Am Jur 2d Affidavits Sections 1 20
Am Jur 2d Affidavits Sections 1 20
SECTIONS 1 - 20
Page 1 of 46
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
A valid declaration has the same force and effect as an affidavit administered under oath. Garcia v. Superior
Court, 42 Cal. 4th 63, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 948, 163 P.3d 939 (2007).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Otani v. District Court in and for Twenty-First Judicial Dist., 662 P.2d 1088 (Colo. 1983); Pappas v.
State, 179 Ind. App. 547, 386 N.E.2d 718 (2d Dist. 1979); In re Murphy, 321 Mass. 206, 72 N.E.2d 413
(1947); Holmes v. Michigan Capital Medical Center, 242 Mich. App. 703, 620 N.W.2d 319 (2000), appeal
denied, 636 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 2001); State v. Haase, 247 Neb. 817, 530 N.W.2d 617 (1995); Alan J.
Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 708 A.2d 401 (1998); Torkelson v. Byrne, 68 N.D. 13, 276 N.W.
134, 113 A.L.R. 1213 (1937); Ackler v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 380 Pa. Super. 183, 551 A.2d 291 (1988);
Collins v. Doe, 343 S.C. 119, 539 S.E.2d 62 (Ct. App. 2000), cert. granted, (May 23, 2001); Clay v. Portik,
84 Wash. App. 553, 929 P.2d 1132 (Div. 2 1997); Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town of Buffalo,
348 P.2d 76, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 (Wyo. 1959).
- An affidavit requires that the affiant make a conscious and unequivocal act. State v. Bishop, 921 S.W.2d
765 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1996).
[FN2] Donnellan v. City of Novato, 86 Cal. App. 4th 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 882 (1st Dist. 2001).
[FN3] Bigler v. State, 602 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
[FN4] Meigs v. Black, 25 Kan. App. 2d 241, 960 P.2d 770 (1998).
- The purpose of permitting a declaration under penalty of perjury, in lieu of a sworn statement, is to help
insure that declarations contain a truthful factual representation and are made in good faith. In re Marriage of
Reese & Guy, 73 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (4th Dist. 1999).
[FN5] Manchenton v. Auto Leasing Corp., 135 N.H. 298, 605 A.2d 208 (1992).
[FN6] Mugavero v. Kenzler, 317 Ill. App. 3d 162, 251 Ill. Dec. 46, 739 N.E.2d 979 (2d Dist. 2000).
- If one was not sworn to before official or person in authority, it is not valid. State v. Bishop, 921 S.W.2d
765 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1996).
[FN7] Goggin v. Grimes, 969 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1998).
[FN8] Lindley v. Midwest Pulmonary Consultants, P.C., 55 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2001).
- An affidavit that contains only legal conclusions is substantively deficient and, although formal deficiencies
in an affidavit can be waived if not raised in trial court, substantive deficiencies cannot be waived. Elam v.
Quest Chemical Corp., 884 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1994), reh'g overruled, (Nov. 22, 1994) and
judgment rev'd on other grounds, 898 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1995) and writ granted, (May 25, 1995).
[FN9] Thatcher v. Darr, 27 Wyo. 452, 199 P. 938, 16 A.L.R. 1442 (1921).
[FN10] Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Mundinger, 528 N.E.2d 829 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1988).
[FN11] Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1994), writ granted, (Feb.
16, 1995) and judgment aff'd, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996).
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 2 of 46
[FN12] Double S, Inc. v. Northwest Kansas Production Credit Ass'n, 17 Kan. App. 2d 740, 843 P.2d 741
(1992).
- A "verification" is an affidavit attached to the statement as to truth of the matters set forth in the statement.
Eveleigh v. Conness, 261 Kan. 970, 933 P.2d 675 (1997).
[FN13] Meigs v. Black, 25 Kan. App. 2d 241, 960 P.2d 770 (1998).
[FN14] In re Morelli, 11 Cal. App. 3d 819, 91 Cal. Rptr. 72 (2d Dist. 1970).
[FN15] Slavenburg Corp. v. Opus Apparel, Inc., 53 N.Y.2d 799, 439 N.Y.S.2d 910, 422 N.E.2d 570 (1981),
ruling, however that even those persons who are statutorily allowed to use affirmations in lieu of affidavits
cannot do so when they are a party to an action.
[FN16] Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 2000).
- A "professional statement" is a technique, used as a matter of convenience and practical necessity to
establish a record of matters peculiarly within the knowledge of an attorney. Blum v. State, 510 N.W.2d 175
(Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
- In offering a professional statement an attorney pledges the honor of his profession and his personal
integrity. Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 2000).
[FN17] Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 2000).
Page 3 of 46
attesting to the oral declaration.[FN4] An acknowledgment does not constitute an "affidavit" because it does
not purport to be a certification that the person acknowledging it swears to the truth of the matter set
out.[FN5] A requirement that a paper be "sworn to" contemplates the execution of an affidavit that the facts
contained in it are true, and not an acknowledgment.[FN6]
The difference between an affidavit and an oath is that an affidavit consists of a statement of fact, which is
sworn to as the truth, while an oath is a pledge.[FN7] Broadly speaking, pleadings and affidavits are
distinguishable in that affidavits must state facts under oath, whereas pleadings may contain allegations of
ultimate facts, and verification of a pleading may not be necessary in all cases.[FN8] An affidavit is not a
pleading and cannot ordinarily be made to take place of a pleading.[FN9]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Depositions and Discovery 108.
[FN2] 23 Am. Jur. 2d, Depositions and Discovery 148.
[FN3] 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments 1.
[FN4] 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments 1.
[FN5] Cutler v. Ament, 726 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1987), writ refused n.r.e., (Sept. 16,
1987).
- An "acknowledgment" shows, merely prima facie, that the instrument was duly executed, whereas a
"verification" is an affidavit attached to the statement as to truth of the matters therein set forth. Eveleigh v.
Conness, 261 Kan. 970, 933 P.2d 675 (1997).
- As to the definition of a "verification," see 1.
[FN6] State v. Wolfe, 156 Conn. 199, 239 A.2d 509 (1968); Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md.
665, 80 A.2d 906, 29 A.L.R.2d 286 (1951).
[FN7] 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Oath and Affirmation 3.
[FN8] State v. Londe, 345 Mo. 185, 132 S.W.2d 501 (1939).
[FN9] In re Petition to Annex Certain Property to City of Wood Dale, 244 Ill. App. 3d 820, 183 Ill. Dec. 343,
611 N.E.2d 606 (2d Dist. 1993).
Page 4 of 46
A.L.R. Library
A.L.R. Digest: Affidavits 2
A.L.R. Index: Affidavits
Forms
1A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Affidavits and Declarations 13:13 et seq., 13:47, 13:53, 13:56 to 13:59,
13:72
1B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Affidavits 115, 141, 142, 144 to 147, 149.1
Page 5 of 46
Page 6 of 46
Caution: The practice of an attorney filing an affidavit on behalf of his client asserting the status of that client
is not approved, inasmuch as not only does the affidavit become hearsay, but it places the attorney in a
position of a witness, thus compromising his role as an advocate.[FN11]
Reminder: It is good practice for the agent to show he has special knowledge, indicating the sources thereof,
except when the affidavit may be, and is, made on information and belief.[FN12]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Leather Facts, Inc. v. Foy, 157 Misc. 2d 35, 595 N.Y.S.2d 874 (City Civ. Ct. 1993).
[FN2] Schwarz v. Smith, 325 S.W.2d 407 (Tex. Civ. App. Waco 1959), writ refused n.r.e., 160 Tex. 280,
329 S.W.2d 83 (1959).
- As to the verification of pleading by attorney or agent, see 61B Am. Jur. 2d, Pleading 892.
[FN3] Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982).
[FN4] Bowman v. Henard, 547 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1977).
[FN5] Romel v. Reale, 155 A.D.2d 747, 547 N.Y.S.2d 691 (3d Dep't 1989).
[FN6] International Turbine Service, Inc. v. Lovitt, 881 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1994), reh'g
overruled, (Aug. 9, 1994) and writ denied, (Nov. 17, 1994).
[FN7] Southern Attractions, Inc. v. Grau, 93 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1956).
[FN8] Possehl v. Ossino, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 918, 547 N.E.2d 59 (1989).
[FN9] Frunzar v. Allied Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 548 N.W.2d 880 (Iowa 1996).
