error of the analyst, 14243 ; see abhidhartna
analyst, the, error of, 142-43, 180-81;
see error
anmik
(the nameless finger,
the ring finger), cited in the stra
to illustrate the relatively indetermi
nate nature o f a concept .or con
ceptual system 54, 134, 357a
Asumdavalli (Taittiriya) 365b
rumtarya-vimoksa
(freedom,
unimpeded and immediate; the
highest kind o f freedom that the
bodhisattva achieves in the final stage
o f his wayfaring), 310; see bhtni,
dharmamegha
animittat
(refraining from mak
ing things occassions for clinging),
as one o f the gates to freedom or
Nirvana, 294, 295 ; see vimok$advra;
cf. nimitta
annihilationism; see uechedadrsti
anta & (dead-ends), 38-39; the two,
90 91* 352a-53a; see extremes, also
dffti
antarbhava
(the state interme
diary between death and rebirth),
the rise of, 223, 239, 367a
antarbhavaskandha cf>(^t)J& (the com382
IN D E X
367a
anupalamhha
(the non
clinging ; that which cannot be seized),
as a name for Nirvana, 272; as a name
for prajnapdramitd, 127-28; see Middle
W ay; see also non-clinging
anupalambha-siinyatd
(non
clinging iunyatd, a name for the ulti
mate truth), 375b; see sunyata
anupalambha (-yoga)
(skil
fulness o f non-clinging), as forming,
with undivided being, the heart of
the Prajndpdramitd-sutrasy 31; as one of
the basic imports of sunyata} 339a; as
the pervading spirit o f the philosophy
o f the Middle W ay, 18; see non
clinging
anupurvavihdra-samdpatti
(suc
cessive abodes o f contemplation;
exercises for testing ones control
o f the mind), the nine, 294, 372b-73a;
see samapatti
anutpada-dharma
(the ultimate
reality devoid o f birth), 19, 263; see
dhartna, the real
anutpada-koti
(the summit of
the reality that is devoid of birth;
Nirvana; and the mind's penetrating
into it), 263, 368a; see bhutakoti
anutpattikadharma-hanti
(the
ability to endure, to sustain the ulti
mate truth o f devoidness of birth,
and to bring that to bear upon every
situation), 284-85, 299, 370a; as an
end to all afflictions, 309; as itself the
ground of the irreversible, 374; as the
power of irreversibility realized by
383
IN D E X
IN D E X
IN D E X
343b
386
IN D E X
atta <\\ (mind), and the soul, 225, 22729; as the basis, center and seed of
personality, 64, 73, 114, 229, 233,
350b, 355a; as constructing all that
is in the three worlds, 71; as desig
nating person, 238, 298, 350b; as
impermanent, 211; as intellect, cogtion, understanding, 199, 227, 228,
229; meaning o f the term, 350b;
as object o f smrtyupasthana, 350b,
371b; as principle o f self-dtermination, 229; as pure in its ultimate na
ture, 354b; as self-conscious person,
238, 298; as self-conscious principle
o f intellection, 64, 73, 114; and the
soul, 225, 227-29; see vijndna
cittaikagratd
(one-pointedness o f
mind), 285, 370b
atta-smrtyupsthdna,
(application of
mindfulness to the self-conscious
principle of intellection), 350b, 371b;
see smrtyupasthana
clinging
Jjx (abhinivefa,grdha, upaddtta), as a link in the cycle o f life, 23637; as the root o f conflict and suffer
ing, 38,129; its root or origin, 48, 99,
106, 236-37, 247; to the act o f char
