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I. D. Subjects of Succession Cases
I. D. Subjects of Succession Cases
Atty. Uribe
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS
PAGUIA, respondents.
In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at
the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on
January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167 Leveriza,
Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and
testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after the
testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated, allowed,
and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed
after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment as executor in
favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and that
therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in
the Philippines.
On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by
herein petitioner alleging among other things, that he has every reason to
believe that the will in question is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the
will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American laws on intrinsic
provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they would
work injustice and injury to him.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a
general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang vs.
Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge
allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found.
Art. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case
ofBellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional
rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was
a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and under the law
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G.
Bellis.
As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief,
the records wig bear the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing
on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner's petition for relief
and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no
reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The
court even admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his
petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due
process. The fact that he requested "for the future setting of the case for
hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina RigorManaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his
cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest
(paragraphing supplied to facilitate comprehension of the testamentary
provisions):
Doy y dejo como legado CUATRO (4) PARCELAS de
terreno palayeros situados en el municipiooo de Guimba
de la provinciaaa de NUEVA ECIJA, cuyo num. de
CERTIFICADO DE TRANSFERENCIA DE TITULO SON;
Titulo Num. 6530, mide 16,249 m. cuadrados de
superficie Titulo Num. 6548, mide 242,998 m. cuadrados
de superficie y annual 6525, mide 62,665 m. cuadrados
de superficie; y Titulo Num. 6521, mide 119,251 m.
cuadrados de superficie; a cualquier pariente mio varon
mas cercano que estudie la carrera eclesiatica hasta
ordenarse de Presbiterado o sea Sacerdote; las
condiciones de estate legado son;
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative
(Rigor vs. Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria, Tarlac,
CA-G.R. No. 24319-R, August 1, 1963).
The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan,
died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which
was probated by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of
December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest
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It may be noted that the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to
analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his
nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no
nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the
legal heirs believed that the parish priest of Victoria had no right to
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest
inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had
studied for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable
trust. According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court.
They point out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be
countenanced in this appeal .
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated March 25,
1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and that they be adjudged as
the persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish
priest of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of" the testator "has ever studied
for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and 35, Record on Appeal). That petition was
opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
Finding that petition to be meritorious, the lower court, through Judge
Bernabe de Aquino, declared the bequest inoperative and adjudicated the
ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of June 28, 1957. The
parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order
of December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew
named Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a
seminarian in the San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City.
The administrator was directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of
Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It
held that Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male
relative who would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only
for twenty years because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the
rule against perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands
within twenty years after the testator's death, the same should pass to his
legal heirs, citing articles 888 and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article
870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
not finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a
priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was
ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by
the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by
the testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee
That contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions
regarding the disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of
Victoria was a trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator
was not survived by a nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a
trustee only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who
desired to become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having
been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies
did not arise, and could not have arisen in this case because no nephew of
the testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever became a
priest.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888
of the old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for
any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except
in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el
legado ... por qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la
herencia, fuera de los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article
960 (2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the will
"does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator." There being no
substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator
had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly
intestate, or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the
indivisibility of the testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional
legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property recovered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra,
51 Phil. 267).
We find no merit in the appeal The Appellate Court's decision is affirmed.
Costs against the petitioner.