[FN10] Leather Facts, Inc. v. Foy, 157 Misc. 2d 35, 595 N.Y.S.2d 874 (City Civ. Ct. 1993).
[FN11] Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235 (N.D. 1979).
- As to affidavits made by agents or attorneys of corporations, see 5.
[FN12] Wakely v. Sun Ins. Office of London, Eng., 246 Pa. 268, 92 A. 136, 3 A.L.R. 128 (1914).
- As to affidavits on information and belief, see 8.
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Page 8 of 46
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Federal Land Bank of Saint Paul v. Anderson, 401 N.W.2d 709 (N.D. 1987).
- As to the verification of pleadings by corporations, see 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations 2222, 2223.
[FN2] American Soda Fountain Co. v. Stolzenbach, 75 N.J.L. 721, 68 A. 1078 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1908).
- As to necessity of statement as to authority to make affidavit, see 6.
[FN3] United Bonding Ins. Co. v. Dura-Stress, Inc., 243 So. 2d 244 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1971);
American Soda Fountain Co. v. Stolzenbach, 75 N.J.L. 721, 68 A. 1078 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1908).
- As to the necessity that the affiant state facts within his or her knowledge generally, see 14.
[FN4] Wakely v. Sun Ins. Office of London, Eng., 246 Pa. 268, 92 A. 136, 3 A.L.R. 128 (1914).
- As to affidavits made by agents or attorneys generally, see 4.
- As to necessity of statement as to authority to make affidavit, see 3.
[FN5] Columbia Screw Co. v. Warner Lock Co., 138 Cal. 445, 71 P. 498 (1903); Mintz v. Tri-County
Natural Gas Co., 259 Pa. 477, 103 A. 285 (1918).
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Page 10 of 46
Page 11 of 46
[FN3] Phoebe Putney Memorial Hosp. v. Skipper, 235 Ga. App. 534, 510 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
[FN4] Sambor v. Kelley, 271 Ga. 133, 518 S.E.2d 120 (1999).
- As to acknowledgments taken over the telephone, see 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Acknowledgments 25.
[FN5] Harris v. Murray, 233 Ga. App. 661, 504 S.E.2d 736 (1998).
[FN6] Thompson v. Self, 197 Ark. 70, 122 S.W.2d 182 (1938); Kirk v. Hartlieb, 193 Ark. 37, 97 S.W.2d 434
(1936).
[FN7] Harris v. Murray, 233 Ga. App. 661, 504 S.E.2d 736 (1998).
[FN8] Harris v. Murray, 233 Ga. App. 661, 504 S.E.2d 736 (1998).
[FN9] Dalbey Bros. Lumber Co. v. Crispin, 234 Iowa 151, 12 N.W.2d 277 (1943).
Page 12 of 46
A. In General
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
8. Generally
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Affidavits 9 to 12
A.L.R. Library
Admissibility of affidavit to impeach witness, 14 A.L.R. 4th 828.
Forms
Caption. 1B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Affidavits 21 to 23.
Venue. 1B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Affidavits 31 to 34.
Introduction of affidavit. 1B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Affidavits 41 to 55.
AffidavitOf handwriting expertForged signature. 1B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Affidavits
155.
A complete affidavit must satisfy three essential elements: (1) a written oath embodying the facts as sworn to
by the affiant; (2) the signature of the affiant; and (3) the attestation by an officer authorized to administer
the oath that the affidavit was actually sworn by the affiant before the officer.[FN1] While an affidavit
typically includes a caption or title, the venue, the signature of affiant, the jurat, and the body of the
instrument,[FN2] no particular terminology is required to render the document an affidavit,[FN3] as it is the
substance and not form of affidavit that is important.[FN4] Technical deficiencies do not render affidavits
improper[FN5] and will not be stricken.[FN6] Accordingly, if it affirmatively appears from whole of
document that affiant could competently testify to contents of affidavit at trial, then technical insufficiencies
in affidavit should be disregarded.[FN7]
An affidavit must set forth facts and show affirmatively how the affiant obtained personal knowledge of
those facts.[FN8] Thus, an affidavit that does not positively and unequivocally represent the facts as
disclosed in the affidavit to be true and within the affiant's personal knowledge is legally insufficient.[FN9]
An objection that an affidavit contains statements of opinion[FN10] or hearsay in an affidavit are defects in
form, and whether an affiant has personal knowledge and is competent are objections to form.[FN11]
Similarly, an affidavit is not a "lawful affidavit" where signed outside the presence of the officer and no oath
is administered.[FN12]
Practice Guide: A verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the
verifying signatory is in substance an affidavit, and is accorded the same probative force as affidavit.[FN13]
A "verification" is a type of statement given under oath where the declarant must not only refrain from
making a knowingly false statement, but must also have affirmative knowledge of the statement's
truthfulness.[FN14] To function as an opposing affidavit, the verified complaint must be based on personal
knowledge and set forth specific facts admissible in evidence.[FN15]
Observation: An attorney's affidavits filed in support of her motion for summary judgment in a legal
malpractice action were not defective, where the attorney stated that she was fully competent and qualified to
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 13 of 46
make the affidavit on her own personal knowledge, that she was the attorney for the client in the underlying
divorce until she withdrew, that she intervened for her fees, and that the attached exhibits were true and
correct copies of the originals, and she signed the affidavit which was sworn to and subscribed before a
notary public.[FN16]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
An affidavit that does not state that the facts recited are true, but is based on personal knowledge and is
subscribed to and sworn before a notary public, is not defective. Churchill v. Mayo, 224 S.W.3d 340 (Tex.
App. Houston 1st Dist. 2006), review denied, (Nov. 17, 2006).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Roberson v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB, 250 Ga. App. 350, 553 S.E.2d 162 (2001).
- As to the administration of the oath, see 7.
- As to the signature of the affiant, see 9.
- As to the certificate of the officer, see 11.
[FN2] Acme Brick, a Div. of Justin Industries, Inc. v. Temple Associates, Inc., 816 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. App.
Waco 1991), writ denied, (Dec. 11, 1991).
- If an affidavit is prepared for use in a pending action, the courts generally require that it bear a caption, or
heading, which states the title of the cause in which it is to be used, specifying the court and the names of the
parties. Dollar v. Thompson, 212 Ga. 831, 96 S.E.2d 493 (1957).
[FN3] Bloyed v. General Motors Corp., 881 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App. Texarkana 1994), writ granted, (Feb. 16,
1995) and judgment aff'd, 916 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. 1996).
[FN4] Centro Jurici de Instituto Tecnologico y Estudios Superiores de Monterrey v. Intertravel, Inc., 2
S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1999).
[FN5] Hoover v. Crippen, 151 Ill. App. 3d 864, 105 Ill. Dec. 8, 503 N.E.2d 848 (3d Dist. 1987).
[FN6] Allerion, Inc. v. Nueva Icacos, S.A. de C.V., 283 Ill. App. 3d 40, 218 Ill. Dec. 632, 669 N.E.2d 1158
(1st Dist. 1996), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Sept. 17, 1996).
[FN7] Kirby v. Jarrett, 190 Ill. App. 3d 8, 137 Ill. Dec. 204, 545 N.E.2d 965 (1st Dist. 1989).
[FN8] M.G.M. Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Castro, 8 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1999).
[FN9] David McDavid Nissan, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 56 (Tex. App. Dallas 1999),
review granted, (Dec. 7, 2000) and rev'd on other grounds, 44 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 779, 2001 WL 578337 (Tex.
2001), reh'g granted, (Dec. 6, 2001).
[FN10] Drew v. Harrison County Hosp. Ass'n, 20 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2000).
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 14 of 46
[FN11] Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.3d 103, 43 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 306 (Tex. App.
Houston 14th Dist. 2000).
[FN12] Phoebe Putney Memorial Hosp. v. Skipper, 235 Ga. App. 534, 510 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
[FN13] Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 861 P.2d 1253 (Ct. App. 1993).
[FN14] Double S, Inc. v. Northwest Kansas Production Credit Ass'n, 17 Kan. App. 2d 740, 843 P.2d 741
(1992).
[FN15] Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 32 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 196 (9th Cir. 1995).
[FN16] Goggin v. Grimes, 969 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1998).