ity, 283; to the conditioned and the
unconditioned, 132, 252; to the con
ditioned as the unconditioned, 66; to
441 and not I, 104; to negation,
172; to sin and merit, 283; to the
specific as the self-contained, 78; to
sunyatd, n o , 146,172,325,342b, 359a,
360a, 375b; to views, 109; the way
to bring to light, 354b
cognition, true or false, as not devoid
of object, 81, 93-96, 216
Collection of Six Dharmas
(Saddharma-pitaka or -samuccaya), of the
Vaise$ika, 363 a
Complete Catalogue of the Buddhist Ca
non, 341a
composite elements; see samskrta
comprehension, as the criterion o f the
IN D E X
273^74
IN D E X
dharma-kfnti
(endurance for
dhartna, the ability to bear the truth),
145; meanings of the term, 369b70a; see anutpattika-dharma-kfanti,
gambhra-dharma-ksnti
dharma-lakfana
(the true, essential
nature o f dharma), o f the elements,
87; the eternal, 270-71 ; the mundane
and the transmundane, 259-60; see
dharma, lakfana
dharma-megha
(bt., dharma-cloud;
the last stage in the bodhisattvas
wayfaring, compared to the great
cloud), 310; see bhmi
dharma-prajnapti (conventional designa
tion o f the subtle constituent ele
ments), 85; see prajnapti, also con
vention
dharma-pravicaya
(analysis and
understanding of the constituent
elements o f all things), 291
dharmaramah
(delighting in and
contemplating on the true nature c r
things), 342a
dharma-ratih Qkf (intersted in compre
hending the true nature of things),
342a
dharma-sthna
(the real nature in
which things eternally stay; the eter
nal nature or abode o f things), 115,
272
dharma-sthiti {\(the real state or the
stability of things), 272
dharma-inyat
(snyat o f dhar
ma), 2s the indeterminate nature o f
IN D E X
faith,
(sraddha), as one o f the five
indriyas 291; see indriyas
Fa-tsang,
379a
Fa Ren, 346b, 347b, 348a
feeling ( vedana, one of the five
skandhas), as a link in the cycle o f
life, 237; as an object o f the applica
tion o f mindfulness, 371b; see skand
has, smrtyupasthana
forbearance ( k$anti) ; see kfanti
Fung Yu-lan, 377b, 378^ 378b, 379a,
379b
390
IN D E X
gambiradharma-kfSnti
(forbe
arance w ith regard to the profound
truth, viz., o f the conditioned origi
nation,) 370a; cf. amtpattikadharmakfnti; see dharma-ksnti, kfnti
gates o f fredom (vimokfa-dvra), the
three, 293-96, 358a, 373a; see way
gati jg (tending), bodhisattvas, to
knowledge of all forms, 266; of
everything to everything else, 266
@ (being a destination, resting
point, refuge) for the entire world,
as a virtue of the bodhisattva, 266
Gaudapda, 319, 376a
Gaudapda, 376b; cf. gamalstra
Gautamiputra takarn, 27, 28, 338a
Giles, Lionel, 335b
Gokhale, Vasudev, 340a
Gopalachari, K., 336b, 338a
grha
^jp (seizing, clinging); see
clinging
Great W ay (Mahyna), and the Small
W ay, 46-47, 55-56, 66-69, 278-79,
343b; as the non-exclusive way,
27^-80; as the way o f perfection,
280-81; see Mahyna, pSramit
Haimavatas, 365 a
Hla, 28, 30, 338a
Hamilton, 378b
Hardayal, 375a
Harsacarita, 336a, 337b
hetu^pratyaya jgjj& (productive condi
tions), critical examination of, 18081 ; see pratyaya
Hnayna (the Small W ay), Mahyna
and, 46-47, 55-J6, 66-69, 2 78 - 7 9 .