Page 15 of 46
Caution: Except where positive law mandates addition of signature to record of oath administration,
signature of deponent is not essential element of affidavit.[FN7] Thus, although in the absence of a statute or
rule of court to the contrary, it is not necessary to the validity of an affidavit that it have the signature of the
affiant subscribed thereto,[FN8] all the authorities and general custom recommend, as the better practice, that
it be signed by the affiant.[FN9]
Practice Guide: For purposes of a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff, by declaring under penalty of
perjury that complaint is true (i.e. verifying complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 1746), and by signing it,
converts the complaint, or rather those factual assertions in the complaint that comply with the requirements
for affidavits specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), into an affidavit.[FN10]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Statutes:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was substantially amended April 28, 2010, effective December 1, 2010. Under the
amended Rule, the requirements for affidavits are in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), which provides that an affidavit
or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.
Cases:
The truth of the facts contained in an affidavit must be sworn to in order for the affidavit to be proper. State
ex rel. Nixon v. McIntyre, 2007 WL 1974953 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2007), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Aug.
28, 2007).
Oaths to affidavits ordinarily are not required to be administered with any particular ceremony, but the
affiant must perform some corporal act before the officer whereby the affiant consciously takes upon himself
or herself the obligation of an oath. Moyer v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 275 Neb. 688, 747 N.W.2d
924 (2008).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Roberson v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB, 250 Ga. App. 350, 553 S.E.2d 162 (2001).
[FN2] Phoebe Putney Memorial Hosp. v. Skipper, 235 Ga. App. 534, 510 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
[FN3] Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1, 182 Ill. Dec. 937, 610 N.E.2d 806 (4th Dist. 1993).
[FN4] Chmielewski v. Kahlfeldt, 237 Ill. App. 3d 129, 179 Ill. Dec. 809, 606 N.E.2d 641 (2d Dist. 1992).
[FN5] Northrop v. Lopatka, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1, 182 Ill. Dec. 937, 610 N.E.2d 806 (4th Dist. 1993).
[FN6] General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Sutherland, 122 Neb. 720, 241 N.W. 281 (1932).
[FN7] In re McAndrew, 105 Pa. Commw. 503, 524 A.2d 1072 (1987).
[FN8] Huff v. Com., 213 Va. 710, 194 S.E.2d 690 (1973).
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 16 of 46
[FN9] International Harvester Co. of America v. Embody, 89 Mont. 402, 298 P. 348 (1931); People ex rel.
New York City Omnibus Corporation v. Miller, 282 N.Y. 5, 24 N.E.2d 722 (1939); State v. Higgins, 266
N.C. 589, 146 S.E.2d 681 (1966).
[FN10] Ford v. Wilson, 90 F.3d 245, 35 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 539 (7th Cir. 1996).
Page 17 of 46
- As to the power of notaries to administer oaths and affirmations, see 58 Am. Jur. 2d, Oath and Affirmation
37.
[FN2] Eveleigh v. Conness, 261 Kan. 970, 933 P.2d 675 (1997).
[FN3] Yang v. Stafford, 515 N.E.2d 1157, 1 A.L.R.5th 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).
[FN4] Bigler v. State, 602 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
[FN5] State v. Colon, 230 Conn. 24, 644 A.2d 877 (1994).
Page 18 of 46
An affidavit that is neither signed nor notarized is not competent evidence. State ex rel. Nixon v. McIntyre,
2007 WL 1974953 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2007), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Aug. 28, 2007).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Bigler v. State, 602 N.E.2d 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1992).
[FN2] Meigs v. Black, 25 Kan. App. 2d 241, 960 P.2d 770 (1998).
[FN3] Cintuc, Inc. v. Kozubowski, 230 Ill. App. 3d 969, 172 Ill. Dec. 822, 596 N.E.2d 101 (1st Dist. 1992).
[FN4] Roberson v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB, 250 Ga. App. 350, 553 S.E.2d 162 (2001).
[FN5] Phoebe Putney Memorial Hosp. v. Skipper, 226 Ga. App. 585, 487 S.E.2d 1 (1997), cert. granted,
cause remanded, (Jan. 8, 1998).
[FN6] Pappas v. State, 179 Ind. App. 547, 386 N.E.2d 718 (2d Dist. 1979).
[FN7] Hall v. Rutherford, 911 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1995), reh'g overruled, (Oct. 30, 1995)
and writ denied, (Feb. 29, 1996).
- A certification which contains neither the signature nor seal of any party purporting to be authorized to take
sworn statement is insufficient to constitute "affidavit" under Florida law. Orbe v. Orbe, 651 So. 2d 1295
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1995).
Page 19 of 46
Certificate of authorityOf officer of court taking affidavit in another stateBy clerk of court. 1B Am. Jur.
Pleading and Practice Forms, Affidavits 101.
Certificate of authorityOf notary public taking affidavit in another state. 1B Am. Jur. Pleading and
Practice Forms, Affidavits 102.
In some jurisdictions, an affidavit in support of motion for default judgment, signed and sworn to before a
notary in another state, does not require an accompanying certificate authenticating the notary's authority to
administer oaths.[FN1] In others, oaths, affidavits, and acknowledgments taken in other states that are
required must be administered by authorized person and authenticated by the signature and seal of that
person.[FN2]
In the absence of any statutory provisions as to what constitutes a sufficient authentication of the official
character of a foreign notary, his seal of office is generally considered sufficient.[FN3] Some authorities
decline to take judicial notice of the authority of a notary in another state to take affidavits, but require that
the authority of the officer before whom the affidavit was taken be shown,[FN4] including that the power of
the notary to administer an oath is customary and inherent in his office, and that statutes conferring the
power are merely declaratory in their nature.[FN5]
Observation: An Israeli advocate was not a person who could authenticate the defendant's affidavit, which
was filed in support of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, since being an advocate in
Israel did not automatically confer the status of a notary public.[FN6]
Practice Guide: Although both pages of an out-of-state affidavit in opposition to the defendants' motion for
summary judgment in a medical malpractice action should have been accompanied by a certificate
authenticating the authority of an oath administrator, the court properly refused to reject an affidavit for the
technical failure to comply with CLS CPLR 2309(c), where the only result would have been in further
delay because the affidavit could have been given nunc pro tunc effect once properly acknowledged.[FN7]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Firstcom Broadcast Services v. New York Sound Inc., 184 Misc. 2d 524, 709 N.Y.S.2d 329 (City Civ.
Ct. 2000).
[FN2] Orbe v. Orbe, 651 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1995).
[FN3] Simpson v. Wicker, 120 Ga. 418, 47 S.E. 965 (1904).
- As to the authority of notaries to administer oaths and take affidavits, generally, see 58 Am. Jur. 2d,
Notaries Public 37.
- As to the authentication of extradition papers, see 31A Am. Jur. 2d, Extradition 74, 75, 78, 79.
[FN4] Teutonia Loan & Building Co. v. Turrell, 19 Ind. App. 469, 49 N.E. 852 (1898); Holbrook v. Libby,
113 Me. 389, 94 A. 482 (1915).
[FN5] Simpson v. Wicker, 120 Ga. 418, 47 S.E. 965 (1904).
[FN6] Ben-Aziz v. Polani, 710 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1998).
[FN7] Nandy v. Albany Medical Center Hosp., 155 A.D.2d 833, 548 N.Y.S.2d 98 (3d Dep't 1989).
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 20 of 46
observe matters about which he or she testifies.[FN5] Statements in affidavits as to opinion, belief, or
conclusions of law are of no effect.[FN6] The affiant must swear or affirm under oath that facts stated are
true.[FN7]
An affidavit need not follow the precise language of the statute requiring such affidavit, a substantial
compliance being sufficient.[FN8]
Observation: Statements in an affidavit to the effect that the affiant had read a memorandum and believed
statements in it to be true did not adequately show personal knowledge of the disclosures within the
document, and an assertion that the writing was based on best of the affiant's knowledge and belief would
not make the affidavit admissible.[FN9]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Summary judgment affidavit of motorist's expert failed to identify a defect in motorist's pick-up truck at time
it left the manufacturer, and thus, affidavit was insufficient to show that manufacturer was liable for product
defect for fire that the expert "suspected" was caused by truck's electrical system. Vernon's Ann.Texas Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 166a(i). Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] 14.
[FN2] Atiya v. Di Bartolo, 63 Cal. App. 3d 121, 133 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1st Dist. 1976); PPX Enterprises, Inc. v.
Musicali, 42 N.Y.2d 897, 397 N.Y.S.2d 987, 366 N.E.2d 1341 (1977).