343b; on the use o f the term, 20,
278-79; see also srSvaka
Historical Inscriptions of Southern India,
338a
IN D E X
indeterminate
(alak$ana), the,
clinging to, 88, n z ; the true com
prehension of, 87-88; as distinct from
the determinate, 267-70; as the
ground o f the world, 251-67; as the
ultimate nature o f all, 87; see the
real; cf. dharma-dhatu, bhuta-koti
indeterminateness, of the mundane and
of the ultimate, distinguished, 5253; o f judgments, clung to as an ex
treme, 159; see avaktavya, avyakrta
individual standpoint, the, truth taught
from, 139; see siddhanta
individuality, wrong notion of, distin
guished from the sense o f self, 100;
Hinayana attitude to, 68, 279; its effacement, not necessary for extinc
tion o f passion, 279, 304, 315
indriyas
(faculties), the five, among
the factors o f the way, 291; cf. bala
intellect, self-conscious, as the self, the
center o f personal life, 98, 99; see
vijftana; cf. buddhi
intellection, self-conscious, as the sense
of I,** and its consequent discri
minations, 100,151,153; see citta and
vijnana
intermediary state, between death and
rebirth; see antardbhava
I-substance; see soul
Ifvara, Bhiksu, 341a
Kvara, the personal god, in Sankaras
philosophy, 319
Iyengar, H .R .R ., 341a
373^
Kalhana, 28, 336a
kalpa (a measure o f time), 249, 313
Kma-stras, 338a
Kandda, 362b
Kaniska I, and Kaniska II, 28; date of
Kaniska 1, 338b, 346a; Ngrjuna
and, 2830
Kao-seng-chuan
335*
Karikd, its criticism of birth, 362a; ot
causal production 360b, 361b; its
criticism of identity and separatness,
362a; its criticism o f substance and
quality, 364a; its criticism o f svabhdva, 360a; of time, 362b; its place
in Ngijunas philosophy, 16, 42;
the different ways in Buddhas teach
ing, 354a, 357a; on impermanence,
358a; on I-substance, 33, 366a; on
mundane existence, 39, 40, 43; on
rejection of extremes, 359b; as replete
w ith negative arguments, 42; on rise
o f extremes, 354a; on Sarvstivda
doctrine of elements, 43; and the
stra, 42-46, 359b-6oa; on snyatd,
40, 43
karma H (deeds), creations of, 73 ; criti
cal examination o f the different con
ceptions of, 185-90; as leading the
seed of personal life to the womb,
Jaggayyapeta, 336b
Jaina non-absolutism or indeterminate
ness o f judgments, 16, 156, 159; see
avaktavya; cf. avayakfta, madhyamapratipat
jati (lit. birth; clinging to embodi
ment), as a link in the cycle o f life,
236; see cycle o f life
Jayswal, K.P., 340b
jhdna ^3, ^ (knowledge), distinguished
392
IN D EX
Kohbhdfya, 347b
koti J5 (the apex; to reach the summit),
o f reality, 263; see bhtita-koti
koti rj (extremes), the four; see extremes
kftsndyatana {TJJsS (bases o f all-per
vasiveness; exercises in contempla
tion), the ten, 294, 372a-72b, 373a
ksana
(moments, instants); that the
bodhisattvas realization of bodhi is
instantaneous
311; Sarvastivada
conception of, 58-60; see time
kfanti jg, (forbearance, endurance), dis
tinguished into that in regard to
sattva and that in regard to dharma,
283,369b-7oa; earlier and later phases
of, 370a; as what Hinay 5na lacks,
68, 278-79; see anlitpattika*dharmaksdnti, dhama-kfdnti, gambhira-dharma-kfdnti
kfdntipdramitd (perfection of endur
ance), 283-84; see pdramitd
KumSrajiva, biography o f Deva at
tributed to, 25, 34, 336a; biography
o f NagSijuna attributed to, 337b; his
exposition o f Madhyamika philoso
phy, 321-23; life and work o 14-16
Kuei-chi
63, 64, 346b
KumaralSta, 346b
Kunst, Arnold, 340b
Kuntala, 338a
lakfana ;fg (sign, mark), in distinction
from dhdtu
(nature), 77; ndma
(name) and, 75-76; as nimitta (occassion), 76
\ak$aqa
(essential nature), the three
gsades of, 86-88; as a synonym of
prakftit svabhdva, also o f dhdtu, dis
tinguished from sign or mark, 76-77,
351a; see also dharmalakfana, dharmatd, tathatd
lak$ana (a specific determinate entity),
77-80, 207
lakjatia
(conventional entities), ndma
(concepts) and, 70-88
393
IN D E X
30
Mddhyamika-kdrikd
(Madhyamakaidstra), 34; the text and its commen
taries, 35-36; see Kdrikd
magical creation, as an illustm ion for
creation o f ignorance, m - 1 2
Mahadeva, five points o 55, 345b
Mahadevan, T.M*P., 376b
Mahdkarunopdya-idstra, 34
Mahakatyayana, 357b
Mahanaga, 27, 337a
Mahdniddesa, 346b-47a
Mahdprajndpdramitd-fdstra; see Sdstra
Mahdpranidhanotpdda-gdthd, 35
mahdsattva (the great being), as a title
for the bodhisattva, 304
Mahasanghikas, and the Sthaviras, 56,
66-68; their chief philosophical doc
trines, 62-64; their contribution to
Buddhist absolutism, 56,64-65; their
controversy with the Sarvastivadins,
56, 65, 66, 67, 68; their relation to
Mahayana, 66-68
Madhyamakdnugama-iastra
35,
336a, 337a, 340b
Madhyamaka-idstra
34 35 ; see
Mddhyamika-Kdrika
madhyamd pratipat npjg (the Middle
W ay) and the doctrine o f conditioned
origination, 47,48,53,81; as identical
394
IN D E X
MahdsuttHatd-sutta (Mahdfanyata-sutra) ,
343b, 348b
mahasunyatd ^ 3 ? , as interpreted by the
ravaka and by the Mahayana, 363b
mahat
(or buddhi of the Sankhya),
compared with vijndna and the subtle
body, 248-50
Mahavagga, 344a
Mahavastu, 344a
Mahdvyutpatti, 373b, 375a
Mahayana, and Hinayana, 66-69, 27879; as not excluding Hinayana, 4647; as one o f the two lines in early
Buddhism that the Sdstrd mentions,
346a; its relation to the Mahasahghikas, 67-68; see Great W ay
Mahaydna-bhavabheda-tastra, 35; see
Bhavasnkranti-fdstra
Mahdydna-madhyamakadarfana-vyakhydidstra, 35
Mahayana-iraddhotpada-Sdstra,
340b,
378b; see Awakening of Faith
Mahaydna-sfitras, 67-68, 348a
Mahaydna-vimiikd, 34, 340a '
Mahilaskas, their view on self-hood, 62
maitri (friendliness), the great, as a
factpr o f Buddhahood, 310
Majjhimcmikdya, 344a, 344b, 345a
Mskandika, 131, 132
mdmsa-cakfus $ jg|| (the eyes o f flesh,
one of the five kinds o f eyes), and the
deva-eye, 120-22, 242; see eyes 1
man; see person
ntanas ^ (or mana-indriya Jjcifi, the
internal sense), 215, 237; cf. citta and
vijndna
Manjuhimulakalpa, 336a
Mankad, D. R ., 338a
mdra (the embodiment o f temptations),
3io
margajnata
(broad and rough un
derstanding o f the one way that
leads to Nirvana), 371b
mdrgdkdrajnata
(d ear and de
tailed knowledge o f the different ways
395
IN D E X
IN D E X
135, 357a
nivarana
(hindrances), the five, in
regard to concentration o f mind,
371a
non-being
(abhava); see non-ex
istence; cf. bhdva
non-Buddhist schools, referred to in
the Sastra, 33
non-clinging (/p ^ f,
anupalambha) ,
skilfulness of, as arising from non
exclusive understanding, 37, 38, 91;
as the consummating phase o f wis
dom, 355a; as forming, with undi
vided being, the heart of the Prajapramit-stras, 31; as one of the
basic meanings of nyata, 339a, 375b ;
as the pervading sprit o f the philoso
phy of the Middle Way, 18; in the
Buddhas way o f teaching, 133; in
the use of concepts, 148-49, 160-63'
see madhyama pratipat, prajd, snyatd
377t>-78a
IN D E X
363*
IN D E X
IN D E X
IN D E X
IN D E X
samata
(the essential sameness
of things), as the equanimity o f
mind given rise to by its compre
hension, 271; as a name for the ulti
mate reality, 270-72; as a synonym
o f iunyata, 271