[FN3] In re Contempt of Steingold, 244 Mich. App. 153, 624 N.W.2d 504 (2000).
- A verified pleading may also be used as an affidavit if the facts stated therein are true to the party's own
knowledge. Bruce E. M. v. Dorothea A. M., 455 A.2d 866 (Del. 1983).
- As to verification of pleadings, generally, see 61B Am. Jur. 2d, Pleading 894 et seq.
[FN4] Hepner v. Southern Ry. Co., 182 Ga. App. 346, 356 S.E.2d 30 (1987).
[FN5] Scott v. City of Seymour, 659 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
[FN6] Young v. First United Bank of Bellevue, 246 Neb. 43, 516 N.W.2d 256 (1994).
- When ultimate facts or conclusions of law appear in an affidavit which also contains the proper subject of
affidavit testimony, facts within the personal knowledge of the affiant, the extraneous material should be
disregarded, and only the facts considered. A. L. Pickens Co., Inc. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 650
F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1981).
[FN7] Coastal Cement Sand Inc. v. First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc., 956 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App. Houston
14th Dist. 1997), reh'g overruled, (Dec. 23, 1997).
[FN8] Simonton v. Simonton, 40 Idaho 751, 236 P. 863, 42 A.L.R. 1363 (1925); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind.
324, 61 N.E. 730 (1901); Clayton v. Clark, 76 Kan. 832, 92 P. 1117 (1907).
[FN9] Arkla, Inc. v. Maddox and May Bros. Casing Service, Inc., 624 So. 2d 34 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 22 of 46
Page 23 of 46
- Where an affidavit does not specifically recite that the facts set forth there are true, but does set out that it is
based on personal knowledge and is subscribed to and sworn before a notary public, it is not defective if,
when considered in its entirety, its obvious effect is that the affiant is representing that the facts stated therein
are true and correct. Federal Financial Co. v. Delgado, 1 S.W.3d 181, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 759 (Tex.
App. Corpus Christi 1999), reh'g overruled, (Sept. 16, 1999).
[FN4] Bova v. Vinciguerra, 139 A.D.2d 797, 526 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1988).
- Where a number of witnesses are making affidavits as to the same state of facts, the close similarity of
language of such affidavits, even with respect to minute details, will render them open to suspicion and,
therefore, objectionable. State v. District Court of Jefferson County, 213 Iowa 822, 238 N.W. 290, 80 A.L.R.
339 (1931).
[FN5] Allerion, Inc. v. Nueva Icacos, S.A. de C.V., 283 Ill. App. 3d 40, 218 Ill. Dec. 632, 669 N.E.2d 1158
(1st Dist. 1996), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Sept. 17, 1996).
[FN6] Kugler v. Southmark Realty Partners III, 309 Ill. App. 3d 790, 243 Ill. Dec. 407, 723 N.E.2d 710 (1st
Dist. 1999).
[FN7] Read v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 725 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
[FN8] Read v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 725 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1998).
Page 24 of 46
belief is insufficient as an affidavit unless authorized by a special statute[FN3] or where those matters sworn
to are of necessity opinions or conclusions of law.[FN4]
Observation: In affidavit based on an affiant's best knowledge and belief, every item set forth as fact in the
affidavit may be false, and yet each one may be true to the best of the affiant's knowledge and belief.[FN5]
Caution: The legislature may expressly authorize the use of affidavits on information and belief to support a
particular pleading or motion.[FN6] Conversely, the legislature may preclude use of affidavits on
information and belief to support particular pleading or motion by expressly requiring allegations based on
personal knowledge.[FN7]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Cases:
Affidavits made pursuant to an affiant's information and belief are limited as to the oath they make because
the affiant is not swearing that the facts as averred are true to the best of his personal knowledge; rather, he is
swearing that he makes the averments in good faith upon his best information and his bona fide belief. Estate
of Neterer v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, 956 N.E.2d 1214 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2011).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] State, Dept. of Human Services for Martin v. Neilson, 771 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
- As to affidavit for attachment on information and belief, see 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Attachment and Garnishment
278.
- As to the verification of an affidavit in an application to vacate, modify, or set aside a judgment based upon
information and belief, see 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments 857.
[FN2] In re Sullivan, 185 Misc. 2d 39, 710 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup 2000).
- Affidavits on information and belief without giving the source of the information or the grounds of belief
are mere hearsay and incompetent as evidence. In re Kuser's Estate, 132 N.J. Eq. 260, 26 A.2d 688 (Prerog.
Ct. 1942).
[FN3] Slater v. Metro Nissan of Montclair, 801 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1990), writ denied, (Apr.
3, 1991) and reh'g of writ of error overruled, (June 5, 1991).
[FN4] State, Dept. of Human Services for Martin v. Neilson, 771 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
[FN5] Ingram v. JIK Realty Co., Inc., 199 Ga. App. 335, 404 S.E.2d 802 (1991).
[FN6] City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222 (1989).
[FN7] City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222 (1989).
Page 25 of 46
Affidavits
Rosemary Gregor, J.D.
IV. Elements of Affidavit
B. Personal Knowledge of Affiant; Statement of Facts
Topic Summary Correlation Table References
16. Allegations in the alternative
West's Key Number Digest
West's Key Number Digest, Affidavits 17
Forms
Statement of factsAlternative allegations. 1A Am. Jur. Legal Forms 2d, Affidavits and Declarations
13:67.
If a remedy exists upon proof of any one of various distinct and separate grounds, an affidavit which alleges
alternatively that one or another ground exists does not definitely allege the existence of either ground and,
by reason of the uncertainty of its allegations, is generally held insufficient.[FN1] A distinction however, is
to be made between alleging in the alternative two or more distinct grounds, and alleging in the alternative
two or more phases of a single ground; in the latter case, the alternative form is of no consequence.[FN2]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Helton v. McLeod & Dantzler, 93 Miss. 516, 46 So. 534 (1908); In re Kuser's Estate, 132 N.J. Eq.
260, 26 A.2d 688 (Prerog. Ct. 1942); Piedmont Grocery Co. v. Hawkins, 83 W. Va. 180, 98 S.E. 152, 4
A.L.R. 828 (1919).
[FN2] McCarthy Bros. Co. v. McLean County Farmers' Elevator Co., 18 N.D. 176, 118 N.W. 1049 (1908);
Johnson v. Emery, 31 Utah 126, 86 P. 869 (1906); Piedmont Grocery Co. v. Hawkins, 83 W. Va. 180, 98
S.E. 152, 4 A.L.R. 828 (1919).
Page 26 of 46
Forms
By affiantAmendment to prior affidavit. 1B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Affidavits 46.
Affidavits are as amendable as other pleadings,[FN1] and an amendment by substitution is as permissible as
an amendment by striking from or adding to the contents of the paper which it is sought to amend.[FN2]
Where the date of the affiant's signature and the date of the notary's attestation differ, such error is an
amendable defect and does not render the affidavit void ab initio.[FN3] Similarly, a failure to sign an
affidavit in the presence of a notary public is an amendable defect and does not render the affidavit void ab
initio.[FN4]
However, if the defect in an affidavit is one of substance, the trial court does not have to allow an
opportunity to amend.[FN5] Thus, affidavits containing hearsay, legal conclusions, and irrelevant
information are properly stricken without an opportunity to amend, as defects in the affidavits are of
substance and not form.[FN6]
Practice Guide: The trial court in its discretion may extend the time for filing amendments to defective
affidavits.[FN7]
Observation: A defendant's motion to strike the government's declaration was dismissed as moot, because the
government filed a corrected declaration that complied with the requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. 1746.[FN8]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Joyce's Submarine Sandwiches, Inc. v. California Public Employees' Retirement System, 195 Ga.
App. 748, 395 S.E.2d 257 (1990).
- As to the amendment of affidavits in attachment and garnishment proceedings, see 6 Am. Jur. 2d,
Attachment and Garnishment 297 to 300.
[FN2] Phoebe Putney Memorial Hosp. v. Skipper, 235 Ga. App. 534, 510 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
[FN3] Kropp v. Roberts, 246 Ga. App. 497, 540 S.E.2d 680 (2000).
[FN4] Weekes v. Nationwide General Ins. Co., 232 Ga. App. 144, 500 S.E.2d 620 (1998).