samaya HUOT (titne, as a derived no
tion), distinguished from kala (time,
conceived as a substance), 199-200;
see time
sambodhi; see samyak-sambodhi
samjiia
(idea, perception, also name),
as forming along with smrti and jnatia
a stage in the process of knowledge,
372b; as a synonym o f ttama and
prajnapti, 349b-5oa; defined as the
picking up o f signs (nimittodgrahana),
and distinguished from seizing them
(lakfanagrdha), 351a
Sdmmitiyas, their alliance with Vatsiputriyas, Sautrantikas and Darstantikas,
56; their chief philosophical concep
tions, 56, 61-62, 64, 362a, 365a, 367a;
their criticism o f Sarvastivada, 56,
62, 347b
Sammitlya-nikdya-sdstra, 346a, 347b,
348a, 365a, 367a
samsara (the course of mundane exist
ence), as itself Nirvana when rightly
seen, 52,66,116-17,25. 324 isee dso
vyavahara; cf. Nirvana
samskdras f f (forces; elements), as
formative forces in the life o f an in
dividual, 240-41, 367a-b; those origi
nating from ignorance, m - 1 2 , 24142; as a synonym o f shandhas, 62;
distinguished from bhava, 240-41,
367a-b; see cycle of life
samskfta
(composite) elements, and
the incomposite, in Sarvastivada, 58;
in the Mahasanghikas, 64
samyagdftti JEJL (right view), as a name
for prajndy 99; as a synonym of saddharma, meaning conditioned origi
nation, 342b; see drfti; cf. mithyadrfti
samyak-prahana
(right effort), of
four kinds, among the factors of the
way, 291, 371b; see prahdna
samyak-sambodhi (the complete awa
kening; wisdom par excellence), its
incomprehensibility 273; its realiza
tion by the bodhisattva, 271, 311;
persistently to look back to it is a
mark o f wayfaring, 281
samyojanas
(factors of bondage),
and the rise o f the sense of *1* and
mine, 98-99
Samyuktagamayii4.3b, 347a, 364b
Samyukta-pitaka 363a
Samyuttanikdyay 344a, b, 345a, 348a
samvrti (veil), as a name for the world
o f convention, 73 ; see vyavahara
sangha (the community o f the Budhas followers), division within, 47,
55. 343b, 345; the two main stems of,
55-56
Sanjayabelatthiputta, 358b
Sarikaras philosophy, compared wiri
the Madhyamika, 319-21
Sahkhya, the, conception of buddhi,
366a, 367b; conception of causal re
lation, critically examined, 33, 156,
178-80; conception of kosa, 365b;
conception o f multiplicity of souls,
217, 365a; conception of prakrti and
mahat, 248-50, 376a; distinction of
self from subtle body, 365b; tattva
(categories), mentioned in the Sdstra,
339b
Sankhya and Vaisesika, criticism of
their basic tenets by the Buddhists,
33
IN D EX
IN DEX
smfti fg,
(memory), 228
smfti
(thought, mindfulness), as one
o f the seven factors o f enlightenment,
291; considered along with samjna
and vikalpa, 352b; as constituting
with samjna and jnana, the process
o f knowing, 372b; see smrtyupasthana
smrtyupasthana ^ j g (application o f
mindfulness), of four kinds, as the
pith o f the entire wayfaring, 291; as
culminating, in Mahayana, in the
comprehension o f the Undivided
Being as the ultimate reality, 364b65a, 371b, 372a
soul (I-substance), the conception cri
tically examined, 219-31; as not the
basis o f the distinction o f self and
other, 219-20; as not having any
definite nature, 221-23; as not an
object o f inference, 224-25; as not
the object o f the sense o f I , 220; as
not a necessary condition o f know
ledge, 227-29; as not necessary for
moral responsibility, 229-31; as the
self conceived as a substantial entity,
217-18, 225-27; as not the subtle
body, 223-24; see I , person, self
Soul-theory of the Buddhists, The, 347b
soul-theory of the non-Buddhists, 218
space; see akafa
sparsa
(touch), as the origin o f all
mental elements, 237
spatial directions; see dik
sphatika (pure crystal) to illustrate the
pure mind, 349; seen as coloured,
used as an example for illusion, 96
sraddha ffj (faith), one o f the five fa
culties, and of powers, among the
factors o f the way, 291; see way
Sraddhotpada-sastra; see Mahayana-sraddhotpada-sastra
sravaka the, and the pratyekabuddha, as
not interested in rddhi, 68; as not
rising to the level o f comprehension,
69; their attitude to individuality,
Seng-chao
323-24, 335*, 377b-8a
Seng-jui
14, 335b
senses, sense-contact and the feeling o f
pleasure and pain, as links in the
cycle o f life, 237; cf. ayatana
sensuous w o rld ^^ L (kama-dhtu) ,236;
see dhatu
Sewell, Robert, 338a
Shaeffer, Phil. 341a
Shih-hsiang-Iun
(Treatise on the
Real Nature of Things), 15
Shih Hui-yuans Buddhism as set forth
in His Writings, 377a
Sho-wa Ho-bo So Mokuroku, 340a
siddhanta igjtg (teaching), o f the four
kinds, 136-41, 34ib-42a, 357a-b
Siksnanda, 378b
sila-paramita (perfection of moral con
duct). 283, 369b; cultivated by the
bodhisattva in the second bhurni, 3056
IN D EX
, 273 323
IN D E X
Ta-cheng-ta-yi-chang
15
Ta-ch'eng-yi-chang
15
Taittiriya (Anandavalli), 365b
Takakusu, 378b
T an g Yung-t ung, 335a, 335b, 377*,
378b
Tao-an
15
Tao-sheng
14,15, 377^
Taranathas History of Buddhism, 336a
Tathagata #P2fc, meaning of the term,
269; his mundane and ultimate
natures, 52-53; his nature is also the
nature of all things and of all beings,
235, 268; his ultimate nature, 235,
268, 269, 345b; the term, used as a
synonym of self, 366a; see also
Buddha
tathagata-garbha (womb of tathagata), a
conception used in T ie n T ai, 326,
340a, 376a
tathata p (the nature o f things as they
are; the true nature of things), basic
import of, 252, 367b; dharma-dhatu
bhiltakoti and, 88, 98, 117, 145, 26165; dharmata and dharma-laksana as
synonyms of, 259, 351a; kinds of,
255-56 (two kinds), 256-58 (three
kinds), 326 (ten kinds); laksana and
prakrti as synonyms of, 351a; see also
prakrti, svabhava
tathata-lakfana $p;fg (the ultimately real
nature), as the eternal undivided
being, 268, 269
tathata-prajhaparamita, #Pj&3=f2$|?g
(perfect knowledge o f the universal
reality), 262
73
INDEX
Vacchagotta, 48, 49
Vaibhasika (a follower o f Vibhafd, an
adherent o f Sarvastivada); see Sar
vastivada
Vaidalya-sutra and -prakarana, 36, 37
Vaipulyakas, the, as clinging to iunyatd,
155; as viewing the world as a base
less illusion, 359a
Vaipulya (Mahdydna) Sutra, 27
vaisaradya (self-confidence), its four
elements among the factors of Buddhahood, 310, 35ob-5ia
Vaifesika, the, Buddhist criticisms of
the basic conceptions o f the Sahkhya
and, 33; their Collection o f Six
Dharmas, 363 a; conception of causal
relation critically examined, 156,
178-80; conception of time critically
examined, 195, 362b; conception of
spatial directions (dik) critically ex
amined, 201, 363a-b; conception of
space (dkasa) critically examined,
204, 363b; conception o f atoms re
ferred to in the astra, 364b; con
ception o f self critically examined,
218-31, 365a, 365b, 366a; conception
o f manas, 366a; their pluralism and
realism close to Sarvastivada, 318
Vatiefika-sutras, 362b, 363a, b, 366a
Vajeska, 28
Vajjian practices, 345b-6a
Vajracchedik a-p rajnaparamitd-sutra, 15
varna ^ (the word that designates), as
a synonym o f natna, 75
vdsand (residual impressions o f deeds),
o f affliction, as extinguished by the
bodhisattva in the last bhumi, 309; cf.