- Absent a showing that the tenant was prejudiced by permitting a dispossessory affidavit to be expanded by
unverified amendments, the court could properly allow the affidavit to be amended after trial to add a
verification. Joyce's Submarine Sandwiches, Inc. v. California Public Employees' Retirement System, 195
Ga. App. 748, 395 S.E.2d 257 (1990).
[FN5] Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1992), writ denied, (Oct. 21, 1992).
[FN6] Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1992), writ denied, (Oct. 21, 1992).
[FN7] Kropp v. Roberts, 246 Ga. App. 497, 540 S.E.2d 680 (2000).
[FN8] U.S. v. Gritz Bros. Partnership, 155 F.R.D. 639 (E.D. Wis. 1994).
Page 27 of 46
Page 28 of 46
Caution: An affidavit need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant and may be based on
hearsay.[FN3] However, affidavit testimony as to which the affiant has no personal knowledge and which
includes information that must have been secured from others may be inadmissible hearsay.[FN4]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Walker v. First Indus. Bank, 95 Colo. 411, 36 P.2d 467 (1934); State v. District Court of Ninth
Judicial Dist. in and for Gallatin County, 72 Mont. 245, 233 P. 126 (1925); Dunn v. Silk, 155 Va. 504, 155
S.E. 694, 71 A.L.R. 667 (1930).
- A statutory provision to the effect that an affidavit may be used upon a motion relates to preliminary,
collateral, and interlocutory matters, and an affidavit by insurer's attorney is not admissible to establish that
under the law of another state attorney's fees are not recoverable by the plaintiff in an action on an insurance
policy. Banks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 823, 8 N.W.2d 185 (1943).
- As to the use of affidavits in supporting or opposing motions, see 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Motions, Rules, and
Orders 22, 27.
- As to affidavits in verifying pleadings, see 61B Am. Jur. 2d, Pleading 894.
- As to affidavits to prove service of process, see 62B Am. Jur. 2d, Process 317.
- As to affidavits in support of a motion to suppress, see 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence 652.
[FN2] Appleton v. Board of Educ. of Town of Stonington, 53 Conn. App. 252, 730 A.2d 88, 135 Ed. Law
Rep. 170 (1999), certification granted in part, 249 Conn. 927, 733 A.2d 847, 136 Ed. Law Rep. 948 (1999)
and judgment aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 254 Conn. 205, 757 A.2d 1059, 146 Ed. Law Rep. 1097 (2000).
[FN3] Doggett v. State, 791 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, (Dec. 8, 2000).
[FN4] Home Bank of Guntersville v. Perpetual Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 547 So. 2d 840, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d 879 (Ala. 1989).
Page 29 of 46
evidentiary value, in a variety of civil contexts, when based on information and belief, or hearsay.[FN2]
Affidavits generally can be used for impeachment purposes,[FN3] but cannot be offered as substantive
evidence.[FN4]
An affidavit is ordinarily not admissible to prove facts in issue at an evidentiary hearing, because it is not
subject to cross examination and would improperly shift the burden of proof to the adverse party.[FN5]
However, an affidavit may be admissible as evidence on a material fact at issue if evidence is admissible
generally on that fact as an exception to the hearsay rule.[FN6]
[EVIDENTIARY HEARING: An evidentiary hearing is a formal examination of charges
by the receiving of testimony from interested persons, irrespective of whether oaths are
administered, and receiving evidence in support or in defense of specific charges which
may have been made. Where an evidentiary hearing is held, the parties are entitled to
know the charges and claims involved, have a right to meet such charges or claims by
competent evidence, and the right to be heard by counsel upon the force of evidence put
forth and upon the applicable law. http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/evidentiary-hearing/]
Affidavits are generally not competent evidence unless provided by statute.[FN7] Accordingly, an affidavit
must state the facts positively and not merely on information and belief in order for the affidavit to be used
as evidence.[FN8]
Unsigned affidavits of a witness are not admissible evidence.[FN9]
As a general rule, a party is not permitted to create an issue of fact by submitting a affidavit whose
conclusions contradict a prior deposition or other sworn testimony.[FN10] While, supplemental affidavits
can be employed to clarify ambiguous or confusing deposition testimony,[FN11] the court should disregard
any inadmissible information contained in affidavit.[FN12] Thus, only such portion of an affidavit that sets
forth facts that are admissible in evidence can be considered.[FN13] On the other hand, every discrepancy
contained in an affidavit does not justify a trial court's refusal to give credence to such evidence, and in light
of the jury's role in resolving questions of credibility, a trial court should not reject the contents of an
affidavit even if it is at odds with statements made in an earlier deposition.[FN14]
While an affidavit is generally inadmissible as a piece of independent testimony, the opposite party may
waive objection to its admissibility,[FN15] and incompetent statements in an affidavit become competent
evidence when admitted without objection.[FN16] It cannot, however, be used to corroborate a witness
whose testimony is unimpeached.[FN17]
Observation: The general rule is that affidavits are commonly regarded as weak evidence, to be received with
caution, and that they are not conclusive of the facts stated therein, even though not contradicted by counter
affidavits.[FN18]
Caution: Even in rare instances in which an affidavit is acceptable as a substitute for testimony, it must be
based on personal knowledge, must set forth only facts admissible in evidence, and must show that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters contained therein.[FN19]
CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT
Statutes:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was substantially amended April 28, 2010, effective December 1, 2010. Under the
amended Rule, the requirements for affidavits are in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4), which provides that an affidavit
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 30 of 46
or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
stated.
Cases:
Affidavits were not admissible on summary judgment motion under the residual exception, to hearsay rule;
affidavits which were pre-typed forms that required the declarants merely to "fill-in-the-blank" with facts
and which appeared to be facially inconsistent with the factual account provided by another affidavit, lacked
indicia of both trustworthiness and probative force, and proponent, by failing to depose either affiant during
the year after obtaining their affidavits despite knowledge of the affiants' elderly age, failed to engage in
reasonable efforts to preserve their testimony for trial in products liability action. Bortell v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
406 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005).
Affidavit of country club president, offered in support of club's motion for summary judgment on claim for
overtime compensation under Maryland Wage and Hour Law, would not be stricken on the ground that
statements therein were at odds with earlier judicial decision finding that club was not a bona fide private
membership club for other purposes; affidavit was proper as long as statements therein were made on basis
of personal knowledge. Paukstis v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D. Md.
2003).
Prisoner's summary judgment affidavit attesting to the source and amount of income in her inmate account
was neither signed nor verified by prisoner, and as such, could not be considered as summary judgment
evidence in state's action for reimbursement of incarceration costs. State ex rel. Nixon v. McIntyre, 2007 WL
1974953 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2007), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Aug. 28, 2007).
Failure of prisoner to present competent summary judgment evidence, as a result of unverified summary
judgment affidavit, precluded prisoner from succeeding on motion for summary judgment in state's action
for reimbursement of incarceration expenses, even if state's response to prisoner's motion failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact; by presenting no competent evidence, prisoner failed to establish a prima facie
case establishing her right to judgment as a matter of law, rendering state's response to her motion irrelevant.
State ex rel. Nixon v. McIntyre, 2007 WL 1974953 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2007), reh'g and/or transfer denied,
(Aug. 28, 2007).
Affidavit executed after appellant's negligence case had reached Supreme Court could not be considered by
Supreme Court when deciding restricted appeal stemming from trial court's dismissal of action for want of
prosecution after appellant failed to appear for pretrial scheduling hearing; appellant was required to show
that error was apparent on face of the record, and affidavit constituted extrinsic evidence. Vernon's
Ann.Texas Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 165a, subd. 1; Rules App.Proc., Rule 26.1(c). Alexander v. Lynda's
Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2004).
Affidavit for medical billing records of provider was not admissible in insured's underinsured motorist claim
against automobile insurer since affidavit was not filed at least 30 days before presentation of evidence, and
the error was not harmless in the absence of other evidence by traditional means of proof to support the
expenses provided by medical provider. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Cleveland, 223 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. App.
Amarillo 2006).
[END OF SUPPLEMENT]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] Brandel Realty Co. v. Olson, 159 Ill. App. 3d 230, 111 Ill. Dec. 181, 512 N.E.2d 85 (2d Dist. 1987).
- As to the admissibility of perjury evidence, see 60A Am. Jur. 2d, Perjury 93 to 95.
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 31 of 46
[FN2] City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, 49 Cal. 3d 74, 260 Cal. Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222 (1989).