samskara
vastu
i f (factors o f embodiment),
as one o f the three phases o f the
cycle o f life, 246
vastu-sat or dravya-sat
(existent as
a substance), as a notion w ith regard
to time, 195
Vasubandhu, 337a, 378b
N D E X
subtle seed o f personal life in {ransition, 233, 238, 239, 240; see citta
Vijnanavada, the, and the Mdhyamika,
321; the basic texts of, 378b
Vijnaptimdtratdsiddhi-sastra, 34, 340a,
379b
vikalpa
(imaginative construc
tion), 90, 352a-b; cf. samjrid.
Vimalakirtinirdesa, 15, 32, 339b
vimokfa
(deliverance or turning
away i.e., from attachment to spheres
of the determinate), the eight ex
ercises of, 294, 372b, 373a
vimok$a-dvdra
(gates of. free
dom), factors of the way aid, 29096; the three, 293-96,358a, 373a
Vimsikd, 378b
Vimuktimdrga, 357b
Vinaya, 64, 141, 143, 344a, 357b, 358a,
363*
viparydsa
(perversion), 353a; see
error; cf. viparyaya
viparyaya (perversion), 353 a \see error
vlrya
(effort), as one o f the four
fddhipadas, 291; its five characterstics, 370b
vrya-pdramitd (perfection o f effot), 282,
285 ; see pdramitd
vi$aya-vi$ayt (subject-object) pattern
adopted in the Advaita Vedanta, 320
Visuddhimagga, 357b
Vydkhyd-sdstra, as one o f the possible
titles o f the Sdstra, 335b
vyanjana (the means to bring to light
the meaning, i.e., words), in con
trast w ith the meaning (artha) itself,
356b; cf. meaning
vyavahdra tttfllj,
(the world of
convention; mundane life; mundane
truth), direct teaching of, 138; im
port of snyatd on, 338b39a; syno
nyms o f the term, 73, 349b-5oa; its
distinction from and relation to paramdrtha, 51-53, 138-41, 316; see paramdrtha, Snyatd; see also prapanca
IN D E X
340b
Watters, 336a, 337b
way, the, 276-96; factors of, 290-96;
the Great, and the Small, 278-90; see
Mahayana, Hinayana; see also Middle
Way
wayfaring, stages in the bodhisattvas,
305-11; see bhiitni
ways o f answering, the Buddhas, 14650; 344b, 358a
ways o f teaching, the Buddhas, 133;
the direct and the expedient, 13536; see siddhanta
Wei-shih-er-shih-lun
(Vimsatika or Vimsika), 378b
Wenzel, H., 337b
wheel o f dharma; see dhamta-cakra
wisdom; see prajfia
world, and individual, 209-50; o f conconvention, see vyavahara
words, and their meanings 75, 130-31,
351a, 356b; see nama, vartta
Zen
(Chan), the, the Madhyamika
and, 327-28; modem studies in,
379b
Zen Buddhism, 379b
409