[FN3] Moseley v. Lewis & Brackin, 583 So. 2d 1297 (Ala. 1991).
- As to the impeachment of witnesses by means of prior inconsistent statements, see 81 Am. Jur. 2d,
Witnesses 938, 963, 996.
A.L.R. Library
Admissibility of affidavit to impeach witness, 14 A.L.R. 4th 828.
[FN4] Robinson v. Robinson, 795 So. 2d 729 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001).
- Ex parte affidavits may be received as evidence in interlocutory or preliminary matters, although they
would be but hearsay at trial. Scott v. Crussen, 741 N.E.2d 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
- As to hearsay evidence, in general, see 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence 658 to 707.
[FN5] Doug Sears Consulting, Inc. v. ATS Services, Inc., 752 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2000).
- Ex parte affidavits are not admissible against a defendant in criminal case. Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 472
S.E.2d 74 (1996).
A.L.R. Library
Disputation of truth of matters stated in affidavit in support of search warrantmodern cases, 24 A.L.R. 4th
1266.
[FN6] Lupyan v. Lupyan, 263 Pa. Super. 303, 397 A.2d 1220 (1979).
[FN7] McDonald v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 4th 364, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 310 (4th Dist. 1994).
[FN8] Hobbs v. Prudential Property and Cas. Co., 1993 OK CIV APP 76, 853 P.2d 252 (Okla. Ct. App. Div.
1 1993).
- An affidavit that states that it is based on "personal knowledge and/or knowledge acquired upon inquiry"
does not unequivocally show that it is based on personal knowledge, and therefore can not serve as evidence.
Federal Financial Co. v. Delgado, 1 S.W.3d 181, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 759 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi
1999), reh'g overruled, (Sept. 16, 1999).
- An affidavit complies with Fed R Civ P Rule 56(e) if it presents evidence which would be admissible at
trial; as general rule, this requires that the affiant have personal knowledge of the information contained in
the affidavit. Reed v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
[FN9] Brewster v. State, 697 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
[FN10] Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1996).
[FN11] Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1996).
[FN12] Bankmark of Florida, Inc. v. Star Financial Card Services, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
- While the trial court is vested with discretion to consider affidavits not timely filed, refusal to exercise that
discretion is not error. Wade v. Howard, 232 Ga. App. 55, 499 S.E.2d 652 (1998), reconsideration dismissed,
(Apr. 3, 1998).
[FN13] Roberson v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB, 250 Ga. App. 350, 553 S.E.2d 162 (2001).
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 32 of 46
[FN14] Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1980).
[FN15] Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 188 U.S. 208, 23 S. Ct. 294, 47 L. Ed. 446 (1903).
[FN16] Vartanian v. Croll, 117 Cal. App. 2d 639, 256 P.2d 1022 (1st Dist. 1953); Naficy v. Braker, 642
S.W.2d 282 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 1982), writ refused n.r.e., (Jan. 26, 1983).
[FN17] Judd v. Letts, 158 Cal. 359, 111 P. 12 (1910).
[FN18] Audit Services v. Kraus Const., Inc., 189 Mont. 94, 615 P.2d 183 (1980).
[FN19] Arkla, Inc. v. Maddox and May Bros. Casing Service, Inc., 624 So. 2d 34 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1993).
- As to personal knowledge, see 14.
Page 33 of 46
The sufficiency of an affidavit is an issue ordinarily left to the discretion of the court.[FN10] The courts must
accept an affidavit as true if it is uncontradicted by a counteraffidavit or other evidentiary materials.[FN11] If
an affidavit is uncontradicted, the reviewing court must accept its contents as true.[FN12] Accordingly,
where an opposing party does not deny or controvert facts stated in a movant's affidavit, the facts may be
deemed to be admitted for purposes of court's ruling on such matter.[FN13] However, it is not a function of
an affidavit to bring a legal argument before the trial court.[FN14]
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------[FN1] State ex rel. Simmons v. Moore, 774 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App. El Paso 1989).
[FN2] In Interest of Simpson, 932 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1996).
[FN3] Jaime v. St. Joseph Hosp. Foundation, 853 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. 1993).
[FN4] Elam v. Quest Chemical Corp., 884 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App. Beaumont 1994), reh'g overruled, (Nov.
22, 1994) and judgment rev'd on other grounds, 898 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1995) and writ granted, (May 25,
1995).
[FN5] Natural Gas Clearinghouse v. Midgard Energy Co., 23 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App. Amarillo 1999), reh'g
overruled, (Feb. 14, 2000).
[FN6] Hoskins v. Sharp, 629 N.E.2d 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1994).
- As to perjury in affidavits, see 60A Am. Jur. 2d, Perjury 44 to 48.
[FN7] Reyna v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 883 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. El Paso 1994),
judgment rev'd, 897 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1995), reh'g overruled, (June 8, 1995) and writ granted, (May 11,
1995).
[FN8] Yang v. Stafford, 515 N.E.2d 1157, 1 A.L.R.5th 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).
[FN9] Yang v. Stafford, 515 N.E.2d 1157, 1 A.L.R.5th 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1987).
[FN10] Caggiano v. Ross, 130 A.D.2d 538, 515 N.Y.S.2d 274 (2d Dep't 1987).
[FN11] Kugler v. Southmark Realty Partners III, 309 Ill. App. 3d 790, 243 Ill. Dec. 407, 723 N.E.2d 710 (1st
Dist. 1999).
[FN12] Frink v. State, 568 N.E.2d 535 (Ind. 1991).
[FN13] Rios v. Danuser Mach. Co., Inc., 110 N.M. 87, 792 P.2d 419 (Ct. App. 1990), cert. quashed, 110
N.M. 72, 792 P.2d 49 (1990).
[FN14] State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
CASE REFFERENCES
Court of Appeals of Indiana,
First District.
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 34 of 46
Page 35 of 46
Page 36 of 46
When reviewing motion for summary judgment, Court of Appeals applies same standard as the trial court
and resolves any doubt as to a fact, or an inference to be drawn therefrom, in favor of party opposing
summary judgment, and role of Court of Appeals includes careful scrutiny of trial court's determination to
assure that nonprevailing party is not improperly prevented from having his day in court.
[7] Judgment 228 185(2)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185 Evidence in General
228k185(2) k. Presumptions and Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases
Party moving for summary judgment bears burden of proving nonexistence of genuine issue of material fact,
and if there is any doubt, motion should be denied, but once movant has sustained his burden, opponent may
not rest on mere allegations or denials in his pleadings be must respond by setting forth specific facts
showing that there is genuine issue for trial.
Trial Procedure Rule 56(C, E).
[8] Judgment 228 185.3(21)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185.3 Evidence and Affidavits in Particular Cases
228k185.3(21) k. Torts. Most Cited Cases
Medical malpractice case based on negligence is rarely appropriate case for disposal by summary judgment,
especially when critical question for resolution is whether defendant exercised a degree of care due under the
factual circumstances, but if defendant doctor can show that there are no genuine issue of material fact as to
any one of the elements of the plaintiff's case, doctor is entitled to summary judgment unless plaintiff can
establish, by expert testimony, genuine issue of material fact for trial.
Trial Procedure Rule 56(C, E).
[9] Health 198H 611
198H Health
198HV Malpractice, Negligence, or Breach of Duty
198HV(B) Duties and Liabilities in General
198Hk611 k. Elements of Malpractice or Negligence in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 299k18.12 Physicians and Surgeons)
To prevail in medical malpractice action, plaintiff must prove three elements: duty on part of defendant in
relation to plaintiff; failure of defendant to conform his conduct to requisite standard of care required by the
relationship; and injury to plaintiff resulting from that failure.
[10] Judgment 228 185(2)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185 Evidence in General
228k185(2) k. Presumptions and Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases
Judgment 228 185(4)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185 Evidence in General
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 37 of 46
228k185(4) k. Documentary Evidence or Official Record. Most Cited Cases Opinion of medical review
panel that evidence did not support conclusion that defendant physician failed to meet applicable standard of
care charged in malpractice complaint was admissible as evidentiary matter for purposes of summary
judgment and sufficient to satisfy doctor's initial burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact on
standard of care issue, so that burden shifted to plaintiff to respond by designating evidentiary matter which
demonstrated genuine issue for trial.
Trial Procedure Rule 56(C, E); West's A.I.C. 16-9.5-9-9
(Repealed).
[11] Judgment 228 185.3(21)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185.3 Evidence and Affidavits in Particular Cases
228k185.3(21) k. Torts. Most Cited Cases
Despite opinion of medical review panel that family practitioner did not violate standard of care in failing to
refer to a hematologist patient with low platelet count, affidavit of another family practitioner that referral to
hematologist would be warranted and would be the standard of care of family practitioners established issue
of fact on standard of care, precluding summary judgment for defendant physician in malpractice action.
[12] Judgment 228 185.1(1)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185.1 Affidavits, Form, Requisites and Execution of 228k185.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
In affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, affiant's words, I affirm the truth of the above statements
met requirements for verification even though affidavit was not notarized.
Trial Procedure
Rule 11(B).
[13] Affidavits 21 1
21 Affidavits
21k1 k. Nature and Functions in General. Most Cited Cases
Affidavit is written statement of fact which is sworn to as the truth before authorized officer, and
chief test of sufficiency of affidavit is its ability to serve as predicate for perjury prosecution.
Trial Procedure Rule 11(B).
[14] Judgment 228 185.1(1)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185.1 Affidavits, Form, Requisites and Execution of
228k185.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Affidavits in support of or opposition to motion for summary judgment must first be properly verified.
Trial Procedure Rule 11(B).
[15] Judgment 228 185.3(21)
228 Judgment
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding
228k182 Motion or Other Application
228k185.3 Evidence and Affidavits in Particular Cases
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 38 of 46
Act) FN1 alleging that Dr. Sharp was negligent in his care of James. After the trial court had ruled on
various discovery and other motions, Pamela's challenge to the constitutionality of the Act and a dispute over
formation of the medical review panel, the panel rendered its unanimous opinion that the evidence did not
support the conclusion that Dr. Sharp failed to meet the applicable standard of care charged in the complaint.
Pamela then filed a complaint in the trial court, specifically alleging that Dr. *1274 Sharp was negligent
because he failed to refer James to a hematologist due to the possibility of the diagnosis of acute leukemia
which she alleged caused his death. Dr. Sharp moved for summary judgment and submitted only the panel's
opinion in support of his motion. Pamela submitted affidavits and letters, James' medical records and his
cause of death report in opposition to the motion. The trial court entered summary judgment for Sharp.
FN1. The Indiana Medical Malpractice
Act, Indiana Code 16-9.5-1-1 et seq., has been repealed and recodified as Indiana
Code 27-12-1-1 et seq., effective July 1, 1993. All citations in this opinion shall be to the former version
of the Act in effect when the suit was filed.
We reverse.
ISSUES
1. Whether Dr. Sharp waived the statutory requirement of a medical review panel by asking the trial
court to compel the formation of two properly constituted medical review striking panels.
2. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the panel chairman to form striking panels constituted
as provided in the Act.
3. Whether the Act is constitutional.
4. Whether Dr. Sharp is entitled to summary judgment as a a matter of law.
FACTS
Dr. Sharp, a specialist in family practice, treated James from approximately 1976 until James' death in June
of 1989. In February of 1989, James submitted to a blood test that Dr. Sharp had ordered which revealed an
abnormally low platelet count. That result was unchanged from a blood test which Sharp had ordered in
1985, which had also revealed a low platelet count. In May of 1989, James, then 45, was admitted to the
emergency room of Hancock Memorial Hospital in serious condition. He was then treated by Dr. Sharp and
other physicians, and was diagnosed with severe encephalopathy. FN2 One of the treating physicians noted
in James' medical records that James also had a history of alcohol abuse. James was later transferred to
Community Ritter Hospital in Indianapolis where he was diagnosed with acute promyelocytic leukemia.
James remained hospitalized until his death on June 18, 1989. FN2. Encephalopathy is generally described as
any disease of the brain. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 508 (25th ed. 1990).
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Issue One: Waiver of Medical Review Panel
[1] Pamela first contends Dr. Sharp waived his right to have Pamela's claim presented to a medical review
panel. She asserts that Dr. Sharp refused to accept the striking panels selected by the panel chairman and
instead obtained a court order requiring a panel under other conformity. She argues that where voluntary
compliance with the formation of a panel becomes impossible and a trial court is asked to intervene in the
panel selection process, the informal procedure contemplated by the Act has failed and the statutory right to
a medical review panel should be deemed waived. We cannot agree.
[2] Generally, no action against a health care provider may be commenced in any court of this state before
the claimant's proposed complaint has been presented to a medical review panel established pursuant to the
Act and an opinion has been rendered by the panel.FN3 IND.CODE 16-9.5-9-2(a). A claimant can waive
this requirement in only one prescribed manner. A claimant may commence an action in court for
malpractice without the presentation of the claim to a medical review panel if the claimant and all parties
named as defendants in the action agree that the claim is not to be presented to a medical review panel.
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 40 of 46
IND.CODE 16-9.5-9-2(b). That agreement must be in writing and must be signed by each party or the
authorized agent of a party. Id. A copy of the agreement must be attached to the complaint filed with the
court in which the action is commenced.
Id.
FN3. However, a patient may commence an action against a health care provider for malpractice without
submitting a proposed complaint to a medical review panel if the patient's pleadings include a declaration
that the patient seeks damages from the
health care provider in an amount no greater
than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000).
IND.CODE 16-9.5-9-2.1(a).
*1275 Here, there was no written agreement between the parties for waiver of a medical review panel. In
fact, in his motion opposing plaintiff's motion for further instruction, Dr. Sharp stated, the Defendant rejects
Plaintiff's offer to waive the panel formation in this case. Record at 161. The evidence also shows that Dr.
Sharp did not simply refuse to accept the striking panels selected by the panel chairman but only insisted that
the panels be composed of qualified physicians as provided under the Act. See IND.CODE 16-9.5-93(b)(1) (when one defendant is specialist in particular area of medicine, two member of review panel are
required to be health care professionals specializing in same area as the defendant). Sharp merely insisted
upon compliance with Indiana Code 16-9.5-9-3(b)(1), and we can discern no waiver from his insistence
that the medical review panel be composed of at least two members from his medical specialty.
Pamela asks that we fashion a common law waiver rule which would apply when the parties are unable
voluntarily and informally to select a medical review panel. She suggests that this waiver rule should be
applied in a case such as this one where the procedure while followed by the parties in good faith, has
broken down due to a requirement that reasonably necessitates a court opinion. Brief of Appellant at 11. We
decline to fashion such a rule where the legislature has narrowly prescribed the circumstances under which
an effective waiver occurs under Indiana Code 16-9.5-9-2(b). Dr. Sharp did not waive his right to a
medical review panel merely by insisting upon compliance with the Act.
Issue Two: Trial Court's Jurisdiction
[3] Pamela next disputes the trial court's order directing the panel chairman to form two striking panels of
family practitioners. The court ordered the formation of new striking panels because the striking panels
previously submitted by the panel chairman contained only one qualified physician in contravention of
Indiana Code 16-9.5-9-3(b)(1). FN4 Pamela contends that the court interfered with the informal panel
formation process and exceeded its jurisdiction under Indiana Code 16-9.5-10-1. FN4. Indiana Code 169.5-9-3(b)(1) provides that if there is only one party defendant who is an individual, two of the panelists
selected must be members of the profession of which the defendant is a member, and if the individual
defendant is a health care professional who specializes in a limited area, two of the panelists selected
must be health care professionals who specialize in the same area as the defendant.
Sharp filed a motion with the trial court asking the court to issue an order compelling the formation of two
medical review striking panels composed of family practitioners. When confronted with such a motion, the
medical review panel chairman is required to appoint a striking panel consisting of three qualified health care
professionals for each party. IND.CODE 16-9.5-9-3(b)(3). Here, the medical review panel chairman had
appointed two striking panels; however, only one of the six health care professionals named to these panels
was a family practitioner like Sharp. The trial court granted Sharp's motion and ordered the panel chairman
to compose two new striking panels with a sufficient number of family practitioners, pursuant to Indiana
Code 16-9.5-9-3(b)(1) and (3).
Page 41 of 46
[4] The Act invests the courts with limited jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims until the medical
review panel has rendered its opinion. Surgical Associates, Inc. v. Zabolotney (1992), Ind.App., 599 N.E.2d
614, 615, trans. denied. The Act provides that any party to the proceeding may invoke the limited
jurisdiction of the court by paying the statutory filing fee to the clerk and filing a copy of the proposed
complaint and motion with the clerk. IND.CODE 16-9.5-10-2. A court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties to a proposed complaint filed with the Commissioner of Insurance may, upon
the filing of a copy of the proposed complaint and a written motion,
(1) preliminarily determine any affirmative defense or issue of law or fact that may be so determined
under the Indiana Rules of Procedure; or
(2) compel discovery in accordance with the Indiana Rules of Procedure; or (3) both. IND.CODE 169.5-10-1.
On December 3, 1990, Pamela invoked the jurisdiction of the Hancock Circuit Court by filing a motion for a
discovery order.FN5 Pamela*1276 does not dispute the composition of the panel as it was finally established
or allege any defect in the panel's operation. Pamela cannot show that the medical review panel deliberations
did not comply with the statutory requirements or that she was prejudiced in any way by the trial court's
order directing the panel chairman to form striking panels properly composed of a sufficient number of
family practitioners. See Jordan v. Deery (1993), Ind., 609 N.E.2d 1104, 1108-09.
FN5. The docket sheet entry states only that, Plaintiff files motion for discovery order. Record at 2. The
record does not disclose that Pamela filed a copy of the proposed complaint with the court. Since the court
considered the motion and other motions filed by the parties, and neither party addressed this issue, we shall
assume without deciding that the proposed complaint was before the court and that the court's jurisdiction
over the case was properly invoked. Pamela cites Griffith v. Jones (1992), Ind., 602 N.E.2d 107, for her
position, although Griffith is inapposite.
In Griffith, the trial court had instructed the medical review panel concerning the definition of terms and
phrases used in the Act, the evidence that the panel could consider in reaching its opinion and the form and
substance of its opinion. Id. at 109. Our supreme court held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction and
interfered with the informal operation of the medical review panel as contemplated by the legislature. Id.
However, in the present case, the panel had not yet been formed, and the trial court did not instruct the panel
or interfere in any manner with its operation. The court did not dictate to the panel concerning the content of
the panel's opinion, the manner in which the panel should arrive at its opinion, or the matters that the panel
could consider in arriving at its opinion. See Griffith, 602 N.E.2d at 110. Instead, the court merely acted to
facilitate selection of a panel by ordering compliance with the specific statutory requirements for panel
formation.
We conclude that it was permissible for the trial court to invoke its jurisdiction for this limited purpose under
Indiana Code 16-9.5-10-1. If the trial court in any way intruded upon the informality of the panel formation
process, it was harmless error.
Issue Three: Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Act
[5] Pamela's third claim is that the Medical Malpractice Act is unconstitutional because the panel selection
process is unworkable in a real life situation, although she concedes that the idea of the statute seems to
have been upheld as ... constitutional. Brief of Appellant at 14; see Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hospital, Inc.
(1980), 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585. Nevertheless, Pamela asserts that the deadlines, paperwork and other
dictates of the Act render it an impossible law and that the scheme of the Act should be held
unconstitutional, if not per se, then in its actual operation and effect.
Brief of Appellant at 14. The trial court rejected Pamela's argument, and we are bound by our supreme
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 42 of 46
Page 43 of 46
Appellee's Brief at 28. However, we need not address whether Dr. Hoffman's letter is proper evidentiary
material under Trial Rule 56(C) because we conclude that Dr. Woods' affidavit is, standing alone, sufficient
evidence to withstand Dr. Sharp's motion for summary judgment.
[12] Dr. Woods' affidavit contains the following statement before her signature: I affirm the truth of the
above statements. According to Dr. Sharp, Dr. Woods' affidavit was not properly verified because it was not
notarized. We must disagree.
[13][14] An affidavit has been defined as a written statement of fact which is sworn to as the truth before an
authorized officer. Jordan v. Deery (1993), Ind., 609 N.E.2d 1104, 1110. The chief test of the sufficiency of
an affidavit is its ability to serve as a predicate for a perjury prosecution. Id.
Affidavits in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must first be properly verified.
Trial Rule 11(B) provides:
When in connection with any civil or statutory proceeding it is required that any pleading, motion, petition,
supporting affidavit, or other document of any kind, be verified, or that an oath be taken, it shall be sufficient
is the subscriber simply affirms the truth of the matter to be verified by an affirmation or representation in
substantially the following language:
I (we) affirm, under penalties for perjury, that the foregoing representation(s) is (are) true. (Signed) __....
(emphasis added).
In Jordan, our supreme court held that a doctor's affidavit was sufficient to subject the doctor to prosecution
for making a false affidavit when it stated, Affiant ... being duly sworn upon her oath alleges and says: ...,
although the affiant did not swear that the statements she made were true. Jordan, 609 N.E.2d at 1109-10.
The court distinguished* 1278 Jordan from other cases involving statutory verification requirements. Id. at
1109-10.
It explained that there is no singular statutory rule regarding proper verification of an affidavit filed in
connection with summary judgment proceedings, and although Trial Rule 11 provides one method
for binding an affiant to his oath, compliance with its provisions is not required. Id. at 1110. We conclude
that Dr. Woods' words, I affirm the truth of the above statements, meets the chief test from Jordan that
the affidavit will subject her to a perjury prosecution if any of her statements are false.
FN6 Therefore, Dr. Woods' affidavit is properly verified.
FN6. Indiana's perjury statute provides that a person who makes a false, material statement under oath or
affirmation, knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, commits perjury, a Class D
felony. IND.CODE 35-44-2-1.
[15] We must next consider whether Dr. Woods' affidavit is substantively sufficient to create a genuine issue
of material fact on the issue of breach of the standard of care. Trial Rule 56(E) requires that supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Ind. Trial Rule 56(E). In addition, [s]worn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. Id. In a medical malpractice case, an opposing
affidavit submitted to establish an issue of fact on the standard of care issue must demonstrate the expert's
familiarity with the applicable standard of care, set out that standard of care and state that the treatment in
question fell below that standard. Oelling, 593 N.E.2d at 190; Ellis v. Smith (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d
826, 829. It is not enough to state the expert would have treated the patient differently. Oelling, 593 N.E.2d
at 191.
Dr. Woods' affidavit stated that she was a board certified family practice physician and that she had reviewed
the hematology report on James prepared by Hancock Memorial Hospital. Her opinion was
(1) that she found the white blood cell count, red blood cell count and platelet count were low;
(2) that she concluded a referral to a hematologist would be warranted and a consultation to determine
3 Am Jur. 2d, Sections 1 20
Page 44 of 46
prescribed by statute, with four possible opinions from which the panel could have selected. Pursuant to the
instructions on the form, three of the opinions were crossed out and one was selected, which read: The
evidence does not support the conclusion that the defendant or defendants failed to meet the applicable
standard of care charged in the complaint. The panel's opinion is silent on the issue of proximate cause.
The medical review panel opinion was the only expert opinion tendered by Dr. Sharp, and it is insufficient
to establish that no genuine issue of fact exists on the issue of proximate cause because it concerns only the
applicable standard of care. Accordingly, while Pamela, through Dr. Woods' affidavit, failed to present an
expert opinion that Dr. Sharp's negligence was the proximate cause of James' death, she was not required to
do so. Dr. Sharp, not Pamela, had the initial burden of negating the proximate cause element of Pamela's
claim.
Thus, the burden never shifted to Pamela. Pamela alleged in her complaint that Dr. Sharp's negligence was
the proximate cause of James' injuries, and she was entitled to rest on her pleadings on that issue. See
Whitten v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 570 N.E.2d 1353, 1359, trans. denied (unless
and until movant makes showing that there is a lack of a material factual issue, nonmoving party may rest
upon allegations of pleadings).
Therefore, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact remains on the standard of care issue. The
existence of a genuine issue of material fact on at least one element of Pamela's claim precludes the entry of
summary judgment in Dr. Sharp's favor. See Oelling, 593 N.E.2d at 1193.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to order compliance with the statutory procedures for formation
of a medical review panel, that Dr. Sharp did not waive his right *1280 to a medical review panel, and that
the Act is constitutional. However, we hold that summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sharp was error. A
genuine issue of material fact remains regarding whether Dr. Sharp breached the requisite standard of care
when he failed to refer James to a hematologist.
We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BAKER and RUCKER, JJ., concur. Ind.App. 1 Dist., 1994.
Hoskins v. Sharp 629 N.E.2d 1271
END OF DOCUMENT
Page 46 of 46